Индивидуальная устойчивость коалиционных структур в играх трех лиц

Результат исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатья

Аннотация

Cooperative games with coalition structures are considered and a principle of coalition structure individual stability with respect to some cooperative solution concepts is determined. In comparison with the paper (Sedakov et al., 2013), we consider the opportunity of the players to block the deviation of a player in case their payoffs decrease with the deviation. We prove the existence of an individually stable coalition structure with respect to the Shapley and equal surplus division values for the case of three-person games according to the new definition of a stable coalition structure.
Переведенное названиеIndividual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
Язык оригиналарусский
Страницы (с-по)73-95
Число страниц23
ЖурналМАТЕМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ ИГР И ЕЕ ПРИЛОЖЕНИЯ
Том11
Номер выпуска1
СостояниеОпубликовано - 2019

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