Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs

Leon A. Petrosyan, Georges Zaccour

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

3 Цитирования (Scopus)

Выдержка

In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииHandbook of Dynamic Game Theory
ИздательSpringer
Страницы595-632
Число страниц38
ISBN (электронное издание)9783319443744
ISBN (печатное издание)9783319443737
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 12 авг 2018

Отпечаток

Cooperative Game
Differential Games
Time Consistency
Cooperative Control
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Differential games

Предметные области Scopus

  • Математика (все)
  • Экономика, эконометрия, и финансы (все)
  • Бизнес, управление и бухгалтерский учет (все)

Цитировать

Petrosyan, L. A., & Zaccour, G. (2018). Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. В Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory (стр. 595-632). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12
Petrosyan, Leon A. ; Zaccour, Georges. / Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer, 2018. стр. 595-632
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Petrosyan, LA & Zaccour, G 2018, Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. в Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer, стр. 595-632. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. / Petrosyan, Leon A.; Zaccour, Georges.

Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer, 2018. стр. 595-632.

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

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Petrosyan LA, Zaccour G. Cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs. В Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer. 2018. стр. 595-632 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12