

**Maria Nikolaevna MALASHEVSKAYA**

PhD in history,  
Associate professor,  
Saint Petersburg State University,  
Department of social development  
of Asian and African countries

Contacts: +7-911-2071417, m.malashevskaya@spbu.ru, malashevskaya@gmail.com

**Establishment of a Positive Bilateral Interaction Model in the Russia-Japan Dialogue  
after the Cold War: Analysis of the 1990-s Negotiations Tactics**

*Abstract:* The paper deals with the Russian-Japanese positive interests-oriented model of interaction in the 1990s within the framework of the diplomatic tactics and mechanisms introduced into the bilateral negotiations. In this research the application of various negotiation instruments applied by the Japanese diplomacy toward the USSR and the Russian Federation in the late 1980s – 1990s is analyzed to demonstrate the process of establishing positive cooperation, despite territorial problems. “No-necktie meetings”, leader talks, informal negotiations, “face-to-face diplomacy” applied from the mid-1990s led to introduction of a positive model of interaction compared to the tactics used by Japan in the early 1990s.

*Аннотация:* В представленной статье анализируется процесс становления модели ориентированного на поиск общих интересов сотрудничества между Россией и Японией в контексте внедрения новых тактик и методов ведения переговоров на двухстороннем уровне в конце XX столетия. Именно этим внедренным тактикам, оцениваемым в качестве базиса и основной репрезентации формирования партнерства между странами, начиная еще с конца 1980-х гг., уделено основное внимание. «Встречи без галстуков», переговоры на уровне лидеров стран, неформальные встречи, «дипломатия лицом к лицу», предложенные японской дипломатией в середине 1990-х гг. на российском направлении, способствовали сближению сторон и нивелированию последствий неудачно примененных тактик в начале последнего десятилетия XX в.

*Keywords:* Russian-Japanese negotiations, “the Russian school”, “no-necktie meetings”, Edamura Sumio, Togo Kazuhiko, Sato Masaru, Tamba Minoru

*Ключевые слова:* российско-японские переговоры, «русская школа», «встречи без галстуков», Эдамур Сумио, Того Кадзухико, Сато Масару, Тамба Минору

It is widely acknowledged that there are lots of works devoted to diplomatic tactics for interstate negotiations in English, Japanese, Russian, as well as the fact that the origins of this discourse can be found in the Renaissance and pre-modern Europe history, namely in the classical works of Niccolo Machiavelli and François de Callieres. Numerous papers, monograph researches and specialized web-sites provide a good deal of information connected with diplomatic behavior in interstate communications; with the works of Henry Kissinger, a diplomat and orientalist, e.g. “Diplomacy” (1994, Simon and Schuster, New York), “On China” (2011, The Penguin Press, New York), “World Order” (2014, The Penguin Press, New York), becoming a worldwide for diplomats of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries in terms of realpolitik. However, the data found in the above-mentioned sources giving a general basic overview and a framework for diplomatic activity do not provide information concerning the tactics typical of Russian or Japanese negotiation culture. This type of issues comes into focus of researches on political culture, cultural anthropology or business-culture<sup>1</sup>, which deal with the basic cultural patterns of Japan and the way they affect negotiating culture, for instance, amae (dependence on others), honne/tatemaie (real intention/ public position or attitude), nemawashi (digging around the roots of a tree before transplanting, which means making necessary arrangements for consensus-building), etc. This kind of approach has been introduced in negotiations with all countries, thus reflecting the intention of the Japanese government to conduct peaceful politics.

From the end of the 1970s the cultural dimensions of international relations attracted attention of the researchers around the world, and, so, the joint volume “Cultural Factors in International Relations” was published in 1981, a collection of papers devoted to the negotiators behavior during high-level bilateral talks. In his introduction to the volume, R.P. Anand underlined: “the representatives of states engaged in the process of negotiation of agreements at diplomatic conferences were conditioned by their cultural backgrounds and traditions in spite of being bound to protect the immediate interests of their countries in accordance with their briefs or instructions” [Anand, 1981, pp. 17 – 18]. Therefore, traditional behavior constituted by cultural identity and meanings becomes a leading factor in trans-national and cross-cultural talks among participants, forming the understanding of national interests and economic or security profits.

This paper examines diplomatic interaction of Japan and Russia, which has been going along the lines of the United Nations values stated, for example, in “Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes” (1982), that stipulates the “spirit of co-operation”

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<sup>1</sup> For instance, one of the most important and popular research works is the book by Ruth Benedict “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture” (1946), prominent work of Japanese scholar Doi Takeo “The Anatomy of Dependence: Exploring an area of the Japanese psyche – feelings of indulgence” (1973), numerous researches of the notable Japanologist Donald Keene, ets.

and “friendly relations” between states, the principles of “avoiding disputes” and “settling international disputes by peaceful means in a manner that ensures international peace and security, and justice” as cornerstone values [Manila Declaration on Peaceful ...]. The USSR and Japan have had a years-long territorial dispute on some isles of the Kurile chain, which, according to the Manila Declaration, ought to be settled by negotiations as a foundation for interstate dialogue (the principle that came into force after World War II). Meanwhile, the confrontation between Japan and the USSR in the Cold War times minimized the chances to establish a ‘normal’ results-oriented model of cooperation till the end of the 1980’s, when the termination of the Cold War allowed to introduce a model of positive interaction based on peaceful means and common values. This research examines the implementation of interests-oriented and results-oriented cooperation within a multi-track approach focusing on the micro-level analysis of traditional and new negotiation tactics applied by the Japanese side in the dialogue with the late Soviet Union and the young Russian Federation in the last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

From the historic perspective, the late 1980s can be considered as the time of great opportunities for the Japanese diplomacy to implement energetic activity towards the USSR. That was connected with the changes in the foreign policy doctrine of the Soviet leadership made by the head of the Soviet government M.S. Gorbachev in the mid-1980’s (“the policy of perestroika”, “new political thinking”). The Japanese government had nothing but promptly react to the rise of this kind of opportunity. According to the diplomatic documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (“The Blue Book”, statements of prime-ministers and ministers of foreign affairs), the main aim of the Japanese government was to submit territorial claims to the USSR. Therefore, Japanese diplomats began to apply wider instruments intending to achieve this purpose at the negotiations with the Soviet government. On the other hand, application of various negotiation tactics ought to be regarded as the evidence of transition of the bilateral relations to a new level of more productive, mutual interests-oriented cooperation and establishment of a “normal” climate of the bilateral dialogue. The development of a positive interaction model is still in progress, but its implementation was laid in the period studied in the paper. The model under examination consists in possibility to discuss and suggest solutions of an unresolved problem and to develop relations according to mutual interests, making use of effective negotiation tactics and, afterward, providing two-sides activity to fulfill the reached arrangements for cooperation.

From the late 1980’s till the early 2000’s there were dramatic changes of the bilateral Soviet, then Russian-dialogue with Japan. Owing to the “perestroika” policy in the USSR high-level bilateral dialogues intensified, resulting in the Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachov's visit to

Japan in 1991. After the USSR collapse in 1992 – 1993, the two ministries of foreign affairs conducted negotiations concerning the Russian president B.N. Yeltsin's visit to Japan, however, due to non-effective negotiation tactics the president's visit to Japan was canceled in 1992. Nevertheless, with the reconsidered negotiation methods it became possible for the Russian president to undertake an official high-level visit to Japan in 1993 and to sign an official framework for the Russian-Japanese cooperation – “Tokyo Declaration”, in which any ideological restrictions on forming a positive results-oriented interaction model were delayed while common values of democracy and market economy were welcomed. The former diplomat and researcher Kawashima Yutaka notes that the basic challenge in strategic thinking and policy making for the Japanese foreign policy in the 1990’s was described as the opposition between values-oriented approach and interest-oriented approach [Kawashima, 2003, p. 14]. “Tokyo Declaration” should be viewed as a step towards establishing new relations based on mutual interest. Notwithstanding this, there followed a four-year pause in bilateral negotiations (1993-1996), caused by the inner political and economic situations and challenges both in Russia and in Japan. The period between 1996 and 2001 saw a rise in the bilateral relations, in the form of a series of high-level talks in 1997 – 1998 – “no-necktie meetings” in Khrasnoyarsk and Kawana and the official visit of the prime-minister of Japan to Moscow, with the “Moscow Declaration on Establishment of Creative Partnership between the Russian Federation and Japan” signed in 1998 as their result. This agreement shows mutual understanding on perspectives of bilateral cooperation and is to be considered as a foundation for results-oriented model of Japan-Russia cooperation, whereas the results-oriented paradigm is understood as the main pillar of a positive interaction model. V.V. Putin – Mori Yoshiro negotiations in 2000 – 2001 revealed mutual interest in intensifying and deepening of bilateral cooperation in various fields, aiming at advancing economic, political, international, security and cultural cooperation, though leaving some historical problems unresolved. Hereinafter Russia-Japan relations underwent a change from the model of weak interaction to the model of full-blooded, positive and fruitful engagements, which can be seen from the analysis of different (effective and non-effective) negotiations methods, made by the Japanese side implemented in the bilateral negotiations from the late 1980s to the early 2000s.

### ***(1) Establishment of a basic concept for diplomacy***

Formulation of a conceptual basis for the policy is considered as a fundamental value for the Japanese political thinking, which describes both its internal and foreign policy. This kind of approach allows to emphasize the priority goals and to draw up the action plan to achieve them.

For example, in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century numerous doctrines of the foreign policy, were used, among them “Yoshida Doctrine”, formulated by the prime minister Yoshida Shigeru at the beginning of the 1950s and aimed to make Japan-US relations fundamental for the Japanese diplomacy, security and economy, and “Fukuda Doctrine”, suggested by the prime minister Fukuda Takeo in the 1970s with the purpose to intensify and strengthen ties between Japan and Asian nations. Results-oriented doctrine for the USSR and, later, the Russian Federation was advanced by Tokyo at the end of the 1980s, demonstrating intentions to find an interest-oriented constructive model for cooperation.

At the summit-meeting with M.S. Gorbachev in Moscow in the spring of 1989, the foreign minister Uno Sosuke suggested that the concept of “*Equilibrium balance*” (kakudaikinko:) should be applied for the Soviet-Japanese dialogue. The concept was announced after a long period of stagnation in the bilateral relations and was expected to give a new impulse to the partnership between the USSR and Japan. “*Equilibrium Balance*” consisted of five points: (1) signing the peace treaty; (2) strengthening the relations based on mutual trust; (3) developing bilateral business contacts; (4) promoting people-to-people communication; (5) preparing M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 127], [Edamura, 2003, pp. 25 – 27]. This concept represents a comprehensive action program. The essential feature of this approach is its positive perspective aimed at strengthening the constructive dialogue, rather than at deepening the existing contradictions. Regretfully, only one point of the “*Equilibrium balance*” became a reality – the Soviet president's official visit to Japan in April 1991.

On September 24, 1991 during the session of the United Nations General Assembly, the concept of “*Five Principles of Nakayama*” was declared by the foreign minister Nakayama Taro, only two years after the announcement of the previous approach. It should be pointed out that “*Five Principles of Nakayama*” were declared at the time of a rising internal political crisis in the USSR and this step demonstrates Japan's attention to the changes in the Soviet Union. The concept consisted of the following five points: (1) full-scale support for reforms and full cooperation with the republics of the USSR; (2) rapid expansion and strengthening of the relations with all the republics, particularly with the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), that shared the border with Japan; (3) maintenance and development of cooperation with the USSR with the purpose to transform it into a full-blooded member of the community of the Asia-Pacific Rim countries; (4) providing the USSR with assistance in its integrating into the international economic space and such organizations as the IMF and the World Bank; (5) signing the peace treaty and resolving the “territorial problem”, based on the principle of “*legality and justice*” which was proclaimed by the leaders of the RSFSR [Statement by Foreign Minister Taro...].

Comparing structure and contents of “*Five Principles of Nakayama*” with “*Equilibrium Balance*” reveals that “*Five Principles*” is a more detailed document applying to a number of goals which were set by the Japanese diplomacy towards the USSR. Foreign strategy toward the USSR consisted in political and economic engagements put forward according to this strategic framework. Responding to a more active policy of the USSR in East Asia after Vladivostok speech of M.S. Gorbachev in 1986, the Japanese government reconsidered the Soviet state’s membership in the Asia-Pacific countries community<sup>2</sup>. The first two points of “*Five Principles*” are of great interest because of their political meaning. The Japanese side started to use separate or parallel talks with the Soviet Union government and the political elites of the republics. These talks can be considered as a foundation of interaction of Japan with the former Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation, after the USSR collapse in December 1991.

The concept of “*Five Principles of Nakayama*” remained the basis of the Japanese policy toward Russia until the announcement of the following concept in the mid-1990s. Consequently, the Japanese government seemed to have no accurately formulated strategy of development of bilateral dialogue during the first years of existence of the Russian Federation and no new model could be created. The necessity to promote a new concept rose in 1996, as a result of the Liberal Democratic Party returning to power, which meant three years of political turbulence. Hashimoto Ryutaro's cabinet formulated “*Multilevel Approach*” (ju:zo:teki-na apuro:chi) which consisted in development of multitrack Russian-Japanese ties both on bilateral and international levels. The cornerstone of the concept lies in three principles: “trust”, “mutual interests” and “long-term prospects” [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 227]. Critical for both sides “territorial question”, which has not been resolved until today, had to become only one of the issues of the Russian-Japanese negotiations agenda [Wada, 1999, pp. 362 – 364], [Togo, 1995, p. 37 – 38]. High-level talks in 1997 – 1998 (Yeltsin-Hashimoto “no-ties meetings” and official visit of Obuchi Keizo to Moscow in November 1998) were conducted under the ideas of “*multilevel approach*”, which was introduced in the “Moscow declaration on establishment of creative partnership between the Russian Federation and Japan” [Moskovskaya deklaraciya ob ustanovlenii ..., 2001, p. 14 - 20].

However, it should be pointed out that the “*multilevel approach*”, which articulated a purpose to create the basis for “strategic partnership” between Russia and Japan, had a positive effect on the establishment of partnership between the two countries at the dawn of the new millennium [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 214]. Henceforth, the practice of formulation of the conceptual grounds for bilateral relations continued to be applied and even got a new form. Since the

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<sup>2</sup> This kind of reconsideration was underlined by Tanaka Akihiko [Tanaka, 2017, p. 45-46], where the steps of M.S. Gorbachov government towards strengthening of Japan-Korea relations after Vladivostok speech in 1986 and speech in Khrasnoyarsk in 1988 are to be estimated as steps toward Asia-Pacific partnership engagement.

beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations have had a bilateral basis. For example, in 2003 the president of Russia V.V. Putin and the prime-minister Koizumi Junichiro signed “The Russian-Japanese action plan” which designed the main ways of bilateral cooperation at the beginning of a new decade [Yapono-Rossijskij plan dejstvij...].

## *(2) Diplomatic pressure tactics*

This part of the paper examines the most inefficient negotiation method, taking into consideration the fact that its introduction provoked the fall of bilateral dialogue between Russia and Japan. Using the diplomatic or oral “*pressure tactics*” for intergovernmental or business negotiations is not a technique used exclusively by the Japanese negotiators<sup>3</sup>. This tactic is widespread in world practice. In business negotiations it is combined with a great variety of other techniques, and quite often it is transformed into an *intimidation method* aiming to reach short-term results [Boughton, 2010]. The essential feature of diplomatic pressure is the use of any advantage of one side. However, these tactics, in the opinion of business community, is not effective, because under the pressure the second party has nothing but take a defensive position. Besides, as the Russian expert in international law I.I. Lukashuk notes that aggression is capable to generate counter-aggression - and instead of an agreement you receive a scandal and spoiled relations [Lukashuk, 2002, p. 107 - 112]. Kimura Hiroshi highlighted that the intimidation was applied by the USSR during the Japanese-Soviet negotiations in 1977 – the Soviet side estimated the Japanese delegation as a weak and unimportant negotiator, which affected negatively, even harmfully, the results of the bilateral fishery talks [Kimura, 1981, pp. 36 - 38]. The Japanese side was humiliated by the Soviet “Big Powerism”<sup>4</sup>, and this worsened the state-to-state relations for the period of eight years shaping a negative image of the USSR in Japan.

However, 15 years later it was Japan that used an unprecedented pressure on the Soviet and then Russian side during the talks. Diplomatic pressure was used by the Japanese side with respect to territorial claims which heavily relied on the economic aid and international recognition of the young Russian Federation and its government. Since the end of the 1980s, the Japanese participants of negotiations tried to put the “territorial issue” forward at negotiations of all levels, intending to get a favorable for Japan solution. The issue was discussed at international summits, was included into official statements of the prime-minister and the minister of foreign affairs, was raised during the visits of parliamentary delegations to Moscow and their meetings

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<sup>3</sup> It is necessary to note, that we mean “soft power” methods, which are avoid application of any “hard power” capacities.

<sup>4</sup> The phenomenon of bipolar world during the Cold War, when USSR and US possessed themselves to be the two world-poles, dominating in the global policy, economics, military affairs and culture as well.

with M.S. Gorbachev, etc. The Japanese negotiators of different levels mentioned that “the problem of the northern territories” needs to be solved. That caused annoyance on the side of the Soviet leadership. In his memoirs M.S. Gorbachev describes the Japanese Socialist Party delegation visit on May 6, 1988, when the Socialist Party representatives were the first among Japanese official circles to bring up the question of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan. M.S. Gorbachev specifically notes that the Japanese guest – Doi Takako – “did not manage to avoid raising the question of “unresolved problems” and the Declaration of 1956” [Gorbachev, 1995, p. 259], the basic agreement between the USSR and Japan signed for termination of state of war between the two countries.

The “territorial issue” can be qualified as a chief goal for diplomatic pressure used by the Japanese negotiators. At each stage of negotiations, the Japanese side stated its position toward the “Kurile problem”, which annoyed the Soviet part. A visit of one of the leaders of the LDP (and the speaker of the lower house of the Diet at that time) Sakurauchi Yoshio is a telling example of applying these tactics. The Japanese politician arrived in Moscow in July 1990 to prepare M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan. In memoirs of the Japanese ambassador in Moscow Edamura Sumio (1990-1994) it is noted that Sakurauchi succeeded in meeting with the president of the USSR and acted in an extremely undiplomatic manner. After the statement of the Japanese position on the “territorial issue”, he demanded from the Soviet leader to pay close attention to this question during his visit to Japan. Edamura Sumio points out that M.S. Gorbachev was greatly displeased with that and said: “If I have to go to Japan to speak there only about one problem, then it might be better to reconsider the question of my visit” [Edamura, 2003, p. 50]. According to the Japanese ambassador memoirs, the situation became very grave, threatening to cancel M.S. Gorbachov’s visit to Japan.

Although the approach based on pressing demonstrated its inefficiency, Japanese politicians did not refuse from using diplomatic “*pressure tactics*”. The prime-minister Kaifu Toshiki, giving an interview to the Soviet journal “Far Eastern Affairs” following the visit of the Soviet leader, expressed the Japanese vision of the history of the “territorial dispute” between the USSR and Japan in extremely emotional terms, presenting Japan as an “affected party” [Interv'yu prem'er-ministra Yaponii T.Kajfu, 1991, p. 7].

Thereafter, the preparation of the Russian Federation president's visit to Japan in 1992 became the most glaring example of “*pressure tactics*” employed by the Japanese side. The Japanese diplomats achieved the most deplorable results for diplomacy toward Russia, when, becoming aware of economic and political weakness of the Russian Federation, they sought to put enormous pressure upon president B.N. Yeltsin while his visit to Japan scheduled for the autumn of the same year was being prepared. The Japanese side promoted the necessity of



“territorial issue” solution as the highest priority of the 1992 winter-spring bilateral negotiations at all international summits, including a meeting of “G7” in Munich in July 1992 [“Do:sho:imu” no shuyo:koku, 1992]. At the final stage of preparing B.N. Yeltsin's visit, at the beginning of September 1992, the minister of foreign affairs Watanabe Michio arrived in Moscow [Diplomatic Bluebook. 1992. Section 4...]. He informed the Russian government about decisive steps of the Japanese side concerning compensations to the inhabitants of the Kurile islands for the cost of their property on the southern Kurile and their legal status after transferring the islands to Japan [Panov, 2007, p. 75]. Watanabe Michio openly demonstrated that the Japanese side considers the “territorial question” to be solved, confirming the prime-minister Miyazawa Kiichi's vision of the situation, announced during the meeting of “G7” a month earlier.

These actions of the Japanese side were regarded by the Kremlin as unprecedented pressure upon the Russian president leading to an international scandal – canceling the official president's visit to Japan. One of the motives of the visit cancellation, as is sometimes considered, is a negative reaction of the Russian president to this pressure. The Japanese specialist in Russian affairs, diplomat Togo Kazuhiko expressed the similar vision and called the incident a “failure of the 1992 plan”. It is necessary to mention that many experts in the field of management and negotiations characterize “*pressure tactic*” as a most destructive if the negotiating parties seek to build up a long-term relationship. Thus, applying this kind of technique, the Japanese diplomats and politicians chose the least effective method to communicate with the Russian counterparts. Within several years the crisis of trust to the Russian government in Japan was felt, some future-oriented politicians and diplomats spoke of the necessity for the both sides to loosen pressure on each other. Fortunately, some positive changes in model of bilateral interaction could have been noticed. The failure of the so-called “1992 plan” led to revision of the rhetoric on both sides: the Japanese government realized that it was important to refuse from “*pressure tactics*” in negotiations with B.N. Yeltsin, as his reaction to any external pressure was extremely negative [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 224], [Kostikov, 1997, p. 104]. Since 1993, the basic principle of trust-oriented relations between the leaders and people of the two countries has become the priority of the Japanese side and is enshrined in “Tokyo declaration” 1993.

### (3) “*Face-to-face Diplomacy*”

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Japanese MOFA put forward the principle of “mutual trust” for establishment of the bilateral relations with Russia considering it as a basis for future comprehensive cooperation. “Mutual trust” idea is reflected in “Tokyo Declaration” of 1993, and

in his speech in 1997 at the assembly of Keidanren, Japan Business Federation, the prime minister Hashimoto introduced a new strategy toward Russia and welcomed “Eurasian diplomacy” of Japan, in which Russia is to be one of the regional attractors for Japan [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 227]. The former diplomat and one of the leaders of “Russian school” of MOFA Togo Kazuhiko in an interview given to the author of this paper on December 7, 2017, in Kyoto underlined that trust-oriented relations (*shinrai kankei*) are to be evaluated as the most important part of diplomatic relations, as one of the ways to strengthen mutual trust in interaction with Russia and other countries as well as the turn to “*face-to-face diplomacy*” (*kao to kao gaiko*;) as an extremely fruitful method. Of note is the fact that implementation of this method was widely undertaken after the Cold War termination owing to Russia and Japan's rapprochement in the 1990s. This method can be estimated as an underlying mechanism for multi-track and “people-to-people diplomacy” exercised by Japan around the world as an element of a “peaceful nation” paradigm at the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, in relations with Russia this method was introduced just at the end of the Cold War.

The “*face-to-face diplomacy*” focuses on strengthening interpersonal communications between Russian and Japanese societies in general. Establishment of contacts among politicians, businessmen, scientists and cultural figures is regarded to be of paramount importance. Introduction of the “*face-to-face diplomacy*” has a number of examples in the history of the Russian-Japanese negotiations in the 1990s, and it is still actively applied by the Japanese side in talks of all levels or tracks. According to the definition of researchers from the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (the United States, est. in 1992): “Multi-Track Diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It looks at the web of interconnected activities, individuals, institutions, and communities that operate together for a common goal: a world at peace” [What is multi-track diplomacy...]. The approach to apply multi-track diplomacy as a method for the US foreign policy was suggested by the diplomat Joseph V. Montville in the 1980's, when he suggested the term “track II diplomacy” as defining a non-governmental level of negotiations aimed to reach conflicts resolution between neighboring countries [McDonald, 2014, p. 7]. In the 2010s nine tracks were highlighted in their hierarchy: (1) Government – to – Government; (2) Multi-track diplomacy for conflict resolution; (3) Business connections; (4) Private citizens communication; (5) Bilateral or multilateral ties for research, training and education; (6) Peace activist; (7) Religion; (8) Funding; (9) Communications and the Media. The Japanese side started to use most part of these diplomacy tracks toward Russia in the 1990s introducing the transversal tactics included in the “*face-to-face diplomacy*”.

For instance, to represent the ways it works it is useful to mention the case of the diplomat Sato Masaru work conducted in the Soviet political environment at the end of the 1980's – the beginning of the 1990s. A vivid example of this diplomacy can be seen in communications of Japanese diplomat Sato Masaru with the Lithuanian politician V.N. Shved, who was a consistent supporter of maintaining the USSR integrity. Shved and Sato had numerous meetings in 1990–1991, discussed domestic situation in the USSR, accompanied their meetings with plentiful consumption of liquors. During one of such meetings, which took place in a casino in the fall of 1990, Shved told Sato about the beginning of the USSR collapse. He looked at the processes in a pessimistic way and his opinion colored the opinion of Sato Masaru on the situation in the Soviet Union [Sato, 2006, pp. 281 – 282]. As we can see, the “*face-to-face diplomacy*” might be considered as a variation of a “communication channel” tactics but on the multitrack, public level which adds to information-sharing and information capturing and is considered as one of the basic functions of the diplomat in the classical work by Francois de Callieres “On the manner of negotiating with princes” [Callieres, 1919, p. 69 – 70, 113 - 117].


Subsequently, the “*face-to-face diplomacy*” began also to be applied at the regional level. For example, the politician Suzuki Muneo used this tactic in the talks with Russian Far East representatives. He was considered as one of prominent specialists in the Japanese parliament on the Russian-Japanese relations and was involved in bilateral governmental negotiations. He was personally familiar with the diplomat Sato Masaru who was an expert in Russian affairs. Suzuki Muneo mentioned in his memoirs that Sato recommended him to visit Russia as often as possible and establish relations with representatives of the Russian society. They both held the opinion that “*face-to-face*” dialogue allows to create a valuable network with the Russian establishment in the “center” (Moscow) and in the “regions” meaning the borderland territories adjacent to Japan (the Sakhalin region, Khabarovsk and Japan Sea seaside region). Guided by the principle of the “*face-to-face diplomacy*”, Suzuki Muneo participated the parliamentary delegation in 1995 and made a trip to Kunashir Island where he got acquainted with local communities. In his memoirs, he gives a careful description of a meeting with the director of one of Kunashir schools, considering these events as a “case” of establishing “*face-to-face*” network with Russians and studying Russian negotiating culture [Suzuki, 2009, pp. 175 – 176]. Suzuki Muneo particularly emphasizes that he enjoyed seeing confidence in the eyes of local Russians. World practice knows similar problems, and making personal ties stronger is highly appreciated as an antidote for ethnic boarder conflicts [Notter, 1995].

To perform results-oriented public policy in order to revive good communication with the Russian public opinion after the “failure of the 1992 plan”, Japanese diplomats in Moscow and personally the minister of the embassy (1994–1996) Togo Kazuhiko started to take rather careful

steps, such as giving interviews to Russian journalists, in which he emphasized that the trust-oriented relations with Russia were favored by the Japanese government, as well as delivering lectures for the students of Moscow State University and MGIMO University (1995–1996) on the history of Russian-Japanese relations. He came up with the idea of “equilibrium dialogue” with Russia without exerting any emotional pressure on each other [Razomknut' «porochnyj krug» i razvivat'..., 1996]. The translation of these vision and values into the public diplomacy was expected to deepen trust of the Russian people in the Japanese government actions.

Notably, trust-oriented and long-term connections are a basic feature of the Japanese political culture. This approach was used toward Russia in the 1990s. The ambassador of Japan in Russia in 1999-2002 Tamba Minoru emphasized that the purpose of the Japanese MOFA in the middle – the second half of the 1990s was to establish long-term ties with the Russian side on the basis of mutual trust [Tamba, 2012, p. 18]. The lawyers Kuroda Kenji and Zhang Danian noted that the focus on the long-term and step-by-step negotiations aimed at establishing confidential relations between partners is regarded to be central to the Japanese business culture [Zhang, Kuroda, 1989, p. 201]. Kuroda and Zhang emphasized that Japanese businessmen studied the culture of negotiations in the western countries in the 1970s –1980s, but they did bring the traditions of Japanese management to the international scene [Zhang, Kuroda, 1989, p. 206]. Intentions and actions of MOFA “Russian school” (Sato Masaru, Togo Kazuhiko, Kawato Akio, Tamba Minory and other diplomats as well as politician Suzuki Muneo) did not contradict this paradigm, because their efforts were directed to detailed studying of Russian political culture and internal political situation. They tried to search for similar Russian and Japanese negotiation models in order to achieve the most visible results.

**Table 1. The hierarchy of diplomatic methods**



In this paper we examine several sub-tactics which compose the “*face-to-face diplomacy*”: *communication channel, informal negotiations, leaders talks*. These tactics and formats of talks

were introduced into negotiations on the basis of studying the Russian political culture in the atmosphere of Post-Cold War rapprochement of Russia and Japan. The tactics analyzed are far from being a complete list of methods applied by Japanese diplomatic tanks, however, these are the most representative and efficient approaches still in use. Pressure tactics, mentioned in the previous paragraph, should be defined as an element of the “*face-to-face diplomacy*”, because it was introduced in two-sides negotiations, but its negative effect on the bilateral interaction makes us classify it as not results-oriented and, therefore, it is examined separately.

#### ***Method A. “Communication channel”***

One of the most effective and wide spread negotiating tactics for the Japanese negotiators business as well as in diplomatic talks is looking for a “*communication channel*” and its establishing. The importance of creating a reliable “*communication channel*” with M.S. Gorbachev's associates was pointed out in the memoirs of Edamura Sumio. It took a long time to choose and establish direct contacts with M.S. Gorbachov's administration because of the reluctance and unwillingness of the Soviet side, but in the end Japanese diplomats understood that their search for direct channel was not going to get any help from the Soviet side and stopped their eyes on the president’s assistant for foreign policy A.S. Chernyaev [Edamura, 2003, p. 113]. On January 8, 1991, the ambassador Edamura managed to meet with A.S. Chernyaev and carried out a preliminary discussion on the planned visit and its agenda. That helped to provide an opinion exchange between the USSR and Japan on the preparatory stage of talks, but the “*communication channel*” was not sufficient for the sustainable and deep dialogue necessary to establish a results-oriented model of cooperation.

After December 1991, when B.N. Yeltsin and his associates came to power, the Japanese embassy made many attempts to establish a “*communication channel*” with B.N. Yeltsin's environment and after 2000 with the environment of president V.V. Putin. In the first half of the 1990's the minister of foreign affairs A.V. Kozyrev and his deputy G.F. Kunadze acted as a kind of “*communication channels*”, however, in 1992 they began to lose trust of B.N. Yeltsin and turned into an ineffective “*channel*” for Japan. The memoirs of Togo Kazuhiko and Sato Masaru (both served in “Russian school” of MOFA) speak of the unique role played by one of the closest to president Yeltsin politicians – G.E. Burbulis (the first and the last Minister of State in the RSFSR and the Russian Federation president administration), who was believed to have lobbied the Japanese interests in the Kremlin in the early 1990s [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 197]. Sato Masaru succeeded in establishing good personal relations with G.E. Burbulis, which helped to promote exchange of opinions at an informal level [Sato, 2006, p. 374 – 375].

In the middle of September 1993 G.E. Burbulis paid an informal visit to Hokkaido. He had a meeting with people of Nemuro and visited the prime minister of Japan Hosokawa Morihiro. Through G.E. Burbulis the prime minister transmitted his personal message to the Russian president about the program of further cooperation between Russia and Japan. During the trip the Russian politician expressed the necessity to “restore justice” of the “territorial issue” and suggested having more active involvement of the Japanese businessmen in the economy of the southern Kurile Islands, which will “allow a new generation of politicians to make a reasonable decision on the status of the islands” [Itogi vizita Gennadiya Burbulisa, 1993]. It is possible to say that G.E. Burbulis really became a reliable “*communication channel*” between the Kasumigaseki and the Kremlin and acted as the *personal envoy* of the Russian President. This intensive dialogue between the Japanese diplomats and the young Russia politicians can hardly be considered as implementation of a true positive interaction model, because an appropriate balance of the dialogue hadn't yet been found, however, still, the negotiations at the beginning of the 1990s can be regarded as a start of Russia and Japan rapprochement.

In the mid-1990s when G.E. Burbulis lost the credibility of president B.N. Yeltsin, the Japanese diplomats tried to come into contact with other politicians who had influence on the president. The diplomat Sato Masaru noted three key figures which could serve as a new “*communication channel*”: a security officer of the president A.V. Korzhakov, the chairman of the coordinating committee on physical culture and sport of the president of Russia Sh.A. Tarpishchev and the first prime-minister O.N. Soskovets [Suzuki, 2009, pp. 233 – 234]. O.N. Soskovets was, from the viewpoint of Sato Masaru, the most suitable figure for negotiations because he had a greater influence on the president, compared to the prime minister V.S. Chernomyrdin [Suzuki, 2009, pp. 235]. Nevertheless, the Japanese diplomats failed to establish close ties with O.N. Soskovets. Thus, Japan showed great intentions to find paths for fruitful and trust negotiations with the Russian establishment, in the mid-1990's, even though they were not very efficient.

After V.V. Putin came to power, the Japanese MOFA had nothing but resort to this tool again, feeling the necessity to find an effective “*communication channel*” with the new president environment. At the first stage, official channels and through the acquired connections with the previous president environment were put to action. But, in the middle of 2000 the Japanese side realized that V.V. Putin would build a new team. During his visit to Japan in September 2000 and later at the APEC summit in October 2000, it was agreed to organize high-level talks, at which the “territorial issue” was to be on the agenda. During the preliminary discussions, the Japanese side dealt with the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov who played the role of a main direct “*communication channel*” with the president of Russia in

anticipation of the planned negotiations. Sato Masaru who had great influence on the Japanese side as the leading analyst of the MOFA ranked S.B. Ivanov as a “key figure and direct link with the Kremlin” [Suzuki, Sato, 2007, p. 155]. In December 2000, an official delegation of the Japanese government came to Moscow. An ambitious politician, Lower House deputy from Hokkaido Suzuki Muneo, participated in these negotiations. He acted as a “*special envoy*” of the prime minister, acting the same role as G.E. Burbulis in 1993. The main function of a “special envoy” was to act as a “*communication channel*” for the Japanese side, to meet with representatives of the Russian president (a “*communication channel*” from the other side), to bring a “personal message” from the prime minister to the Russian president and back. In this framework of establishing “*communication channels*”, talks between Suzuki Muneo and S.B. Ivanov were held in Moscow on December 25, 2000, when the Japanese politician reported a personal letter of the prime minister Mori to president Putin. This fact should be considered as an example of using “*communication channel*” tactics because the message of the Japanese prime-minister was clearly directed to the president of Russia. Wide scale application of the “*communication channel*” method on different levels of interaction led to normalization of bilateral dialogue, as compared to the previous period, when no other evident “communications” except official negotiations were accepted by the Soviet side. “*Communication channels*” allowed to introduce a more or less trust-oriented and results-oriented dialogue helping to establish a new model of interest-oriented cooperation with strong public and political ties.

Application of the “communication channel” tactics and its variation such as sending of “special envoy” with personal messages or letters from the Japanese head of state to his overseas counterpart ought not to be interpreted as a tactics to communicate specifically with the Russian president. For instance, the prime minister Obuchi Keizo sent his personal letter to the prime minister of Vietnam Phan Van Khai with a “special envoy” – the chairman of Keidanren<sup>5</sup> Imai Takashi, who visited Vietnam in October 1998 within the Asian economic mission from the Japanese federation of economic organizations against the background of negotiations on introduction of ASEAN+3 framework [Tanaka, 2017, p. 204]. Adoption of a similar diplomatic tactics for both Russia and for Vietnam at this period suggests that diplomacy towards Russia became “normal”, identical to Japan's diplomacy towards Asian countries. This kind of similarity gives grounds to our hypothesis concerning normalization of the Russian-Japanese dialogue in the 1990s and Russia's taking its place among traditional partners overseas of Japan.

### ***Method B. Informal Negotiations***

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<sup>5</sup> Japanese federation of economic organizations

Informal talks are a worldwide tactics resorted to by all governments in different historical epochs in order to exchange opinions and reach an agreement on issues of common interest. In the case of the USSR-Japan diplomatic dialogue during the Cold-War period informal talks were scarce, which can be understood as weak intentions of both sides to establish a constructive model of cooperation besides interstate negotiations and several economic projects. The intention to introduce a new paradigm of relations in the Post-Cold War period due to the social and economic liberalization made it possible to conduct informal talks with the purpose of reaching an agreement on numerous complex issues of bilateral relations, including the territorial dispute.

Informal negotiations cannot be called an exclusive feature of the Japanese or Russian practice because it is well-known among diplomats, politicians and businessmen worldwide. The essential feature of adoption of this tactic by Russia and Japan in the 1990s lies in the choice of the place for talks which would allow to conduct meeting in a free informal atmosphere. L. Aronson noted that negotiations in an informal atmosphere, if they are well-prepared and the sides going step-by-step, are especially effective and promising in the case of conflict and compromise bringing peaceful solutions [Aronson, 2005, p. 10]. Notably, the informal talks tactics is also widely used in the Japanese political and business practice as a management technique called “*nemawashi*” and “*honne*”. Both principles assume preliminary informal coordination and consultations of the sides aimed to search for a compromising solution [Zhang, Kuroda, 1989, p. 199]. J.L. Graham emphasizes that at preliminary talks the style of the Japanese participants can be classified as the least aggressive [Graham, 1993, p. 128]. Moreover, the Japanese businessmen pay the closest attention to the needs and wishes of the second contracting party, looking for a compromise [Graham, 1993, p. 128]. This approach agrees with the idea of Togo Kazuhiko about negotiations based on the formula “51% to 49%” which can yield positive results in the case of talks with Russia [Togo, 2005, p. 45]. The formula consists in searching a compromise at a critical moment of negotiations, in case one party shows readiness to give in slightly more to the other party, i.e. to hold 49% of benefits against 51% owing the other party will finally obtain. Therefore, informal talks for reaching a compromise between two parties ought to be considered as a main reason for applying this tactic. In this regard, the basic function of informal talks is to search for a compromise and use the agreements reached informally as a preliminary stage for final a decision to be proclaimed at an official meeting.

The case for our study is “no-necktie meetings” between president B.N. Yeltsin and prime minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1997–1998 in Krasnoyarsk and Kawana. “Russian school” of MOFA insisted on holding informal talks between the leaders for the first time over a long period of bilateral negotiations in order to come to a compromise on the territorial dispute in the first place and to widen Russian-Japanese cooperation in various fields under the ideas of the



“multilevel approach” concept. Providing a new experience for the Japanese diplomacy in Russia “Russian school” representatives demonstrated high expectations, that were not to be realized.

The agreement to conduct informal talks was reached at the venue of 23<sup>rd</sup> “G7/8” Summit in Denver, the US, in July 1997 when the Japanese and Russian heads of states had a bilateral meeting [Tamba, 2012, p. 17]. The first informal Russian-Japanese summit was opened in a Siberian center – the city of Krasnoyarsk – on November 1-2, 1997. The meeting in Krasnoyarsk was carried out “behind the closed doors” that brought about waves of criticism of the president of Russia. The delegation of Japan, headed by prime minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, was thoroughly prepared both in proposals and in the style of negotiating with the Russian president. Despite adopting a new “multilevel approach” concept towards Russia aimed at strengthening comprehensive partnership between the two countries, the central objective of the Japanese delegation was their strong intention to find a compromise on the “territorial issue”. In order to resolve this issue “Russian school” of MOFA had provided a special training for prime minister Hashimoto so as to create a unique tactic for his negotiation with B.N. Yeltsin, based on meticulous analysis of the Russian president’s nature and preferences.

Negotiation tactics were expanded due to active participation of Suzuki Muneo, who joined Hashimoto Ryutaro's “team” as a minister for Okinawa and “northern territories” affairs and supervised the preparation of negotiations in the LDP structures and at government levels. At the end of October 1997 Suzuki Muneo together with the diplomats Sato Masaru and Togo Kazuhiko arranged a lecture “How to Construct Friendly Relations with Russians” for Hashimoto Ryutaro [Suzuki, 2009, p. 180]. According to personal preferences of the president B.N. Yeltsin, who usually conducted domestic and international talks in the Russian sauna, hidden in a very intimate atmosphere, the Japanese diplomats supposed that negotiations possibly would be conducted in a sauna. They convinced the Japanese leader that “joint fishing and sauna” (“*sauna policy*”) would have a positive influence on the bilateral relations. Hashimoto Ryutaro was also informed that during the meeting he would be forced into heavy drinking, and so he got a special training. Sato Masaru who regularly carried out field work and got information in Russia communicating with Russian informants in bars and restaurants, had enough experience in consuming considerable amounts of alcoholic beverages (“Self-destructing Empire” (Tokyo, 2006) and in “Art of Negotiating” (Tokyo, 2011)). Moreover, Suzuki Muneo noted that Sato had recommended him to resort to this method in negotiations with the local Russian Far Eastern authorities to resolve conflicts over illegal fishing by the Japanese fishermen [Suzuki, Sato, 2007, p. 190]. In this case, it is possible to speak about applying “*alcohol diplomacy*” at all levels of negotiating. Inclusion of the two approaches stated above into a set of negotiation tools demonstrates that “Russian school” paid great attention to personal traits and

preferences, because it was well-known that B.N. Yeltsin tended to arrange talks in saunas and had a predilection for alcohol drinking. From the Japanese MOFA standpoint, using this kind of tricks was thought to facilitate a sincere discussion on the “territorial issue” between the leaders. However, in fact, both “*sauna policy*” and “*alcohol diplomacy*” were not put into practice, because the Russian president had just undergone open-heart surgery and overheating in a sauna was for him health hazardous. According to the memoirs of B.N. Yeltsin: “On November 1, 1997, the prime minister of Japan Ryutaro Hashimoto and I were fishing in the neighborhood of Krasnoyarsk. ... With Ryu we had to fish up from the Yenisei River not only fish, but also peace. The true peace, laid on the foundation of precise arrangements” [Yeltsin, 2000, p. 135]. That means that the basic aim of the head of the Russian Federation was to conclude a peace treaty.

An informal discussion was held in the closed doors format and Hashimoto Ryutaro and Boris Yeltsin agreed on “Yeltsin-Hashimoto plan” for deepening comprehensive cooperation; one point of the plan was to negotiate and sign the Peace Treaty by the end of 2000 [Ivanov, 1999, 38], [Nichirokankeishi: Parareru..., 2015, p. 556]. The Russian and Japanese representatives discussed the roots of the idea to have the peace treaty concluded before the end of 2000, pondering whether it had its origins in the Japanese or Russian side, because the negative public reaction both in Russia and in Japan made the governments of the two countries try to dodge the responsibility and shoulder it the other party. In fact, the final decision on this plan was not reached. Regardless of this, the implementation of informal talks format made it possible to establish intensive high-level communication which, in turn, contributed to developing normal bilateral relations and forming a positive interaction model with a high proportion of state-level interaction along with developing people-to-people engagement<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, great impact on the establishment and development of a positive interaction model was made due to the basic approach – a joint problem-solving paradigm of negotiations and the informal format enhanced this kind of intention.

The spirit of joint problem-solving intentions and positive effect of informal talks between the heads of states deepened at the second “no-necktie” summit, which took place in the Japanese resort town of Kawana (Shizuoka prefecture) on April 18–19, 1998. MOFA of Japan analyzed the experience of the Russian-Chinese negotiations, held in November 1997, so as to frame a new proposal to solve the “territorial issue”. The Japanese side announced the so-called “Kawana plan” or “Plan of delimitation” which consisted in demarcating the borders between Russia and Japan: drawing the frontier between the Islands of Iturup and Urup [Tamba, 2012, p. 74 - 77]. The plan was based on the first Russian-Japanese treaty in Shimoda (formally Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia signed on February 7 (January 26 of the

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<sup>6</sup> People-to-people means to interact at citizens level, so called II Track of Diplomacy.

Old Calendar), 1855), when the border line was drawn between these islands [Traktat mezhdru Rossiej i Yaponiej..., 1906, p. 128 - 129], [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 250], [Suzuki, Sato, 2007, p. 26]. The former diplomat Sato Masaru noted that the plan was intended to be a “secret plan”. Not enough information concerning the scope of the negotiations is available, but according to Sato Masaru, the Kawana “secret plan” on the “territorial issue” was to level up the interaction of Japan and Russia, strengthening ties with the US creating the “Northern Alliance” to be able to balance against rising China [Sato, 2011, pp. 344 - 345]. In the view of our research, the “secret negotiations” and intention to deepen Russia-Japan cooperation in international matters shows that the informal talks became an effective instrument in establishing direct confidential bilateral relations. The official proclamation of the Kawana talks agreements took place during the official visit of the prime minister of Japan to Moscow in November 1998. The Russian side rejected the “Kawana proposal” because of the changes in the Japanese government, as Hashimoto Ryutaro was not re-elected as a prime minister in July 1998, and a severe financial crisis in Russia in August 1998. In spite of the fact that the “Kawana proposal” had not been put into force, some other points of “Yeltsin-Hashimoto plan” were implemented in “Moscow declaration on establishment of creative partnership between the Russian Federation and Japan”, signed by the heads of states on November 13, 1998, giving a layout for multilevel cooperation at the turn of 21<sup>st</sup> century. The informal talks were widely used between the Russian and Japanese parties in the 1990s within the multitrack diplomacy framework and were raised to the level of leader’s informal talks and are considered to have made a considerable contribution to normalization and intensification of bilateral interaction for the first time in the Post-Cold War period. Leaders talks of formal and informal type were used extensively in Russia-Japan negotiations especially during V.V. Putin's presidency since 2000.

### ***Method 3. Leaders talks***

Since the middle of the 1990s the aim of the Japanese MOFA has consisted in establishing direct contacts between the leaders of Russia and Japan. The case of V.V. Putin and Abe Shinzo's summit in December 2016 in Japan deserves to be viewed as an example of this approach. However, direct contacts between high-level statesmen were implemented in the Soviet-Japanese dialogue for several times, for instance, at direct talks without help of an interpreter between an influential politician of the LDP, Kono Ichiro and the Premier of the Soviet Union N.A. Bulganin in 1956 whose conversation of mutual trust allowed to upgrade the interstate relations, raising them on a new level [Kimura, 1981, p. 44]. From the other hand, traditionally, the decision-making level of negotiations is not the level of top-managers (CEOs), who just proclaim the final decision for cooperation with their business partner, the decision prepared for them by middle

managerial staff (chiefs of departments and deputy directors in case of MOFA), who directly negotiates with partners [Zhang, Kuroda, 1989, pp. 197 - 200]. That is a basic feature of Japanese political culture. Nevertheless, in 1996-1998 MOFA focused attention on introduction of leader's direct talks. That was nothing new for the Japanese diplomacy, for example, the prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro managed to come into good contact with the U.S. President R. Reagan, thus succeeding in developing a dialogue based on trust and leading to results-oriented talks between Japan and US [Togo, 2007 (b), p. 94].

President B.N. Yeltsin's policy gave the MOFA's "Russian school" the grounds for development and deployment of negotiating tactics at the level of the leaders of the two countries. The former diplomats Togo Kazuhiko and Sato Masaru paid close attention to B.N. Yeltsin's personal features and his vision of the future of Russian-Japanese interaction. Togo Kazuhiko especially emphasized the fact that high-level summit talks were a rare opportunity for Japan to achieve success in negotiations with Russia [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 224]. According to his memoirs, a favorable situation for leaders talks occurred in 1996–1997, which was due the Hashimoto cabinet coming to power [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 221]. In June 1996 the prime minister of Japan held an important dialogue with the Russian president on international issues and various issues of the Russian-Japanese relations at the venue of "G7" summit in Denver. Togo marked out that during these negotiations Hashimoto Ryutaro sought to build a good contact with the president of Russia in order to establish a strategic partnership with Russia in the future [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 225].

Yeltsin–Hashimoto "no-necktie talks", in addition to the establishment of truly confidential relations between the leaders, assumed their personal responsibility for the decisions made at the meeting. The main purpose consisted in establishing personal friendly relations between B.N. Yeltsin and Hashimoto Ryutaro. The Japanese diplomacy managed to achieve this objective. During those talks the Russian side sought the Japanese assistance to get a membership in APEC, and with the Japanese support Russia joined this international organization in 1998. Moreover, with regard to the desire of B.N. Yeltsin's administration to join the "G7", Hashimoto Ryutaro sought to mediate this matter with the administration of the Russian president, the administration of the U.S. President B. Clinton and German Chancellor G. Kohl [Togo, 2007 (a), p. 222].

The same model of leaders talks based on confidential relations between the state leaders had to be implemented in 2000 when the new prime minister of Japan Mori Yoshiro paid his first foreign visit to Russia in order to conduct a meeting with the new elected president of the Russian Federation - V.V. Putin in April 2000 in St. Petersburg. Of note is the fact that the visit was of informal character [V Sankt-Peterburge prohodit neformal'naya..., 2000]. In 2000-2001 Mori and Putin met over ten times at the venues of international summits and during their

bilateral meetings. Mori-Putin talks should be considered as the most telling and bright illustration of leaders talks tactics in its application. The confidential human relations were formed between the two leaders, which helped to promote exchange of opinions on international issues and on complex issues of bilateral relations. Japan considers the Irkutsk summit of 2001 as the culmination of this dialogue, when the “Irkutsk Joint statement” was adopted aiming to deepen the bilateral cooperation in international, economic, cultural fields and make a leap forward to a final solution of the territorial dispute.

After the charismatic and nationalistic leader Koizumi Junichiro came to power in 2001, despite serious shifts in MOFA, the dialogue at the leaders level did not lose its dynamics. As a result, in 2003 the “Joint action plan” was signed which laid the foundation for the results-oriented Russian-Japanese dialogue based on mutual interests for the next several years. Yet, neither the adoption of this document nor leaders talks between the Russian president and the Japanese prime minister in 2003-2006 allowed to use the advantages of direct leaders talks tactics because of lacking trust between the leaders and their strong national ambitions.

The model of Putin-Mori leaders talks was introduced after 2012 when the strong leaders V.V. Putin and Abe Shinzo were elected to become state leaders. In the run-up to the Abe visit to Russia in 2013 the former prime minister Mori Yoshiro came Moscow [Vstrecha byvshego prem'er-ministra Yaponii...]. In 2000, Suzuki Muneo – the “special envoy” of prime minister Obuchi Keizo – handed a personal message to president V.V. Putin, in 2013 the personal envoy of Abe Shinzo – Mori Yoshiro – handed a message to president V.V. Putin in anticipation of Abe's visit with the purpose to prepare the Abe-Putin negotiations aimed at deepening mutual trust and seeking for a new positive interaction model. As a result, in April 2013 Abe Shinzo came to Moscow and “Joint statement” – actually the concept of the Russian-Japanese relations in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – was signed [Nichiroshuno:kaidan...]. In 2016, the Russian president's visit to Japan combined both elements of leader talks and elements of informal talks, when Abe Shinzo invited the Russian high guest to his native Prefecture of Yamaguchi, aiming to deepen personal ties [Pu:chin roshia daito:ryo: no ho:nichi...]. Thereafter working groups consultations between the governments were conducted in 2016-2017.

Considering negotiating tactics of the Japanese side in 2013-2016 we can note that, first of all, tactics for establishment of a “*communication channel*” was widely applied by Japanese MOFA. Sending the personal envoy of the prime minister should be considered as a variation of this tactics. Secondly, during 1996-1998 and 2000–2001 the tactics of leaders talks was introduced as the basic results-oriented technology on negotiations, seeking for the creation of direct contact between V.V. Putin and Abe Shinzo. The arrangements of 2013 and 2016 confirm efficiency of the chosen tactics. Leaders talks ought to be estimated as the most efficient tactics

for the structuring of interaction framework that indicates the character of the dialogue, whether positive or negative, that helps minor non-governmental actors to have their ideas introduced into bilateral relations.

## **Conclusion**

The 1990s became a period when a new model of results-oriented cooperation between Russia and Japan was established, while both sides intended to deepen bilateral dialogue under the spirit of “multilevel approach”. In the face of “Russian School” of the MOFA, the Japanese government put forward numerous newly adopted tactics the most important of which became the establishment of a basic concept for diplomacy that formed a framework for the politicians and diplomats activities. The usage of two contrary tactics – diplomatic pressure and “face-to-face diplomacy” - reduced the inefficiency of the first approach and gave a fruitful impetus of the second one. We examined only three tactical tricks, used in the last decade of 20th century by the Japanese diplomats in negotiations with their Russian counterparts. These tactics – “communication channel”, “informal negotiations”, “leader talks” – allowed to establish a positive model of cooperation based on mutual interests after the period of antagonism during the Cold War. That doesn’t mean the solvation of maintaining problems of bilateral relations, but the modus of interaction changed to the positive manner. At the same time, adoption of those tactics highlighted the importance of the “human dimension” in forming a “face-to-face” dialogue, since the diplomacy consists in humans connections. Therefore, in the 1990s the intention of diplomats from both sides allowed to create a results-oriented ties between the peoples and the governments of Japan and Russia. Finally, the intensive field work of the Japanese diplomats, who researched into Russian political culture, personal features of president B.N. Yeltsin's behavior, his environment, all these were used to diminish cultural differences between the Russians and the Japanese during the negotiations and allowed to find a ground to provide fruitful talks. The tactics, analyzed and presented in this paper, are often used in the work of high-level bilateral summits at present, therefore, this analysis could help to understand national logic and behavior of the Japanese side.

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