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**ДЕЙСТВИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО КОМИТЕТА ОБОРОНЫ  
В РАЗРЕШЕНИИ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ГОЛОДА В БЛОКАДНОМ ЛЕНИНГРАДЕ:  
СЕНТЯБРЬ-ДЕКАБРЬ 1941 Г.**

**ACTIONS OF THE STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM  
OF FAMINE IN BLOCADED LENINGRAD: SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1941**

**Аннотация:** 8 сентября 1941 г. вокруг Ленинграда сомкнулось кольцо блокады. С этого момента сообщение города с остальной страной поддерживалось теперь только воздушным путем и по Ладожскому озеру. Над Ленинградом и его жителями нависла угроза голодной смерти. В связи с этим ГКО стал предпринимать действия для разрешения проблемы возникшего голода и спасения осажденного города. Статья посвящена их анализу.

**Abstract:** on September 8, 1941, a blockade was closed around Leningrad. From that moment on, the communication of the city with the rest of the country was now supported only by air and along Lake Ladoga. The threat of starvation hung over Leningrad and its inhabitants. In this regard, the State Defense Committee began to take actions to resolve the problem of the resulting famine and save the besieged city. The article is devoted to their analysis.

**Ключевые слова:** Блокада Ленинграда, Государственный комитет обороны, Дорога Жизни, проблема голода.

**Keywords:** Blockade of Leningrad, State Defense Committee, Road of Life, the problem of hunger.

At the beginning of September 1941, the threat of starvation hung over Leningrad, because the food supplies in the besieged city, as mentioned earlier, were not designed for a long time. In this regard, in order to save them, the Council of people's Commissars of the USSR on September 1 decided to reduce the grain standards for workers – up to 600 g, employees – up to 400 g, dependents and children – up to 300 g [1, p. 145]. However, these measures could not radically change the current difficult situation with food for Leningrad residents. After all, despite the adoption of a number of measures to save food resources, their supply was still very limited. On September 6, the city residents had flour for 14 days, cereals for 23 days, meat and meat products for 19 days, and fat for 21 days [2, pp. 46-47]. This difficult situation for Leningrad residents was aggravated by the fire at the Badaevsky warehouses (September 8-10). It destroyed: about 5 million kg of sugar, 360 thousand kg of bran, 18, 5 thousand kg of rye, 45, 5 thousand kg of peas, more than 286 thousand kg of vegetable oil, 10, 5 thousand kg of animal oil, about 3 thousand kg of pasta and 2 thousand kg. Flour [3, P. 139]. In modern historiography, there is no consensus on how much would be enough stocks stored in Badayev warehouses. According to some researchers, the fire at the Badayevsky warehouses could not have caused significant damage to food supplies in the besieged city. However, in connection with this event, a legend arose in besieged Leningrad that there were a lot of food supplies in the Badaevsky warehouses and they would have been enough for a long time. According to Leningraders, it was the fire at the Badaevsky warehouses that led to a ferocious famine in besieged Leningrad in the winter of 1941-1942.

Aware of the threat posed to the residents of Leningrad by the current situation, the GKO took a number of tough and decisive measures to stabilize the situation in the city. So on September 10, the GKO resolution No. 651-SS was adopted ("on the appointment of Pavlov D. V. as the authorized representative of the State defense Committee for the supply of food to the troops of the Leningrad front and the population of Leningrad, and Kokushkin D. F. as his assistant"). The decree stated: "to control the correct expenditure of food resources intended for the supply of the population of the city of Leningrad and military units of the Leningrad front and timely reporting of t-bills on the facts of violation in the economy prodresurs, establishes the office of Commissioner of t-bills to supply the city of Leningrad and armies of the Leningrad front". D. V. Pavlov, people's Commissar of Trade of

the RSFSR, was appointed Commissioner of the GKO, and D. F. Kokushkin was appointed his assistant for supplying troops with food. With the help of these measures, the GKO established increased control over the distribution of food to the city's population, since this was necessary in conditions of limited food supplies in the besieged Leningrad. The GKO resolution No. 651-SS. shows that the GKO attached great importance not only to supplying the troops defending the city, but also to providing food to the civilians of Leningrad.

After the appointment, the GKO Commissioner D. V. Pavlov and the leadership of Leningrad began to take a number of measures to stabilize the food situation in the besieged city. So on September 10-11, 1941, they carried out a new accounting of food products, which showed that by September 12 in besieged Leningrad there were: stocks of flour and bread-for 35 days, cereals and pasta – for 30 days, meat and meat products-for 33 days, fat-for 45 days, sugar and confectionery – for 60 days [4, p. 43]. Based on this, the military Council of the Leningrad front on September 11 decided "in order to save food products" to again lower the norms for issuing food to the population: bread-to workers from 600 to 500 g., employees and children – to 300 g., and dependents – to 250 g. These rules, according to the leadership of Leningrad and the authorized GKO D. V. Pavlov, should have allowed to extend the time of using the limited food supply until the food situation in the blocked city improves in the future. Unfortunately, however, this was almost impossible to do in 1941.

In September-October 1941, despite a series of harsh measures designed to stabilize the food situation in the besieged city, the situation for the Leningrad people remained critical. Food was delivered to besieged Leningrad in September – December only by water transport through lake Ladoga. This supply route was fraught with a number of difficulties. This is often a storm on Lake Ladoga and the German air attacks on transport convoys of food. Therefore, not all food shipments sent to besieged Leningrad were delivered to their destination. Besides, the work on food distribution in the besieged city was complicated as the lack on the Western coast of Lake Ladoga equipped jetties and berths for receiving and unloading cargo and small cargo fleet, capable of carrying food items, because the bulk of the river vessels of the Ladoga shipping company was in internal waters of the Leningrad region and on the Svir river [1, P. 202]. Despite the fact that 9,800 tons of food were delivered to besieged Leningrad during the first month of the autumn navigation on lake Ladoga, these supplies were clearly not enough for besieged Leningrad. They compensated only a part of the daily food needs of the besieged city, and the besieged Leningrad and its residents only needed 1,100 tons of flour per day. The critical nature of the situation is particularly emphasized by the certificate of October 17 addressed to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the head of the Leningrad party organization, a member of the Military Councils of the Northern and Leningrad fronts. A. Zhdanov. It indicated that if the consumption rate of bread was reduced for the city's population, the troops of the Leningrad front and the KBF, from October 20, there would be enough food for only 26 days, or until November 11. And in early November 1941, the food situation in the besieged city became even more critical. After all, on November 9, Leningrad itself had: flour – for 7 days, cereals – for 8 days, fat – for 14 days [4, p. 104]. At the same time, in early November, the first Leningrad residents with dystrophy, a disease caused by constant malnutrition, began to appear in Leningrad hospitals. All this caused deep concern among the top leadership of Leningrad and the USSR, which was aware of the ruinous nature of the situation. Due to such a limited food supply in the besieged Leningrad, The military Council of the Leningrad front decided to lower the norms for issuing bread and meat for the troops defending Leningrad and for the sailors of the Baltic fleet from November 9, 1941. However, these measures could not in any way radically correct this difficult food situation. Pavlov, the Commissioner of the GKO for providing the population of Leningrad and the front troops with food, recalled this time: "Bread was coming to an end. Time began to work against the besieged. No matter how hard and painful it was, we had to reduce the distribution of bread to the population" [5, p. 155]. Due to such a critical food situation, GKO strenuously sought measures to increase the tonnage of food delivered to the city. One of these measures was the establishment of air links between Leningrad and the rest of the country. As early as September 20, 1941. GKO decided to establish an air transport link with Leningrad (GKO resolution No. 692-SS.). According to this resolution, the Civil air fleet was required to establish the volume of various cargo, including food, transported by air, in

the amount of 100 tons per day until October 1, and after – 150 tons per day. However, these cargo deliveries were still not enough to improve the food situation in the city. Therefore, on November 9, the GKO adopted the GKO resolution No. 871-SS. the responsible GKO for Leningrad G. M. took an Active part in the implementation of this resolution. Malenkov, who coordinated the actions of the GKO with the top leadership of Leningrad [6, p. 78].

According to the GKO decree No. 871 – SS. to increase the transport of food by air bridge to Leningrad for five days had to be allocated a special aviation group, consisting of 24 transport aircraft "Douglas" and 10 aircraft TB – 3. Besides delivering food to besieged Leningrad, the purpose of this panel was the removal of valuable goods from the besieged city. Also, the aviation group was assigned the task of delivering 200 tons of various products to the besieged city every day, because the fate of many Leningrad residents depended on the work of the aviation group. So for all its time, from September 13 to the end of 1941, a special aviation group managed to deliver 4,325 tons of food to besieged Leningrad. Despite this, unfortunately, its work has not been able to significantly stabilize the food situation in the besieged city. This was due to a number of factors:

Firstly, the amount of food delivered daily by the air group to Leningrad was not enough to cover even the average daily food consumption in the besieged city;

Secondly, the work of the aviation group itself was, in my opinion, not effective enough. Unfortunately, not all planes reached their destination, due to the fact that they were often shot down by German aircraft, which dominated the air over Ladoga. In addition, the work of the aviation group was partially slowed down by the Chairman of the GKO, I. V. Stalin, who believed that Douglas-type aircraft were needed in more important areas of the Soviet-German front;

Based on the above, the leadership of Leningrad and the GKO Commissioner for providing the population of Leningrad and the front troops with food, D. V. Pavlov, clearly realized the importance of establishing a strong connection between the besieged Leningrad and the rest of the country by water, and then by the ice of lake Ladoga. After all, most of the food supplies for Leningrad were located just on the Eastern shore of lake Ladoga. In the conditions of the beginning of ice on lake Ladoga from November 10, it was necessary to reduce the supply of food by water. This factor only further aggravated the difficult food situation in the besieged city. So November 19, 1941 The military Council of the Leningrad front decided on another reduction in food standards in Leningrad. So under the new standards, workers began to receive 250 g of bread, and employees, dependents and children – only 125 g of bread. This led to a mass famine in the besieged city, which caused an increase in mortality in Leningrad.

Realizing the destructiveness of the situation, on 19 November 1941, a member of the Military Council of the front A. A. Zhdanov and commander of the Leningrad front, M. S. Khozin decided "to oblige the head of logistics of the Leningrad front Leningrad front rear F. I. Lagunova, Leningrad Executive Committee Chairman P. S. Popkov and major – General A. M. Shilov to organize tractor road across Lake Ladoga, with a daily throughput of at least 100 tons of food products". Following these instructions, the Ladoga road management managed to send the first horse – drawn wagon train with 63 tons of flour to Osinovets on November 21. The next day, on November 22, the first 60 GAZ – AA vehicles loaded with food passed through the ice of lake Ladoga. It was November 22, according to the memoirs of the military Commissar of the Ladoga military highway I. V. Shikin, that became the «birthday» of the famous «Road of Life» [7, p. 81]. Only after this event, on November 24, 1941, The military Council of the Leningrad front turned to the Chairman of the GKO I. V. Stalin with a request to authorize the construction and operation of an ice road through lake Ladoga with a total cargo turnover in both directions of 2000 tons per day [8, p. 235].

According to the memoirs of Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the USSR and member of t-bills (3 February 1942), A. I. Mikoyan, Chairman of the SCG had agreed to her arrangement, but it drew the attention of the leadership of Leningrad that the work of the ice road can not, in General, to solve the food problem in the besieged city and the only means to establish regular and reliable food supply of Leningrad is the need to break through the ring of the German army. And, indeed, it was absolutely impossible to call the work of the ice road successful. After all, for November and December to 1941 only 325 tons of food were delivered daily on the ice road, which could not improve the situation with it in the besieged city. However, the beginning of the ice road across lake Ladoga gave Leningrad residents hope for a possible improvement in their food situation.

Unfortunately, the Road of Life, which had just begun its work, could not immediately solve the problem of famine that raged in besieged Leningrad. This was due to the fact that her work was influenced by several unfavorable factors: The ice road was not facilitated by the changeable weather that prevailed On lake Ladoga. It made it very difficult to transport food to the besieged city. And the ice track itself was not fully equipped. This not only slowed down the pace of transportation of food cargo on the ice of lake Ladoga, but also did not allow to increase the number of transported food products, which was necessary for the Besieged Leningrad;

These and other difficult tasks faced the leadership of the GKO and the leadership of Leningrad in late 1941 and early 1942, and they had to be resolved as soon as possible. They will be able to overcome all the difficulties of the ice road only in the winter of 1942.

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**СОСТОЯНИЕ ТОРГОВЛИ И ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО ПИТАНИЯ  
В ПОСЛЕВОЕННЫЕ ГОДЫ  
THE STATE OF TRADE AND CATERING IN THE POST-WAR YEARS**

**Аннотация:** в статье рассматривается состояние торговли и системы общественного питания в послевоенных условиях. Авторы проанализировали значение данных сфер экономики для населения страны, охарактеризовали сложности в их восстановлении. Особое внимание авторами обращено на значение развития сферы обслуживания для повышения уровня благосостояния народа.

**Abstract:** the article describes the state of trade and public catering systems in the post-war conditions. The authors analyzed the importance of these sectors of the economy for the population of the country, characterized the difficulties in their restoration. The authors pay special attention to the importance of the development of the service sector for improving the well-being of the people.