Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование


In this chapter, the optimization by cartels that restricts outputs to enhance their joint profit is examined. In particular, we consider oligopolies in which firms agree to form a cartel to restrain output and enhance their profits. Some firms have cost disadvantages that force them to become dormant partners. In Sect. 7.1 a dynamic oligopoly in which there are cost differentials among firms is presented. Pareto optimal output path, imputation schemes, profit sharing arrangements, and time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent solution are derived for a dormant firm cartel in Sect. 7.2. An illustration is shown in the following section. The case when the planning horizon becomes infinite is analyzed in Sect. 7.4, including an illustration with an explicit solution following in the subsequent section.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Подзаголовок основной публикацииFoundations and Applications
ИздательBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Число страниц26
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 янв 2012

Серия публикаций

НазваниеStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (печатное издание)2363-8516
ISSN (электронное издание)2363-8524

Предметные области Scopus

  • Статистика, теория вероятности и теория неопределенности
  • Теория вероятности и статистика
  • Прикладная математика

Fingerprint Подробные сведения о темах исследования «Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel». Вместе они формируют уникальный семантический отпечаток (fingerprint).