A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

Аннотация

We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility. We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииFrontiers of Dynamic Games
РедакторыLeon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
Место публикацииCham
ИздательBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Страницы85-102
ISBN (электронное издание)9783030236991
ISBN (печатное издание)9783030236984
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 2019

Серия публикаций

НазваниеStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (печатное издание)2363-8516
ISSN (электронное издание)2363-8524

Предметные области Scopus

  • Теория вероятности и статистика
  • Статистика, теория вероятности и теория неопределенности
  • Прикладная математика

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  • Цитировать

    Kuzyutin, D., Pankratova, Y., & Svetlov, R. (2019). A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. В L. A. Petrosyan, V. V. Mazalov, & N. A. Zenkevich (Ред.), Frontiers of Dynamic Games (стр. 85-102). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6