

5. Котлер, Ф. Основы маркетинга / Ф. Котлер; Пер. с англ. – М.: Прогресс, 2000. – 815 с.
6. Мокшанцев, Р. И. Психология рекламы. / Р. И. Мокшанцев. – М.: ИНФРА-М, 2007. – 230 с.
7. Реклама в бизнесе: Уч. пособие/Сост. Серегина Т.К., Титкова Л.М., под общ. ред. Дашкова Л.П. – М.: Маркетинг, 2005. – 423 с.
8. Психология рекламы. А.Л.Швабская [Электронный ресурс]: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/psihologiya-reklamy/viewer> (дата обращения 12.03.2021)



ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ

УДК 93/94

Солнышкин Андрей Александрович,
Институт Истории СПбГУ, г. Санкт-Петербург
Solnyshkin Andrey Alexandrovich,
Institute of History, St. Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg

ДЕЙСТВИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО КОМИТЕТА ОБОРОНЫ ПО ЭВАКУАЦИИ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ ИЗ ЛЕНИНГРАДА В 1942 Г. ACTIONS OF THE STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO EVACUATE THE POPULATION FROM LENINGRAD IN 1942

Аннотация: с 8 сентября 1941 г. местные органы власти Ленинграда осуществляли эвакуацию мирных жителей. ГКО в 1941 г. осуществлял контроль за эвакуацией ленинградской промышленности. Только в начале 1942 г. ГКО стал осуществлять меры по организации массовой эвакуации населения из блокадного Ленинграда.

Abstract: since September 8, 1941, the local authorities of Leningrad carried out the evacuation of civilians. In 1941, the GKO controlled the evacuation of the Leningrad industry. Only at the beginning of 1942, the GKO began to implement measures to organize the mass evacuation of the population from the besieged Leningrad.

Ключевые слова: Блокада Ленинграда, Государственный комитет обороны (ГКО), Дорога Жизни, эвакуация населения Ленинграда.

Keywords: blockade of Leningrad, State Defense Committee (GKO), Road of Life, evacuation of the population of Leningrad.

One of the key problems for The State Defense Committee (GKO) for the defense of Leningrad in 1942, as in 1941, was the implementation of the evacuation from Leningrad. However, now the GKO paid increased attention not so much to the evacuation of industrial enterprises, but to the evacuation of civilians from the besieged city. It was understandable. In 1941, one of the key goals for the actions of the GKO was the urgent evacuation of the most important military enterprises in Leningrad and the personnel working for them, as they could be captured by German troops. GKO managed to fulfill this difficult task with honor. Now in 1942, with more resources and capabilities, the GKO planned to organize the evacuation of the civilian population from the besieged city as soon as possible.

The evacuation of Leningrad residents began in 1941. First of all, children were evacuated from Leningrad, and then the adult population. Thus, according to the «Report of the city evacuation commission on the evacuation from Leningrad from June 29, 1941 to April 15, 1942», during the evacuation of residents from Leningrad from June 29, 1941 to August 27, 1941, 395,091 children were evacuated [1, p. 301]. However, in connection with the tragic events of the beginning of 1941, when the evacuated children found themselves in the areas occupied by the German army, which was rapidly advancing towards Leningrad, the Leningrad leadership decided to return some of the children

back to Leningrad and out of 395,091 children, only 219,691 people were evacuated to safe areas. A total of 488,703 children and adults were evacuated from Leningrad from June 29, 1941 to August 27, 1941. But, as we can see, for a multi – million city-Leningrad, the number of evacuated Leningraders, unfortunately, was not so large. After the establishment of the land blockade by the German troops on September 8, 1941, the Leningrad residents were evacuated by the vessels of the Ladoga Military Flotilla (LMF). In the period of September – November 1941, food was delivered to the besieged Leningrad by ships on Lake Ladoga, and the inhabitants of the besieged city were taken back. Also, a special aviation group evacuated residents from Leningrad by air.

Many residents of the besieged city, who were not evacuated, continued to stubbornly fight the German troops besieging and destroying Leningrad, working in factories that produce weapons or serving in the MPVO detachments. But soon the devastating famine and cold began to take the lives of many Leningraders. The leadership of Leningrad was aware of the danger of the current situation. And it, without waiting for the decisions of the GKO, began, starting in November 1941, to take a number of energetic measures in this direction. So on November 19, 1941. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decided «to approve the commission for the evacuation of people from Leningrad consisting of: T. T. Popkov P. S. (chairman), Motylev B. M., Lagunov F. N., Smirnov A. P., Vorotov G. G.» [2, p. 179]. This commission was assigned two main tasks:

First, the evacuation commission had to establish the number of residents evacuated from the besieged Leningrad and set the order of their evacuation;

Secondly, the evacuation commission had to establish the methods of evacuation of Leningrad residents from the city and the amount of funds necessary for this;

The evacuation commission in November 1941, in the course of its work, decided to evacuate people from the besieged Leningrad along the «Road of Life», the work of which began relatively recently on November 22-24, 1941. Also, the adoption of this decision was facilitated by the actions of the Deputy Chairman of the Evacuation Council under the SNK of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin. He ordered «to accept the proposal of the Leningrad City Executive Committee to evacuate from Leningrad by road to the Zaborye station of the Northern Railway with a further transfer to the railway transport of 118 thousand people...» [2, p. 180]. In accordance with this provision, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front on December 6, 1941 decided «To oblige the evacuation commission to begin on December 10, 1941, the evacuation of the population from Leningrad..., bringing the number of people exported to 20. 12. 1941 to 5000 people per day...» [1, p. 277]. But, it was hardly possible to successfully implement this resolution in late December 1941 – early January 1942, because the bad weather prevailing on the «Road of Life» did not allow to increase the capacity of the highway, which reduced the number of evacuated people per day. This provision also confirms the fact that on December 12, 1941, The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decided to «...Postpone the evacuation of people from Leningrad along the front road until further notice» [2, p. 193]. However, it is absolutely impossible to argue that the evacuation of Leningrad residents from the besieged city was stopped. Despite the decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the residents of besieged Leningrad still continued to be evacuated along the «Road of Life», but not in such large numbers as the evacuation commission suggested. Only in mid-January 1942, we can observe the decision of the Leningrad leadership to return to the mass evacuation of Leningraders from the besieged city. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front began to plan the evacuation of Leningrad residents from the besieged city. So on January 21, 1942. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decided «...To oblige the Leningrad City Executive Committee and the Leningrad Evacuation Commission to evacuate 1,200 people daily from the city of Leningrad from January 23 to January 25, 1942. And since January 25, 1942, at least 2,400 people» [1, p. 285]. These measures, according to the Leningrad leadership, were supposed to increase the number of people evacuated from the besieged city of Leningrad. In addition, a number of factors contributed to this: this is both the relatively stable weather prevailing on Lake Ladoga, and the smooth traffic on the «Road of Life» at the end of January 1942, compared to December 1941, which increased the capacity on the ice track;

Seeing that the independent measures of the Leningrad leadership could not fundamentally solve the problem of evacuating the besieged population, the GKO began to take and implement decisive measures in this direction. So, the next day, on January 22, 1942, the State Defense

Committee adopted a resolution on the mass evacuation of 500 thousand residents from the besieged Leningrad [3, p. 199]. The number of Leningrad residents exported was not accidental. It made it possible to somewhat ease the food situation in the besieged city, since due to the evacuation, the number of remaining food consumers in the city was reduced and, in this regard, a part of the food resources transported to Leningrad was released to increase the standards of the remaining residents. The head of the evacuation from Leningrad was appointed a commissioner from the GKO-A. N. Kosygin, who immediately flew to Leningrad [4, p. 193]. To provide all the necessary evacuees of Leningrad, evacuation points were created along the entire route of the evacuation. These measures were supposed to allow the GKO, together with the leadership of Leningrad, to carry out a highly organized mass evacuation of the besieged residents of Leningrad. This statement is confirmed by the fact that on February 19, 1942, The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decided «...To oblige the Leningrad City Executive Committee, starting from February 21, 1942, to evacuate from Leningrad by passenger trains at least 5,000 people per day, and from February 27, 1942 – at least 6,600 people per day, by motor vehicles up to 1,200 people per day» [5, p. 677]. This number of Leningraders, who should have been evacuated daily from the besieged city, indicates that the commissioner for evacuation from the GKO – A. N. Kosygin and the top leadership of Leningrad did not doubt the successful implementation of the evacuation plan for Leningrad conceived by them.

However, the evacuation of the population from the besieged Leningrad, despite the increased control of the highest state officials, still had a number of major miscalculations in its organization. This is confirmed by the report of the head of the transport department of the NKVD of the Northern Railway, captain of the state Security N. S. Borisenko in the OK VKP (b) of March 5, 1942 It states that «despite the instructions of the decision-making bodies, the transportation of the population evacuated from Leningrad is extremely unsatisfactory»[1, p. 292]. Evacuation of Leningrad residents, according to N. S. Borisenko, carried out in cars that are not equipped for this purpose. This leads to the fact that the evacuated population from Leningrad is in unsanitary conditions, which lead to an increase in morbidity and mortality among the evacuees. All these facts could not but worry the commissioner from the State Defense Committee for the evacuation of A. N. Kosygin, who had to correct this situation. Fortunately, these errors in the organization of the evacuation of the population were soon corrected. Evacuation along the «Road of Life» continued until the end of its work-mid-April 1942. During the period from January 22 to April 12, according to the report of a member of the State Defense Committee A. N. Kosygin, 539,400 people were evacuated from the besieged city [6, p. 341].

During the ice drift on Lake Ladoga, the evacuation of Leningrad residents from the besieged city was temporarily stopped. However, after the water cleared of ice, the evacuation was resumed again. The Ladoga flotilla began to evacuate people again. In the spring of 1942, the GKO began planning a second mass evacuation of people from the besieged city. On May 24, 1942, the GKO adopted GKO Resolution No. 1805-ss. GKO decided to approve the proposal of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front and the Leningrad City Executive Committee on the evacuation of 300 thousand people from Leningrad during the spring-summer period of 1942: 25 thousand children, 175 thousand family members of workers and employees and 75 thousand family members of military personnel, 6 thousand disabled people of the Patriotic War and 19 thousand workers and employees with their families. The evacuation of Leningrad residents was carried out on LVF vessels on Lake Ladoga.

During the entire period of navigation in 1942, LMF took out more than 448 thousand people, and together with the military personnel, the sick, the wounded, and others, the number of evacuees amounted to about 540 thousand people [7, p. 45]. The mass evacuation of Leningrad residents ended after the closure of navigation on Lake Ladoga at the end of 1942. No more mass evacuation of people from the besieged Leningrad was carried out, since on January 18, 1943, the Soviet troops broke the blockade of Leningrad and the need for it disappeared.

It is worth noting that the GKO partially managed to cope with the task assigned to it in 1942 to organize the mass evacuation of Leningrad residents from the besieged city. But at the same time, the activities of the State Defense Committee on the evacuation of residents from the besieged Leningrad can not be fully called successful. This provision confirms the fact that the GKO did not

immediately draw its attention to the shortcomings of the work on organizing the evacuation of Leningrad residents, committed by the previous actions of the Leningrad leadership. As mentioned earlier, many evacuated residents of Leningrad found themselves in unsanitary conditions, which led to an increase in morbidity and mortality among the evacuees. Fortunately, thanks to the establishment of the GKO of strict control over the improvement of conditions for the evacuated Leningraders, this problem was finally resolved by the middle of 1942. Despite the fact that the actions of the GKO to organize the evacuation of the population cannot be fully called successful, it remains undeniable that thanks to the actions of the GKO and the leadership of Leningrad, many lives of the residents of the besieged city were saved, who were evacuated to the Mainland in 1941-1942.

References:

1. Leningrad v osade: sbornik dokumentov o geroicheskoj oborone Leningrada v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny. 1941-1945 / redkol.: A. R. Dzeniskevich (otv. red.) [i dr.]. Sankt-Petersburg. 1995. 639 p. (in Russ.)
2. Rossiya. Vek dvadcatyj: sbornik statej k 95-letiyu doktora istoricheskikh nauk V. M. Koval'chuka / redkol.: A. N. Chistikov (otv. red.) [i dr.]. Sankt-Petersburg. 2011. 409 p. (in Russ.)
3. Karasev A. V. Leningradcy v gody blokady (1941-1943 gg.). Moskva. 1959. 315 p. (in Russ.)
4. Komarov N. YA., Kumanev G. A. Blokada Leningrada. 900 geroicheskikh dnei 1941 – 1944. Istoricheskii dnevnik. Kommentarii. Moskva. OLMA-PRESS. 2004. 576 p. (in Russ.)
5. Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh rassekrechennykh arkhivov / pod red. N. L. Volkovskogo. Moskva. Sankt-Petersburg. AST. 2005. 766 p. (in Russ.)
6. Na zashchite Nevskoi tverdiny / redkol.: Yablochkin YU. N. (otv. red). Leningrad. Lenizdat. 1965. 643 p. (in Russ.)
7. Nepokorennij Leningrad / redkol.: Koval'chuk V. M. (otv. red.) [i dr.]. Leningrad. 1985. 327 p. (in Russ.)

S E H ПЕДАГОГИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ

УДК 376

Данилина Ангелина Леонидовна,
Казанский Государственный Архитектурно-Строительный Университет, г. Казань
Danilina Angelina Leonidovna, Kazan State University of Architecture and Engineering, Kazan

Шмыров Иван Борисович, Казанский Национальный Исследовательский
Технический Университет им. А.Н. Туполева – КАИ, г. Казань
Shmyrov Ivan Borisovich, Kazan National Research Technical University
named after A.N.Tupolev – KAI, Kazan

**АНТИКОРРУПЦИОННОЕ ВОСПИТАНИЕ МОЛОДЕЖИ В ВУЗЕ
ANTI-CORRUPTION EDUCATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE
IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS**

Аннотация: в данной работе рассматриваются проблемы современного общества, связанные с коррупционными составляющими. А также приводятся положительные примеры людей и политиков.

Abstract: this paper examines the problems of modern society associated with corruption components. There are also positive examples of people and politician.

Ключевые слова: общество, коррупция, молодежь, студенты.

Keywords: society, corruption, youth, students.