

The evolution of the threat narrative: from Thomas Hobbes to Stephen Walt

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Abstract: *In this article, on the one hand, we examine the concept of threat and its evolution in the theory of Hobbes and Walt, and on the other hand, we discuss the key concept of security against threats. Hobbes finds the State of nature to be detrimental to security, with fear, and in constant threat, and sees the solution in establishing a power that eliminates the threat posed by anarchy. On the other hand, in the face of the threat, Stephen Walt emphasizes the importance of the balance of threat instead of the balance of power. The purpose of this article is an attempt to achieve an alternative security, a security with an emphasis on rational approach that goes beyond the desire for survival (Hobbes). The question is: can the prevailing logic against the threat in the structure of realism be applied to today's political situation? It seems that the structure of neorealism has a better solution to this situation. It is assumed that, in describing Hobbes's security, there was an approach to repelling disorder and evil (otherness), but in today's relations between governments and for international security, no other elimination is entirely possible; and so there has to be an approach to calculating the cost of profit. The management of the world system must be based on the interests and understanding of the existing conditions. So today, the nation-state alone is not important, but different perceptions of the threat and attention to structural condition and other actors in the international environment are important. The goal is to turn threats into opportunities. Therefore, we are witnessing a change and transformation of the concept of threat from classical (structural) realism in Hobbesian approach, to the reality of the position of neoclassical (defensive) realism in the concept of Stephen Walt. Threats in the traditional conception are the eliminating concept and in the new conception are the unifying concept.*

Keywords: balance of threat, security dilemma, Thomas Hobbes, Stephen Walt, forming alliances

1. Introduction

In Hobbes' anarchic world, the fear of death and chaos caused by absence of a power based on law was considered a threat, so the best thing to do in classical realism was to eliminate the threat. However, in the neo-realistic world of Walt, although the same anarchist atmosphere that Hobbes says still exists, but the threat posed by this trend can be balanced by the formation of alliance and balancing. The path that Hobbes sought to prove was the war of all against all. An atmosphere of mistrust, fear, and the decision to eliminate another (other). This was an aggressive and offensive approach to the fear of threat, but in the context of Walt's discussion, we see a defensive approach and a balancing to the threat. The threat posed by the Hobbesian anarchist space cover nation-state, but the threat posed by Walt seeks to change the notion of a threat that seeks not only national but also regional and global security and alliances with even non-state actors. One might say that a missing link in Hobbes's discussion is a different understanding of the threat and the diversity of different situations and contexts in the application of the threat. It seems that the similarities and differences between Hobbes and Walt's approach to the threats posed by the insecure world can be described as follows: Although both in cases such as the anarchy of the international system and the principle of self-help, the role of governments as the main actors in the international system, the emphasis on fear and

intimidation and efforts to achieve security and security, The desire to survive and prioritize one's own interests, and the non-denial of war and violence, have similarities; but with the evolution of realism and greater understanding of the actions and practices of governments in the face of threats and dangers, we have seen the emergence of layers of realism commensurate with the international system, the role of non-governmental organizations and actors, the globalized space, the emphasis on normative perceptions and approaches, along with causal and realistic factors. So that not only the performance of governments alone is important, but also the study and analysis of the situation and the context. As Walt states: "It matters what states do (Ontology), but it also matters why they do it (Epistemology)." So today, governments' perceptions of the concept of threat are no longer similar to Hobbesian theories. If Government A may consider Government B as its enemy (as Hobbes says), but now the elimination of this enemy does not ensure the security and survival of country A. In addition, today there is no place for government isolation. Therefore, in order to achieve a successful outcome, and in line with national and international interests, a policy must be adopted that, while repelling the threat, has the maximum benefit and the least harm to Government A. Therefore, here comes the issue of Walt's threat balance. Because states can turn existing threats into opportunities by better understanding threats, coalitions, and balancing. Thus, it can be said that the threat and fear that Hobbes was talking about was only to achieve security and survival, but the threat that Walt is talking about is to secure and ensure survival along with the guarantee of interests and profits and also alliancing and accompanying other Commonwealth countries. Therefore, it might be said that this is a step in the direction of shifting security studies to a new trend of security. (Collaborative security and the logic of cooperation)

2. Ontology of anarchist conditions (from realism to neorealism) and changing perceptions of threat

First, to clarify the concept of threat and its interrelationship with the security factor and the need for a proper understanding of these two concepts in today's political relations, It is better to look at the ontology of the concept of threat in general, as well as the study of reality and what it is from the point of view of Thomas Hobbes, and then Stephen Walt. If the preservation of survival and existence, as the most central link in the definition of security, coincides with the first period of human life and in fact the first stage of life of individuals and human societies, the lack of threat means the second link in the definition of security. Accordingly, the definition of security with a negative attitude focuses on the relative liberation of any threat to social foundations and elements of government.

In Hobbes' classic realist view, human beings are consistently trapped in a constant state of nature – and perennially at war with each other. This condition was innately unstable and anarchical mainly through the absence of an overarching governmental entity, unable to provide a sense of security and order through a universal set of norms, rules and regulations. Life was brutal and its outlook pessimistic and dire. The survival of humans was consistently under threat by humans themselves. In Hobbes' state of nature, people remained imprisoned in a world dominated by 'continual fear, and danger of violent death'. In his central argument, Hobbes contended human beings could only overcome these brutal circumstances of life through surrendering to an entity (a person or a structure) that promised protection from harm – hence, security. Hobbes called this entity "Leviathan". Without Leviathan, human beings were confined to terminal despair imbued with 'no propriety of goods, or

lands; no security'. In Hobbes' view, Leviathan represented the 'long longed for' antidote for a life without the ever-present impetuses of war and violence. Nevertheless, Leviathan came at a price. Security was only attainable through surrendering individual independence and self-determination. By conceding one's right to self-governance to an overarching, broader entity (Leviathan), one gained security. (Hirschauer, 2014: 33)

So in connection with this anarchic situation with the concept of threat in Hobbes's discussion, we can say, Thomas Hobbes was the first to draw his conclusion that the international system, whereby states exist in a permanent struggle against one another for survival and nationals refer to their sovereign for protection against foreign threats, is anarchic and lead to the inescapable and universal danger. Thus, the notion of "national security", as the requirement to maintain the survival of the nation-state emerged. (Tsebenko and Shymchuk, 2017: 53)

Actually, Hobbes' philosophy of human nature informs his theory of state behaviour, wherein he laid the foundation of one of Classical Realism's most important tenets. Hobbes talks about the existence of a state of nature before the society was founded. The state of nature was a state of insecurity and 'war. Even though the individuals agreed to end this state of nature among themselves by forming societies, the societies thus formed continue to remain in a state of war. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), a later social contractarian, is a milder version of Hobbesian realism. However, Hobbesian realism underwent a great deal of moderation in the thought of Montesquieu (1689-1755) and John Locke (1632-1704), who were the proponents of liberal realism. Classical realist tradition in western thought goes back thousands of years. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau all belong to the classical realist tradition. Important among the classical contractarians was Thomas Hobbes, whose arguments on the 'state of nature' have become well respected in the classical realist tradition. (Happymon, 2009: 23-24)

But within Neorealism, the Waltzian balance of power theory is the best example of states that Faced with threats and looking for security which says that weaker states would balance the preponderance of the more powerful ones to ensure that the latter do not become too powerful and dominate all others states in the system. Balance of power, therefore, is not meant to maximize a state's power but ensure its security. Waltz makes it clear that international politics is a realm of power only because of struggle and survival when he writes that "international politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation". So we can say that Neorealism takes its philosophical roots from Thomas Hobbes who unlike John Locke said that the struggle for power is not due to human nature but international anarchy. Hobbes argues that human beings acquire more power because "he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more." Waltz also stresses that a balance of power in the international system does not necessarily equate to rational behaviour. (Happymon, 2009: 44) Therefore, here is the first step in the distinction. Rational behavior is the factor that actors must use in the face of threats and understanding of goals and circumstances.

However, Stephan Walt, another neorealist, seeks to improve upon balance of power theory and puts forward a balance of threat theory. His theory argues that balancing behaviour among states is a result of imbalances of threat and not power. In other words, states balance against threats, and not against power. In this regard, his concept of threat includes "perceived state intentions" rather than the

pure power that an opponent has. Walt argues that balance of threat theory "can explain not only why a state may align against the strongest power (if its power makes it the most dangerous) but also why one state may balance against another state which is not necessarily the strongest but which is seen as more threatening on account of its proximity, aggressive intentions, or acquisition of especially potent means of conquest". (Happymon, 2009: 45)

3. Security dilemma- Hobbes's dilemma

However, what remains to be seen in Hobbes's discussion of the concept of threat is the "security dilemma", which we will explain in the following. Security derives from the state. The state must be able to provide a sufficient level of protection of the population, from external as well as from internal threats. However, the problem is that, the means of such protection is, in the final analysis, power. The state needs coercive power-a monopoly over the means of violence-in order to protect the population. Nevertheless, with coercive power at hand the state is not only a source of protection of the population; it is also a source of threat. This constitutes what has been called Hobbes's dilemma.

That is, in Hobbes's discussion, what can protect people from state of nature (chaos and death threats) and give them security; On the other hand, it can destroy their security. Without the state, there can be no protection; people will live in the 'state of nature' where anarchy will reign, because egoistic humans will get at each other's throats. Law and order is absent; life will be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. However, the same government, with power and a factor called legitimate force, is able to suppress, oppress, and use the tools of violence. (Sørensen, 1996: 903) as in this regard, and in confirmation of the above, it can be said that Hobbes himself advocated the necessity of a political society, even in the face of authoritarian rule, rather than an anarchic situation.

Thomas Hobbes argues in *Leviathan* (1651) that the state of nature is a state of "warre, as is of every man, against every man". In such a condition, man not only lives in "continuell feare, and danger of violent death" but even his potentially short life is utterly miserable. By showing that the pre-political condition is an intolerable state of permanent conflict, he hopes to demonstrate the necessity of a specific kind of political society, namely that which is governed by an undivided and absolute sovereign. He argues that the worst that can happen to man is a reversal to the state of nature, which is essentially what happens when society gets torn apart by civil war – a situation that Hobbes himself witnessed in his lifetime. A sovereign with absolute power, he claims, is the best security against this ever happening. Whatever evils such unlimited power itself might bring, it is a necessary risk because the evils arising from the lack of such power are far greater. (Piirimäe, 2006: 3-4) Anyway, the main approach to studying threat in international relations – the realist and neorealist paradigms – takes the state as the locus of agency.

However, there seems to be another problem with Hobbes' attitude. When Hobbes draws an analogy between international relations and the state of nature, he says nothing about the ability of states to destroy one another. Nor does he suggest that states generally have to wage war in anticipation of others' attacks. Hobbes discusses strategic aspects of foreign policy on only a few occasions. In *De cive*, for instance, he states that sovereigns should subvert the power of foreigners when they expect an imminent attack, 'to ensure that the calamities they fear do not happen'. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes praises leagues between states, but he does not offer any further strategic considerations. There is no indication

that states are, or should be, concerned about their relative standing within a system of states, or form alliances against more powerful opponents. (Jaede, 2018: 86)

Hobbes's concern in this passage is still with the prevention of an impending danger, rather than with a stable equilibrium of capabilities between different states or alliances. In general, Hobbes pays little attention to the nature of the threat that the military capabilities one state acquires for defensive purposes may pose to another country's security. (Jaede, 2018: 87) This suggests that, even though Hobbes maintains that states should assess their own power by comparison with their neighbors, he does not believe that the mere presence of material capabilities in another country poses a threat, which necessitates a preventative war. To the contrary, sovereigns can acquire knowledge about their neighbors' policies and attitudes towards them. Other states' coercive power does not pose an immediate security threat for as long as other states do not show signs of aggressive intent. (Jaede, 2018: 89)

But Hobbes's view that „other states' coercive power does not pose an immediate security threat for as long as other states do not show signs of aggressive intent “is contrasted to realism, where in fact Stephen Walt's neorealist concept of a balance of threat, according to which states do not balance against power as such but against perceived threat, can account for this. Here, individuals are assumed to be motivated by rationality. Since realist thinking and theories are based on assumptions such as human rationality and a Hobbesian worldview (which is applied to states through e.g. the assumption of anarchy and zero-sum gains), they align with a positivist philosophy/meta-theory. Coherency between methodology and theory is a very important consideration in any scientific research, since a given general theory (such as realism) has some meta-theoretical ideas behind it (such as positivism, rationality etc.). Hobbes's understanding of the problems of both domestic and international political relations is intrinsically bound with his skepticism. It is based not upon an empirical science of human behavior in the positivist sense but upon the impossibility of knowing with certainty that we know, in the empirical realm. His paradoxical science of politics results not in an objective description of behavior but in a tension-filled stress on practical action in light of the limits and possibilities he outlines. (Williams, 1996: 222)

4. Realism: Threat, Power and "Rational Behaviour"

First, it is better to review the main analytical assumptions of realism, in order to answer the Hobbesian problem. The first possible answer to Hobbes's dilemma emerges from the realist tradition in international relations. It is true that modern realism (or neorealism) appears to assume away the Hobbesian dilemma, because the analysis begins with the sovereign state as the ontologically given, constitutive component of the international system. From there, neorealism constructs a purely systemic theory of international relations, a theory that does not speculate about domestic events in state units; it concentrates on the systemic pressures on units. Yet if we review the core analytical assumptions of realism, an answer to the Hobbesian dilemma can be derived. To begin with, realism posits that state elites are rational and self-seeking actors who seek security for their state as well as for themselves, that is, their regime. The latter depends on the former; without state security there can be no regime security; the state is a necessary precondition for the regime. The international system is anarchic; system wide government is absent. It is a self-help system where states will have to rely on their own means of protection. The use of force is always a possibility, because that is the ultimate

means of settling discord among states. States unable to provide protection for themselves risk their own survival. This puts pressure on state elites; they are compelled to provide for domestic order, because without it, the state will be disabled and powerless when it comes to facing external enemies. Domestic order is a precondition for bringing about the resources needed for protection of state and regime in the face of perennial external threat. States without efficient means of protecting themselves put their very existence at risk in an anarchical international system. This, then, is the realist answer to the Hobbesian dilemma: because of the constant external threat in an anarchic international system, state elites will seek to create such domestic order and civility that the state-and thus the regime will be able to weather external threat. (Sørensen, 1996: 904)

However, here we turn to the issue of external threat and the Hobbesian approach. According to realist analysis, there is always external threat in an international system, which is anarchic; but the degree of actual threat can vary over time and across countries. It is clear that the realist solution to the Hobbesian dilemma is most efficient when there is a high degree of external threat, and least efficient at low levels of external threat. (Sørensen, 1996: 905)

Although there is anarchy in the system in the sense of absence of system-wide government, it does not follow that there is a constantly high external threat. Hobbes's state of nature is less a theoretical model of the international order than a heuristic for understanding it in the absence of a universal theory, such as liberalism. Again, the Hobbesian stuff should not be exaggerated because it is just a way to think of the difference between relations within states, where there is a monopoly of force, and between them, where there is not. A general problem with contributions towards International Political Theory, though, is that they are either strong on Political Theory or on International Relations, but rarely on both. Hobbes's purported view that "other states' coercive power does not pose an immediate security threat for as long as other states do not show signs of aggressive intent" is contrasted to realism, where in fact Stephen Walt's neorealist concept of a balance of threat, according to which states do not balance against power as such but against perceived threat, can account for this. (Niklas Rolf, 2018: 2)

However, in the next step, we address the epistemological dimension of the threat and study of the place of this concept in the structure of realism and neo-realism. In other words, our intention here is to provide knowledge and awareness about the better functioning of each of these two schools of thought in the face of the threats posed by today's conditions. To this end, the epistemology of this concept is first addressed in Hobbes's discourse and then in Walt's discourse.

4.1. Hobbes and Epistemology of threat in classical realism

Chapter 13 of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, originally published in 1651, imagines politics in a pre-social state of nature. The result is an unusually clear classical realist theory that gives roughly equal weight to human nature and international anarchy. (Donnelly, 2005: 32) Hobbes acknowledges that such a savage state never existed across the entire globe.

Hobbes, in this reading, identifies a logic of interaction, an ideal-type model of pressures and tendencies. When equal actors interact in anarchy, driven by competition, diffidence and glory, generalized violent conflict can be predicted. Theory requires radical simplification. Rather than ask whether Hobbes accurately describes the world – of course, he does not: much, even most, of politics

lies outside his scope – we should ask whether his theoretical assumptions help us to understand important elements of international political reality. (Donnelly, 2005: 33)

Anarchy has been replaced by hierarchical political rule within most states. Even vicious and inefficient governments usually provide considerable security for the lives and property of their citizens, dramatically reducing the pressures to replace the international state of nature with international government. International anarchy can therefore be expected to persist, even without taking into account the strong desire of states and their citizens for autonomy. Material inequality reduces the number of effective players. But unless one is clearly superior to all others, the Hobbesian logic will reassert itself in relations among the strong. ‘Great powers’ – states with the capacity to inflict punishing damage, even the threat of death, on any other power in the system – are Hobbesian equals. In passing, we should note that this suggests that (Hobbesian) realism is a theory of great power politics, rather than a general theory of international relations. (Donnelly, 2005: 34)

Hobbes ‘classical’ realism gives roughly equal emphasis to anarchy and egoism. Although ‘neo-classical’ realism has recently made a modest comeback, most realist work since the 1970s has been more or less rigorously structural, largely because of the influence of Kenneth Waltz. (Donnelly, 2005: 34) according to waltz, But even if states seek only survival, without knowing who holds which particular capabilities and their intentions – as well as who we are and what we value – we simply cannot say whether there is a threat against which to balance. Thus Stephen Walt (1987), one of Waltz’s leading students, has introduced balance of threat theory: states balance not against (all) external capabilities but against threats, which are defined as much by intentions as by capabilities. Unfortunately, realism has had very little to say about threats. In addition, structural realism in principle can have nothing to say about threat (as opposed to capabilities), leaving the crucial explanatory variable completely outside the scope of the theory. (Donnelly, 2005: 32)

4.2. Walt and Epistemology of threat in neoclassical realism

Fear that will arise as a reaction to threat, which emerged because of power asymmetry, will essentially be determined by material factors. This would allow for the assumption that fear is a rational reaction. If the logic of the international system is such as provided by Waltz, to fear means to behave rationally, prudently and adequately to the actual conditions. However, it is not completely agreed in the realistic perspective of international relations why a threat arises. Stephen Walt is one of the theoreticians that reflected on the logic of Waltz’s “calculation” of threat.

According to Walt, threat is a function of 1) military power, 2) geographic proximity, 3) offensive capability, and 4) aggressive intentions. It is an important contribution to explaining the genesis of threat because it shows that states rather balance against threat and not against power. These factors, though retaining the perception of threat as the principle of the identification of power asymmetry, allow to slightly relax from strict structural reasoning and force to deeper consider analysis at the levels of state, bureaucracy and an individual. (Brunalas, 2015: 208) Consequently, threat perceived by following the logic of power asymmetry may even contradict some realists who, by considering other states as inherent enemies, would rather conform to the structural aspects of the presented in this study belief system than to that of the asymmetry of powers. (Brunalas, 2015: 209)

Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt made realism more robust and falsifiable with structural theories. The school of neorealism deviated from classical realists as it started to rely less on human emotions, or political leaders and their individual rationality, and more on the structures of world politics. To put it simply, the fundamental concepts of realism remained the same—the world was still considered anarchic, balancing was still the key and nation-states, and great powers were still the primary actors of international relations—but structural theories suggested that the actions of great powers and nation-states are dependent on structural forces like economics, industrial capacity and efficiency, geography, and military power. For example, Stephen Walt's Balance of Threat theory determines four different causal variables, like aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and offensive intentions, on which depends a set of hypotheses of balancing and bandwagoning by different states when they face a threat. Likewise, there are several other sub-theories, within the realist school of IR which determines and calculates offense-defense balance, security dilemma, etc. (Maitra, 2018)

While, offensive realists claim that power is a never-ending quest, the defensive realists believe that too much of power can be self-defeating. Walt and Mearsheimer are the best-known opponents of liberal hegemony from a “realist” perspective—a school of thought in international relations that emphasizes the role of states and the distribution of power over, say, the importance of promoting democracy and liberal values. Realists argue that, because the international system has no central authority, states are locked in a sort of Hobbesian trap of permanent competition, constantly vying for influence over one another. (Johnson, 2019)

Morgenthau and Thomson argued that there exist three ways in which nations could respond to a threat posed by an adversary: They can increase their own power, they can add to their power the power of other nations, or they can withhold power of other nations from the adversary ... When they choose the second and the third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances. The formation of an alliance is based mainly on the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning where states respond to a growing threat from one or more states.

In his book *The Origins of Alliances*, Stephen Walt writes about the creation of alliances using substantial historical data. According to the balance of power theory, states create alliances with the purpose of preventing stronger powers from dictating them. In his view, there are two main reasons for which states choose to balance: first, they ally with the strongest state and place their trust on its benevolence and second, they join the weaker side because it needs great assistance. Joining the strongest does not give the weaker state much influence since this latter does not contribute much to the coalition, while lining up with the weaker states enhances the strongest ally's influence within the alliance, as the member(s) of the alliance need support. (Dumani, 2017: 9)

Bandwagoning actions occur when a state lines up with a strong and growing power. The conviction that states are inclined to bandwagon indicates that most alliances are very fragile. Hence, Walt argues: Bandwagoning may be a form of appeasement. By aligning with an ascendant state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in wartime in order to share the spoils of victory.

In fact, triumphing in the world politics, or in a war, or just creating a great threat would drive the states on the “sidelines” to align with the most successful state. Walt amends the theories introduced by Hans Morgenthau and George Liska, contending that the creation of an alliance is a response to a perceived threat rather than a simple move to form equilibrium in the face of power. The “balance of threat” theory, (contrary to the predictions of the “balance of power” theory), argues that coalitions can become far more potent than their opponents. (Dumani, 2017: 10)

4.3. Neoclassical realists and perceptual approach of threat

Security studies developed from the neorealist tradition of scholars as a way of studying the use of force by states in the international arena. In an article entitled “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” Stephen Walt defined the discipline as the “study of the threat, use, and control of military force.” In its original formation, scholars assigned the term “security” a strict interpretation, which limited the discipline to realism’s focus on the technical specifics of power and force. This provided a means of measuring and interpreting relative power relations among states. Security studies methodically categorized the world into regional subsystems based on competing interests, thereby providing an analytical framework for evaluating the threats that nations posed to one another. Proponents argued that intellectual contestation involving rigorous analysis of contingency scenarios would yield ideas by which states could better craft security policies that responded to the multitude of threats they confronted. (Gerwin Leslie, 2019: 46-47)

Those engaged in the new security studies sought to create a framework for analyzing a threat, most especially one so serious as to threaten existence. When a danger reached the status of being an imminent existential threat, the scholars spoke of the securitization of that threat. They recognized that a threat could come in many different forms and that the perceptions of the risk might differ. More importantly, they realized that risk perception is often subjective and thus may not reflect objective reality. A threat appearing credible could induce fear of catastrophic harm to a polity even when the probability of its occurrence is low. This meant that an existential threat need not be “real” to produce a collective sense of insecurity. This redefinition-enlarged consideration of security issues from exclusive focus on the realm of the physical – such as the gain or loss of territory, manpower, or materiel – to include the emotional. (Gerwin Leslie, 2019: 51)

However, Security is the prime motivation of states, according to defensive realists. They can gain security by adopting a defensive posture, which has a natural advantage as states generally want to have security. Defensive realism argues that survival in an anarchic system will transform states into defensive position lists or status quo states. (Happymon, 2009: 45) The problems of the security dilemma and the need to avoid it is the starting point of defensive realists. According to defensive realism, "states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security". (Happymon, 2009: 46)

Theorists and strategists challenged us to think anew about the meaning of threat and security. Influence (power) is the defining variable in the neoclassical version of realist theory, but the causal logic of the theory places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior. However, neoclassical realists believe there are definite limits to these domestic effects. The framework set by the systemic balance of power sets the limits for and

constrains state action. Shifts in the balance of power change the possibilities of state behavior. These changes can materialize themselves as threats and/or possibilities; the international system offers fear and hope for political leaders. (Mononen, 2009: 5)

We tries to show that the Hobbesian world is not real, but an institution on the bottom of the standard continuum of security systems – just another competitive security system. In a competitive security system states identify negatively with each other's security so that ego's gain is seen as alters' loss. Negative identification under anarchic external conditions towards other actors' security creates what in realist literature is defined as the security dilemma, constituting systems of realist power politics where risk-averse actors infer intentions from capabilities and worry about relative gains and losses. At the calamitous climax – in the Hobbesian war of all against all – collective action is impossible because each power must constantly fear every move of the other powers. (Mononen, 2009: 9-10)

Neoclassical realists aim at doing justice to the complexity of human experience and social phenomena. History is therefore viewed holistically as a complex web of elements. This view on history assorts all events, goals and motivations as both dependent and independent variables.

According to neoclassical realists power explains change only if it is viewed phenomenologically. Phenomenology is an approach to philosophy asserting that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness, not of anything independent of human consciousness. Neoclassical realists therefore claim that if realist theories wish to account for specific events, especially episodes of change, they need a perceptual approach to power.


Neoclassical realism continues in the classical realist tradition that it might not always produce simple, neat answers. To neoclassical realists, foreign policy behavior may look clocklike only from a distance. The complexity of social life is endorsed by this new realist formulation. Neoclassical realism's worldview contains a philosophical insight that values the attempt to, but remains skeptical of, the possibilities of success of the human endeavor to reach definite answers. With neoclassical realism, we can tell better stories about world politics. (Mononen, 2009: 12)

5. Threats Are the Subjects; Anarchy Is the Condition; and the commitment to rationalism is the Solution (epistemological foundation)

The Evolution of Disciplinary Authority to understand the debates surrounding so-called new threats to security, it is useful to historicize the concept. Security, after all, is a historically variable condition: while one might perhaps agree with Thomas Hobbes's claim that the fear of death is the one truly human condition, the sources of this fear vary drastically across time and space. Grasping the contemporary meaning and nature of security, then, means coming to terms with the historical dynamics that constitute contemporary world politics and the way in which security is understood within the dominant modes of contemporary thought. In the context of security studies, this recovery of the past is particularly important and enlightening because the currently dominant understandings rest in part on a series of claims about the history of security and the evolution of thinking about it. (Krause & Williams 2002: 36)

While it would be foolhardy to deny the relevance of states, it is also evident that the claim that states comprise the most important elements in the contemporary world is one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analysis. These debates usually take the form of a dispute over what the relevant facts are: transnational corporations and capital networks, international organizations, and interstate cooperation. However, Neorealism’s key theoretical moves here involve a conception of the individual subject that provides both a positivist epistemological foundation and a conception of the sovereign realm of domestic politics. Both elements are grounded in an understanding of human subjectivity as self—contained instrumentally rational actors confronting an external reality to which they relate objectively. (Krause & Williams 2002: 39)

Although this does not explicitly commit the field to a positivist conception of science, the conception of state action as the instrumentally rational pursuit of self-interest is the foundation of theoretical analysis for the neorealist approach to security studies. Here the “logic of cooperation” and its anti-thesis, the logic of conflict, engage their long-standing confrontation. Although cooperation is not excluded, it can only arise under circumstances in which each actor rationally calculates interest—maximizing strategies. The analytic assumptions of instrumentally rational actors (and the commitment to rationalism), however, remain the same. (Krause & Williams 2002: 40)



Conclusion

States pursue their own interest, and are always at risk of being attacked by other countries, wrote Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. However, why threat matters more than power, and how we created rules to make cooperation easier but have not found a way to prevent conflict where the road is

paved with unfriendly intentions. The sources of fear and intimidation vary from what Walt's time was considered to be threatening to contemporary. Wendt theorizes three cultures of anarchy characterized respectively by "enmity (Hobbes)", "rivalry (Locke)" and "friendship (Kant)". With Hobbes' anarchy culture in force, in the social structure, a collective picture of the "Other" as an enemy will predominate. In general, if we want to apply the same category today to the concepts of threat and security and today's globalized space in international relations, we can say that the concept of threat and security studies in Hobbes's discussions, as Wendt acknowledged, is in the interests of hostility, but today the Political Relations it is in a position of competitive-cooperative interests. Competition is a way of prioritizing cooperation over hostility; not cooperation and alliance of the type of friendship. Something between fear of the other and rational understanding of the threat. In other words, a country can look at a threat with different dimensions, pay attention to the threat (enemy / other) and keep it away on the one hand, and sometimes even cooperating with it against another country on the other hand, can be an example of this dimension.

Thus, as shown in the chart above, the path that Hobbes pursues in classical realism is, in a way, to repel the existing threat and to use a single power to create security and to overcome chaos and the desire to survive. Therefore, it can be said that the result of this process will be the logical formation of a conflict to defend oneself and individual interests.

Therefore, it can be said that the result of this process will be the formation of a logic of conflict to Self-Defense and self-interest. On the other hand, the path that Walt takes in neoclassical realism is in line with the balance of threat and cooperation and alliance with other actors who are close to its interests and goals. In today's globalized world of international relations, what may be a threat to one country may be a threat to another. Thus, in the process of this extroverted balance (Balance based on alliance and cooperation), it is not only necessary to pay attention to security and national goals, but also to reveal the importance of examining and considering the behavioral logic of other actors. Because today, the relationship between states and non-states actors is growing in an interconnected and reciprocal space.

While traditional theories of balance of power see the main factor in the behavior of governments as the offensive and aggressiveness of other countries, the balance of threat gives a deeper look at state relations and argues that the main factor is not the ability to attack, but the "threat" of states against each other. In classical theories, "power" and "threat" are assumed equal, and simply increasing the power of a state threatens neighboring states. Walt disagrees with this assumption. It seems that a dominant power can be a good solution to escape the natural state of Hobbes and the threat posed by anarchist conditions, but in Walt's view, the threat is a combination of power, proximity, offensive capabilities and perceptions of intent. So just having power is not important, and other factors are important. What Walt means is that what matters in relations between states is not simply the power of each state, and their perception of each other as a threat is very important.

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