

Ministry of Science and Education
L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University

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EURASIA-LATIN AMERICA

STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

MONOGRAPH



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STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT AND COMPARATIVE
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MONOGRAPH

Astana 2018

UDC 339
LBC 65.9

Reviewers

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PhD in Politics – Sheryazdanova K.G.*

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Ariel González Levaggi, Akбота Zholdasbekova, Nilüfer Narlı **Eurasia-Latin America
Strategic Engagement and Comparative Perspectives in Politics and Economics:**
monograph / - Astana: Kultegin, 2018 170 p.

ISBN 978-601-7318-71-0

The monograph “Eurasia-Latin America: Strategic Engagement and Comparative Perspectives in Politics and Economics”. This collective effort presents the case of an increasing strategic engagement between the two regions by presenting convergences and divergences, similarities and differences of specific economic, political and strategic developments. It emphasizes the increasing relationships between Eurasia and Latin America nations as well as analyze the main similarities and problems in comparative perspective from political economy to social and cultural dynamics.

UDC 339
LBC 65.9

ISBN 978-601-7318-71-0

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Prologue

The international system has become increasingly multipolar after the global financial crisis and the strategic and economical growing of emerging powers such as China, India and Pakistan, or the reemergence of 'old' great powers like the return of the Russian Federation to the higher league of international politics.

In this context, one of the critical changes in world politics is the emergence of Eurasia as a geopolitical space in which the key cooperative and conflictive dynamics are converging into a new 'great game'. These new environment is characterized by the non-linear patterns of tension and engagement between the most relevants regional powers, and the existence of intentions to interfere in the regional space by extra-regional powers. Increasing interconnectivity of regional infrastructure driven by the Chinese-led projects of the New Silk Road 'One Belt, One Road' and the Asian Development Bank, regional integrative initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union are coexisting next to 'cold regional wars' in the Middle East, the Black Sea and the East Asia. The issue of the creation of an eurasian 'axis' or 'concert' grounded on the convergence of national vision against third parties in the region has become one of the most debated topics among regional and global experts.

On the other side of the world, Latin America has benefited in this new environment since the scope and ability to maneuver has expanded enabling to expand global network to strength the developmental trayectory towards social and economic welfare. Despite domestic and economic problems in Brazil, the regional insignia of the international projection of Latin America during 2000s, the region strengthened its global presence, diversified the external market towards the Pacific, and toughen up the sources of regional peace by developing new regional institutions such as the Union of South American Nations and the South American Defence Council.

The key challenge for scholars is to think about the consequences of this global changes both regionally and interregionally. The impact of this new international scenario in Latin America and Eurasia has varied from country to country but there are positive prospect of cooperation and mutual learning from different experiences has been growing in the last years. Latin America is facing an important opportunity to expand its global networks while the Eurasian countries look Latin America as an attractive land to learn from development experiences and to expand its political and economic interests.

Based on the latest developments, a group of scholars, experts and graduate students, promoted the organization and realization of the first Eurasia-Latin America International Conference (ELAIC 2016), which took placed at the Bahçeşehir University in Istanbul (Turkey) on on 26-27 March, 2016. The conference had the co-sponsorship of the Eurasia Department of the Institute of International Relations, National University of La Plata (Argentina) and the Department of International Relations of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Kazakhstan).

The result of an important section of the discussions in that conference are reflected in the book “Eurasia-Latin America: Strategic Engagement and Comparative Perspectives in Politics and Economics”. This collective effort presents the case of an increasing strategic engagement between the two regions by presenting convergences and divergences, similarities and differences of specific economic, political and strategic developments. It emphasizes the increasing relationships between Eurasia and Latin America nations as well as analyze the main similarities and problems in comparative perspective from political economy to social and cultural dynamics.

This era of global transformations and changing engagements, requires additional efforts for academics and scholars to present, analyze and explain these global phenomena since the political, economic and social forces has changed significantly from the previous times. This work is the first attempt to bring Eurasia and Latin America from an interregional perspective. We hope it is only the first step.

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Buenos Aires, 21st July 2018

Introduction

The beginning of the 21st century in international political life is characterized by the trends in the transformation of the existing system of international relations, the formation of a multipolar world, the establishment of a dialogue between countries of different regions. The Eurasia and Latin America are not exception, developing a strategic partnership in various fields of politics and economics. Increasingly important is the establishment of cooperation between the countries of the two regions. The prospect of movement in this direction is to develop new formats for international communication between states.

Raising relations to a strategic level, the parties assume that the basis of their enhanced political and economic cooperation is the proximity (or match) of the basic national interests. The partners have similar and interrelated tasks, for which a critical international climate, stable and calm situation in the world is critically needed.

Strategic partnership implies simultaneous (and parallel) effective interaction not in one or two, but in several priority areas. In modern conditions, the strategic partnership of Eurasia-Latin America is developed in three mutually complementary formats: global, regional (multilateral) and bilateral.

At the global level the parties are interested in the improvement and efficiency of the existing world order in the fields of security, economic development, credit and financial stabilization of commodity, food and energy markets. The main global platforms for political and diplomatic cooperation between Eurasian and LAC countries are the UN bodies and the G-20 group, which includes major giants of both continent as Russia, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.

Regarding the regional level, its importance is determined by centripetal integration processes, which have been developing for decades in the Latin American space. Therefore, Eurasia takes full account of this important trend and is taking concrete steps to structure relations with the integration groups in Latin America.

Fundamentally new prospects for cooperation were opened after the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) began functioning on January 1, 2015, which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. For example, there were conditions for working out, in practical terms, questions about free trade between the EEU and the regional integration groups of the Latin American states. In addition, the issue of cooperation between the EEU and the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercado Comun del Sur, Mercosur), which includes Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Contacts at the bilateral level are in high intensity. Strategic partnership is a complex phenomenon, since it covers practically all key spheres of cooperation and is not of a short-term, but sustainable and long-term nature. The strength of this type of interstate relations is determined, first of all, by the willingness of the parties to take into account mutual interests and to promote their promotion, as well as the existence of effective mechanisms for interaction.

Forming relations of strategic partnership is an integral part of the modern megastrategy aimed at strengthening the economic and political positions of Eurasia and Latin America in the global world, building a multi-level system of geopolitical and geo-economic influence.

The work «Eurasia-Latin America. Strategic Engagement and Comparative Perspectives in Politics and Economics» prepared by the attendance of 12 scientists from leading research and educational institutions from Kazakhstan, Russia, Argentina, Iran, Turkey, who are recognized experts in the field of international relations, economics, political science.

The monograph is distinguished by a strictly scientific and at the same time accessible presentation of the material. The multinational team of authors made an attempt to analyze the processes on Eurasia and Latin America in a complex way. It can be concluded that the work is a successful attempt to implement this complex task. The participation of a number of leading foreign experts engaged in this area strengthens the theoretical and practical significance of the work, since it presents an alternative view (inside view) on the topical issues of the two strategic important regions of the world.

The chapters presented in this monograph covers areas of cooperation between states of two regions, the elaboration of possible formats for building constructive interregional dialogue, a review of the latest trends in the Latin American and Eurasian perspective.

Thus if, in Chapter 1 “Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Context of Latin American Integration” offered a vision on how the Russia’s foreign policy towards the regional integrational groups in Latin America is shaped, chapter 2 “Iran's Position in the Intra-Regional Economic Cooperation between the Latin America and the Eurasia regions: a neo-regionalist approach” perform the role that Iran play, as the neighboring country of the Eurasian region that at the same time has a close politico-economic cooperation with the Latin American countries. Chapters 3 “Regional Integration in Central Eurasia and Ibero-America: a comparative analysis” and 11 “Eurasian Economic Union and the Latin America: Framework of the Cooperation” dedicated to a comparative analysis of integration processes in Eurasia and Latin America with possible options for borrowing a positive experience of integration, as well as potential forms of interstate cooperation in the framework of integration projects. While in Chapters 4 “Coup Memory, Transitional Justice and Democracy in Turkey and Latin America”, 7 “A Comparative Analysis on the Role of Cooperation Agencies in Turkish and Brazilian Public Diplomacy”, 8 “Turkey - Mexico Friendship Agreement (May 25th, 1927): A perspective from the Mexican Foreign Ministry Archives”, 9 “Turkey-Uruguay Relations: Opportunities for Strategical Cooperation” and 10 “Dimensions of the Cultural and Academic Cooperation between Turkey and Latin America” various questions in comparative characteristics with Turkey are presented.

These collective efforts are an example of enhancing the strategic interaction between the two regions by presenting convergences and divergences, similarities and differences in specific economic, political and strategic developments. It emphasizes the growing relations between the countries of Eurasia and Latin America, and also analyzes the main similarities and problems in a comparative perspective from political economy to social and cultural dynamics.

This work is the first attempt to bring Eurasia and Latin America from an interregional perspective. Undoubtedly, the monograph is an important analytical material that is in demand in modern science. A comparative study of two important regions on the world scene makes it possible to better understand the features of the modern system of international relations, to analyze the close interconnection of the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries in the modern world, to make forecasts about the development of international regional relations in the 21st century.

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Chapter 1

Russia's Foreign Policy in the Context of Latin American Integration

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This paper offers a vision on how the Russia's foreign policy towards the regional integrational groups in Latin America is shaped. The authors have attempted to demonstrate the change in Russia's attitude to major political and economic integration blocks in the region. The paper, based on fundamental Russia's foreign policy documents and official statements, analyse if the economic perspectives are resulting in strengthening of political ties and vice-versa. A special attention is given to forms of Russia's ties with regional blocks. The authors conclude that political contacts still exceed economic cooperation in respect of Latin American region. While Russian diplomacy introduce new models of interaction with multilateral institutions, some old problems remains unsolved.

Introduction

The regionalization of economic and political processes has become a determining factor of regional development in Latin America. It has definitely contributed to the strengthening of the international profile of the region. As the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereinafter the Concept of 2013) states:

‘regional integration becomes an effective means to increase competitiveness of the participating states. Networks and associations, trade pacts and other economic agreements, as well as regional reserve currencies serve as instruments to enhance security and financial and economic stability’ (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013).

The Concept of long-term socio-economic development of Russia until 2020 underlines that Latin American states develop progressively and attract Russia in terms of economic cooperation. It also defines several directions for surge in cooperation including development of cooperation with regional integration organizations, primarily with the markets of the countries of the Southern Common Market and the Andean Community (Concept of long-term socio-economic development of Russia until 2020, 2008). Five years later the Concept of 2013 states that:

‘Russia will continue to comprehensively strengthen relations with the Latin American and Caribbean countries, given the region's growing role in world affairs.’... ‘Russia will seek to consolidate its ties with Latin American partners at international and regional forums, expand cooperation with multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, in particular with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the Southern Common Market’ (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013).

Comparing the two documents one can notice the change in declared priority partners that reflects the evolution of the Russian foreign policy. The idea was not only in replacement of

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Andean Community with CELAC, but in the shift from limited economic cooperation through regional economic groups to comprehensive economic cooperation augmented by multilateral political interactions.

The Russian Federation, as well as countries of Latin America, seeks fair, mutually beneficial relations build on principles of multipolarity, respect for international law, strengthening the central role of the UN an ensuring sustainable development. And as Russian President Vladimir Putin (2014) states, ‘Today, cooperation with Latin American states is one of the key and very promising lines of Russia’s foreign policy’.

There is no secret that the Russian Federation maintain relations with all independent states in the Western Hemisphere on bilateral basis. Some Latin American countries are good partners of Russia. Although these countries can’t be considered as natural partners of the Russian Federation, there is no doubt that in terms of political and economic advisability, especially in the contemporarily political context of Russia’s relations with European and some other trading partners, Latin America to some extent could ‘replace’ Russian trade partners advocated economic sanctions. Not least because Russia and some regional countries have positive history of bilateral relations traced back to the XXth century. One more favourable fact ensuring an effective Russian-Latin American cooperation is the absence of serious geopolitical controversies.

Structurally the forms of Russian foreign policy in the region in general we can define several types of cooperation with Latin American states:

- Direct bilateral cooperation;
- Cooperation in the framework of international organizations (e.g. the UN, WTO);
- Cooperation in country-bloc format;
- Cooperation in bloc-bloc format.

Since the economic integration has become a driven force of economic development on regional and global level; and the political integration has resulted in the formation of a new multilevel hierarchical world system – where the macro-region is becoming a unit of the analysis as well as a centre of power – the study of cooperation in country-bloc and bloc-bloc format is becoming of a key importance.

Since the collapse of the USSR Russia has distanced itself from a number of world processes, including regional affairs in Latin America, for some period. However, the 2000s had a brand new start for Russia’s foreign policy in general, and particularly in Latin America.

Russia has observed the processes of regional economic and political integration in Latin America with interest (See Table 1). MERCOSUR (*Mercado Común del Sur*) was called ‘the most promising regional grouping in South America’ (Russian Foreign Ministry 2009). In 2006 Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a mechanism for political dialogue and cooperation with MERCOSUR. The memorandum laid the foundation for further cooperation. In 2010, an agreement was signed between the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the MERCOSUR Parliament to expand inter-parliamentary cooperation and the development of mutually beneficial relations between Russia and the largest trade union in South America

(Yakovleva, 2014). An agreement on cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and MERCOSUR is under discussion. And it is reported to be at the final stage (TASS 2015).

Table 1. Russia's relations with some political and economic blocs in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Regional Bloc	Russia's Attitude
Andean Community of Nations (CAN)	Mechanism for Political Dialogue and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Andean Community, 2001.
ACS	Permanent Observer, 1997.
ALADI	Permanent Observer, 1993.
ALBA	No institutional relations. Informal contacts.
Association of Latin American Peacekeeping Training Centres (ALCOPAZ)	Permanent Observer, 2009.
Caricom	Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Mechanism for Political Dialogue and Cooperation between Russia and CARICOM, 2010.
CELAC	Permanent Mechanism for Political Dialogue and Cooperation between Russia and CELAC, 2015.
Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC)	Permanent Observer, 2005.
MERCOSUR	Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Creation of the Mechanism of Political Dialogue and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Member States and Associate Member States of MERCOSUR, 2006.
OAS	Permanent Observer, 1992.
Organization of Ibero-American States	Memorandum of Cooperation between the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation and the Secretary-General of the Organization of Ibero-American States, 2007.
Pacific Alliance	No institutional relations. Russia considers the expediency of institutional relations.
SICA	The intention to start the process of joining SICA as an extra-regional observer is under consideration, 2015.
UNASUR	A memorandum on cooperation is under discussion. Also Russia has manifested its interest in cooperation with South American Defence Council.

Source: prepared by the author.

Russian interest to Latin America has become a tendency since 2008, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev visited Latin America upgrading ties with a continent.

It was 2008 when Russia articulated its persistent interest to Latin American integration groups for the first time. N. Patrushev stated that Russia would like to be a permanent observer at the South American Defence Council, which is a part to UNASUR (*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*). President Dmitry Medvedev also expressed Russian interest in strengthening relations with the group ALBA (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*). Medvedev underlined primarily the prospects of economic and political cooperation (El Economista 2015).

Russian interest to ALBA traces back to the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia that took place in 2008. Nicaragua was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And this fact made Russia expect the other ALBA countries to follow the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan examples. It did not happen. Then it was stated by the Russian officials that ‘the Russian relationships with ALBA has been pragmatic and without an ideological component’ (Rouvinsky, 2015, p. 311). However, the ‘pragmatism’ of the relations should be questioned, since Russia had abandoned its plans to seek associate member status with ALBA. As Vladimir Rouvinsky points out, ALBA doesn’t form part of current Russian foreign policy design (Rouvinsky, 2015, p. 315). In fact, left socialist orientation of ALBA is far from Russia’s political discourse. Russian anti-Americanism doesn’t convert into socialist rhetoric.

UNASUR – is another Latin American group that attracts Russian Foreign Ministry. Russia states its readiness ‘to develop relations with the bloc to the extent that the countries belonging to him, ready to establish links with extra-regional countries, including Russia’ (Kommersant.ru 2014). Russia participates in the meetings of Council of South American Defence, as far as it accords with its interest in the sphere of security cooperation. UNASUR activities on regional conflict resolution (especially Venezuelan case) meet with strong support from Russia. There are perspectives for Russia-UNASUR cooperation that could be complimentary to the bilateral relations with member-states. However, there are no real projects of region-wide level. Russia could participate in different initiatives such as the regional railway or energy facilities construction. For both, Moscow and UNASUR, such cooperation could be efficient in terms of diversification of partners.

In December 2014 it was announced that the Russian Foreign Ministry and the General Secretariat of UNASUR are considering the possibility of signing a memorandum of cooperation. The Russian interest in being an observer within the South American Defence Council (*Consejo de defensa suramericano*) – a mechanism aimed to promote security and defence cooperation among UNASUR member-states – was declared in 2009. However, yet there are no any details on the progress in the field.

Since July 2014, when the first BRICS-UNASUR summit took place in Brazil, another opportunity for interaction with UNASUR has emerged. Work in a new format is reported to be promising. Despite the uncertainty of applied results in the future, the new channel should be considered in several reasons. First of all, the BRICS-UNASUR summit emphasizes the importance of both structures for the development of modern world. Secondly, such non-binding format is more flexible, it facilitates the promotion of frank dialogue of the highest level and exchange of views on the main challenges of the modern world. As Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro stated, a special commission on the presidential level is to be created for control the work in the BRICS-UNASUR format. According to Maduro it would give

‘continuity to the alliance in the fields of economics, finances, culture and politics’ (AVN 2014).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov underlines Russian interest in taking part in regular political dialogue with integration institutions in Latin America. It is true for Russia-CELAC (*Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños*) contacts, which develop persistently. In 2012, Russia welcomed the establishment of CELAC, which was considered as ‘a promising process, which helps to harmonize the development of the integration of Latin America in some areas’ (Russian Foreign Ministry 2014). In 2013, an agreement on the establishment of a mechanism for political dialogue and cooperation between Russia and CELAC was reached (Russian Foreign Ministry 2014). However, the joint statement on the establishment of a Permanent Mechanism for Political Dialogue and Cooperation between Russia and CELAC followed only two years later, in 2015 (Russian Foreign Ministry 2015). The mechanism will support the development of our relations with integration organizations in the region. The joint action plan of Russia-CELAC cooperation is expected to be agreed at the end of 2016.

Russia-CELAC mechanism, as well as BRICS-UNASUR format, is a useful tool for both sides while the summits facilitating free exchange of opinions, as well as general coordination of processes of bi-regional interactions, without any binding obligations. They can be also considered as an alternative to groups dominated by the USA and its Western allies, often applying double standards.

Moscow is consistently strengthening its ties with other existing regional integration organizations. Russia is expected to get an observer status within SICA (*Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana*). SICA, in its turn, shows interest in expanding cooperation with Russia in the field of security, the fight against climate change on the planet, as well as trade. Russia cooperates with the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Caricom (Caribbean Community). Russia has an observer status with the ALADI (*Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración*) and ACS (Association of the Caribbean States). Both groups are in charge with issues of trade cooperation.

For pragmatic reason Moscow maintains relations with Organization of American States (OAS). However, the accents of Russian foreign policy were shifted to the CELAC – a promising truly Latin American body with underlined political agenda, while the OAS is considered as an outdated institution.

Moscow tends to develop its cooperation with Latin America by all available means. Russia maintain inter-parliamentary dialogue between the Russian Federation and Latin America. For instance, based on the Agreement on Cooperation between the Russian Parliament, and PARLATINO, and is also have the experience of inter-parliamentary dialogue in a multilateral format, intend to develop existing relationships. We are interested in PARLATINO experience in such areas as a model legislation – a topic relevant for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); the rotation policy of elective offices and the formation of a parliamentary system; use in the parliament of modern information technologies. Also the establishment of a permanent format of cooperation between Russian and Latin American members of parliament as a mechanism for dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of issues of international and bilateral agenda is considered.

Quite a number of intergovernmental commissions between Russia and 12 Latin American states exists (See Table 2). It is not less than 15 Russian-Cuban intergovernmental commissions

are in function. By comparison, Russia has 24 intergovernmental commissions with China, 5 – with Germany, 1 – with the USA, and 1 – with Belarus. The geography, scope and spheres of the dialogue demonstrate the priorities of Russian cooperation with the region. On the basis of the Table 2 one can draw a following conclusion: Russia seek profound economic and political cooperation aimed at persistent positive growth of trade and interregional mutually profitable partnership. The energy sector, as well as trade and industry, is the main focus for the Russian-Latin American cooperation. The contacts in the sphere of culture and education develop steadily.

Table 2. Russia-Latin America intergovernmental commissions.

Argentina
1. Russian-Argentine Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation
2. Working Group on Trade, Economic and Investment cooperation
3. Working Group on Energy Cooperation
4. Working Group on Educational, Scientific and Technical Cooperation
5. Working Group on Agricultural Cooperation
Bolivia
1. Russian-Bolivian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Cooperation
Brazil
1. Russian-Brazilian High-Level Commission on Cooperation
2. Russian-Brazilian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation
3. Working Group on Trade, Economic and Industrial Cooperation
4. Working Group on Investment Cooperation
5. Working Group on Cooperation in Innovations
6. Working Group for Financial and Banking Cooperation
7. Working Group on Harmonization of Statistics
8. Working Group on Science, Technology and Education Cooperation
9. Working Group on Energy Cooperation and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
10. Working Group on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space
11. Working Group on Military Technical Cooperation
12. Working Group on Cooperation in Culture and Sports
13. Russian-Brazilian Agricultural Committee
Chile
1. Russian-Chilean Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation
2. Working Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation
3. Working Group on Science, Technology and Education Cooperation
4. Working Group on Agricultural Cooperation
Colombia
1. Russian-Colombian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation
2. Working Group on Trade, Economic and Investment cooperation

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Working Group on Fuel and Energy Industry Cooperation 4. Working Group on Science, Technology and Education Cooperation 5. Working Group on Military Technical Cooperation
Cuba
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation 2. Working Group on Trade, Economic Cooperation and Priority Projects 3. Working Group on Transportation Cooperation 4. Working Group on Energy Cooperation 5. Working Group on Industrial Cooperation 6. Working Group on Custom Affairs 7. Working Group on Military Technical Cooperation 8. Working Group on the Nickel Industry 9. Working Group on Finance 10. Working Group on Foreign Policy Cooperation 11. Working Group on Culture, Tourism and Sports Cooperation 12. Working Group on Education Cooperation 13. Working Group on Agricultural Cooperation 14. Working Group on Cooperation in spheres of IT and telecom 15. Working Group on Health-Care Cooperation
Ecuador
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian-Ecuadorian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation 2. Working Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation 3. Working Group on Agricultural and Fishery Cooperation 4. Working Group on Cooperation in Strategic Sectors
Mexico
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian-Mexican Combined Commission on Economic, Trade, Research and Technology Cooperation and Sea Navigation
Nicaragua
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian-Nicaraguan Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation 2. Working Group on Industrial Cooperation and Pharmaceuticals 3. Working Group on Transportation and Transport Infrastructure 4. Working Group on Agricultural and Fishery Cooperation 5. Working Group on Military Technical Cooperation 6. Working Group on Education Cooperation
Peru
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian-Peruvian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Fishery 2. Working Group on Trade, Investments and Industry Cooperation 3. Working Group on High-Tech Cooperation 4. Working Group on Agricultural and Fishery Cooperation
Uruguay

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian-Uruguayan Combined Commission on Promotion of Trade and Economic Relations 2. Working Group on Trade, Economic and Investments Cooperation 3. Working Group on Agricultural and Fishery Cooperation and Veterinary and Phytosanitary Measures
Venezuela
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russia-Venezuela High Level Intergovernmental Commission 2. Sub-commission on Trade and Industry Cooperation 3. Sub-commission on Energy Cooperation 4. Sub-commission on Cooperation in Finance 5. Sub-commission on Transportation Cooperation 6. Sub-commission on Trade and Science Cooperation 7. Sub-commission on Agricultural Cooperation 8. Sub-commission on Culture Cooperation 9. Sub-commission on Cooperation for Prevention and Liquidation of Emergency Situations 10. Sub-commission on Housing Development 11. Sub-commission on Military Technical Cooperation

Source: Ministry of the economic development of the Russian Federation (<http://www.ved.gov.ru>).

Since 2011 in Latin America a new integration bloc has emerged known as the Pacific Alliance (PA) aimed at promotion of integration of economics, as well as at strengthening ties with the world, particularly with the Asia-Pacific region (ATR). Within the shortest time period several dozens of world states have gained an observer status in the PA. And it does not come as a big surprise. The PA is expected to grow 3,1% and 4,5% in 2017 and 2018, respectively (Andina 2016).

The potential for expansion of economic relations between Russia and the Pacific Alliance exists in trade and investments, especially in energy, oil and gas, communications, transport, infrastructure, science and technology spheres. Other areas of possible cooperation are tourism, biofuels, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, development and support of academic and student exchanges. It seems that Russia should be more decisive in respect of that regional group. Firstly, according to many experts, the Pacific Alliance is the most dynamic union in Latin America. Secondly, it includes major economies of the region – Mexico, Chile and Peru – with whom Russia is successfully expanding its cooperation. And thirdly, in the context of slight alteration of Russia’s foreign vector to the Asia-Pacific region, the Pacific Alliance may become for Moscow a ‘window’ to Latin America from the Pacific. The development of economic relations with the countries of the Pacific Alliance can also contribute to development of the eastern regions of Russia. However, the advisability of gaining an observer status in the PA is under consideration.

Available WTO statistics on growth rates (See Table 3) demonstrates that Latin American growing economies are very promising partners for Russia. Therefore, Moscow is considering the possibility to promote bi-regional relations through Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), established in 2012. Moscow undertook a commitment on conducting trade negotiation through that governing body of the Eurasian Economic Union. After its establishment, the EEC began

dialogues with almost all Latin American countries, offering the idea of memorandums on behalf of the Commission with the governments of these states. In 2015 such documents were signed with Chile and Peru. The same document is expected to be signed with Mexico in 2016 (RIA Novosti 2015).

Table 3. Gross domestic product ranking, 2014.

Ranking	Economy	GDP (millions of US dollars)	World GDP, %	LAC GDP, %
7	Brazil	2 346 076	3	38,76
10	Russian Federation	1 860 598	2,39	–
15	Mexico	1 294 690	1,66	21,39
24	Argentina	537 660	0,69	8,88
31	Venezuela, BR	381 286	0,49	6,30
32	Colombia	377 740	0,49	6,24
42	Chile	258 062	0,33	4,26
52	Peru	202 596	0,26	3,35
	World	77 845 107	100	–
	LAC*	6 052 611	7,78	100
	MERCOSUR**	3 353 374	4,31	55,40
	PA**	2 133 087	2,74	35,24
	CAN**	714 249	0,92	11,80
	CACM**	164 734	0,21	2,72
	Caricom**	80 001	0,1	1,32

Source: WTO.org (<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>). * The sum of GDF of 33 Latin American and Caribbean states, according to the WTO data. ** Calculated on the basis of WTO data.

On November 2014 the delegation of the EEC and the delegation of MERCOSUR held consultations on draft cooperation instrument on trade and economic issues. Both sides have agreed that there is a significant potential to strengthen cooperation between both regional blocks. It is reported that the memorandum of cooperation is to be agreed in the nearest future. According to the head of Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Latin America Russia, Aleksandr Schetin, a cooperation agreement is expected to be signed in 2016. The pending agreement will become the first document on the EEU's cooperation with an economic bloc outside Eurasia (Sputnik 2015). Promotion of EEU's cooperation with other integration associations, including EU, ASEAN, Pacific Alliance, etc. facilitates the convergence of integration processes between the Eurasia, ATR and Euro-Atlantic region.

However, despite the positive rhetoric one should not be misguided by the manifested optimism. As known, the free trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the EU has been discussed since mid-90s, although the EU is the largest trade partner of MERCOSUR.

Argentinian President Mauricio Macri have called to modernize and accelerate the efforts to sign the trade deal with Europe. ‘A trade deal between MERCOSUR and the European Union [should be] a priority,’ he said (Mercopress 2015). As far as it were Argentinian protective measures to be considered the main obstacle to reaching the agreement, it is very likely that the parties will advance.

New directions of Argentinian foreign policy toward regional integration have also been formulated. Since the establishment of the PA different experts have stated some antitheses between the two groups. However, the Argentinian and Chilean Ministries for Foreign Relations agreed to promote the dialogue between the PA and MERCOSUR (Sputnik 2016).

The change in the Argentinian priorities may obstruct the cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and MERCOSUR. As well as political difficulties within MERCOSUR, related to Venezuela crisis, may postpone extra-regional deals.

In any case Latin American integration successes are inconsequent. There are enough economic and political difficulties within the national borders of Latin American states, as well as unresolved interstate controversies. Russia should take into consideration the fact that the USA is an important economic partner for Latin America, especially for Central America and the Caribbean; the Latin American-Chinese trade volume is growing, while the trade potential of Russian-Latin American cooperation has not yet been realized.

The current trade between Russia and Latin American states is not significant (See Table 4 and Table 5) and the product range remain quite narrow. This fact doesn’t contribute to the increased interest in the discussion of a free trade agreement.

Table 4. Bilateral trade between the Russian Federation (RF) and some regional groups in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

	2005				2015			
	Import from RF, value in US dollars thousand	Share in Russian export, %	Export to RF, value in US dollars thousand	Share in Russian import, %	Import from RF, value in US dollars thousand	Share in Russian export, %	Export to RF, value in US dollars thousand	Share in Russian import, %
MERCOSUR	1 209 367	0,5	3 776 492	3,8	2 762 205	0,8	4 143 036	2,3
CAN	249 354	0,1	415 794	0,4	789 713	0,2	1 343 848	0,7
Caricom	12 506	0,005	21 748	0,02	353 667	0,1	119 908	0,06
CACM (integrated in SICA)	242 089	0,1	61 935	0,06	180 438	0,05	97 250	0,05

PA	–				1 802 701	0,5	1 447 238	0,8
LAC (total)	5 239 715	2,1	4 510 500	4,5	6 010 123	1,8	6 565 435	3,7

Source: Calculated on the basis of UNCTAD/WTO Trade Map (<http://www.trademap.org>).

Table 5. Foreign Trade of the Russian Federation with some Latin American States, millions of US dollars.

	2014			Share in turnover, %	2015			Share in turnover, %	Rate of growth, %		
	Volume	Export	Import		Volume	Export	Import		Volume	Export	Import
Argentina	1338,2	221,5	1116,7	0,2	946,6	122,0	824,6	0,2	70,7	55,1	73,8
Brazil	6335,1	2365,6	3969,5	0,8	4839,0	1924,3	2914,7	0,9	76,4	81,3	73,4
Chile	882,8	64,5	818,4	0,1	745,2	59,0	686,1	0,1	84,4	91,5	83,8
Cuba	163,0	101,2	61,8	0	135,9	87,3	48,5	0,0	83,4	86,3	78,5
Mexico	2156,9	1373,8	783,1	0,3	1579,1	990,2	588,9	0,3	73,2	72,1	75,2
Peru	550,7	439,7	111,0	0,1	698,6	619,0	79,6	0,1	126,9	140,8	71,7
World	78450 2,8	49783 3,7	28666 9,1	100 ,0	52583 0,3	34342 6,7	18240 3,5	100 ,0	67,0	69,0	63,6

Source: Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation (<http://eng.customs.ru/>).

Another factor limiting the scope of cooperation between Russia and Latin American partners is the fact that Russia is still not a member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The IADB plays an important role in the economic life of Latin America. In the course of its evolution, the IADB has become the largest investment institution in the region carrying out long-term financing of development projects, including those implemented in the framework of integration measures. Russian participation in the IADB activities could enhance the ability to create a reliable basis for the stable trade and economic relations with the IADB members-countries; it could help to move from single transactions to sustainable and long-term trade and economic cooperation. Becoming a shareholder of the bank, the Russian Federation gain access to large capital-intensive projects that will contribute to the growth of its non-oil exports, the revival of the industrial potential. In the case of Russia's entry into the IADB, our companies will be able to participate in tenders for the supply of goods and services in a wide range of

industries, primarily in the energy, transport, environmental protection, sanitation, urban development, science, technology, social projects, tourism (Glinkin, Kuz'min, Lavut, Nutenko & Sudarev, 2004, p. 210–211).

During the parliamentary hearings of 2013 the Ministry of Economic Development was invited to study the issue of accession of Russia to the IADB to provide a more effective and equitable participation of Russian business in large-scale economic projects in the Latin American states. At the moment, the question still remains open because of the difficulties with the financing of the participation of the Russian side.

Taking into consideration current uncertain international environment for Russia, cooperation with Latin American partners is of particular importance. The growing potential of bi-regional interaction is out of doubt. The development of trade and economic relations with countries in the region can significantly strengthen the existing trend in the development of a dialogue on South-South cooperation; it also can become a counterweight to Western initiatives to promote the Transatlantic and Transpacific integration projects.

Another important aspect of particular interest of Russia to the MERCOSUR is the vast Latin American experience in integration. MERCOSUR consists of the developing states with certain economic gaps, with a giant core-state, as well as the broad industrial and cultural ties between the partners. It is very similar to the integration processes in the post-soviet space. Therefore, developing relations with MERCOSUR Russia could learn from the positive experience and draw some lessons from its problems.

And finally, the volatility of prices on primary products force the countries to diversify the product range of the commodities that can form special trade agreements signed between Russia and certain Latin American states in recent years, e.g. in infrastructure, nuclear power, aerospace, natural resources, etc.

Russian officials repeatedly state that Russia and Latin America have a lot in common. First of all, the partners have very similar positions on the issues of the modern world, which are based on strict observance of international law. Both Russia and Latin America are strongly opposed to 'double standards', which became the handwriting of some Western partners. Our positions coincide on the strengthening of international institutions: mainly the UN as a leading research institute, designed to solve the problems of war and peace, nuclear non-proliferation and other global problems.

To sum up, it should be underlined that Russia understands the growing potential of Latin American states and regional blocs. Russia seek cooperation on different levels. However, the progress is not immediate. There is a lot work to be done. Many cooperation opportunities stay within the limits of protocol statements, except for only MERCOSUR – politically and economically motivated interest to the block promotes institutional relations along the lines of Russia-MERCOSUR and EEU-MERCOSUR interactions. However, the progress should not be expected at once.

There are enough opportunities for Russia-Latin American cooperation. But political contacts still exceed economic cooperation in respect of Latin American region. Therefore, MERCOSUR and CELAC are the most preferable Latin American groups for Moscow to cooperate. But we should underline the new directions of Russian foreign policy – such as deepening the cooperation with SICA and promotion of BRICS-UNASUR cooperation.

Funding

The paper was prepared with support of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation, grant No. 15-31-01016.

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Chapter 2

Iran's Position in the Intra-Regional Economic Cooperation between the Latin America and the Eurasia regions: a neo-regionalist approach

Mandana Tishehyar³

Regional convergence represents a contradiction in itself in an era, which is known as the era of globalization. However, it is a fact that in the past decades political units while accepting globalization of some patterns and environmental methods in the international arena have tried to redefine their interests and identities in the regional frameworks. Therefore, theories of regionalism that had a place among theories of international relations in the 1960s and 1970s, rushed up the steps in redefining its basic concepts from 1990s and following the collapse of the Soviet Union and new approaches have emerged in the new regionalism framework.

Looking at some features of new regionalism theories, the present article aims at considering the role of such an approach in providing an appropriate framework in order to understand the regional cooperation between the Latin America and Eurasian regions and the role that Iran, as the neighboring country of the Eurasian region that at the same time has a close politico-economic cooperation with the Latin American countries, preserves to perform.

In fact, the main question of the present article is the way Iran and Latin American countries could achieve convergence in identities and norms and also cooperate with each other in the Eurasian region despite the distance between the two regions and also the disparity in defining common interests at the level of bilateral relations between some countries in both regions. The author argues that Latin America and Eurasia countries could have achieved a shared definition of identities and norms governing the patterns of their foreign relations with taking advantage of intra-regional convergent capabilities. Based on this framework, the two regions can try to cooperate closer together in order to resolve intra-regional problems and have easily arrived at shared interests on an intra-regional level. This policy has become possible since the level of analyzing the relations between the countries in both regions has changed from a micro-level bilateral relation into a more macro-level one within an intra-regional and international context.

Introduction

Regional and continental convergence represents a contradiction in itself in an era that is known as the era of globalization. However, it is a fact that in the past decades political units while accepting globalization of some patterns, they also have tried to redefine their interests and identities in the regional frameworks.

Based on classical regionalism, since the countries cannot hold different places in every time, like billiard balls, due to the fact that they are dependent on the geographical areas where they have come into existence, therefore, they do not have the option to join various regional

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arrangements. Then, this could be seen as a barrier to regionalism, which in turn, has led to the most animosities and battles in the history among the neighboring countries.

However, the new approach to regionalism, more than anything else emphasizes the characteristics of "openness of definition for the concept of region" and its different "layers".

Therefore, geography is regarded as a relative term or issue. In fact, definition of the concept of region has become more flexible and various forms of regionalism; regional organizations and unions can be created on the basis of the interests of the countries. In the modern world order, the world has been globally regional rather than moving toward uni-polar or multi-polarism and although powerful political units have their own roles and particular functions, regional actors have also found a stage to show themselves.

According to classical systemic theories, only the great powers can affect various regions. However, the new regional approaches emphasize over the role of regional powers in politics. For example, today, as new wars are forming in order to defeat terrorism, it can clearly be seen that without different countries' help and cooperation, great powers cannot implement their programs to fight against terrorism.

Regional convergence represents a contradiction in itself in an era that is known as the era of globalization. However, it is a fact that in the past decades political units while accepting globalization of some patterns and environmental methods in the international arena have tried to redefine their interests and identities in the regional framework next to their neighbors and surrounding countries. Therefore, theories of regionalism, which had a place among theories of international relations in the 1960s and 1970s, rushed up the steps in redefining its basic concepts from 1990s, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union and new approaches have emerged in the new regionalism framework. (1)

Currently, the formation of new institutes and organizations in the new regional framework provides a basis for countries to coordinate themselves with a rapid-paced processes of globalization and play the tune of coordination with global trends in political, economic, cultural and military plans primarily in narrow contexts and with convergence, regionally, thereby, they do not distance themselves from the convergent caravan in a macro level scope. However, what is often seen in action is the heterogeneity of regionalization process with globalization. In fact, it can be seen in some areas that regional and trans-regional powers utilize the obtained power from convergence in the framework of regional arrangements in order to present new issues and provide new approaches towards the structure of international systems rather than having the compatibility with global trends. Hence, new regionalism has provided an appropriate ground for forming various layers of regional cooperation in an independent framework and has separated from global trends based on two elements of "thematic openness" and "geographical flexibility" and sometimes claims to have provided the foundation of a new kind of co-operations at the international level.

Looking at some features of new regionalism theories, the present article aims at considering the role of such an approach in providing an appropriate framework in order to understand the regional cooperation between the Latin America and Eurasian regions and the role that Iran, as the neighboring country of the Eurasian region that at the same time has a close politico-

economic cooperation with the Latin American countries, preserves to perform.

In fact, the main question of the present article is the way Iran and Latin American countries could achieve convergence in identities and norms and also cooperate with each other in the Eurasian region despite the distance between the two regions and also the disparity in defining common interests at the level of bilateral relations between some countries in both regions. The author argues that Latin America and Eurasia countries could have achieved a shared definition of identities and norms governing the patterns of their foreign relations with taking advantage of intra-regional convergent capabilities. Based on this framework, the two regions can try to cooperate closer together in order to resolve intra-regional problems and have easily arrived at shared interests on an intra-regional level. This policy has become possible since the level of analyzing the relations between the countries in both regions has changed from a micro- level bilateral relation into a more macro-level one within an intra-regional and international context.

New Regionalism and Regional Cooperation

Regionalism is not a new concept in the literature of international relations. It has a life of at least more than five decades in contemporary history. However, different perceptions and interpretations have been presented for this concept in different eras, each of which reflects some truth, governing the structure of the international system in a particular era. Without any doubt, macro- level looks at the relationships between political units in the international stage is one of the most important barriers in developing the co-operations and convergences among these units at a regional level within the framework of classical regionalism. Hence, countries have often tried to help big powers, which are far off in order to move away from the harm of their own powerful neighbors.

From another perspective or approach, hostility or animosity among neighbors in every region can itself, even prepare the ground for cooperation. The history bears witness to the fact that when economic interests and national peace and prosperity become important, the countries seek to identify and recognize the benefits of each other and competition happens in the framework of coexistence rather than looking for enmity, war and destruction. They consider the damages of war have become more expensive so they try to avoid it as much as possible from the outset. This pragmatic approach to cooperation for achieving collective security and providing interests for regional actors from convergence has been a first step towards regionalism as a bridge between two study levels of micro (including political units) and macro (including international structure) regionalism. In fact, regionalism has helped to increase and boost the regional security. Moreover, this perception from regionalism has offered a kind of independency to the countries against the concept of globalization and absorbing into it securing a margin for them. (2)

However, regionalism has itself a variety of forms and approaches. Sometimes governments tend to converge in order to cope with an outside power, sometimes they choose regionalism as a mechanism to achieve their rights in order to protest against unjust distribution of power and wealth between the North and South of the world and often put themselves in the particular regional arrangements according to the political and ideological frameworks governing the

structure of the world to prevent the ideological penetration or military attack of the enemy.

Moreover, forming regional arrangements were sometimes according to the logic of the market development that political and economic actors go beyond their national borders. And also, the need for political control to support internal industries provided the foundation of governmental regionalism. Actually, the logic of regions towards such an arrangement was the logic of supporting internal and regional organizations against greater structures and organizations. However, with emerging actors to the global business era, which is under the control of several governments, including multinationals, there was a need for a new approach in regionalism that accepts the phenomenon of competition in modern frameworks rather than being an exclusive nature. (3) Meanwhile, since the 1990s and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new approach came into existence in this field and new arrangements in the framework of the "new regionalism" concept have been made in this field of study.(4)

This new approach to regionalism, more than anything else emphasizes the characteristics of "openness of definition for the concept of region" and its different "layers." Therefore, not only the countries are less involved and bound in ideological arrangements for their joining or separation, but also geography is regarded as a relative term or issue and it can be seen that there are countries, which have joined these regional organizations outside their regions. Therefore, even the two processes of globalization and uni-polarism have not been able to prevent regionalism and even sometimes, on the contrary, have helped it.

Only the great powers can affect many various regions according to systematic theories. However, the regional approaches emphasize over the role of smaller powers and regions in politics and superpowers' approaches. For example, the role of small and Middle powers in the Eurasian region can be clearly seen in determining the process of the foreign policy of the great powers in this region. Moreover, regionalism can be an approach against the former colonial and/or imperial stance and demonstrates that small governments and regions are worth finding a place for playing a role. (5) Furthermore, the experiences of America's war in Vietnam and the Former Soviet in Afghanistan clearly showed that great powers are not always able to defeat small governments. Therefore, today, as new wars are forming in order to defeat terrorism, it can clearly be seen that for instance, with Latin American or Eurasian countries' help and cooperation, super powers cannot implement their programs and goals in these corners of the world. Thus, reviewing the macro-oriented international theories seems inevitable in order to better understand the regional dynamics.

This new kind of regionalism, as informed, has constructed identities and norms within the framework of institution-building have considered being a new political discourse in the international era. In this new discourse, sometimes multiple identities have been defined in a geographical area and have overlapped each other. Subsequently, several layers of regionalism could be formed simultaneously with different functions and each country defines its regional relations according to its needs and interests in one or more layers. Consequently, a "region" is what we perceive not necessarily what is defined on the map and/or based on mere strategic considerations. Therefore, although the geography is still an important factor, this element has become more flexible and can be portrayed as a new kind based on the need, identity and interests of a country, each time.

In fact, new regions will not only be the free trade zones or interlocking context such as the European Union as previous theories of international relations had predicted. In new regionalism, the countries seek to solve internal problems and improve their levels and positions at international levels within the specific definition of their regional relations. This will be supported through forming open and flexible areas, which pragmatically provide the interests of the countries and go through regional convergence from the perspectives of political, economic, culture or any other dimensions.

However, it must be noted that a great revolution is not supposed to occur and regions are not going to stand up against the global structure. Here, only power seems to be decentralized at the international level and this, in turn, can only be implemented through the convergence of regions with the surrounding world (6) rather than through conflict or confrontation. In fact, this cannot be done by force and all international organizations and institutions are promoters of the global-regional convergence. (7)

But has this new regionalism lead to multilateralism at the international system level and/or does it serve the globalized liberal values? It seems that the current trend of regionalism would end in increasing the capacity of regional powers and the regions' playing more important roles in shaping the structure of the international system in short-term and it avoids developing monopolies in this arena. However, in the long-term, the implementation of economic, political and cultural globalization plans will be easier through developing small economic powers with the help of greater regional economic powers and bridging the gap between the North and the South. In fact, global powers, instead of confronting with a number of underdeveloped or traditional countries, can wait until a regional framework grow therein, and then deal and interact with more macro- level, political units of national governments; i.e., regional institutions.

Latin America-Iran-Eurasia Regional Cooperation

Having considered the above-mentioned theoretical framework in the field of new regionalism at the age of globalization, this study continues the discussion with considering the role of such an approach in providing an appropriate framework in order to understand the regional cooperation between the Latin America and Eurasian regions and the role that Iran, as the neighboring country of the Eurasian region that at the same time has a close politico-economic cooperation with the Latin American countries, preserves to perform. In fact, I would like to continue the discussion with a case study in the area of regional economic cooperation between Latin America and Eurasia and the role of Iran as a country geopolitically located in a place that make a bridge between Latin American and Eurasian countries.

Iran and Eurasian countries share several cultural, religious, linguistic, and ethnic commons that create cultural similarities and common identities between the two sides. Iran also shares a long and intertwined history with this region.

Geographically, Iran is located in the neighboring of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan and has marine border with Russia. Iran also enjoys a strategic position between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, the two main hub of energy in the world.

This geographical fact gives Iran an opportunity to play the role of a trading bridge between the Eurasian countries and the other markets in different parts of the world. The neighborhood has prepared a suitable ground for business, religious, cultural, and historical ties between people in both sides.



Culturally, Iran and Eurasian countries also share several linguistic, and ethnic groups that create cultural similarities and common identities between the two sides. Some parts of Eurasia heir to an older Persian tradition that gave the entire region a cultural integration that transcended national boundaries.

The city of Heart in Afghanistan served as the capital of the Persian language few centuries ago. The same was true in Central Asia, where such old urban centers as Bukhara and Samarkand retained Persian-speaking populations and cultural traditions under dynasties of Turkish origin. Far from displacing this Persianate cultural tradition, the Turkish dynasties, which had ruled much of the region since the 11th century, embraced it as their own. Their populations were commonly bilingual, often intermarried with Persian speakers, and developed relationships that were more symbiotic than antagonistic.

These cultural similarities create common identities between these societies. According to the constructivist approach, identities are the basis of interests. (8) As a result, we can say that the common identities provide a suitable ground for different aspects of cooperation between Iran and Eurasian countries.

On the other hand, Iran has established close relations with most of the Latin American countries during last decade. The shared ideology of fighting against imperialism and uni-polarism have created a common identity for both sides and prepared a suitable ground for more cooperation to establish a multipolar system in the international level.

Economically, an important change is going to occur both in the regional and global levels. While energy diplomacy was the focal point of cooperation between many countries during last

decades, it seems that a major shift is proceeding and different countries are following a new approach to increase investment in the field of transportation. As a result “Transport Diplomacy” is the new politico-economic term to expand the regional cooperation with the aim of developing the transport infrastructures.

With this regard, Iran is interested in improving joint infrastructure projects with the Eurasian countries. There are different multi-billion-dollar projects to connect Iran to Eurasia via rail. Such transportation links with Iran provide the land-locked countries with an outlet to the world economy, increasing commercial ties with abroad.

An example of this strategy is permitting India to construct a 215 km road through Iran that connects the Iranian port of Chahbahar with Afghanistan’s Nimroz province. Completed in September 2008, the road created a new transport corridor into Afghanistan and also Central Asian region. It would shorten the distance from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan by 700 kilometers.



The port of Chahbahar lies in the Gulf of Oman in the south of Sistan and Baluchistan province. It is the only Iranian port with direct access to ocean. Because of its establishments and ease of access to ocean as well as Oman Sea and Persian Gulf, long ago it was the center of business, trade and navigation. Chahbahar is officially designated as a Free Trade and Industrial Zone by Iran's government. Due to its free trade zone status, the city has increased its significance in international trade.

Growing commercial sector located at free trade area the port has this potentiality to turn to a place that would connect business growth centers in Latin America to Eurasian markets. Iran’s government also is pursuing a multi-billion dollar railway project, which is named "Iran's

eastern corridor". It will connect Chabahar port to Central Asia, Afghanistan, Caucasus and Turkey via Central Iran.

There are long term plans to integrate Chabahar with the International North-South Transport Corridor. In fact, Chabahar can play a strategic role in different scenarios of Silk Road projects raised by Latin American countries, Turkey, Russia, China, South Korea and India. A close partnership between India, Iran and Russia is intended to establish a multi-modal transport link connecting Mumbai with St. Petersburg and Istanbul, providing Turkey, Europe and Eurasian countries access to Asia and vice versa. The same links can be made to connect Latin American markets to the Eurasian region via land and sea routes.



On the other hand, the growing and multi-layered relationship between Iran and numerous Latin American countries since 2005 is driven by a combination of factors. The economic relationship between Iran and Latin American countries is growing. International Monetary Fund figures compiled by the Latin Business chronic indicate that trade between Iran and Latin America tripled between 2007 and 2008, almost half of which was between Brazil and Iran. The other partners were Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

Conclusion

In total, although there is enough capacity in different sides to increase cooperation, however, it seems that we need to create a new common discourse to establish a joint framework for cooperation. The new discourse should be based on mutual trust and understanding.

As mentioned above, based on constructivism approach, identities are the basis of interests. However, I would like to add three more maxims. I think that common interests are the basis of cooperation. For cooperation we need to trust each other. And to trust, we need to understand each other.

As a result, the main barrier to improve cooperation between Latin American, Eurasian and the rimland countries such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India is lack of enough understanding between different sides. In sum, beginning a process of confidence building seems necessary. Political, economic and academic elites in both sides can play a key role in this process.

Organizing joint workshops and seminars in different levels, increasing bilateral cooperation between the private sectors and small businesses, preparing a suitable ground for exchanging students and researchers in different fields and following a clear joint diplomacy towards bilateral and regional issues can pave the way of cooperation in the future.

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Chapter 3

Regional Integration in Central Eurasia and Ibero-America: a comparative analysis

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This article examines the EAEU and Mercosur in accordance with the following indicators: genesis, institutional landmarks, institutional structure, dispute settlement mechanism, deepening and widening of integration. In this sense, it explores a degree of integration in the blocs through using facts. Measuring institutional index yielded more precise data, which enabled detection of strengths and weaknesses of the regional integration. On basis of advantages and disadvantages of union were developed prospects for further development of EAEU and Mercosur.

Introduction

In all regions of the world various integration projects are functioning with the aim of ensuring a deeper convergence of national economies. At the same time, the effectiveness of the integration groups varies starting from the supranational level of EU regulations to numerous “pseudo-integration” structures that have not been able to provide even a minimum reduction of tariffs to trade and obstacles to the free movement of factors of production. Thus, identifying driving forces and factors of success or failure of integration projects becomes one of the main tasks of researches of the world economy.

The outcome of integration mostly depends on the features of the interaction of national economies, which can be examined in limited number of integration models. The integration models are characterized by the combination of three factors: actors; their interaction; and institutional structure coordinating their performance. Comprehensive analysis of integration models taking into account all above aspects is interest of in the context of research. What all models have in common is interaction of states within the framework of market mechanisms adjusted in some extent by governmental and intergovernmental structures. The differences concern the following main factors of cooperation:

- the level of economic development of the participating states, which directly affects the quality of governance and institutions. More homogeneous economies are in favor of the development of common institutions and equipped to deal with the problems of the sustainability of the regional union;
- the number of participants in the integration group. Groups with different number of participants have miscellaneous chances of success. The probability of differences between states and the costs of negotiations rise as the number of participants increases;

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- equality or asymmetry of qualitatively homogeneous or heterogeneous players. The more homogeneous the participants in the integration initiative, the formation of a trading regime under the pressure of a stronger player is less likely; which means there are more equal conditions for access to world markets;
- the presence of “soft factors” like ethnic identity, mentality, language, values. The existence of these factors means a higher degree of “informal unity” of the region and the commitments of individual states to costs of integration;
- interest in the deepening of cooperation and the creation of supranational bodies.

To date European Union is considered as the most mature form of economic integration. European Union has experienced a number of stages of integration characterized by its deepening, the transition from the lower forms to the higher, and enlargement of the members from 6 states to 28. Since the late XX century developing states from various regions have attempted to implement integration initiatives based on EU model, but they have failed to reach anything resembling to EU. However, taking into account divergent cultural and historical backgrounds, it would not be appropriate to compare the achievements of the EU with the less remarkable state of developing regions [1].

Accordingly, it is essential to analyze the application of the same model on regions with similar economic, political and social backgrounds. Hence, there is need to scrutinize integration models of developing countries between each other rather than between developed and developing countries. It is more sensible to analyze countries on the same level of economic and political development.

Nowadays the development of Eurasian integration in geostrategic location is subject of interest of national as well as foreign authors. The strengths and weaknesses of the EAEU are determined on the basis of comparison. Therefore, it would be appropriate to compare the bloc with the organization with similar features, like Mercosur, and to learn from the experiences of Mercosur. Regions' states have common historical, political, economic and social backgrounds. In addition, both blocs have dominant lingua franca. Here arises a question is it possible to compare these blocs. Bella Balassa in 1961 defined economic integration as "the abolition of discrimination within an area" and identified following degrees of integration: a Free Trade Area (FTA), a Customs Union (CU), a Common Market (CM), an Economic Union, and finally a Political Union. The level of integration directly depends on the political conclusions of regional intergovernmental forums and supranational organs. In this work are examined only impacts of institutions on regional integration without considering actual influence on the stage of integration.

In order to identify the overall level of institutional integration in a regional initiative at a particular time, the scores will be given to the stage of integration, for each of these 5 levels, within an appropriate period. In this regard, EAEU will be considered in 2006-2016 period and 1991-2016 for Mercosur. The scores provide measurement, thereby allows us to compare the organizations in a relatively homogeneous manner. Points from 0 to 25 will be nominated for each level reached over time. Thus, Free Trade Area and Customs Union are reviewed jointly, Common Market, Economic Union as well as Political Union. By summing up results reached

in a given part of time (yearly data), it is possible to obtain an index of institutional regional integration ranging from 0 to 100.

Criteria for calculation of index vary according to the level of integration:

Free Trade Area and Customs Union. Amendments of tariffs and quotas on trade inside the FTA and with non-members over time are the most significant indicator for free trade area and customs union. When IO reaches a fully-fledged Customs Union, project obtains 25 points. Intermediate phases may get points between 1 and 13. Therefore the last steps for CU weights higher than intermediate steps. In EU experience, union scores 25 points.

Common Market.

- a) A foundation of the CU is not sufficient for integration of goods and services market. Progress in removal of non-tariff barriers is the next step for this. EU European Court of Justices explains such measures as “all rules for trade enforced by Member States those can actually or potentially, directly or indirectly hinder intra-regional trade”. For example: In EU the elimination of non-tariff barriers began with the White Paper of 1985, of which 95% had been achieved in late 1992. The White Paper was established together with the European Single Act in 1986 that came into force a year later (+2 points). 5 points are given for intermediate steps from 1987 until launch of European Single Market in 1993.
- b) Steps for the liberalization of the capital movement are key indicator representing the increasing weight of economic cohesion as main target of economic policy. All moves to liberalize movement of the capital in regional level receive positive points, while any restrictive measure subtracts scores.
- c) Liberalization of the labor movement is another key factor. Establishing a common market for labor is more significant than converging goods, services and capital market. Example for allocation of scores in case of EU: Treaty of Rome (1957) enables workers to work in foreign state without any nationality discrimination [Treaty of Rome, Article 48]. In 1968 this norm was enacted at least as principle for which EU receives +1 point. Since 1993 the EU has an internal market for labor, which has not been realized yet. In this regard, the ratio of people working from one member state in another constitutes less than 2% of the working age population of the union, which has negatively affected score of EU in this factor. However, there were implemented additional steps that increased a score: higher education diplomas are mutually recognized since a directive of 1989; policies in the field of labor movement evolved after the meeting of European Council in Amsterdam in 1997 and elaboration of Action Plan by the Commission; full realization of Schengen convention founded in 1990 by 1998.

The total score of EU on implementation of CM accounts to 21 due to the lack of coordination in labor mobility.

Economic Union. A level of management of national macroeconomic policies, particularly exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies is key factor in identifying union's index of regional integration. In case of EU, European Monetary System was created to

coordinate exchange rate stability in 1979. The realization of policies at regional level together with national level is important in maintaining a stability of exchange rate within the bloc. These policies include competition policy, transport policy, harmonization of value-added tax (VAT) on goods and services, convergence of other domestic structural policies particularly in labor market in order to gain price elasticity in region. The successful realization of above policies guarantees the rise of the trans-border price elasticity of demand for the same products made in different member-states.

The total score assigned to European Union is 23 out of 25.

Political Union.

- a) The establishment of supranational institutions and binding decision-making procedures, creation of the legal fundament of the international organization at the supranational level is distinguishing factor of Political union. In the EU supranational organs and decisions were set from the early days of integration and were updated over time. The first supranational bodies created with the Treaty of Rome in 1958, for which EU gains 4 points. Additional 3 points received by the foundation of European Council as a permanent forum for political discussions in 1974, the participation of citizens in defining composition of the European Parliament since 1979; and an increase of qualified majority voting by Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Lisbon Treaty of 2007 introduced new position High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose role is to conduct the Union's foreign policy. The total point given to EU in this area is 8 out of 9 as still there is a room for improvement the institutional supranational aspects.
- b) The concrete attempts to manage macroeconomic policies at supranational level. In case of EU we talk about the formation of Euro system and European Central Bank, for which assigned 5 points. Euro system was initiated in Maastricht Treaty (+1 point). For this factor EU obtained 6 points out of 9 as fiscal policies still conducted at the national level.
- c) Microeconomic policies conducted dominantly at a supranational level depends on the regional exchange rate stability. In EU case this policies cover the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 1962 the CAO was introduced and in 1964 was improved, for which to EU attained 3 points. In EU functions structural fund for poorer members for adjustment of exchange rate. In 1988 the budget of fund is doubled and upgraded (+1 point). Total point at this factor is 4 out of 8.

On the whole at Political Union EU attained 18 scores. Total institutional index of regional integration for European Union is 86 out of possible 100.

In this work EAEU and Mercosur are investigated according to the following indicators: for trade – tariff, non-tariff barriers and quotas; for services and factor markets – non-tariff restrictions, labor mobility and capital movement; policy coordination and institutional developments.

An application of index to EAEU

Since the collapse of the USSR post-soviet states are making attempts to create free trade zone, customs union and common economic space with the future target of a monetary union. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia began new project of sub-regional integration in 2006 and laid basis for Eurasian Economic Union.

Customs Union. First documents in framework of Eurasian CU were measures about uniform tariff and non-tariff barriers on internal and external trade, including discipline of conflict resolution in 2008 (+2 point). CU started its operation in January 2010 (+4 points).

States agreed on Customs Code in November 2009 and it was enacted on 1 July 2010 (+5 points). Weakness of the code was that it included 285 reference norms that can't be implemented without adoption of additional legal acts. Thus, 48 articles invoked to the agreements of CU, 56 substances depended on the decision of the Commission of the CU, when 180 references fall under the national legislation of the member states. In this regard, majority of the key issues are regulated by the domestic law and cause controversies in unified policy of the bloc. The Supreme Council adopted the new Customs Code of EAEU on 26 December 2016 (+4 points). EAEU Customs Code will enter into force on 1 July 2017. Novelty of new code is all customs control will be implemented at the supranational level, except technical moments.

A one year later CET was established in accordance with the decision of Commission of the Customs Union and in 2012 was altered by the Council of the Commission (+7 points). Sensitive products like dairy and meat are excluded from the list. The last update to the CET of the Eurasian Economic Union made on March 2017, and entered into force in April 2017 (+1 points). Between 2010 and 2014 all member states applied temporary measures on foreign trade for the products like sugar and grains (-1 point).

In 2015 Belarusian trade entities re-exported goods from EU that falls under Russian sanctions (-1 point). In this case Russian officials decided to inspect the country of origin of all importing goods, which led to the queues and delays at the borders of states. The conflict was settled by introducing harsher requirements for country of origin and imposing tough penalties for non-compliance. Diversion of interests occurred when Russia unilaterally imposed sanctions against Turkey in 2015 for the strike of Russian aircraft on Turkish-Syrian border. Moreover, Russia applied embargo against Ukrainian goods that complicated delivery of Ukrainian products to Central Asian states (-1 point). On the whole, for the CU EAEU attained 20 scores.

Common market. Non-tariff impediments to trade such as intellectual property rights, after-sales properties, subsidies public procurement are coordinated at national level. Kazakhstani government applied its domestic standards against Russian cheap dairy exports (-1 point). In case of Kyrgyzstan, it is difficult to poor Kyrgyzstan to comply with higher standards. State lacks of necessary veterinary infrastructure and laboratories (-1 point). This tendency negatively affects the capacity of organs on elimination of non-tariff barriers. In case of services from January 2015 launched common service market for 43 sectors, additional 21 service sectors will be converged in near future (+3 points). Affected fields are engineering, meteorology, surveying, tourism, construction, advertizing. From 1 January 2015 the employment procedure in the territory of union has been simplified (+7 points). Thus, diplomas in all specialties, except medicine, pedagogy and law are mutually recognized. Living conditions for labor migrants in EAEU member states is improving [2]. In 2015 states adopted a vision for common electricity

market which scheduled to the second quarter of 2019 (+1 point). A plan of establishing single market for medicines and pharmaceuticals by January 2016 was postponed due to the difficulties in defining common procedures regulating pharmaceutical operations through EAEU. Transition period was introduced for gradual move from national regulation of pharmaceutical markets to unified government. Thus, the manufacturers are given rights to choose rule of registration whether national or unified until 31 December 2020. Medicines registered under the national legislation before 31 December 2020 has to coincide with the union's regulation and receive upgraded certificate of the EAEU by 31 December 2025 (+1 point). On the whole, for the CM EAEU attained 10 scores.

Economic Union. EAEU Treaty includes provisions on coordinated monetary policy and unified regulation of financial markets. Despite of these arrangements states have been applying devaluation of their currencies that seriously influences mutual trade [3]. In 2014 a rapid devaluation of the ruble affected a trade of the Central Eurasia. Kazakhstan initially responded through blockade of Russian import and later carried out devaluation of the tenge. EAEU was unable to take measures in settling such issues (-1 point). EAEU members agreed on common principles and rules of competition, ensuring detection and suppression of anticompetitive actions in the territories of member States. The main direction of policy is to ensure the competition of companies rather than their collusion, ceding of the efficiencies to consumers in the form of lower prices and higher quality. Thus, competition policy points to provide wider consumer choice, effective price competition, and technological innovation. The notion of pure competition in the EAEU is governed by Commission (+4 points). Generally, competition policy create fair market for all business in the region, eliminate discrimination and violence of producer's rights. In 2016 states approved main directions and stages for unified transport policy (+1 point). Experts are expected to accomplish draft with emphasis to air services and increasing frequency of flights until July 2017. To 31 December 2017 scheduled a formulation of general draft of events. States agreed on the establishment of supranational organ regulating financial market by 2025 (+1 point). On the whole, for the Economic union EAEU attained 5 scores.

Political Union. In 2012 February Eurasian Economic Commission was launched. Commission is authorized to regulate functioning of CU and SES, to which the parties delegated their national powers in the fields of customs policy and collaboration within SES (+4 points). The competition field was the first area in the EAEU, where installed supranational governance (+2 points). On the whole, for the Political Union EAEU attained 6 scores.

Prospects for EAEU:

Strength of EAEU includes its location at geostrategic region. It could undertake a role of bridge between West and East situating at the heart of Eurasia. States are making efforts to construct common market for over 180 million consumers. Year by year the incorporated sectors are increasing. After the collapse of the USSR member states inherited infrastructure, skilled personnel, and industrial complexes and consolidated transport system. Systems will work again if states make attempts for restoration of broken economic and social ties.

There are still rooms for improvement. Application of beggar-thy-neighbor strategy by Russian government in 2014 caused economic setbacks in EAEU members, in particular Kazakhstan

suffered severely. The economic crisis diminished attraction of the bloc for new comers. Post-Soviet states, which are not party to EAEU, are reluctant to integrate with the growing Russian market. However, Russian authorities are doing their utmost to attract all ex-Soviet states. The case with Kyrgyzstan proves it: Russia created Development Fund as a prop for convergence of Kyrgyz economy; together with Kazakhstan they provided grants to Kyrgyzstan to certify its food imports.

Another matter is threat of Russian economic and political hegemony in the bloc. Since the establishment of EAEU Russian interests prevail in all spheres of cooperation. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan insisted tenaciously only on integration of markets. Structural differences in member states negatively affect the deepening of integration. Non-tariff barriers such as different attitudes to certification and standardization of products and customs clearance cause barriers for free flow of goods and services. Elimination of these problems will speed up customs control and lessen queues at borders.

Potentials of the bloc are high. If the EAEU states achieve planned destinations on time, in near time the EAEU with the vast amount of natural and mineral resources will become global supplier of raw materials. With the launch of the transport corridor “Western Europe-Western China” the transit possibilities of EAEU may increase. EAEU parties are in different levels of economic development that may cause socio-economic problems. Among the EAEU states Russian economy is considered as the most industrially developed. Thus, Russian products with the lower prices may be traded at dumping prices. It means that producers from another state may experience unequal competition, which can result at job reductions, social tensions.

Measuring results for Mercosur

From the beginning of 1990s the renewals of sub-regional integration processes in Ibero-American space go along with the structural economic reforms realized in the states of the region. In 1991 Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil found Mercosur with ambitious to establish a common market and manage the economic policies of its members.

For FTA in 1991 member-states established TLP concerning the progressive, automatic and linear tariff reductions, and gradual removal of non-tariff barriers. Exemptions had to be reduced by the end of 1991. 47% of linear tariff cut was accomplished in June 1991 and the left tariffs expected to be completed by 7% each 6 months until 1995 (+2 points). In December 1994 the Protocol of Ouro Preto founded the Mercosur Trade Commission that co-ordinates trade relations between the states and participates dispute-settlement mechanism as a first instance forum (+1 point).

In January 1995 in the territory of Mercosur was established “imperfect” FTA, which covers only several products in accordance with CMC Decision N 31/03 mentioned earlier. For remaining goods Final Adjustment regime to the Customs Union started for Argentina and Brazil in 1995. Final Adjustment regime to the CU includes list of intra-regional import tariffs those have to be eliminated by 1 January 1999: in 1996 25% of tariffs should reach 0%, in 1997 50% of tariffs, by 75 % in 1998, and 100% in 1999. Final Adjustment regime to the Customs

Union started in Paraguay and Uruguay a year later in 1996, and has to be finished by 1 January 2000. For the launch of FTA and adjustment regime for CU Mercosur attained 7 points.

For CU the CET was established in 1995. CET has 11 stage structures with tariff levels varying from 0% to 20%, increasing by 2% each level. The general design for CET is the more added value the higher the level of the duty. MERCOSUR defined a period of transition toward a Custom Union since establishment of CET. Convergence covers domestic exception lists and sector lists. Each member state defines national list and Mercosur decide their length. In accordance with CMC Decision N 31/03 Argentina and Brazil can set a maximum of 100 items of national exceptions, 649 to Paraguay (100 basics, 150 extra and 399 established by the Article 4 of CMC Decision N 07/94), and 225 to Uruguay (100 basics and 125 extra) [4]. Additional 6 points were given for the establishment of CET.

Brazil imposed import licensing systems for imported products like dairy, fruits, chemicals, machinery and fuel in December 1997 for which Mercosur lost 1 score. The Brazilian protectionism strained further. In response in 1998 the other members of the bloc applied to the tribunals of Mercosur for the first time since its creation in 1994. According to the decision of tribunal Brazil had to stop its regime until December 1999. Mercosur recovers lost 1 point.

In 1999 Argentina and Brazil incorporated excluded products from FTA and the same occurred in Paraguay and Uruguay in 2000. Sugar production and auto industry still remained out of agreement with longer transition period to FTA. Furthermore, devaluation of Brazilian real in the beginning of 1999 laid to the protectionist measures in other members of Mercosur (Table 2). 200 telecommunication and informatics equipments along with 900 capital goods were excluded from the CET. In this regard, capital goods planned to be incorporated to the CET of 14% by January 2001 for Argentina and Brazil, schedule for Paraguay and Uruguay is January 2006. Others are decided by the domestic legislation of member states temporarily and have to be converged to the CET by 2006 in all parties. A convergence to the FTA and CU are demonstrated in table.

Tariffs for 99% of goods in internal market of Mercosur were removed by 2006 (+1 point). Despite of official convergence of auto industry, vehicles and auto parts were administrated by governments through quotas.

In early 2001 Argentinean government increased tariffs on imports from non-members for final products for 35%, removed partly CET, in particular capital-good import tariffs. Moreover, Argentina with the aim to increase profits raised anti-dumping measures against important trade partners, even Brazil. Argentinean shift to the dual currency board for present account transactions disturbed a trade with Mercosur members. As a result Mercosur lost 1 point.

Table 2

Mercosur: Schedule of Permanent Trade Regime[5]

	Argentina	Brazil	Paraguay	Uruguay
Free Trade Area:				

Adaptation Regime	Jan 1, 1999	Jan 1, 1999	Jan 1, 200	Jan 1, 2000
Sugar	2001	2001	2001	2001
Auto industry	Jan 1, 2000	Jan 1, 2000	Jan 1, 2000	Jan 1, 2000
Customs Union:				
National exceptions	Jan 1, 2001	Jan 1, 2001	Jan 1, 2006	Jan 1, 2001
Capital goods	Jan 1, 2001	Jan 1, 2001	Jan 1, 2006	Jan 1, 2006
Informatics and telecommunications product	Jan 1, 2006	Jan 1, 2006	Jan 1, 2006	Jan 1, 2006
Sugar	2001	2001	2001	2001
Auto industry	2000	2000	2000	2000

Source: INTAL (1996)

In early 2001 Argentinean government increased tariffs on imports from non-members for final products for 35%, removed partly CET, in particular capital-good import tariffs. Moreover, Argentina with the aim to increase profits raised anti-dumping measures against important trade partners, even Brazil. Argentinean shift to the dual currency board for present account transactions disturbed a trade with Mercosur members. As a result Mercosur lost 1 point. Argentina constantly imposes unilateral antidumping measures against imports from Brazil, when Brazil only in a few cases hit Argentina with temporary trade barriers. Both states apply temporary trade barriers against non-members of Mercosur on different sectors in different periods for which 1 point is subtracted from overall score. From 2006 Mercosur members started negotiations on Customs Code and reached agreement only after 6 years in 2012 (+5 points). Under the actual law of Mercosur products made outside Mercosur charged CET at each crossing the border; the issue of double taxation system has not been resolved yet. Total score for the first factor is 20 points.

Common Market. In 1994 the executive body of the union Common Market Group was established with working groups specialized in issues regarding the creation of common market. Working groups issue only recommendations and their conclusions are not mandatory. For Common Market Mercosur gets only 1 point in transition phase. In 1995 structure of working groups were updated and divided into following areas: technical rules and regulations, communications, financial affairs, institutional aspects, transport, industry, agriculture, the environment, energy and mining, healthcare, labor affairs, electronic trade, investments, and control of the economic and trade latitude (+1 point). Montevideo Protocol of 1997 scheduled

abolishment of all impediments to free trade on services to 2007. In 1998 started formal negotiations on provisions of Montevideo Protocol (+2 points).

In 2004 in Common Market Council adopted Working Program for 2004-2006 which put emphasis on cultural dimension of integration and strengthening measures related to the free movement of people [6]. With the enactment of Buenos Aires Declaration in 2006 labor mobility, technological cooperation, energetic and physical convergence were on the agenda of Mercosur. In this regard Commission of Coordination of Ministers of Social Affairs and the Mercosur Social Institute were established in 2007 (+1 point). Under the CMG was established International Cooperation Group (ICG) with competence of managing matters related to intra and extra block cooperation (+1 point). Common position of the bloc at international forums is formulated by ICG. Total score for the second factor is 6 points.

Economic Union. In transition phase Mercosur members, did not make attempts to coordinate economic policies. In 1996 states laid basis for key competition policy arrangements in Fortaleza Protocol. However, provisions of competition policy still unfulfilled due to the reluctance of members to establish supranational competition structure. Although Uruguay and Paraguay recently enacted competition laws that are not incorporated with the Mercosur competition law. Macroeconomic Coordination Committee was formed in June 1999 in charge of investigating economic policies of members and preparing administrative proposals as well as programs for macroeconomic integration (+1 point). In 1999 for the formation of a monetary union the maintenance of fiscal balance is key factor. Taking this into account Mercosur members tried to formulate a treaty based on Maastricht (+1 point). Total score for the third factor is 2 points.

Political union. The Asuncion Treaty enforced in November 1991. The Asuncion Treaty applies definite European Union terminology to outline the new objective: free circulation of goods, services and factors of production, elimination of customs rights and non-tariff barriers, adoption of a CET and the establishment of a common commercial policy, together with the coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies. [7] For which Mercosur attained 1 point. Additional point was given for the Protocol of Ouro Preto of 1994, which established institutional base of Mercosur and laid basis for legal personality of the bloc. In 2002 the Olivos Protocol renewed dispute-settlement mechanism of the bloc and Secretariat was upgraded to Technical secretariat (+2 points). Total score for the fourth factor is 4 points. On the whole, 31 scores assigned to Mercosur.

Prospects for Mercosur. Applying temporary trade barriers since 1998 combined with the devaluation of currencies in member states retarded integration processes. CU scheduled to 1995 has not reached yet (2017). Establishment of institutional bodies in 1994 is important. However, institutions failed to form a system on application of antidumping against non-members. Since the establishment of the bloc Brazil has been recently using anti-dumping on importing Chinese steel. The lack of uniform discipline against third-countries diminishes the quality of customs union.

Despite of establishment of full-fledged free trade area, Argentina has been unilaterally blocking import of Brazilian fabrics through temporary trade barriers. Lack of codification of

Mercosur internal policies challenges the value of free trade agreement. Weak institutional base and uncoordinated protectionist policies have noticing implications. Member states unilaterally overcome both political and economic crises, which prevents completely enjoying the benefits of FTA and CU arrangements. Failure to reach an agreement to coordinate internal policies changing overtime eases the collective bargaining power of Mercosur with the rest of the World. However, after the shocks caused by the devaluation of real in 1999 and crisis of 1999-2002 Mercosur continues to be core inter-regional project in Latin America.

Lessons to be learned

In terms of degree of regional integration Mercosur falls little behind of EAEU with the total score of 31 out of possible 100, the result for the latter is 41 points. Mercosur spent more than 20 years to establish Customs Union which have been reached in 7 years of cooperation of EAEU. Scores are not distributed only to the quantity, but the quality also is taken into account. Mercosur and EAEU got the highest scores for FTA and CU, which is the same for both – 20 scores. Both projects could take lessons on actual implementation of CU and FTA from the EU experience.

The functionality of the common market, political union and economic union is directly affected by the: 1) incentives of states, 2) institutional structure, 3) the deepening of integration, and 4) enlargement of the union. To deepen integration processes member-state have to consider following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Strengthening of institutional structure

EAEU treaties and agreements are supranational nature, when the Mercosur arrangements are intergovernmental. Though, Mercosur's decisions are non-binding and do not require implementation by corresponding national organ. Moreover, Mercosur lacks of supranational court issuing obligations on states and secretariat administrating enforcement of treaty arrangements. As a result, Mercosur institutions do not weight as EAEU structures. However, there is still a room for improvement the institutional supranational aspects of EAEU. On the other hand, Mercosur achieved the same results in FTA and CU without transferring power to supranational organ.

The institutional composition of Mercosur is generally considered as weak. The decision-making bodies of the Mercosur are made of representatives of national governments, who vary in status and scope (see Table 3) Delegates presented in CMC are the heads of states, in GMC - executive body, Trade Commission with limited capacity. Authorities of the Permanent Review Court have reformed since 2002, but it still lacks of uniform system with harmonized rules, the equal accountability to governments and individuals, and capacity to punish.

Legislative branch

Dependence of Parliament decisions on CMC shows immaturity of legislative power of the Mercosur. Monitoring the performance of the parties within Mercosur cannot be effectively fulfilled due to the unreliability of the Parliament and Permanent Court. Moreover, the

participation of civil society in decision-making is limited. In case of legislative, EAEU lacks of division of powers. Instead, legislative power mandated to the executive body (Table 3). In addition, not all decisions represent the will of citizens. This phenomenon is not a surprise as all EAEU member states do not have independent legislative power, even there is no opposition in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Hence, EAEU has not have organ responsible for monitoring of governing bodies of the bloc, which portrays democratic deficit of EAEU. Moreover, there is no any attempt to create such organ. In this context, both EAEU and Mercosur have to follow the EU experience, in order to increase credibility of the blocs (Table 3). Parliament does not only control the governing bodies, but also influences the deepening and widening of the union. For instance, EU Parliament had pushed for introduction of a number of measures, which increased solidarity among the EU institutions, at Lisbon Treaty.

The contributions of EU Parliament to increase union’s efficiency are:

- New system of voting in the Council – double majority of states (55%) and population (65%);
- Extended terms of president of European Council from 6 months to 2.5 years;
- Merger of the roles of Council’s Foreign Policy High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations into one person, Vice President of the Commission who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council;

To provide democratic accountability EU Parliament introduced:

- modified budgetary procedure that requires approval of the whole annual budget by both Parliament and Council of Ministers.
- approval of all international agreements at first by Parliament;
- inspection of the Commission work by both Parliament and Council of Ministers.

Therefore, the formation of EAEU Parliament on the basis of EU and designing of Parlasur on EU mechanism would significantly affect integration progress in Central Eurasia and Ibero-America.

Table 3
Division of powers in EAEU, Mercosur and EU

Blocs	Executive power	Legislative power	Judiciary power
EAEU	Supreme Council, Intergovernmental Council, Commission	(mandated to Commission)	Court of the EAEU
Mercosur	CMC, GMC	Parlasur	Permanent Court of Review
EU	European Commission, European Council	EU Parliament	Court of Justice of EU

Executive bodies

Supranational organs are regarded as means of establishing common legal basis of union and coordinating the integration processes. In Eurasian Economic Union the states shared their part of sovereignty in several fields with the supranational body Eurasian Economic Commission. This was a step by step process, to date, foreign trade, customs and tariff regulation, non-tariff barriers (including protective, anti-dumping and countervailing measures), as well as technical, sanitary and phytosanitary regulation are completely enforced at supranational level. The circulation of medicines, medical products, financial markets, ICT sector are planned to be transferred to the supranational level by 2025.

In contrast, Mercosur lacks of supranational organs. Instead, intergovernmental control is obvious as the highest decision-making body of Mercosur governed by heads of states of parties. In addition, both GMC and Trade Commission are composed of civil servants working in government structures. Therefore, national interests prevail during decision-making procedures based on summits, where member-states took role of decision makers as well as dispute settlers. Consequently, Mercosur summits are ceremonial meetings full of protocol, but without desire to reach a solid, impartial integration. Thus, 'Inter Presidentialism' is still imminent in Mercosur. The improvements of Permanent Court might not enhance Mercosur in this context.

An increase in the scope and strength of supranational bodies contributes indirectly to the deepening of integration. The weight of Commission in EU proves that. Commission having significant powers and tasks such as: policy initiator, legislative facilitator, guardian of the Treaties, executive roles, mediator and broker – sets the course of the integration. The role of the Commission on definite sectors:

Energy

It has been the heart of the European projects since its foundation. It's used in heating and cooling buildings, for transportation, lighting, in other words the driver of economy. European countries are vulnerable to the energy supply disruptions, as they are dependent on a limited number of external suppliers. The previous interruptions of supply, caused by the oil crisis of 1973 and disruptions in gas supply in 2006-2009, vindicated that uncoordinated national policies and the lack of the common position to the non-EU countries in energy sector decelerates market integration. Commission considers the implementation of an interconnected and integrated internal energy market assuring energy security through reducing prices, enhancing competition, and assuring mechanisms to diminish disruptions of external supplies. A direct offshoot of the Commission's existing single market competencies is regulation and promotion of an internal EU energy market.

Activities made by EU institutions to ensure security of energy supply and integrate both internal and external energy market:

- In 1991 European Commission proposed to create European Energy Charter accompanied by the initiative of European Council of 1990 at Dublin to collaborate with the Eastern European countries and former Soviet Countries in order to stimulate

economic growth and to improve security of energy supply (common position to external suppliers). On 17th December 1991 at Hague 51 countries signed European Energy Charter. After 3 years in Lisbon all signatories signed The Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects.

- On 25th of February 2015 European Commission adopted European Energy Union strategy. The objective of project is to make energy field well-functioning, more secure, sustainable, and affordable to citizens, and climate-friendly energy. Strategy covers areas like security of supply, a full-fledged internal energy market, energy efficiency, emissions and reduction, and research and innovation.

Technology and Science

European Commission in order to strengthen the technological and scientific bases of Community industry, to make it competitive in international area, and to support other policies of community established Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development since 1983. At first, program forced research centers to cooperate in solving scientific and technical problems of a general character that further allowed the manufacturers to create their own technologies and products. Second, for the first time private companies was involved in financing Research and development. Funding was on a parity basis: half of the funds provided from the EU budget, the other part received from the enterprises participating in the projects. Thirdly, the program clearly was aimed at overcoming the individualism and isolation of national research and development. Commission set criteria to be met by the researches. The researches should:

- demand big spending, that one country cannot independently perform it;
- economically profitable to pursue on a multilateral basis;
- contribute to the creation of the EU single market and the unification of European science and technology;
- promote social and economic cohesion;
- encourage the mobility of scientific and technical personnel and coordination of scientific and technical policies of member countries.

Cooperation resulted in the development of the human resources in science and technology both quantitatively and qualitatively, in transportation and share of technologic equipment and created new jobs. Transfer of sensitive areas rather than excluding them from unified system of management would make more sense for EAEU. The establishment of supranational organs functioning on EU basis would accelerate convergence of Mercosur policies.

In case of EU, it needed decades to build the system of institutions, norms, methods and procedures that ensures daily functioning of the bloc. This system allows coordination of the interests of various parties during the decision making, and then monitoring their execution. Inevitable contradictions between individual countries and groups of interests are overcome through active dialogue and continued focus on a compromise. Throughout its history, the EU has experienced both successful and frozen periods. However, in the long-term integration continued to grow. The European community has consistently moved first to the customs

Union, further to the single internal market and finally to the monetary Union. Within the EU are ensured the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons.

The Area of integration has been gradually expanded both in geographical terms and in terms of activities. Starting in 1951 with 6 members, the community now has 28 States. Beginning with individual industries and trade, the integration process gradually captured more and more areas: transport, research, environment, energy, etc. Since the 90-ies it became obvious progress in the sphere of common foreign policy. Currently integration in varying degrees, affect virtually all aspects of social life of member States. The success of integration is directly linked to a unique political culture and legal system of the European Union.

Management is ultimately responsible for the single market integration. Supranational structures ensure the compliance of members with the Union law. All policies of both organizations are modeled on those of European Union. Unified transport system is lesson for EAEU and Mercosur. Common policy contributed to the elimination of restrictions in several service categories and border controls, which simplified flow of goods. EAEU implemented second lesson of the EU based on implementation of supranational bodies in achieving fundamental goals [8], whereas Mercosur-members confronted this. There should be noted that it took 30 years for EU to agree on common transport policy and 10 years of debate for implementation. Thus, the Mercosur circumstance is not so bad.

Recommendation 2: Adoption of common principles for widening of integration

EAEU does not have distinct principles of admission new members. The treaty establishing EAEU provides that newcomers are admitted upon their readiness by defining the extent of the obligations they undertake. Thus, new members determine the commitment themselves together with EAEU structures. However, Russia is eager to reunite ex-Soviet states and ready to pay for the costs of integration with weak states.

Attempts of new members of the EAEU to gain privileges and unilateral exemptions during the admission exacerbated an enlargement. For instance, Kyrgyzstan tried to get large amount of compensation for closure of borders with China. Bishkek enjoys additional benefits, for instance, Kyrgyzstan's share of total customs duties of union is 1.9%, which for Armenia is 1.11%. Moreover, Kyrgyz-Russian fund with a capital of \$ 1 billion was created for restoration and development of the country's industry. Joining of Kyrgyzstan with such privileges placed additional responsibilities to the EAEU members, especially to Kazakhstan and Russia. If countries continue to be accepted with the same concessions, the EAEU will lose its value. Therefore, there rises necessity for common accession principles.

The economic state, socio-political dimension of Mercosur members are different. Therefore, the conditions they can undertake differ hugely. A grouping of underdeveloped Paraguay and Uruguay with regional economic giants Argentina and Brazil was shortcoming of union. Paraguay assumed obligations it cannot fulfill. Mercosur and Paraguay should work together for the development of Paraguay. However, Mercosur does not provide a huge amount of aid for states at the moment. At present, for Paraguay putting more emphasis on the Pacific Alliance would offer the development of its economy.

The enlargement of the both Mercosur and EAEU is inspired by political factor with a little emphasis on the economic factors and counting pros and cons to the involved states. For instance, Venezuela was pursuing political aims at joining the Mercosur: to create a great bloc against US power in South America. Brazil's support of Venezuela stems from the Venezuelan purchase of 20 Brazilian passenger jets at a worth of \$900 million. Venezuela recognized the burdens of integration only after accession, when state attempted to adopt free market under the authoritarian rule. Thus EAEU shall consider as well as the political system of the newcomers.

The formal accession of Venezuela to the bloc in 2012 proved institutional fragility of Mercosur. Politics ruled over the package of acts. Venezuela joined a bloc despite inconsistency of its internal affairs with the Mercosur values and principles. It should be noted that Venezuela was given 4 years of adaptation period. The official admission of Venezuela in 2012 shows an example of the institutional weakness of Mercosur. Politics ruled over the package of norms. In regard to Venezuela's domestic situation, it does not suit the official values and principles of Mercosur. Still, the country was given four years to adapt to all the formal rules for formalities. However, Venezuela failed to adapt bloc regulations and has been suspended since 1 December 2016.

Therefore, it is advisable for the blocs to take ideological and economic differences into consideration before accepting members, as newcomers may face difficulties in adjusting into unions' rules. Widening of integration would considerably affect the flow of goods and services, in economic context. However, as the number of members rises the more difficult to reach agreements.

In this regard, the demand for powerful institutional framework again manifests. Europe due to its strategic location admitted a wide range of countries. In this regard, Europe has its principles of adoption states composed of extensive, long stages:

- Enforcement of the *acquis communautaire* - EU law;
- Securing political criteria stemming from the rule of law and democracy, respect for human rights;
- Working market economy.

At the same time, EU provides quasi membership for states, which are unwilling to become full member of the bloc. Unlike full members such states contribute to the preparation of laws without participation at decision-making procedures. Also, union conducts relations with its neighbors and candidates through European Neighborhood Policy. Both EAEU and Mercosur have to consider admission of members based on common principles without any exemptions for all.

Recommendation 3: avoid emergence of the dominant state

In both blocs, the bulk of trade turnover in the blocs emanate from the trade relations of weaker states with the dominant state within the union. Internal trade of EAEU characterized by export of Kazakh, Belarusian, Kyrgyz and Armenian products to Russia, and the import of Russian products, while trade relations between these four states are limited. In this regard, Russia

serves as a vehicle of modernization and an agent of integration. In case of Mercosur, Brazil takes a role of engine of unification.

At this point, the governing bodies of EAEU shall learn from the experience of Mercosur in order to determine the proper path for the deepening of union. Brazil is reluctant to create supranational structure as they can diminish the regional power of state. In the end of XX century the agenda of Brazil was the reaffirming its dominance in South America. Thus, Brazil used Mercosur as stage of power demonstration. Paraguay and Uruguay criticize Brazil for protectionist policies and accession of Venezuela under the umbrella of Brazil. Mercosur is becoming more political rather than economic. To avoid this scenery Central Eurasian states, have to reconsider their policies.

Recommendation 4: setting up advisory services

One of the promising tools that could be introduced in the Central Eurasian and Ibero-American space is the European advisory service SOLVIT oriented at issues of the domestic market. This system consists of an extensive network of focal points located in all EU members. The system is recommendatory as it has proved itself as an effective platform for identifying existing non-tariff barriers.

Recommendation 5: improving the economic state of members

A stage of integration project and its potential value for member states directly depend on the socio-economic indicators of the region. States with the mature market economy and developed industrial capacity are best integrated. International specialization and cooperation in production of finished goods, in particular, auto-industry, provide sustainable labor division. Whereas this tendency contrasts at developing states as such countries tend to focus on agricultural products, raw materials and other types of industrial goods of mass market. Intensive international cooperation in these fields is impossible or extremely limited. In accordance with that Mercosur and EAEU members have to improve economic conditions of their states to enjoy the benefits of integration and to be competitive at international arena. Here, Mercosur states can implement the experience of Kazakhstan. Message of President N.A. Nazarbayev announced on 31 January 2017 is a bright example of a clear strategy drawn up for the development of the country [9].

In XX century, the nation-state value was subject to re-evaluation. A model where the region functions as a part of the international community is becoming more popular. International experience proves that the importance and weight of a particular region can be increased with the deepening of integration trends in it. Thus, since 1990s, countries started to actively engage in regional integration. In addition, national economic development strategy has changed due to the internationalization of the economy associated with changes in technique, technology, organization of production; where reproduction processes transcend national borders. Meeting

economic needs became essential in pursuing national interests. Being a member of regional associations became integral part of state policy in preserving and improving state welfare.

In this regard, after the collapse of USSR former Soviet republics despite the protests to integration processes, since late 1990s there have been launching cooperation schemes with a little progress. With the target of creation of free trade area, later customs union and single economic space with the future target of a monetary union Central Eurasian states established 3 main projects: Economic Union in 1993, EurAsEC in 2001, and EAEU in 2014. The EAEU is more sophisticated than organizations established earlier. Despite of all inadequacies in existing normative base, including exemptions in the procedural framework and the time-bound special treatments; the EAEU is the first integration initiative in Central Eurasia reached the highest level of integration – Common Market based on EU [10].

Within Ibero-America proposals for integration and free trade areas have been regularly launching since the 1960s. To date, following EU experience Mercosur poses itself as the most sophisticated and enduring integration project in Ibero-America. There is no other integration initiative has theoretically reached the level of Mercosur – Customs Union.

By exploring the brief history of integration processes in both Central Eurasia and Ibero-America above, the following is observed: Central Eurasia initially integrated via mixed models, they are: model of inter-governmental agreements, model of dominant participant and model of common center. Ibero-America since the 1960s has predominantly used inter-governmental agreements as means of integration.

After exploring separately the genesis of EAEU and Mercosur, institutional bodies, each stage of integration in Chapter 2 it can be stated that both Central Eurasian and Ibero-American integration processes are comparable and meaningful results are obtained once an institutional index of regional integration applied in the analysis.

In this work an index of regional integration is investigated according to the application of 4 indicators for each phase of integration: for CU and FTA – removal of tariff, non-tariff barriers and quotas; for Common Market – elimination of non-tariff restrictions, free labor mobility and capital movement; for Economic Union – policy coordination; and for Political Union –institutional developments.

According to the measures, Mercosur falls little behind of EAEU with the total score of 31 out of possible 100 points of, the result for the latter is 40 points. Mercosur spent more than 20 years to establish Customs Union which have been reached in 7 years of cooperation of EAEU. Scores are not distributed only to the quantity, but the quality also is taken into account. Mercosur and EAEU got the highest scores for elimination of tariffs and quotas, which is the same for both – 20 scores.

EAEU attained 10 points for the development of Common Market due to the transfer of sovereignty in several sectors to Eurasian Economic Commission. However, this indicator for Mercosur scheduled to achieve Common Market in 2006 is far from satisfactory, only 5 points.

For the unified policy coordination and institutional development EAEU got respective 5 and 6 points, when Mercosur performed poorly and received only 2 and 4 points. The functionality of the common market, political union and economic union is directly affected by the: 1)

incentives of states, 2) institutional structure, 3) the deepening of integration, and 4) enlargement of the union. However, both unions have different attitudes to these aspects.

During the analysis was found that members of the groupings faced similar difficulties stemming from the unilaterally imposition of protective measures, the absence of strong institutional architecture, the existence of the dominant party, the higher standards ignoring economic level of the parties, lack of uniform principles for accession to the union. A useful exchange of experiences among organizations may result in addressing shortcomings and prevent the spilt of the EAEU and Mercosur.

The first recommendation reflects the need for need a strong institutional base to cut unilateral temporary protective measures both organizations. Concerning the degree of institutionalization, EAEU structure is composed of the Eurasian Supreme Council, the Eurasian Economic Commission, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, and Court of the Eurasian Economic Union. On the other hand, the Mercosur consists of the Common Market Group, the Common Market Council, the ParlaSur, the Mercosur Trade Commission and the Permanent Review Court. Both of them selectively established institutions based on EU experience, and accorded them with different level of powers. EAEU has supranational Commission and Court, when Mercosur lacks of supranational organs. Instead, intergovernmental control is obvious as the highest decision-making body of Mercosur governed by heads of states of parties. Therefore, national interests prevail during decision-making procedures based on summits, where member-states took role of decision makers as well as dispute settlers. Moreover, Mercosur lacks of supranational court issuing mandatory obligations and punishing for non-compliance. Mercosur developed immature Parliament relying on CMC decisions, whereas EAEU mandated legislative power to the Commission and suffers democratic deficit.

Thus, EAEU have to implement power division, at least on the experience of Mercosur to increase credibility and efficiency of existing institutional organs. On the other hand, for Mercosur is advisable to create supranational control at minimum for competition policy. The second recommendation covers establishment of certain principles of accession as the enlargement of the both Mercosur and EAEU is inspired by political factor with a little emphasis on the economic factors and counting pros and cons to the involved states. In this regard, the demand for powerful institutional framework again manifests.

The third recommendation considers the avoidance of the dominant power to maintain functionality and deepening of the integration group. To date, Russia serves as a vehicle of modernization and an agent of integration in Central Eurasia. In case of Mercosur, Brazil takes a role of engine of unification.

At this point, the governing bodies of EAEU shall learn from the experience of Mercosur in order to determine the proper path for the deepening of union. Brazil is reluctant to create supranational structure as they can diminish the regional power of state. Brazil uses Mercosur as stage of power demonstration. Mercosur is becoming more political rather than economic. To avoid this scenery Central Eurasian states have to reconsider their policies. Moreover, the establishment of advisory system is recommendatory for identifying existing non-tariff barriers in member-states. On basis of this system elimination of non-tariff measures will be

accelerated. Finally, improvement of economic conditions of member allows completely enjoying the benefits of integration and to be competitive at the international arena.

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Chapter 4

Coup Memory, Transitional Justice and Democracy in Turkey and Latin America

Nilüfer Narlı⁶

Experience of several coups and military regimes is one of the characteristics shared by Turkey and Latin American countries, where coups interrupted democratic process and caused huge violation of human rights. The study looks at the political patterns in the coup memory relationship with transitional justice in the selected Latin American countries and in Turkey in order to answer the following question: to what extent the memory of military coup and politics of memory have contributed democratization and reconciliation in Latin America and Turkey? Based on a nationwide survey, the paper concludes that Turkish people have a strong coup memory and share an urge for transitional justice, yet the mechanisms of transitional justice have not been established in the post-coup Turkey. Such mechanisms were established in Argentina, Peru and Uruguay and the official politics of memory encouraged facing off the coup, seemingly an important process leading to higher level of democratization.

Introduction

Turkey and many Latin American countries share one political similarity that is the painful past related to the experience of several coups and military regimes that have interrupted the democratic process and led to the severe human rights abuses. This was the pattern in Turkey, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and the Central American countries except for Costa Rica.

How people remember a coup/military regime is the question of political memory and politics of memory studies, and this question is critical to the democratization of post conflict countries. In some of the post-conflict societies, dealing with the unpleasant past in the transition period was marked by a politics of monumentalizing the coup memory and by a transitional justice⁷ process that included truth telling, the trial of the perpetrators, and reparations for the victims, a process that in turn paved the way to democratization reforms. However, in some post-coup countries, the repressive past that resulted from the experience of military coups/regimes has bred an organized silence about the military coup/regime and led to the absence of a democratic political consciousness.

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⁷ Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses; and it also refers to the totality of truth policies (truth commission and investigation committees), justice policies (trials, amnesties that are an institutionalized manifestation of social amnesty (Jelin, 2007), and impunity) and compensation and reparation policies (financial, restoration, etc.). Transitional justice does not “refer exclusively to penal justice and even to retributive interpretations of trials and punishment”, but also covers “such concerns as compensatory, distributive, and restorative justice”. (Crocker, 2000: 2).

Why such different political patterns emerge is the focus of this comparative study. It is an attempt to identify and compare the political patterns in the coup memory relationship with transitional justice and democratization. It compares Turkey with the five Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Uruguay), which all had an experience of military regimes (described in Table 1, below). They are selected on the basis of a rationale that Turkey and these five Latin American countries all have one major similarity, an experience of military coups and regimes in the 1970s, either in the form of a military coup, short lived military government, or military dictatorship. In the 1980s, there was an opening towards democracy either due to the fall of military regimes, some of which were accompanied by rapid civilianization (Argentina in 1983), or due to the defeat of the military sponsored candidates (Turkey in the 1983 elections and Brazil in the 1985 elections). Yet the five Southern Cone countries differ from Turkey with respect to the politics of coup memory and the patterns of their truth, justice and reparation policies in the post-coup era. Despite such resemblances in the former, there are some variations in the Southern Cone states. The first is the variations in the timing of initiating and implementing the truth and justice policies, either early or belatedly. Secondly, there are minor differences in the types of reparations for the victims. Amongst these Southern Cone states, Peru is different from the rest with respect to an experience of the authoritarian rule under President Fujimori (1990-2000)⁸ in its post-military regime era, while the others were almost free from authoritarianism in the post-coup period.

In more specific terms, the study aims to answer how the political memory and the politics of the military coup/regime memory and the post-coup truth and transitional justice policies are related to democratization and reconciliation in these selected countries by examining and comparing various sets of propositions, which are divided into four major post-coup political memory and justice development clusters. The first compares countries along the post-coup government's politics of memory options, which are either keeping the coup memory alive by commemorations, or adopting a pact of silence policy. The second compares how strong/weak is the people's coup/military regime memory and the presence/absence of societal demands for public memorialization. The third is the civil government's transitional justice options, which are initiating the related procedure, or taking no steps for transitional justice in the post-military coup/regime era. The fourth compares the civil society actors' dealing with the coup memory and transitional justice options, which are either demanding investigations to find the truth about the wrongdoings of the perpetrators and asking the governments to move for transitional justice, or being weak in such demands and even embracing complete silence about the coup and the atrocities.

The study adopts path-dependent sequence explanation (explained below) and moves from the assumption that the way of remembering the painful past, ethical and judicial issues and democratic processes are all related and that truth, memory, justice and reconciliation are interrelated. By adopting the path-dependent sequences, the study offers explanations as to why democratization, as an outcome, advanced in some post-coup countries while it regressed in

⁸ Alberto Fujimori, elected in 1990, used draconian legal measures, "permitting paramilitary tactics, staged a self-coup that shut down a recalcitrant Congress, rewriting the constitution, and dismantling political parties and other institutional intermediaries in the development of his self-described 'direct democracy'" (Laplante & Theidon, 2007: 232).

others. As such it is significant contribution to the memory and justice studies in a comparative perspective.

Dealing with the Past: Politics of Memory and Political Memory, Power and Justice

Dealing with the past is critical because it has “become a larger presence in the present public consciousness” (Winter, 2006; 2012), a process starting after the First World War and becoming more important after the Second World War that is associated with traumatic events (Rigney, 2004). Since then, scholars have agreed that what we remember from the political past and the way we deal with the past is vital to reconciliation (Ricoeur, 2004) and conflict resolution in the present, and a key to democratization in the post-coup period or in the era of moving from authoritarian to more democratic politics.

The collectively remembered political past is defined as political memory in the study. The definition of political memory moves from the premise that even individual memory is always inherently shaped by collective context (Halbwachs, 1992), and whatever we remember is formed by social, cultural and political context and is recalled in the history of the collectivity (Assmann, 1999). Political memory like collective memory is “socially constructed” and *mnemonic* (Halbwachs, 1992). The defining feature of political memories is a continuous and socially constituted connection with the political past that is the narrated past (Nora, 1989; Bell, 2003; Winter, 2010; Basu, 2011).

How political memory is different from history is one of fundamental questions in political memory studies. Despite sometimes being “made from similar material” (Fogu and Kansteiner, 2006:285), political memory is different from history (Nora, 1989) in that it is socially reconstructed historical events. For Nora (1989) memory and history are two very different phenomena: “memory” is spontaneous, living, authentic, and characteristic of pre-modern communitarian societies and “history” is analytic, derivative, official, and hence alienated from popular feelings (Nora, 1989).

Why some political events are remembered/disremembered can be explained with a reference to Assman’s cultural memory theory built by the “social-constructivist” approach, and Nora’s hypothesis of political will. The events and personalities we remember are “figures of memory”, which are retained and sustained by ‘festivals, rites, epics, poems, images, etc.’ (Assmann & Jzaplicka, 1995: 129), all forms of media, and also by monuments and museums (Mayo, 1988; Savage, 2007; Marschall, 2010), including portable monuments like literary texts (Rigney, 2004.). All types of rituals, rites, monuments, epics, movies, and commemorations are the “dispositive” of politics of memory approved and arranged by the hegemony (Basu, 2011). Political and collective memory studies show the significance of various types of rituals, myths, rites, monuments, festivals, and commemorations as instruments in maintaining “fateful events of the past” (Assmann & Jzaplicka, 1995; Basu, 2011). These studies also reveal how the political memory tools are associated with evocations of real or fictitious pasts in forming a national identity, fortifying the bonds of nationality, and creating legitimacy for a new political entity and consolidation of power after revolutions, reforms or any type of change in a political landscape. (Zerubavel, 1995; Nora 1999; Ozyurek, 2007).

Without a political will to remember or to disremember, the maintenance and conservation of past events is not likely (Nora, 1989). How the past is remembered is a constructive process, which is linked to political power and political will (Nora, 1989); it is an act of power, part of a strategy of symbolic conquest, and a claim to legitimacy (Nora, 1989). How past events are remembered is also connected to personal and public identities (Olick & Robbins, 1998; Bell, 2003; Winter, 2010; Basu, 2011) and to ethnicity, nationalism, and religious and linguistic groups. How the past is narrated and meanings attributed to the past are key components of building national and other identities (Ballinger, 2003); they are essential elements of political competition. This is why the national flag, marches, monuments, ceremonies, commemorations and national days gained importance in creating legitimacy for politicians and nations, particularly from the last quarter of the 19th century, as observed by historians (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).

Not only politics (power relations) but also media are essential to the reconstruction of past events. What is remembered/disremembered, to a certain extent, reflects “media memory”, referring to the remembering from the media’s narration of the past (Neiger, Meyers & Zandberg, 2011). Indeed, all types of media including films, poems, novels, or an image are related to the reconstruction of past events (Basu, 2011). Policies of a state related to what to remember from the past and how to remember and what type of media can be used to remember are the totality of the politics of memory; in other words, the politics of memory is the political means and ways by which past events are systematically remembered/disremembered and recorded/eradicated.

Since identities and power relations are essential to what is remembered /disremembered, both political memory and politics of memory studies are concerned with the importance of the shared past and shared symbolic system as markers of group identity and solidarity (Halbwachs, 1992). Dealing with the past can be more critical when competing narrations of the past associated with the competing politics of memory are used for the competing political interest of political parties or actors. This is why political memory needs to be studied by considering the links between memory and competition for political power. Which narration prevails is a matter of political power that is scattered in today’s post hegemonic world. The politics of memory are affected by the relations of power between master/hegemonic narratives, defiant “counter-memories”⁹, and silent groups whose historical experience is rarely represented in public or in mainstream publications.


Political memory and politics of memory are related to truth and justice policies and hence to transitional justice. When dealing with the memory of the past, politicians have many questions related to truth and justice (Assmann & Shortt, 2012). They can deny the past and ignore the consequences of the wrongdoings, or adopt a politics of recognition and remembrance as an ally of a politics of clarifying the troubling past, recognizing the victims and initiating judicial process for punishing the perpetrators (Jelin, 2007). Politicians choose these options of remembering or oblivion and pursue diverse kinds of social amnesia politics depending on their own political interests and “national interests”.

⁹ “Counter memory” concept is used by Foucault (1980).

Theoretical Framework: Path Dependence and Transitional Justice as Critical Junctures

This study moves from the statement that the impact of the politics of memory and transitional justice decision with a choice of clarifying the truth and “Prosecute and Punish”¹⁰ those who violated human rights during the military regime is a “critical juncture” in the sequence of developments leading to democratization. “Critical junctures are characterized by the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are ‘critical’ because “once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”. (Mahoney, 2000: 513).

Theoretical Model: Coup Memory, Narration, Politics of Memory, Transitional Justice, Critical Juncture and Contingency in Democratization



In this path dependency theory based model, the initial condition where politics of memory and transitional options are made is the product of various historical, political and social antecedents. This is not in the scope of the study. In this model, the critical juncture is the implementation of the transitional justice decision to favor finding the truth and clarifying the past, and persecuting and punishing the perpetrators, a process that leads to a path of political developments in the direction of further democratization. Truth commissions¹¹ are important elements of the critical juncture because they have an essential role in helping post-conflict societies to establish the facts about past human rights violations, improve accountability, preserve evidence, identify perpetrators and recommend reparations and institutional reforms in order to provide justice to the victims and to prevent future violations. This is key in reaching reconciliation and implementing and sustaining democratic practices.

¹⁰ Available choices of transitional justice are to “Forgive and Forget,” or to “Prosecute and Punish” (Huntington, 1991: 231).

¹¹ Truth commissions are critical in post-coup democratic achievements because these commissions are “hailed as key mechanisms for addressing the goals of justice and reconciliation in post conflict societies and as a prerequisite to announcing the establishment of a new democratic order by marking a break with a violent past” (Laplante & Theidon, 2007: 229).

Whether this critical juncture happens or not depends on the coup narration and the politics of coup memory, because coup narration, politics of narration and transitional justice are related. (Lessa, 2013). The narration of a coup/military regime and the politics of a coup memory could back and sustain the transitional justice process, when both the governments and civil society share the same narration and they are ready to deploy memory “dispositives” by using various media such as conventional media, as well as monuments, films, novels, and commemorations to remember the coup collectively. The remembering should not be destructive and lead to stagnation in the past, as Nietzsche (1874/1983)¹² describes it, but must move in the direction of helping the society to learn the truth about the misdoings of the past regime, to reconcile and struggle not to repeat them.¹³ Once such a democratization process starts, it is more likely to bring new policies to prevent human rights abuses and sustain freedom of speech and assembly, which are the conditions of being a fully democratic country.

Military Coups, Coup Memory and Politics, and Transitional Justice in Turkey and in Five South Cone States

Modus Operandi of Coups and Political Dynamics

The study starts comparing the selected countries with a brief look at the military’s role in politics and examining the similar social, political and cultural dynamics associated with the central political role of the military. Based on the survey of the literature¹⁴ on Turkish and Latin American politics, the study identifies four major similarities related to the old role of the military in the selected countries: a) authoritarian political culture that facilitated the military’s take over; b) statist economic policy that benefited a civil-military coalition including civilian and military bureaucrats and some members of the local notables (*eşraf* in Turkey, *haciende*¹⁵ landlords in Latin America) and hence a critical factor in sustaining military prerogatives; c) the military’s central role in building the nation (Davies & Loveman, 1997; Cizre, 2004); d) the military having special prerogatives in order to “establish order” and to “secure a strong and decisive government”.

There are also similarities in the *modus operandi* of the military actors staging a coup. In all the selected countries, the military actors of the coup adopted a similar rhetoric of “order and security”, fighting against instability and terrorism. All these short and long lived military regimes operated in a similar way: banning public gatherings and silencing the civil society; re-organizing art and popular culture (e.g., restricting tango in Argentina, and banning transgender

¹² Nietzsche tells us to select what to remember in order to find hope of freeing ourselves from the negative aspect of remembering the past and warns us about certain kinds of misuse of history. Nietzsche (1874/1983, p. 62) wrote: “there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing”.

¹³ Ricoeur (2004) answered the crucial political and ethical question related to how much of the past should we remember and how much should we forget by arguing that remembering, forgetting, and forgiving are ways of reconciling ourselves with the past and offer us the hope of establishing a new, more inclusive communal identity.

¹⁴ The survey covers the comparative studies on the Turkish and Latin American civil-military relations (Pion-Berlin, 2011); studies on Turkish politics and civil-military relations (Begüm, 2011; Narlı, 2011) and the civil military relationship in Latin America (Stepan, 1971; Huntington, 1995; Pion-Berlin, 2003).

¹⁵On the *haciende* system and the military in Latin America, see Wolf & Hansen (1967).

woman singer Bülent Ersoy in Turkey); advocacy for Christianity/Islam to the public and upholding traditional family values; and showing paternal tenderness, a political gesture that was backed up by tanks lining the streets of the capital and by the institutional and public prevalence of the military. Mystification¹⁶ of military officers, as “the Saviors”, is another common politico-cultural trend. Consequently, almost every coup was seen as salvaging economic and political crises.

Comparing Politics of Memory in the Post-Coup/Post Military Regime Era in the Selected Countries

The politics of reconstruction and monumentalizing coup memory by building monuments, museums and in movies and novels in the post-coup/military regime era are essential to demanding justice. Memorialization of the victims is a part of transitional justice in the post-coup period. Since all forms of media and politics are essential to the reconstruction of past events and justice, the study investigates how coup memory is monumentalized and transmitted by the use of various media and to what extent the power centers encourage/discourage its transmission to future generations in the selected countries.

“Neither forget nor pardon” is a motto widely shared in Turkey and in the selected South Cone countries. However, the post-coup/military regime government’s politics of memory did not always favor remembering the coup, the victims and perpetrators. This oblivion fully applies to Turkey where the 1980 coup memory was suppressed in the 1980s and 1990s along with the de-politicization process that silenced the intellectuals and civil society actors about the coup. This silence and mute approval of the military’s role in politics was partly related to a “civil-military coalition” (Narli, 2011) where the society and elite groups maintained a direct, special bond with the military, the most trusted institution, holding the less trusted politicians in a secondary position (Aydinli, 2009). Complementing the military as an untouchable and unquestionable institution, the architects of the 1980 coup institutionalized the oblivion politics of the coup by granting the coup leaders constitutional immunity from prosecution.¹⁷ Despite the prevalence of an organized pact of silence in almost all media and the lack of any encouragement of the symbolic and economic rehabilitation of the victims, the memory of the 1980 coup has survived and been transmitted to new generations, as revealed by a nationwide survey (May 2013-January 2014). This survey showed that the most frequently remembered event was the 1980 coup and it is associated with traumatic feelings (Narli and Akyıldız, 2015). The respondents mentioned the coup with pain, sorrow, anger and with a grievance that their sense of justice was hurt. They demanded justice for the horrors and atrocities committed during the military regime (1980-1983) but they were not optimistic about justice when they were interviewed.

The Turkish reticence went on until late 2000 when the Turkish policy of silence was largely, but selectively, abandoned with a judicial milestone event, the trials of military officers on charges of plotting to overthrow the Ak Party government and membership of a terrorist

¹⁶ The Turkish army is mystified as “Home of the Prophet” (“Peygamber Ocağı”).

¹⁷ 1982 Constitution, drafted during the military regime, included a provisional article 15 for impunity.

organization, named *Ergenekon*.¹⁸ As a response, the media rushed to refresh the 1980 coup memory by narrating the sufferings of the victims, a selective process that peaked in 2010-2013. Press narrations often focused on the suffering of the far-right while being amnesic to the agonies of the leftists (Narli & Kaya, 2015).

In Argentina, on the contrary, the post-coup government's politics of memory was the public remembering and recognition of the victims. The memorialization of the victims, and their representations in places of memory (e.g., museums and monuments) and public consciousness were in various forms: the most emblematic one was building a monument to the victims of state sponsored terrorism in 1998, Parque de la Memoria, designed to cut into the landscape like an open wound, representing the people lost during Argentina's "Dirty War" under the military regime (1976 to 1983). Many other such monuments¹⁹ were built by a governmental decision as a means of redress for victims and by strong endorsement from the civil society.

However, in Brazil, where the 'politics of forgetting' prevailed during the post-military regime period, a monument referring to the sufferings of the torture victims during the long-lasting military regime (1964-1985), Monumento Tortura Nunca Mais (Monument Torture Never Again) was proposed by a civil society, *Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais* (Torture Never Again Group) and erected in 1993 (Schneider (2012). In Peru, such a monument, "*El Ojo que Lloro*", was established in 2005 as a private art initiative, rather than by the government, designed to honor the thousands of victims as a result of internal armed conflict in 1980-2000 (Sierra León, 2014). Despite being a controversial monument (Hite, 2007), it is seen as a symbol that strengthens the political memory of all Peruvians and promotes peace and reconciliation in the country.

Compared to the commemoration process in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, monumentalizing the 1980 coup was tardy in Turkey. Only in 2010, the Museum of Shame, a large collection of pictures of trials, torture and several items belonging to the victims of the coup, was installed by the victims of the 1980 coup, who had founded the 78'ers Foundation in 2002 to undertake truth-finding and citizenship rights activities.

Movies are also media for commemorating the sufferings of coup victims. In the selected countries a large number of the movies have mediated the coup memory and the sufferings of the victims. In Turkey, the earliest were made in 1986: *Dikenli Yol* (1986); *Prences* (1986); *Sen Türkülerini Söyle* (1986); *Ses* (1986); *Sis* (1988); *Av Zamanı* (1988), and *Uçurtmayı Vurmasınlar* (1989); then several movies about the 1980 coup were made in the 1990s-2010s.²⁰

¹⁸*Ergenekon* trials began in 2008 and ended on August 5th, 2013. They altered the society's perception of the army by decreasing the traditional public trust in the Turkish Armed Forces, as shown by Eurobarometer surveys (2008). (Gürsoy, 2012).

¹⁹There are many site-specific memorials in Argentina: "former concentration camps Automotores Orletti, Club Atlético or El Olimpo, all in the city of Buenos Aires, or the Pasaje Santa Catalina memorial at Córdoba, incorporating the Provincial Archive of Memory, and museums such as the Museo de la Memoria at Rosario", opened in 2010 (Andermann, 2012: 77).

²⁰ These movies are: *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye* (1990); *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı* (1990); *Suyun Öte Yanı* (1991); *Uzlaşma* (1991); *Babam Askerde* (1994); *Gülün Bittiği Yer* (1999); *Eylül Fırtınası* (1999); *Vizontele Tuuba* (2004); *Babam ve Oğlum* (2005); *Beynelmilel* (2006); *Eve Dönüş* (2006); *Bu Son Olsun* (2012); *Hükümet Kadın I* (2013); *Hükümet Kadın 2*, (2014); *O... Çocukları* (2008); *Zincirbozan* (2007); *Kafes* (2016).

Argentinian movies²¹ depicting the pains of Dirty War victims during the military dictatorship were made as early as 1983. In Brazil, a number of such movies were made even in the last years of the military regime.²² Likewise in Chile, the movie, *Il pleut sur Santiago (1976)*, was made in the very early years of the military dictatorship. All these movies share several similarities yet one of them is important for transitional justice: it is the overt or implicit demand for justice for the victims. All types of conventional monuments are important for the mediation of coup memory, yet in today's digital age social media are effectively used for this purpose in the selected countries and elsewhere.

Comparing Transitional Justice in the Post-coup Decades: Truth and Justice Policies in the Selected Countries

In order to compare the truth and justice policies of the five Southern Cone countries and Turkey, Table 1 presents the parameters of comparison and the data related to the truth commissions, trials of the perpetrators, and the enactment of laws. Turkey's post-1980 coup Ozal²³ government, a civil government that came into power in 1983, had no choice but to endorse the pact of silence and forgetting, despite the severe human right abuses linked to the military regime. The civil society voice was too weak to demand truth telling and transitional justice mechanisms largely due to the fact that the majority of the associations and trade unions were sealed soon after the coup. Despite such a repressive political climate, a human rights advocacy, Human Rights Association, came into being in 1986. It worked diligently in order to bring the torture issue to public attention and to seek justice for the victims, despite facing state intervention in its work.

In Turkey, the 'no truth, no justice' formula prevailed for three decades before the revoking of the immunity of the 1980 coup leaders by the September 12, 2010 referendum on amending Turkey's Constitution, which included the repeal of the impunity article. Following the approval of the repeal, on April 12, 2012, two retired generals (Kenan Evren and Tahsin Şahinkaya) were placed on trial for their roles in the 1980 coup. On April 7, 2012, the court indicated that criminal complaints would be filed against Evren and Sahinkaya "on charges of torture and mistreatment, to be investigated separately". In 2014, the two generals were sentenced to life in prison for preparing and leading the 1980 coup. Yet, in July of the same year, a court ruled to drop a case against two high-ranking officers for torture, allegedly carried out during the time of the military regime (1980-1983). Dropping a torture case due to the statute of limitations was a development that curtailed transitional justice hopes and disappointed many coup victims.

Both Evren and Sahinkaya died in 2015, one year after they had been sentenced. The death of Evren in May 2015 brought back the dark memories of human rights abuses and political violence suffering. Anger, shame, an injured sense of justice, all feelings associated with the coup memory prevailed in the media and were also shared by Twitter users with several

²¹ Very early examples of these movies are *Funny Little Dirty War* (1983); *The Official Story* (1985); and *The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo* (1985).

²² *They Don't Wear Black Tie* (1981); *Pra Frente, Brasil* (1982); *A Freira e a Tortura* (1983).

²³ Turgut Ozal (1927-1993) was the leader of the Motherland Party and Prime Minister for two terms (1983-1989). He became President in 1989.

hashtags (e.g., #KötüBilirdik²⁴). While Evren was condemned, the memory of Erdal Eren, a victim of the coup who was executed at the age of 17, was commemorated in all media.

Looking at this situation, it not wrong to argue that unfinished transitional justice is a pending issue in Turkey where no truth commission has yet been founded but efforts have been made to document human right abuses. Sema Pişkinsüt, a member of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the then President of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, documented the human right abuses and torture in 2000 (Sevimay, 2001) by carrying out investigations at police stations and prisons to prepare the report. Piskinsut emphasized the need for transitional justice and the need for reparation for torture survivors, but this did not create any progress in the transitional justice that prematurely closed.

The Argentinian path of transitional justice in the post-military regime era sharply contrasts to that of Turkey. In Argentina the civil government under the presidency of Alfonsín, which came into power in 1983, immediately took transitional justice measures, including founding a truth commission (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, CONADEP, 1983)²⁵ and passing the National Reconciliation Law (*Ley de Pacificación Nacional*) that transferred the cases of human-rights abuses to military courts. The report by CONADEP and the Juntas Trial were milestones in the collective understanding of the dimension of state terrorism and they gave a push towards seeking justice by the larger society. Reparation policies were also adopted soon after the end of the military regime. Beginning with that of President Alfonsín in 1986, which passed the first reparation law providing economic compensation for the families of the disappeared, successive governments passed other reparation laws as part of the reconciliation process.

The Trial of the Juntas, a milestone judicial action in Argentina that tried the members of the military government, officially began on 22 April 1985 and ended by sentencing the coup generals to life imprisonment (General Jorge Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera) and several years in prison (General Roberto Viola: seventeen years, Admiral Armando Lambruschini: eight years, General Orlando Agosti: four and a half years). Also, several other officers were convicted and sentenced (Speck, 1987). Trials of lower-ranking officers caused increasing restlessness in the armed forces, which urged the then-president, Raúl Alfonsín, to push two laws to terminate the proceedings and to stop prosecution of additional suspects among military and security officers: the *Punto Final*, (“Full Stop” law, Law No. 23492, 1986) and the *obediencia debida* (*Due Obedience Law*, Law No. 23521, 1987). *Nonetheless*, the impunity laws granting subordinates immunity from prosecution when they were carrying out orders did not halt the judicial action to find the truth about the victims. Truth-finding trials, which were judicial actions limited to investigation and documentation but not criminal prosecution, began in 1995. They constituted a novel solution devised by the Argentine judicial system, neither to allow judges to establish criminal responsibility nor to sanction the perpetrators of crimes, but

²⁴ *Kötü bilirdik*: At a funeral in the Islamic tradition, when a person dies the *imam* asks the people who attend the funeral “How did you know the deceased?” Customarily, people always say, “We knew him/her as a nice person”. However, Kenan Evren was remembered not very well in social media with the hashtag #KötüBilirdik (# we knew him as a bad person). See the article entitled “The Death of Kenan Evren on Social Media: #KötüBilirdik”, Bianet (2015), <http://m.bianet.org/bianet/other/164443-the-death-of-kenan-evren-on-social-media-kotubilirdik>.

²⁵ See Crenzel (2008) on transitional justice and Argentina's National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons.

“to investigate the truth about the dictatorship’s crimes and concerning the victims’ respective fates”. (Maculan, 2012:106).

After a decade of struggle by the human rights groups against the two amnesty laws that had blocked the prosecutions of crimes committed under the military dictatorship, both laws were annulled after lower-level courts started declaring Full Stop and Due Obedience laws unconstitutional. Then Congress and the Senate voted to annul them in 2003 after President Néstor Kirchner won the elections. This was celebrated as a landmark victory against impunity for gross human rights violations.

Amongst the trails, Mega Cause I (ended in 2011) was the largest surge of trials and it was an important step in doing justice to the victims in Post-Dirty War Argentina (1976-1983). The judges condemned 16 of the 18 defendants, all ex-naval officers from the ESMA, for clandestine detention and human rights violations committed during the military dictatorship (Davis, 2013) and many officers were sentenced. Despite many difficulties in the trial, partly due to its large size, the successes of Mega Cause I were translated to the larger Mega Cause II.

In Argentina, the civil society, which had already raised its voice against human rights abuses by the military regime before its fall, has contributed to the struggle for transitional justice. The Mothers of Plaza Mayo²⁶ association was formed and organized numerous events to bring the perpetrators to trial for misdeeds and to punish them.

Table 1: The Post-coup/Military Regime Truth and Justice policies in Selected Countries with Military Regimes (Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Uruguay)

Selected Countries with Military Regimes	Truth Commissions to Investigate Human Right Abuses Committed by the Military Regime and Trials
Turkey (1980-1983)	No truth commission. Human Rights Inquiry Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly documented the human right abuses and torture in the Trial of General Evren (2012).
Argentina (1976-1983)	National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP, 1983) and "Nunca Mas" (Never Again, 1984). Trial of Juntas (1985), The “Truth Trials” (1995), Prosecutions of Argentinian military outside Argentina (1999) ²⁷

²⁶ Plazo Mayo Mothers were organized in 1977 in order to learn what had happened to their children who disappeared, and began to march at the Plaza de Mayo.

²⁷ Prosecutions held in Spain, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States against Argentine military. The most critical example was Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón’s investigation into the crimes committed during the military dictatorship. On November 2, 1999, Baltasar Garzón indicted Commander Adolfo Scilingo who publicly spoke

	<p>Creating the Historical Reparation Fund for the Restitution of Kidnapped Children and/or Children Born in Captivity in Argentina.</p> <p>October 26, 2011, the verdict of <i>Mega Cause I</i> sentencing sixteen of the defendants to prison. November 28, 2012, <i>Mega Cause II</i> was scheduled to begin (Davis, 2013).</p> <p>Declaring the laws of Full Stop (23492) and Due Obedience (23521) unconstitutional in 2003 (Guembe, 2005).</p>
Brazil (1964-1985)	<p><i>Comissao Nacional da Verdade</i> (National Truth Commission) declared in 2011 and installed in 2012. In December 2014, the Commission released its report on human rights violations by the military regime.</p>
Peru (1968-1980)²⁸	<p>After two decades of internal armed conflict, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up in 2001 and presented its first report in 2003. Law of Reparations in July 2005. National reparations plan and the prosecution of former President Fujimori.</p>
Chile (1973-1990)	<p>National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (1990–1991). Commission of Political Imprisonment and Torture of Chile (known as the Valech Commission). "National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation" (enacted by <u>Law No. 19123</u> (PDF-254KB) on January 31, 1992.</p>

Turkey's path of transitional justice sharply contrasts to those of Argentina, Chile and Peru, all of which formed truth commissions to investigate deaths and torture and to identify the perpetrators, and they all established accountability for the crimes committed during the military regimes soon after the fall of those regimes (Tables 1 and 2). Comparing the South Cone states amongst themselves reveals differences in truth and justice policies. In contrast to the immediate initiation of the official truth-finding policies of Argentina and Chile following the breakdown of the military regime, the Brazilian and Uruguayan cases were not marked by immediate truth commissions in the transitional period. Brazil and Uruguay are examples of belated truth-telling and accountability for some historical "mistakes". In Uruguay 15 years and in Brazil three decades passed before an official truth commission on past human rights violations was established (Table 1). Both countries have experienced protracted confrontations with the past, where civil society and human rights advocacy groups' demands for truth telling

out about "death flights. During the military regime, the opponents were released into the sea at night from the helicopters or airplanes in flight over the Atlantic Ocean.

²⁸The military rule (1968–1980) began when General Juan Velasco Alvarado overthrew elected President Fernando Belaúnde Terry.

and justice for the victims were challenged by the official narration in favor of forgetting and forgiving.²⁹ In Brazil, an Amnesty Law established in 1979 before the military regime ended (1985) contributed to the prevalence of the policy of forget until the last years of the Lula government that was able to promise a truth commission only towards the end of his term. The commission was eventually launched with the Presidency of Dilma Rousseff in 2011.³⁰

In both Brazil and Uruguay,³¹ the amnesty laws that prevented the criminal prosecution of human rights abuses committed during the country's military regimes were belatedly challenged thanks to the efforts of human right groups and the civil society. In Brazil, on April 9, 2014, a bill that would modify this law to exclude human rights violations committed by state agents was approved by the Brazilian senate, yet there has been no trial as of December 2016. In Uruguay, the Law on the Expiration of the Punitive Claims of the State, an amnesty law enacted in 1986 and backed by the people twice in 1989 and in 2009 referenda, was repealed in 2011. This paved the way for punishing human rights abuse crimes, including enforced disappearances, committed during the military dictatorship. However, in February 2013, Uruguay's Supreme Court ruled against dictatorship trials made possible when Congress passed legislation in 2011 to revoke the impunity law. Yet, *there are some emblematic cases on the path from impunity to accountability in Uruguay. One of them was the arrest of former President Bordaberry in 2006 for his involvement in the murder of four opposition members in Argentina, conducted as a part of Operation Condor, a cross-border conspiracy of dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s to "eradicate 'subversion'".*³² In the same year, six military officers and two policemen were prosecuted for 28 disappearances of Uruguayans in Buenos Aires in 1976 (Skaar, 2016). In February 2010, Bordaberry was sentenced to 30 years for human right abuses and for violating the Constitution by partaking in the 1973 coup. In March 2013, former military officers from Argentina and Uruguay went on trial in Buenos Aires for their human rights abuses in Operation Condor, jointly conducted by the two countries. In Uruguay, "the lack of judicial independence obstructed the quest for justice for many years" was one of the factors that sustained the impunity. However, "the combination of continued civil society demands for justice met by increasingly human-rights-friendly executives and liberal-minded judges (and lately also prosecutors)" contributed to the advancement of retributive justice (Skaar, 2013:1). Despite the progress in the trial of the atrocities committed under Operation Condor, today Uruguay is still divided over how to deal with former military officers accused of rights abuses.

Table 2: Amnesty Laws for the Military-era in Selected Countries with Military Regimes (Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Uruguay)

²⁹ This paper benefited from Roniger's (2011) study on memory and transitional justice in Uruguay and his comparison of Uruguay with Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

³⁰ After years of discussing the issue, in October 2011 Brazil's Congress voted to set up a truth commission and President Dilma Rousseff signed the bill into law.

³¹ In Uruguay the human rights groups' work was vital in lifting the impunity that prevented the trial of the perpetrators. (Burt & Lessa, 2013).

³² "Operation Condor" was a clandestine intelligence-sharing Inter-American System organization that identified, located, and assassinated suspected guerrilla leaders and non-violent dissenters from the left and center left in many Latin American countries.

Selected Countries with Military Regimes	Amnesty Laws and Impunities
Turkey (1980-1983)	Amnesty Law, established in the 1982 Constitution, revoked in 2010.
Argentina (1976-1983)	No constitutional article for amnesty but Impunity Laws (<i>Punto Final</i> and <i>Obediencia Debida</i>) in 1998 ³³ granting automatic immunity from prosecution to all members of the military except top commanders. They were annulled in 2003.
Brazil (1964-1985)	Amnesty Law was established in 1979. On April 9, 2014, a bill that would modify this law to exclude human rights violations committed by state agents was approved by the Brazilian senate.
Peru (1968-1980)	The amnesty laws, created in 1995 by Fujimori, were repealed in 2001.
Chile (1973-1990)	Amnesty Law null, a decree passed by the Pinochet regime in 1978. In 1998 Chile's Supreme Court ruled that the law should not apply to cases of human rights violations.
Uruguay (1973-1985)	Law of Expiry (<u>Law on the Expiration of the Punitive Claims of the State</u>) enacted in 1986. People voted in referenda twice to keep the law in 1989 and in 2009, repealing the Expiry Law 4 in 2011 and restoring it in 2013.

Despite similarities, the five Southern Cone states have some differences with respect to the compatibility of truth commission works with trials and punishments. They are not very compatible in Uruguay, but more so in the Brazilian case. They are well-matched in Chile and Argentina, where criminal proceedings followed the publication of each country's truth commission report (Crocker, 2000). Chile is still an example of late accountability; nevertheless, a handful of successful prosecutions in the mid-1990s of cases not covered by the time-limited amnesty were indicators of the progress of transitional justice in Chile. The progress did not mature to the desired level as much as it did in Argentina, partly due to Chilean "judicial apathy" (Collins, 2010). However, transitional justice regained momentum with the post-1998 revival of prosecutions for past human rights crimes in Chile, a development that is linked to the 'Pinochet effect', the impact of the detention of Pinochet in the UK at the request of Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón in that year (Collins, 2010). Chile is a case of semi-finished transitional justice as the military dictator, Augusto Pinochet, although never formally convicted of a crime, died while under investigation.

³³ Under these laws, during the Carlos Mennen rule (1989-1999), two generals were pardoned and in 1991 ten convicted officers were all pardoned and released (Engstrom & Pereira, 2012).

Amongst the Southern Cone states, Peru's struggle for transitional justice is more similar to Chile. Its transitional justice project began in 2001 when an interim government, under president Valentín Paniagua, established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate two decades of internal armed conflict (1980–2000) between guerrilla groups, the armed peasant patrols (*rondas campesinas*) and the Peruvian armed forces. TRC concluded its two-year investigation in August 2003 and produced a nine volume report on human rights abuses and offered recommendations to the transitional or successor government, which included “a wide range of reforms, including moral, symbolic, and economic reparations for victims, institutional reforms, and the transfer of selected cases to the appropriate authorities for further criminal investigations” (Laplante & Theidon, 2007:236). But the truth-telling and finding process did not lead to the immediate implementation of reparations. The delays in implementing reparatory measures have affected victim-survivors negatively, leading to them being disillusioned with the transitional justice project. (Laplante & Theidon, 2007). A handful of criminal investigations opened pursuant to the TRC's recommendations and the approval of the Peruvian Congress of a Law of Reparations in July 2005 are important transitional justice outcomes.

To what extent the transitional justice was successfully launched and implemented is very much related to the demands coming from the civil society. The position of the civil society organizations vis-à-vis the politics of coup memory and demand for transitional justice is one of the parameters of comparison in the study. Table 3 summarizes the civil society activity in the selected countries that experienced transition from military regimes to democracies. In Argentina, imparting justice for serious past crimes has been part of state policy, yet it has been decidedly accompanied by civil society organizations that have provided means for the realization of justice. Moreover, two institutions, the Center of Legal and Social Studies (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, CELS) and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) have made contributions to transitional justice and hence to the defense and promotion of human rights and the strengthening of democracy. Similarly, in Peru, where the transition to a democratic regime in 1980 opened up political space and created new possibilities for civil society organization, both government agencies and civil society including NGOs and victim-survivor's associations struggle over reparations (Laplante & Theidon, 2007). In Chile, Uruguay and Brazil civil society was an essential part of the struggle for transitional justice (Sharnak, 2013), while in Turkey the civil society's³⁴ activity for transitional justice was curtailed due to unstable and conflicting politics of the 1980 coup memory.

Table 3: Civil Society Activity, Politics of Memory, and Transitional Justice in Selected Countries with Military Regimes (Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Uruguay)

³⁴ In Turkey, “new” social movements, including women's associations, environmentalist organizations and many community-based organizations have become active since the early 1990s.

Selected Countries with Military Regimes	Civil Society Organizations, Human Rights Networks and Initiatives Documenting Human Rights Abuses and Demanding Truth Telling and Justice
Turkey (1980-1983)	Human Rights Association (1986) and the 78'ers Foundation documented human rights abuses. Memory and Justice Center (<i>Hakikat Adalet Hafıza Çalışmaları Merkezi</i>) founded in 2011; Islamic human rights associations have initiated memory and truth activities.
Argentina (1976-1983)	Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (1977) and several human rights associations connected to the truth telling and justice initiatives. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) and International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).
Brazil (1964-1985)	Torture Never Again (<i>Tortura Nunca Mais</i>) is a human rights association founded by Cecília Coimbra in 1985.
Peru (1968-1980)	<i>State of Fear</i> ³⁵ , a project of Skylight Pictures, is a long form documentary film at the center of a multiplatform local/global strategic human rights and social justice campaign (2005). It has been linked with social movements since 1983.
Chile (1973-1990)	Vicariate of Solidarity (Vicaría de la Solidaridad) was set up by Pope Paul VI in 1976 to stop the abduction and ill treatment of Chilean citizens by the government during military rule.
Uruguay (1973-1985)	Uruguay Institute for Legal and Social Studies (IELSUR), the Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) focusing on human rights abuses and helping torture victims (Sharnak, 2013).

Comparing Patterns of Coup Memory, Politics of Truth and Justice in the Transition Period and Democratic Achievements in Selected Countries

³⁵ This project documents the political use of fear in Fujimori's Peru.

All selected Southern Cone countries and Turkey share a similar coup memory pattern, which is the public retaining a strong coup/military regime memory with a demand for its public commemoration and retribution for the victims. But in contrast to Turkey, where the decades old reluctance in commemorating the coup and recognizing wrongs doings has created grievances, the governments of the selected Southern Cone countries sooner or later recognized the historical mistake of acting like a military coup/ regime and pursued a consistent politics of remembrance and recognition, largely independent of their political interests. Then, consistent with the selected Southern Cone states' politics of memory favoring remembering rather than oblivion, they initiated the transitional justice process.

In Argentina, Chile and Peru, the post-coup politics of memory endorsed remembering the coup rather than oblivion and adopting the prosecute and punish choice of transitional justice, which in turn paved the way to democratization reforms and to new measures for reparations programs. In the other countries, like Turkey, the “forgive and forget” option prevailed for a few decades despite opposition from some political parties and human rights advocacy groups. In Brazil and Uruguay, the belated truth telling and identifying the perpetrators came and gave impetus to the immature transitional justice. In Turkey, it was prematurely closed.

In Southern Cone countries, particularly in Argentina and Chile, the initial transitional justice led to prioritizing the legal-institutional reforms and responses—such as punishing former leaders of the military regimes, vetting abusive security forces, and replacing state secrecy with truth and transparency. This process was belated in Uruguay but resulted in the persecution of the perpetrators in the end. This process is still progressing in Brazil, despite the truth telling process commencing tardily, and the amnesty law has been challenged. In Turkey, the belated trials of the 1980 coup actors in 2012, which were made possible thanks to the Ak Party government's efforts and the civil society struggle, resulted in an unfinished process; it is no longer a governmental agenda. Turkey has not implemented any reparations as part of the transitional justice procedure.

The emerging pattern in the Southern Cone is formulating truth and justice policies in the transition period, sooner or later, and establishing accountability for past human rights violations. Their path of initiating truth and justice policies (truth commissions, established normative frameworks for reparations, persecuting the perpetrators) have many similarities, despite the differences in the time of the truth telling and commencing criminal justice process. Their path diverges from Turkey's no truth, no justice policy.

After studying documents relating to the differences in the types of politics of a coup/military regime and in the choices of the transitional justice options in the selected countries, we need to answer the critical question: whether these differences are related to the different patterns in democratization? In order to answer this question, the study refers to the Democratic index³⁶ that measures the level of democratization worldwide. On this index, based on their scores (ranging from 0 to 10) on a variety of indicators within the five categories (of electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political

³⁶The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2015.

culture), each country is then itself categorized as one of four types of regime: “full democracies”; “flawed democracies”; “hybrid regimes”; and “authoritarian regimes”.

The Democracy Index (2015) data show that Uruguay scores the highest at 8.17 and is categorized as a “full democracy” country.³⁷ The scores of Chile (7.84), Argentina (7.02), Brazil (6.96) and Peru (6.58) locate them as “flawed democracy” countries. Turkey (5.12) scores the lowest amongst the selected countries and is categorized as a hybrid regime by the Democratic Index Study. Thus, the study shows that transitional justice and reparations are critical to generating the recognition, civic trust, and social solidarity that are the foundations of a meaningful democracy. If this is missed in the transitional period, democratization cannot fully mature. However, Spain, a European country, offers a key counterexample to the transitional justice studies. The refusal to confront and redress the past did not hinder the growth of a successful democracy in Spain. On the contrary, by leaving the past behind Spain chose not to repeat it (Encarnación, 2003). Yet, Spain had to reform in order to be a European Union country soon after the end of authoritarianism. Once it became a member state, any deviation from the democratic norm is very unlikely. As such Spain’s path differs from Turkey, a candidate country that keeps waiting to join the EU, while facing many domestic political challenges.

This study confirms the hypothesis that the rights to truth, justice and reparation are linked to democratization. Right to truth for justice entails a “good narration” that is shared by the people and governments so that they can struggle for transitional justice, an important juncture for consolidation of democratic norms and practices, unless there are other imperatives for democratization.

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³⁷ In 2015 the number of “full democracies” is low, at only 20 countries. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2015, p.1.

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Chapter 5

Mexico and The Caucasus: The battle for the symbolic space

Manuel Férrez³⁸

The diplomatic representations of the Caucasus in Mexico (those of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Georgia) have built and developed, since the establishment of their embassies, dissimilar relationships all over Mexican territory. This is an interesting point of departure to perform an analysis on their diverse activities in order to be able to understand the type of objectives they pursue, as well as the results they hope to achieve in Mexico.

The Republic of Armenia opened its embassy in Mexico in February 2014. It was Mr. Grigor Hovhannisyanyan who, as the ambassador, declared during the official inauguration that “our people, our citizens, do not know each other very well; there are few cultural and historical elements that we may have in common. It is precisely because of that we now have a great opportunity to cooperate. Armenia realized this and, finally, after years of long distance chains of work between colleagues and friends, we are ready to act directly” (1).

The opening of the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia, in 2004, might be understood as a necessary movement because of two factors: the first one, to have permanent representation in a country that only two years before went through a polemic episode because of the public display of a Heydar Aliyev’s statue that not only exposed the corruption of the local government (the statue was set in one of the most important avenues in Mexico City), but also demonstrated the ignorance and the lack of interest that the Mexican academics, the own Ministry of Education and the Federal Government had over the Caucasus and its current dynamics; the second factor involved in this process of setting a formal representation by establishing an embassy was to prepare, with the help of a small but active Armenian Diaspora in Mexico, the events to commemorate the genocide/ massacre of the Armenians in 1915, during the Ottoman era. The diplomatic relations between Georgia and Mexico were set in 1992, but it was until 2011 that the first resident ambassador in Mexico City, Malkas Mikeladze, arrived. Today it is the second ambassador, Zurab Eristavi, who continues the diplomatic efforts.

In September of 2010 the Prime Minister of Georgia, Nika Guilaury, made the first official visit to Mexico and, in December of the same year, President Mikheil Saakashvili attended the UN’s Conference on Climate Change that took place in the city of Cancun, Mexico. At the conference, the presidents of both countries met and exchanged some ideas.

It is interesting to take note that both on the Internet Web Page and the Facebook profile of the Georgia’s Embassy is manifested that the main orientation of their politics towards Mexico is focused on the tourism promotion and the search for commercial and investment alliances; they outline the geographical, cultural and economical advantages of Georgia, reasserting that since the Rose Revolution of 2003, the country has greatly enhanced the Rule of Law and its government institutions.

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Regarding the Republic of Azerbaijan diplomatic relations were also established in 1992. They opened an embassy in 2008 with the goal of: “consolidate the friendship and partnerships that exist today among Azerbaijan and this region of the world. Our task has been to collaborate with the Mexican authorities over strategic issues for both sides. At the same time, we have had a strong commitment in searching for new communication channels with all of the other Latin American countries of the region.”

We have to underline the fact that for many years, previous to the establishment of their own diplomatic representations, Mexico had request the Embassy of Turkey in Mexico to handle every issue concerning the Caucasus region and that currently all the diplomatic relations between Mexico and Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are taken care by the Mexico’s Embassy in Turkey as well; only recently, in 2015, a Mexico’s Embassy was established in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Consular affairs with Armenia are dealt by the Mexican diplomatic representation in the Russian Federation.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: The statue of discord

Mexico City is peppered with monuments, statues, streets and avenues that are not of the common knowledge. Some of them are there to commemorate a historic character or a Middle East or Caucasus country, within which stands out the statue of Atatürk in Avenida Paseo de la Reforma - one of the most important avenues in the city- two busts of Yasser Arafat, a couple of commemorative plaques regarding the Armenian Genocide of 1915, some parks and names of streets and cultural centers, monuments to the “Lebanese immigrant” and even a monumental clock named “The Ottoman Clock” – also known as the “Turkish clock”, or the “Lebanese clock” – donated by the Lebanese community of the Ottoman Empire to Mexico City in September of 1922.

The controversy around the unveiling of the former President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, statue in a Mexico City’s park may be understood from the point of view of those who confront Mexico City’s government over the appropriation of the symbolic public space that has been going on for a couple of decades now; one also has to acknowledge the academics disregard over the Caucasus region both from Mexican universities and Government.

On August 22, 2012, Marcelo Ebrard, former head of Mexico City’s government, inaugurated Plaza Tlaxcoaque and the Mexican-Azerbaijan Park. The Republic of Azerbaijan destined 65 million Mexican pesos (6 million dollars) for the rehabilitation of the plaza and the placement of monuments.

Over the next few months, a number of neighbors filed their complaints against the statue and on October 23, the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing of the city announced the creation of a special commission to come out with an opinion about it. As a result of the complaints, the Embassy of Azerbaijan maintains that the process of negotiation with the local government was crystal clear.

On November 23, the Commission for Analysis on Plaza Tlaxcoaque and The Friendship Park recommended the local authorities to remove the statue of Aliyev and relocate it in another cultural public space.

Then, on December the 5th of the same year, Miguel Ángel Mancera, the new Mayor of the city, named Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as Coordinator of International Affairs of Mexico City who, just a month after, stated that “*the statue cannot rest in its place because it does not honors the City*” (2).

The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan did not stay indifferent and, on January 23 of 2014, the local government promised to relocate the statue; only after two days, the agreement of July 2011, by which the Azerbaijan’s government was to donate the 65 million Mexican pesos, is amended.

The statue was finally taken to Azcapotzalco (one of the municipalities of Mexico City) and the Mayor of the City committed himself to relocate the statue into a Governments House that they will give to the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to establish a cultural center. But, up until today, the statue is kept in some government storehouse (3).

The inevitable question is: what are the factors that caused such a media, political and public commotion over the statue of President Heydar Aliyev? Especially, because this is not the only case involving the symbolic use of the city’s public space, neither is the only one worth discussing, nor that should cause indignation.

In my opinion, the only satisfactory answer must take on account four main actors: The Embassy of The Republic of Azerbaijan in Mexico, the Armenian Diaspora, the local government and authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within the, sometimes very dark, relationships amongst these four entities one might find the answer.

It is not by chance that the Azerbaijani government decided to place the statue of Heydar Aliyev within a park that has other monuments with strong political references and meanings around; and, of course, one has to acknowledge the reasons to consider the place in terms of politics: on the one hand, because the map that is part of the Plaza shows the occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh; on the other, it also contains a monument over four cities in Azerbaijan (Baku, Ganja, Nagorno Karabagh and Nakhchivan). It is important to add in this point that the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Mexico also inaugurated another important and controversial monument in Mexico City: The commemorative statue about the Genocide of the Jodyalı.

In the *Plaza Tlaxcoaque*, located near the historic Centre of Mexico City is located the chapel of *la Santísima Concepción*, a Catholic church dating back to the 17TH century. *Plaza Tlaxcoaque* was for many year an area abandoned by the City’s Government to the point to relegated any tourist reference about the square.

On January 9, 2012 was launched the recovery of the chapel of *la Santísima Concepción* and the square that surrounds it. This remodeling project occurred in conjunction with the Government of Azerbaijan and was part of the collaboration agreement signed between the Government of the city of Mexico (then Federal District) and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

A bronze statue cast of more than 3 meters high was added to the structural changes of the square (renovation of paving, placement of trees, installation of a water fountain) and that commemorates the Jodyali genocide.

In east corner of the square was placed a statue bronze of 3 meters with the figure of a woman with the head and arms raised, and at the base of black mosaics the legend "JODYALI" in vertical letters and "25-26 February 1992 genocide" in horizontals. The monument refers to the massacre of Jodyali during the war in Nagorny Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This monument has aroused a diplomatic conflict between Mexico, Armenia and Azerbaijan

Currently, the map and the monument in *Plaza Tlaxcoaque* are kept in their original place, and this fact can be considered as a victory for Azerbaijan as it is a clear statement of the political and historical position of the country, and it remains in this very symbolic public space in Mexico City.

The Armenian Diaspora in Mexico – that has one hundred years of historical roots in the country – was preparing the commemoration for the centenary of the Armenian Genocide; and it reacted vigorously in the political, diplomatic, media and academic spheres; the reaction was not only about the statue itself, but against the whole project of rehabilitation and placement of any other monuments on the Embassy's behalf.

What went wrong with the Mexico City's Government is that it took over a public space without previously consulting with any specialist in the Caucasus region, it did not ask the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, without any official notification, was simply left behind from the issue; whereas the 65 million Mexican pesos were handled in very corrupt terms, not only to the eyes of the citizens but to the Azerbaijani government as well.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred to avoid any responsibility, and took the problem to the next level by making it impossible to avoid conflict over an important public space in Mexico City. The Ministry's action was due to a combination of ignorance over the implications of the statue, the map and the monument; to a selfish position in terms of its own relationship with the local government; and to the supposition that this case was one among many of the statues, parks and monuments that pepper the city, which are not even registered thoroughly, nor does it exist a standard and transparent procedure that involves the citizens in the approval of this or any other monument.

Last, the intensity used by the media to address this episode is at least curious; if one compares the lack of attention given to almost any other similar matter: there are polemic monuments all over Mexico City, there are even some of them that represent countries that have more vast, profound and historical relationships with Mexico than Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia deeply questioned Mexico through diplomatic channels over this event. For me it is exemplary and symptomatic of the type of international relations that my country is used to establish with the Caucasus region: one that goes between the ignorance and corruption of the high government levels. Added to the previous, the lack of interest of the Mexican academics over the Caucasus region and its historical and cultural dynamics is mesmerizing. Concerning this last point, I want to single out that the Anahuac University, by the means of its International Relations School, has created the Seminar in Middle East and Caucasus, which was inaugurated in January, 2016, aiming to fulfill the academic void in the Mexican academic field.

Georgia in Mexico: A cultural and commercial approach

From a different perspective of those embraced by Azerbaijan and Armenia – even if it is true that they do not neglect the cultural and commercial aspects of the bilateral relations, have focused on political matters as the ones described above – Georgia has oriented its efforts in promoting the country by means of tourism and commercial opportunities, as well as through its academic sphere with a medium and long-term vision.

Georgian Embassy in Mexico gives utmost importance to introducing its country to the geographically distant region, by concentrating on similarities between the two - in culture, traditions and values.

With the belief that cultural issues are the first door to knock if one wants to introduce a foreign country and establish foundations for greater contacts, during the last couple of years, the Embassy of Georgia has organized different exhibitions and events to promote its culture: presented the richness of its cuisine by organizing the Georgian Gastronomic Festival, organized a huge exhibition of the Georgian wine culture at the prestigious Museum of Wine in Baja California, presented Georgian Cinema in different Art-House film festivals like FICUNAM or Chiapas International Film Festival and organized the Georgian Film Week at the *Cineteca Nacional*. Georgia presented the art of its National Dance in Luminaria Festival by presenting Georgina National ballet and hosted the famous group of young dancers called *Niños Virtuosos del Cáucaso*, who made many performances around Mexico. Last year the embassy organized the concert of Georgian Jazz Singer Maia Baratashvili in order to introduce Georgian jazz and many more features.

With the initiative and support of the Embassy, in 2015 the first ever Spanish translation of the works of Georgian contemporary writers was published by Mexico's Institute of Culture of Tlaxcala and the Georgian Book Center - a perfect example of bilateral cooperation between the corresponding institutions of the two countries.

In addition, The Embassy has developed close ties with different higher educational institutions and pays an utmost importance on spreading information, fostering academic interest and encouraging scholastic debate about Georgia and the Caucasus in Mexico's younger generation and the future leaders.

As an example of the commercial approach given by the Embassy of Georgia it is the press relies of March 8, 2016, in which it is stated that the National Association of Importers and Exporters of the Mexican Republic (ANIERM, for its acronym in Spanish), with the involvement of the Georgian Embassy in Mexico, decided to appoint as its representative to Mr. Bezhan Gurgendidze.

This partnership has 72 years of experience in import and export issues and has representations over several countries in America, Asia and Europe. It is worthy of interest to know that 60% of the business belonging to the Association have some degree of involvement in activities concerning the import market.

Conclusion

There are three diplomatic representations, with different interests and dynamics in Mexico, which can be taken as an example of the type of international policies of the three independent Caucasian republics. On the one hand are Armenia and Azerbaijan are focusing their efforts on the appropriation of the public space in Mexico City, promoting the debate of historical and political subjects that are far from understanding the general public of Mexico's capital and, on the other, the Georgian representation is enhancing the commercial relationships and profits from the academic field to introduce a country that stays out of controversy, making it more attractive to the Mexican people without diminishing the academic relationships that may come in the near future.

The regional dynamic of the Caucasus, their military clashes and diplomatic conflicts were reflected in the public space of Mexico City. The relationship among Mexico with Armenia and Azerbaijan also was damaged by the lack of coordination, communication and collaboration between the Mexico City's Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mexican academia, which, for their own interests, was decanted for taking a partial position in favor of Armenia narrative about the statue of Aliyev. The inhabitants of Mexico City were victims of the news media which failed to investigate in depth the dynamics of the Caucasus or to proposed alternatives to resolve the diplomatic dispute.

The use of the public space in big cities as Mexico City for the placement of monuments and statues should be regulated and consulted with large sectors of academics, journalists and experts to avoid unnecessary diplomatic confrontations that harm (although our political deny it) the image of our country abroad.

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Chapter 6

Alternative development strategies in case of Latin America³⁹

Emine Tahsin⁴⁰

This paper aim to analyze emerging development strategies in the early 2000s on the basis of political economy in case of Latin America. As it is known in case of Latin America alternative initiatives against neoliberal agenda and Washington Consesus coincidence with the rise of leftist governments that also lead to redefinition and restructuring of integration and cooperation experiences (such as ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC and MERCOSUR) and development strategies. Besides Latin America is one of the specific region that inequalities have increased during the neoliberal era and as a consequence alternative policies opposed to Washington Consesus and neoliberal policies have been discussed widely.

“Neostructuralism”, “neodevelopmentalism”, “development within”, “endogenous development”, “neoextractivism”, “buen vivir” are among the main concepts that have been defined under the label of emerging development strategies. Addition to these considering the social exclusion and the level of poverty, pro-poor policies have been on the agenda of the governments.

While questioning the basis of emerging development strategies it would be suggested that market and state relations in the formation of these strategies need to be investigated in detail. It is claimed that the basis of market and state relations also reflects the dimensions of emerging alternatives against neoliberal policies. Furthermore the external conditions that has influenced the applied policies would be included to the analysis. It would be introduced that the commodity boom, fluctuations in oil prices and changing nature of bilateral relations on the basis of south- south cooperation also have been influencing the basis of emerging development strategies.

Besides it is thought that aftermath of 2008/2009 world economic crisis another stage in the formation of alternative development strategies has started. Currently the success of alternative development strategies has been questioned based on economic performances of the countries and as a one of the consequences of rising discontent the failure of leftist governments in elections has been observed. Given these results, to what extent it is possible to follow an alternative development path need to be investigated in detail considering both internal and external factors in the determination of these strategies.

What is going on in real terms under these initiatives? What are the main possible contributions of these initiatives to the development process? What are the limits and contradictions of these strategies considering the development process? would be among the main questions that would tried to be answered within the framework of the paper.

³⁹ This paper is extended version of presentation delivered by Emine Tahsin at LASA2014 XXXII under title “The limits and possibilities of integration and development strategies in Latin America “.

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Key words: Alternative development strategies, neodevelopmentalism, alternative integration policies, development strategies in Latin America

Introduction

As it is known Latin America (LA) is one of the unique geography that the developmentalist approaches and integration policies have strong historical roots. Given that Latin America has its own specific characteristics that is historically defined and goes back to 19th century (Dabéne, 2009) during the last decades regarding alternative policies, integration and cooperation initiatives have been on the agenda of the most Latin American governments. Since then these initiatives have been conceptualized either as a part of Inter-American system or as a reaction to Inter-American system. Besides these initiatives have been defined as one of the specific tool for providing Latin America unity or diversity (Gardini, 2010). Hence these initiatives emerge as the result of mutually interaction with the policies led on governmental level and formation of the foreign policies. Besides in the 20th century, it seems that the divergence and convergence of independency and developmentalism ideas lead to the emergence of two important schools, structuralism and dependency, from Latin America that also have worldwide influences and currently in some ways still have been shaping the definition of developmentalist ideas.

Currently the region is called with new concepts related with development, integration and cooperation initiatives. Neoliberalism, neodevelopmentalism, development within, endogenous development, cooperative development are among the most used terms in order to define the applied development strategies for Latin America and Caribbean (LAC). In addition to these it is seen that integration and cooperation initiatives has gained a new momentum that also has been defined as a part of these developmentalist strategies. Furthermore implications of these policies have been carried by the leftist governments that lead the debate of rising left and alternatives in LAC.

Since then, definition and scope of these new concepts and related political implications has been discussing widely. This paper aim to investigate developmentalist strategies and as a part of this integration and cooperation initiatives would be included to the analysis. What is going on in real terms under these initiatives and to what extent they could be called as alternatives to neoliberalism? What are the possibilities, limits and contradictions related with applied policies? These questions would be the priority of this study that is aimed to be answered.

The initial starting point of these actual theoretical developments and their related political implications could be analyzed as the consequences of neoliberal policies that is more clearly crystallized in WC (Washington Consensus) principles. Secondly responds against globalization and changing dynamics in multilateral trade system as a part of neoliberal agenda has led the emergence of new actors specific to the region. In this context it is possible to claim that US led ALCA project and reactions against to this projects opened a new era for the region. When President Georges Bush launched his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in June 1990, emphasized free trade, investments and debt relief in Americas and later on by Miami Summit (1994) creation of ALCA by 34 countries was accepted. Although slow negotiating process

after “post 2001“ agenda of US foreign policy under Bush doctrine, ALCA project also became one of the main determinant of LAC-USA relations and intend to play an instrumental role in restructuring of the OAS and as a consequence restructuring of Inter-American system.

Although during those period reactions against to USA policies and restructuring of Inter – American system based on USA foreign policy, has lead rising of “autonomy” demands from the region that also coincides with the anti-globalization movements. The emergence of new social movements has flourished within these circumstances. Although demands carried by these social movements have different aspects they simply served to the determination of anti-neoliberal agenda for the region and reveal of rising discontent against neoliberalism.

The repoliticization of the societies and their demands within this context have been also carried to electoral process⁴¹ that have resulted with the victory of leftist parties. Election of Workers Party in Brazil under Lula presidency in Brazil and the Bolivarian revolution led by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela represents the main divergence from the previous periods of the region. Moreover around 60 percent of Latin America’s population now lives under a government (Arnson, 2007:3) that is in some way recall themselves as leftists.

Under these circumstances the collapse of ALCA process in Mar de Plata Summit (2005) has changed the directions of US-LAC relations. Increasing reactions against globalization, organization of the social movements in World Social Forums against ALCA, radicalization of social movements especially as a consequences of Bolivarian Revolution and Zapatista movement, the strengthen opposition of Brazil⁴² could be defined as the main factors determining the reasons of failure of ALCA project.

Although it should be emphasized that the failure of ALCA has also transformed hemispheric integration policies to a new form. The ALCA initiative as Zoellick quoted is based on competitive liberalization⁴³ that puts free trade on the offensive. In addition to these ALCA was considered as an instrument of strengthening trade relations and formation of WTO-plus agreements in purpose of creating hemispheric integration. Although the failure of ALCA initiative as a part of competitive liberalization policies sub-regional, bilateral trade relations has been rising. According to this approach US has signed PTAs with several countries that resulted with an increase in trade volume.⁴⁴ As Dabène (2009) underlines that despite FTAA failure, the Summit process⁴⁵ kept on working on the non-trade agenda, building a multilevel regional governance scheme. Besides as Dabène suggests the whole FTAA negotiation process has triggered an intense transnational mobilization that contributed to the transition from “Wave 3 to Wave 4” of regionalism. It is possible to claim that it has also formed the initial starting

⁴¹ The election of Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 was followed by Lula in Brazil in 2002 (reelected in 2006), Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003) (and the Cristina Fernandez Krichner in 2008) Tabare Vasquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2006) and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay(2008).

⁴² See Arashiro (2011).

⁴³ It has been used to describe a trade negotiating strategy containing a sequential logic linking negotiations and therefore trade liberalization across different levels (bilateral, regional and multilateral).

⁴⁴ CAFTA-DR, US-Chile(2003), US-Colombia(2006), US-Peru(2007), US Panama(2007)

⁴⁵ So far, the Summit process is composed of the six Summits of the Americas (Miami, United States, 1994; Santiago, Chile, 1998; Québec, Canada, 2001; Mar del Plata, Argentina, 2005; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 2009; and Cartagena, Colombia, 2012), and of two other Summits: on sustainable development (Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 1996) and a special summit (Monterrey, México, 2004).

point in creation of trading bloc (Gardini, 2011) system within the hemisphere⁴⁶. Within this multilevel regional governance system first of all the divergence in sub-regional trade agreements could be classified according to distance kept against to ALCA process. In addition to this reactions against to USA policies and restructuring of

Inter-American system based on USA foreign policy “autonomy” demands of the LAC states have been rising.

Besides as a consequences of the victory of leftist parties in 2000s elections the reaction against neoliberal policies has gained a momentum that also lead to the emergence of society based policies (De la Barra, 2010) and open spaces to the idea of “developmentalism”. According De La Barra a popular agenda based on the defence of sovereignty and on political democratization has been developed with the intention of transforming the failed inherited liberal states that are obstacles to change. The following agenda objectives can be summarized from the many declarations issued (De La Barra, 2010: 649):

- “Expand and defend the sustainability of the emerging, emancipatory processes.
- Deepen emerging sovereignty.
- Expand participatory and protagonist democracy.
- Fight against exclusion.
- Recover natural resources.
- Recover the public sector and public assets.
- Consolidate Latin American identity.
- Redirect development towards popular interests.
- End US hegemony and aim at a multipolar global system.”

Furthermore it is seen that in some cases the related policies goes beyond developmentalism and instead of this, 21st century socialism have been defined as the core agenda. Since then the question of “Is Latin America experiencing a post-neoliberal (Pia Rigozzi 2010, Laura Macdonald 2010) period or is it a transition to a different phase or to what extent the reactions emerge as an alternative to neoliberalism?” has formed one of the hardcore of the debates on developmentalism and integration initiatives.

The roots of developmentalism⁴⁷

After the lost decade by 1990 it is observed that CEPAL itself target to revise its theoretical stance in order to readopt LAC economies to the 21st century conditions. “*Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity*(1990)”, “*Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach*(1992)”, “*Globalization and Development*(2000)”, “*Productive*

⁴⁶ See Shadlen and Sánchez-Ancochea, (2009).

⁴⁷ The section of the paper is based on Tahsin(2011a).

Development in Open Economies(2004)” are classified among the key documents of neostructuralism that is defined by CEPAL and represents the basis of this theoretical renewal.

On the other hand the roots of these theoretical renewal goes back structuralism and in some ways aim to redefine structuralism under the given conditions of global economy. As it is known the structuralist school in Latin America has played an important role in the evolution of developmentalist approaches in 1950s and 1960s that has direct influences from German Historical School (Love, 2005:157), Keynesian-Post-Keynesian theories(Palma, 1989). Latin America structuralism basically based on Prebisch (*The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems*, 1950) studies later on mostly termed with contributions made under CEPAL.

Since late 1980s, Fanjzybler (1983,1990), Bitar(1988), French-Davis(1988), Sunkel(1990), Altimir(1990), Rosales(1994), studies could be analyzed as the pioneers of neostructuralist stance of CEPAL(Bielschowsky,2009). One of the main purpose of this theoretical renewal is to redefine the place of LAC economies within the international economy. First of all changing dynamics with globalization and the policy implications of neoliberal agenda have been taken into account and re-adoption of LAC economies in order to achieve international competitiveness has been questioned. After the lost decade increasing inequalities and the relatively poor performance of LAC lead questioning of WC principles and neoliberal agenda.

The reports of CEPAL; “*Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity*(1990)”, “*Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach*(1992)”, have been the main pillars of neostructuralist approach that characterizes the concepts of “*growth with equity*” and “*systematic competitiveness*”. These studies mostly concentrates on necessity of creation of productive patterns and endogenous accumulation process besides elimination of inequalities. Besides CEPAL report,” *Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Integration as a Contribution to Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity*(1994)” supported “open regionalism” as a part of increasing international competitiveness policy, whereas “*Equity, Development and Citizenship*(2000) represents the given emphasize to citizen rights, income inequality, social cohesion etc.

As Bielschowsky (2009:172) stated between 1998 and 2008, the neostructuralists analyses and proposals were enhanced, matured and improved to form a policy agenda encompassing the institution’s four basic analytical domains of macroeconomics and finance, productive development and international trade, social development and environmental sustainability. By the 2000s one of the specific contribution is to redefine “changing production patterns with social equity” paradigm with a set of proposals for relations between countries and peoples worldwide, together with the crucial role of the regional space and national strategies (Ocampo, 2000). CEPAL report “*A Decade of Light and Shadow LAC in 1990s*(2001)” was written under coordination of Ocampo that summarize region’s performance in 1990s and structural macroeconomic problems that need to overcome. Another key study, “*Productive Development in Open Economies*” (CEPAL, 2004) mostly concentrates on technological development and innovation, policies for enterprise development and job creation of the formal sectors and policies strengthen productive structures fostering and consolidating strategic sectors (Leiva, 2008:41) It highlights the systemic nature of competitiveness prioritizing the creation of

physical infrastructure, human resource formation and policies towards innovation and technical progress, together with others aimed at achieving faster and sustained growth and successful international engagement (Bieslowsky, 2009: 177). Following CEPAL reports one of the output of these studies is to give more importance to institutionalism and neo-Schumpeterian approaches.⁴⁸

As it is stated by Rosales (1988, cited by Sunkel and Zuletta, 1990: 41) the truth of this theory is revealed in three crucial characteristics of the Latin American economy at the end of 1980s: a) a continuing pattern of external insertion which given the trends in international trade and the international financial system leads to an impoverishing specialization, b) the predominance of incoordination production apparatus which is vulnerable and highly heterogeneous concentrates technical progress and is incapable of absorbing productively the growth of labor force c) the persistence of a very concentrated and exclusive income distribution which reveals the system's incapacity to reduce poverty. As it is reflected to the ideas of CEPAL, it is possible to claim that after the mid-1990s the search for alternatives have also coincide with the emergence of Post Washington Consensus (PWC) and the redefinition of CEPAL policies for the region. Under these circumstances it is also possible to observe that neostructuralist approach similarly with PWC try to define economic policies differently from neoliberal agenda and aim to remedy the negative effects of these policies. For example, the *growth with social equity* approach could be understood better considering the results of neoliberal agenda in the region on the other hand the redefinition of the state's role for institutional restructuring have common basis with PWC.

By looking to "*systematic competitiveness*," definition of CEPAL, as one of the main core concept of neostructuralism, it seen that competitiveness founded on the strengthening of productive capacity and innovation. Systematic competitiveness replace competitive advantage, differently from neoliberalism the roots of the competitiveness is not the prices but it is incorporation of technical progress. In neoliberalism realm of competitiveness is the market where as in neostructuralism it is the society as a whole (interface between market, intuitions and mindset (Leiva, 2008:9).

In the CEPAL's view, the aim of competitiveness is to achieve both a better position in international markets (that also determines the rivalry) and a better standard of living for the population, within open economies with few restrictions on trade and free markets (CEPAL, 1990).

As defined by CEPAL (1994) the promotion of competition encompasses a number of areas: i) deregulating competitive markets, which represent the majority; ii) regulating markets dominated by natural monopolies or other flaws of industrial organization, which are few but decisive for the well-being of individuals; and iii) deepening and extending the coverage of incipient or underdeveloped markets, such as those for technology, training and long-term capital. By this definition, the systemic nature of competitiveness, prioritizing the creation of physical infrastructure, human resource formation and policies towards innovation and technical progress, together with others aimed at achieving faster and sustained growth and successful international engagement has been defined (Bielschowsky, 2009:177). As it is emphasized by

⁴⁸ Especially based on Fajnzylber studies later on Ocampo, Cimoli and Katz contributions. (Bieslowsky, 2009)

Ocampo (2002) Latin American economies today should be building systematic competitiveness based on three fundamental pillars: the creation of innovation systems to speed up the accumulation of technological capacities; support for new productive activities and the formation of production linkages; and the provision of quality infrastructure services. The role of deep financial markets has already been emphasized, as an essential complement to an appropriate macroeconomic environment. In case of systematic competitiveness, first of all the change in the productive systems is crucial. Besides, the composition and forms of specialization for international trade, the wage policies and labor productivity also plays critical roles that should be considered in the formation of policies. Labor flexibility is defined as one of the tools in order to achieve international competitiveness and technical progress and as stated by Lagos(1994 cited by Leiva, 2008:11).) state action is a need to ensure the transition from defensive to offensive or proactive policies to achieve labor flexibility .

The idea of systematic competitiveness are highly influenced from Fajnzylber (1990) where he explored the relationship between growth with equity via industrialization, technological progress and international competitiveness .Fajnzylber uses two main concepts in order to explain the process of industrialization in Latin America. First of all Latin America countries have faced with empty box syndrome; whereas the industrialization could not achieve growth with equity. Considering the link between the pattern of industrialization and development and the attainment of the objectives of growth with equity, Latin America should fullified empty box into a black box. Black box refers to Latin America's precariousness in terms of creativity absorbing and incorporating technical progress in order to respond to regional deficiencies and potentials (Fajnzylber ,1990:ix). Latin American development process could be characterized as weak incorporation of technological progress so that the empty box would be linked directly to the inability to open the black box of technical progress. The industrialization pattern characterizes by the convergence of these 4 elements; showcase modernity, comfortable internal market, preferential international insertion by means of natural resources and the national entrepreneurial precariousness-reflects the weakness of what has been defined as the endogenous nucleus of technological dynamization (Fajnzylber 1990:20-21). Here the black box would also be influenced by the origin of Latin American formations, their instutionality, the cultural context and a series of structural economic factors whose ties with the socio political element are complex yet undeniable (Fajnzylber 1990: 4-5). Addition to these Fajnzylber (1990, 53) defines the chief factors that link the pattern of industrialization and development within the achievement of the objectives of growth with equity. The principle factors to be explored and quantified are the natural resource base, the structure of the industrial system, its international competitiveness and the pattern of consumption and investment.

Development from “within” also emerge as another key concept defined under neostructuralism. As Sunkel and Zuletta (1990:42) states development from within means industrialization, creation of genuine competitiveness that seeks to progress from the perishable income derived from natural resources to the dynamic income derived from the incorporation of technical progress into productive activity. Sunkel(1993) defined strategy of “development within” that aim to generate an endogenous accumulation process that absorbs and generates technical advances including the use of foreign investments. Shortly this attempts is named as “endogenization of technological change” and development within (Sunkel, 1993, Rodriguez,

1993). According to this approach industrialization is an inward to outward looking development but towards a future of development and industrialization from within that promises a dynamic progress of accumulation, innovation and productivity gains (Sunkel, 1993: 156). Technological change performs an essential function in the structural change (Sunkel,1993:46).

Development from within also have been explained, as given importance to dynamic effort on the supply side. Neostucturalism mostly focus on supply side, accumulation, quality, flexibility, the combination and efficient use of productive resources the deliberate incorporation of technical progress, innovation and creativity organizational capacity social harmony and discipline, frugal private and public consumption and emphasis on national savings and the acquisition of the capacity to insert national economy dynamically into the world economy. With active participation of the state and private economic agents to achieve self-sustained development. According to this approach an endogenous nucleus for industrialization, endogenous nucleus of technological infrastructure lead to creative impulse. This approach could resemble the metaphor of “creative destruction” process of Schumpeterian analysis. By the endogenous nucleus of technological infrastructure, initial creative impulse give rise to industries such as iron and steel, after the foundation stage has passed large industrial plants tied to medium and small business scientific and technological infrastructure (technological and basic sciences research institutions), the training of skilled human resources mass communications media, and public agencies and levels of decision-making are consolidated as a national practice of an endogenous nucleus of technological dynamism(Sunkel, 1993:47).

Ocampo’s contribution to the analysis of the relationship between the dynamic of the productive structure and economic growth in developing countries (Ocampo, 2002 and 2005 cited by Bielschowsky,2009) also represents another critical perspective in the development of neostucturalist ideas. Ocampo in “*Globalization and Development* (2000)” has proposed using heterodox mechanisms to rectify global asymmetries in three basic areas; production-trade, macroeconomics-finance and capital and labour mobility. Hence counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies have become one of the specific agenda of neostucturalism. In order to have changing production patterns with social equity under globalization era crucial role of regional space and national strategies have been defined. In order to tackle with asymmetries, organizations of strategies, institutions and other policy instruments have been recommended. These policies also have strengthen the context of idea of cooperation in the globalization era. Supplying global public goods, such as democracy, peace, security, macroeconomic and financial stability, and environmental sustainability, the incorporation of a rights-based international social agenda has been defined as the challenges to globalization. These studies shares the view of those who, like CEPAL, believe that per capita GDP growth is related to the changes in the composition of output and forms of specialization in terms of trade

(Bielschowsky, 2009:180-181).⁴⁹ The other importance is given emphasize to counter-cyclical policies.

Summing up four themes of neostructuralism (Sunkel, 1993, Bielschowsky, 2009, cited by Ocampo, Ros, 2011:19) are defined as;

“1)The adoption of more active and counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies in order to avoid, in particular the disequilibria generated by boom –bust cycles in external financing. 2)The combination of trade liberalization with open regionalism.3)The promotion of innovation through active technology and productive development policies adjusted to the new economies.4)The adoption of equity at the center of development policy (see esp.Ocampo, 2004, French-Davis, 2005)”. Summing up the main target in neostructuralism is to create productive structure that allows for dynamic growth and ensures efficient insertion of LAC countries in the world economy, besides by increasing the generation of productive employment and reducing structural heterogeneity (Sunkel and Zuletta,1990: 41).

Within this framework, based on theoretical basis first of all it should be stated that neostructuralists do not disagree in principle with the “outward- oriented” development strategy imposed by neoliberalism, but they criticize the fact that neoliberals “attribute export and output success to a fairly narrow set of policy instruments being manipulated in a tightly defined way”(Colclough,1991). It is the extreme nature of neoliberal policy agenda that have been criticized (Sunkel,1990:48). According Bitar (1988), neoliberals emphasize fiscal, monetary, tariff , and tax instruments but neglect structural, institutional, and political factors hence neostructuralists target to do so.

Thus market-state relations, role of the state need to be redefined. State should have a complementary role in creation of lacking markets or incomplete markets and besides should have an active role in order to eliminate defects of the markets. Administrative capacity of the state should be strengthened and state must act to eliminate structural distortions(Sunkel and Zuletta, 1990:42). Related with growth with equity; state must concentrate on three priority aims; a) minimize the impact of external shocks on the poorer and more vulnerable groups by supporting their production and productivity as well as their income levels and social services. b)lower the costs of relocating manpower associated with the structural reforms inherent in the adjustment. c) facilitate the eradication of poverty and the excessive concentration of income and wealth once growth has been recovered (Lustig, 1990 cited by Sunkel and Zuletta,1990:42).

Neostructuralist stress that the public sector must be modernized, depolitized and decentralized so that an optimum intervention strategy must be designed for deliberately promoting development. Selectivity, competitiveness and professionalism must be the main guidelines for the social efficiency of public action(French Davis ,1988 cited by Sunkel and Zuletta, 1990:48). Within this retrospect neostructuralists recall state back, that also reminiscent of PWC. On the other hand it is possible to claim that “ developmental state” approaches has been readopted to 21st century conditions in case of LAC. Without any doubt neostructuralism represents a paradigm shift from the neoliberalism but its theoretical renewal is limited to

⁴⁹ First of all Katz (2000) set out in a group of papers critically evaluating the effects of reforms on the productive performance of the countries of the region and the growth rate of their economies and also in the discussions on the relevant transformation strategies and development policies(cited by Bielschowsky, 2009:180).

criticizing neoliberalism rather than the roots of capitalist accumulation model. As Leiva (2009) discuss Latin American neostructuralism's discursive potency derives from simultaneously being (1) an alternative vision to neoliberal dogmatism; (2) a comprehensive development strategy; (3) an integrated policy framework; and (4) a grand narrative about the path toward modernity that the twenty-first century offers Latin American and Caribbean societies. On the other hand its progressive character that does not neglect capitalist accumulation model is questioned (Leiva, 2009, Weber, 2010). According to these approaches within export-led capitalist model, cohesion among state and society, state and labor has been always contradictory. Under neostructuralist policies it is possibly to observe that welfare and equity trade off stays unsolved.

In practice neostructuralism was also deeply influential in the 'Buenos-Aires Consensus' that came out of a June 1999 convention of the Socialist International, and has influenced the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, and Vázquez's Uruguay (Weber, 2010). On the other hand Leiva (2009) analysis Chile and Brazil policies under neostructuralist approaches beginning from late 1990s.

Furthermore key tenets of neostructuralism also extended into the first major multi-year development programmes of left governments such as Chavez in Venezuela and Morales's in Bolivia (Weber, 2010) that is also termed with 21st century socialism. In the Venezuelan case, Chavez has been famously influenced by neostructuralist economist Osvaldo Sunkel's edited volume "*Development from Within: Toward a Neostructuralist Approach for Latin America*". Lebowitz (2006: 93) advises Chavez to read Sunkel's book as it signals a radical breakdown of neoliberalism and draws attention to the idea that neostructuralist formulas can sustain capitalism. Later on Chavez continued to call for the text to be read in schools, ministries, and elsewhere. Neostructuralist principles impacted heavily upon the country's National Plan of Development for 2001–7, which called for the necessity of a small 'social economy' to complement rather than replace the private sector, transformation of informal workers into small managers through training and micro-credit and focus on endogenous development among other things (Weber, 2010: 215-216). Bolivarian government extended the social economy through the redistribution of wealth (via land reform programs and social policies), the promotion of cooperatives, the creation of nuclei of endogenous development, industrial co-management, and social production enterprises (Wilpert, 2007: 77). Endogenous development is therefore a plan for development based on the use of national and local resources with an emphasis on popular cooperatives and other forms of social enterprise in conjunction with public corporations (in Venezuela sometimes the private enterprises) (Raby 2006a: 180). Cooperatives and small and medium sized local enterprises are one aspect of endogenous development but active intervention by the state in promoting large scale industrial and infrastructure projects is another (Raby 2006a: 184). As cooperatives and small and medium scale enterprises represent endogenous development, large scale enterprises and infrastructure projects that are led by active intervention of the state also stand on the other side of this model.

The other reason of insisting on "endogenous development" and "development within" could be explained by the aspiration of development on the basis of independency and self-sufficiency. Besides endogenous development concept also represents more radical view in case of Venezuela. Lebowitz states that to break with the dependency on capital, an ideological and

political break needs to be realised. A development approach that is really opposed to neoliberalism could be defined by endogenous development. That is why Lebowitz prefers to define Venezuela's experience as 'radical endogenous development'. Endogenous development is possible – but only if a government is prepared to break ideologically and politically with capital, only if it is prepared to make social movements the actors in the realisation of an economic theory based upon the concept of human capacities.

By giving reference to the applied policies, the debate rise on “neodevelopmentalism”. Basically "neodevelopmentalism" in Latin America is being called as a paradigm shift from the old developmentalist approaches of 1950s (Ocampo and Ros, 2012) as a reaction to market based development and policies applied under Washington Consensus. Sao Paulo Convention(2010)⁵⁰ which has been declared by international scholars, merged structuralist and Keynesian thinking into a new development paradigm in a manifesto entitled ten thesis on neodevelopmentalism.

In case of this emerging debate related with neodevelopmentalist practices, Brazil under Lula would mostly taken into account. Neo-developmentalism emerged in two strands, represented by Bresser-Pereira (2004, 2006) and by Sicsú et al. (2005) (cited by Morais and Saad-Filho, 2012). Bresser-Pereira(2001, 2009), Bresser-Pereira and Nakano(2002, 2003) drew upon the structuralist tradition associated with CEPAL to develop a critique of neoliberalism ('conventional orthodoxy') and support the emergence of a neo-developmental policy framework. (Morais and Saad-Filho, 2012:790).

According to this approach new developmentalism is a set of values, ideas, institutions, and economic policies through which, in the early 21st century, middle-income countries seek to catch up with developed countries. It is not an economic theory but a strategy; it is a national development strategy, based mainly on Keynesian macroeconomics and development economics (Pereira, 2009:18). The main pillars of neodevelopmentalism could be categorized as;(1) Strong markets can exist only with a strong state; (2) Sustainable growth is impossible without strengthening the state and the market, and without the implementation of adequate macroeconomic policies; (3) strong markets and states can be built only through a national development project which makes growth compatible with equity; and (4) it is impossible [to reduce] inequality without rapid and sustained growth. (Sicsú et al., 2005: xxxv) (cited by Morais and Saad-Filho(2012:790)

National development strategy is defined as the key institution for economic growth. Export-led growth combined with strong domestic market is at the center. Selectivity in industrial policies is mostly supported, fiscal deficit policy is rejected and growth should be achieved based on domestic savings, investment and innovation. The state is supposed to create investment opportunities and reduce economic inequalities.

When ten thesis of neodevelopmentalism(Sao Paulo Convention,2010) is analyzed, it is seen that regarding with structural deficiencies both demand and supply side policies have equal importance in the formation of national development strategies. According to this convention national development strategy should aim to seize global opportunities such as;” global

⁵⁰ http://www.networkideas.org/alt/oct2010/Ten_Theses.pdf

economies of scale and multiple sources of technological learning, mitigates barriers to innovation created by excessively strong intellectual property regimes, assures financial stability, and creates investment opportunities to private entrepreneurs .”

Since then the discontinuity and continuity from neoliberalism is one of the critical question to be answered whereas according to some scholars neodevelopmentalism is defined either as “liberal” neodevelopmentalism (Ban,2013) or as a policy inflection (Barbosa and Souza, 2010 cited by Morais and Saad-Filho,2012) and an attempt that regulates neoliberal policies with human face policies and strong state intervention (Webber, 2010 and Leiva, 2008).

Integration and cooperation “best ally” of “developmentalism”

As Ocampo (2012) states since 1980 the external integration model of LAC is based on export led growth and without any doubt integration and cooperation initiatives have been defined under these external integration model. As Ocampo (2012) suggests integration policies has been best ally of industrialization policies in LAC and have been practiced as a part of development strategies. In addition to this it would be underlined that the current experiences have several specific dynamics that go beyond industrialization process.

As stated in the first section since 1990s integration and cooperation initiatives have been on the agenda of the most Latin America governments and they have been shaped under responds against globalization and changing dynamics in multilateral trade system. These responds lead to the emergence of third wave regionalism debates and following that these initiatives have also triggered transformation of third wave regionalism to fourth wave regionalism experiences (Dabène, 2012).

Emergence of third way regionalism initiatives in LAC could not be evaluated separately from globalization and multilateral trade system adding that they own specific characteristics regarding with Americas. Terms of “*new regionalism*” and “*open regionalism*” represents the new approaches in the definition of regionalism initiatives during that period. While the liberalization of trade policies and opening up process of Latin American countries have determined trade regime, it has also accelerated the trade based initiatives within the hemisphere (such as the ALCA initiative, Mercosur, PTAs, FTAs, bilateral trade agreements etc). In addition to these, the post-cold war period conditions and changing dynamics of US foreign policy also has influenced the formation of the third way regionalism. Hence these initiatives have been also analyzed within the restructuring of inter-American system or under given reactions against to inter-American system.

Without any doubt the earlier versions of regionalism has become the part of neoliberal globalization and represent the initiatives that target to find out a place within multilateral trade regime. As Gamble and Payne (1996: 251-252) suggests globalization was simply seen as manifestations of global orders envisioned as hegemonic politics modelled by the need of countries to engage efficiently in global market activity (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012: 7-8) Within this framework, regionalism also became a tool for the states to protect themselves against globalization or redefine their roles within the multilateral trade system(Payne and Gamble, 1996, Phillips, 2004).

Bulmer-Thomas (2001) lists eight dimensions of globalization affecting how new trade regionalism is developing, namely, liberalization of trade in goods, liberalization of trade in services, liberalization of capital flows, rearrangements in the allocation of foreign direct investment, adoption of the WTO rules as the basis for dispute resolution in trade; the rising importance of patents and intellectual property rules, free movement of labor, and environmental concerns.

One of the output of these approaches is based on open regionalism that is also defined as the part of third wave regionalism. Differently from old regionalism (Giardano and Devlin, 2011:350) trade related issues go beyond goods and cover services, investments, intellectual property rights. As a part of opening process, open regionalism promote competition and trade liberalization in order to achieve regional competitiveness.

This third way of regionalism- “new regionalism”- is defined as a part of global capitalist transformation process manifested regionally or meso globalization process(Phillips, 2003: 329).As a governance project, new regionalism unfolded as a state strategy to lock in market reforms of the Washington Consensus on a regional scale. Regionalism from this perspective was conceived as a building block to global liberalization through the interplay between state-led macro-processes of regulation and, sometimes informal, micro-processes of regionalization led by non-state actors (Hurrell 1995; 2005; Bøas et al. 1999,2005; Mittelman 2000: 113; Breslin and Hook 2002: 8).(cited by Rigorizzi and Tussie, 2011:7-8)

As stated in the previous section neostructuralist development strategies supports open regionalism as a part of their strategies. Based on “systematic competitiveness approach and changing production patterns with equity”; it is an inevitable fact that LAC need to retarget their productive and export basket on goods of higher technological content and, at the same time, add value through larger sector chains. CEPAL supports the necessity of open regionalism in order to promote, improve the international insertion of the regions countries, increase regional power in trade negotiations with industrialized countries and multilateral organizations and manage interdependencies more efficiently (CEPAL,1994).

Therefore as stated by CEPAL (1994); *"open regionalism", i.e., a process of growing economic interdependence at the regional level, promoted both by preferential integration agreements and by other policies in a context of liberalization and deregulation, geared towards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region and, in so far as possible, constituting the building blocks for a more open and transparent international economy. Nevertheless, even if this optimal scenario does not come to pass, open regionalism would still serve an important purpose as a defence mechanism against eventual protectionist pressures in markets outside the region"*.

Within this context Mercosur⁵¹ based on open regionalism principles is welcoming agenda for CEPAL as well and accepted as one of the political tool of neostructuralism; developmentalist strategies. Mercosur, based on bilateral agreements with Brazil and Argentina has covered trade, security, democracy and stability related titles and has emerged simultaneously with EAI

⁵¹ Mercosur members; Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela(2012).

initiative (1990). Especially as an regionalism initiative emerging from the southern cone, Mercosur target to readopt itself to globalization on regional basis, based on open regionalism principles. Mercosur is purely a state-led regionalism initiative, incorporates largest economy of the Southern Cone (Brazil) hence its presence has been also critical in the process of ALCA and WTO negotiations.

Institutionally, the ‘re-politicization’ of Mercosur was seen in references to new initiatives for labor rights, participation of civil society, the establishment of a regional parliament, the introduction of the Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) in 2000, and the establishment of a Fund for Structural Convergence in 2005, marking a new direction beyond trade-led goals – and the road to what later crystallized as UNASUR(Union of South American Nations,2008)⁵².

Furthermore Mercosur’s presence has also kept regionalism debates alive and under leftist governments has accelerated emergence of 4th wave regionalism both in direct and indirect ways. The 4th wave regionalism differently from the basis of open regionalism mostly has emerged under the influences of neostructuralist and neodevelopmentalists policies that is led by leftist governments. Under these circumstances UNASUR and ALBA(Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas)⁵³ has emerged as two specific case. Dabène (2009, 2012) evaluates these initiatives under 4th wave regarding the political environment and their coverage and basis. Both of these initiatives target trade beyond policies and represents desire of creating regional spaces in different aspects that could be evaluated as counter-hegemonic initiatives against inter-American system. At the same time the basis of cooperation of the states within these initiatives differs from the 3rd wave initiatives. Bottom-up approaches has been considered, citizenship rights and regional identity formation has given more importance. Hence emergence of these initiatives clearly led debate on counter-hegemonic spaces against Inter-American system, on the other hand their post-liberal, post-neoliberal character has been investigated. Either “post-liberal” or “post-neoliberal” character of these initiatives would be analyzed in the following sections regarding their policy implications in real terms.

The limits and possibilities under Mercosur

In this section rather than a deep analysis of Mercosur, the possibilities and limits of Mercosur process would be considered. By 2011 Mercosur agreement (Treaty of Asunción,1991) has completed its 20th year. Although nearly 50 percent of taken decisions has not been applied and as it targets custom union, Mercosur has not completed common external tariffs yet, it is still important as one of the largest integration initiative emerging from the Southern Cone.

Besides structural asymmetries among the member countries, lack of coordination in macroeconomic policies, weak institutionalization still determines the main vulnerabilities in the improvement of Mercosur process. Although these weakness, Mercosur has been defined as one of the main actor in the determination of regional policies and on global scale formation

⁵² UNASUR contained twelve nation states: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (also members of CAN); Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (also members of MERCOSUR); and Guyana, Surinam and Chile.

⁵³ Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent , Grenadines, Venezuela

of south-south trade agreements. These initiatives also has both direct and indirect influences to foreign policy hence Mercosur has been not only an ally of developmentalist policies but also has influenced foreign policy formation in the region.

Mercosur has won recognition in other areas of international trade: it signed some 22 preferential trade agreements with a variety of countries, including the Andean Community (October 2004), India and the South African Customs Union (December 2004), Israel (December 2007) and Egypt (2010). It is engaged in trade talks with a number of partners such as the European Union, Russia, Mexico, China and various countries in the Middle East. Moreover, a number of South American countries have joined Mercosur as associate members, including Chile and Bolivia (joined 1996), Peru (2003), Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia (2004)(Doctor,2013:526). On the other hand negotiations to sign free trade agreement with EU is still forming one of the main policy agenda of Mercosur and keeps its importance alive within international trade regime.

Venezuela's approval of membership and suspension of Paraguay's membership in 2012 became one of the critical political tension observed within Mercosur process. In July 2006, Mercosur and Venezuela signed an adhesion protocol for full membership, Paraguayan Congress has not approved its membership until 2013. Approval of Venezuela's membership has been also accepted as the radicalization of Mercosur. Political tension within Mercosur process has been observed during impeachment of Paraguay's President Fernando Lugo (22 June,2012.) and suspension of Paraguay's membership until the next elections was decided. Later on Paraguay has welcomed Paraguay back (2013), but new President of Paraguay, Cartes, has been reluctant to accept the offer due to Mercosur's 2012 inclusion of Venezuela. Paraguay Parliament approved Venezuela membership in 2013.

If the Mercosur process has been analyzed on the basis of economic integration theories it would be seen that deepening of Mercosur has been limited and only specific sectors has been covered. On the other it will not be possible to mention about Mercosur's strong supranational character.

When Mercosur figures compared basically it is seen that increasing productive capacities via intra-regional trade and investment creation has been limited. On the other hand employment creation effects of Mercosur approved to be poor (López, 2011)Mercosur expanded domestic market for the sectors such as automobiles and other durable consumer goods that are still protected from the imports. State led companies for the production of industrial outputs, provision of social infrastructure has been realized but the potential of creating productive capacities has stayed limited.

Both intra and extra trade has increased in Mercosur and after 2001 period it is seen that the share of intra-zone trade has been greater than extra -zone trade. Besides intra-zone exports are greater than intra-zone imports and for extra-zone trade the opposite is valid. Intra-regional trade figures also represent one aspect of structural asymmetries that has been restructuring via Mercosur. Trade related structural asymmetries also determines limits in deepening of Mercosur. Although Brazil's exports to Mercosur is lower than its exports to other regions of the world, it has the highest share in the export of the Mercosur countries. Besides for Argentina, Mercosur is important for regional investment opportunities and for Paraguay and Uruguay

intra-trade have more importance than extra-trade and therefore via intra-trade, enlargement and protection of domestic markets could be achieved. Shortly for each Mercosur member intra-trade has different meaning that is driven by their trade strategies both on regional and international level.

While the composition of trade flows in Mercosur is considered it is seen that that medium level technology especially in manufacturing sectors have increased and on the other hand trade has decreased in primary products and low technology products. Limited increase in the trade of high level of technological products have been observed. Basically manufacturing sector has the highest share and food industries (agricultural products) have the second rank in the intra-trade figures. According to extra-trade figures food and raw materials trade have been increasing while manufacturing industry increase has stayed at lower levels. Especially for the current period rising prices of commodities and trade with China, has direct influences to Mercosur trade figures (Molteni, León and Giudice, 2011) After 2002 China's imports to Mercosur are greater than exports that also makes China another important partner for the Southern Cone. Furthermore as Doctor (2013:531) states stagnation in WTO process after Doha round and increasing Chinese trade and investment in Latin America could be defined as constraints related with the external agenda that directly impact internal deepening agenda.

Within this framework the amount and composition of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mercosur need to be analyzed. Mercosur's share on total world FDI flows are lower than the other regions of the world (The average for 1996-2000 period is 4.41 percent and for 2005-2007 period is 2.09 percent)(López, 2011).Mercosur has attracted foreign direct investments especially due to acceleration in privatization of services during late 1990s. The flow of EU based investments and currently Chinese investment share has been increasing within the Mercosur. On the other hand the FDI flows to Mercosur countries also reflects another asymmetry whereas Brazil has the highest share that is nearly equal to other Mercosur members FDI flows (López,2011).

As Phillips(2006) argues Mercosur serves to restructuring of transnational corporations especially in automotive (Ford–Wolkswagen, Renault- Mercedes), chemicals and electronic sectors. Within the context of regional strategies of large TNCs, Mercosur serves as a restructuring agent (Doctor, 2013:520). The interest of TNCs that has activities in Mercosur countries coincides with the industrialization –enlargement expectations of Mercosur states. In addition, Mercosur attracted over 400 billion dollars in FDI in the past 20 years, much of it was based on specifically regionalist strategies of large trans-national corporations setting up or expanding operations in the region (Doctor, 2011; Chudnovsky and López, 2007). Within regionalist strategies the automotive industry became one of the most significant recipients of FDI (Doctor, 2011, Phillips, 2004). Notwithstanding the sector's stated preference for liberalization, it accepted an administered trade regime within Mercosur. As Doctor (2013:520) states in actual practice, the local subsidiaries of the automotive multinationals were extremely hesitant to embrace sectoral free trade. Furthermore Mercosur governments often took protectionist positions to support employment in the automotive production chain to the detriment of their partners (e.g., Brazil's recent measures announced as part of the 'Bigger Brazil' program, INTAL, 2011) (cited by Doctor, 2013:520).

Mercosur's TNCs affiliates produce for the internal market and their exports are generally low; it is suggested that trade liberalization has facilitated TNCs affiliates to increment their imports both by replacing local suppliers for foreign ones as well as for complementing their local production with imported goods (Chudnovsky and López, 2004). Thus, even if affiliates have obtained productivity gains through specialization and restructuring (partly at the expense of reducing their linkages with the host economies), these gains have not yet been reflected in a significant increase in TNCs affiliates exports, and even less in an increase in their exports destined towards the markets of developed countries (Chudnovsky and López, 2004:650). Besides it is observed that technological contribution of TNCs is limited and TNCs activities are mainly concentrated on market-seeking strategies. In the Mercosur countries, TNCs in the services and manufacturing sectors have adopted a predominantly market-seeking strategy and have increased exports flows significantly, especially to neighbouring countries (Chudnovsky and López, 2007, Álvarez, Fischer and Natera, 2013).

As it is clearly seen from the practices of the Mercosur, it is a state-led integration process and on the other hand influences of bottom-up approaches is rather weak. By the time business groups interest has increased regarding regional investment opportunities in order to widen business activities (Phillips, 2004, Doctor, 2011) and they became more active in the determination of Mercosur policies.

On the other hand it is possible to suggest that during Lula and Kirchner period, critiques against neoliberal policies has also transformed policy framework of the Mercosur. Citizenship rights, environmental and social policies have been on the agenda of the Mercosur and policies regarding bottom-up approaches have been taken into consideration. Although it should be stated that in practice the application of the taken decisions stay limited.

In 1998, the Mercosur Social and Labor Declaration was established, aimed at embedding social rights into the Mercosur System. According to the declaration, social and labor standards should be harmonized with each partner's legal framework in order to guarantee the same rights to workers and their families if they move to a different member state of Mercosur. In 2002, the Declaration of the Presidents of Mercosur was on the eradication of child labor.⁵⁴ In 2006 Mercosur Social Institute was created, bringing a new phase in the development of Mercosur, and consolidating the need to combine regional policies in social and economic issues. In the same year the Biennial Plan 2007-2009 for Mercosur, and the Social Mercosur Declaration were both approved. The emergence of a Social Chapter for Mercosur represented an improvement in the sense of conferring a social dimension to the process of regional integration.⁵⁵

On December 2008, the Second Mercosur Social Summit was held in Salvador, gathering civil society organizations and social movements as well as governments from the partner countries. Several issues were discussed such as migration, employment, education, gender and equity, family, agricultural policies, youth, indigenous populations, environment, information and

⁵⁴ <http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/international-cooperation/item/314-Mercosur>

⁵⁵ <http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/international-cooperation/item/314-Mercosur>

energy. At the same event, an amount of 227,000 dollars was approved for the Mercosur Social Institute, showing the commitment towards investing in the social sector.⁵⁶

Focem(Fund for Structural Convergence) as the first allocative mechanism created under Mercosur was approved in 2005. Later on the first Meeting for a Productive and Social Mercosur was held in Cordoba, Argentina in 2006. The definition of such an allocative mechanism could be directly linked with developmental policies shaped within the Mercosur. In order to overcome structural asymmetries, the budget is also determined according to GDP. Especially demands of the smaller countries to overcome asymmetries has also affected the formation of such an allocative mechanism.

In 2004, Decision 33/04 created a 360,000 dollars Fund for Education (FEM). FEM is Mercosur's first allocative policy, aimed at financing educative projects reinforcing the regional integration process. Argentina suggested the creation of a Mercosur Educative Forum. The objective was to debate about ways to promote equity and inclusion in the region. The Forum institutionalized and now constitutes a deliberative arena accompanying Mercosur's initiatives in the realm of education. In the same year the CMC took Decision 19/04 that created a High Level Group on Structural Convergence and Integration Financing (GANCEFI).Its objective was to think of "initiatives and programs" to improve Mercosur's competitiveness, targeting the less advanced regions, and securing stable financing in order to strengthen Mercosur's institutions. It met for the first time in 2004, with a loaded FOCEM will serve to develop four types of programs: (1) Structural convergence; (2) Competitiveness; (3) Social cohesion and (4) Strengthening of the institutional structure.

The total budget is given as 100 million dollars that is also defined to be limited (Doctor, 2011). Brazil has the highest share in Focem budget, since budget contribution is determined according to GDP in absolute terms. Brazil's contribution to the projects is 70 percent, Argentine's 27 percent, Uruguay's 2 percent and Paraguay's 1 percent. The resources are distributed among the members according to projects presented so that Paraguay could have 48 percent of the projects, Uruguay 32 percent, Argentina 10 percent and Brazil 10 percent (Focem, 2012)⁵⁷. Within this framework Focem is mostly defined an allocative mechanism for the smaller countries in the group.

Following the rules, the first pilot projects were approved in 2007 (Decision 08/07). They were mainly Paraguayan and Uruguayan projects for infrastructure or small businesses, agriculture and livestock. Some other projects were approved later in 2007, like on drinkable water in Paraguayan indigenous communities or road improvements in Paraguay (Dabène,2012). Social housing, road improvements, improving small business, technological development and training in software, biotechnology and electronics and in their own value chains, border social economics, health, sanitary , environmental and habitat emergency for extremely poor,

⁵⁶ <http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/international-cooperation/item/314-Mercosur>

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http://www.iirsa.org/admin_iirsa_web/Uploads/Documents/fir_montevideo07_fondo_convergencia_mercosur_eng.pdf

information system on the common external tariff, legal data base, biotechnology, food safety are the main titles covered under Focem projects(Focem,2012). Since Focem was conceived as a redistributive policy to allow the smallest economies to catch up, it does not come as a surprise to see Paraguay presenting projects that are substitutes for its own social policies (Dabène,2012). Projects in infrastructure such as road improvements are more likely to yield regional positive externalities. But on the other hand for smaller countries it seems to be one of the main source of social policy as well and it is one of the critical field that the taken decisions are applied on the basis of distributive policies.⁵⁸

Furthermore as Doctor (2011) states within Mercosur there were also more signs of cultural exchange, evidence suggest that samba and capoeira schools abound in Argentina, Spanish language classes flourish in Brazil, and intra-regional tourism is taking-off. Regional cultural networks, such as Rede Cultural Mercosur, set up in 1998, have also foster regional cultural exchanges and artistic collaboration (Doctor,2011: 108)Besides it is stated that related with democracy and security Mercosur have important gains contributing social life of the Southern Cone(Doctor,2011, Gardini,2010) that are also main factors keeping importance of Mercosur alive.

4th wave regionalism and which way Latin America?

As Dabène analysis UNASUR and ALBA under 4th wave regionalism Riggirozzi(2012) suggest that UNASUR and ALBA represent different pathways to regional building, creating foundations for post-hegemonic and post-trade regional governance. Although both of these initiatives have common characteristics such as pioneers of these initiatives are leftist governments that search for autonomy and furthermore they also represent different paths on the basis of ideological discourse. It is possible to claim that divergence in leadership, motivations and political understanding of the purposes of regional-building led Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to diverge from the South American regionalist strategy. The result was the establishment of Venezuelan-led ALBA in 2004, and the formation of Brazilian-led UNASUR in 2008 (Briceño-Ruiz 2010, Burges 2007). Besides both of these initiatives have common practices related with post trade issues, promoting regional cooperation and in addition to these they have shared the principles of neodevelopmentalism with different nuances. On the other hand it should be underlined that both of these initiatives have different scope, political orientation and viability (Gardini,2011).

Based on the ideas of José Martí and Simón Bolívar, the ALBA historically considers the idea of the unity of the continent against colonization and imperialism. The idea of ‘Our America’ that belongs to José Martí (1891) and the anti-colonial ideas of Simón Bolívar (Jamaica Letter, 1815) are defined as the roots of the ideological challenge of the ALBA. According to its founders, the ALBA is the tool for creating ‘Our America’. It can be seen that the arguments

⁵⁸ For more detail about the 2013 Focem budget see http://www10.iadb.org/intal/cartamensual/Cartas/PDF/196/en/MonthlyNewsletter196_Integration%20Blocs_ME RCOSUR_Art2.pdf

against the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 in the nineteenth century have parallel links with those that emerged against the ALCA.

Furthermore the ALBA has been defined as an initiative developed by socialist Cuba and the Bolivarian Revolution against the increasing tendency of free trade models in the globalization era (Tahsin, 2011b). Hence debates on the 21st century socialism and ALBA come up together and via ALBA the ideas of 21st century socialism is carried to the regional integration model. Transformative possibilities (Robinson, 2008) of the ALBA has been on the agenda and creation of post-hegemonic spaces under the ALBA has been investigated (Riggirozzi, 2012, Escobar, 2010).

Another interesting fact is that although the ALBA members have no physical boundaries (Dabène, 2012) they react on the basis of creation an independent identity based on Our America principles. ALBA, emphasize state-centered collaboration, public ownership and regional solidarity, seeking to advance “a new vision of regional welfare and equity” at the regional level (Hart-Landsberg, 2009). Three countries of ALBA has inserted this renewed conception of regional integration in their new constitutions(Venezuela in 1999; Ecuador in 2008; and Bolivia in 2009). The 1999 Venezuelan constitution includes an article (153) setting the objective of creating a “community of nations” and “granting supranational organizations, by means of treaties, with the exercise of necessary competencies to achieve regional integration”. Ecuadorian one is defined to be one of the most “integrationist” of all Latin American constitutions (Dabène,2012) since it aims at promoting regional integration in a wide array of issues (economy, environment, law, culture, identity), and also mentions the possible creation of supranational organs, an incursion into deep integration the Bolivian constitution mentions as well.

In 2004, ALBA-TCP (ALBA- Peoples’ Trade Agreement) was founded by Cuba and Venezuela, and later on Bolivia joined to ALBA-TCP protocol in 2006. With ALBA-TCP protocol fair trade alternative to the US-promoted bilateral Free Trade Agreements was integrated (Muhr, 2011:105).⁵⁹ In the 7th Summit (2009) ALBA-TCP decided to be called” Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - Peoples' Trade Treaty” (ALBA-TCP) in the understanding that the growth and political strengthening of ALBA-TCP make it into a real and effective force⁶⁰. In the 4th Summit (2007) *grandnacionales* (grandnations) protocol, in the 5th Presidential Summit (2007) the structure of the ALBA and formation of economic, social and energy commissions were also defined. In the 6th Summit (2008), on finance, the ALBA Bank (BALBA) was established; in the Cumana Summit (April 2009) the use of SUCRE, a common currency for the ALBA members, was announced (Tahsin, 2011). The ALBA Bank was created with initial reserves of 1 million dollars. ALBA Bank was formed after 2008 global crisis ALBA Bank was formed after 2008 crisis and it was fleshed out in September 2009, granted 20 billion of capital to lend for infrastructural projects,anti-poverty programs and small and medium enterprise development . In 2011 LBA Bank was formally incorporated into UNASUR and began to make loans(Chodor and Mc-Charthy-Jones,2013:219). SUCRE was

⁵⁹ For the difference between ALBA-TCP and neoliberal integration schmes, see (Girvan,2011)

⁶⁰ <http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/history-alba-tcp>

used for the first time in July 2010 for trade between Ecuador and Venezuela. Although both of these projects could not be improved to a further step and stayed only as specific samples in case of financial cooperation. It is stated that in 2013, so far, there have been 1,500 transitions with the Sucre, equivalent to 670 million dollars, for prefabricated houses, medical equipment, medicines, and vehicles. 61

When the principles of these protocols have been analyzed it is seen that the ALBA is based on “solidarity”, “cooperation”, “complementarity” and “reciprocity” principles and represents transnationalized welfarist projects⁶² based on intra-regional grassroots cooperation in areas of health, education and housing through state-led programs (*grandnacionales* projects). Moreover the state-led programs are not limited to creation of regional public goods such as infrastructure but also by *grandnacionales* projects the dimensions of trans-national cooperation is extended to social projects and supply side of the economies. It is possible to claim that state intervention and control plays a critical role in the ALBA. For example, in the case of the nation state itself acts as an entrepreneur. The *grandnacionales* represent the member nations as public firms and have agreements in the areas of science and technology, easy access to water, the protection of forests, the foundation of an ALBA university, reading and writing projects and transport. The projects which are predicted to cover the areas of energy, electricity, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, transport, food production, trade, tourism, and the cement industry that was aimed to be financed by the ALBA Bank.

While state-owned oil and gas company, PDVSA, became central for the funding of regional social welfare programs, a new model of production is also advanced based on a barter system rather than free trade (Altmann, 2009), that is also different from other integration initiatives. On the other hand the dependency to oil finance represents the weakness of the ALBA and limits the sustainability of the projects. Besides TCP, oil barter on the basis of cooperation is defined specific cases applied under the ALBA. Venezuela’s supplying of cheap oil to the ALBA members or the use of Cuba’s advantageous position in health and education to the benefit of socioeconomic programmes of the ALBA countries could be given as specific examples. Especially in the oil industry, self-sufficiency, infrastructure investments or horizontal integration that benefits in the supplier sectors have been also realised. (For example in the production of plastic goods that have been used in the Cuban construction sector.) Within this framework, energy integration led by the ALBA still plays a critical role in the determination of energy policies on regional basis. Furthermore ALBA-CARICOM relations - Petrocaribe- initiative represents extension of ALBA-TCP principles to CARICOM; apart from energy cooperation, economic infrastructure and social projects are being defined under Petrocaribe (Girvan, 2011). In addition such initiatives led ALBA to be called among one of

⁶¹ "ALBA countries conducted 670 million dollars in trade using common currency in 2013," Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Washington DC, <http://rabble.ca/news/2013/08/alba-latin-americas-groundbreaking-alliance-solidarity-and-mutual-aid>.

⁶² 1.Oil and energy 2.Communication and transportation 3.Military4.External debt 5.Economy and finance 6.Basic and light industry 7.Natural resources 8.Land; food sovereignty and land reform 9.Education10.Universities11.Scientific and technological development 12.Media13.Health14.Gender 15.Immigration and identity 16.Settlement 17.Participant democracy and leadership 18.Indigenous movement 19.Labour movement.

the important integration projects on the basis of regional energy agreements (UNCTAD, 2007:174)

As Raby (2006b) states, ALBA is not explicitly socialist but its emphasis on endogenous (self-sufficient) development, equitable exchange and social solidarity represents a major challenge to neoliberalism. It provides a protective umbrella under which socialist initiatives have a chance to develop. This endogenous development is a sign of clear rupture from IMF and World Bank oriented development projects and CEPAL's open regionalism (Salazar, 2006). Through endogenous development, a strategy built on the dynamics of the ALBA countries' own resources, the self-sufficiency principle and the interests of peoples has been defined. While the ALBA supports self-sufficiency in agriculture, it criticizes the liberalization of the agriculture sector and developed countries' policies where they spend millions on subsidies and high import tariffs for the protection of their agriculture sector (Arreaza, 2004).

The ALBA also challenges such labels as 'Most Favoured Nation' proposed by the ALCA, since these titles have been arranged in the interests of transnational and foreign corporations and small businesses and cooperatives are not protected. The ALBA gives preference to national business, small businesses and cooperatives (Arreaza, 2004).

The ALBA is also opposed to intellectual property rights regimes on the grounds that they only protect the areas of scientific and technological knowledge that developed countries control, while at the same time leaving unprotected those areas in which the developing countries have considerable advantage: e.g. in the genetic biodiversity of their territories and the traditional knowledge of peasant and aboriginal peoples (Arreaza, 2004).

Agreements within the ALBA are necessarily mutually beneficial through a strategy of endogenous development where the economy is conceived of as a social structure linking production to consumption through distribution (Cole, 2008: 38).

The ALBA, while focusing on social exclusion and inequalities, gives more importance to local areas and the improvement of local infrastructure. According to the ALBA the creation of new production structures, micro enterprises, cooperatives and alternatives in the technological area plays a significant role. In some ways these enterprises act as the tools that will facilitate bottom-up development. According to 2009 figures, in Cuba and Venezuela nine endogenous development projects were carried out, mainly in tourism and agriculture. These involved training experts in agriculture from Cuba and Venezuela in the Havana Agriculture Institute and the establishment of common farms (ALBA, 2005). As a part of the TPC, one of the articles states that Venezuela will support Bolivia's participation in the promotion of endogenous development nuclei. Development policies applied under the ALBA have been related to supplying basic needs, achieving self-sufficiency and giving importance to the human resources, and the role of the state has gained importance in this transition to a more equal and fair structure.

The legacy of the ALBA is based on cooperation among Cuba and Venezuela but relatively being "weak states" and constraints on dependency to "oil-based finance" are defined as the negative factors affecting ALBA process. Up till now creation of productive structures has

stayed limited on the other hand the dimensions of the social policies represents more direct intervention to the social structure of the societies. Furthermore the coup in Honduras(2009), the 2008 global crisis, slow constitutional process in Bolivia and Ecuador, debate on economic measurements in Cuba, Chavez's death(2013) and the uncertainties on the future of the Bolivarian revolution are among the main factors that has decelerated the ALBA process.

Apart from ALBA, UNASUR is one of the newest actor emerging in the region. Although this fact the idea of Southern American nation union goes back to 2000s. The first Summit of South American presidents was held in Brazil in 2000, at the time of Cardoso's presidency. The leaders of South America launched the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), in the first meeting of South American Presidents(2000) with the aim of clearing away some of the obstacles to integration, while proposing the idea of merging Mercosur and CAN. Interestingly UNASUR in some ways is the by- product of IIRSA process. In the third summit (2004), held in Cuzco (Peru), twelve nations (including Guyana and Suriname) formed the South American Community, which finally evolved into the Union of South American Nations, established in Brazil in 2008. The first designated Secretary General was the Argentine ex-President, Nestor Kirchner, who took functions in May 2010.

The signature of the Buenos Aires Consensus (2003) by Presidents Lula da Silva and Nestor Kirchner is suggested to be one of the turning point in the formation of regional dynamics in South America that also lead way to the formation of UNASUR. The document meant to be a counterpoint to the Washington Consensus and expressed the commitment of both presidents to bolster economic development and to work for a more equitable distribution of wealth. citizen's wellbeing, freedom and social justice were at the center of their concerns(Arenas-García, 2012:72)

The Cuzco Declaration⁶³ established three main goals; convergence between MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and Chile through trade agreements, but more fundamentally formation of regional public goods, especially physical infrastructure (roads, energy and communication) and political cooperation. Within this framework the institutionalization of IIRSA need to be considered in more detail since it plays a critical role in the coordination and finance of the regional public goods- infrastructure projects. IIRSA's Technical Coordination Committee composed by regional multilateral agencies (IADB, CAF Andean Promotion Corporation (CAF) and the Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin (Fonplata). IADB/INTAL was appointed as the permanent Secretariat of IIRSA in 2003. In the summit of Quito in 2009, there was a consensus that governments, and not banks, should be the designers and drivers of the regional infrastructure project and, accordingly, it was decided to let expire the contract with the IDB and, instead, subsume IIRSA within the UNASUR. In 2009 the IIRSA is absorbed into the new Infrastructure and Planning Council (COSIPLAN) of UNASUR: Since 2010 the secretariat role was assigned to UNASUR (Cespedes,2013). Since then the national coordinators network becomes the technical body of COSIPLAN that is also one of the legal

⁶³ Cuzco Declaration. Available from www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documentos/cusco8-12-04.htm (Accessed at 20 December 2013)

body which is regulated by UNASUR. The IDB ⁶⁴and the multilateral banks downgraded to the level of technical assistance of national coordinators. Besides IADB, CAF and Fonplata have been key drivers behind the initiative achievements⁶⁵.

According to IDB figures, between 2005 and 2010, 524 projects were approved (for 96 billion dollars). Most of the projects are related with road transport (nearly 90 percent in number), only about 12 percent (6.5 percent in 2010 when the plan was initially envisaged to be completed) had been built and around 30 percent were in execution in September 2012. IDB suggests that most of these projects are purely national (83 percent, representing 75 percent in total value of investments), a modest share binational (15 percent) and only 2 percent multinational in character and progress in regulatory matters has been especially disappointing: there had been only two programs approved for a value of 6.3 million dollars.(IIRSA,2012)

UNASUR projects after 2011 is organized within COSIPLAN under API(The Integration Priority Project Agenda). API is the result of the work undertaken during 2011 by the twelve countries within COSIPLAN. This Agenda is made up of 31 strategic projects (17,260.7million dollars) mostly based on the physical integration and socioeconomic development of the region. The purpose of the API is explained as “to encourage connectivity in the region through the construction and efficient operation of infrastructure while taking into account sustainable social and economic development criteria and preserving the environment and the balance of ecosystems. COSIPLAN Portfolio as of 2012 which amounts to 130,139.1 million dollars. Only 8 structured projects are national, 16 are binational, and the other (7 projects) involve three or more countries (IIRSA,2012).

Within this context the contribution and role of BNDES is also critical whereas under COSIPLAN partnership with BNDES is defined. BNDES share in the finance of the projects also reveals the extent of Brazil’s being called regional power. BNDES has become in the last seven years a fundamental financier of regional infrastructure projects (FIESP,⁶⁶ 2012 cited by Cespedes,2013). The figures released by the Foreign Ministry Report of 2010, show that between 2003 and 2010, the 80 ongoing projects financed by Brazilian public credits to South America, mainly through BNDES resources (Banco do Brasil is another source of resource), totaled 10 billion dollars(Cespedes, 2013).

Besides private sector partnership is supported, especially business associations from Brazil is actively participating in COSIPLAN agenda (Palestini, 2013).In general sub-regional, geographical hubs covering trans-borders have been created under these projects. Creation of regional public goods seems to increase UNASUR’s importance in the future since they provide necessary infrastructure for regional value chains so that increase cross-border transaction (IDB, 2012). Within this framework one of the most important project is considered to be

⁶⁴ The IDB participates in 28 projects of the IIRSA Portfolio, where the total investment is 10.2 billion dollars and the financing is 2.9 billion dollars. The IDB supports 12 of the 31 strategic projects of the priority agenda of the IIRSA projects which must be implemented before 2010.

⁶⁵ During the last decade besides INTAL, the share of CAF and Fonplata in the financment of the projects have been increasing.

⁶⁶ For the activities of FIESP ; <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37317821>(Access at 10 April 2014)

creation of inter-ocean central axis(motorways network) that would link Atlantic (Brazilian port) and Pacific ports (Chilean port) (CEPAL, 2011 cited by Sanajua, 2011:23).

Infrastructure, energy, security are among the main priorities of the UNASUR besides other issues such as poverty reduction, food security, sustainable development, natural resources, human rights, migrations are being considered. On the other hand it should be stated under UNASUR socioeconomic policies have limited space compared to physical infrastructure projects.

South American Defence Council (2008) is another legal body that is created in the Cuzco Declaration. UNASUR supports the idea of necessity of having “concerted and coordinated political and diplomatic efforts among South American countries. The presence of the Defence Council is considered to be an important initiative that restrict US interference in the South balancing the authority of the existing US-led institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) (Sanajua, 2010). Furthermore, the presence of UNASUR also lead the formation of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), during the third Summit, in Caracas (Venezuela, 2011)(Dabène,2012) which is also considered to have a different path within Inter-American system, and have potential of counter-hegemonic character against OAS.

Although energy cooperation is one of the main title of UNASUR and even Southern Energy Council (2007) was established, the dimensions of cooperation is not matured yet. As Sanajua (2010) discuss under UNASUR potentials of energy cooperation is limited. On the other hand for Brazil it is seen that energy cooperation means to create specific roles for Petrobras on the basis of regional energy cooperation. Besides UNASUR has established Council of Economy and Finance, the South American Council for Education, Culture, Science, Technology and Innovation seeking to reinforce the objectives of quality, equity and international competitiveness through harmonization of Higher Education programs. UNASUR Health Council was established to consolidate a space of cooperation in health provision and training.

In case of UNASUR, regional identity is based on Southern American unity that target to provide autonomy for the South American states. Regional spaces aimed to be created hence rather than US-led projects-South America states aim to have leading role in the creation of the regional public goods. Under UNASUR it is observed that creation of the regional public goods is also defined to be part of national development strategies. National alliances on the basis of national development strategies is being carried to regional level on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation. On the other hand increasing private business partnership in the creation of regional public goods is becoming one of the main agenda.

Under these circumstances it is possible to claim that UNASUR’s ideological stance provides spaces for the return of development agenda mostly on the basis of PWC principles. Hence its anti-neoliberal agenda is limited to PWC principles. While this new development agenda has deepened cooperation among the South American states it has provided spaces against Inter-American system.

Conclusion

In this paper, specific dynamics of developmentalist agenda in case of LAC tried to be defined. Additionally integration and regionalism initiatives within this development agenda has been analyzed. Without any doubt these initiatives have emerged within post-WC period and furthermore they have specific characteristics for LAC. Characteristics of developmentalist agenda and integration initiatives, have been analyzed under “alternative” practices emerging from the region. It is possible to claim that these policies have influenced strongly the transformation process of LAC in the last decade. On the other hand in general under these initiatives it is not possible to claim that there is a clear rupture from neoliberalism but mostly alternative spaces have been created against to WC principles and Inter-American system.

Neodevelopmentalism represents the paradigm shift in the definition of development policies and revised under “neoliberalism” in case of LAC. In spite of this when the related policies have been taken into account it is not possible to mention about homogeneity. The application of these policies also differs according to countries’ specific conditions; inter-class dynamics, their relations with the state and level of external integration. Within this framework, the essence of the developmental state is becoming more important. developmental state considers the failures of neoliberal policies and aim to form new alliances on the basis of nationalist development strategy. Within this framework, developmental state is back although the efficiency of the state in development policies and the relations between class and power and contradictions among them, should be considered on the basis of applied policies (Fine, 2006, Chibber, 2005). The inter-class dynamics within the nationalist development strategy need to be investigated in more detail that also determines limits of these alternative policies. Besides the other critical question is the dimensions of the contradictions among developmental state and international system.

Integration and cooperation policies integrate to this framework and became one of the best ally of the developmentalist policies that is carried to regional level. These initiatives both directly and indirectly have influenced the developmentalist agenda and furthermore have determined the formation of the foreign policies. Although as Tussie (2011) states the boundaries of the integration experiences are fuzzy-institutional roots still represents weak side of these initiatives- they also have become successful in the creation of new spaces. Under these initiatives beyond trade, especially cooperation in energy, defence, security and creation of regional public goods have been more important. Furthermore, definition of regional identities via these initiatives have been strongly supported. Political stability is one of the key factor that would determine the future path of these initiatives. Moreover , conditions for the finance of developmentalist projects, dependency to high commodity prices are among the main important titles that would determine the path of the integration initiatives.

Especially in case of integration initiatives, the divergence between developmentalist and 21st century socialism approaches has been more clear. Related with integration initiatives ALBA represents another specific case that is different from the others. Without any doubt ALBA represents anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist principles that is possible to be covered under an integration initiative. Briefly ALBA is an unique example that is purely connected with these titles. Besides via ALBA process it is also possible to see the limits faced during the application of such policies. In case of ALBA it is simply possible to observe the influences of 21st century

socialism debate related to the integration policies. Due to this inevitably it is expected that the path of 21st century socialism would also affect the future of the ALBA process.

On the other hand alternative potentials within Mercosur stays limited. Primarily Mercosur mostly serves to restructuring of trade related issues within multilateral trade system and is integrated to multilateral trade system more strongly than the other initiatives. It is possible to claim that post trade issues seem to be connected with UNASUR process rather than Mercosur. Increasing importance of the UNASUR would not be surprising in the future. The scale of the projects financed under UNASUR is one of the key parameter that increases its importance for the region. Alternative character of both ALBA and UNASUR is stronger than the other integration/regionalism experiences. Besides their transformative possibilities are more clear. Although the essence of the developmental state in both of the cases determine the dimensions of these transformative possibilities. While ALBA represents ideological challenge against capitalism, UNASUR transformative potential is limited with neodevelopmentalist approaches. UNASUR is the key case study of neodevelopmentalism on regional scale.

Finally it should be stated that the future path of Brazil and Venezuela seems to influence integration experiences. Brazil is one of the unique example of developmental state and the alliances kept within the state need to be considered in more detail. Differently from the old developmental state, currently the nature of these alliances have also changed. In case of Brazil apart from big business-private sector and state relations the bottom income groups also have been included to this alliance via specific social policies. The maturity of the capitalist accumulation and the greater scale of big business also determines the developmental state preferences. On the other hand to eliminate inequalities is another critical dimension to struggle with. The sustainability of these policies would also depend on the sustainability of the power relations. Briefly welfare-equity trade off still remains actual and unsolved.

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Chapter 7

A Comparative Analysis on the Role of Cooperation Agencies in Turkish and Brazilian Public Diplomacy

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Conceptualization of the roles of Brazil and Turkey in regional and international affairs in the 21st century as “emerging powers” due to their successful economic performance and as “twins” due to their similar choices in global politics has close connections with the “active” foreign policy approaches framed within the “new” foreign policies of these two countries. In accordance, the concept of public diplomacy, which has started its journey in the second half of the twentieth century in the United States, has been embraced by these two countries, which wish to increase their international presence and win the hearts and minds of foreign publics. Today, as past and ongoing aid receivers, both Turkey and Brazil have reached the status of rising donor in international development cooperation. Despite the differences in the historical and ideational foundations of the foreign aid policies of these two countries, both use international development cooperation as a soft power tool; a component of public diplomacy targeting their immediate neighborhoods and distant regions with which they have historic and cultural ties. Both in Brazil and Turkey, foreign aid is allocated via fragmented structures due to the involvement of different ministries and official institutions in the process, besides the contributions of civil society. However, both Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) established in 1987 and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) established in 1992, have become the main official institutions in the planning and implementation of international development cooperation in both countries with an extensive increase in their budgets, responsibilities and activity areas in the recent years. This paper aims to analyze and compare the increasing roles and the prospects for the sustainability of the activities of TIKA and ABC in the implementation of foreign policies of Turkey and Brazil with reference to their roles in pursuing an effective public diplomacy and their contribution to the achievement of regional and global foreign policy goals of both countries.

Introduction

Implementations of public diplomacy and foreign aid can be traced back to the first political units founded by the humankind. However, current meanings of both terms were primarily shaped by the Cold-War political environment in the second half of the 20th century and secondly by the economic and political emergence of some of the developing countries in world politics during the first decade of the 21st century. With the emergence of new donors using foreign aid as public diplomacy in order to ‘win the hearts and minds’⁶⁷ of the people and decision makers, both terms are gaining new meanings. As Gilley suggests, today we are living

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⁶⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p. 1.

“...in an era of emerging powers that aspire to make their own contributions to global humanitarianism *in the name of the state*.”⁶⁸

Today, Brazil and Turkey are among these emerging powers and as a result of their ‘new’ foreign policies and successful economic performances. As emerging donors, they use development assistance and the rising levels of financial resources they allocate for foreign aid, as an important public diplomacy component. In both countries, since the first years of 2000s, during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Workers’ Party (PT) governments, already established cooperation agencies were transformed into the main responsible bodies and coordinators of their foreign aid policies. In accordance with their state-centered approach in foreign aid, Turkey and Brazil strengthened their cooperation agencies in the recent years and many other public institutions from ministries to municipalities became involved in development assistance. In addition, not only the contribution of business associations and NGOs to development assistance in both countries but also their interaction and cooperation with their own governments, increased. In this process Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação – ABC) and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı – TİKA) were given special importance in Brazilian and Turkish foreign policies by the governments as the main implementing bodies of the foreign aid policies of these countries.

This paper firstly explains the transformation of the concepts of public diplomacy and foreign aid in the 21st century and the reasons why rising donors prefer to use foreign aid as public diplomacy. Secondly, the place of foreign aid provision in foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey will be analyzed based on the increasing roles of their cooperation agencies; ABC and TİKA. Thirdly, contributions of ABC and TİKA to public diplomacy and the sustainability of foreign aid policies of Brazil and Turkey will be discussed.

Foreign Aid as Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century

Public diplomacy is defined as “a deliberate act designed to communicate with the public in foreign countries”.⁶⁹ Public diplomacy mainly comprises state-to-public and state-to-state activities and it is more an interaction than a mere presentation.⁷⁰ It is used by countries to understand others, explain themselves, to prevent or counter misinformation and to enhance prestige. Public diplomacy may include different activities from informing the public to influencing a selected target group. It also includes the evaluation of the outcomes.⁷¹ Probably

⁶⁸ Bruce Gilley, “Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism”, *Perceptions*, Vol XX, No 1, 2015, p. 47.

⁶⁹ William A. Rugh, “The Case for Soft Power”, Philip Seib (ed.), *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 12.

⁷⁰ “A Glance at Public Diplomacy”, <http://kdk.gov.tr/en/sag/kamu-diplomasisine-bakis/21>, Retrieved (29 February 2016); Nicholas J. Cull, “How We Got Here”, Philip Seib (ed.), *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 42.

⁷¹ Rugh, “The Case for Soft Power”, p. 14; Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy”, Jan Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 31; Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Governance: Challenges for Scholars and Practitioners”, Andrew F. Cooper et al. (eds.), *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?*, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 243.

the main difference of public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy is that an equality or hierarchy does not necessarily exist between the side implementing public diplomacy and recipients of its messages.⁷² Moreover, public diplomacy is conducted by using soft power tools which do not quickly produce certain outcomes that is why it is difficult to predict the success of public diplomacy activities.⁷³

Soft power is a relatively new concept but has been widely discussed since it was coined in 1990.⁷⁴ Soft power is regarded as an important tool of public diplomacy⁷⁵ and is exerted in a combination of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy.⁷⁶ According to Nye, soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”⁷⁷ Nye lists a country’s culture, political values and foreign policies as the sources of its soft power.⁷⁸

Although neither public diplomacy activities nor the use of soft power in order to influence the foreign people is a new phenomenon in the history of relations among political units,⁷⁹ public diplomacy in the sense we understand today is a product of the 20th century world politics. However, the term public diplomacy has gained new meanings since it was used by Edmund Guillion in 1965⁸⁰ when public diplomacy was defined as an activity dealing “with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies”.⁸¹

In the post-Cold War period, public diplomacy has become more important than ever. The increase in the number and types of the actors involving the private sector, NGOs and individuals; the increase in the density of their interaction; the rise of democratization supporting civil society and NGOs, and advancements in communication technologies are the reasons for the new rising position of public diplomacy in international relations besides our “global environment that is vastly more challenging, complex and demanding than the world of 1945”.⁸² Thus, public diplomacy has become a “central activity” within the general field of diplomacy and its rising importance is accompanied by rising levels of resources allocated to public diplomacy activities.⁸³

Today, both small and large countries struggle for building a positive perception of their countries in the eyes of foreign people and organizations. This positive perception is regarded

⁷² Shelton A. Gunaratne, “Public Diplomacy, Global Communication and World Order: An Analysis Based on Theory of Living Systems”, *Current Sociology*, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2005, p. 766.

⁷³ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 99.

⁷⁴ Rugh, “The Case for Soft Power”, p. 3-4.

⁷⁵ “A Glance at Public Diplomacy”.

⁷⁶ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 31.

⁷⁷ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. x.

⁷⁸ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 11.

⁷⁹ Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice”, Jan Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, “Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It”, Occasional Paper, *Rand Corporation*, p. 4.

⁸¹ “What is Public Diplomacy?”, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy> (Retrieved 03 November 2015).

⁸² Ramesh Thakur, “National Diplomacy and Global Governance”, Andrew F. Cooper et al. (eds.), *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?*, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 293; Mark Leonard et al., *Public Diplomacy*, London, The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002, p. 2; “Definitions of Public Diplomacy”, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy/Definitions>, (Retrieved 03 November 2015).

⁸³ Leonard et al., *Public Diplomacy*, p. 95.

as a component of national power, strengthening the international legitimacy of a country.⁸⁴ Foreign aid is not always provided in accordance with the national power of a country. By providing foreign aid, some countries enjoy a high level of soft power appreciation in world affairs exceeding their economic or military power.⁸⁵

Within this context, foreign aid is regarded by established and emerging powers as a public diplomacy tool contributing to a country's soft power, resembling a moral commitment.⁸⁶ Explaining foreign aid in a value-based discourse does not reduce its primary functions of providing a friendly environment for the activities of traditional diplomacy⁸⁷ and finding new markets for the donor country's products and companies or buying political loyalty. Despite the ongoing debate on the balance of values and interests in shaping development policy,⁸⁸ still it is the moral dimension of aid provision which makes it a valuable public diplomacy tool.

Foreign aid in the sense understood today, as a temporary contribution to the improvement of the lives of the people of recipient countries, is a product of the Cold War period. However, just like public diplomacy, the concept of foreign aid is under change in the 21st century. It has become "a common and expected element"⁸⁹ in international relations; number of donors and involved actors have increased and underlying reasons of aid provision have diversified.

Foreign aid policies of the emerging donors offer an alternative South to South relationship to the traditional and hierarchic North to South aid provision structure. Most of them reject the dominance of the conditionality based OECD development cooperation system.⁹⁰ They determine their preferences freely depending on a combination of factors ranging from moral, historic or religious reasons and humanitarian needs to their quest for new markets, natural resource providers and political allies.⁹¹

Emerging donors both receive and deliver foreign aid and they not only offer financial resources but also share their development experience via technical cooperation activities with the recipient developing countries. The total amount of aid provided by the emerging non-OECD member donors has reached 2.3 billion USD and is in the trend of increasing.⁹² Although most of the emerging donors have been providing aid for many years, the increase in the amounts in the flow of aid from developing countries to their counterparts, attracts Western countries' attention to these new donors. Moreover, there is an increasing sympathy among the recipient

⁸⁴ Jian Wang, "Introduction: China's Search of Soft Power", Jian Wang (ed.), *Soft Power in China Public Diplomacy through Communication*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 1; *Public Diplomacy*, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2005–06, p. 12.

⁸⁵ Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, s. 9.

⁸⁶ Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America*, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 3; "Foreign Aid as Public Diplomacy: Is U.S. investment in the Middle East sowing goodwill? Interview with Walid Maalouf", *Public Diplomacy (PD)*, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 47-51.

⁸⁷ Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2007, p. 15.

⁸⁸ Sebastian Barnet Fuchs, "Development Cooperation in Times of Global Power Shifts", *KAS International Reports*, Issue 3, 2014, p. 20.

⁸⁹ Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, p. 2.

⁹⁰ Fuchs, "Development Cooperation in Times of Global Power Shifts", p. 28.

⁹¹ Ngaire Woods, "Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance", *International Affairs*, Vol 84, No 6, 2008, p. 1.

⁹² *Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2014*, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-Report-2014-interactive.pdf> (Retrieved 17 August 2015), p. 6.

countries towards the emerging donors since they think that the assistance of these developing countries not only in terms of finance but also in terms of technology transfer and experience sharing, meet their needs more than the conditional aid programs of traditional donors.⁹³

When we set aside their desire of guaranteeing a more powerful position in accordance with their economic and political ascendance in the post-Cold War World order and especially under the AKP and PT governments since the first years of the 2000s, Brazil and Turkey have their specific reasons in giving importance to foreign aid. While “Turkey has made humanitarianism a key dimension of its foreign policy”⁹⁴, for Brazil the distinction between social development agenda followed inside the country and outside is becoming blurred. The country challenges the developed North and promotes development in many countries within the scope of South-South Cooperation via its elaborate foreign aid policy.

Technical Cooperation and the Rising Role of ABC in Brazilian Foreign Policy

The foreign policy priorities of the emerging Brazil since the first years of 2000s, are supporting the shaping of a multipolar world order in which Brazil will have a prominent role along with other emerging powers and playing an active role in various areas of global politics such as international trade and finance, environment, climate change and international peace and security.⁹⁵ With the motto of ‘active and proud’, the new foreign policy of Brazil follows a highly internationalized agenda and aims to increase bilateral and regional relations with the Global South countries. According to President Rousseff, the multipolar world order that Brazil desires should be “founded on the promotion of peace, sustainable development, poverty eradication and the reduction of inequality.”⁹⁶ And these are the main priority areas of Brazilian foreign aid policy or the Brazilian cooperation for international development, as Brazil defines it.

Brazilian support for international development is distributed via four channels; humanitarian assistance, scholarships for foreign students, technical cooperation and contributions to international organizations. ABC coordinates and carries out technical cooperation activities and it is not the main receiver of the Brazilian financial resources allocated to development assistance. Traditionally, Brazilian financial contribution to international organizations is the main receiver.⁹⁷ Within the scope of technical cooperation; Brazil encourages development,

⁹³ Woods, “Whose aid? Whose influence?”.

⁹⁴ Gilley, “Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism”, p. 43.

⁹⁵ Monica Hirst et al., “A Política Externa Brasileira em tempos de novos horizontes e desafios”, *Observatório Político Sul-Americano, Análise de Conjuntura*, No 12, 2010, p. 1; Paulo Fagundes Visentini, “Brazil’s Contemporary Foreign Policy: An Affirmative Agenda”, Wilhelm Hofmeister (ed.), *G20: Perceptions and Perspectives for Global Governance*, Singapore, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011, p. 38; Hal Brands, “Evaluating Brazilian Grand Strategy under Lula”, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol 30, No 1, 2011, p. 28.

⁹⁶ “Speech by President Dilma Rousseff on the occasion of the General Debate of the 69th General Assembly of the United Nations – New York, September 24th, 2014”, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5836:statement-by-the-president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-dilma-rousseff-at-the-general-debate-of-the-69th-general-assembly-of-the-united-nations-new-york-september-24th-2014&catid=197&lang=en&Itemid=750, (Retrieved 03 March 2016).

⁹⁷ Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*, Brasília: Ipea, ABC, 2010, pp. 20-21.

promotes capacity building and supports necessary structural changes in the partner countries. Despite its decades-long policy of providing development assistance to Third World countries; consolidation of democracy, increasing economic growth and implementation of successful social programs allowed Brazil only in the recent years to follow an assertive development cooperation policy.⁹⁸ That is why despite its lower share from the budget, technical cooperation has recently become the main area where the contribution of Brazil is the most visible and thus Brazil uses its soft power and promotes its development model.

The history of Brazilian interest in development assistance as a provider country, is closely connected with the Brazil's desire of gaining more autonomy in international affairs by establishing relations with other Third World countries. Officially, Brazilian policy of supporting international technical cooperation started with the establishment of National Commission for Technical Assistance comprised of representatives from different ministries, in 1950. In 1969, Ministry of External Relations and Secretariat of Planning of Presidency became the main responsible institutions for technical cooperation activities. In 1984 a reform process started in order to strengthen the efficiency of the system and in 1987, ABC (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação) was established under Ministry of External Relations as the main official body in the field of international technical cooperation with a special emphasis on the promotion of South-South cooperation.⁹⁹ The democratization process that started in 1980s accompanied by reforms in the constitution and social policies and the increasing economic and political stability of the country, besides the recognition of these improvements in the international arena, contributed to the increasing Brazilian involvement in international development assistance.¹⁰⁰ ABC is responsible from coordination of both foreign policy and technical dimensions of development assistance. In 2012, activity areas of ABC were redefined and extended. Today, ABC conducts its activities under the Undersecretary-General of Cooperation and Trade Promotion.¹⁰¹

Technical cooperation activities include “transfer or sharing of knowledge, experience and good practices between governments bilaterally or via an international organization”. Main areas subject to cooperation activities are agriculture, health, education, environment and public administration.¹⁰² Besides ABC, the main responsible body for the coordination of technical cooperation activities, more than one hundred Brazilian institutions like FIOCRUZ and EMBRAPA, various ministries, Brazilian states, municipalities and other organizations also contribute to the technical cooperation activities.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Nathalie Beghin, *A Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional na Área de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional: Avanços e Desafios – Onde estamos e para onde vamos?*, Brasília (DF), INESC&OXFAM, 2014, p. 25.

⁹⁹ “Histórico”, <http://www.abc.gov.br/SobreABC/Historico>, (Retrieved 16.03.2016).

¹⁰⁰ *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*, Brasília: Ipea, ABC, 2010, p. 16.

¹⁰¹ “Histórico”, <http://www.abc.gov.br/SobreABC/Historico> (Retrieved 16.03.2016).

¹⁰² “Cooperação técnica”, http://www.itaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3686:cooperacao-tecnica&catid=189&lang=pt-br&Itemid=439, 24.04.2014, (Retrieved 17 February 2015).

¹⁰³ Bianca Suyama and Melissa Pomeroy “Picking and Choosing: Contributions of Brazilian cooperation to more horizontal post-2015 partnerships”, *BRICS Reports*, 2015, <http://brasilnomundo.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2.Bricks-Report-Brazil.pdf>, p. 188; *Comparative Analysis Regulation of Foreign Aid in Selected Countries*, The Law Library of Congress, September 2011, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign->

In the field of humanitarian aid provision, the establishment of the Interministerial Working Group for International Humanitarian Aid (Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial para Ajuda Humanitária Internacional - GTI-AHI) in 2006 resembles a turning point, after which activities and visibility of Brazil in the field of humanitarian aid, increased.¹⁰⁴ In the GTI-AHI, representatives from presidency and eleven ministries work under the coordination of Itamaraty.¹⁰⁵ The main focus of the Group's activities are the disaster and emergency situations in foreign countries.

ABC does not make fund transfers and is not directly involved in the provision of humanitarian aid. Instead, it is a highly professionalized agency providing consultancy-like technical cooperation services to requesting states and institutions. Nevertheless, Brazil overcomes this obstacle by providing funds to the international organizations such as UN agencies, MERCOSUR and IBSA, by using ad hoc mechanisms and by allocating BNDES credits to Brazilian companies planning to invest in cooperation partner countries.¹⁰⁶ For example, MERCOSUR financially supports development projects in the member states with the FOCEM fund of the organization, to which Brazil is the main provider and Paraguay is the main recipient.

Brazil is involved in technical cooperation activities in three dimensions; as a provider, as a recipient and as a partner in triangular cooperation. Technical cooperation does not necessarily involve the flow of financial resources, financing of construction or donation of goods or equipment. For example, technical cooperation that Brazil receives from both other countries and international organizations in the fields of development and public management, is mainly financed by Brazil. Brazil is also a partner country in triangular cooperation projects targeting capacity building, which in the case of Brazil, occurs as North-South-South cooperation; bringing together a traditional donor country or an international organization and another developing country.¹⁰⁷ Despite still being a recipient of development assistance from the OECD countries, Brazil rejects becoming a part of the OECD-DAC system since it prefers to act independently and is against the conditionality principle of the development assistance system established by developed countries.¹⁰⁸ In addition, in contrast to developed countries which

aid/regulation-of-foreign-aid.pdf; "Cooperação técnica". Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) is a public health organization and Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) is a ministerial department supporting international partnership in agricultural research.

¹⁰⁴ José Maurício Vieira Filho, "Brazil and its foreign policy: the promotion of humanitarian action in Lula's Governments (2003-2010)", *World International Studies Committee - WISC 2011*, Porto, Portugal, 17-20 August 2011, http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-556.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ "Grupo Interministerial de Assistência Humanitária se reúne em Brasília", <http://cooperacaohumanitaria.itamaraty.gov.br/noticias/63-grupo-interministerial-de-assistencia-humanitaria-se-reune-em-brasilia>, (Retrieved 29.03.2016).

¹⁰⁶ Hirst et al., "A Política Externa Brasileira em tempos de novos horizontes e desafios", p. 6, p. 13; Lídia Cabral and Julia Weinstock, "Brazil's Emerging Aid Programme: Time to Move Beyond the Jabuticaba Complex", <http://www.norrag.org/es/publications/boletin-norrag/online-version/a-brave-new-world-of-emerging-non-dac-donors-and-their-differences-from-traditional-donors/detail/brazils-emerging-aid-programme-time-to-move-beyond-the-jabuticaba-complex.html>, *Norrag News*, No 44, 2010, p. 38-40; Christina Stolte, "Brazil in Africa", *Harvard International Review*, Vol 34, No 4, 2013.

¹⁰⁷ "Cooperação técnica"; Guido Ashoff, "Triangular Cooperation: Opportunities, risks, and conditions for effectiveness", *Development Outreach*, October 2010, pp. 23-24.

¹⁰⁸ Adriana Erthal Abdennur, "Emerging powers as normative agents: Brazil and China within the UN development system", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 35, No.10, 2014, p. 1883; *Comparative Analysis Regulation of Foreign Aid in Selected Countries*, p.65.

mainly finance the international organizations of the Northern countries, Brazil allocates resources for the organizations of the South which gather states from the developing world, including Brazil.¹⁰⁹ Within this framework, Brazil defines and promotes its technical cooperation model as an alternative to the established and asymmetrical donor-receiver relations.

In principle, Brazil shares its technical cooperation partners among the countries experiencing similar social and economic problems with Brazil.¹¹⁰ In practice, the choice of cooperation partners occur in accordance with the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy focusing on Africa; Latin America and Caribbean and Middle East, the regions with which Brazil has “historic, linguistic, cultural and ethnic” ties.¹¹¹

In consequence, although Brazil has implemented around 7000 technical cooperation projects in more than 100 countries around the world,¹¹² main destinations have been Portuguese speaking African countries and neighbour Latin American and Caribbean countries. Timor Leste from Asia, with which Brazil shares linguistic and historic ties; Lebanon, the main source country of 19th century Arab immigration to Brazil and Palestine should also be included in the list of prominent aid receivers from Brazil via ABC or other channels.¹¹³ The top receivers of Brazilian technical cooperation are from Latin America and the Caribbean, in which Brazil emerged as a regional power of South America and from Africa, support of which is crucial for both the global presence of Brazil as an aspiring global power and for the security of the South Atlantic region.

Brazil has attracted considerable international attention as a rising donor during the two presidential terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The increasing importance of technical cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy is closely linked to the developmentalist agenda and successful social policies that the country has been implementing since Lula’s first presidential term.¹¹⁴ However, since Brazil does not systematically report its financial allocation for technical cooperation and other channels of foreign aid provision, it is not possible to make reliable estimations on the amounts spent by Brazil.¹¹⁵ However, among the emerging donors of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, South Africa and China; Brazil with its annual contribution below 400 million USD, was the sixth of the six countries donating to multilateral cooperation in 2015.¹¹⁶ According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, humanitarian assistance provided by Brazil decreased 97% from 2012 to 2013. On the contrary, Turkey increased its

¹⁰⁹ Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*, Brasília: Ipea, ABC, 2010, p. 17.

¹¹⁰ *Comparative Analysis Regulation of Foreign Aid in Selected Countries*.

¹¹¹ “Gestão da Cooperação Sul-Sul de 2000 á 2014”, <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/CooperacaoSulSul> (Retrieved 16.03.2016).

¹¹² “Cooperação técnica”.

¹¹³ *ECOSOC Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum: Trends in South-South and Triangular Development Cooperation*, ECOSOC, April 2008, p. 18; *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*, p. 24.

¹¹⁴ Hirst et al., “A Política Externa Brasileira em tempos de novos horizontes e desafios”, p. 6.

¹¹⁵ Sarah-Lea John de Sousa, “Brazil as an Emerging Actor in International Development Cooperation: A Good Partner for European Donors?”, *Briefing Paper 5*, German Development Institute, 2010.

¹¹⁶ OECD, *Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World*, Paris, OECD Publishing, p. 35.

humanitarian assistance by 57% during the same period and became the third donor ranking only after USA and the UK.¹¹⁷

As explained, ABC is legally banned from transferring funds to other countries and it is responsible from “negotiating, promoting, and monitoring the Brazilian government’s cooperation projects and programmes and coordinating the relationship with the counterparts”.¹¹⁸ ABC operates as a technical organization implementing institution strengthening and capacity building activities for requesting partners. Since its foundation in 1987, main transformations in the work of ABC was firstly the restructuring of the organization according to thematic working areas instead of the previously used geographical divisions.¹¹⁹ Second one is undoubtedly the increase in the activities and partner countries of ABC, during the Lula presidency. However, the budget of ABC which was around 2 million R\$ in 2000, reaching its peak with exceeding 37 million R\$ in 2010, decreased to 7 million R\$ in 2014.¹²⁰ General budget allocated to international development cooperation reached its peak in 2011 with 1.504 million R\$ and decreased to 384.9 million R\$ in 2014.¹²¹ The same tendency of decrease is also visible in the number of the ongoing and completed projects implemented by ABC. The highest levels were reached in the 2009-2011 period and the trend is reversed since then.¹²² The organization, as a part of Ministry of External Relations, is also hampered by its being lack of autonomy and independent financial and human resources¹²³ to coordinate the development assistance activities of the country. Moreover, it is probable that the ongoing impeachment process and the government change in Brazil will have a hampering effect on Brazilian technical cooperation.

As explained, despite the long experience of Brazil in development cooperation, it became a foreign policy priority in the period starting with the first term of Lula as a consequence of the “internationalization of social policies”¹²⁴ such as right to food and elimination of extreme poverty which have become both internal and external policy goals.¹²⁵ However, the economic agenda is not easily separated from the social agenda, and South-South cooperation as the basis of Brazilian technical cooperation policy is an area where “both idealist and realist elements” merge for Brazil.¹²⁶ Brazil defines its activities under the South-South cooperation as “... efforts

¹¹⁷ *Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2014*, p. 29.

¹¹⁸ Sousa, “Brazil as an Emerging Actor in International Development Cooperation...”, p. 3.

¹¹⁹ “A Reestruturação da ABC”, <http://www.abc.gov.br/imprensa/mostrarnoticia/243#> (Retrieved 25 August 2015).

¹²⁰ “Evolução da Execução Financeira dos Projetos da ABC”, <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/EvolucaoFinanceira> (Retrieved 28 February 2016).

¹²¹ Beghin, *A Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional ...*, p. 25.

¹²² “Quantitativos de Projetos e Atividades Isoladas de Cooperação por Ano”, <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/QuantitativoProjetos>, (Retrieved 28 February 2016).

¹²³ “Brazil: an emerging aid player”, *ODI Briefing Paper 64*, 2010, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6295.pdf>, p. 2.

¹²⁴ Suyama and Pomeroy, “Picking and Choosing: Contributions of Brazilian cooperation...”, p. 188.

¹²⁵ “Remarks by H.E. Mr. Celso Lafer, Foreign Relations Minister of the Federative Republic of Brazil”, *International Conference on Financing for Development*, Monterrey, Mexico, 22 March 2002, <http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/brazilE.htm>, (Retrieved: 25 August 2014).

¹²⁶ Oliver Stuenkel, “Book review: “Africa, Partner of Atlantic Brazil” by José Flávio Sombra Saraiva”, <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2012/03/19/book-review-%E2%80%9Cafrika-partner-of-atlantic-brazil%E2%80%9D-by-jose-flavio-sombra-saraiva/>, 19 March 2012, (Retrieved 09 August 2015).

being made by Brazil in favour of developing countries.”¹²⁷ In terms of public diplomacy, Brazil views its South-South cooperation policy as a contribution to the “positive image of Brazil”.¹²⁸ In practice, as seen from the relations with Africa -the most prioritized region in Brazilian South-South cooperation- Brazil increased its political and economic ties with the countries in the region in recent years and provided technical cooperation via ABC,¹²⁹ thus “linking ethical values and national interests”.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, despite financial and administrative constraints, ABC has been playing an important role in coordinating governmental efforts in the field of technical cooperation. Technical capabilities of ABC and the own development experience of Brazil with successful examples such as eliminating hunger and extreme poverty renders its technical cooperation policy a very appealing soft power factor in the eyes of the countries of the South.¹³¹ The role of ABC in Brazilian public diplomacy can be defined as a specialized one targeting mainly decision makers and professionals in recipient countries. However, due to its being a ministerial department ABC is quite sensitive to the ups and downs of Brazilian foreign policy. It is clear that economic and political problems which partially reversed the increasing interest of Brazil in global politics, will also effect the financial and human resources, productivity and visibility of ABC.

Turkish Foreign Aid Policy and the Role of TIKA

Turkey has become one of the emerging powers and rising donors of the 21st century due to its successful economic performance and increasing activism in mainly regional and also global politics. The new foreign policy of Turkey, defined as “multidimensional” and “proactive” by the former Foreign Affairs Minister and Prime Minister Davutoğlu, leads Turkey to pursue an active humanitarian diplomacy which “is based on a critical equilibrium between conscience and power”.¹³²

According to Kalın, in the 21st century, Turkey determines “its national and regional priorities” according to “its own geographical and historical background”.¹³³ And Turkish foreign aid policy is not exempt from this approach. Turkish foreign aid policy is humanitarian relief oriented and has the general aims of strengthening human security, securing political stability and supporting state-building and peace-building activities.

¹²⁷ The Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, *South-South Cooperation Activities Carried Out by Brazil*, Under-Secretariat General for Cooperation and Trade Promotion, 2007, p. 6.

¹²⁸ “Discurso proferido pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Celso Amorim, na Conferência Internacional em Apoio à Economia Palestina para a Reconstrução de Gaza - Sharm el-Sheikh, Egito, 02/03/2009”, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7996:discurso-proferido-pelo-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso-amorim-na-conferencia-internacional-em-apoio-a-economia-palestina-para-a-reconstrucao-de-gaza-sharm-el-sheikh-egito-02-03-2009&catid=163&lang=pt-br&Itemid=478, 02 March 2009, (Retrieved 02 December 2015).

¹²⁹ Élodie Brun and Bruno Muxagato, “El proyecto internacional brasileño (2003-2010): Intenciones regionales y proyección global vía las relaciones Sur-Sur”, *Anuario Americanista Europeo*, No 10, 2012, p. 104.

¹³⁰ Visentini, “Brazil’s Contemporary Foreign Policy: An Affirmative Agenda”, p. 33.

¹³¹ “Brazil: an emerging aid player”, p. 2.

¹³² Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects”, *Nationalities Papers*, 2013, Vol 41, No 6, p.865.

¹³³ İbrahim Kalın, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey”, *Perceptions*, Vol XVI, No 3, 2011, p. 19.

Turkey has been involved in development assistance activities as a provider since 1970s and started to provide official development aid within an institutional framework in 1985. The responsible official unit was the State Planning Organization at the time and the first 10 million USD aid package was designed to contribute to capacity building in seven African countries.¹³⁴ The most important turning point in the field of development aid for Turkey, was the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 when Central Asian and Caucasian countries having ethnic, linguistic, historic and religious ties with Turkey emerged as independent states. Secondly, democratization process in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the following conflict, opened the way and in the case of Yugoslavia, brought the necessity of interaction with the peoples of the Eastern European geography with which Turkey also have historic, ethnic, religious and cultural ties. Thus foreign aid became an important component of Turkey's proactive foreign policy in the Eurasian space. TIKA was established in this political environment in 1992 as a technical aid organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the mission of becoming the "implementing intermediary of Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the countries with whom (Turkey has) shared values, as well as in many other areas and countries." The first TIKA Program Coordination Office was opened in Turkmenistan, in the following years other offices were opened in different parts of Eurasia.¹³⁵

When compared to the activism of the recent years, 1990s was a learning and institution-building period for TIKA. Nevertheless, during that decade the agency made important contributions to the state-building process of Central Asian and Caucasian countries.¹³⁶ From 2001, TIKA started to continue its activities as an organization under the Prime Ministry.¹³⁷

In the post-2001 period, with the AKP government, in accordance with the active foreign policy goal of the country and its emergence among the rising economic and political powers in international relations, TIKA's role in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy gained more importance. Since 2005, Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible from the political dimension of foreign aid and TIKA is responsible from the technical coordination.¹³⁸ Due to the Africa and Latin America openings of Turkey, TIKA Programme Coordination Offices were opened in both regions. The number of coordination offices which was 12 in 2002, reached 50 by the year of 2016. The number of countries that TIKA has offices also increased and reached 48 and TIKA has activities totally in 140 countries.¹³⁹ For example, in the 1992-2002 period TIKA had completed 2.241 restoration works and projects however since 2002, total

¹³⁴ "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa, (Retrieved 1 March 2016).

¹³⁵ "About Us", http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-1465, (Retrieved 23 February 2016); "History of TIKA", http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526, (Retrieved 23 February 2016).

¹³⁶ Engin Akçay, *Bir Dış Politika Enstrümanı Olarak Türk Dış Yardımları*, Ankara, Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 169.

¹³⁷ "History of TIKA", <http://www.tika.gov.tr>.

¹³⁸ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey as an 'Emerging Donor' and the Arab Uprisings", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2014, p. 335.

¹³⁹ "About Us", <http://www.tika.gov.tr>.

number of TİKA's activities exceeded 18.000 and the number of projects implemented reached 6.500 by the year 2016.¹⁴⁰

Successful economic performance of the country caused an increase in both the amount allocated to foreign aid and its receivers. Turkey also increased its voluntary contributions to the UN agencies such as UNDP. Recently, UNDP Regional Centre for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States was moved to Istanbul.¹⁴¹ Turkey's contribution to the alleviation of the Syrian refugee crisis is appreciated by the UN and UN World Humanitarian Summit will take place in İstanbul in May 2016. Besides the justification from the UN explaining that "Turkey's extraordinary breakthrough in the fields of humanitarian aid and humanitarian diplomacy in particular" was the most important determining factor in the choice of İstanbul as the host city,¹⁴² other underlying reason of choosing Turkey against Switzerland as the place of the Summit, was the necessity of recognizing the emergence of new donors and finding ways to cooperate with them.¹⁴³

Today, more than 80% percent of the aid provided by TİKA is used in the projects and activities directly related with the Millennium Development Goals in the areas such as health, sanitation and education via capacity building and construction of physical infrastructure.¹⁴⁴ Besides the geographical extension and institutional changes, scope of the activities of TİKA also extended since its establishment in 1992. During the 1990s, TİKA's main focus was cultural and educational cooperation with the Turkic speaking countries of Central Asia and Caucasia. In 2000s, TİKA extended its activities from infrastructure construction to capacity building.¹⁴⁵ The Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries also took place in İstanbul in 2011¹⁴⁶ and Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, some of which are also LDCs, besides the traditional aid receivers of Turkey, gained more importance in Turkey's development aid policy in the recent years and this trend is expected to continue.¹⁴⁷

While Turkey does not provide aid within a legal framework of conditionality principle, it officially has "the objective of contributing to the creation of a more peaceful and stable

¹⁴⁰ "TİKA, Türkiye'dir", http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_turkiyedir-3545, (Retrieved 23 February 2016); "Türkiye Dünyanın 'Delikanlı Sesi'", <http://www.yenisoz.com.tr/turkiye-dunyanin-delikanli-sesi-haber-10592>, (Retrieved 29 March 2016).

¹⁴¹ "Speech of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Conference on "International Development Cooperation: Trends and Emerging Opportunities -Perspectives of the New Actors", 20 June 2014, İstanbul", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-of-h_e_mr_ahmet-davutoğlu_the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-at-the-conference-on_international-development-cooperation_trends-and-emerging-opportunities_perspectives-of-the-new-actors__-20-june-2014_istanbul.en.mfa, (Retrieved 23 February 2016).

¹⁴² "Turkey will host the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-will-host-the-first_ever-world-humanitarian-summit.en.mfa (Retrieved 02 March 2016).

¹⁴³ Gilley, "Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism", p. 47.

¹⁴⁴ "TİKA ve Undp İşbirliğinde Uluslararası Kalkınma İşbirliği Konferansı", http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_ve_undp_isbirliginde_uluslararasi_kalkinma_isbirligi_konferansi-6978, (Retrieved 20 February 2016); "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect".

¹⁴⁵ "About Us", <http://www.tika.gov.tr>.

¹⁴⁶ "Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries", <http://www.un.org/en/conf/ldc/>, (Retrieved 20 February 2016).

¹⁴⁷ "TİKA ve Undp İşbirliğinde Uluslararası Kalkınma İşbirliği Konferansı"; "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics And The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect"; "Speech of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Conference on "International Development Cooperation: Trends and Emerging Opportunities -Perspectives of the New Actors".

environment in the neighbouring regions.” Development aid is used by Turkey as a complementary to its diplomatic efforts in conflict prevention, both of which constitute Turkey’s “policy of utilizing a wide range of soft power”.¹⁴⁸ Different from Brazil or other emerging donors such as China or India, since 2005, Turkey has been reporting to the OECD-DAC. As candidate country to the EU, Turkey receives technical and financial support from the EU. When considered in line with Turkey’s position as a candidate country to the EU, its role in the neighbourhood policies of the EU and its expanding cooperation with the UN agencies, it can be envisaged that Turkey’s future in development aid will be alongside the EU and other developed countries.

In the success of Turkish foreign aid policy as a public diplomacy component, besides the achievements of TİKA, there are two other reasons. First of all, civil society contributions to Turkish foreign aid represent a “convergence of interest between civil society and the state.”¹⁴⁹ This strengthens both the humanitarian dimension of foreign aid provision and the image of Turkey, as a country helping the poor both with its official organizations and its people. In Turkish aid to Myanmar, Pakistan and Somalia contributions of NGOs and individuals had a special place. For example, according to then Deputy Prime Minister Bozdağ, almost half of the Turkish development aid in 2012 which in total reached 2.263 million USD, was provided via unofficial channels including NGOs.¹⁵⁰

Second reason is the cooperation of the official development aid providers of Turkey such as Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kızılay), Presidency of Religious Affairs, Directorate General of Foundations, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities and Prime Ministry Disaster & Emergency Management Authority.¹⁵¹ Especially in the case of disaster relief, these organizations, TİKA and NGOs work in coordination to provide humanitarian aid. It can be said that when compared to TİKA, these organizations are more active in disaster relief and immediate aid provision in the conflict areas or for refugees and contrary to TİKA, both Kızılay and Presidency of Religious Affairs receive donations for their aid projects. Today, Turkey’s distribution of development aid is managed elaborately depending on the needs of the receivers.¹⁵² However, it is claimed that TİKA should leave the duty of humanitarian aid provision to Kızılay and NGOs and focus on technical cooperation projects which necessitates technical capabilities and human resources.¹⁵³

Besides providing humanitarian aid and implementing capacity building projects, TİKA contributes to the revival of the Muslim and the Ottoman civilizational heritage in the receiver countries. This dimension is non-existent in Brazilian development cooperation policy despite Brazil’s focus on cooperating with the countries sharing cultural and historic ties with Brazil.

¹⁴⁸ “Turkey’s Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect”.

¹⁴⁹ “Turkey’s Developing Role in Africa: Interview with Birol Akgün and Mehmet Ozkan”, <http://www.sde.org.tr/en/newsdetail/turkeys-developing-role-in-africa-interview-with-birol-akgun-and-mehmet-ozkan/2576>, 05.05. 2011, (Retrieved 29 February 2015).

¹⁵⁰ “TİKA, Türkiye’dir”.

¹⁵¹ “Türkiye Dünyanın 'Delikanlı Sesi”.

¹⁵² B. Senem Çevik, *Uluslararası Halkla İlişkilerde İnsani Yardımlar: Kamu Diplomasisi Boyutu*, Ankara, Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2014, p. 54.

¹⁵³ Akçay, *Bir Dış Politika Enstrümanı Olarak Türk Dış Yardımları*, p. 147.

Since 2008, TİKA is responsible from the coordination of the restoration of immovable historic and cultural heritage of Turkey such as mosques, tombs, cemeteries, schools, public buildings and museums in Europe, Asia and Africa in a large number of countries from Serbia to Ethiopia.¹⁵⁴ These activities contribute to the protection of the common historic heritage, increase the visibility of TİKA and strengthen Turkey's image as a protector of the Ottoman and Muslim heritage all over the world. In practice, Turkish politicians are accompanied by a group of businessmen in their visits to foreign countries and many visit programs involve official opening ceremonies of buildings restored by TİKA¹⁵⁵ and this brings more public visibility to TİKA's role in Turkish public diplomacy. Nevertheless beyond this soft power dimension, just as the case of Brazil, close links of Turkish foreign aid policy and the activities of TİKA with the general Turkish foreign policy receives criticism due to the merge of ethical and interest-based motives.¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

In the 21st century, how public diplomacy is designed and implemented and what it aims differs from country to country. And the security oriented US domination on the worldwide public diplomacy discourse does not necessarily represent the priorities of other countries.¹⁵⁷ Both Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies in the 21st century, call for a change in the existing world political system. Turkey demands a “global transformation of centre-periphery relations in order to create a more democratic and fair world system”.¹⁵⁸ Brazil calls for a “more representative”, “more legitimate” and “more effective” UN Security Council and “an economically and socially just world order members of which work in solidarity”.¹⁵⁹ Thanks to their successful economic performances and active foreign policies, Brazil and Turkey took their place among the rising powers of the 21st century and benefited from the international recognition and availability of internal financial resources, to develop and implement assertive development aid policies.

Both countries use the ‘soft power’ of providing foreign aid in their foreign policies primarily in order to find partners from their respective regions and other developing countries. Prospects

¹⁵⁴ “TİKA Projeleri Toplu AÇILIŞ Töreni Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Katılımıyla Gerçekleştirildi”,

http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_projeleri_toplu_acilis_toreni_cumhurbaskani_sayin_recep_tayyip_erdogan_in_katilimiyla_gerceklestirildi-16807, (Retrieved 23.02.2016).

¹⁵⁵ Akçay, *Bir Dış Politika Enstrümanı Olarak Türk Dış Yardımları*, p. 136; Ahmet Topal, “Sırlar asgari ücreti kışkandı”, *Sabah Gazetesi*, 29 December 2015, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2015/12/29/sirplar-asgari-ureti-kiskandi#> (Retrieved 29.12.2015).

¹⁵⁶ Altunışık, “Turkey as an ‘Emerging Donor’ and the Arab Uprisings”.

¹⁵⁷ Jan Melissen, “Introduction”, Jan Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. xx.

¹⁵⁸ Kalın, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey”, p. 19.

¹⁵⁹ “Discurso da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, na abertura do Debate Geral da 68ª Assembleia-Geral das Nações Unidas - Nova Iorque/EUA”, 24 September 2013, <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-o-planalto/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-na-abertura-do-debate-geral-da-68a-assembleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas-nova-iorque-eua>, (Retrieved 03 March 2016); “Speech by President Dilma Rousseff on the occasion of the General Debate of the 69th General Assembly of the United Nations – New York, September 24th, 2014”.

for economic benefits are in a secondary status.¹⁶⁰ In the specific case of Turkey, foreign aid is also used to promote political stability and development in the neighbour countries and regions in order to provide a secure environment for Turkey. When comparing the place of cooperation agencies in the foreign policies of both countries, it is visible that activities and partners of both ABC and TİKA increased in the recent years and their contribution to the soft power of their countries became visible. In both countries, the recent increase of diplomatic relations and bilateral high level visits to the target countries were accompanied by increasing cooperation projects from ABC and TİKA and resulted in an increase in economic relations.¹⁶¹

Despite these similarities, there are certain differences in the ideational motivations of using foreign aid as public diplomacy in both countries. Although both countries try to protect their autonomy in providing foreign aid, Turkey is more close to the Northern style aid provision and is quite confident in defining itself as a rising donor country as the provider side of the donor-receiver relations, which is defined by president Erdoğan as the “Turkish Style Development Model”.¹⁶²

On the other hand, Brazil is labeled as a rising donor in the academic literature but Brazilian diplomats prefer not to define Brazil in this way and emphasize the horizontal South-South framework of Brazilian development assistance policy.¹⁶³ Brazilian technical cooperation policy is based on sharing experience with other developing countries going through similar social and economic developmental problems with Brazil.¹⁶⁴ This approach directly links the success of the Brazilian national development project and social policies implemented in Brazil to the country’s foreign policy. However, linking the external agenda with the internal one not only promote development in poorer countries but also carries the risk of limiting the scope of Brazilian aid to what has been achieved in Brazil, which may lead to the ignorance of specific needs of Brazil’s so called cooperation partners or limit their number as not all the developing countries around the world share Brazil’s problems.

On the other hand, ABC is internationally recognized for its highly expertized working style while TİKA seems to have a workload comprising various activities and it can be expected that in the future some of TİKA’s responsibilities might be channelled to other governmental bodies and TİKA may assume the sole coordinator role or design its structure as an ABC type technical department.

A general evaluation of the development assistance activities of both countries reveal that today, internal and external factors are pulling Brazil back from spending more on foreign aid and pushing Turkey to spend more, especially for the Syrian refugees. While development aid provision of Brazil has been decreasing year by year due to internal economic and political problems, Turkey has proved its determinacy in the development aid provision. But as President

¹⁶⁰ Jeannine Hausmann, *Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in Triangular Cooperation, Discussion Paper 14*, German Development Institute, Bonn, 2014, p. 1; “Brazil in Africa”.

¹⁶¹ Brun, Muxagato, “El proyecto internacional brasileño...”, p. 104; “Brazil: an emerging aid player”, p. 2.; Topal, “Sırlar asgari ücreti kıskandı”.

¹⁶² “TİKA Projeleri Tanıtım Töreni Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Katılımı ile Gerçekleşiyor”, http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/16_mart_tika_projeleri_tanitim_toreni_cumhurbaskani_recep_tayyip_erdogan%27in_katilimi_ile_gerceklesiyor-21641, 16.03.2016, (Retrieved:16.03.2016).

¹⁶³ Abdenur, “Emerging powers as normative agents..”, p. 1883.

¹⁶⁴ *Comparative Analysis Regulation of Foreign Aid in Selected Countries*.

Erdoğan declared, the number of Syrians refugees in Turkey has reached three million people and Turkey has been trying its best to host them but the situation is going beyond Turkey's means,¹⁶⁵ a sustainability problem may also occur for Turkish foreign aid policy in the near future.

In a speech he delivered in 2013, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davutoglu said that TİKA had become a 'brand'.¹⁶⁶ Whether TİKA has become a brand or not is open to discussion, however, it can be said that Turkey is more aware of the public diplomacy dimension of development assistance and enjoys the benefits of its foreign aid policy in terms of public diplomacy, more than Brazil.

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¹⁶⁵ "Erdoğan: Türkiye insanlığın onurunu kurtarmıştır", <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/02/23/erdogan-turkiye-insanligin-onurunu-kurtarmistir>, 23.02.2016, (Retrieved 23 February 2016).

¹⁶⁶ "TİKA, Türkiye'dir".

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Chapter 8

Turkey - Mexico Friendship Agreement (May 25th, 1927): A perspective from the Mexican Foreign Ministry Archives

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Diplomatic relations between Republic of Turkey and the United Mexican States started in 1927. At that time, a friendship agreement was signed in Rome by Suad Davaz on behalf of Turkey and Carlos Puig y Casauranc on behalf of Mexico. After that, diplomatic legations were opened in both countries' capitals reciprocally. Before they concluded this agreement, a convention draft with thirteen points was formulated by the Mexican Consul in Istanbul in 1924 to regulate their mutual trade relations. The articles were focusing on mostly commercial activities between Mexico and Turkey to arrange the rules of their trade relations such as that the contracting parties had to undertake not to hinder freedom of trade and navigation between each other by any ban or restrictions on the import, export or transit. Also, when foreign policy objectives are compared, it can be seen that both states tried to develop diplomatic relations with other countries by making peace or friendship treaties during 1920s and 1930s.

Introduction: Background of the Agreement

The beginning of official relations between Turkey and Latin American countries date back to the 19th century. There had been several waves of migration from Ottoman Empire to Latin America from the 1860s till the end of World War I. Those emigrants, mostly Arabs, were called *El Turco*, as they had Ottoman passports. Thus, diplomatic and consular contacts between Ottoman Empire and some Latin American countries started in the late 19th century (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>).

Mexican-Ottoman relations began in the same way during the reign of Emperor Maximilian who came into power by French support in Mexico in 1864. A Mexican diplomat named Pablo Martinez visited Istanbul and Athens in the same year to report officially Maximilian's accession to the throne. After that, General Don Leonardo Marquise was appointed as negotiator minister by the emperor Maximilian to Ottoman Empire in 1865 (Temel 2004, p.49). As soon as the Marquise took office in Istanbul, he offered to sign a protocol to develop bilateral relations of two countries and to open diplomatic missions reciprocally. At the end of the negotiations of this offer, General Don Leonardo Marquise and Foreign Minister of Ottoman Empire, Mehmet Emin Ali Pasha, signed a three point protocol (Temel 2004, p.50). Soon after the signature of this protocol, *Friendship, Trade and Sea Transportation Agreement* including 30 articles was concluded between Mexico and Ottoman Empire on May 6, 1866.¹⁶⁷ Although these growing relations since 1864, it could not be possible to maintain them after 1867 due to the internal disturbance in Mexico. The first and the last emperor of Mexican monarchy – Maximilian I - was overthrown by the liberals under the leadership of Benito Juarez and Mexico

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¹⁶⁷ See also for detailed informations about the articles (in Turkish): Temel 2004, p.53-60.

entered an extraordinary period for restoration of republic. Juarez, president of the new government, declared all the agreements and commitments signed by Maximilian I, null and void. Right after, relations between two countries had frozen for a while.

With the beginning of the 20th century migration to Latin American countries from Ottoman Empire was increasingly going on. Mexico was one of the biggest immigrant-receiving countries during that time. When the number of Ottoman citizens exceeded 12.000, it was decided to sign a protocol to open diplomatic missions in Mexico (Temel 2004, p.62). A four point protocol was signed between two countries in Rome by their own representatives on December 23, 1910. It meant that diplomatic relations between two countries had been restarting. On the other hand, those years including the first quarter of the 20th century were covering the era of wars and internal conflicts for Mexico and Ottoman Empire. In 1910, Mexican Revolution broke out against Porfirian regime and its radical violent phase lasted ten years. During the same period, Ottoman Empire entered many wars including World War I that brought its collapse and disintegration. Due to such kind of reasons or problems both countries' diplomatic and economic relations never grew sufficiently.

Beginning of A New Era: Foreign Policy Priorities and Friendship Agreement

Mexico and Turkey were totally transformed into modern, secular, nation-states under revolutionary leaders in 1920s and 1930s. Many legal arrangements, important reforms in numerous fields and new constitutions were done that changed Mexico and Turkey forever during those years. The aim of this revolutionary institutionalization in both countries was to create modern state with a modern nation.

After the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Republic of Turkey was established on October 29, 1923. Founding cadre of the new state was republican and secularist; they implemented radical changes from the imperial Ottoman past to transform the country from monarchy to a contemporary republic and from theocratic order to a secular state. During that period, revolutionary elites in Mexico were trying to rebuild the state. First of all, they needed to ensure the national and political integrity of the country. Revolutionary leader Plutarco Elias Calles established National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 to incorporate Mexican people from all different sectors or classes. He enforced secular and anti-clerical laws in whole country to abolish Catholic Church's influence in politics and education. In this revolutionary period, Elias Calles and Kemal Ataturk also developed foreign policy strategies for their modern regimes. Ataturk's foreign policy was based on friendly relations with all powers irrespective of internal regimes (Kürkçüoğlu 1960, p.161). Therefore, Turkey maintained friendship with all the power centers of the world. Western democracies, the Fascist powers and the Communist Soviet Union were all in friendly dialogue with Turkey even in the 1930s when the ideological rift in the international arena was becoming an ever-increasing danger to world peace (Kürkçüoğlu 1960, p.162). On the other hand, Mexican foreign policy initiative during the same period was based on the universal principle of non-interventionism. According to Mexican policy makers, all countries are equal under international law; intervention in the internal affairs of a country is intolerable, foreign residents can expect only equality of treatment with citizens under the law, and that diplomatic

recognition does not entail moral approval of a government (Engel 1969, p.523 cited in Tucker 1957, p.187). One of the Mexican presidents, Lopez Mateos, explained why the principle of non-interventionism is the basic determinant of Mexican foreign policy in his first annual report to Congress. He stated that “The principles of our foreign policy emanate from our historical experience. We were forced to defend our territory, our sovereignty, and our integrity” (Engel 1969, p.524). As it can be seen, the most important characteristics of Turkish and Mexican foreign policies carried out during their revolutionary era were to be respectful to all nations, to seek peace and to place a great emphasis on the rules of international law. They also attempted to establish regional and international cooperations and to make various friendship agreements with many countries. In this respect, Mexico and Turkey concluded a friendship agreement in Rome in 1927. But establishment of trade relations between these two countries was planned in 1924 by Scarlat Tottu, the Consul of Mexico in Istanbul. He formulated a trade convention draft with thirteen provisions to sign. It was a project for the establishment of a friendship agreement and a convention of commerce between the Republic of United Mexican States and the Republic of Turkey. Translations of the draft and the provisions are hereinbelow:

Trade Convention Between Mexico and Turkey

It was aimed to be signed between Mexico and Turkey with a desire to regularize their reciprocal trade relations. To conclude the convention, on behalf of Mexican President, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Mexico in Rome and on behalf of Turkish President, Minister Plenipotentiary and Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul shall be appointed. After they communicate full powers in good and due form, they agree on the following provisions.

Article 1) There shall be in the territories of the contracting parties reciprocal freedom of trade and navigation. Consequently, the contracting parties undertake not to impede their reciprocal trade relations by any prohibition, nor restrictions on imports, exports or transit. However, the contracting parties reserve the right to establish prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports:

First: To reserve the indispensable alimentary resources of life and to protect the economic activity of the nation.

Second: For reasons of state security.

Third: For reasons of sanitary policy or for the protection of animals and plants useful against diseases, harmful insects and parasites, and particularly in the interest of public health, in accordance with the international principles adopted in this regard.

Fourth: For the goods that constitute monopolies of the state.

Fifth: When it is aimed to apply prohibitions or restrictions to foreign goods by the domestic legislation that have been or will be established in respect to the production, sale, transport or consumption of the similar domestic goods.

Sixth: To prevent the export of the gold coin or metallic gold.

Article 2) The Contracting Parties compromise reciprocally to allow transit of persons, equipages, goods and all kinds of objects, remittances, vessels, ships, vehicles and wagons or other transportation instruments through the most appropriate means of international transit ensuring the particular most favored nation treatment.

Any kind of goods which pass through the customs territory of one of the contracting parties shall be exempt from all customs law reciprocally apart from the official statistical and surveillance regulations.

None of the contracting parties will be obliged to ensure the transit of travelers, if entry into their territory is prohibited.

Transit of the goods may be prohibited:

- a) For reasons of public security and state security.
- b) For health reasons or as a precaution against diseases of animals and plants.
- c) For the falsifications and the goods that, in the territory of one of the contracting parties, constitute a monopoly of the state.

Article 3) The traders, manufacturers and other industrialists of one of the contracting parties who have an industrial identity card issued by the competent authorities of their respective country are authorized to exercise their trade and industrial activities in the other contracting country have to pay taxes and contributions there required by the law. They will be entitled either personally or through travelers taken at their service, to verify purchases in the territory of the contracting party, in the houses of merchants or producers or in the premises of sales to the public. They may also receive requests on the basis of samples from the traders or other persons who use their corresponding goods for their trade or industry.

Commercial travelers of the contracting parties, bearing an identity card, issued by the authorities of their respective countries, shall reciprocally have the right to carry samples or models, but not goods.

In any case, commercial travelers who have visas on their cards will not have the right to enter into other business on behalf of merchants or industrialists.

Except the goods whose importation is prohibited, objects which are imported as samples or models by commercial travelers and subject to any customs duty or any other similar taxes shall be admitted by both parties under the condition of custom free entry and exit. Also such objects are re-exported within a statutory period and the identity of the articles imported and re-exported is well specified, whatever the customs office through which they pass.

The re-exportation of samples or models must be guaranteed at the customs office of entry, either by means of a deposit in cash or by a solvent deposit. With respect to the formalities to which traders and industrialists (merchant travelers) will be subjected, in the territories of both contracting parties, the treatment of the most favored nation is guaranteed by the two countries reciprocally.

Article 4) When the owners of the possessions of one of the contracting parties come to trade fairs and markets with a valid identification card issued by the authorities of the country from which they come in order to exercise their trade, they will not be treated in the territory of the other party less favorably than their nationals.

The Contracting Parties will inform each other's responsible authorities for issuing identity cards.

The above provisions are not applicable to itinerant manufacturers, street vendors or to the people who receive orders in their houses and do not exercise neither industry nor commerce. In this respect both contracting parties reserve full freedom for their legislation.

Article 5) The franchise of all rights of entry and exit is stipulated reciprocally under the obligation of re-expedition and re-importation within the term of one year. Subject to proof of identity and subject to make a deposit, submit bail or display customs duties, regulations in force must be always obeyed.

First: When it comes to the samples susceptible to customs duties, including those belonging to commercial travelers.

Second: When it comes to the objects intended for exhibitions or competitions.

Article 6) The vessels coming to or departing from the waters and ports within the boundaries of one of the contracting parties with full cargo or empty shall not be subject to any charges or taxes for their entrance and departure regardless of where they go.

With regard to the positioning of ships, their cargo and unloading at ports, a privilege or facility shall not be accorded by one of the contracting parties to the national vessels. It is valid for the other party as well.

The foregoing provisions shall not prevent each of the contracting parties from reserving cabotage, fishing in territorial waters, as well as towing and other port services.

Vessels and ships navigating under the national flag of one of the contracting parties and carrying board papers and documentation required by the laws of the country of that flag shall have full rights as well as the other contracting party's nationality in the territorial waters, inland waters and ports without having to provide greater justifications.

The tonnage certificates delivered to the vessels of each contracting parties, according to the Moorsom method, will be respectively recognized in the modalities that shall be specified subsequently, after the change of the regulations applicable to the matter.

Article 7) All products of the land or industry originating in and coming from the customs territory of one of the contracting parties to be imported into the customs territory of the other party and to be intended for consumption, re-dispatch or transit shall be submitted during the term of this convention according to the most favored

nation agreement. In particular, in no case they may be subject to different or higher duties than those which tax the products or goods of the most favored nation.

Exports destined for one of the contracting parties shall not be taxed by the other one with different or higher duties or taxes than those perceived as the export of the same objects in the most favored country in this respect.

Article 8) Each of the contracting parties may demand the presentation of a certificate of origin showing that the objects to be imported are fabricated in the importing country.

Certificates of origin formulated according to the model that contracting parties notify subsequently shall be issued, either by the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Agriculture, or by the Chamber of Commerce on which the sender depends, or by any other body or grouping that the recipient country shall accept. The government of the country of destination shall have the right to demand the legalization of the certificates of origin by its diplomatic or consular representative.

Article 9) Restrictive measures concerning the export of the capitals are applied all the time in the territories of the contracting parties. Each of them shall authorize the companies or houses of the other and national companies or houses in which capitals of the other part are rotated to export freely from its country, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 6, the necessary amounts for the payment of its dividends, coupons for exhibitions or organizations, interest and repayments of loans or other debts, and as well as for the purchase of goods.

Article 10) The contracting parties will guarantee the treatment of the most favored nation reciprocally in their territories under all circumstances related with various administrative formalities or any other matters which are necessary for the application of the provisions of this Convention.

Article 11) One of the contracting parties' internal taxes and duties that levied on behalf of the state and burden or encumber the production, manufacturing or consumption can not affect the products, goods and consuming materials imported from the other party in a harder or worse manner than related party's similar kinds of national products, goods or materials.

Article 12) This Convention shall enter into force one month after the date of the change of ratifications, and shall last for one year. If the agreement is not denounced by one or other of the high contracting parties, at least six months before the expiration of its term, it shall remain in force until it is denounced. Denunciation shall not take effect after a lapse of six months.

Article 13) This Convention shall be ratified and ratifications shall be made in Rome or somewhere else as soon as possible. (Archivo Diplomático, Expediente: III / 352 (72: 496) / 1)

This convention draft was probably not come into force. There was no any other document as a formal convention signed and sealed reciprocally in the Mexican archives. But in the year

of 1927, The Republic of United Mexican States and the Republic of Turkey concluded the Friendship Agreement. They were encouraged by the desire to establish and strengthen the ties of sincere friendship among themselves in 1927. Due to the conviction that both countries' relations would contribute to increase the prosperity and well-being of their respective nations, they resolved to conclude a treaty of friendship. For the fulfillment of the agreement, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the United Mexican States, *Don Carlos Puig Casauranc* and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Turkish Republic, *Suad Bey* were appointed as representatives on behalf of the President of the Republic of the United Mexican States and the President of the Turkish Republic (Tratado de Amistad 1927).

The articles of this agreement are as follows:

Article 1) There will be inviolable peace, sincere and perpetual friendship between the Republic of the United Mexican States and the Turkish Republic, as well as between the citizens of the two Parties.

Article 2) The Contracting Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations between the two states in accordance with the principles of international law. Both agree that diplomatic and consular representatives of each of them will admit the consecrated treatment in the general principles of General Public International Law subject to reciprocity, in the territory of the other.

Article 3) This agreement will be ratified and ratifications will be exchanged in Rome as soon as possible. It will enter into force on the fifteenth day following the exchange of ratifications. In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this agreement and have fixed their seals thereon. It was issued in Rome, on May 25, 1927 in two copies and each them would be delivered to each of the signatory states (Archivo Diplomatico, Expediente: III / 352 (496: 45) / 1).

Friendship Agreement between Mexico and Turkey served to establish diplomatic missions in each country in the later years. Explanation of the Mexican President, Plutarco Elias Calles, on approval and enforcement of the agreement is as the following:

PLUTARCO ELIAS CALLES,

Constitutional President of the Mexican United States,

To all those present, you know that:

A Treaty of Friendship was concluded and signed between the Republic of the Mexican United States and the Republic of Turkey on 25th May, 1927 in the city of Rome by the plenipotentiaries duly authorized for this purpose.

Previously-inserted treaty was approved by the chamber of the senators of the United Mexican States, on 29th September, 1927.

Me, Plutarco Elias Calles, in the capacity of Constitutional President of the United States of Mexico, in the exercise of the power given to me by the tenth fraction of the eightieth article of the ninth Federal Constitution, ratify, accept and confirm the related treaty, and I promise in the name of the Mexican nation to comply it and make it in force and be complied.

In witness whereof, I issue the document signed by my hand, authorized with the Great Seal of the Nation and countersigned by Don Genaro Estrada, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in charge of the office in the National Palace of Mexico on 20th October, 1927 (Archivo Diplomático, Expediente: III / 352 (496: 45) / 1).

Following this statement about the approval of the friendship agreement officially, Mustafa Kemal wrote a letter on November 21, 1927 to the President of the United Mexican States, Plutarco Elias Calles to notify his reelection as President of Turkey and his gladness about the signature of the Friendship Agreement. In his letter, Kemal Ataturk wrote that he was reelected as a president by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; so that he would again officiate for the functioning of government. He also stated how useful the Friendship Agreement was for Mexican and Turkish people and how he was happy to communicate with ‘esteemed president’ Plutarco Elias Calles. Kemal Ataturk indicated that the letter he sent to Calles, was guaranteeing to further and enhance the amicable relations between Turkey and Mexico and his positive feelings about Calles and Mexican people were warranty for both nations’ prosperity and future (Acervo Histórico Diplomático, NC-3664-5).

Despite these initiatives written above, relations between Mexico and Turkey could not be developed much until 2000s. Diplomatic ties between two countries remained weak and commercial activities were carried out at a low level. A diplomatic attempt following the Friendship Agreement signed in 1927 was just made in 1992. It was an agreement on educational and cultural cooperation and it was subscribed in Ankara on June 2, 1992. Thereafter, the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation was subscribed on September 28, 1998 in Mexico. Consequently it can be said that, Mexico and Turkey were friends distant from each other with almost no connection during the 20th century.

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Chapter 9

Turkey-Uruguay Relations: Opportunities for Strategic Cooperation

Ramiro Rodríguez Bausero¹⁶⁸

Uruguayan society, like many others in the Americas, shaped from the very beginning of its independent life, with migratory flows from different parts of the world. Among them, the regions that made up the former Ottoman Empire. The so called "Turcos" amalgamated within local society and helped to forge national identity. From the liberalizing reforms of the 90s, Turkey has become an outward-oriented trade economy, increased its prestige and importance within markets in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and also in Latin America, as shown by the opening of new diplomatic Missions and the significant increase in trade and cultural flows. Uruguay represents the 10th export market for Turkish goods in the Americas, as well as being in 2015 the 6th origin of imports Turkey made from our region. Its features of political and institutional stability, macroeconomic soundness, transparency, legal certainty and large political consensus on the big national issues, can be considered as attractive assets for Turkish corporations, taking advantage of the strategic location of Uruguay in the heart of Mercosur, a market of 280 million people. This framework is complemented by investment promotion schemes, free ports and special economic zones, coupled with an advanced infrastructure of alternatives energies, telecommunications and logistics. A more fluid relationship with Turkish authorities and companies, not without challenges, offers opportunities to stimulate investment and trade as well as helping to strengthen cultural ties and bilateral and regional cooperation.

Immigration in Uruguay

Uruguay is a country with a much smaller size than its two large neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. It occupies a quarter of the surface of Turkey, and only 4% of its population. International migration is a key component in the history of the country's peopling. Uruguayan society, like many others within Latin American continent, formed itself from the very beginning of its independent life – even earlier – with migratory flows from different regions of the world.

Until the mid-twentieth century, Uruguay was a country with a positive migration balance, having received important flows mainly from Europe, with a significant impact either demographically, socially and culturally. In fact, by 1865, one out of three people in the country had foreign origin, and in 1889, 71% of the population over 20 years of Montevideo, the capital city, had been born abroad¹⁶⁹. During the period between 1919 and 1932, characterized by the closing doors to immigration from the United States in 1924, about 190,000 immigrants arrived to our country. This period coincides with the greatest economic growth in Uruguay, when the

¹⁶⁸ MA Candidate, International Politics and Economy (Universidad de San Andrés, UDESA, Argentina). Assistant Professor of History of International Relations (UDELAR, Uruguay). Diplomat at the Uruguayan Foreign Service.

¹⁶⁹ Quoted by Arocena, Felipe – La contribución de los inmigrantes en Uruguay (*Contributions of immigrants in Uruguay*). Papeles del Centro de Estudios de la Identidad Colectiva, CEIC, Universidad del País Vasco (Basque Country University), N° 47, setiembre 2009. Retrieved from: <http://www.identidadcolectiva.es/pdf/47.pdf>.

national income was comparable to England's, France's or Germany's¹⁷⁰. The contribution of European immigration continued until about 1930 and had one last push in the 1950s and early years of 1960 decade¹⁷¹.

Furthermore, different regions that made up the former Ottoman Empire, in its vast extension covering the eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor, was also origin of migrants arriving to Uruguayan territory. Thus, apart from traditional nationalities, such as Spanish, Italian and French, Turks, Armenians, Jews, Syrians and Lebanese are added to the list of the incoming migrants¹⁷². Many of them came directly from Europe and the Middle East, but many others chose Uruguay as an alternative to the impossibility of getting satisfactory settlement in neighboring Argentina.

Among the reasons that can be cited to explain the departure of these human groups from their hometowns, it can be mentioned the uneven implementation of the capitalist system in different countries and regions, particularly within rural areas, or the breakdown of social and productive traditional structures, and the inability of undeveloped urban industries to absorb the available labor force from the countryside¹⁷³. We can also explain this phenomenon by the internal tensions caused by the assimilation difficulties of national or religious minorities, internal political and social rearrangements of States and border changes after wars, which made the winner State to get rid of the local nationals after incorporating their territory¹⁷⁴.

Immigrants that arrived in Uruguay have had a strong tendency to cultural assimilation, contributing to the formation of a strong and majority middle class, who used the free secular public education system to initiate and strengthen social promotion¹⁷⁵. That assimilation was facilitated firstly, because the earliest migratory waves were composed of single men and young people who rapidly mixed with natives, which contributed to settle down. In addition to this, they rapidly adapted to local customs and fashions, such as clothing, language, popular music and even got early involved with the political party system and their struggles¹⁷⁶. For all these reasons, the so-called "*Turcos*" became an element of the human landscape of Uruguay, especially in rural areas¹⁷⁷.

Currently, it is estimated that the descendants of immigrants from the regions that made up the Ottoman Empire in Uruguay total around 100,000 people, meaning nearly 3% of the country's population¹⁷⁸. These groups have been able to access to important places in Uruguayan society either in politics, trade and culture.

¹⁷⁰ Arocena, Felipe – Op. cit.

¹⁷¹ Uruguay Migratory Profile 2011 – International Organization for Migration, IOM.

¹⁷² Porzecanski, Teresa – Inmigrantes. 1811-2011 (Immigrants 1811-2011). Retrieved from: <http://www.1811-2011.edu.uy/B1/content/inmigrantes?page=show>. 2011

¹⁷³ Vidart, Daniel and Renzo Pi Hugarte – El legado de los inmigrantes (The immigrants' legacy). Colección Nuestra Tierra, Nº 39. Editorial Nuestra Tierra, 1969.

¹⁷⁴ Vidart, Daniel and Renzo Pi Hugarte – Op. cit.

¹⁷⁵ Porzecanski, Teresa – Op. cit.

¹⁷⁶ Pi Hugarte, Renzo - Asimilación cultural de los inmigrantes siriolibaneses y sus descendientes en Uruguay (Sirian-lebanese immigrants' cultural assimilation and their descendants in Uruguay). Anuario de Antropología Social y Cultural en Uruguay, Vol. 1, p.: 53 - 58, 2005.

¹⁷⁷ Pi Hugarte, Renzo – Op. cit.

¹⁷⁸ Arocena, Felipe – Op. cit.

Political and commercial relations between Turkey and Uruguay

From the liberalizing reforms of the 90s, Turkey has become a foreign trade oriented economy, which opened and increased the importance of markets in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. Latin America has not been immune to the economic growth achieved by Turkey as "trading state", to which it must be added a renewed cultural development and deployment of soft power, externally manifested, among others, by the increasing emissions of Turkish television soap operas to several countries in the region, including Uruguay¹⁷⁹.

Based on those reforms and on the Five Principles of foreign policy that Turkey has implemented henceforth¹⁸⁰, the country has managed to strengthen the sense of community within its immediate region, exerting an attraction in economic, cultural and academic fields. This can be exemplified during the 90s, when a new opportunity emerged for Turkey *vis á vis* the birth to independent life of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

Furthermore, after the turn of the century, the then Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu became the advocate of a policy that would reposition Turkey from a peripheral place in relation to Europe and Asia, to take center stage as a link between the different geopolitical areas around the country, as heir of a vast multicultural and multiethnic empire endowed with historical and cultural interactions to fulfill this central role and to reach its "strategic depth".

In this vein, the opportunities that Latin America can also offer to Turkey can definitely help to consolidate the international influence of the country, within the framework of those principles and Ankara's foreign policy. Turkey has been deepening the strategy of approaching to the Latin American region from some years on, context in which we must highlight the official visits of several heads of state, as well as senior officials' ones from our region to Turkey in recent years, President Erdogan's tour around LAC countries during 2015 and 2016, and the opening of many Embassies of in our region, and vice versa.

Within this frame of reference briefly described, Uruguay and Turkey can further deepen their bilateral relations as a result of over 150 years of mutual knowledge.

In a context of increased migratory waves of those regions, as already stated, in January 1892 it was appointed the first Consular Agent of Uruguay in the city of Istanbul, then capital of the Sublime Porte, some decades before the designation of the first Turkish General Consul in Uruguay in November 1954¹⁸¹. The first head of diplomatic mission accredited by Turkey to

¹⁷⁹ Cerami, Carola – "Rethinking Turkey's Soft Power in the Arab World: Islam, Secularism and Democracy". *Journal of Levantine Studies*. Vol. 3, No. 2, 2013, pp. 129-150. Popularity of Turkish soap operas helped to export an image with combines both modernity with the traditional topics of Muslim world.

¹⁸⁰ The balance between freedom, security and democracy, perceiving the region as an opportunity rather than a threat; the implementation of a policy that involves maintaining "zero problems" with the neighbors; developing relations with neighboring regions and beyond; deepening a more active participation in multilateral diplomacy; and pursuing a "rhythmic diplomacy," through a more active role within international organizations and venture into areas hitherto unexplored by Turkish diplomacy, such as Latin America.

¹⁸¹ Information provided by the Historical Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay.

the Republic took place in January 1958. Finally, in June 1966, the Embassy of Uruguay was formally opened in the Republic of Turkey based in Ankara, which was closed later on¹⁸².

As far as trade is concerned, Uruguay-Turkey trade balance is characterized by a surplus in favor of Uruguay, which in 2015 was worth USD 112 million. In that year, Uruguay exported for more than USD 158 million, which meant the highest value in recent years¹⁸³. Out of those sales, cattle, pulp, soybeans, textile and wool sector, accounted for nearly 95% of them. If we compare this value with Uruguayan exports to Turkey in 2001, it is noted that they increased 10 times compared to 15 years ago.

Meanwhile, Uruguay imports from Turkey reached USD 45 million, which includes iron foundries and steel, machinery and vehicles, which accounted for nearly 70% of the total. This value is 300% higher than in 2008, and 1000% higher than 2001 values¹⁸⁴.

These figures show that the bilateral trade between the two countries has had a greater increase than the growth of trade corresponding to each country separately during the very same time period – which reached rises of 490% and 390% for Turkey and Uruguay respectively. Similarly, the expansion of bilateral trade was even greater than the increase in trade between Turkey and Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, which was 820% between 2001 and 2015¹⁸⁵.

The dynamics of world trade explained some movements from some classic Uruguayan goods such as wool, grains or butter, towards new ones like cattle, pharmaceuticals or beef.

Despite the small size of its economy, Uruguay represented the 9th export market of Turkey in the Latin American continent in 2014, and it was in 2015 the 6th origin market of the imports Turkey buy from our region.

In terms of bilateral agreements between Uruguay and Turkey, on April 30, 2009, during the visit of Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade Tuncer Kayalar, to Montevideo, the Agreement on Economic Trade and Technical Cooperation and the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation were signed. The former, ratified by National Law No. 18740, covers different areas such as trade, banking and finances, industry, transport and communications, agriculture, fisheries, energy and tourism. It also provides the establishment of a Joint Bilateral Commission, which shall take the necessary measures for the implementation of the Agreement¹⁸⁶.

For its part, the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation updates the commitments assumed by the Treaty of Amity concluded between Turkey and Uruguay in Rome in January 1929, ratified by Law No. 9006 of 1933. Indeed, the new agreement has a broader content, which *inter alia* provides the holding of "regular consultations at different levels in order to ensure the development and deepening of bilateral relations", the promotion of scientific and technological

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Source TradeMap

¹⁸⁴ Source TradeMap

¹⁸⁵ Source TradeMap

¹⁸⁶ Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Uruguay, April 30th, 2009. Retrieved from: <http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/htmlstat/pl/acuerdos/acue-ap-103331.htm>

cooperation, the exchange of financial information, etc. It also shows a common position against terrorism, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking¹⁸⁷.

In May 2013 the Air Services Agreement was signed in Izmir, while those corresponding to Promotion and Protection of Investments and Defense are being negotiated.

Commercial, political and cooperation possibilities

International vocation of Uruguay is rooted in the very history of the country, is linked to its geographical location and makes its own viability. Due to its dimensions and features of small domestic market, dependence on foreign trade, limited capital generation, etc., articulation with the rest of the world is essential.

Over recent years, Uruguay has managed to achieve an international reputation for democratic and social stability, macroeconomic soundness and reliability of its institutions as well as legal certainty. These have become very important assets to attract foreign investment. As a matter of fact, FDI received by the country in the last 10 years averaged 5.6% of the GDP – USD 2,000 million-, which places Uruguay as the second largest recipient of FDI in Latin America, with one of the highest FDI stock/GDP ratios in the region of around 40%¹⁸⁸.

Owing to its strategic location in the heart of MERCOSUR, Uruguay offers the possibility to access to a 280 million people market, to which it must be added the national scheme investment promotion, both regarding taxes and in terms of Special Economic zones, Industrial Parks, Ports and Free Airports, among other incentives.

Concerning infrastructure, Uruguay operates as a major logistics platform for MERCOSUR and the region, as an advantageous distribution center for goods in transit, with up-to-date port facilities, excellent grid of roads and the best internet penetration in Latin America, thanks to its modern optic fiber interconnections

Moreover, Uruguay has diversified its energy matrix, 95% based on renewable energies, and becoming a world leader in wind power generation, with 22% of electricity generated from wind¹⁸⁹, being the country with the largest share of renewable sources in the continent.

For all these reasons, a more fluid and deep relationship with authorities and Turkish companies would present better opportunities to explore possibilities of mutual cooperation and investments in the areas of defense, education, and infrastructure in road, railways, ports, and also within the energy field.

In the area of technical cooperation there is ample scope for joint work between TIKA, the Turkish agency major donor of international cooperation, and Uruguayan Agency of International Cooperation, AUCI, in order to engage in cooperation projects and programs in various areas, and to take advantage of the expertise Uruguayan counterpart has achieved in

¹⁸⁷ Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Uruguay, April 30th, 2009, Art.12. Available on <http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/htmlstat/pl/acuerdos/acue-ap-101181.htm>

¹⁸⁸ Uruguay XXI Institute.

¹⁸⁹ Uruguay aims to reach 38% by 2017, getting closer to Denmark with 42%. <http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2016/03/how-uruguay-became-a-wind-power-powerhouse.html>

implementing triangular cooperation, particularly related to other countries in the Americas. There are several national flagship programs to work with, such as *One laptop per child*, small water treatment plants, etc.¹⁹⁰

Meanwhile, thanks to its strategic position and its historical location at the Eurasian crossroads, Turkey is a node of land and sea communications, and is projected as an energy center between Europe and Asia. Therefore, being a political, economic¹⁹¹ and diplomatic¹⁹² power, Turkey could also work as a doorway for Uruguay and the rest of Latin America, not only for the important Turkish market itself, but also towards the market, society and culture of the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

When considering the deepening of bilateral relations with Turkey, we cannot overlook the challenge about the existence of local lobbies – as also displayed in other countries of our region – which have also deployed roots of cultural and economic relations with the country, and could be seen as an obstacle to achieve closer ties with Ankara. Notwithstanding, this should not prevent that further rapprochement occurs not only in the political, and economic-commercial fields, but also within the cultural and academic ones. Further endeavor is needed about this matter.

In this regard, we have recently witnessed the progress and presence of different samples of Turkish culture such as the opening of different Forums and Chairs of Turkish studies at many universities in Latin American and Caribbean region, through football as well, and also by the enormous success harvested by Turkish soap operas within our countries, especially in Uruguay. These samples of soft power, are helping to create a much closer image of Turkish people, its customs and traditions, which undoubtedly resulted on an increased interest by the Uruguayan society, as shown in the rise of Uruguayan people traveling to Turkey.

Conclusions

One of the guiding principles of the foreign policy of Uruguay is to be a State of unyielding international vocation, willing to establish friendly relations with all nations that wish to do so, with the aim to obtain greater exchanges in trade, cultural and political matters.

The relation Uruguay has developed with Turkey has not been exempted from its ups and downs, even though bilateral trade has grown very significantly in the last decade, and there have been very far-reaching steps as reciprocal high-level visits together with the signing of promissory agreements.

Considering the referred international undertaking of the country, along with the historical background dating back to the early Turkish immigration in Uruguay, as well as the national framework to encourage trade, investment and bilateral and regional cooperation, we understand that achieving closer ties between the two countries is not only necessary, according

¹⁹⁰ <http://www.auci.gub.uy/aucci/cooperacion-sur-sur.html>

¹⁹¹ Turkey is one of the 20 most important world economies, aiming to be among the first ten by 2023. (Sources: IMF, WB).

¹⁹² Turkey is one of the world 10 countries with more diplomatic missions abroad.

to the complex dynamics of present international relations, but also essential to harvest the benefits that may result from greater mutual understanding. The conditions are given.

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Chapter 10

Dimensions of the Cultural and Academic Cooperation between Turkey and Latin America

Emiliano Limia*

The creation of instances of academic cooperation and intercultural dialogue between Turkey and Latin America constitutes a recent phenomenon that proves the involvement of various actors and a deployment of a wide range of resources. Firstly, we can identify the initiatives implemented by the Turkish government in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean through government institutions as a direct form of foreign policy. Secondly, the proposals promoted at a bilateral level, instances of cooperation between Turkish and Latin American academic areas such as university networking, signing agreements and professors and students exchange programs, with a marked transnational nature and in permanent coordination with public diplomacy organizations. Finally, the proposals promoted by civil associations in the framework of initiatives for interregional dialogue, developed in fields such as religion, media and filmmaking, which describes the existence of dynamic cooperation in areas where the state and regional initiative is surpassed by the integration of global flows of production and circulation of information. The change in Turkish foreign policy initiated at the beginning of this century has generated a global expansion of its interests demonstrating that its culture acquired a significant role. This paper attempts to contextualize the cultural elements and institutions in which the expansion and diversification of contacts between Latin America and Turkey are based.

Introduction

Turkey is increasingly seeing Latin America as a destination for investment and trade. In this context, Turkey has identified Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) as a space for the extension of its interests and to position itself as a benchmark in the Eurasian space. Likewise, the cooperation in international forums and the modification of its international identity factors have contributed as catalysts of its approach to LAC¹⁹³. The creation of institutions of public and cultural diplomacy directed towards the Latin American space is one of the most significant events of this dynamic, clearly influenced by the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP by its Turkish acronym), which limited its pro-European orientation to watch the rest of the world, regaining its presence in the Middle East and making a commitment to emerging countries. With the AKP, Turkey found in LAC an enabling space to develop two key tasks: to prestige and position politics. Through various actions, AKP not only seeks to impart its own

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¹⁹³ González Levaggi, A. (2012). *América Latina y Caribe, la última frontera de la "nueva" política exterior de Turquía*. Araucaria, Revista iberoamericana de filosofía, política y humanidades, 28, 179-202.

culture but also generate contacts with social and political organizations to help Turkey promote its position on specific issues that affect the country¹⁹⁴.

These Turkey's projects are based in the recognition of cultural bridges for the generation of political and economic bonds. Policy objectives and practices demonstrate the emergence of particular national interests that refer to competitive models, both religiously and in the regional level and its leadership¹⁹⁵. As part of this, today we can speak of a new foreign policy of Turkey with institutions approaching to other parts of the world like Latin America. To reveal the role of foreign policy in promoting Turkish culture abroad, it is important to note that Turkey has adopted a policy of cultural diplomacy covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In line with the efforts of cultural promotion, the Ministry participates in bilateral and multilateral agreements on the basis of different priorities and principles. What is more, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, meanwhile, is another important institution promoting Turkish culture abroad. These promotional efforts depend heavily on political relations and foreign policy priorities¹⁹⁶.

This paper seeks to identify the instantiation of academic cooperation and intercultural dialogue between Turkey and LAC, a recent phenomenon that shows the implication of different actors. To do this, it has been divided into three sub-themes in order to mark the implication of the various characters. First, the initiatives launched by the Turkish government regarding LAC through government institutions as a direct form of foreign policy. Second, the academic cooperation proposals promoted at the bilateral level, such as university networks, signing agreements, exchange programs for teachers and students. Finally, instances promoted by civil associations in the framework of interregional dialogue initiatives developed in such fields as religion, media and filmmaking.

Initiatives of the Turkish government

González Levaggi¹⁹⁷ highlights the end of the Cold War and the relative autonomy of the strategic positions in Turkey and Latin America as turning points that generated an ideal scenario to slowly advance on various cooperation channels. The researcher divides this period (1989-2012) in three stages from the point of view of the Turkish foreign policy: During the first stage (1989-1998), they deepen relationships within a multidimensional foreign policy. The final breakdown of the stillness of the relationship with LAC was the first official visit of a Turkish President to the region in 1995, when Suleyman Demirel traveled to Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

The second stage (1998-2006) was characterized by the multiplication of political consultations and business growth. In addition, Turkey designed the first "Action Plan for Latin America" in

¹⁹⁴ Vagni, J. (2014). Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World. FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference. Available at: <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/c58a6c98-e430-4857-8bde-e43b5ca7a57e.pdf>

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ozkan, M. (2014). *La política Exterior de Turquía en el Siglo XXI: La Diplomacia Cultural y el Poder Blando*. SAM Papers. Available at: http://sam.gov.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SAM_Papers_9.pdf

¹⁹⁷ Ibidⁱ

1998 with the specific objective of complementing a legal framework for bilateral relations with the nations of LAC. The goals were mainly to foster high-level political dialogue, increase economic and trade relations, and keep an interregional exchange as permanent observers from regional organizations. Finally, the last stage (2006-2012) is marked by unusual series of high-level visits, the doubling of the number of embassies and trade growth. This way, Turkey and major Latin American countries intensify their ties and emerging investment projects.

By early 2014, Turkish-Latin American relations slowed down by the limits of Turkish diplomacy due to the lack of presence of other official organizations. Despite these problems, the relationship between Turkey and LAC has been relaunched and has the potential to solidify the ties that unite them, basically, due to the new strategic partnership between Turkey and Mexico, the fundamental decision to open the offices of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA by its Turkish acronym) in Mexico (with coverage in Central America and the Caribbean) and Colombia (for all South America) along with renewed efforts to expand trade and investment development¹⁹⁸.

TIKA is perhaps the most important government agency focusing on development collaboration. This agency works in 140 countries, including the ones where their offices are located. Through TIKA, Turkey shares knowledge and experience with many countries from all continents including LAC¹⁹⁹. It is an autonomous body but dependent on the prime minister's office. Its main function is to satisfy international needs with the experience achieved by Turkish ministries and partner agencies with cooperation policies for development, and also it is the main government agency responsible for reporting and data collection²⁰⁰. Thanks to TIKA initiatives, cooperation projects between Turkey and LAC has grown in recent years reaching around 650 cooperation projects in several countries, including plans for education, health care, equipment for agriculture and solar energy directly financed by Turkey²⁰¹.

Some of the educational cooperation projects driven by TIKA in last years: A donation of a total of 120 desktop computers was made to 4 Guatemalan schools affiliated to the Ministry of Education in that country²⁰²; donation of equipment to the Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Renewable Energy of Zamorano Agricultural University in Honduras²⁰³; donation of medical equipment to the Neonatal Department of the Hospital of National Autonomous University of Honduras²⁰⁴. As it happened in Africa and Eastern Europe before, Turkey relies

¹⁹⁸ González Levaggi, A. (2015). *Nueva ola de activismo turco en América Latina*. Hispanatolia. Available at: http://www.hispanatolia.com/seccion/23/id_cat,254/id,469/nueva-ola-de-activismo-turco-en-america-latina

¹⁹⁹ Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (2015). *About us*. Available at: http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650

²⁰⁰ Ibid^v

²⁰¹ Dinatale, M. (2014). *Turquía, el país que exporta su economía en auge y sus contradicciones*. La Nación. Available at: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1707055-turquia-el-pais-que-exporta-su-economia-en-auge-y-sus-contradicciones>

²⁰² Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (2014). *TİKA'dan Guatemala Eğitim Bakanlığına Ekipman Desteği*. Available at: http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tikadan_guatemala_egitim_bakanligina_ekipman_destegi-14442

²⁰³ Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (2015). *TİKA'dan Zamorano Tarım Üniversitesi'ne Büyük Destek*. Available at: http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika'dan_zamorano_tarim_universitesi'ne_buyuk_destek-14571

²⁰⁴ Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (2015). *TİKA'dan Honduras Ulusal Bağımsız Üniversitesi Eğitim Hastanesi'ne Tıbbi Donanım Desteği*. Available at:

on the work of TİKA in Latin America, therefore, these initiatives show that Turkey's Latin American initiative speed was accelerated. Moreover, this agency has also been working on a Turcology project to carry out research on linguistics and ethnology of the Turkic languages and people. Recently, the Yunus Emre Institute²⁰⁵ took over the project from TİKA²⁰⁶. Its former director, Prof. Dr. Hayati Develi, said that although there are not branches of the institute in LAC yet, in the coming years they expect to open centers in North America and South America²⁰⁷.

Another part of the export of Turkish culture in Latin America is in charge of the media. In this same vein, the portal of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) has its version in Spanish. Şenol Göka, director of TRT, has also said that there is strong interest in Latin America for Turkish soap operas, and toward that niche he works in coordination with Latin American producers. The business of television series is just another manifestation of the recent landing of Turkey in the region. In the words of Ali Kaya Savut, current Turkish ambassador in Brazil and former Secretary of State for Latin America of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "We want to expand and open our culture on all continents and we are very interested in advancing in Latin America"²⁰⁸. Following this same line, we can mention the imminent arrival to LAC of the semi-state news agency Anadolu Agency²⁰⁹ and the new destinations added last year by Turkish Airlines in the region: flights to Bogota and Panama in addition to those already established to Brazil and Argentina.

In another order of things, until recently Turkey, a secular state, has deliberately refrained from participating in any Islamic or religious gathering. However, this began to change after the AKP came to power in 2002. Today, religion and historical relationships developed from its doctrine are important elements in Turkey's cultural diplomacy so that religion can even be considered as a key legitimizing force. Earlier, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) did not have a dominant role in foreign policy, but with the change of Turkey towards a multidimensional spectrum, religion has served as an element of soft power²¹⁰. At the broadest level, Diyanet expects "to introduce Turkey's experience and heritage in the field of religion abroad, enable Islam to be correctly understood, closely follow discussions about religious understanding and practices in both EU member states and Turkey and give accurate information to the public opinion in the West on this matter"²¹¹.

http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_dan_honduras_ulusal_bagimsiz_universitesi_egitim_hastanesi_ne_tibbi_don_anim_destegi-14487

²⁰⁵ The Yunus Emre Institute is a government organization that aims to promote Turkish language and culture under the umbrella of the Yunus Emre Foundation.

²⁰⁶ Cihan News Agency (2011). *Yunus Emre Institute takes over Turkology project from TİKA*. Available at: <https://www.cihan.com.tr/tr/cms-copied-news-on-26-10-464962.htm>

²⁰⁷ Ünal, A. (2014). *We teach Turkish to the world, says Hayati Develi*. Daily Sabah. Available at: <http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/05/19/we-teach-turkish-to-the-world-says-hayati-develi>

²⁰⁸ Ibid ix

²⁰⁹ Anadolu Ajansı (2016). *Anadolu Ajansı küresel ağını genişletiyor*. Available at: <http://aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/anadolu-ajansi-kuresel-agini-genisletiyor/554938>

²¹⁰ Ibid iv

²¹¹ Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey. *Basic Principles and Objectives*. Available at: <http://www.diyamet.gov.tr/en/category/basic-principles-and-objectives/23>

In November 2014, Diyanet organized in Istanbul the 1st Latin American Religious Muslim Leaders Summit, with the participation of Turkish Prime Minister on that year, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for closing the program. Seventy representatives from 40 countries attended the summit which aimed to be conducive to friendship and solidarity between Turkey and Latin American countries, and in particular to consolidate the peace bridge linking the Latin American Muslims²¹². Several Islamic Centers of different countries aim to act together with Diyanet and to cooperate with it in its functions, study the Diyanet model and use their experiences in religious training. After the summit, the President of Diyanet, Mehmet Görmez, said in his visit to Argentina: “(...) This was a beginning. Now we want to institutionalize such relationships. We can send representatives to your region and offer our help especially in religious education. The new generation needs to be taught the accurate knowledge about Islam. Today the reason for the existing ignorance in the Islamic world is not the lack of education but on the contrary ignorant and crooked education. We need the right and accurate knowledge about the Quran and the actions and teachings of the Prophet.”²¹³

Finally, it is worth noting the actions taken by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB by its Turkish acronym), which was established in order to help Turkish citizens living abroad and to strengthen ties with related communities. The organization manages new social, cultural and economic activities with Turkish citizens and their descendants living abroad regarding their needs and demands. YTB’s activities are directed not only to Turkish citizens and their descendants abroad, but also migrant organizations, Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and professionals outside organizations. In turn, the department also deals with foreign students who come to study in Turkey and coordinate scholarships from Ankara for thousands of foreign students²¹⁴.

By 2016, around 250 Latin American students benefited from the mentioned scholarships²¹⁵. Thus, these grants are offered only to international students who are at the level of higher education. The main objective is to enhance mutual understanding with other countries and contribute to the wealth of global information with a people-oriented approach. In addition, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK by its Turkish acronym) grants fellowships for international highly qualified PhD students and young post-doctoral researchers to pursue their research in Turkey.

The formation of academic networks

Academic cooperation between Turkey and LAC is a field of increasing development which shows potential courses of action. Both from Latin America and from Turkey, interlinked thematises were practically nil in consideration of local academia. Several factors contributed to place them in a secondary position in research agendas like the entrenchment of a strong

²¹² TRT Diyanet TV (2015). *1.Latin Amerika Ülkeleri Müslüman Dini Liderler Zirvesi sona erdi*. Available at: <http://www.diyamet.tv/1-latin-amerika-ulkeleri-musliman-dini-liderler-zirvesi-sona-erdi/>

²¹³ [turkishamericannews.com](http://www.turkishamericannews.com) (2015). *Muslims Of Argentina Visit Diyanet*. Available at: <http://www.turkishamericannews.com/life-and-islam/item/5949-muslims-of-argentina-visit-diyamet>

²¹⁴ *Ibid* iv

²¹⁵ Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. *Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Şili'ye Gitti*. Available at: <http://www.tcgb.gov.tr/haberler/410/38661/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-siliye-gitti.html>

tradition mismatching, the perception of remoteness, idiomatic distance, lack of a critical mass, among others. In this context, this paper examines the trends that show the increasing dynamism in academic ties.

The Center for Latin American Studies of Ankara University (CEL by its Spanish acronym) was inaugurated on 2009 by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who at the time was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Undoubtedly, Ankara University has been the leading institution trying to develop a Latin American study area in Turkey. The CEL is dedicated to promoting mutual understanding and its main objectives are conducting scientific research on Latin America, showing how events in Latin America are interpreted in Turkey as well as Latin American interpretation of the events occurring in Turkey, and the training of researchers specializing in this region. The Center has the first library specialized on Latin America, organizes cultural activities in LAC and collaborates with academic institutions, universities, research centers, embassies, consulates, and other national and international organizations related to the region. The CEL also organizes seminars, conferences and national and international panels, supports scientists interested in research projects on Latin America and provides information to the public concerning LAC²¹⁶.

In the same line, the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara offers a Latin and North American Studies master program²¹⁷, whereas Bahçeşehir University in Istanbul established an American Studies Center (AMERS)²¹⁸. Both universities give students specific expertise, thus deepen theoretical and practical knowledge about the developments taking place on the American continent. At the same time, these initiatives enable students to gain a broad view of both Americas as well as their global connections. Moreover, one and another are establishing and maintaining bilateral exchange and cooperation agreements with research institutions in the whole continent, thereby facilitating transnational collaborative research.

In addition, there are also emerging proposals, organized and promoted within Latin American institutions. Such is the case of the Center for Turkish Studies, created in 2014 under the Eurasian Department of the Institute of International Relations (IRI) at National University of La Plata (UNLP), Argentina. The Turkey's chair aims to promote the realization of academic, scientific and cultural activities on Turkey and expects to work with Yunus Emre Institute in the short term. In addition, the 1st Eurasia-Latin America International Conference (ELAIC) has been held at Bahçeşehir University in March 2016. It was part of a Latin American Project of AMERS with the academic support of the IRI at UNLP.

In a similar way, a Center for Turkish Studies works at the University of Antioquia, the National University and the University of Rosario in Colombia, institutions that, in order to expand ties with other universities, they have also signed agreements²¹⁹. Furthermore, the Center for

²¹⁶ Center for Latin American Studies of Ankara University. *About us*. Available at: http://cel.ankara.edu.tr/?page_id=198

²¹⁷ Middle East Technical University. *About*. Available at: <http://lna.metu.edu.tr/about>

²¹⁸ Bahçeşehir University (2014). *Amerikan Araştırmaları Merkezi*. Available at: <http://www.bahcesehir.edu.tr/icerik/3268-amerikan-arastirmalari-merkezi>

²¹⁹ Gürlek, R.; Arias Patiño, E. (2009). *Cultura e idioma turco: Percepciones y dificultades respecto a su aprendizaje*. Matices en Lenguas Extranjeras, Electronic Journal. National University of Colombia. Available at: <http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/male/article/view/13867/28322>

History and Culture of Turkey was established within the University of Havana in 2013, as a result of the collaboration with Ankara University. It is worth mentioning that already in 2010, the Chair of History and Culture of Turkey had been founded at the same university. This chair aims to approach the Turkish culture for Cubans to approach the legacy of that country from its beginnings to contemporary times, exchange teachers, literature, offer stays in both countries and, thus, get culturally closer²²⁰. The main objectives of this subject are the promotion and exchange of the country's culture, get to know about current manifestations and its influence in the world.

Along with the creation of the Center, other activities such as Turkish language courses and the event *Jornadas de la Cultura Turca* (Days of the Turkish Culture), which had its first edition in November 2015, are conducted. This event was hosted and sponsored by the Embassy of Turkey in Havana joined with TIKA and the CEL of Ankara University in order to encourage interest in modern Turkey and motivate students, teachers and all interested people to participate in the activities and programs that the mentioned chair promotes and organizes²²¹. Another important achievement was the creation of the first Turkish magazine published in Latin America, *Cuadernos Turquinos*. The first issue of the scientific journal of international arbitration was published in Havana in 2011 with the collaboration of the Latin American Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Havana and the CEL.

Another activity to highlight is the Symposium *1915, el año más largo del Imperio Otomano* (1915, the longest year of the Ottoman Empire), an international symposium organized by the CEL in conjunction with leading universities in Latin America and currently being carried out in different countries of the LAC region. The ideologue is the director of the CEL, Dr. Mehmet Necati Kutlu. It has an interesting and novel approach: to revise history to learn from the past in order to benefit from it in the present. It also has the peculiarity that several historians, Turkish, European and Latin American researchers present new works that point to the historical relationship between the decaying Ottoman Empire and Turkey of today with Latin America.

Together with leading universities in the region, the 2015 symposiums were held in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Chile, and in 2016 they were held in Bolivia and Paraguay. The next will be this year in Panama. In each case, a book is published with the articles that are exposed. This symposium should be seen, in one way or another, as part of the new Turkish foreign policy in the world, where the exercise of soft power through cultural diplomacy, recommended by Josep Nye, is one of its bases²²².

Other projects supported by the CEL that have contributed to the academic cooperation are: the book *Imperio Otomano – América Latina: Periodo Inicial* (Ottoman Empire - Latin America: Initial Period), which was published in Turkish, Spanish and Portuguese in 2012 as a result of the project *El Inicio de las Relaciones entre el Imperio Otomano – América Latina en el 200º*

²²⁰ Barrios, M. (2010). *Una cátedra para acercarse a la cultura turca*. Juventud Rebelde (digital versión). Available at: <http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2010-06-24/una-catedra-para-acercarse-a-la-cultura-turca/>

²²¹ University of Havana (2015). *Primeras Jornadas de la Cultura Turca*. Available at: <http://www.uh.cu/node/3552>

²²² Nye, J. S. (2004). *El poder blando y la política exterior americana*. Soft Power, Public Affairs. New Hampshire, 127-147.

aniversario de su independencia (The Beginning of Relations between the Ottoman Empire - Latin America on the 200th anniversary of its independence); the book *Las Ponencias del taller de América Latina* (Latin America Workshop's Presentations), published in 2013 after a workshop with the collaboration of TIKA; the *Piri Reis en América Latina a los 500 Años de su Mapamundi* (Piri Reis in Latin America after 500 Years of his World Map) project in 2013 carried out in Argentina with the cooperation of YTB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, the Turkish National Commission, UNESCO and the UNLP. The book of the project with the same name was published in June 2013 in its bilingual version Spanish-Turkish²²³.

Rightly seen, Ankara University plays a key role in the development of academic relations between Turkey and Latin America and in analyzing this association that seeks to consolidate. To all things already considered, the visits, signing of agreements and protocols of academic cooperation, conferences with the University of the Caribbean, APEC University, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, and the Global Institute of Higher Studies in Social Sciences in the Dominican Republic can be added²²⁴. It can also be mentioned the organization of the Congress of the International Federation Studies on Latin America and The Caribbean (FIEALC by its acronym in Spanish) in 2013 in Antalya, Turkey, in coordination with the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the permanent headquarters of FIEALC and executor of its resolutions²²⁵. Furthermore, a cooperation agreement between the CEL and the Institute of International Studies at the University of Chile was signed in 2010, in which they pledged to increase the exchange of academic staff, students and joint research projects²²⁶. The list keeps on growing.

Civil associations, cultural exchange and interreligious dialogue

In accordance with the expansionist policy towards Latin America driven by the Turkish government and supported by research projects with the firm intention to spread Turkish culture in Latin America, there are academic, cultural and religious initiatives promoted by non-governmental institutions as well.

As intercultural dialogue is concerned, the Turkish Embassy in Madrid decided in 2007 to support Hispanatolia, a Spanish web portal focused on Turkey and its region of influence. It is headed by Akin Özçer, a Turkish diplomat retired with a deep understanding of Spain and politics. In June 2014, the portal closed the Turkish-language part of the website, which thereafter ceased to be a bilingual page to become a portal completely in Spanish. Among its

²²³ Center for Latin American Studies of Ankara University. *Publicaciones*. Available at: (http://cel.ankara.edu.tr/?page_id=222)

²²⁴ González, L. (2015). *Turquía: presencia académica en la RD*. Editora Acento. Available at: <http://acento.com.do/2015/opinion/8301216-turquia-presencia-academica-en-la-rd/>

²²⁵ International Federation for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean. *Estatutos de la FIEALC*. Available at: <http://www.tau.ac.il/~medin/fiealc/estatutos.htm>

²²⁶ University of Chile (2015). *Universidades de Chile y Ankara firmaron acuerdo de cooperación académica*. Available at: <http://www.uchile.cl/noticias/117212/universidades-de-chile-y-ankara-firmaron-acuerdo-de-cooperacion>

objectives it is to develop bilateral relations not only between the Turkish and Spanish society, but also more broadly between the Latin and the Turkish-speaking world²²⁷.

Another example of this is the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM by its acronym in Turkish), a Turkish NGO which has been operating as a think tank for thirteen years, that steers and coordinates the activities of a wide range of institutions, networks and platforms serving as a center for building management capacity and cooperation²²⁸. TASAM first started the initiative of the Turkish - Latin America and Caribbean Congress, which was held in Istanbul in 2009 with the cooperation of TUKLAD (Trade Association for Caribbean and Latin America)²²⁹. The second edition of the congress was held in Ankara in 2011, with cooperation with the CEL²³⁰, while the third one took place in April 2016 again in Istanbul²³¹. In addition, TASAM organized in 2012 a Brazil-Turkey Country Meeting in Rio de Janeiro under the theme of “Turkey and Brazil: Rising Powers in The Changing World Order”, in cooperation with Fundação Getulio Vargas, a Brazilian NGO²³². In relation to the above, the Brazil-Turkey Cultural Center (CCBT) is a non-governmental organization that can be found in several cities in Brazil. It was founded in May 2011 by a group of Turkish and Brazilian people in order to strengthen relations between the two countries conducting cultural, academic and social activities.

Besides, cinematographic cooperation can be placed standing in the same line, hand in hand with organizations such as CAPAZ and the Mexican Institute of Cinematography (IMCINE), being the first an Argentinian civil association that is responsible for the production of the Festival of Turkish Films in that country, while IMCINE is a space for dialogue and cooperation between the film industries of Turkey and Mexico. CAPAZ aims to establish solidarity between the peoples of Turkey and Argentina. Its project aims to promote, distribute and disseminate intercultural dialogue between the Turkish and Argentinian film productions through film screenings, art exhibitions, seminars on industry and the organization of the mentioned festival itself²³³. IMCINE seeks to establish co-production and distribution agreements with Turkey, and for this reason inaugurated the bilateral Mexico-Turkey Forum in coordination with Guanajuato International Film Festival (GIFF). Mustafa Oğuz Demiralp, former Turkish ambassador in Mexico, agrees with the idea of encouraging co-productions between the two

²²⁷ Hispanatolia.com. *Qué es Hispanatolia*. Available at: <http://www.hispanatolia.com/seccion/3/que-es-hispanatolia>

²²⁸ Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies. *Profile*. Available at: <http://www.tasam.org/en/Kurumsal/Profile>

²²⁹ Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies (2009). *Turkish – Latin American and Caribbean Meeting*. Available at: http://www.tasam.org/en/Icerik/3284/turkish_%E2%80%93_latin_american_and_caribbean_meeting

²³⁰ Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies (2010). *2nd Turkish-Latin American And Caribbean Congress Was Held In Ankara*. Available at: http://www.tasam.org/en/Icerik/3238/2nd_turkish-latin_american_and_caribbean_congress_was_held_in_ankara

²³¹ Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies (2016). *3rd Turkish - Latin America and Caribbean Congress*. Available at: http://www.tasam.org/en/Etkinlik/228/3rd_turkish_-_latin_america_and_caribbean_congress

²³² Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies (2012). *Brazil - Turkey Country Meeting in Rio*. Available at: http://www.tasam.org/en/Icerik/4656/brazil_-_turkey_country_meeting_in_rio

²³³ CAPAZ. *¿Qué hacemos?* Available at: <http://cineturco.com/festival/>

countries and warned that, as MIKTA²³⁴ member countries, Mexico and Turkey might include cinema as a subject of international cooperation²³⁵.

It was mentioned before that the growing popularity of Turkish soap operas in LAC is another indicator of potential soft power of Turkey in the region. Seen from a general point of view and in terms of diplomacy, the series were very important to open new channels between Turkey and other countries. Turkish television series combine well the reality with fantasy: reality, incorporating similar problems that the Turks have in their lives, both personally and as a couple or family; fantasy, with a combination of the luxury of the upper classes of Turkey, the splendid views of Istanbul and the villas on the Bosphorus²³⁶.

As a counterpoint, it is common to hear that Spanish is the second foreign language studied in Turkey. In Turkish universities, Spanish is the second most studied language after English and, in recent years, language learning centres have increased in Ankara and Istanbul²³⁷. Before September 2001 (date of opening of the Cervantes Institute in Istanbul), the history of teaching Spanish in Turkey can be summarized in the work of three teaching areas: 1) The departments of Spanish language and literature in Ankara and Istanbul universities; 2) Courses offered by various institutions in these two cities opened to external students, mainly in Istanbul Technical University and the Centre for Modern Languages (TÖMER) in Ankara; 3) Spanish as an elective subject that some universities have begun to include in their curricula (like Bilkent and Middle East universities in Ankara, and Bosphorus and Sabanci universities in Istanbul) with a growing acceptance by students²³⁸.

Conclusions

Turkey has established organizations and institutions for the formalization, organization and policy coordination, representing a new stage in Turkey's external relations with LAC. Understanding the cultural elements of its foreign policy not only determines a part of Turkish foreign policy but also helps explain his strength, in a comparative manner with other emerging powers. Unlike others, Turkey has begun to use cultural diplomacy more recently in Latin America, but very efficiently. This is because the young Turkish civil society is leading this process and paving the way for the state to continue its rise. This convergence between state and society has accelerated the implementation of cultural diplomacy in foreign relations and has helped make it more effective. Taking into account current developments and national groups operating in Turkish foreign policy, we can say that cultural diplomacy will be more important in the LAC relations and will play a supporting role in many areas. Finally, this will

²³⁴ MIKTA is an acronym formed by the first letter of the names of the countries that comprise it: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia. It was founded in 2013 in New York by interests in common these emerging economies hold.

²³⁵ Ministry of Culture of Mexico (2015). *Inauguran El Foro Bilateral México-Turquía*. Available at: <http://www.imcine.gob.mx/comunicacion-social/comunicados-y-noticias/inauguran-el-foro-bilateral-mexico-turquia>

²³⁶ Ibid

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ Martínez Gila, P. (2007). *El español en Turquía*. Enciclopedia del español en el mundo. Anuario del Instituto Cervantes 2006-2007, Barcelona, 343-346.

represent a process in which institutions such as TIKA, YTB, TRT and Diyanet will play a more important role in both the development and the implementation of foreign policy of Turkey²³⁹.

Further examples abound showing the search to generate fluid channels of academic exchange of knowledge and experiences around scientific issues of mutual interest, and to create the conditions for greater exchange of academics and students. The creation of specific institutions of cultural diplomacy, developed at the bilateral level, is the clearest demonstration of this tendency²⁴⁰. However, an obvious imbalance is observed: while Turkey has launched several entities in the Latin American field, the initiative of this region to the Turkish space is scarce. That is, the explicit purpose of strengthening intercultural dialogue, institutional state or parastatal proposals respond to specific objectives of Turkish foreign policy, aiming to position itself against other competing regional actors, among others.

The emergence of new players in the Turkey-LAC relationship represents an important turning point in the evolution of interregional ties. Culture is a set of values that is established as a result of the historical events of a society. These values are: knowledge, science, art, language, history, literature, morals and values of religion. Activation of contacts in fields such as media and cinematography describes the emergence of dynamic cooperation in areas where state or regional initiative is overcome by integration into global flows of production and circulation of information. The importance of civil society also stands as an even more distinguished than bureaucratic traditional authority or any other entity. NGOs are an audible voice as they can suggest transnational education initiatives, dialogue and humanitarian aid, are non-profit companies formed in accordance with international legal norms, and are not intended to achieve commercial operation.

Today communication is extremely fast and this facilitates the diffusion and expansion of cultural and scientific advances. New technologies and global academic integration have allowed a more direct approach to those realities taken before as distant, either with fieldwork on the ground or by contact with the document archives and research centers of the central countries²⁴¹. This raises the need to consider the interaction of cultures and their relationship with others, because in a globalized world it is not possible to have an isolated life. Also, the expansion of academic networks, with a marked transnational nature and permanent linkage with think tanks and organizations of public diplomacy, show a trend of significant development but of course has not reached its full potential yet.

²³⁹ Ibid

²⁴⁰ Ibid

²⁴¹ Ibid

Chapter 11

Eurasian Economic Union and the Latin America: Framework of the Cooperation

Maria Lagutina²⁴²
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This chapter is devoted to analysis of the prospects of cooperation of Eurasian Economic Union and the Latin America.

The emergence of the EEU in January 2015 marked a new phase of joining the Eurasian countries into the global economic space. At the moment, membership consists of five states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Today the EEU is an international organization of regional economic integration, which has the international personality and established by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, undoubtedly, changes the balance of powers in the world. According to the EEU Treaty, the regime of free flow of goods, capital, services, labor, as well as equal access to transport and energy infrastructure and common rules of customs and tariff regulation is being introduced stepwise on the territory of five state-members.

Besides that the creation of free trade zones of the EEU is largely determined by current geopolitical situation in the world. Thus, the European direction in connection with the political crisis 2014-2015 in relations with Russia and the subsequent sanctions war, making unpromising the creation of a free trade zone with the EU. In this regard, for the development of the EEU is very important the creation of free trade zones with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the Latin America.

Introduction

The beginning of the XXI century can be determined as the phase of the "third wave" of world integration processes. The variety of existing political and economic integration types (regional, international, TRANS-regional, etc.) indicates different degree of willingness of nation states (often - political elites of these states) to participate in the global governance processes of the XXI century. So, one group of states considers the integration policy to be a way of strengthening their economic and political domination (for example, the US in NAFTA and the TRANS-Pacific partnership, etc.), and another group of states has certain expectations on the effectiveness of policy integration as a way of successful participation in the modern world political processes (e.g., Russia in the EEU, Brazil in MERCOSUR and UNASUR, both countries in BRICS, etc.). Finally, a third group of countries (mainly - developing countries) are wary of integration policy, often considering it to be a new form of neo-colonialism (Africa). Meanwhile, the process of integration has covered all regions of the world and one of the modern integration trends is to develop not only regional or sub-regional forms of cooperation, but trans-continental as well.

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Thus, one of the trends of modern development is the establishment of broad international contacts between different developed regional structures. We are talking about the development of extra-regional, TRANS-regional connections by the type of the interblock associations EU-MERCOSUR, EU-ASEAN, ASEAN-MERCOSUR, CIS-MERCOSUR, etc. In the activities of the leading international and regional organizations a foreign policy component, which is aimed at the development of relations between different regions and the elaboration of agreed positions on a number of common urgent problems of development is becoming very important.

The success of the Eurasian integration is already evident and today the geopolitical prospects of the EEU's further enlargement have not only regional dimension, but a global dimension as well²⁴⁴.

Today the EEU is developing trade and economic cooperation with more than 50 states and with the leading international organizations and international unions. Treatments on Preferential trade regimes or Free trade zones agreements were signed (for example, with Vietnam) or pending conclusions with some of them (for example, India, Iran, Singapore, Israel, Egypt and other). In addition, negotiations are underway about expanding trade ties between the EEU and other integrationist blocs.

According to a Russian politician Valentina Matvienko, after a visit of a group of Russian members of parliament to Latin America it became clear that "Ecuador and some other Latin American countries are interested in creating a free-trade zone with the EEU since they understand the potential. Ecuador will be chairing the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and we expect this organization to help us in cultivating ties with the region's integrationist organizations"²⁴⁵. Thus, the Latin America' countries see the EEU as a quite significant market to expand its export potential, as a new direction of the world economy development.

The EEU-countries traditionally have good economical relations with Latin American countries. The region of Latin America is very perspective for the development economical cooperation with Eurasian Economic Union. At the moment already there are some initiatives aimed at the establishment of constructive relations between the two regions: for instance, Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) signed the Memorandum on cooperation with Chile and Peru. Besides that they discuss the prospects of possible cooperation with Mexico and Argentina. In addition, the EEC is actively working on establishing cooperation with such integration structures as the Pacific Alliance, CARICOM, the Andean community and MERCOSUR. For the Latina America's countries there is necessity to construct relations with EEU-countries on new basis, taking into consideration the potential of the EEU and new geopolitical conditions in the world.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the prospects of the possible cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Latin America region. This can be achieved by means of

²⁴⁴ Lagutina M., Vasilyeva N. *The Russian Project of Eurasian Integration. Geopolitical Prospects*. Lexington Books, Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. P. 149.

²⁴⁵ Valentina Matvienko, "Ryad stran Latinskoy Ameriki proyavlyaut interes k sozdaniyu zony svobodnoy trgovli s EAES" ["The number of countries in Latin America show its interest to creating a free trade zone with the EEU"], 13.01.2015, Sovet Federatsii, accessed September 11, 2015, <http://council.gov.ru/press-center/news/50386/>

analyzing the existing trade and economic cooperation between the EEU and countries and integration blocs of the Latin America.

Our analysis is based mainly on analytical materials of Eurasian Economic Commission, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation and Russian International Affairs Council etc. We have used a case study approach for data collection, mainly through the study of official documents and by reviewing annual reports.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part is devoted to analyzing of the historical background and current stage of the EEU. The second part evaluates the current processes of regionalization in the Latin America. In the third part, the authors focus on the analysis of the existing form of cooperation between the EEU and MERCOSUR.

Eurasian integration project: from the idea to realization

Knowingly, the contemporary integrational project in Eurasia was inspired by Kazakhstan's President N. Nazarbayev, who put forward an initiative of Eurasia-based reintegration back in 1994, which would create a qualitatively new alliance of the former Soviet republics, and suggested entitling it the Eurasian Union (EEU)²⁴⁶. Thereby the Kazakhstani leader expressed a will to retain unity of countries, which had co-existed for more than 70 years. This union was to be oriented at interstate cooperation and integration in economic and humanitarian spheres engaging the most mature countries in the region. The draft especially underscored the thesis that rapprochement of countries was to proceed from economic interests and conduct of joint modernizational policy. The key principles, while constructing the Eurasian Union, were to become the following ones: equality, non-interference in domestic affairs of each other, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders. Apart from that, the document remarked that, if the political form of integration may evoke certain fears among the converging countries, which refuse to restrict their sovereign rights, whereas the idea of reaping economic benefit from rapprochement seemed to be the most prospective for the post-Soviet nations. However, unfortunately, at that moment the historic chance was not duly reckoned and, thus, missed out. The idea of establishment of the Eurasian Union had been taken out from the table only in early second decade of XXIst century, being endorsed by the Russian leader V. Putin and A. Lukashenko.

However, in early 1995 the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation signed the Agreement on the Customs Union. In 1996, the Leaders of the three Eurasian states, together with the Head of the Kyrgyz Republic, signed the Treaty on Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Areas. In 1998, the Republic of Tajikistan joined the Treaty. The Customs Union of the 1990s failed to really operate for a number of reasons.

The new integration's stage of the Eurasian space began with the creation in 2000 of a new integration structure – the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). In 2006, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation were again at the forefront of the formation of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. Just a year later, in

²⁴⁶ Nazarbaev, N. *Evrasiyskiy soyuz: idei, praktika, perspektivy, 1994-1997* [Eurasian Union: ideas, practice, prospects, 1994-1997]. Moscow: Fond sodeystviya razvitiyu sots. i polit. nauk, 1997.

October 2007, the Treaty on the Establishment of the Single Customs Territory and Formation of the Customs Union was signed. The Customs Union of Belarus, of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation began its work in January 2010 and than a year and a half after, in July 2011, it started to operate at its full capacity: the customs territories of three states were combined into the common custom territory. Within the territory, the rules of the Customs Code, the single customs tariff, the single system of foreign trade and customs regulations, as well as the common legal framework in the sphere of technical regulation began to be applied.

On November 18, 2011, Presidents Alexander Lukashenko, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Dmitry Medvedev signed a Declaration on the Eurasian Economic Integration. This document announced the transition to the next stage of integration – the Common Economic Space (the CES). By January 1, 2012, a legal framework of the CES as a market with 170 million consumers, free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, was formed. The CES was based on concerted action in main areas of economic regulation: in macroeconomics, competition policy, the field of industrial and agricultural subsidies, transport, energy, tariffs of natural monopolies.

The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) started its work on February 2, 2012. For the first time in a twenty-year history of the Eurasian integration process, a permanent supranational regulatory body with real powers in a number of main sectors of the economy was established. The EEC provides conditions and mechanisms for the functioning and development of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, and the elaboration of proposals for the further integration.

During 2013-2014, the Eurasian Economic Commission and the authorized authorities of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation were actively preparing the draft of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. In this period, 5 rounds of negotiations were held to finalize the draft Treaty, which were attended by more than 700 experts from Member States and the EEC. The final document containing more than 1000 pages is divided into 4 parts that include 28 sections, 118 articles and 33 annexes²⁴⁷.

On May 29, 2014, Astana hosted the session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, where Presidents Alexander Lukashenko, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vladimir Putin signed the Treaty on establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (entered into force on January 1, 2015). Many experts called this project the most ambitious and at the same time the most realistic and relying on the evaluated economic advantages and mutual benefits. Ample opportunities were opened for the business community of the Member States: the Treaty gave the “green light” to the formation of new dynamic markets with single standards and requirements for goods, services, capital and labor.

Now the Treaty on the Union is a legal and regulatory basis for the functioning of the EEU. This is a single core document developed by taking into account the best international practices. The Treaty established general provisions for conducting technical regulation in the EEU.

²⁴⁷ Dogovor o Evraziyskom ekonomicheskoy soyuz [The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union]. Signed in Astana on May 29, 2014, http://www.eaeunion.org/files/history/2014/2014_2.pdf

The Eurasian Economic Union started its operation from January 1, 2015. The single services market began to operate in 43 sectors as it was determinate in the Treaty of the Union. It was significant step in integration because it is almost 50% of the total volume of services in the Member States of the Union.

From January 2, 2015, after the completion of the ratification procedures, the Republic of Armenia became a full member of the Eurasian Economic Union.

On August 12, 2015, after implementation of the “road map” and the completion of the ratification procedures, the Kyrgyz Republic became a full member of the Union. Thus the formation of EEU was completed as the Union of five Eurasian countries.

Eurasian Economic Union today and Long-term priorities of Eurasian Integration

Today the EEU covers an area of more than 20 million square kilometers with a population of more than 179 million people²⁴⁸. The EEU’s economic potential accounts for about 2.7% of the world’s GDP, about 3% of the world’s export and about 2.5% of the world’s import, but mostly its potential is the potential of Russia – the alliance’s biggest national economy²⁴⁹.

The EEU’s chief objective is providing its participating nations with so called “four freedoms”: free movement of goods, capital, services and labor. Presently the EEU has already accomplished the first stage of economic integration – free movement of goods, services and labor²⁵⁰. First of all, the abolishment of several customs restrictions and duties simplified trade in goods and services among the EEU countries. The single market of services applies to many areas – for instance, construction, commerce, agriculture, etc. – and is gradually expanding. Integration within the EEU means a gradual unification of sector-specific policies (in electric power sector, industry, agriculture, etc.), as well as integration of markets (for instance, markets of medical products and devices, drugs, oil and oil products, etc.), and there are plans to set in place, by 2025, a supranational trade regulator at the EEU, as well as a supranational financial megaregulator²⁵¹.

The EEU was created for the purpose of comprehensive modernization, cooperation, and strengthening the national economies’ competitiveness, as well as creating conditions for sustained development and, consequently, improving living standards in the member states²⁵².

2017 year become most notable from point of efficiency. In April this year the new EEU Customs Code was adopted. The document focuses on the application of paperless electronic technologies and online services. It also contributes for greater simplification of many procedures. There are also significant results of integration, which significantly reduce time and

²⁴⁸ Eurasian Economic Union, <http://www.eaeunion.org/#about>

²⁴⁹ Kuvshinova O. Snijenie baryerov v torgovle stran EAES mojet uvelichit ih tovarooborot na chetvert [The reduction of trade barriers in the EEU countries could increase their turnover by a quarter], 14.12.2016, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/12/14/669499-snizhenie-barerov>.

²⁵⁰ Dogovor o Evraziyskom ekonomicheskom soyuze [The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union]. Signed in Astana on May 29, 2014, http://www.eaeunion.org/files/history/2014/2014_2.pdf

²⁵¹ Kuvshinova O. Snijenie baryerov v torgovle stran EAES mojet uvelichit ih tovarooborot na chetvert [The reduction of trade barriers in the EEU countries could increase their turnover by a quarter], 14.12.2016, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/12/14/669499-snizhenie-barerov>

²⁵² Official site of Eurasian Economic Commission, <http://www.eaeunion.org/#about>

resources both for entrepreneurs of the EEU-states and their business partners from third countries. In May this year, in the framework of the Union the markets of medicines and medical devices were implemented.

Today the EEU develops the coordinated policies in the most important economic spheres such as macro-economic, transport, energy, agriculture, foreign exchange and migration policies, as well as in financial sphere and implementation of the single transport space intellectual property.

The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union provides for and has already implemented tools and mechanisms, such as the Eurasian technology platforms, the Eurasian Subcontracting Network and the Eurasian Technology Transfer Network.

The Treaty on the EEU established the EEU as a fully-fledged party of the global economic relations. A determinant factor in the EEU establishment was awareness of the post-Soviet states' need for blending in with the global economic space as equal partners on condition of mutually advantageous cooperation, rather than raw-material appendage and peripheral states.

The Treaty lays down the structure of permanent bodies of the Union which consist from the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC), the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EIC), the Eurasian Economic Commission the Court of the Union

The Union management bodies system is based on a collective form of decision-making. The main body of the Union is the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC), which is composed of the Heads of the Member States. SEEC sessions are held at least once a year. The Supreme Council determines the strategy, directions and prospects for the formation and development of the Union and makes decisions aimed at implementing its objectives. At least twice a year the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EIC) at the level of Heads of Government is summoned. At the proposal of the EEC Council, the Council considers any issues for which no consensus was reached during decision-making in the Council session.

The permanent supranational regulatory body of the Eurasian Economic Union is the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). It is a kind of a supranational government, with its headquarters in Moscow, where national authorities have transferred some of their powers. The Commission acts in the interests of no particular state, but combines and coordinates the interests of all the Member States of the Union. The EEC provides for the principle of equality of the Member States, irrespective of economic power, territory and population.

The Commission includes the Council and the Board. The Council consists of one Vice Prime Minister of each party, decisions are taken by consensus. In the Board, each state is represented by two members, decisions are taken by a qualified majority or by consensus. The Commission's decisions have a direct effect on the territories of the Member States of the Union. They do not require additional approval at the national level.

The judicial branch is represented by the Court of the Union. The purpose of the Court's activity shall be to ensure the uniform application by the Member States and the Union Bodies of the Treaty, international treaties in the framework of the Union, international treaties of the Union with Third Parties and decisions of the Union Bodies. The Court shall consider disputes arising

from the implementation of the Treaty, international treaties within the Union and (or) the Union Bodies' decisions.

In October 2015, at the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the Presidents of five Member States of the Union approved the Main Directions of Economic Development of the EEU up to 2030. It is an important document, which defines further coordination of national policies and ways of improving the competitiveness of the economies of the EEU Member States. The effect of participation in the EEU by 2030 is estimated to be 13% of additional GDP growth for the Member States.

The leaders of the Union countries agreed to conduct a coordinated policy in the field of energy and to establish common markets for electric power, gas, oil and oil products. The Treaty on the EEU provides for this task to be implemented in several stages and finally performed by 2025: establishment of a common energy market of the Union and ensuring access to services of natural monopoly entities in the electricity sector is expected to be completed by 2019, common gas, oil and oil product markets – by 2025.

One of the main conditions of development of the Eurasian Economic Union as a contemporary integrative format is Digital transformation of economy together with global leaders of digital economy: the USA, the EU, ASEAN and China. The relevance of the digital agenda was marked by the end of 2016, when the Heads of EEU States signed the Statement on the digital agenda of the Union. And in 2017 the digital agenda became a central theme in the Commission as well as in all the EEU states.

External relations: framework for cooperation

While the 'internal contour' of the Eurasian integration is stagnating due to some objective reasons, the EEU should actively promote the so-called 'external contour' of integration: the creation of a network of free trade zones (FTA) and Preferential Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements in Eurasia and out of Eurasian space²⁵³.

The Eurasian Economic Union as an international organization of the regional economic integration has the legal personality and is vested with the right to enter into international treaties with other parties of the international relations and undertake obligations corresponding to the status of an international organization.

After the signing the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, the EEU Member States together with the Commission have strengthened the impact of the Union on external directions. Its prestige and importance in the international arena have increased significantly.

In order to expand the international recognition of the Eurasian Economic Union, the EEU is working to form the vision of the EEU as a reliable and predictable economic partner. Representatives of the Commission deliver speeches and presentations to the governmental, business and expert communities of Europe, the Latin America, Asia and the CIS, in the USA,

²⁵³ Lapenko M. Vneshnii kontur EAES: potencial rasshireniya i poisk optimal'nyh mehanizmov vzaimodeistviya. Izvestiya Saratovskogo universiteta. Novaya seriya. Seriya Istoriya. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. 2016. V. 16. № 1. P. 71-76.

Republic of South Africa etc. and take part in regular meetings with diplomatic missions, international organizations, and business structures.

In May 2015, the Presidents of the Member States of the Eurasian Economic Union decided to start negotiations with China on conclusion of an agreement on trade and economic the cooperation. This is an important stage in the development of economic cooperation sequencing the entire structure of relations and providing a basis for further progress in the area of trade simplification and elimination of non-tariff barriers that restrict reciprocal access to markets. In order to organize this activity efficiently, in October 2015 the presidents adopted a disposition on the coordination of Presidents of the EEU Member States on conjunction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). Formal negotiations started in the first half of 2016. Nowadays, a range of projects has been already launched in the context of the conjugation of the EEU and SREB.²⁵⁴

On May 29, 2015, the EEU Member States and Vietnam signed an agreement on establishment of a Free trade zone. The document suggests zeroing of the duties for 90% of products will give an opportunity to increase by 2020 the trade turnover of the EEU Member States and Vietnam more than twice. The agreement marked the beginning of the subsequent closer integration of the EEU with the Asia-Pacific Region.

In 2015-2016, the decisions were taken to launch negotiations on concluding similar agreements with Egypt, Israel, India and Singapore, to unify preferential trade regime with Serbia, to transit to a preferential trade regime with Iran.

In general in accordance with the Treaty on the EEU the Union can cooperate with

- * states,
- * international organizations
- * international integration associations.

Interaction in these areas is conducted in a variety of formats ranging from Memorandums of understanding and deepening cooperation to agreements on creation of a Free trade zone (FTZ). Generally, the interaction starts in a memorandum format that allows creating a platform for discussion and deepening cooperation in the future.

The Eurasian Economic Commission concludes Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation with foreign countries, regional associations and international organizations.

Latin America agenda

The region of Latin America illustrates dynamic evolution of the regional integrational processes. Due to its significant resource potential political leaders of countries in this region ever more often claim about their desire to establish a Latin American “power centre” and embed it into the world system of XXIst century.

²⁵⁴ Lagutina M. Improving relations with Russia and Ukraine / China’s Belt and Road: a Game Changer? Edited by A. Amighini. Milan: ISPI, 2017. P.53-75.

A distinct trait of the current stage of Latin American regionalization is, first and foremost, its definitive breakaway from the USA sway in consequence of a transition to the so-called “leftist drift”. As such, in a series of Latin American countries political leaders from leftist parties and movements came to power, who turned to promoting a need for the countries of the region breaking away from blind following economic conjuncture, importance of modernization, social welfare and comprehensive inclusion of countries from this region into global economy and politics²⁵⁵.

The modern Latin American regionalization is characterized by extension of the agenda as well: not only the economic reasons lie at the heart of integration, but also the political, social and even military factors.

Today, evolution of regional integration and the multipolar world order have been declared to be of paramount priority in the majority of Latin America foreign policies. In an outcome of such a policy a strong influence of the USA in the region had begun to shrink gradually, and, therefore, new kind of relations emerged in the region²⁵⁶. Yet, nowadays Latin American regionalization has still two paths: “Latin American” and “Pan American”, which have always been antagonistic throughout all history of US - Latin America relations.

As far as the “Pan-American” regionalization is concerned, mainly it whittles down to strife by the USA to control all integrational processes in the region. In practice, it is reflected in efforts at expanding the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) or creating the Area de Libre Comercio de las Americas – (ALCA), which was suggested by the US leadership as a Pan-American project. Although it never succeeded even in the “ALCA light” form, de-facto its implementation is still underway in either a bi-lateral or multi-lateral formats.

Following the NAFTA conclusion, Mexico’s economy gained momentum, commercial relations with the USA got expanded significantly that allowed Mexico to use its case in putting forward the Pan-American project of ALCA.²⁵⁷ The ALCA agreement was expected to be signed in 2005 at the summit in Mar-del-Plato (Argentina), but conclusion never happened. It can be mentioned, that countries were not unanimous on this initiative in the region itself: Central American countries saw implementation of the ALCA project quite differently from what was expected by the MERCOSUR member-states or even Mexico, which had acceded to NAFTA.

However, the majority of countries in the region held a course for regional integration without the US engagement, in other words, - subcontinental integration took precedence over all-continental. Moreover, in 2004 the Bolivarian Alternative for Americas (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, ALBA) –an anti-market and anti-globalist project,

²⁵⁵ Vladimir Davidov , Na chto raschityvat region v novom globalnom kontekste? [What does the region expect in the new global context?] *Latin America*. №3, 2008, 4-13.

²⁵⁶ Christopher Sabatini, “As Latin America Changes, Will the U.S. Policy Debate?” *The Huffington Post*. 10 January 2011. [Web: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-sabatini/as-latin-america-changes_b_807108.html]

²⁵⁷ Galina Kostunina, Evolutsiya kontseptsii formirovaniya obsheregionalnoy zony svobodnoy trgovli v Latinskoy Amerike [The evolution of the concept of forming a region-wide free trade zone in Latin America] *Russian Foreign Economic Bulletin*, №7, 2008, 11-20.

members whereof aspire to a new type integration, based on the traditional values of America's indigenous peoples.

A second direction of regionalization is a "Latin American" path. Establishment of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) in 1991 upon Brazil's initiative featured a tangible embodiment of this dimension. Due to MERCOSUR states attained sustainable trade and economic links, apart from that, it became a factor of stability and political security in the region, having thus strengthened both economic and political networks.

It is important that owing to MERCOSUR the member-states gain ever broader involvement into the global political processes (here, noteworthy is interaction between MERCOSUR and other regional groupings: the European Union, ASEAN, the Eurasian Economic Union and so on). Nevertheless, MERCOSUR still represents a classic case of regional structures, whose perspectives depend mainly on activity and stance of the leading power – Brazil, around which this entity emerged.

At the same time, regionalization requires Latin American countries to elaborate new approaches to regionalization. As a result, in 2004 "the decision was made, which launched a principally new integrational mechanism in the continent"²⁵⁸ – the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). From the expertly view point, the UNASUR "reflects a transition from the sub-regional to the regional complex entities of a larger scale"²⁵⁹ – in fact, precisely this case implies an intention on forging the "global Latin American region". The UNASUR entity has been brought to life by the desire of member-states to enhance their national economies, competitive power, as well as upgrade the political significance during negotiations with the developed nations, particularly with the USA.

The trend towards emergence of wide-scale integrational entities, or global regions found its expression in formation of another entity as well – the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) – a regional bloc of Latin America and Caribbean states, established in 2010. The role of this structure boils down to full-scale political, economic and cultural integration of South and Central Americas. Assessing the very fact of CELAC foundation, many pundits discovered a tendency towards complete detachment of Latin American countries from the USA, as, to a certain extent, the new bloc is set against the Organization of American States (OAS), established in 1948 under the US aegis, which encompasses all countries of the Latin America (except for Cuba) along with the USA and Canada²⁶⁰.

²⁵⁸Mikhail Rykhtik, Vladimir Podguskov, MERCOSUR v sisteme Soyuzo yujnoamerikanskikh natsiy (UNASUR): osobennosti, problem i perspektivy [The MERCOSUR system of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR): specifics, problems and prospects] Vestnik Nizhegorodskogo Universiteta imeni N. A. Lobachevsky. №5(1), 2010, 310.

²⁵⁹Leonid Evdokimov, Integratsionnie protsessy v Andskom regione Latinskoy Ameriki: politicheskiy aspekt. [Integration processes in the Andean region of Latin America: the political dimension] Abstract to the PhD dissertation on Political science. St. Petersburg, 2012. URL: http://spbu.ru/dissert/%7Bzashiti_disser___id%7D/avtoref-Evdokimov.pdf (accessed 11.09.2015)

²⁶⁰Piotr Yakovlev, Geopoliticheskie sdvigi v Latinskoy Amerike [Geopolitical shifts in Latin America], http://www.perspektivy.info/table/geopoliticheskije_sdvigi_v_latinskoj_amerike_2013-05-03.htm (accessed: 09.09.2015)

The cooperation with Latin American's countries and integration groups is one of priorities on external agenda of the EEU. Negotiations with regional representatives were beginning since the autumn 2014. There are two format of negation's process:

- Signing of the Memorandum of cooperation between the EEU and the Latin America's countries
- Signing of the Memorandum of cooperation between the EEU and the Latin America's countries (MERCOSUR, Andean Community of Nations)

On the level of the EEU-the Latin America's countries Chile can be considered as a pioneer among the countries of the Latin America that began cooperation with the EEU. Cooperation between the EEC and the government of the Republic of Chile is the part of the Memorandum of understanding which was signed on 19 June 2015. This document is aimed at promoting the development of economic cooperation between the EEU countries and the Republic of Chile.

According to this Memorandum the parties intend to develop cooperation through the conferences, forums and seminars, involving in their work the representatives of business communities of the EEU member-states and the Republic of Chile. It also assumes the exchange of experience on a number of areas: regional economic integration; economic cooperation; technical regulation and standardization; application of sanitary, veterinary and quarantine phytosanitary measures; finance; transport; energy; agro-industrial complex; industry, including the deepening of industrial cooperation; customs regulation; intellectual property; services, investment and enterprise development, and other areas of mutual interest²⁶¹.

In accordance with the Memorandum the meetings of the joint Commission annually take place. In March 2017 in Santiago the 3rd meeting of the joint Commission hosted, where the action plan was adopted and the parts exchanged their lists of products of export interest. According to the plan customs cooperation, digital agenda and cooperation prospects in the agricultural sector will be priority areas of cooperation between the countries of the EEU and Chile in 2018.

The issues of trade and economic cooperation between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union from the one hand and Brazil and MERCOSUR from the other were discussed at the meeting of the Minister of Integration and Macroeconomics of the EEU Tatyana Valovaya with the Ambassador of Brazil in Russia Antonio Luis Espinola Salgado in February 2017: "The development of cooperation with Brazil is a new amplitudinous direction of the international activities of the EEC, which, on the one hand, strengthens bilateral relations, and on the other, reinforces the cooperation of the Eurasian Economic Union with the Latin American region," noted Tatyana Valovaya. Particular attention was paid to strengthening contacts and formation beneficial dialogue between Eurasian Economic Union and Brazil for the development of economic partnership between the member states of the EEU and Brazil. In his turn Antonio Luis Espinola Salgado confirmed the interest of the Brazilian side in expanding trade and cooperation with the members of the Union²⁶².

²⁶¹ Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Government of the Republic of Chile 19.06.2015, <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/19-06-2015-3.aspx>

²⁶² Ministr EEK Tat'yana Valovaya: «Sotrudnichestvo s Braziliiei ukreplyaet svyazi EAES so stranami Latinskoi Ameriki»

It should also be noted the interest of the Pacific Alliance - an integration associations of Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru – to develop contacts with the EEC at the multilateral level²⁶³.

As far as the multilateral level is concerned, 25 November 2014 the delegations of the Eurasian Economic Commission and the leading integration association of the states of South America – MERCOSUR held consultations on the draft of Memorandum on the cooperation in trade and economic issues. The key interest for the Latina America countries is the development of trade ties with new blocks that could to lead MERCOSUR to the global trade arena. In August 2015 MERCOSUR and the Customs Union of the EEU signed a Memorandum of understanding. However, the development of negotiations stopped in 2016 due to the political crisis in the countries of South America and the suspension of the membership of Venezuela in MERCOSUR. Finally, in April 2017 MERCOSUR agreed to expedite the signing of a treaty, which will include the possibility of negotiations on a comprehensive trade agreement. As an Argentinean expert Ariel S. Gonzalez Levaggi notes “The process will not be easy, but it can become a platform for redirection of global trade flows from North to South”²⁶⁴.

In 2016 the officials of Argentina announced their ambition to become “the driving force in the promotion of relations between the EEU and MERCOSUR”²⁶⁵.

²⁶³ The EEC Minister Tatyana Valovaya identified priority areas of cooperation between the EAEU and Chile for the near future 27.07.2017, <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/27-07-17.aspx>

²⁶⁴ Mamedov S., Soglashenie mejdu EAES I NERKOSUR razvnet globalnie trgovie potoki s Severa na Yug [The agreement between the EEU and MERCOSUR will redirect global trade flows from North to South] 07.08.2017, <http://mirperemen.net/2017/08/soglashenie-mezhdu-eaes-i-merkosur-razvnet-globalnye-torgovye-potoki-s-severa-na-yug/>

²⁶⁵ Botta P., Evraziyskiy soyuz pozvolit Yujnoy Amerike snizit zavisimost ot SSHA – argentinskiy ekspert [The Eurasian Union will allow South America to reduce its dependence on the US – an Argentine expert] 24.05. 2017, <http://eurasia.expert/evraziyskiy-soyuz-pozvolit-yuzhnoy-amerike-snizit-zavisimost-ot-ssha/>

Meanwhile, there are a number of some difficulties: one of the main problems is the narrow range of trade between two regions, narrow range of Eurasian business circles which are involved in the Latin American region,²⁶⁶ the lack of information about the EEU and its activity in the Latin American countries etc. The difficult current political situation, political changes and changes in political priorities in some MERCOSUR' countries hinder the process of negotiations between two blocs.

Among the areas of cooperation along with the trade the development of technology has to prevail (for example, research in the field of agricultural technology or academic exchange, including study of languages). Cooperation between the EEU and MERCOSUR have a great potential and can provide the creation of the new center of international integration: the two Unions have territories in the 33 million square kilometers, a population of 450 million people and a combined GDP exceeds \$ 8.5 billion (11.6% of world GDP in nominal terms)²⁶⁷.

Besides that in March of this year, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the General Secretariat of the Andean Community of Nations (ACN)²⁶⁸.

Negotiations process between the EEU and Latin America region: key points

Format, Date	Countries, Representatives of countries	Integration group	Results
September 17 2014		Meeting with representatives of MERCOSUR	Presentations to each other of the integration associations (the structure, goals, tasks and future plans), discussion on the question of the preparation of Memorandum of Understanding between the EEU and MERCOSUR.
November 2014		Meeting with representatives of MERCOSUR	Consultations on the draft of Memorandum on the cooperation

²⁶⁶ EAES I MERKOSUR nachinaut sotrudnichestvo v ekonomike [EEU and MERCOSUR begin cooperation in economy], <https://news2.ru/story/432460/>

²⁶⁷ Rodríguez A.N., Kak MERKOSUR I Evraziyskiy soyuz brosayut vizov Soedinennim Shtatam I gegemonii dollar [How MERCOSUR and the Eurasian Union challenge to the United States and the dollar hegemony] <http://inosmi.ru/world/20150320/226991984.html>

²⁶⁸ Memorandum o vzaimoponimanii mezhdru Evraziiskoi ekonomicheskoi komissiei i General'nym sekretariatom Andskogo soobshestva http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_razv_integr/memorandymi/Documents...pdf

November 7 2014	Meeting of EEU with the delegation of the Republic of Peru		Discussion of the possibilities of trade and economic cooperation. Decision to prepare Memorandum on the cooperation between EEU and the Government of the Republic of Peru
June 19, 2015	Meeting of the EEU and the Government of the Republic of Chile		Memorandum of Understanding
October 2 2015	The first meeting of the Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Government of the Republic of Chile		Consideration of the priority areas of cooperation between EEU and Chile
October 6 2015	Meeting of EEU and the government of the Republic of Peru		Memorandum of Understanding
September 26-27 2016	The second meeting of the Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Government of the Republic of Chile		Joint Protocol about the framework of the Joint Commission and necessity to prepare Joint action plan for 2017-2018.
October 19 2016	Meeting with Argentina Minister of agro-industry of Argentina Ricardo Buriayle		Discussion on the issue of the substance and perspectives cooperation of the EEU and Argentina in the sphere of agrarian and industrial complex
February 2017	Meeting with Brazil Ambassador of Brazil in Russia Antonio Luis Espinola Salgado		Discussion on the issues of trade and economic cooperation with Brazil and MERCOSUR
March 20-21 2017	The third meeting of the Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the		Joint Action Plan between EEU and the Government of the Republic of Chile for 2017-2018, lists of goods for export interest of Chile

	Government of the Republic of Chile		and each member's states of the Union.
March 2017		Meeting with General Secretariat of the Andean Community of Nations (ACN).	Memorandum of Understanding Eurasian Economic Commission and

Conclusion

To conclude, today we are witnesses of some great transformations in global economic and political processes with participation of leading developing economies of Eurasia, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America.

Despite the fact that geographically Eurasia is located in the Northern hemisphere, today the Eurasian countries established the closest diplomatic relations with the developing countries of the South (including the Latin America), and this fact creates some prerequisites for the redirection of global trade flows from the North to the South.

In its turn, last years the Latin American countries seek to participate more actively in world processes and in this context they search of new partners in different regions of the world. The Eurasian region is one of the key elements of the modern system of world economic relations, and the establishment of the EEU provides opportunities for effective institutional cooperation between the two regions at different levels.

It is interesting also to evaluate the prospects of cooperation between the Latin America and the EEU in the context of the conjugation of the EEU and the Chinese project "One belt, one road". It is known that China has a great interest in the Latin America and actively invests in the extractive industries of the states in this region. Moreover, recent years China became a strong competitor in economic sphere of the region to the main partner of most countries in the Latin America - the USA. Today China is a key partner for Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

In this context, the project of conjugation of the EEU and "One belt, one road" may expand in the Latin American region in the future. This new Union could unite the majority of developing economies in the world that will correspond to the world trends of the creation of the transcontinental trade megablocks.²⁶⁹ The cooperation in the framework of BRICS can create the basis for this cooperation.

Thus, today the EEU countries are actively developing close coordination in the economic sphere in different regions of the world, creating a new reality in which cooperation among the countries of the Latin America and the EEU is becoming an important mechanism for building a multipolar world order and even the formation of their own non-Western model of international integration.

²⁶⁹ EAES stremitsya v Latinskuyu Ameriku [The EEU tend to the Latin America], <http://politruussia.com/ekonomika/integratsiya-skvoz-kontinenty-915/>

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