Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs

Leon A. Petrosyan, David W.K. Yeung

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

Выдержка

In many real-life scenarios, groups or nations with common interest form coalition blocs by agreement for mutual support and joint actions. This paper considers two levels of cooperation: cooperation among members within a coalition bloc and cooperation between the coalition blocs. Coalition blocs are formed by players with common interests to enhance their gains through cooperation. To increase their gains coalition blocs would negotiate to form a grand coalition. A grand coalition cooperation of the coalitional blocs is studied. The gains of each coalition are defined as components of the Shapley value. Dynamically consistent payoff distributions between coalitions and among players are derived for this double-level cooperation scheme. For definition of players’ gains inside each coalition the proportional solution is used.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Подзаголовок основной публикацииFoundations and Applications
ИздательBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Страницы209-230
Число страниц22
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 янв 2019

Серия публикаций

НазваниеStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (печатное издание)2363-8516
ISSN (электронное издание)2363-8524

Отпечаток

Dynamic Games
Coalitions
Dynamic games
Shapley Value
Directly proportional
Scenarios

Предметные области Scopus

  • Теория вероятности и статистика
  • Статистика, теория вероятности и теория неопределенности
  • Прикладная математика

Цитировать

Petrosyan, L. A., & Yeung, D. W. K. (2019). Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. В Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (стр. 209-230). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_11
Petrosyan, Leon A. ; Yeung, David W.K. / Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. стр. 209-230 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).
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Petrosyan, LA & Yeung, DWK 2019, Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. в Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, стр. 209-230. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_11

Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. / Petrosyan, Leon A.; Yeung, David W.K.

Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. стр. 209-230 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

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Petrosyan LA, Yeung DWK. Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. В Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2019. стр. 209-230. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_11