A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

Выдержка

We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility. We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Подзаголовок основной публикацииFoundations and Applications
ИздательBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Страницы85-102
Число страниц18
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 янв 2019

Серия публикаций

НазваниеStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (печатное издание)2363-8516
ISSN (электронное издание)2363-8524

Отпечаток

Sustainable development
Multicriteria Games
Time Consistency
Trajectories
Game
Shapley Value
Imputation
Vector-valued Functions
Sustainability
Incentives
Characteristic Function
Pareto
Compatibility
Immediately
Schedule
Trajectory
Imply
Concepts
Incremental
Payment

Предметные области Scopus

  • Теория вероятности и статистика
  • Статистика, теория вероятности и теория неопределенности
  • Прикладная математика

Цитировать

Kuzyutin, D., Pankratova, Y., & Svetlov, R. (2019). A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. В Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (стр. 85-102). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6
Kuzyutin, Denis ; Pankratova, Yaroslavna ; Svetlov, Roman. / A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. стр. 85-102 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).
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Kuzyutin, D, Pankratova, Y & Svetlov, R 2019, A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. в Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, стр. 85-102. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6

A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. / Kuzyutin, Denis; Pankratova, Yaroslavna; Svetlov, Roman.

Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. стр. 85-102 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

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Kuzyutin D, Pankratova Y, Svetlov R. A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. В Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2019. стр. 85-102. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6