Channel coordination in a HMMS-type supply chain with profit sharing contract

Imre Dobos, Barbara Gobsch, Nadezhda Pakhomova, Grigory Pishchulov, Knut Richter

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференции

Выдержка

We investigate a supply chain with a single supplier and a single manufacturer. The manufacturer is supposed to know the demand for the final product which is produced from a raw material ordered from the supplier just in time-i.e., the manufacturer holds no raw material inventory. Her costs consist of the linear purchasing cost, quadratic production cost and the final product quadratic holding costs. It is assumed that the market price of the final product is known as well, hence the sales of the manufacturer are known in advance. Her goal is to maximize her cumulated profits. The supplier's costs are the quadratic manufacturing and inventory holding costs; his goal is to maximize the revenues minus the relevant costs. We will not examine the bargaining process that determines the adequate price and quantity. The situation is modeled as a differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales price and the production quantity, while the manufacturer chooses a production plan that minimizes her costs, so maximizing the cumulated profits. The basic problem is a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) problem extended to linear purchasing costs. We examine two cases: the decentralized Nash-solution and a centralized Pareto-solution to optimize the behavior of the players of the game.

Язык оригиналаАнглийский
Название основной публикацииOPERATIONS RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS 2011
РедакторыD Klatte, HJ Luthi, K Schmedders
ИздательSpringer
Страницы445-450
Число страниц6
ISBN (печатное издание)978-3-642-29209-5
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 2012
СобытиеInternational Conference on Operations Research (OR) - Zurich, Швейцария
Продолжительность: 30 авг 20112 сен 2011

Серия публикаций

НазваниеOperations Research Proceedings
ИздательSPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN
ISSN (печатное издание)0721-5924

Конференция

КонференцияInternational Conference on Operations Research (OR)
СтранаШвейцария
ГородZurich
Период30/08/112/09/11

Цитировать

Dobos, I., Gobsch, B., Pakhomova, N., Pishchulov, G., & Richter, K. (2012). Channel coordination in a HMMS-type supply chain with profit sharing contract. В D. Klatte, HJ. Luthi, & K. Schmedders (Ред.), OPERATIONS RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS 2011 (стр. 445-450). (Operations Research Proceedings). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_71
Dobos, Imre ; Gobsch, Barbara ; Pakhomova, Nadezhda ; Pishchulov, Grigory ; Richter, Knut. / Channel coordination in a HMMS-type supply chain with profit sharing contract. OPERATIONS RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS 2011. редактор / D Klatte ; HJ Luthi ; K Schmedders. Springer, 2012. стр. 445-450 (Operations Research Proceedings).
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Dobos, I, Gobsch, B, Pakhomova, N, Pishchulov, G & Richter, K 2012, Channel coordination in a HMMS-type supply chain with profit sharing contract. в D Klatte, HJ Luthi & K Schmedders (ред.), OPERATIONS RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS 2011. Operations Research Proceedings, Springer, стр. 445-450, Zurich, Швейцария, 30/08/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_71

Channel coordination in a HMMS-type supply chain with profit sharing contract. / Dobos, Imre; Gobsch, Barbara; Pakhomova, Nadezhda; Pishchulov, Grigory; Richter, Knut.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS 2011. ред. / D Klatte; HJ Luthi; K Schmedders. Springer, 2012. стр. 445-450 (Operations Research Proceedings).

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференции

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N2 - We investigate a supply chain with a single supplier and a single manufacturer. The manufacturer is supposed to know the demand for the final product which is produced from a raw material ordered from the supplier just in time-i.e., the manufacturer holds no raw material inventory. Her costs consist of the linear purchasing cost, quadratic production cost and the final product quadratic holding costs. It is assumed that the market price of the final product is known as well, hence the sales of the manufacturer are known in advance. Her goal is to maximize her cumulated profits. The supplier's costs are the quadratic manufacturing and inventory holding costs; his goal is to maximize the revenues minus the relevant costs. We will not examine the bargaining process that determines the adequate price and quantity. The situation is modeled as a differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales price and the production quantity, while the manufacturer chooses a production plan that minimizes her costs, so maximizing the cumulated profits. The basic problem is a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) problem extended to linear purchasing costs. We examine two cases: the decentralized Nash-solution and a centralized Pareto-solution to optimize the behavior of the players of the game.

AB - We investigate a supply chain with a single supplier and a single manufacturer. The manufacturer is supposed to know the demand for the final product which is produced from a raw material ordered from the supplier just in time-i.e., the manufacturer holds no raw material inventory. Her costs consist of the linear purchasing cost, quadratic production cost and the final product quadratic holding costs. It is assumed that the market price of the final product is known as well, hence the sales of the manufacturer are known in advance. Her goal is to maximize her cumulated profits. The supplier's costs are the quadratic manufacturing and inventory holding costs; his goal is to maximize the revenues minus the relevant costs. We will not examine the bargaining process that determines the adequate price and quantity. The situation is modeled as a differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales price and the production quantity, while the manufacturer chooses a production plan that minimizes her costs, so maximizing the cumulated profits. The basic problem is a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) problem extended to linear purchasing costs. We examine two cases: the decentralized Nash-solution and a centralized Pareto-solution to optimize the behavior of the players of the game.

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Dobos I, Gobsch B, Pakhomova N, Pishchulov G, Richter K. Channel coordination in a HMMS-type supply chain with profit sharing contract. В Klatte D, Luthi HJ, Schmedders K, редакторы, OPERATIONS RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS 2011. Springer. 2012. стр. 445-450. (Operations Research Proceedings). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_71