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In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.
| Язык оригинала | английский |
|---|---|
| Название основной публикации | Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory |
| Издатель | Springer |
| Страницы | 595-632 |
| Число страниц | 38 |
| ISBN (электронное издание) | 9783319443744 |
| ISBN (печатное издание) | 9783319443737 |
| DOI | |
| Состояние | Опубликовано - 12 авг 2018 |
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Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. / Petrosyan, Leon A.; Zaccour, Georges.
Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer, 2018. стр. 595-632.Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › научная › рецензирование
TY - CHAP
T1 - Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs
AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.
AU - Zaccour, Georges
PY - 2018/8/12
Y1 - 2018/8/12
N2 - In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.
AB - In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.
KW - Cooperative differential games
KW - Core
KW - Imputation distribution procedure
KW - Shapley value
KW - Strong time consistency
KW - Time consistency
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063059269&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85063059269
SN - 9783319443737
SP - 595
EP - 632
BT - Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory
PB - Springer
ER -