Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs

Leon A. Petrosyan; Georges Zaccour

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs

Leon A. Petrosyan, Georges Zaccour

Кафедра математической теории игр и статистических решений

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел

3 Цитирования (Scopus)

Аннотация

In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.

Язык оригинала	английский
Название основной публикации	Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory
Издатель	Springer Nature
Страницы	595-632
Число страниц	38
ISBN (электронное издание)	9783319443744
ISBN (печатное издание)	9783319443737
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12
Состояние	Опубликовано - 12 авг 2018

Предметные области Scopus

Математика (все)
Экономика, эконометрия, и финансы (все)
Бизнес, управление и бухгалтерский учет (все)

Доступ к документу

10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063059269&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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Виды деятельности

1 выступление с приглашенным докладом/лекцией

Cooperative differential games

Леон Аганесович Петросян (Докладчик)

13 дек 2018

Деятельность: выступление › выступление с приглашенным докладом/лекцией

Цитировать

Petrosyan, L. A., & Zaccour, G. (2018). Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. В Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory (стр. 595-632). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

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