Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

Выдержка

In this chapter, the optimization by cartels that restricts outputs to enhance their joint profit is examined. In particular, we consider oligopolies in which firms agree to form a cartel to restrain output and enhance their profits. Some firms have cost disadvantages that force them to become dormant partners. In Sect. 7.1 a dynamic oligopoly in which there are cost differentials among firms is presented. Pareto optimal output path, imputation schemes, profit sharing arrangements, and time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent solution are derived for a dormant firm cartel in Sect. 7.2. An illustration is shown in the following section. The case when the planning horizon becomes infinite is analyzed in Sect. 7.4, including an illustration with an explicit solution following in the subsequent section.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Подзаголовок основной публикацииFoundations and Applications
ИздательBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Страницы177-202
Число страниц26
Издание9780817682613
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 янв 2012

Серия публикаций

НазваниеStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
Номер9780817682613
ISSN (печатное издание)2363-8516
ISSN (электронное издание)2363-8524

Отпечаток

Profitability
Profit
Oligopoly
Output
Optimal Trajectory
Costs
Imputation
Infinite Horizon
Explicit Solution
Trajectories
Planning
Arrangement
Sharing
Path
Business
Cartel
Optimization

Предметные области Scopus

  • Статистика, теория вероятности и теория неопределенности
  • Теория вероятности и статистика
  • Прикладная математика

Цитировать

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2012). Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. В Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (9780817682613 ред., стр. 177-202). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; № 9780817682613). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7
Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613. ред. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 177-202 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; 9780817682613).
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Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2012, Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. в Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613 ред., Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, № 9780817682613, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, стр. 177-202. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7

Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613. ред. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2012. стр. 177-202 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; № 9780817682613).

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

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Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. В Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 9780817682613 ред. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2012. стр. 177-202. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; 9780817682613). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7