Equilibrium and cooperation in repeated hierarchical games

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференции

Выдержка

In the paper a two-level infinitely repeated hierarchical game with one player (center) C0 on the first level and S1...Sn subordinate players on the second is considered. On each stage of the game player C0 selects vector x=(x1....xn) from a given set X, in which each component represents vector of resources delivered by C0 to one of subordinate players, i.e. (formula presented). At the second level, Si i=1,2..,n, choose the controls (formula presented), where Yi(xi) depends upon the choice of player C0. In this game, a set of different Nash equilibrium also based on threat and punishment strategies is obtained. In one case, the center enforces special behavior of subordinate firms (vector of manufactured goods), threatening to deprive them of resources on the next steps if the subordinate firms refuse to implement the prescribed behavior. In another case, the subordinate firms can force the center to use a certain resource allocation threatening to stop production. Using different combinations of such behaviors on different stages of the game, we obtain a wide class of Nash equilibrium in the game under consideration. The cooperative version of the game is also considered. The conditions are derived under which the cooperative behavior can be supported by Nash Equilibrium or Strong Nash Equilibrium (Nash Equilibrium stable against deviations of coalitions).

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 18th International Conference, MOTOR 2019, Proceedings
РедакторыMichael Khachay, Panos Pardalos, Yury Kochetov
ИздательSpringer
Страницы685-696
Число страниц12
ISBN (печатное издание)9783030226282
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 янв 2019
Событие18th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research, MOTOR 2019 - Ekaterinburg, Российская Федерация
Продолжительность: 8 июл 201912 июл 2019

Серия публикаций

НазваниеLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Том11548 LNCS
ISSN (печатное издание)0302-9743
ISSN (электронное издание)1611-3349

Конференция

Конференция18th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research, MOTOR 2019
СтранаРоссийская Федерация
ГородEkaterinburg
Период8/07/1912/07/19

Отпечаток

Nash Equilibrium
Game
Resource allocation
Cooperative Behavior
Resources
Coalitions
Resource Allocation
Deviation
Choose
Business

Предметные области Scopus

  • Теоретические компьютерные науки
  • Компьютерные науки (все)

Цитировать

Petrosyan, L., & Pankratova, Y. (2019). Equilibrium and cooperation in repeated hierarchical games. В M. Khachay, P. Pardalos, & Y. Kochetov (Ред.), Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 18th International Conference, MOTOR 2019, Proceedings (стр. 685-696). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Том 11548 LNCS). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22629-9_48
Petrosyan, Leon ; Pankratova, Yaroslavna. / Equilibrium and cooperation in repeated hierarchical games. Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 18th International Conference, MOTOR 2019, Proceedings. редактор / Michael Khachay ; Panos Pardalos ; Yury Kochetov. Springer, 2019. стр. 685-696 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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Petrosyan, L & Pankratova, Y 2019, Equilibrium and cooperation in repeated hierarchical games. в M Khachay, P Pardalos & Y Kochetov (ред.), Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 18th International Conference, MOTOR 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), том. 11548 LNCS, Springer, стр. 685-696, Ekaterinburg, Российская Федерация, 8/07/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22629-9_48

Equilibrium and cooperation in repeated hierarchical games. / Petrosyan, Leon; Pankratova, Yaroslavna.

Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 18th International Conference, MOTOR 2019, Proceedings. ред. / Michael Khachay; Panos Pardalos; Yury Kochetov. Springer, 2019. стр. 685-696 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Том 11548 LNCS).

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференции

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Petrosyan L, Pankratova Y. Equilibrium and cooperation in repeated hierarchical games. В Khachay M, Pardalos P, Kochetov Y, редакторы, Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 18th International Conference, MOTOR 2019, Proceedings. Springer. 2019. стр. 685-696. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22629-9_48