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ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ

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**ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ КОМИТЕТ ОБОРОНЫ И ПРОДОВОЛЬСТВЕННАЯ
ПРОБЛЕМА ЛЕНИНГРАДА: ИЮЛЬ-СЕНТЯБРЬ 1941 Г.
STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND FOOD PROBLEM OF LENINGRAD:
JULY – SEPTEMBER 1941**

Аннотация: после начала Великой Отечественной войны 22 июня 1941 г. для Ленинграда проблема с продовольствием не имела большого значения. Однако по мере стремительного продвижения немецких войск к Ленинграду, в августе 1941 г. в продовольственном вопросе города наметилась тенденция нарастания голода. В статье рассматриваются действия ГКО в решении надвигающейся продовольственной проблемы Ленинграда в 1941 г. до установления полной блокады 8 сентября.

Abstract: after the beginning of the great Patriotic war on June 22, 1941, the problem with food did not matter much for Leningrad. However, as the rapid advance of German troops to

Leningrad, in August 1941 in the food issue of the city there was a tendency to increase hunger. The article deals with the actions of the GKO in solving the impending food problem of Leningrad in 1941 before the establishment of a complete blockade on September 8.

Ключевые слова: государственный комитет обороны, блокада Ленинграда, комиссия ГКО, продовольственная проблема

Keywords: the state Committee of defense, the siege of Leningrad, Commission of GKO, food problem

Since the establishment of the land blockade of Leningrad by the German troops on September 8, 1941, the problem of providing food for the troops defending Leningrad and the city's residents has become one of the key issues for the top leadership of the USSR. This issue became particularly acute in the autumn-winter of 1941, when the food situation for Leningrad residents in the city was particularly difficult due to a significant decrease in the norms for issuing bread. Aware of the ruinous nature of the situation for the besieged city, the GKO tried in 1941 to solve this problem as soon as possible and establish food supplies to besieged Leningrad, which could at least compensate for the minimal needs of the city's residents and its defenders. To achieve this goal, first water transport was organized, and then, after the establishment of solid ice, automobile communication (Military highway No. 101 (No. 102)) through lake Ladoga, through which much-needed food was delivered to besieged Leningrad. This route was later called the «Road of Life».

Since the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941, the GKO and its members have been paying attention to Leningrad and the Soviet troops defending its distant approaches. However, it was not so special, since the GKO had to solve more important tasks that arose in other sections of the Soviet-German front. But the situation that developed on the near approaches to Leningrad in mid-August caused extreme concern and increased attention from the GKO, rather than what it was before. August 19, 1941 Novgorod fell under the blows of German troops, and on August 25 – Lyuban, thereby cutting the railway connection between Leningrad and Moscow on the October railway. After that, the German troops aimed directly at Leningrad itself, which was only about 100 kilometers away. A possible threat of rapid capture by German troops hung over the city. The critical situation that had developed around Leningrad and its inhabitants required a number of decisive and rapid measures to stabilize it on the part of the highest Executive authorities of the USSR. To resolve the current difficult situation, on August 26, the GKO decided to send a GKO Commission to Leningrad consisting of: Deputy Chairman of the GKO T. Molotov V. M., member of the GKO T. Malenkov G. M., people's Commissar of the Navy T. Kuznetsova N. G., Deputy Chairman of the Council of people's Commissars of the USSR T. Kosygin A. N., commander of the red Army air force T. Zhigarev P. F. and chief of Artillery of the red Army T. Voronova N. N. (GKO resolution No. 586-SS. (mandate)). The purpose of the GKO Commission, which has extraordinary powers, was to consider and resolve, together with the Military Council of the Main Command of the North – Western direction and The military Council of the Leningrad front, all issues related to the defense of Leningrad, as well as issues related to the evacuation of enterprises and the population of the city. During the Commission's stay from August 26 to August 29, members of the GKO considered issues related to strengthening the defense of Leningrad and approved a plan for 10 days to evacuate a number of enterprises and part of the city's population from Leningrad [1, P.37]. Of the Commission, the most significant role in it was held by GKO member G. M. Malenkov, who was appointed responsible GKO for Leningrad. He later, as a representative of the GKO, played a significant role in the participation of the GKO in the defense of Leningrad in 1941.

Arriving in Leningrad, the GKO Commission immediately revealed the fact that the direct leadership of Leningrad had made a number of serious mistakes and miscalculations in the management of the city's defense. So according to one of the members of the GKO Commission, the chief of Artillery of the red Army N. N. According to Voronov, this provision was due to the fact that some persons responsible for the defense of Leningrad, instead of directly performing their functions of leading the defense of the city, arranged a huge number of unnecessary meetings to resolve any issue that arose and, moreover, more than once simultaneously combined several positions in military councils, although they should not have done this [2, P.202].

Among other things, the GKO Commission also revealed that the leadership of Leningrad made a number of major mistakes in solving the food problem, which became the most acute in the current military situation around the city. The leaders of Leningrad at that time were not fully aware of the disastrous consequences that could result from the lack of food resources in the city and its residents. By the time of the beginning of the great Patriotic war, the amount of food reserves in Leningrad was relatively small. So on June 21, 1941 the warehouses of the city had: flour and grain – for 52 days, cereals for 89 days, meat – for 38 days, animal oil – for 47 days, vegetable oil – for 29 days [3, P. 200]. Fortunately, such a small supply of food was fully compensated by delivering up to 250 wagons with food cargo to the city every day [4, P. 90]. However, the food situation in Leningrad began to deteriorate rapidly as the German-fascist troops advanced towards Leningrad. This situation was due to a number of factors:

First, the daily consumption of food in Leningrad has increased significantly due to the increase in the number of residents of the city due to the refugees arriving in it, compared to what it was at the beginning of the great Patriotic war;

Secondly, Leningrad lost the opportunity to make food supplies at the expense of the harvest from a number of areas adjacent to it, which were captured by the German-fascist troops. So in 1941, only 37,844 tons of vegetables and fruits were delivered to Leningrad, although a year earlier 414,948 tons of vegetables and fruits were delivered to the city [4, P. 91].

In the current difficult food situation, the leadership of Leningrad had to set strict standards for the consumption of food supplies in the city. However, instead, the city allowed commercial trade in food at increased prices, which was stopped only by September 1. This led to the fact that the food reserves of Leningrad at the end of August 1941 were in the most critical situation. This was reflected on August 29 in their message about the availability of basic food products in Leningrad via HF communication to I. V. Stalin, members of the state budget Committee. So on August 27 in Leningrad there were: flour and grain-for 17 days, cereals-for 29 days, fish-for 16 days, meat-for 25 days, animal oil-for 29 days. To stabilize this critical food situation, members of the GKO Commission proposed to take a number of measures: to normalize the release of eggs, tea and matches; to stop commercial trade in food in Leningrad, and so on. One of these measures was to create a one-and-a-half-month supply of food products in the amount of 173,300 tons of food in Leningrad by October 1.

To deliver this amount of food, it was necessary to establish a transport supply of Leningrad with the rest of the country, either by rail or by water through lake Ladoga. But rapidly changing events on the front of the defense of Leningrad forced the GKO to abandon the establishment of a land option for delivering food to Leningrad. On August 30, German troops captured the Mga station and cut the last railway connecting Leningrad with the rest of the country, thus partially interrupting land communication between Leningrad and the USSR. In this situation, the GKO began to take a number of measures aimed at stabilizing such a critical situation for Leningrad:

First, the GKO entrusted the direct management of food supply in Leningrad to the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of people's Commissars A. I. Mikoyan [4, P. 92].

Second, the bills decided to establish supply of the city by water via lake Ladoga. For this purpose, on August 30, the GKO decided to allocate 75 lake barges to ensure food supplies to Leningrad, while ensuring that they ply 12 barges daily with cargo from the Lodeynoye Pole pier to Leningrad (GKO resolution No. 604 – SS.). In Addition to food, a tanker was allocated to transport fuel, which was in acute shortage in the city.

Also, according to the GKO resolution No. 604-SS., the NKPS ordered eight routes with food to be sent to the Lodeynoye Pole station every day, starting from August 31. This provision was somewhat late, because it could not be fulfilled, since Leningrad was already under partial blockade. And with the capture of Shlisselburg on September 8, 1941, the German troops of the army group "North" completely interrupted the land communication of Leningrad with the rest of the USSR and closed the blockade ring around the city. For Leningrad, only the waterway of communication through lake Ladoga remained, which would later become the famous «Road of Life». Further, goods could be delivered along the Neva river by rail, because they could not be transported along the Neva river itself due to the fact that German troops reached the river on August 30 and shelled its fairway.

It is worth noting that the actions of the GKO to solve the problem of impending famine in Leningrad and its inhabitants in July and August were far from effective, despite a certain energetic focus. In many ways, they were late. However, this was due to the constantly changing negative situation on the near approaches to Leningrad and the miscalculations of local leaders in providing the city with the necessary amount of daily food. All this led to the tragic consequences of a General famine that occurred in the city shortly after the establishment of its blockade on September 8, 1941.

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ЛИТЕРАТУРНЫЕ ПРЕДПОЧТЕНИЯ ДВУХ ПОКОЛЕНИЙ TWO GENERATION LITERARY PREFERENCES

Аннотация: в данном исследовании рассматривается проблематика литературных предпочтений молодежи 80-90х гг и 2000х гг. На основе разведывательного исследования определено общее и особенное в их литературных предпочтениях на современном этапе.

Abstract: this study examines the problem of literary preferences of young people in the 80-90s and 2000s. On the basis of intelligence research, the general and specific in their literary preferences at the present stage have been determined.

Ключевые слова: литературные предпочтения, молодежь, чтение, жанровые предпочтения, анкетирование.

Keywords: Literary preferences, youth, reading, genre preferences, questionnaires.

В настоящее время существует точка зрения, что читательская активность молодежи постепенно снижается, соответственно, эта проблема начинает беспокоить широкий круг научных работников: культурологов, педагогов, библиотечников, книгоиздателей, социологов. Приведем примеры нескольких публикаций, которые актуальны для нашего исследования.

В работе Т. Б. Ловковой говорится о жанровых предпочтениях современного поколения. Она подчеркивает, что большинство молодежи предпочитает фэнтези, приключения, мелодрамы, детективы, триллеры и мистику. Исходя из вышесказанного, мы можем сделать вывод, что молодежь читает, в основном, ради развлечения, так как перечисленные выше литературные жанры носят преимущественно развлекательный характер [3, с.127].