

## ORDINALITY AND FILM IMAGE

**Lyubov Bugaeva**

*St. Petersburg State University*

[ldbugaeva@gmail.com](mailto:ldbugaeva@gmail.com)

**ABSTRACT:** The paper follows John Ryder's thinking in that he was the first to apply Buchler's categories to film analysis, and it considers a metaphysics of natural complexes in its application to cinematic expressions of contextual relations. On one hand, an analysis of cinematic images as objects of perception in terms of natural complexes contributes to the applicability of Buchler's categories of complex, ordinality, and relation. On the other hand, Buchler's metaphysics provides the frame of interpretation and the language of description for the art of metamodernism, most relevantly for metamodern cinema, but also for the theory of metamodernism itself. On the example Charlie Kaufman's "I'm Thinking of Ending Things" (2020), the paper examines film images as natural complexes using the categories of prevalence, alescence, and the notion of contour.

**Keywords:** John Ryder, Justus Buchler, Charlie Kaufman, cinema, film image, dreams, mental states, natural complex, ordinality, contour, prevalence, alescence

John Ryder was the first to apply Buchler's categories to film analysis. In his article "The Ontology of Santa Claus: 'Miracle on 34<sup>th</sup> Street'," he examined the case that the 1947 film makes for the reality of Santa Claus through the perspective of ordinal metaphysics. In the story, Macy's Department store hires a man, Kris Kringle, to play the role of Santa Claus in its annual Thanksgiving Day parade. Kris not only plays Santa but claims to be Santa Claus in fact, a later claim that is later adjudicated in court. Ryder suggests that the film does not just follow the path of William James's "will to believe", providing "some vague rationale for belief or faith, but it advances the even more challenging claim that Santa Claus in fact exists" (Ryder 2012, 51). Thus, the film makes an ordinal argument for the existence of Santa Claus in four orders of relations, i.e., family, politics, represented by the judge who presides over the "Santa Claus case", commerce (Mr. Macy), and the State exemplified by the US Postal Service, which delivers to the courtroom letters addressed to Santa. The characters have to acknowledge the reality of Santa Claus in all these four spheres, or

"order of relations", since Christmas plays a vital role in each of them. Ryder asks, "what it might mean to say that Santa Claus exists", (ibid.) and arrives at the conclusion that it means "to locate Santa Claus in those orders", and that an ordinal ontology helps one to understand the impossibility in an American cultural context of denying Santa Claus's existence (ibid., 53–54).

John Ryder's article is a convincing argument in favor of applying an ordinal ontology to interpretation of ontological issues that the story may invoke. Let me take another step in the same direction and examine possibilities of applying an ordinal ontology to categories of film images and to the image itself. I will take as an example the 2020 psychological thriller "I'm Thinking of Ending Things" directed by Charlie Kaufman (b. 1958), who is, like John Ryder, a New York native and raised on Long Island.

The film starts as a story narrated by a young woman Lucy (Jessie Buckley) who is, together with her boyfriend Jake (Jesse Plemons), on the road in Upstate New York to visit his parents (Toni Collette and David Thewlis). During the journey, Lucy and Jake are engaged in a strange conversation, in which Jake reacts to Lucy's words, though they are not pronounced audibly, and he seems to be able to know what she thinks. The title of the film is in fact one of Lucy's thoughts. The journey brings the two to an eerie dinner at Jake's parents' house, in the course of which the eeriness accelerates. The age of Jake's parents keeps changing, Lucy's occupation vacillates from a physics student to a gerontologist, a painter, and a waitress, as well as does the timing and location of Lucy and Jake's first encounter. At some point, Lucy even assumes the name Louisa. There is a telling moment when she looks into the car mirror; the mirror is broken, as is, it seems, her identity. Eventually, the viewer realizes that Lucy's voice narration and the Jake-Lucy storyline develop in the mind of an old janitor (Guy Boyd), the footage of whom occasionally interrupts the film sequences. The metamorphosis of Jake's parents and other inconsistencies revealingly underscore his search for the ideal place and time for events that never happened. Reality and Jake's fantasies continue to mingle until the very end of the movie.

### Hallucinations or Not?

"I'm Thinking of Ending Things", complexity of which is thought-provoking from a cinematic point of view, also poses other challenges. It raises ontological, epistemological and film theory issues that can be considered within Justus Buchler and John Ryder's categorial framework of an ordinal metaphysics. The first issue is, as in Ryder's analysis of "Miracle on 34th Street", connected to the status of film characters in relation to their environment, i.e., to the consensus reality on screen. Jake's girlfriend Lucy, that is the first-person narrator in the first half of the film, turns out to be Jake's thought, a fantasy or a dream, a girlfriend he has never had. Jake, though he is not a thought, never gets the chance to voice his thoughts in a verbal narration. Moreover, Lucy seems so real that many film critics still continue to interpret the film as a drama of Jake and Lucy's relationship.

Charlie Kaufman once admitted in an interview that "Jake has built her [Lucy] out of the books, movies, and passing encounters that have shaped his isolated worldview". But the film director's answer to the question, "So Lucy's the main character and she also doesn't exist?", was surprisingly vague – "yes and no". Kaufman's explanation for the ambiguity of his answer was "She is a device, but I wanted her to be able to separate herself from that [...] I didn't want it to be a twist. I felt like that would not work in a movie at this point in history [...] To my mind, it would have been a misuse of any actress not to give them something to play that was real [...] I needed her to have agency" (Kohn; Kaufman 2020). The script for the film supports this claim; its non-dialogue parts describe Lucy as a subject with a consciousness of her own: "Suddenly, she feels self-conscious, glances around to see if she is being watched, peering into dark apartment windows" (Kaufman 2019, 10).

At the same time, Charlie Kaufman's movie is overloaded with quotations, allusions, and intertextual references. Thus, there are several episodes that allude to the musical "Oklahoma!" (1943), written by Rodgers and Hammerstein. At the end of the movie Jake sings the

"Lonely Room" song from "Oklahoma!". Jake indeed bears some resemblance to Jud from the musical; but one of the most remarkable allusions to "Oklahoma!" is the "Dream Ballet" sequence. A dream ballet in musical theater is an all-dance *mise en abyme* that explains and clarifies the main plot. A dream ballet in the movie nods to the dream character of the world on screen.

So, Lucy is a thought, a dream, a hallucination and so on, and concurrently she does exist as a human being in the consensus reality created in the film. The curious twist here is that the realization that the girl is no more than a projection of the older Jake's imagination, as well as the young Jake himself, does not undermine the close relations that those "projections" have to the consensus reality and does not move them to the category of hallucinations. "I'm Thinking of Ending Things" evokes "A Beautiful Mind" (2001, Ron Howard): in the final scenes, Kaufman imitates the Nobel Prize speech episode from Howard's Oscar winning film. In "A Beautiful Mind", John Nash's schizophrenic mind also produces images, i.e., of the mysterious agent William Parcher, and of his former roommate from Princeton and his niece. However, the status of those cinematic representations of hallucinations is quite different from the "dreams" that Jake has. The agency capacity of hallucinatory images of Howard's movie is extremely limited; their mental states are never revealed or even suggested, and there is no space for sympathy or empathy. This is not the case in "I'm Thinking of Ending Things." Kaufman tried to share Jake's "experience of absorbing things [...] and how they become part of his psyche" (Kohn; Kaufman 2020). As a result, he created characters that seem to have experiences of their own, independent of what the older Jake experienced or may plan for them. Lucy has a representative power; she is the fantasy that "fights back". Kaufman explained that he needed her to have agency: "I really liked the idea that even within his [Jake's] fantasy, he cannot have what he wants. He's going to imagine this thing, but then he's going to also imagine how it won't work, how she's going to be bored with him, how she's going to not think he's smart enough or interesting enough" (Kohn; Kaufman

2020). If Lucy and the young Jake are not hallucinations, then what kind of cinematic images are they?

In film theory, e.g., in Gilles Deleuze, perception has a double reference and can be objective or subjective. While the subjective image is “the thing seen by someone ‘qualified’, or the set as it is seen by someone who forms part of that set”, the objective image is the thing or the set “seen from the viewpoint of someone who remains external to that set” (Deleuze 1986: 71). The cinematographic perception-image, which is a type of movement-image<sup>1</sup>, continuously balances between subjectivity and objectivity as the camera moves from the point of view through the eyes of the character to a position outside or even “with” the character, and that allows Deleuze to define the perception-image as semi-subjective (ibid., 72–73). The distinction between hallucinations and ‘real’ objects in cinematic spaces described by Deleuze is often conveyed by, though not limited to, the interplay of subjective and objective camera. Thus, in “A Beautiful Mind”, the hallucinations that John Nash sees are what the subjective camera portrays through the eyes of a character. The camera discriminates them from the non-hallucinatory characters, as well as Nash himself does later in the movie. However, in *Cinema I: The Movement-Image* Deleuze does not provide an adequate framework for such hallucinatory images as are produced by Jake’s mind in Kaufman’s movie, since the subjective/objective camera does not contribute to the differentiation of hallucinations and reality in “I’m Thinking of Ending Things.”

In *Cinema I* Deleuze singles out Italian neo-realism as opposite to the realism of place and spatial coordinates. The destruction caused by World War Two created a great variety of any-space-whatever. It changed the nature of movement in films as characters barely undertake common trips in non-complicated sensory-motor situations, but are likely to drift in any-space-whatever. Deleuze thought that this indicated a crisis of the action-

image that failed to motivate walking in determinate places (Deleuze 1986: 109, 122). A simple sensory-motor formula does not work in such cinema of behavior; what does work are the internal factors: “only the inner counts, but this inner is not beyond or hidden, it is not the same as the genetic element of behaviour, which must be shown [...] not a perfecting of action; it is the absolutely necessary condition of the development of the action-image” (ibid., 158). If one compares “any-space-whatever” and other types of environments that awaken an affective memory to spaces and environments in Kaufman’s movie, and there are many of them shaping an emotional line of narration, there is a difference. A simple sensory-motor formula does not work in “I’m Thinking of Ending Things,” and no space could be named “any-space-whatever”, even the Tusley Town Ice Cream, a non-existent ice cream shop that Jake and Lucy encounter in the middle of a snowstorm. (In the book the film is based on, it is a Dairy Queen, but Kaufman did not get permission to film there.)

Patricia Pisters, a follower of Gilles Deleuze, in her attempt to combine philosophy, modern cinema, and the “mysteries of the brain,” sees the brain as a screen, and even as a neuro-screen. She insists that contemporary cinema seeks not only to depict the world seen through the character’s eyes, but also to show what is going on in his or her consciousness, to capture his or her mental landscape, that is, to move from cinema as an “illusion of reality” to the image as the “reality of illusion”. The visualization of images of consciousness and subconsciousness on the movie screen is the creation of a neuro-image: “We no longer see through characters’ eyes, as in the movement-image and the time-image;<sup>2</sup> we are most often instead in their mental worlds” (Pisters 2012, 14). Pisters

<sup>1</sup> Deleuze identifies four types of cinematic movement-images: perception-images (what is seen), affection-images (what is emotionally expressed), action-images (what is performed), and mental-images (what is recollected).

<sup>2</sup> In *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, Deleuze, who thought that Hitchcock caused dwarfing of the movement-image and led to the emergence and expansion of time-image, defines and discriminates such types of time-images as a recollection-image and a dream-image. He contrasts them with a perception-image as the virtual to the actual; for him, recollection- and dream-images are not actual, they are “on the way to actualization” (Deleuze 1989, 130). I claim that Kaufman does not create time-images in Deleuzian sense, such as a recollection-image and a dream-image.

introduces the new category of “the neuro-image” (new, that is, relative to the movement-image and time-image), which she connects (dubiously) to the activity of the brain. Though there is a temptation to identify the film narrative in “I’m Thinking of Ending Things” as a mental space, there is a number of factors that prevent it. Kaufman does not seek to establish a correlation between the mental state of the character and the environment; the characters of the film that emerge in Jake’s mind could not be reduced to his recollections and dreams for the reasons mentioned earlier, i.e., their “representative power”, independence, and potential ability to cause sympathy or empathy. The neuro-image conception, like Deleuze’s theory, fails to conceptualize the cinematic images in Kaufman’s movie. My claim is that the ordinal ontology does.

According to Buchler, perception is a relational complex; therefore, a film image, for example a mirror, a tree or a candle, can be interpreted as mirror-in-perceptual-relation-to-observer where the observer is a film character or a camera eye, on one hand, or a film viewer, on the other hand. The observer is both internal and external. The cinematographic image is also a complex of relations, possibilities, and actualities. According to Kathleen Wallace, “perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations may share some locations (e.g., location in the order of the sensory apparatus) but not all”, as a result, “we might not be able to tell the difference between perception, hallucination, and illusion solely on the basis of the sense experiences (from within the order of the sensory apparatus), or from the first person perspective alone” (Wallace 2004, 276). However, “perceptual validation is possible through intersubjective duplication and confirmation or through reiterated perceptions and actions by the perceiver”, while a hallucination “is not located in an order which is plurally accessible and, hence, would not be able to be validated as a perception” (ibid.). In ordinal terminology, John Nash is a natural complex that belongs to the order of characters that are presented as ‘real people,’ while, say, William Parcher from the US Department of Defense belongs to the order of hallucinations. The claim is checkable through “perceptual

validation”, since Nash is the only one in his circle of people who sees Parcher. As for “I’m Thinking of Ending Things,” in ordinal terminology, Lucy or the young Jake are natural complexes, the ordinal location of which are not as easily determined as in “A Beautiful Mind.” What seems to be objective turns out to be subjective. Both, Lucy and Jake, turn out to be as it were projections of the janitor who is, supposedly, the older Jake. Thus, the janitor is not somebody registered by the camera-eye, and Lucy is not the ultimate narrator of the story, but the voice of somebody’s dream.

### Within the Contour of Complexes

In the opening scenes of Kaufman’s movie (but not in the script), Lucy reiterates what, as she claims, Jake once said: “Sometimes the thought is closer to the truth, to reality, than an action. You can say anything, you can do anything, but you can’t fake a thought.” Kaufman, while constructing the opposition of true and false, problematizes here, to use Buchler’s terminology, the prevailing traits of natural complexes located in the order of consensus reality. So, we have, one might say, two Lucies, one, which is in the order of hallucinations and dreams, and a second, which is in the order of real-life characters in the consensus reality. However, we do not talk of Lucy as two different natural complexes alternating in different situations and film sequences. We deal with the same complex in two quite different ordinal locations.

In the “Reply to Anton: Against ‘Proper’ Ontology,” Buchler clarifies the term “natural definition” of a complex: “It is the kind of definition in which any natural complex sets limits to another, inherently demarcates the boundaries between it and another” (Buchler 1990, 206). Hallucinations and dreams as complexes have their limits that demarcate them from real-life characters. What then makes it possible for the natural complex “Lucy” to belong to both of them? In this case, the notions of the complex’s integrity and of its contour, categories that Buchler introduced, become relevant:

A complex has an *integrity* for each of its ordinal locations. The continuity and totality of its locations, the interrelation of its integrities, is the *contour* of the complex. The contour is itself an integrity, the gross integrity of that which is plurally located, whether successively or simultaneously. A contour is the integrity of a complex not in so far as the complex transcends all orders but in so far as it belongs to many orders. The *identity* of a complex is the continuous relation that obtains between the contour of a complex and any of its integrities (ibid., 22).

Ryder also raises “the question of the sameness of the complex across its ordinal locations”, and he states,

The identity of a complex is not a function of this or that integrity. If it were, then we would be forced to say that a complex in one of its ordinal locations is not the same one as complex considered in another of its locations. Since identity is a function of the relation between the contour, or gross integrity, of a complex and any of its integrities, the possibility of speaking of the “same” complex across ordinal locations is assured (Ryder 1980, 125).

In “I’m Thinking of Ending Things,” Lucy is the same Lucy in all the ordinal locations in which she is located. More importantly, such traits as ‘hallucinatory’ or ‘real’ do not prevail in the identity of the complex “Lucy”. The character’s identity is not broken, as seems to be the case in the broken car-mirror scene, but it is fragmented. Buchler indicates that “the identity of a complex depends upon a relation of each integrity to the contour, not upon a relation of each integrity to every other” (Buchler 1990, 221–222). If the contour of a natural complex is “the continuity and totality of its locations, the interrelation of its integrities”, then “the possibilities of a natural complex are those traits which define its contour (or any of its integrities) in so far as this contour is to continue or to be extended”, “every trait defines, and a possibility is one kind of defining” (ibid., 161–162). Buchler also uses the term “prefinition” to embrace “both extension or continuation” of a natural complex, “a possibility is an extension of a complex – an extension prefined” (ibid., 165).<sup>3</sup> The contour of the natural complex “Lucy” in-

cludes traits that could have brought her to the order of hallucinations as well as traits that are constituent of the complexes of ‘real-life characters’ and ‘real people’. How is this possible?

#### “Christina’s World” Gives the Clue

In Kaufman’s movie, during a weird conversation at the dinner table at Jake’s parents’ house, Lucy makes a reference to the famous painting “Christina’s World” (1948) by Andrew Wyeth:

YOUNG WOMAN

I try to imbue my work with a kind of interiority.

FATHER

Interiority. So you paint insides? I thought...

YOUNG WOMAN

Inside my head. So a landscape would attempt to express how I’m feeling at the time: lonely, joyous, worried, sad.

MOTHER

That sounds very interesting. Like that painting of that girl sitting in a field looking at a house.

YOUNG WOMAN

Christina’s world. Wyeth. Yes. Exactly [...] (Kaufman 2019, 46–47).

The visual illusion that the painting by Andrew Wyeth creates, as well as the story of its creation, contributes to the understanding of the nature of the natural complex that the character Lucy exemplifies in the movie and that is a distinctive type of cinematic image that film theories to date cannot embrace and explain. “Christina’s World,” a tempera work that is part of New York MOMA’s permanent collection, depicts a woman in the field looking up at a farmhouse on the horizon. The woman, Anna Christina Olson, suffered from a degenerative muscular disorder and used to crawl in the grounds around her house instead of using a wheelchair. Wyeth, who had a summer home in the area, saw Christina crawling and, inspired, created the painting. The impression that the female figure produces is dubious; at first it seems that the woman is young and then the viewer realizes that the situation is, in fact, the opposite. In

<sup>3</sup> It seems that Deleuze was thinking if not within the same lines then at least in a similar direction, when he argued that “The cinema does not just present images, it surrounds them with a

world. This is why, very early on, it looked for bigger and bigger circuits which would unite an actual image with recollection-images, dream-images and world-images” (Deleuze 1989, 68).

1948, Olson was 55. However, the visual illusion has a basis: Wyeth used two models, Christina Olsen and his wife Betsy, who was then 25. While the distorted limbs and pink dress belong to Christina, the head and the torso belong to Betsy.

The ambiguity is built into the Kaufman's movie. The natural complex "Lucy" does not change its ordinal locations – it does not move from the order of hallucinations and dreams to the order of real-life characters in the consensus reality. Its contour and its integrity allow the simultaneous existence of both of them since the ambiguity is the prevailing trait in the natural complex "Lucy," thus allowing it. And this is not an ambiguity caused by an uncertainty over which interpretation to choose. It is, on the contrary, an ambiguity that arises from the clearness of its nature. Other natural complexes in Kaufman's film that undergo transformations in the course of the movie – Jake, Lucy, Jake's parents, their house where Jake spent his young years – do not just experience change. They presuppose a continuous fluctuation and alteration of their traits, in the first place the traits that are connected to the complex's position on the time-line in Jake's fantasies, and to their status in relation to the viewer's perception. They balance between complexes that belong to the order of consensus reality and those that belong to the order of mental construction. Their 'agency' status also balances between complexes that belong to the order of agents and manipulators and the order of manipulated objects. Thus, the ambiguous status of these complexes becomes their intrinsic attribute, a trait. So, Kaufman made a film that is filled with cinematic images of a puzzling nature that the film theories of Gilles Deleuze and his follower Patricia Pisters cannot explain, while Justus Buchler's theory, supported by John Ryder's insights, can.

In "I'm Thinking of Ending Things," the characters, the space, and the time are controversial at various stages of their metamorphoses. According to Buchler, "contradiction is always ordinal, located by the orders of the complex as much as by the order of logic" (Wallace 2004, 277). I would say that contradiction, as well as ambiguity, is built

into Kaufman's cinematography in general, and "I'm Thinking of Ending Things" is one of the examples. I would also say that these traits are markers of a new kind of cinematic image that comes to replace dream-images and neuro-images. Buchler uses the category of alecscence to express "the idea that a complex is altering its location in (or to or from) an order" (Wallace 2004, 275). It is possible to say that in the midst of the given prevalence of cinematic images linked to mental states, there is an alecscence that Kaufman's cinematic images reflect. For an alecscence to be regarded as "complete", it needs to "be regarded as prevalence in some order" (Buchler 1990, 59). What, then, is that order?

### Ordinality and Metamodernism

My claim is that that order is metamodernism. "I'm Thinking of Ending Things" presents such an attractive case for discussion because Charlie Kaufman is in the midst of artistic efforts shaping what is called metamodern art. The attempts to formulate a theory that explains contemporary culture, which is often awkwardly called 'post-postmodernism,' led to the emergence of the term 'metamodernism'. Metamodernism is understood in the first place as "a structure of feeling that emerges from, and reacts to, the postmodern as much as it is a cultural logic that corresponds to today's stage of global capitalism," and it is "developed through a systematic reading of dominant tendencies in contemporary artistic and cultural production rather than isolated or dated phenomena" (Akker; Gibbons; Vermeulen 2017, 5). Metamodernism is characterized by such traits as oscillation, "meta", with or among, between, after, super-hybridity, historicity, affect, structure of feeling, depth, new sincerity, postirony, post-truth. For my argument, probably, the most important is oscillation, which is the most crucial characteristic of the contemporary 'structure of feeling.' Oscillation is understood as "betweenness," it is "an oscillating in-betweenness or, rather, a dialectical movement that identifies with and negates – and hence, overcomes and undermines – conflicting positions, while



being never congruent with these positions (keeping being with or among in check)" (ibid., 10). The prefix 'meta' in the term 'metamodernism' originates from the Platonic notion of metaxy in the *Symposium*, which he used to describe a sense of in-betweenness (ibid.).

Charlie Kaufman, when he creates the types of cinematic images that have been discussed, images that as natural complexes have ambiguity in their structure (not just in their perception) in fact creates *oscillation*. And oscillation as a trait prevails in his cinema and in cinema of metamodernism in general. The discussion of the Andrew Wyeth's painting ends with the following exchange between the characters:

YOUNG WOMAN

Christina's world. Wyeth. Yes. Exactly. But without people.

FATHER

How can a picture of a field be sad without a sad person looking sad in the field? (Kaufman 2019, 46–47).

Lucy's idea is not absurd. Neither is Jake's father question. It is known that,

Wyeth felt that the painting would have been more successful without the figure in the field. He remarked to an interviewer, "When I was painting 'Christina's World' I would sit there by the hours working on the grass, and I began to feel I was really out in the field. I got lost in the texture of the thing. I remember going down into the field and grabbing up a section of earth and setting it on the base of my easel. It wasn't a painting I was working on. I was actually working on the ground itself."<sup>4</sup>

Kaufman thus links Lucy to Wyeth in her desire to paint this painting without a human figure. By doing this he

queries the forms of artistic expressions in the art of metamodernism. And Justus Buchler and John Ryder provide a framework for these queries.

## References

- Akker, Robin van den; Gibbons, Alison; Vermeulen, Timotheus. 2017. *Metamodernism: Historicity, Affect, Depth, after Postmodernism*. London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Buchler, Justus. 1990. *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*. Second, expanded edition. Eds. Kathleen Wallace, Armen Marsoobian, with Robert S. Corrington. SUNY Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1986. *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1989. *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kaufman, Charlie. 2019. *I'm Thinking of Ending Things*. Screenplay. Based on the novel by Iain Reid. <https://script-pdf.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/im-thinking-of-ending-things-script-pdf.pdf>
- Kohn, Eric; Kaufman, Charlie. 2020. "Charlie Kaufman's Guide to 'I'm Thinking of Ending Things': The Director Explains Its Mysteries". <https://www.indiewire.com/2020/09/charlie-kaufman-explains-im-thinking-of-ending-things-1234584492/>
- Pisters, Patricia. 2012. *The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press (Cultural Memory in the Present).
- Ryder, John. 1980. "Buchler's Ordinal Metaphysics and Process Theology," with Peter H. Hare. *Process Studies*, Vol. 10, Nos. 3/4, December.
- Ryder, John. 2012. "The Ontology of Santa Claus: 'Miracle on 34th Street'," *International Journal of Cultural Research*, Vol. 2, No. 7, July. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/the-ontology-of-santa-claus-miracle-on-34th-street/viewer>

<sup>4</sup> "Andrew Wyeth". *The Art Story*. <https://www.theartstory.org/artist/wyeth-andrew/>