

oil products in the sea. The matter is that the surface of the water of the Kola Bay, which, in its turn, is an important transport highway, is covered with oil stains, the banks are smeared, and all this is covered with a layer of household waste on top. The oil film covering the Kola Bay is already visible from space. The type of the form of this conflict of nature management is areal, the degree of complexity is a multiple conflict, the manifestation is actually existing, the dynamics is also increasing, the duration of the development is short-term, the intensity is moderate, the nature of the borders is uncertain [3].

And as a final conflict of nature management, the process of unloading coal at the commercial port in the center of Murmansk should be studied. The source of the conflict is the fuel industry, the object is the unloading of coal. The content of this conflict implies that the unloading of coal leads to such an amount of coal dust that in the spring, when the snow melts, it is possible to extract coal on an industrial scale in Murmansk itself. The type of the form of this conflict is point – based, the degree of complexity is a pair conflict, the manifestation is actually existing, the dynamics is stable, the duration of the development is year-round, the intensity is moderate, the nature of the borders is uncertain [3].

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ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ

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ДЕЙСТВИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО КОМИТЕТА ОБОРОНЫ ПО ЭВАКУАЦИИ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТИ ИЗ ЛЕНИНГРАДА: СЕНТЯБРЬ – ДЕКАБРЬ 1941 Г. ACTIONS OF THE STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO EVACUATE INDUSTRY FROM LENINGRAD: SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 1941

Аннотация: в сентябре 1941 г., сухопутная связь с Ленинградом была прервана. В городе находилось большое количество различных заводов и предприятий, выпускавших важную военную продукцию для страны, в том числе и уникальную. Статья посвящена анализу действий ГКО по эвакуации ленинградской промышленности.

Abstract: in September 1941, land communication with Leningrad was interrupted. The city was home to a large number of different factories and enterprises that produced important military products for the country, including unique ones. The article is devoted to the analysis of the actions of the GKO on the evacuation of the Leningrad industry.

Ключевые слова: Блокада Ленинграда, Государственный комитет обороны (ГКО), Дорога Жизни, эвакуация, ленинградская промышленность

Keywords: Blockade of Leningrad, State Defense Committee (GKO), Road of Life, evacuation, Leningrad industry

One of the key problems for GKO for the defense of Leningrad in 1941 was the planning and implementation of the evacuation from Leningrad of both its residents and those Leningrad military enterprises, factories, and their personnel that produced military products for the Soviet troops. In 1941, the GKO paid special attention to the evacuation of the civilian population from Leningrad. However, the GKO more closely followed the evacuation of the Leningrad military enterprises from the city. This provision reflects the subject of the decisions of the State Defense Committee on the evacuation of Leningrad in 1941. Most of them were devoted to the evacuation of strategic industrial enterprises from the city to the interior of the country. However, this does not mean that the GKO did not want to contribute to the evacuation of Leningrad residents by its actions. To achieve this goal, on June 27, the Leningrad City Evacuation Commission (Chairman B. M. Motylev) and the commission of the Leningrad City Executive Committee (E. T. Fedorova) were organized. Their competence included the organization and conduct of the evacuation of Leningrad residents from Leningrad. Also active in this direction was the Evacuation Council under the SNK of the USSR, headed by L. M. Kaganovich (July 3, 1941, N. M. Shvernik became chairman of the Evacuation Council under the SNK of the USSR instead of him), which was created on June 24, 1941 and was responsible for the evacuation of the most threatened areas of the USSR. Thus, thanks to their actions, from the beginning of the siege of Leningrad to the beginning of the mass evacuation of the civilian population from the besieged city in early 1942, 104,711 people were evacuated to the «Mainland» [1, p. 84].

The GKO itself focused its attention on the evacuation of the Leningrad military enterprises. And it was no coincidence. After all, in 1941, Leningrad remained one of the largest military-industrial complexes of the USSR. The percentage of Leningrad took the second place in terms of gross industrial production of military products after Moscow. Also, Leningrad enterprises produced about a quarter of the heavy engineering products and over a third of the electrical products of the USSR. [2, p. 151]. The products of the Leningrad military factories had a significant impact on improving the defense capability of the Soviet troops, not only on the fronts that covered Leningrad itself, but also on other sections of the Soviet-German fronts of 1941. In this regard, according to some researchers, the German command attached great importance to the capture of the city on the Neva, because it planned to deprive the Soviet troops of the types of military equipment produced at the Leningrad factories [3, p. 13].

At the beginning of 1941, a critical situation developed on the front of the Soviet troops covering Leningrad. Quickly taking possession of the Baltic States, by July 12, the German troops reached the Luzhsky fortified area and were stopped there. However, realizing the possibility of breaking the Luga defence and of withdrawal of German troops directly on the immediate outskirts of Leningrad, GKO began to take a number of measures for the evacuation of the most important companies and industry government of Leningrad in the interior of the country.

So on July 11, 1941, the GKO decided to approve, submitted by the Evacuation Council, a plan for the mass evacuation of industrial enterprises from Leningrad (GKO resolution No. 99-ss.). According to this resolution, 90 Leningrad factories were subject to evacuation within 5-7 days, except for those that fulfilled current urgent military orders and were under special control of the GKO. To solve this problem, the GKO ordered the people's Commissariat to allocate 40 940 cars. Direct control over the implementation of the GKO resolution was assigned to the Evacuation Council, which was headed by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars A. N. Kosygin. In my opinion, this resolution shows that the actions of the State Defense Committee to organize the mass evacuation of industrial enterprises in this period of time were most likely impulsive and biased. Unfortunately, it was almost impossible to evacuate a large number of factories from Leningrad together with equipment and personnel in such a short time, despite a number of circumstances that could contribute to this. Therefore, the mass evacuation of industrial enterprises from the city will take place almost throughout the entire siege of Leningrad, but some factories will not be evacuated from the besieged Leningrad.

The State Defense Committee, realizing that it would not be able to evacuate most of Leningrad's industry in a short time, began to take measures to evacuate the most important military enterprises and military institutions of the city. So on July 20, the GKO decided to begin the evacuation of institutions and enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the Navy from Leningrad (GKO resolution No. 214 – ss.). This decision Narcomoeba ordered within 10 days to evacuate from the city, some schools: research and the military Committee of the Navy, research Institute of communications research, artillery, torpedo and chemical testing institutions, as well as documentation and equipment of the institutions. Continuing to act in the direction of the evacuation of higher naval educational institutions, the GKO decided on August 2 to begin the evacuation of naval educational institutions of the People's Commissariat of the Navy from Leningrad (GKO resolution No. 375 – ss.). According to this decree, 6 naval educational institutions and 9,750 people from their personnel were to be evacuated from Leningrad during the ten-day period. In my opinion, the relocation of higher maritime institutions from Leningrad to the interior of the country was far from accidental. These institutions trained young cadres for the Soviet Navy, on the professionalism of which the success of the outcome of the naval battles of the Soviet and German fleets in various areas of combat operations more than once depended.

Due to the fact that by August 13, the Luzhsky line was broken, the GKO was forced to speed up the evacuation of the most important military enterprises of the city from Leningrad. This provision is confirmed by 2 resolutions of the GKO of August 21, 1941. So, according to the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 537-ss. the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry had to immediately completely evacuate three aviation plants from Leningrad to Kazan and Molotov (Perm). To accomplish this goal, the people's Commissariat was to provide 2052 of the car. Also, the GKO decided on the same day to evacuate the Leningrad Molotov plant to the Urals (GKO resolution No. 540 – ss.), providing 200 cars for this purpose.

In 1941, in Leningrad, in addition to the construction of ships for the Baltic Fleet and the production of shells and mines for the front, some unique types of weapons of the USSR were also produced, for example, Soviet super-heavy tanks, which were a formidable force for the German troops. The only company that produced them since 1939 was the Kirov Plant, which was located directly in Leningrad itself. A number of historians note that the production of super-heavy tanks was one of the reasons why the German troops tried to capture Leningrad. They refer to the conversation of A. Hitler and his generals on August 4, 1941, at the headquarters of the army group «Center»: «...in this area there are a large number of industrial enterprises for the production of super-heavy tanks...» [4, p. 225]. Another of the most important Leningrad factories was the Izhora Factory, which produced armored hulls for tanks. Based on the fact that the German troops could seize the capacity of these factories and deprive the Red Army of strategically important super-heavy KV tanks, the GKO began to take a number of urgent measures to evacuate these enterprises to the interior of the country. So on July 30, the State Defense Committee decided to start transferring equipment from the Izhorsky Plant associated with the production of armored hulls and turrets for KV and T-50 tanks, and armored rolling machines to the East of the country – to Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk. (GKO resolution No. 330 – ss.). Along with the factories in the Urals, the personnel and their families who worked for them were to be evacuated. In order to implement this resolution, the GKO obliged the NKPS (People's Commissariat of Railways) to provide 4247 wagons and 12 transporters.

T-bills, dissatisfied with the pace of the ongoing evacuation of Leningrad military factories, decided August 26 to evacuate the Izhora and the Kirov military factories now in two stages: first to 50 % of the capacity by 10 September, the second the remaining equipment that was completely evacuated by 5 October. (GKO resolution No. 587-ss.). For the implementation of this resolution, the GKO of the NKPS of the USSR was supposed to allocate up to 9,000 railway cars.

In order to implement this resolution, the leadership of Leningrad on August 29 proposed a plan to evacuate some of the most important enterprises for a period of 10 days [5, p. 211]. It was planned to use 12,313 wagons for the export of equipment and workers of enterprises. However, unfortunately, this plan could not be implemented. This was due to the fact that the GKO on August 28 suddenly decided to cancel the evacuation of the Kirov and Izhora factories until further notice and leave their products directly at the disposal of the Leningrad Front (GKO resolution No. 596 –

ss.). In my opinion, this was due to the current critical situation in the Soviet troops defending Leningrad. After all, on August 20, German troops took Chudovo station, cutting the Oktyabrskaya Railway, which connected Leningrad with Moscow. Under the control of the Red Army on August 29, there was still a railway through the Mga station, along which it was possible to evacuate factories. But it had already been heavily bombed by German aircraft for several days. In addition, on the next day, August 30, the Mga was captured by German troops and after that the last opportunity to evacuate the plant's facilities by rail was lost. For some time, the evacuation of the Kirov and Izhora factories was postponed. This led to the fact that the military-industrial complex of Leningrad was almost paralyzed. One part of the equipment of the factories managed to be transported to the East of the country, the other was dismantled and shipped to railway cars. Thus, about 2,200 freight cars with equipment were left standing on the Leningrad railway tracks, ready to be sent for evacuation [6, p. 34]. This situation immediately affected the percentage of KV tanks produced, now arriving in much smaller numbers at the front of the troops defending Leningrad.

Despite the fact that the evacuation of the largest Kirov and Izhora factories was suspended, the evacuation of other industrial enterprises did not stop. So until October 1941, 86 large factories and enterprises were almost completely evacuated from the besieged Leningrad [7, p. 36]. This was facilitated by the establishment of a strong sea, and later land communication on the ice of Lake Ladoga Leningrad with the Mainland-the «Road of Life». Soon the evacuation of the Kirov and Izhora factories was resumed. This provision confirms the GKO resolution No. 734 – ss. On October 4, the GKO decided to begin the immediate evacuation of the tank equipment of the factories, along with its maintenance personnel, which was to be fully carried out by November 1. The production of KV tanks from the Kirov plant was moved to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, and the production of armored hulls for the Izhora Plant tanks to Uralmash. The evacuation of the plant's capacities was carried out in the most difficult conditions under constant raids on the ships of the LMF (Ladoga Military Flotilla) of the German aviation. However, the sailors of the LMF with honor fulfilled the task assigned to them to evacuate military factories. This provision confirms the fact that in late January – early January 1942, 85 KV tanks produced by factories that were evacuated to the Urals arrived on the ice of Lake Ladoga to the troops defending Leningrad [8, p. 111].

After October 4, 1941, we do not observe the decisions of the State Defense Committee in 1941 on the evacuation of strategic industrial enterprises from the besieged city. This indicates that the most important military enterprises were evacuated from Leningrad to the interior of the country and the task of preserving most of the Leningrad military industry, as an important component of the defense complex of the USSR, was completed.

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