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Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography (TIPG 2023)

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TIPG 2023 Preface

On December 22, 2023, the International Conference “Topical Issues of International Political Geography” (TIPG 2023) was held in St. Petersburg (Russia). This proceedings book consists of the papers accepted by the Program Committee of the TIPG 2023. This volume addresses the specific issues of contemporary political geography and international relations, as well as provides a platform for discussion and collaboration of experts in Political Geography, Geopolitics, International Relations, etc. Participants from all over the world consider the controversies and challenges posed by globalization, focusing, in particular, on the ideologies of globalization and regionalism, migration crises, prevention of ethnic conflicts, and measures to promote sustainable development. The content of the volume may be interesting to expert community, academicians, and popular audience.

The Program Committee comprising of the recognized researchers from 14 countries had conducted a rigorous peer review. The unique characteristics of this volume are that it provides diversity and independence of assessments, promotes an understanding of such trends as multipolarity and multilateralism, regional integration, and the increasing role of states, as well as discusses a digitalization of international relations.

Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences provided a platform for the event held in cooperation with Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University.

The previous proceedings of 2019–2022 contain the titles of Parts I–IV and VI. Discussion has generated new works collected in the TIPG 2023 proceedings under this umbrella. By the way, TIPG 2023 discovered new directions for the studies. The titles of Part V (Migration and Socio-Demographic Processes) are new topics of TIPG comparing last year. In addition, education issues have been added to Part IV.

The chapters of the section “International Relations” cover such issues of international relations as multipolarity, small states, transport cooperation, think tanks, etc. The main idea of the section is to discuss the effects of global issues on the international relations and the effects of international relations on the global issues. The geographic space is a background for this discussion. Some studies represent

the international platforms as a context of politico-geographical processes (for instance, the Eurasian Economic Union as a platform for countries' cooperation). The chapters of the section discuss the international security issues related to the power distribution depending on the geographic location.

The chapters of the section "Ideologies of Regionalism and Globalization in Historical Context. Philosophy of Politics" focus on the spatial aspects of two parallel processes—globalization and regionalism. The authors discuss the effects of globalization on the nation state, ideology, identity, and symbolics of the nations and communities. The authors discuss such trendy phenomena and processes as national sovereignty, historical memory, etc. The context of the section is designed by the historical framework of geographical issues with the use of historical geographical approach to studying the politics. Following Élisée Reclus, "geography is history in space whilst history is geography in time."

The section "Political Institutions and National Policies" moves from cases at the national level to the local one. The chapters cover such issues of domestic politics as gender policies, public service, elections, anti-corruption policies, etc. The section contains a set of cases for comparative analysis focused on national and international cases (i.e., the EU, China, Post-Soviet countries). The contemporary background of the studies is the digital transformation.

The chapters of the section "Geography of Culture, Education, and Tourism" represent the culture as a factor of geography (for instance, international cultural exchanges, cultural policy, etc.) The chapters pay special attention to education and tourism as instruments of cultural policy. Can Nature-Based Tourism Empower Women and Foster Gender Equality? What are the main trends in the historical policy of modern states? The section is intended to answer these and other questions. The chapter of this section focuses on national cases (i.e., Russia and China), as well as international organizations (BRICS and CELAC). Special attention is paid to digital education and digital tourism.

The chapters of the section "Migration and Socio-Demographic Processes" deal with migration and socio-demographic issues. They focus on national, regional, and local cases of European countries, China, and Russia. The chapters discuss the digital and security aspects of migration. The authors make conclusions about the challenges of migration to the multiculturalism issues.

The chapters of the section "Sustainable Development" present the studies of international organizations and countries' activities in the field of sustainable development as well as theoretical issues (for instance, the concepts of Political Ecology, Environmental Culture, Sustainable Tourism, etc.). The authors analyzed the cases of international organizations (the European Union, BRICS etc.), as well as national cases (for instance, countries of the Global South, China, Russia, and the EU).

We would like to thank those who made this event possible and successful. We especially express our gratitude to the Program Committee members for their contribution to the event. We thank the authors for submitting their papers. We are proud to attract a great team of scholars from different countries and disciplines. We will work further to sustain and expand the TIPG community through joint research and collaboration.

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Part I
International Relations

New Dichotomy Non-Western World Versus the West: The Place and Role of Russia in the New Configuration of the World Order



Marina Lapenko  and Alina Naumenko 

1 Introduction

New geopolitical trends, the escalation of tension between Russia and the West, the special military operation of Russia in Ukraine, the confrontation between the United States and China, a new round of the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the confrontation between Israel and Iran have raised the question of a new understanding of the dividing line between the West and the East. This is not a traditional dichotomy but a new configuration of world politics in which the non-Western world is opposed to the Collective West (more accurately Euro-Atlantic West).

The dominant view in the Russian establishment is that it is necessary to break the system of Western dominance in the international arena, and there is a widespread belief that it is necessary to move far from the Western-centric view of the world that has existed for centuries in the policy and economy [37].

The Non-Western world is acquiring the greatest importance in the world order that is now being formed, and Russia has objectively quite good opportunities to strengthen its position in this process. In a world dominated by the United States and its Western allies, Russia, China, and other Non-Western countries do not see the possibility of ensuring their national interests in both the security and economic spheres.

In an analysis of the geopolitical consequences of the current situation, most Russian experts proceed from the fact that the United States and its allies are unable to assert their global leadership and ensure the advancement of a “rules-based order,” and a polycentric world could become a reality despite modern challenges.

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The Ukrainian crisis had become a bifurcation point and a new rift in relations between the West and the East. Most Non-Western states refused to support the anti-Russian position and sanctions of the collective West against Russia. Fundamental changes in global political processes and the global economy are helping to increase the qualitative role of the “Non-Western world” in the creation of a multipolar world order. Russia takes an active place and role in this process.

2 New Learning Contexts

When we speak of the classical definition of the Non Western world, we are referring to the areas in which cultures developed essentially apart from the Greco–Judaic–Christian tradition of Western culture. Thus, it included East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea), Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa [5, 13]. We can have summarized some of the major differences between Non-Western and Western cultures in related issues: the relation between society and nature, the role of religion in society, the structure and nature of cultural values, and the role of individuals and groups in society [14].

The classical discourse of West and East was imported into Russia in the eighteenth century and became the key dichotomy of Russian foreign policy (the eternal dispute between Westerners and Slavophiles). During the Cold War, there was a long period of stable geopolitical binary system—West versus East. Currently, this discourse has been rethought and reduced from the option “Russia is not the West” to “Russia is the anti-West” (and vice versa).

And the modern attempt to find a definition of Non-West is characteristic not only of Russia but also of all countries that, at the new stage of transformation of the world order, are trying to determine their identity and their civilizational basis.

Now the definition of the non-Western world is an attempt to view this world not through the eyes of former colonizers, according to Western standards, but from the point of view of representatives of this world who know it from the inside. This is another attempt to free ourselves from the colonial past and find true sovereignty: political, economic, and societal.

The discussion about the postcolonial heritage is still based on the theses formulated by E. Said in the book *Orientalism* [30]. It proves that the identity of the postcolonial East is often not autochthonous but imposed. Europe colonized the East and created artificial ideas about Eastern civilization, Eastern culture, and Eastern identity. The East accepted these stereotypes and began to cultivate them itself.

The same option applies to the political process of liberation from colonialism.

The formation of new states followed the model of European nation-states; for this reason, many political systems in Africa, the Middle East, South America, and the post-Soviet space have not yet been able to stabilize.

In general, the concepts of the West and the Non-West have no scientific status until now. Within the framework of metatheoretical tools, the categories “West” and “Non-West” can be easily explained in the paradigm of the social construction of

reality. They act as unique markers of social values, claiming a special identification value, i.e., directly related to self-presentation [35]. These are peculiar political declarations and not evidence of epistemological differences in the foundations of social knowledge in different parts of the globe.

The concept of “Non-West” was not developed scientifically, and therefore, the West denied everyone else the ability to conduct theoretical research. In this sense, it is characteristic that the concept of “Non-West” began to penetrate Western scientific thought toward the end of the twentieth century when the global scale of social changes became obvious, reducing the global significance of the West from year to year.

Thus, the concepts of West and Non-West have lost their classical geographical and value content. At this stage, belonging to the Non-West is determined by geopolitics, the desire to play an important role in the system of international relations, to maintain existential security and independence.

3 Methods of Research and Theoretical Background

The authors use a comparative analysis method, content and event analysis, and a forecasting method. Also, in the course of writing the chapter, the authors used a system approach, a method of situational analysis, and a method of analyzing the current situation. The chapter is based on Russian and foreign sources and a wide range of analytical materials. The authors of this chapter adhere mainly to grand theories in international relations (IRs) although they take into account middle-range theories and narrow-gauge theories [8, 9].

In recent years, a non-Western approach to defining the world order and its structure has begun to develop in the theory of international relations. A new Non-Western school in IR was created by such scholars as Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan [7]. They introduce non-Western IR traditions, challenge the dominance of Western theory, and reinforce existing criticisms that IR theory is Western-focused and therefore misrepresents and misunderstands much of world history and IRs.

4 Results of Research

4.1 New Non-West Approach to World Order

Non-West includes all countries whose tenets include the defense of a multipolar and more just world order. Non-West could be considered a coalition of dissatisfied powers of the US global hegemony, an “antihegemonic association,” and a platform most suitable for the democratization of international affairs. But, today it has become clear that essential role in the configuration of a non-Western international

system could play Russia, China, and other members of BRICS (in this case, you can also indicate the BRICS+ format because this para-organization not only expands its potential but also attracts new members) or other Non-Western regional groups.

By the opinion of the former American National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski [6], the most dangerous scenario for the US hegemony in global affairs is the formation of a coalition of dissatisfied powers (namely: China, Russia, Brazil, India, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia and others), representing an “‘anti-hegemonic’ group united not by ideology, but by complementary grievances. By common aversion to the dominant power of the [...] the United States” [10, p. 1].

The rise of Non-Western powers in the system suggests that “the world is returning to a culturally and politically polycentric form” [1, 2, p. 227]. For Non-West countries, international affairs should be based on five fundamental principles: mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, and peaceful coexistence between states [27, 29]. These countries opposed the “homogenization” of the world based on Western values and rules that are not universally applicable, emphasizing the equal sovereignty of all actors in the system, both politically and culturally, and whose relations should be guided by the UN, international law, and multilateral agreements. These countries want to be truly independent, protect their way of life and political choices, and play a more prominent role in global decision-making.

An analysis of documents of G20, ASEAN, and BRICS makes it possible to highlight the following propositions advocated by these groups: (1) the world should be multipolar, and global politics should be determined by multiple centers of economic, political, and civilizational influence; (2) the architecture of financial governance should be reformed in order to empower emerging economies; and (3) importance of emerging market economies should increase in the international system.

The impact of Non-West countries (developing countries) on industrial countries has become more significant over the past two decades. If this trend continues over the next 10–15 years, Non-West countries can be expected to play a much greater role in the world economy and have a much larger impact than the West.

Nowadays, developing countries have no significant influence within the key current multilateral economic institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. But these countries are already capable of creating effective free-trade zones, zones for trading national currencies, new trade routes, and new technological solutions. This means that from year to year, the West will lose its influence on the global economy.

Thus, Non-West is fighting against the hegemonic nature of the current world order and the unfair structure of the world economic architecture. The main aim is the process of real decolonization of the non-Western world.

4.2 Role of Russia in the Process of Strengthening the Influence of the Non-West

The strengthening of Russian statehood and power under the presidency of V. Putin, as well as the Ukrainian crisis and the conflict with the West, made it possible to revive two distinctive features of Russia—traditional values and the desire to play a global role in the system of international relations. After 2014, Russia returns to the justification of its civilizational foundation in both domestic and foreign policies. Civilizational ideas in international relations theory express states' cultural identification and stress religious traditions, social customs, and economic and political values. Russian civilizational ideas are determined by two criteria: the values they stress and their global ambitions [18, 26, 35].

It should be pointed out that Russia is facing an attempt by the collective West to reduce its international authority, including various events such as exclusion from international organizations and structures, the cancellation of sporting events on our territory, and a ban on Russian athletes competing in competitions. In addition, countries that are ready to interact with Russia are automatically perceived by the West as rivals. Thus, states have to make a choice between Russia and Europe and the United States. Due to the international influence, economic development and technological advancement of the West, the number of those who will support Russia will be small.

It is also worth noting that the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, adopted in 2023, is the first official document that proclaims that “Russia is a distinctive state-civilization” [20]. As stated in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, “Russia acts as one of the sovereign centers of world development and fulfills a historically unique mission to maintain the global balance of power and build a multipolar international system, providing conditions for the peaceful, progressive development of humanity based on a unifying and constructive agenda day” [33, Chapter 5].

“Humanity is experiencing an era of revolutionary change. The formation of a fairer, multipolar world continues. The unbalanced model of global development, which for centuries, ensured the accelerated economic growth of colonial powers through the appropriation of resources of dependent territories and states in Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, is becoming a thing of the past. The sovereignty and competitive capabilities of non-Western world powers and regional leading countries are being strengthened. The structural restructuring of the world economy, its transfer to a new technological basis, the growth of national self-awareness, cultural and civilizational diversity, and other objective factors accelerate the processes of redistribution of development potential in favor of new centers of economic growth and geopolitical influence, and contribute to the democratization of international relations” [33, Chapter 7].

Supporters of the civilizational approach have stressed Russia's unique capacity for understanding different cultures and guarding the world against extremes of nationalism and hegemony in international relations. Russian theory of international relations and political science for almost the entire post-Soviet period

borrowed Western experience and scientific approaches, and only in recent years, Russian IR theory has come to accept the importance of samobytnost, or national distinctiveness [11, 36].

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was immediately guided by the idea of joining the Western community. It was the first 20 years of independent development during the time of weakness in Russia. But during the time of the rise of Russia, her insistence on playing a unique role in European and Eurasian affairs began to conflict with the West's idea of expanding its political, economic, and military institutions, resulting in multiple political crises in relations between Russia and the West including military conflict in Ukraine.

Russia has challenged Western liberal ideology and leans on values of conservative family values, national sovereignty, a strong state, and great power. For this purpose, the Russian Constitution adopted in 1993 was changed in 2020 [25]. Since 2023, a new compulsory subject has been introduced in all Russian universities—the Fundamentals of Russian Statehood for all specialties. One of the sections of this course is called “Russian civilization.” Thus, not only in the scientific but also in the public Russian space, the civilizational approach, the exclusivity of Russia, and its messianic role begin to dominate. Today, as the international system is becoming increasingly post-Western, conditions emerge for Russia's new intellectual justification of its role in the world [35].

Sanctions and pressure from the West forced Russia to think about technological sovereignty, and a new concept for ensuring technological sovereignty was adopted on April 15, 2023 [28]. Russia's desire to achieve true sovereignty in technology, industry, and finance and Russia's insistence on its distinct interests promote her active rapprochement with China and other non-Western nations. It is a fact that none of these nations have supported the West and Ukraine in their confrontation with Russia and did not take part in the sanctions regime against Russia.

Russia's international activities are increasingly organized outside Western countries and aimed at developing relations with friendly countries. Overall, Russia has made essential headway in overcoming its dependence on the West and in developing global activities in partnership with non-Western nations such as China, India, Turkey, Iran, South Africa, and others. Russia, despite the incompleteness of the Ukrainian crisis, is not in complete international isolation.

As for the new world order, Russia and China note the rapid nature of the changes taking place in the world and the profound transformation of international architecture [15]. In addition, states “state the acceleration of the process of formation of a multipolar world order, the strengthening of the positions of countries with emerging markets and developing states, the growth in the number of regional powers influencing global processes and demonstrating their intentions to protect their legitimate national interests.”

Thus, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping intend to further promote a multipolar world order, economic globalization, and democratization of international relations in a fairer and more rational way. In addition, BRICS should be noted as one of the international structures that are increasing their political weight on the world stage. The BRICS Summit 2023, the expansion of the group, has become a relevant and

significant event. According to Sergey Lavrov, “states with different political systems and distinctive values set an example of multipolar diplomacy aimed at harmonizing relationships on an equal basis in many areas of cooperation.” The expansion of BRICS may mark a transition to a new multipolar world and also shows the success of the structure [32, 34].

In 2023, Russia held several major international forums—the Far Eastern Economic Forum, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and the Second Russia–Africa International Summit, each of which included a large number of delegations from friendly countries and ended with the signing of large business contracts. Russia continues to lead in non-Western economic associations, both global (BRICS) and regional (EAEU, SCO, partnership with ASEAN, SADC, and others) levels [16, 17, 19, 21, 22].

The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and European powers, on the other hand, has revived the Russian discourse about national exceptionalism within the country and outside especially in relation to the West [23, 31]. It became the reason for the Kremlin’s focus on containing the West globally. And there is not an opportunity to turn Russia into a besieged fortress.

On the contrary, the sanctions regime has discredited itself as an effective international instrument. The military–political cooperation of Russia, Iran, and North Korea was brought down by three sanctions regimes at once.

In general, in recent years, the balance of power in the international arena has changed and the era of “power transit” as the transition of global power from the United States to China, and more broadly, from the “Collective West” to the “Collective Non-West” [4, 12]. For a long time West has power to promote its values, rules and perceptions as in the policy and in the issues of security.

The transformation from unipolarity creates new ideas about war and peace. Primarily, Russia and China, two permanent members of the UN Security Council, created the successful conceptualization of the issues of war and peace. Russia has great experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, especially in the Syrian crisis [24, 25]. Non-Western countries began to support the government of B. al-Assad in response to the anti-Assad coalition of the “Collective West” [27]. The Ukrainian crisis and the Special military operation of Russia only confirmed the further inability of the Western coalition to achieve victories in military operations against non-Western countries [3].

Analyzing the “Annual Report of the US Intelligence Community on Threats to National Security,” we come to the conclusion that Russia is a serious and unpredictable challenge for the United States, primarily in the military–technical sphere. The document also states that Moscow is seeking dominance over the Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, the report puts forward a certain “scenario” for US–Russian relations, according to which “there is a possibility that a direct military conflict will occur with US and NATO forces.” Also, the so-called Russian invasion of Ukraine reduced the possibility of a Russian attack on post-Soviet countries [10].

Liberal interventionism of NATO and the EU turned out to be largely discredited in many regions of the world. The normative and value-based approaches tested within CIS, ASEAN, AU, and the SCO are of interest in the context of conceptualizing non-Western peacekeeping [4]. Thus, in recent years, the Russian Federation could have acted quite successfully as an alternative security provider. Russia could initiate new institutionalized mechanisms for ensuring global security.

5 Conclusions

The concept and definition of “Non-West” is not identical to the concept and definition of “East”; it is much broader in scope and more diverse in content. Therefore, when we talk about the actual geopolitical relations of states, it is more appropriate to talk about the “Non-West” rather than about the “East.”

It has become obvious that many Non-Western states are alien to Western values and norms, now proclaimed as universal, and their forceful imposition can only cause countermeasures, also of a violent nature.

In this regard, the dichotomous contradictions between the culture and values of the West and the Non-West, but especially the construction of a new world order, are more relevant today than ever.

In the next 20 years, the world order will transit out of the Western-centric framework. There are two models for interaction between the West and the East: the cooperation model and the confrontational model.

Using the method of scenario forecasting, we will try to find out what the world order will be like in 20 years. We have two models: (1) collaboration model and (2) confrontational model.

Regarding the first model, we note that under some conditions, Russia could revive the dialogue with the West and contribute to a mutual understanding between Western and Non-Western nations preventing the development of a dangerous economic and military conflict.

What are these conditions? First, an end to NATO’s expansion to the East; second, the normalization of the situation in the world and the peaceful resolution of crises, in particular, the conflict in Ukraine, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the confrontation between Israel and Iran, and the American–Chinese contradictions; and third, the restoration, development, and strengthening of the regulatory framework between the West and the Non-West.

As for the second model, we note that if the above conditions are not met, as well as if the parties are disinterested in building a fair, harmonious world order, we will always observe a confrontational model of interaction between the West and the East.

We think that all participants should contribute to building a more secure and integrated world. Such a world could be the result of global dialogue and cross-cultural conversation between West and Non-West countries.

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Latin American Integration and the Multipolar World: Strategies and Problematic Issues of Participation



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1 Introduction

Throughout its history, integration in Latin America (LA) has developed under the significant influence of changes in the international environment and has been a way to adapt the region to external challenges and smooth out its peripheral position [1]. In this regard, the relevant question seems to be what reactions from integration in the twenty-first century the trend toward the formation of a multipolar world causes.

In principle, researchers recognize that the emergence of multipolarity is an important factor in the development of contemporary Latin American integration. Thus, firstly, the connection between the emerging multipolarity and the dynamics of globalization processes and regionalization as their integral part is noted. At the same time, Latin America is turning into an international region (or a sum of them) and relies on interstate associations to formulate its “collective will” and convey it to other actors [2–5, pp. 147–175]. Secondly, the impact on Latin America of the actual end of the unipolar moment with its USA-centricity and the dominance of the philosophy of the Washington Consensus is taken into account [1, 6, 7]. In this regard, it is assumed that in the twenty-first century, some previously purely trade blocs, such as the Common Market for the South (MERCOSUR), are expanding their problematic agenda. Others, such as the South American Community of Nations (UNASUR), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC),

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are emerging for the first time under the motto of mutual support of states in pursuing their national interests and rise in the international arena [6, pp. 28–29]. Based on this, regionalism of the twenty-first century has been commonly referred to as “post-liberal” and “post-hegemonic” [7, 8].

The academic literature, especially in Russia, also expresses the thesis that Latin American countries rely on integration in attempts to become “the pole of a new system of international relations” [2, p. 51]. Speaking about Latin American regionalist thought, the autonomist school can provide some support for its verification. As it has already been proved by Ekaterina Kosevich (National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Russia) [9, pp. 175–183], within the framework of contemporary autonomism, basically, Latin American governments are supposed not only to struggle to prevent external interference and act in the national interests, which can, by the way, be understood in terms of a “greater Latin American homeland”, referring to Bolivarianist myth, but also participate in shaping global dynamics, multilateral norms, and rules. All this brings us to the topic of integration’s functionality for Latin America’s global positioning and self-projecting. Moreover, the idea of “strategic regionalism” by the Mexican researcher Giuseppe Lo Brutto is worth noting when one links integration and the emergence of a multipolar world. For Lo Brutto, most of the integration groups that have emerged in Latin America in the twenty-first century are, in principle, a reflection of the ambitions and capabilities of individual nation-states “to generate a multipolar power distribution that directly affects geopolitical restructuring not only at the regional but global level, meaning greater autonomy with respect to United States’ hegemony” [10, p. 120].

However, the existing research does not answer the stricter question of whether integration structures create opportunities for themselves as collective bodies, and not for individual nations, to become stakeholders of a multipolar world, and on which resources they rely to do this in the reality of 2020s. The goal of our study is to fill this gap. For this purpose, we first give a general idea of the phenomenon of a multipolar world from the point of view of Latin America’s participation in it. Then, the geopolitical component in Latin American integration is discussed. In the end, we examine different options for the international positioning of regional groups, noting the peculiarities and limitations of integration “responses” to multipolarity.

2 Methods and Materials

Our study is based, firstly, on a systematic approach necessary to consider integration groups as consolidated complex structures with a presumably common identity that interweaves them into the international system. Secondly, it applies the historical description and analysis of documents and rhetoric to discover the perceptions of multipolarity by leaders and the steps done by multilateral groups to take part in its formation.

To disclose to what extent and how the idea of a multipolar world might be present in the political texts, we conducted a critical discourse analysis. We followed van Dijk's approach, which focuses on identifying the peculiarities of recontextualization of a given semantic code in the rhetorical space in relation to its extralinguistic—social and political—conditionality [11]. In our study, the semantic code is represented by the very concept of “multipolar world” while social and political conditionality implies domestic and international environments affecting the functioning of selected multilateral integration groupings. In terms of specific techniques, we searched for references to the notion of “multipolar world” in open-access texts (mainly available on the official websites of the integration associations) and then provided their comprehension and interpretation.

Chronologically, the study focuses on the 2020s, as this period is associated with a dramatic restructuring of the global environment, in terms of a new multipolar order ascending [4, 12, 13]. As we sought to detect the references to a “multipolar world” that would presuppose any specific vision of international reality and not just a single mention of a concept, from the wider array of texts we chose the 19 items—summit materials, leaders' statements and experts' opinion papers—for our analysis. Based on the different recontextualizations of a “multipolar world” as well as observing the integration practices, we tried to identify the strategies of the Latin American integration groups' positioning in the changing international order.

The selection of multilateral blocs for analysis is motivated, first, by the presence of geopolitical projection within a group. This makes us turn to those associations that are qualified as cases of “strategic regionalism” [10]. The second selection criterion was the noticeable integration dynamism in a group at the turn of the 2020s. As a result, we focus on ALBA, CELAC, UNASUR, Pacific Alliance, and, to a lesser extent, MERCOSUR.

3 Latin America and Contradictions of a Multipolar World

The applicability of the definition “multipolar” to the world of the twenty-first century remains debatable. Our work proceeds from the premise that one can at least talk about the multipolarity-in-formation, as probably a transitional state of the international system (e.g., [5, pp. 23–27]). In such a context, the predominant position of the United States, consolidated with the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam order, is being constantly challenged by a large and diverse group of countries, including those from the global South, but at the same time, the emergence of an actor comparable to the United States in all criteria of state power and ability to influence others actors is still utopic. It seems possible to identify a number of key parameters of today's “multipolarity-in-formation” that influence Latin America's global presence.

First of all, multipolarity is associated with a general dispersion of power and influence in the world. Under these conditions, Latin American countries have the

opportunity to neutralize the lack of “classical” attributes of state power, diversify external relations through cooperation with various Euro-Atlantic players, mitigating the usual asymmetry in favor of the United States, and the former “second” and “third world”. At the very beginning of the twenty-first century, the post-Yalta system began to be characterized by the growth of multilateralism, which was embodied both in attempts to provide universal institutions, such as the UN, WTO, with greater representativeness, and in the creation of new multilateral structures to facilitate interregional, intercivilizational interaction, such as the G-20 or BRICS. Latin American diplomacy has historically relied on international institutions to balance the influence of dominant actors, so these circumstances have indeed created the preconditions for a more confident positioning of the region [3].

However, in comparison with the realities of the second half of the twentieth century, today’s international system is characterized by extremely variable dynamics in the interaction of its subjects. It can be associated with both the trend of interdependence and cooperation, rather inherent in the period of the 2000s—the very beginning of the 2010s, and, conversely, the crisis of the legitimacy of multilateral institutions, in which the Covid-19 pandemic played a special role, growth of interstate competition, everything more clearly marked by the turn of the 2010s–2020s. The current emergence of “multipolarity without multilateralism,” as formulated, for example, by experts from the Ibero-American think tank Carolina Foundation, is characterized as a negative factor for the prospects of Latin America’s global clout [14]. On the one hand, it encourages governments to advocate for the restoration of conditions for multilateral dialogue. On the other hand, it raises the question of the risks and opportunities of the region when it is involved in the confrontation between leading actors and blocs.

Here we can note one more—concrete historical—parameter of the forming multipolarity of the 2020s: the unfolding confrontation between stakeholders of the world liberal order and powers that disagree with its “rules”. The basis of the first “camp” is the United States and the European Union, the “core” of the second is Russia, whose behavior is perceived by the Western establishment as an existential threat to the world liberal order [15], and China, which by still maintains competitive-cooperative relations with the West. At the same time, from the point of view of approaches to LA, both camps are not uniform inside, and each of the above-mentioned players has their own project for geoeconomic and geopolitical involvement of the region in order to find allies there. Under these conditions, LA can either rely on the support of any external power or adhere to a position of equidistance while configuring its independent view of international reality. It is noteworthy that some Latin American authors (e.g., [16, 17]) in this regard talk about the “new Cold War” overlaying the multipolar context, and speculate over potential “new non-alignment” strategies.

Thus, the multipolarity as a feature of the contemporary international system presupposes accumulation and simultaneity of various trends, creating not only opportunities but also structural limitations for LA’s global role.

4 Geopolitical Dimension in Latin American Integration

Geopolitical design has traditionally been a significant component of Latin American integration, and the development of its agenda in the twenty-first century has further updated the function of integration structures as political spaces that serve to represent the region in the international arena.

Based on the current stage of regionalism in LA, three leading geopolitical projects have taken shape:

- pan-South American (around MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which functioned in 2009–2019 then fell into lethargy due to ideological contradiction and was supposed to resurge in 2023–2024),
- pan-Latin American (around CELAC and, potentially, ALBA, which did not receive regional coverage),
- a project of positioning at the intersection of Latin America international region and increasingly globally significant Asia-Pacific region (Pacific Alliance, PA).

In all cases, the driving forces were national foreign policy programs, which is consistent with the state-centric nature of Latin American integration. At the same time, since in pan-continental projects the source of international identity was the internal ideological and political unity of Latin or South America, the changes of governments that followed in the 2000s–2010s and crises in such integration locomotives as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela led to a reformatting of the blocs. Thus, the end of the political era of Kirchner (2015) in Argentina launched plans to reorient MERCOSUR from the idea of South Americanism to economic openness and the priority of extra-regional ties. Severe socio-economic difficulties and civil conflict in Venezuela during the presidency of Nicolas Maduro weakened ALBA, split CELAC, and brought down UNASUR, on the ruins of which the Forum for the Progress of South America—PROSUR arose, which has not had a consolidated international projection and, by and large, aimed only at the regional isolation of Bolivarianism. Brazil, with the coming to power of Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022), generally moved away from prioritizing the regional neighborhood as the basis of its international strategy, which undermined CELAC and deep integration within MERCOSUR as well.

Initially, the formation of continental projects was facilitated by the special context of the “left turn” of the 2000s and early 2010s, which meant that many governments had similar attitudes about the state supporting development and sovereignty, Latin American cultural and civilizational identity, and solidarity on the world stage. At the turn of the 2020s, after a period of electoral defeats, left forces are on the rise again, which, on the one hand, creates hopes for a new unifying impulse, on the other hand, leaves this issue controversial [18] due to high political polarization in the region and the complication of global realities.

The geopolitical identity of the Pacific Alliance from its very beginning has been directed outward, implying not so much Latin American solidarity as “representation of the region in the world, with a special emphasis on Asia” [19]. This deprived

the association of a solid institutional core, unlike ALBA or UNASUR but increased the Alliance's resistance to political turbulence and allowed it to maintain its model in its original form throughout the 2010s. During the existence of PA in its founding countries—Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile—ideologically very diverse leaders have been in power, from the left-wing populist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (President of Mexico from 2018 to the present) to the ultra-conservative Ivan Duque (President of Colombia in 2018–2022), but in each case, participation in the PA was considered by politicians from the position of continuity and pragmatism in the international self-representation of their countries.

Despite the differences in philosophy and internal dynamics, all formats of spatial positioning of Latin America are united by a focus on adapting the region to globalization trends. By and large, all mentioned integration formats have had either alter-globalist (ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC) or globalist (Pacific Alliance, MERCOSUR after the end of the “left turn”) character. They started from globalization not only as a reality of the twenty-first century world but also as an incentive for unity, albeit negative (e.g., in the case of ALBA, one can talk about unity based on criticism of transnational capitalism). Against the background of the worsening disintegration of global interdependence and multilateralism in the 2020s, in the discourse of Latin American politicians speaking on behalf of regional associations, on the one hand, there are calls to fight these trends (e.g., [20]). On the other hand, the importance of adapting to a fragmented world, divided into economic and geopolitical blocks is problematized (e.g., [21]).

5 “Responses” of Integration to Multipolarity in 2020s

Based on the complex nature of the multipolar context and the peculiarities of the geopolitical component in Latin American integration, it seems possible to identify several strategies for the international positioning of integration associations.

The first strategy might be called *truly anti-hegemonic*, it is associated with ALBA. With a left-nationalist and anti-American agenda, ALBA has, since its creation in 2004, embodied the most extreme and literal version of post-hegemonic regionalism. By the 2020s it experienced a decline in its international subjectivity due to the crisis in Venezuela and political conflicts in Nicaragua and Bolivia, but received the opportunity to strengthen it again against the backdrop of the erosion of the liberal world order.

ALBA is distinguished by consistent, noticeable both in official rhetoric (e.g., [22, 23]) and its information and intellectual field (e.g., [24–26]), references to the idea of a multipolar world from the position of overthrowing US' leadership, supporting China and Russia as counterweights. An argument for a “multipolar world without Western predominance” in the case of this bloc is also the idea that its countries “suffered from this hegemony” [27], which arose as a result of sanctions imposed against Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, as well as Russia and to lesser extent China. The Bolivarian Alternative was initially presented by its founders as a

pan-Latin American one, but due to its radicalism, it involved only a few nations. In the 2020s, against the background of erosion of universal trust in neo-liberalism and social and economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, ALBA seeks to return to positioning in a continent-wide manner, to present itself as a potential “engine that could drive the unification processes in Latin America and the Caribbean” (cit. according to [28]).

However, ALBA’s goals for revising the global liberal order do not receive support in a broader regional context. This can be associated, firstly, with the critical attitude of most regional forces toward the ideologies and practices of the governments of Nicolas Maduro, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Miguel Diaz-Canel in Cuba. Secondly, with the fact that the central actors of ALBA, due to their regime characteristics and foreign policy guidelines, have a narrowed space for maneuver in the international arena, including in universal institutions. At the same time, beyond political declarations, ALBA cannot maintain a general anti-American and anti-Western line on the world stage. Although ALBA members Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia are strategic partners of Russia and China, they have very close ties with the EU, and for Nicaragua, the United States remains the principal trade partner. While ALBA has built a number of mechanisms designed to support its self-sufficiency in the global economy (see [29, pp. 28–34]), it is in fact extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in commodities markets and actions of the countries—stakeholders of the liberal world order.

The second strategy is *strengthening continentalism*. Its logic is to transform CELAC and the reconstituted UNASUR into instruments for the collective representation of the will of Latin America in a fragmented and competitive world [21]. A positive attitude toward this strategy exists in LA at two levels: at the level of states—main drivers of integration (the mentioned ALBA countries, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil after Bolsonaro’s departure) and at the level of individual leaders—political figures who made a great contribution to the ideas and spirit of regionalism and South-South cooperation during the “left turn” era in 2000s–early 2010s. One may remember not only Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, who again became the president of Brazil in January 2023, but recall a whole group of ex-presidents, ministers, parliamentarians, and intellectuals who presented an open letter in November 2022 on the need to resume the work of UNASUR and strengthen the authority of CELAC (see [21]).

In theory, such a strategy seems the best suited to articulate the idea of Latin America as “the pole of a multipolar world”. However, its implementation presents a number of obstacles.

Thus, until now, one of the reasons for the impossibility of resurging UNASUR as a continental bloc is that the formula proposed by Lula for this association as “the voice of South America in a multipolar world” was not supported by various politicians—the heads of Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Chile and Ecuador. As the head of Uruguay Luis Lacalle Pou explained, the phraseology of a multipolar world hints at support for Russia and China to “artificially” downplay the role of the United States [30] and is therefore not suitable as a motto for integration. The result of discussions on the principles of reviving UNASUR at the summit in Brasilia in May 2023 was

a vague document without any mentions regarding any pan-South American geopolitical contour in general. By March 2024, 7 out of 12 original members stay in UNASUR or decided to return to it (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, Venezuela and Suriname), but according to experts, the relaunched association cannot develop a coherent program of action and its ambitions to consolidate South America and “enhance its performance in the race with other continents in matters of health, economic development, and environment” seem unrealistic [31].

CELAC has traditionally been the only pan-Latin American forum, which supported its ambition to “speak for the region”, and at the same time an internally amorphous and politically fragmented structure. The turbulence of the 2020s, on the one hand, gave CELAC relevance in the international arena. In 2021–23 The CELAC-China Forum intensified its work, a US representative arrived at its Buenos Aires Summit in January 2023, and the CELAC-EU meetings were restarted in July 2023 after an 8-year break. On the other hand, the Community faces the task of forming and promoting a common position for Latin America in the context of each time escalating competition among external powers. Some scholars believe that CELAC is capable of becoming a symbol of Latin America’s “new non-alignment” [32] against the backdrop of complicated relations among the United States and EU, China, Russia, and other major powers, but so far such “non-alignment” rather has prospects for situational balancing.

To begin with, in terms of economic development and modernization to confidently position Latin America in the world, CELAC sets ambitious goals that are unattainable without external investment. These goals include simultaneously achieving health sovereignty, digital transformation, creating new infrastructure [33]. Referring to this the CELAC countries are “in the crosshairs” of several megaprojects at once—the Chinese “Belt and Road”, the American “Build Back Better World”, the European “Global Gateway”, proclaimed just at the CELAC-EU summit in 2023. External partners can find their specific “niches” for participation in CELAC plans; thus, it is noticeable that the “Global Gateway” claims a leading role in ensuring the sustainability of healthcare systems in LA [34], while this area is not a direct priority for the “Belt and Road”. But on the whole, three megaprojects compete with each other, and Western initiatives are aimed at containing China’s presence in Latin America, while this actor is already a key sponsor of some projects that are strategic for the pan-continental unity—e.g., the construction of transoceanic transport corridors—and therefore very desirable for CELAC.

Moreover, besides the issues directly affecting the interests of the LA countries (such as sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands or the embargo against Cuba), CELAC does not have any common and concrete vision of the desired international order that could be promoted in the external contour. Thus, with regard to the multipolar world, it can be noted that in the rhetoric of internal CELAC meetings the sought-after image of multipolarity is not formulated at all. In the extra-regional interactions of the Community, the topic of the emerging multipolarity arises from time to time, but it is given different meanings depending on the partner: in the vector of China, for instance, it is linked to the openness of the world economy and the democratization of global governance (e.g., [35]), while for the EU the

message is about multipolarity as based in the high authority of the international law (e.g., [36]). As one can judge in both of these cases there are rather arguments about sustaining multilateralism and no specific geopolitical features of a potential multipolarity are posited.

Finally, the third type of “response” of regionalism to a multipolarity-to-come can be called *the diversification of ties*. Its essence is to maintain a dialogue with many existing poles of power at once while trying not to formulate positions along dividing lines in the international system. The Pacific Alliance can be considered a model example of such a strategy.

As already noted, the Alliance is characterized by a pragmatic self-presentation. It associates its partners, which include many countries of the Asia-Pacific region, China, the USA, Canada, the EU, with their, first of all, geoeconomic subjectness proceeding from the status of large markets, influential investors, and technological and financial centers. PA has a mechanism of cooperation with Russia as well, but it can distance itself from its geopolitical effects, since such a mechanism presupposes contacts not from government to government but to the Eurasian Economic Commission.

The main strategic document of the Alliance, adopted in 2018, defining its goals until 2030, states that it “continues to support free trade and globalization” [19]. The attitude toward multipolarity in PA, on the one hand, can be considered a derivative of the key guidelines for maintaining multilateralism and transnational connections. It is illustrative in this regard that Ivan Duque recalled multipolarity speaking of the ability of Colombia to attract a wide range of investors from different countries [37]. On the other hand, the issues of the centro-power configuration of the world are not given special attention at all in the Alliance, and the positions of national actors on this matter remain outside the scope of its common interest.

The status of an associate member is of key importance in promoting extra-regional ties for PA. As noted in its strategic goals until 2030, this status provides “*the network of integration* (emphasis added) between Latin America and the world” [19]. Such a metaphor can be considered a vivid illustration of a vision through the prism of global interdependence, rather than an anarchic, competitive international system. It clearly differs from the images of “the voice of Latin America in a fragmented world”, “the tool to put South America into the race of continents” and even more so of “the region’s participation in the struggle against the US’ hegemony,” formulated by those who promote UNASUR, CELAC, or ALBA.

The practical results of the Alliance’s international performance are the sum of diverse bilateral and multilateral agreements, which do not imply political obligations and are dedicated to free trade, business interaction, scientific, educational and innovative cooperation. This philosophy seems attractive to many Latin American actors, including the nations of MERCOSUR, which, after the end of the “left turn” era, has been experiencing a crisis of its geopolitical identity. From the economic point of view, plans to bring the MERCOSUR and PA integration models closer together that emerged in the mid-2010s are difficult to implement, but politicians saw in them an opportunity to promote MERCOSUR’s extra-regional partnerships and adopt the very ideals of open and pragmatic involvement in the world [38].

However, the strategy of presence in a multipolar world through diversified ties also has its limitations. The first one is the unclear prospects of globalization itself, which directly determines both the existence of a wide range of international alternatives—from Canada to China—and the legitimacy of neoliberal thinking, which, for example, was called into question by A. M. Lopez Obrador at the PA presidential summit in 2020 [39]. Secondly, geopolitics may still affect the ability of PA and MERCOSUR to safely combine diverse external vectors if the contradictions between China and the United States move into a more acute phase.

6 Regionalism as a Pillar for Latin America’s Performance in Multipolarity? Closing Remarks

It can be noted that multipolarity does not so much create conditions for Latin America to become an independent center of power in the world, but rather problematizes this issue for politicians and experts in the region. It becomes particularly relevant against the backdrop of the 2020s when the trend of decreasing concentration of state power and influence is superimposed on the growth of geopolitical conflictivity and fragmentation.

As far as one can judge, most integration groups, in principle, do not develop their own special consolidated view of the contemporary international system as multipolar (or potentially multipolar) and the place of Latin America or its subregions in it. Instead, their views toward the concept of multipolarity highly depend on how its member governments perceive the international situation or on the approaches formulated by important external partners. If, as, for example, in the case of ALBA, such a common view toward multipolarity is noticeable, its implementation in the international course of the bloc as a whole encounters obstacles.

Looking at all three types of the “response” to multipolarity by regionalism, we can conclude that integration, in general, does not ensure for Latin America or its subregions a status of consolidated, self-sufficient geopolitical player(s). It seems the most correct, as the autonomists put it [9], to perceive integration as a tool that “connects” Latin America as an international region to the dynamics of today’s world and expands the sphere of the foreign policy maneuver for its national players. Such an expansion presupposes not establishing any self-contained geopolitical spaces but rather the possibility for governments of appealing to both the stakeholders and opponents of the world liberal order, balancing between them, or pragmatically “bypassing” the problem of geopolitical choice and supporting multilateral cooperation. These considerations bring us to the idea that the most relevant objects of analysis of the prospects of Latin America in the changing international context of now should be their nation-states, and not the integration institutions. We believe that the potential of regional integration groups to secure for LA any overall meaningful position in a multipolar system is limited as it is always complementary to national approaches and capabilities in this regard.

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Transforming Roles of Small States in World Politics at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: In Search of Systemic and Comprehensive Approach



Bogdan Barabash 

1 Introduction

The research interest in small states is motivated by the fact that, despite a lack of unanimous agreement on the term, the study of policies and behavior of those states belonging to the category of small states allows for a better understanding of the influence of the constraining structural factors on political actors with limited resources and the modern nation-state per se. It also makes it possible to assess the relevance of the experience gained by small states in relation to not only polities with limited statehood and stateness but also larger sovereign states in terms of addressing a number of challenges including but not limited to the reproduction of political institutions, the preservation of state stability and national cohesiveness as well as functioning in the emerging multipolar post-hegemonic world and tackling global problems such as epidemics and climate change.

Many researchers specializing in small states have been increasingly noting that the characteristics of the new international post-Cold War system gave small states more opportunities to pursue their national interests, no longer keeping them just the pawns of the great powers [5], but allowing them to punch well above their weight [13]. This reflects the shift from the neorealist tradition of international relations theory to the liberal one. Indeed, such cases as Singapore, the UAE, and the Vatican City among many others demonstrate that physical smallness is not identical to insignificance and it does not shape the developmental outcome in a single deterministic way. However, from the point of the theory of international hierarchy, the category of small states is marked by a number of characteristics that highlight its weakness, peripherality, and dependence as “their leaders” perceive that their

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own state's security depends on the assistance of others [25]. Thus, small states by definition do not possess necessary resources to take certain roles like middle powers and great powers.

With that being said, there seems to be a contradiction between the stable analytical category of small states within the theory of international hierarchy and some small states that are increasingly playing more important roles in the contemporary post-Cold War era. The main research questions constituting the backbone of the paper are as follows. How does the perceived transformation of small states' roles fit in with the theory of international hierarchy? Is it relevant to claim that a small state is able to play a more important role while still staying a small state? What are the analytical instruments to make the study of small states more heuristically useful taking into account the said transformation? Answering these questions would particularly be instrumental in better understanding the essence of the changing roles of small states in world politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century from a systemic and holistic point of view.

The chapter is theoretical in nature and seeks to bridge the gap between two adjacent middle-level theories within the theory of international relations, namely the theory of international hierarchy and the theory of smallness. The former seeks to identify crucial processes and key factors influencing the position of states within the international hierarchy taking into account different categories of states including great, middle, and small while the latter focuses on analyzing various polities of small size and significance in relation to their behavior and development from a number of perspectives. Despite the fact that both theories acknowledge each other, there seems to be little overlapping between the two as the notion about some of the small states getting more opportunities to pursue their national interests does not address the change of their position within the international hierarchy. This is also complicated by the fact that the lines between great, middle, and small states are blurry [3]. In order to find an answer to the aforementioned research questions a literature review was conducted. After analyzing the recent developments in the theory of international hierarchy and the theory of smallness, an attempt was made to reconceptualize the notion of small states getting more opportunities to pursue their national interests and play a bigger role in world politics. Rather, it would be more precise to claim that some of the states initially belonging to the category of small states efficiently actualize their limited resources to play a bigger role in some functional subsystems of the global international system, thus drawing closer to the status of middle states. This is possible due to the fact that international hierarchy does not have a single dimension but rather is comprised of many functional layers where one state plays different roles. This reconceptualization makes it possible to claim that further introduction of additional subcategories of small states based on extra variables is needed to better understand the differentiation of small states within the category and inter-convergence of microstates, small states, and middle states as separate layers of analysis. Finally, some examples of the aforementioned processes are briefly analyzed at the end of the chapter to test the conclusions.

The selection of literature on the international hierarchy and small states was based on a query generated in the Scopus database using the keywords

“international hierarchy” and “small states” and sorted by the number of citations. The time frame was not formally set taking into account the relatively timeless and static object of research, however, only some fundamental works are older than 10 years, while the absolute majority of papers are no older than 5–10 years. Separate articles were picked as a result of analyzing the bibliography of selected scientific articles and using the ResearchGate web portal based on thematic connectivity. The articles were selected in such a way as to reflect both theoretical approaches to the study of international hierarchy and small states and the practical application of individual research paradigms, taking into account the entire range of measurements of the functioning of small states in the global processes. The search for papers by Russian researchers was carried out with the help of the RSCI scientific electronic library based on the number of citations and thematic connectivity, as well as by analyzing the bibliography of already selected scientific articles. The main purpose of the search was to identify the most cited scientific articles with the biggest academic impact reflecting the newest developments in the theory of international hierarchy and the complex functional and structural factors influencing the status of small states that shed light on the phenomenon of the transformation of their roles within the world politics. More than 70 initial articles and books were selected; however, the aim of the literature review was not to cover the extant sources as much as possible but rather to understand the general focus on the links between the two aforementioned theories.

2 Systemic Typologies of States and International Hierarchy

There are numerous ways according to which sovereign states may be classified or typologized for the purpose of a more nuanced understanding of both domestic and international processes relating to and happening with a homogenous group of states. This can prove instrumental in conducting proper comparative research and arriving at conclusions that can help scholars and policy practitioners become more aware of the new developments in the international arena particularly at the beginning of the twenty-first century when the new world order continues to emerge.

The primary and most fundamental typology of states is built upon their place in an international hierarchy. Perhaps, the first comprehensive conceptual understanding of it occurred in the wake of Napoleonic Wars after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) where all state parties to it were divided into great powers (namely Austria, Britain, Russia, Prussia, and France) and the rest (civilized countries). K. Waltz as an eminent contributor to the paradigm of political realism in his work accentuated six defining features of a great power, namely significant population and territory, vast resources, heavy military strength, strong economic capability and political stability as well as competence [32]. All these criteria were relevant not only for the initial great powers of the “Concert of Europe”, but the leading states of today, as well.

Yet, there is and has always been a limited number of great or superpowers as the absolute majority of states are characterized by more modest parameters. Nowadays, the four-category division is used more often. According to it, all sovereign states could be classified into the following groups taking into account their valued attributes: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers [30]. However, the portrait of the aforementioned categories of states is different not only in the temporal aspect, as there also seems to be a lack of scholars' unanimous agreement on what exactly constitutes a certain category currently, too. Key differences seem to revolve around the roles of the state in world politics, the ability to set or change the norms and rules, provide or receive public goods, affect the behavior of other states, and influence certain functional subsystems of the world system among many other dimensions.

However, all the aforementioned features are difficult to operationalize and scale. Moreover, they do not seem to completely correlate with each other as in the literature there could be found many ways to conceptualize what structural or behavioral criteria constitute a great power or a middle power. Conclusions about the belonging of a certain state to a specific category are rather intuitive and are based on the principle "I know it when I see it". Among some of key characteristics that could define the perceived status is the general scope of interests of a state—global, regional, or local [12]. In addition, the ability of a state to influence world politics, as R. Cohen puts it, could deem certain states as system-determining, system-influencing, system-affecting, and system-unaffected [11]. Moreover, Russian researcher M. Ilyin has expanded on J. Colomer's general and comprehensive typology of states in relation to their system roles and divided all sovereign states into megastates, macrostates, ministates, and microstates. This reminds of the traditional four-category distinction but here the researchers accentuate stateness, sovereignty, and statehood of the said states [9].

The overlapping effect and limited scope of truly exclusive traits like the strategies of bandwagging and joining alliances traditionally pertaining to small and middle states [26] also exacerbate the problem. For instance, such behavioral patterns as reliance on multilateral institutions, niche diplomacy, and soft power tactics that conventionally define middlepowermanship could be employed by both great and small states [4]. However, an important systemic distinction between great, middle and small powers in that regard was made by D. Cooper who claimed that great powers do not need to specialize, whereas small states are thought to lack the resources to exert global influence even through specializing [6]. Thus, middle powers are the only polities who are both willing and able to play key roles in certain functional spheres of the international relations system.

It is important to note that recent research tends to reconceptualize the international hierarchy in terms of a status acknowledged by other states rather than the mere presence of material capabilities [21]. It builds upon A. Zarakol's recent distinction between "authority hierarchy" and "power status hierarchy" [34] and lifts the contradiction of some states being perceived as leaders, rank, and file as well as outsiders simultaneously as the state's position can be different in various functional subsystem of the international relations system.

The chosen paradigm or school of thought by a researcher also determines what criteria are used to reflect the international hierarchy. For instance, from the point of view of structural realism, the size of economy and military might be crucial, while for institutional liberals soft power resources and engagement with global institutions and transnational actors of a state play a more important role. Neomarxists would determine the place of a state in the international hierarchy taking into account its technological sovereignty or position in global added value chains whereas constructivists would pay close attention to the declared position of the state on its status and perception of other actors [8]. Still, the existence of the international hierarchy is not denied by anyone, as all states have always been, are, and most probably will continue to be very different from each other in terms of the resources possessed and actualized, their behavior and mutual perception, among other things.

The fact that the international hierarchy is in a state of transformation is acknowledged by the majority of authors. However, the ongoing debates about it are mostly focused on the consequences of the changing structure of the international order in relation to the US being the only superpower and new emerging power centers including BRICS+ countries and regional leaders rising “in the hegemon’s shadow” [20]. A separate research field is dedicated to the study of revisionism, “overachievers” and “underachievers” [29]. The new roles of the middle powers are extensively analyzed as well. For instance, S. Teo claims that middle powers tend to weaken stratification where the great powers are concerned, and strengthen functional differentiation by means of taking on key and distinctive roles [28]. The said processes reflect an important theoretical understanding of the hierarchy transformation as on the one hand, it cannot happen too fast and drastically due to its complexity and multilayer structure, but on the other hand, it is not expected to go completely unnoticed, as power and status have always been constantly changing.

All in all, it should be noted that the universal typology of states is difficult to conceptualize as adjacent categories such as sovereignty, independence, statehood, and stateness, along with dichotomic characteristics like strength/weakness, significance/periphery and do not always correlate with each other. That is why it is crucial for the researchers to be aware of these overlapping characteristics to find the best operationalization when conducting research. The fact that the international hierarchy can have a direct or abstract manifestation depending on its conceptualization accentuates the importance of systemic understanding of factors that influence the development of the processes on the international arena. At the same time, the mere existence of great, middle, and small states demonstrates that these categories are marked by differences in roles they perform. While great powers set the norms in all spheres, middle powers play some important roles in separated function subsystems, small states are thought to reflect those states that are complete “price-takers”. However, what does the theory of smallness entail?

3 The World of Small States

3.1 *Conceptual Difficulties of Small States*

Small states as a separate analytical category are of no less importance and academic interest than the superpowers and great powers which have always been the focus of most research on international relations and world politics alike [22]. Granted, the number of states has drastically increased since the middle of the twentieth century with their average size logically decreasing. In the aftermath of the decolonization and collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia now the number of sovereign states according to the United Nations Organization is as high as 193, whereas the number of sovereign states mere 75 years ago was no more than 60.

At the same time, it would be an understatement to say that the research of small states has become more widespread in recent years. The literature on small states has noticeably grown and now presents various dimensions of analysis starting from political economy and demographics, domestic politics, to international relations and world politics.

Still, after conducting a review of the existing literature some analytical problems that to this day seem to be rampant could be pinpointed. They are as follows:

Firstly, the problem of connection between the theory of international hierarchy and the theory of smallness. In most research articles written in the framework of the general theory of international hierarchy, there is little emphasis on small states, even though they are recognized as a separate analytical category. More importantly, articles devoted to the theory of smallness tend to lack enough emphasis on the international hierarchy as a whole despite the presence of abundant and detailed case studies focusing on specific book examples of small states. This is especially important if small states are conceptualized as chronotopes (a dynamic category) rather than stable and rigid phenomena. As a result, there is little dialog between the researchers focusing on different analytical groups of states.

Secondly, the two-dimensional problem of categorization. There is an enormous number of criteria and ways for conceptualization and operationalization of small states, some of which are characterized by oversimplification (single variables such as population size) or, vice versa, high degree of complexity (indices comprising dozens of parameters at the same time). The use of certain qualitative and/or quantitative methods might result in remarkably different states such as Nauru and Singapore being categorized into the same category of small states despite being vastly different on many tangible parameters (and the latter clearly being an extremum on many parameters despite traditionally small area size). This reflects the problem of high diversification within the analytical group of small states. High diversification might lead to incomparable and incompatible roles of certain small states taken into account at the same time. For instance, the roles of the Baltic states performing the role of “gatekeepers” between the EU and Russia would be different from those of the integrated small states within Europe or those of Africa or Central America. Thus, there is a need for the introduction of subgroups of small states that

would allow conducting comparative analysis as the single group of small states does not seem to have a high heuristic value per se.

Moreover, there is a lack of unanimous agreement on certain states that might be classified as small. This demonstrates the problem of low diversification between the analytical groups. For example, while some scholars treat Vietnam as a middle power, others deem it a small power, especially in relation to China. The same could be applied to Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Belarus, and many more borderline examples [19]. This is also related to the temporal dimension of states, some of which seem to be able to change their place within the international hierarchy.

Finally, there is little emphasis on the differences and similarities between such interrelated concepts as small states and small powers. The distinction between the two categories was recently pinpointed by M. Maass and accentuates physical size and role of the said states within world politics respectively [18]. It reinforces the problem of conceptualizing international hierarchy because the notion of size is also a blurry concept.

All these problems cumulate in the supposed inability to make generalizing conclusions within the theory of smallness as well as conclusions with actual heuristic value. Yet, if small states are clustered alongside additional parameters resulting in the introduction of separate subcategories of small states, these problems will likely be resolved.

3.2 Possible Principles of Clustering Small States

The most basic division between small states could be drawn alongside geographical lines with regard to regions and regional subsystems of international relations.

Based on this approach, there could be identified clusters: small island states of Oceania, Central American small states, small states of the Caribbean, continental small states of Europe, small states of Asia-Pacific, and small states of Africa. At the same time, it is possible to distinguish subclusters within, such as the small states of Balto-Scandinavia, small states of the Western Balkans, and microstates of continental Europe. This principle is not only simple but also contains additional dimensions of historical genesis and development as well as political and economic ties between neighboring countries in addition to geographic proximity. Yet, there are small states that appear to be outliers, such as the Maldives, Ireland, Iceland, and others that do not have other small states around.

The following physical and geographical factors influence not only the status of the small state but also its development: the geostrategic location, the degree of isolation or openness, the proximity to one or more major regional powers and traditional ties with them, the proximity to other small states and traditional ties with them, the colonial past or lack thereof, the availability of tangible particular-intrinsic resources [16] that a small state can actualize, the physical size of the state.

The second approach takes into account additional parameters such as economic performance, recognition from other states and international prestige, population

size, diplomatic activity, etc. These factors tend to be dependent on the more fundamental physical and geographical factors with varying degrees of determination [23].

The third—behavioral—approach allows forming subcategories of small states based on the actions and decisions made by their leaders, which mirrors the second approach by turning the dependent variable into an independent one. From this point of view, small states would be such polities that have local interests, do not participate in international events, have little diplomatic activity, and so on. An additional layer to this approach would entail taking into account constructivist perceptions and self-identification embodied in the official documents and statements of the officials.

Additional analytical clusters of small states should be noted [2]: microstates occupying the smallest land area and having a very low population either economically developed or having lagging economies, but in general unable to have a significant impact on world politics primarily because of their physical size; small states playing an insignificant role in world politics and are extremely dependent on great or regional powers or playing the role of their guides; small states that came to perform a disproportionately significant role in certain functional subsystems within the international system; small island states all of which tend to play a limited role in world politics, but are characterized by unequal economic development; relatively large island states that can be considered small due to their proximity to larger regional powers; relatively large states that have lost some dimensions of sovereignty and belonging to the category of “failed states” or chiefly playing the role of buffer states; relatively large and independent states conceptualized as small due to their proximity to a larger and more powerful regional leader but could possess some traits of a middle state; relatively large states with low indicators of economically efficient territory or effective national territory.

Overall, there are many ways to add additional parameters and variables to the research on small states and it primarily depends on the methodological design and aims of the scholar. Method of agreement or method of difference (“most similar or most different” research design) [1] is the key methods that could be exploited in order to identify hidden developments in the operation of small states and beyond. Besides, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) may come in handy in identifying most influential factors among myriads of variables that comprise, affect or directly influence the phenomenon of smallness.

3.3 The Transformation of the Role: Theoretical Aspect

There is a clash between two ideas about the essence of small states, which could be briefly tagged as traditional and liberal approaches. The former has been present in the academic field since the theoretical conceptualization of political realism whereas the latter has a direct relation to the theories of interdependence and

political liberalism that arose in the 1970s and triumphed after the end of the bipolar confrontation.

The traditional approach to small states, which corresponds to the views of political realists, deems small states as the ones experiencing a shortage of resources in the first place, both material—demographic, physio-geographical, financial and others; and intangible, associated with the lack of influence on various global political processes and manifested in their dependence, periphery and weakness [31]. “Small states cannot survive on their own” is one of the key ideas of this approach.

On the other hand, proponents of the liberal approach note that in addition to structural factors, small states had tools to ensure their own security during the bipolar confrontation, so they did not disappear from the political map of the world. What is more, by choosing certain efficient strategies and by means of efficient actualization of limited resources, small states are able to achieve their goals, and, adhering to the principle of asymmetry [33], gain leverage over larger powers.

This distinction is manifested in the roles of small states in the international arena as well. Based on the literature review various authors conducting research on small states’ roles concerning their relations with their bigger neighbors tend to describe their interaction from a neorealist point of view assigning such traditional geopolitical roles as a buffer zone, a diplomatic mediator, a barrier state, a geopolitical gateway, the periphery [15] or a gatekeeper, a missionary and a mediator [27]. Moreover, as N. Kaveshnikov put it, small states today can sabotage the international political landscape by blocking strategic projects using the principle of formal equality of sovereign states, arbitrarily securitizing threats, undermining the world order due to the low professionalism of one’s own political elites; abuse the role of a recipient of external assistance and question the stability of the system due to vulnerability to external influence, which demonstrate their increased leverage [10].

Those who scrutinize small states’ roles within the framework of world politics, which is wider in scope than bilateral or multilateral relations between states, focus on the institutional opportunities of small states as neoliberalism posits. Among the incomplete list of new roles of small states thus could be summarized as follows: a functional specialist, an experimenter, a developer, a normative entrepreneur, a morality upholder, a mediator, and an attention-seeker. Thus, the debate about the dependence and peripherality of small states is still ongoing [7].

The truth is, as always, somewhere between the two extremes. The very transformation of small states and their role in world politics serving as the bridge between the traditional and liberal approaches is not a new discovery. Yet its manifestation is different in each case and in each group of small states. When speaking about systemic understanding of the said process, as mentioned before, not all small states are the same, so conclusions should be carefully made taking into account what cluster the state in question is a part of and what additional variables are used.

From this point of view, one should agree that in the current political landscape, there appears to be a growing diversification of instruments small states may employ to attain their ends. Among them are the participation in international organizations and multilateral formats, development of high-technological industries, mediation,

participation in peace-keeping operations, utilization of particular-intrinsic resources, and other numerous instruments that have been researched in the literature on small states. Yet, the efficiency and utilization of the said instruments differ. Considering the new parameters of the international system, as Russian researcher I. V. Kudryashova notes, the differentiation of the foreign policy courses of small and middle states is primarily due to their functional ability, rather than size or resources [14]. Efficient utilization of both material and intangible resources allows for small states to take a unique role in the specific areas of functionally differentiated international society [17].

As such, Singapore has become a major financial center while Qatar plays an especially significant part in the distribution of hydrocarbons. The Maldives attracts world's attention to the problem of rising sea levels (as it is at risk of literally drowning by the middle of the century) whereas the UAE develops innovative technologies for desalination of water ahead of others. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania derive the attention of the EU from their confrontational stance on Russia while Hungary rejects cutting all ties with Russia slowing down the EU's imposing sanctions on it. Djibouti serves as one of the biggest hubs of international military bases while Mauritius is one of the most successful African developers of IT security sector. The authorities of Bhutan experiment with Gross National Happiness index to measure the collective happiness and well-being of its population while Fiji has sent numerous soldiers on peace-keeping operations worldwide. These all are indeed sporadic and incomparable manifestations of small states' efforts to play a larger role in international processes, some of which are more efficient than others. Especially successful cases may demonstrate the ability of a state to change its position in the international hierarchy and play the role of a middle or even great power at least in one of the functional subsystems of the international community.

Thus, in addition to the emergence of new opportunities given to the small states as an analytical category within the international hierarchy due to the recent structural and systemic developments, separate levels of certain small states seeking to elevate their status should be taken into account. This serves as an important analytical instrument in understanding the growing differentiation within small states as well as between small states and middle states.

Membership in International Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs): An Illustration One dimension of the changing roles of European small states in particular can be demonstrated through the lens of their quantitative membership in IGOs in 1991–2014.¹ Despite the fact that, in general, more frequent participation in IGOs is more typical of large states, there are a number of small states in Europe that use this tool on par (Norway, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland). The largest increase was identified in those states that were part of the USSR with the most significant increase in the Baltic states. Within the European Union, major regional leaders (Germany, France, Italy) either reduced their participation in IGOs or increased it slightly, whereas all small states (with the exception

¹Data from: Pevehouse et al. [24].

of Belgium and Denmark) more significantly increased their participation in IGOs by several or even dozens of memberships. The tendency is also typical for non-integrated European states (Iceland, Andorra, Serbia, Switzerland, Norway). Monaco, San Marino, and Liechtenstein were joining IMO at a noticeably slower pace being more dependent from their historical neighbors. Overall, it is safe to say that there was a tendency of increasing quantitative participation of small states in IGOs while their larger counterparts were distinguished by a slower speed during the period under consideration. Thus, the gap between the larger and small states became smaller. Granted, these figures do not show the quality of participation but rather put the general outlines for further analysis.

Granted, this is just a small evidence of the transforming roles of small states in world politics, as there are numerous ways to see how exactly it is manifested among different groups of small states. Systemic methodologies aiming at grasping as many variables and cases while still keeping them comparable is a prerequisite for a well-grounded study within the theory of smallness.

Empirical Example: Singapore as the Most Evident Example of Overcoming Smallness

The use of some tools of foreign policy by small states can be considered taking into account the example of Singapore, an exceptionally small state being the only city-state in the contemporary world that performs a crucial role of global economic and financial hub, a mediator and an active international organization participator.

Since Singapore advocates the concept of the Southeast Asian region, it pays great attention to activities in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), being one of its six founders. Taking into account the fact that the creation of ASEAN was largely due to Singapore's desire to pursue its own policy separate from its nearest developed and powerful states, as well as because of its concerns about the spreading communism, it can be concluded that initially the security aspect was the most important for the city-state. Singapore's foreign policy on a regional level still adheres to the views of the first Minister of Foreign Affairs Sinnathamby Rajaratnam. Due to the constant threats posed by external adversaries and distrust from its closest neighbors for historical reasons, since the founding of the independent state, the government of Singapore has prioritized survival and bringing peace and stability to the region. This is the reason why Singapore's foreign policy is aimed at conducting a friendly dialogue with neighboring countries, as well as activities within ASEAN, which should promote regional integration without causing tension among the governments of the neighboring countries. So far, Singapore has been making significant contributions to ASEAN through financial and legislative measures, striving to build a self-sufficient region of Southeast Asia that will not politically depend on China, India or Japan. That is why it opposes the idea of any of these states joining the organization, even despite promises of increased economic well-being with the help of the "political giants."

From the economic point of view, ASEAN is of no less importance for Singapore, since its market has very close ties with the entire region of Southeast Asia. Realizing the need to integrate into the global economy in order to compensate for its limited

material resources, the founding states of ASEAN, along with the principle of security, prioritized economic development, which in recent decades has become practically dominant. The growth of economic interdependence, the promotion of the exchange of goods, technologies, and capital between the members of the organization, as well as the reduction of tariff barriers played a significant role not only for the economic growth of the entire Southeast Asian region as largely due to successful and innovative activities in ASEAN Singapore was able to find the means to conduct a comprehensive modernization, which turned a lagging-behind agrarian country of the third world into a major financial center. Since the 90s, Singapore has become the largest investor not only in Southeast Asia, but also, together with Hong Kong, shares the position of one of the largest Asian financial centers around the world.

Historically, ensuring its own security has been Singapore's most important goal in international organizations. Two years after independence, Singapore, along with five other developing countries, founded ASEAN with the strategic objective of resisting the powerful states of the developed West and the communist bloc of the USSR-China. However, in the context of Singapore becoming a powerful Asian economy, the security aspect has ceased to be the most important one. With the acquisition of economic independence and the ability to influence global investment and production processes, Singapore no longer sees the danger of losing its own sovereignty caused by the expansion of neighboring states. The desire to influence the strongest Asian states has become more apparent. Since Singapore is a supporter of the regional integration within Southeast Asia, it tries to prevent such powerful states as China or India from participating in the activities of ASEAN in order to maintain the existing balance of power. The desire to influence more powerful actors can be considered as an evolutionary step away from focusing on ensuring one's own security. In addition, Singapore's similar interest can be explained by the fact that it has a substantial amount of economic resources, as well as an international credit of trust. It is worth noting that Singapore alone, even though it has huge economic potential, is not able to particularly influence the developments on the Asian continent. It is its operation in ASEAN that allows it to achieve this. The universal prohibition of nuclear weapons in the region, which was initiated by ASEAN on the part of Singapore, despite the complaints of some states outside the coalition, can serve as a demonstration of this idea. Like almost any small state, Singapore tries to use various platforms, forums and meetings in international organizations in order to attract public attention to the problems that concern the government of the state. For example, proactive peace-making operations around the world and the signing of a document regulating humanitarian supplies to emergency areas, according to the plan of Singapore's officials should draw the international community's attention to the problems of self-determination of peoples, encroachments on the sovereignty of weaker states and low rates of development of countries of the third world.

All in all, Singapore demonstrates the most evident example of a weak "break-away" small state efficiently utilizing its geographic position as well as the complex of relations with its neighbors to turn from a dependent peripheral agrarian

micropolity to a financial hub, mediator, active participant in international organizations and investor.

4 Conclusion

The transformation of the roles of small states in world politics has been noticed by many researchers working in the paradigm of institutional liberalism, yet systemic and comprehensive analysis of the new developments of small states at the beginning of the twenty-first century remains yet to be conducted.

For this purpose, it is crucial to become aware of additional variables that allow categorizing small states into clusters using both qualitative and quantitative methods. This can substantially assist in building more generalizing conclusions that possess higher heuristic value. Thus, there is a need for additional subcategories of small states since on its own the only analytical category does not seem entirely conclusive.

Considering the status of a small state largely depends on the structural factors of world politics, their actions and responses should always be taken into account through the lens of international hierarchy rather than a mere account of possessed resources without context, which is unfortunately relevant for some case studies in the literature.

Close attention to new developments in the operation of small states in the international arena within functional subsystems of international community might demonstrate that some of the small states that were considered as such in the past have either found their comparative advantage while still staying small or have changed their position in the international hierarchy. From this point of view small states cease to be small rather than start to play different roles,—a conclusion which is different from the majority of research papers that do not take into account the international hierarchy closely. Yet the relevance of either conclusion should be determined in each case separately with enough empirical data to support it.

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Prospects for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region: A Case Study of the Indian Ocean Rim Association



Irina Zeleneva and Maria Alekseeva

1 Introduction

The Indian Ocean has been an area of interaction between peoples, civilizations and cultures throughout world history. The increasing importance of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) in the twenty-first century was emphasized by R. Kaplan [1]. Compared to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Indian Ocean arguably poses the greatest challenge for security management. The main security threats in the region are the politics of great powers, the spread of piracy, unregulated migration and the activities of extremist groups. Most non-traditional security threats are associated with the political and socio-economic development of the region: the problems of poverty and hunger, population growth, energy crisis and environmental degradation [2]. Slow economic growth, irrational use of ocean resources leading to significant environmental degradation, threats and risks to maritime transport and trade have led the Indian Ocean coastal countries to understand the need for common efforts within a regional organization [3]. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) was established on March 7, 1997, and the focus of its creation was clearly stated in the name “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation” (IOR-ARC). IORA includes 23 member states from different regions of the world.¹

¹IORA includes Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. China, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States are named as the dialogue-partners.

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The chapter is structured as follows: first, the theoretical framework of the study is given, then the IORA's origins, structure and priorities are presented, the opportunities and threats are identified and the conclusions are drawn to demonstrate the prospects of the IORA.

2 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypothesis

The concept of regionalism and subregionalism has attracted a lot of attention from scholars studying international relations. Recent integration trends contributed to the emergence of the "new regionalism" concept [4]. The main goal of forming regional integration groups is to solve regional problems in various fields (trade, cultural communication, migration problems, etc.). The process of regionalization prompts the member states of various organizations to coordinate their positions, seek compromise, and develop new mechanisms for regional cooperation [5].

The Indian region became part of the regional integration processes back in the twentieth century, followed by the creation of the IORA. The relevance of the topic has been proven by a considerable number of studies devoted to analyzing regionalism development and typologies of regionalism relevant to the Indian Ocean, as well as to the details of the IORA activities and its prospects.

All available literature on the topic can be roughly divided into several groups. The first group includes studies analyzing the concept of the "Indian region", as well as different concepts and approaches to the problem of regional security [3, 6, 7].

There are, in particular, several approaches to define subregions in the IOR. According to the first typology, the IOR region includes the coastal states that are bordered by the Indian Ocean. Using a functional approach, the IOR would be represented only by the 23 states that are formally considered to be the IORA members. However, there is a third approach to defining this region: all coastal states interested in security (in a broad sense) can be included in the IOR [8]. In our work, we will adhere to the definition that the IOR is made up of the 23 member states of the IORA.

The second group focuses on the history, structure, activities, and prospects of the IORA. A number of studies published before 2013 note the organization's weakness and express doubts about the very existence of the IORA, however, the researchers remain hopeful for the future [9]. In discussing Indian Ocean regionalism, the authors try to determine what type of regionalism the IORA represents. "maritime regionalism" is highlighted as the institutionalization of cooperation in maritime territories associated with the process of codification of maritime law [10]. In 2012, Dennis Rumley identified five interdependent elements of maritime regionalism in the IOR: the central nature of the Ocean, holistic multidimensional security paradigm, ecological concept as its basis, focus on human security, and regional cooperation as a cornerstone of the whole concept [11]. Since 2012, following the revitalization of the IORA activities, the interest in the IORA, reflected in rising numbers of academic publications on the topic, has been renewed. The emerging

research shows a trend to view regional multilateral organizations as the best way to combat non-traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean, and the IORA is seen as a potential platform for the development and coordination of joint efforts [12].

In 2014, within the framework of a study titled Indian Ocean Regionalism, a group of researchers made an attempt to critically assess some of the main strengths and weaknesses of regionalism at the pan-regional and sub-regional levels in the region. The authors focused on such problems as “securing” the Indian Ocean, competing regional security constructions, different viewpoints on the IORA regionalism, ASEAN as an example of interconnecting regional spheres, etc. According to the general conclusion drawn by the scientists, regional integration is no longer a strategy to restrain trade and investment transactions between neighboring regions and trade agreements; these network economic alliances ignore the conventional boundaries of the “region” and change political identity [7]. These conclusions correspond well with the concept of “open regionalism”, which has become the basis of the statutory relations of the IORA members and is usually associated with greater focus on internationally competitive strategies, rather than on regional competition. Even though sometimes criticized, this concept is believed to be capable of strengthening the economic integration of the region [13].

Moses O. Ogutu, considering regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region within the framework of the IORA, concludes that “while geographical proximity stimulates regional cooperation, ‘shared’ evidently plays a more central role in encouraging nations in far distant places to form an association for various economic, political, and social functions” [14]. Several authors address different aspects of economic development, Blue Economy, maritime security and sustainable development as the priority areas of cooperation that play an important role in promoting the region-wide goals of the IORA [14, 15].

The third group of research data concentrates specifically on the Blue Economy as a promising direction for the IORA cooperation. Maritime security is essential to support the Blue Economy. The maritime economy brings investment, jobs and food security to the region [12]. IORA makes a clear distinction between the concept of the Blue Economy and the more traditional model of “ocean” and “coastal” economies [16].

The authors of this chapter take the liberty of putting forward the hypothesis that since regional integration is no longer a restraining strategy for trade and investment transactions between neighboring regions, the effective development of the IORA should proceed in the future through expanded cooperation with dialogue partners and international organizations (ASEAN, BRICS).

3 The Indian Ocean Rim Association: Origins, Structure, and Priorities

In 2022, the Indian Ocean Rim Association celebrated its 25th anniversary. Its origins can be traced back to the inspirational ideas put forward by the South African President Nelson Mandela. N. Mandela’s proposal for cooperation in the Indian

Ocean was immediately supported by India and Australia. Upon its establishment on March 7, 1997, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) with headquarters in Mauritius included seven member states: Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, South Africa and Singapore.

Over the years of its existence, the IORA has travelled a difficult path, which has been quite aptly described as a journey “from inefficacy to reinvigoration” [17]. Since 2011, IORA has taken a more active stance, which was reflected in its activities in different spheres. In 2011, India took over the chairmanship of the IORA and was successful in identifying six priority areas of cooperation agreed-upon by all member states: maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, disaster risk management, academic, science and technology cooperation, tourism promotion and cultural exchange. In 2013, the organization took the decisive step of changing its name from Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) to the IORA to represent a new era and a break from “the organization’s underwhelming past” [17]. In subsequent years, the IORA added the Blue Economy model and gender equality issue to the agenda, which were later cited as fundamental for efficient development, and focused on such topics as the fight against terrorism and extremism, strengthening institutions and expanding ties between member states and international organizations such as the African Union, and ASEAN, as well as combating the COVID-19 pandemic.

The highest body of the IORA is the Council of (Foreign) Ministers (COM), which meets annually. IORA has two specialized agencies: the Regional Center for Science and Technology Transfer (Tehran, Iran) and the Fisheries Support Group (Muscat, Oman) [14]. IORA, as a regional organization, is based on the principle of open regionalism, the purpose of which is to promote trade and investment projects.

The 23rd meeting of the IORA Council of Ministers was held on October 11, 2023, in Colombo, Sri Lanka, with the main topic being “Strengthening Regional Architecture: Strengthening Indian Ocean Identity.” At this meeting, the chairmanship of the IORA was transferred from the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka [18].

Today, the priority areas of activity of the intergovernmental organization are: security, including maritime security; fisheries regulation; academic, scientific and technological cooperation; trade and investment facilitation; disaster risk management; tourism and cultural exchanges; Blue Economy; and women’s economic empowerment.

4 Opportunities for the IORA

In the twenty-first century, the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has increased both in geo-economic and security terms. The economies of the Indo-Pacific countries collectively grew by more than 300% in the 25 years from 1993 to 2018 [19]. The Indian Ocean provides important maritime trade routes connecting

Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. Strategic security is largely determined by the security of transit through the important sea routes of the Indian Ocean: the Suez Canal (Egypt), the Bab el-Mandeb (Djibouti-Yemen), the Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman), and the Strait of Malacca (Indonesia-Malaysia). The increasing geo-economic importance of the Indian Ocean can certainly be used by the IORA for effective development.

The Indian Ocean remains a strategic space both for the United States, Great Britain and France, as well as emerging powers (China and India), which have economic and military interests in the region [12]. The maritime route of the Chinese Belt and Road project, the so called “Maritime Silk Road (MSR) of the 21st Century”, passes here. There is an increase in the Chinese naval presence in the waters of the MSR, which is associated with the need to ensure the safety of the relevant maritime trade routes. The Chinese MSR project offers investments and loans to the coastal countries of the IOR.

4.1 Blue Economy Opportunities

Today, the countries of the Indian Ocean are paying more attention to economic issues and non-traditional security: human trafficking, weapons and drugs, combating piracy, illegal and unregulated fishing, climate change, oil spills from vessels, threats to ecosystems due to tourism activities, etc. Indian Maritime Security Analytical Center and the National Maritime Foundation note the lack of a clear structure of cross-border maritime security as a key problem in ensuring the necessary protection of economic assets [16]. To successfully combat traditional and new threats to maritime security, the efforts of individual countries are not enough; it is necessary to apply different approaches [20].

The maritime security, in its turn, as we have already indicated, is closely connected to the Blue Economy model, which despite its increasing popularity to this day has no single universally agreed-upon definition [16]. Nonetheless, there is a general understanding, that the oceans play an important role in preserving biological diversity, ensuring food security, and developing maritime trade. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982, gave the world a push to understand the economic potential of the oceans and led the coastal states to try and make maximum use of their advantages [21]. The emergence of a new paradigm of sustainable development has later brought different ideas to the forefront of the agenda. Thus, the UN proclaimed the intent to “conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”, as the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) No. 14 [22]. The concept of the “Blue Economy” is becoming increasingly widespread both in the agenda of international organizations and in national development strategies.

In 2014, at the IORA Council of Ministers meeting (Perth, Australia), the development of the Blue Economy was recognized as a priority direction [23]. The IORA Secretariat identified six priority areas for the Blue Economy: fisheries and

aquaculture; ocean renewable energy; seaports and shipping; marine hydrocarbons and seabed minerals; marine biotechnology and tourism. Fisheries form the basis of the Blue Economy play a key role in the food security of the coastal states [23]. The Indian Ocean has great potential for renewable energy. Sources of renewable energy in the region include wind, waves, tides, biomass, etc. Protection of local marine resources is also one of the most pressing needs in the development of sustainable tourism. Sustainable coastal tourism will help preserve fishing communities, protect the environment, and make a positive contribution to the sustainable economic development of the region [24].

IORA defines the Blue Economy as the part of the ocean economy that covers all ocean-related activities [16]. The Blue Economy, therefore, includes such industries as shipping, port infrastructure, shipbuilding and ship repair, marine construction and dredging, offshore gas and oil production, marine R&D and education, fishing and seafood processing, etc.

Since 2014, several programs in the field of the Blue Economy have been successfully implemented: “fisheries and aquaculture”, “safety and quality of products”, “sustainable management and development of fishery resources”, “ocean forecasting”, etc. [23]. The Blue Economy is in the focus of attention for all THE IORA states since the top priority of the Blue Economy is job creation, food security, poverty alleviation and ensuring the sustainability of business and economic models in the Indian Ocean. The First IORA Ministerial Conference on the Blue Economy (September 2015) adopted the Blue Economy Declaration. The Declaration states that the goal of the joint efforts of the IORA countries in the field of Blue Economy is economic growth, which will lead to sustainable development and environmental protection of the Indian Ocean region [23]. The Jakarta Declaration on Blue Economy, adopted in 2017, stated the need for increased support and financing, technology exchange, and building the capacity and skills of local fisheries entrepreneurs [25]. In 2019, the establishment of the Indian Ocean Blue Carbon Center was announced at the IORA Third Ministerial Conference on the Blue Economy in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The main goal of the Center is to accumulate the knowledge necessary to protect and restore blue carbon ecosystems (primarily mangroves), which will help improve living standards and reduce the risks of natural disasters [26].

4.2 IORA: Russia Cooperation Opportunities

In 2021, following the results of the 21st annual meeting of the Association’s Council of Ministers, Russia joined the IORA as a dialogue partner. Nowadays, Russia is trying to actively integrate into the processes taking place in the IOR. The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2022) identifies the Indian Ocean as one of the main regional vectors of national maritime policy (along with the Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific, Caspian and Antarctic vectors) [27]. The priorities of the national

maritime policy of the Russian Federation in the Indian Ocean are: the development of trade, economic, military-technical and cultural ties, the development of tourism; expansion of Russian shipping in the region; ensuring the safe functioning of maritime transport communications, including the fight against piracy; conducting marine scientific research in the interests of preserving and consolidating the positions of the Russian Federation [27]. As a result, the Blue Economy became part of the common agenda between IORA and Russia.

Joint Blue Economy projects can become the basis for fruitful cooperation between Russia and IORA in the Indian Ocean region. IORA showed great interest in Russian expertise in the organization's priority areas, including security, fighting piracy, tourism, fishing, environmental protection, science, and education. Representatives of the Department of Multilateral Economic Cooperation and Special Projects of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development participating in a meeting of the IORA's Working Group on the Blue Economy, which took place in 2023, became one of the positive examples of multilateral cooperation. At the meeting, representatives of the member states and dialogue partners discussed the main provisions of the draft for the Work Plan 2024–2027, which was to determine the main measures for the Blue Economy development in the region. Experts from different countries discussed forms of joint work to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, promoting sustainable fishing and open access to global fisheries trade markets for all participating countries [28].

In June 2023, the Department of Multilateral Economic Cooperation and Special Projects of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, together with the IORA, held an expert discussion on regional prospects and modern challenges of the Blue Economy. The discussion was attended by representatives of government agencies, business and scientific experts from 26 countries—member states and dialogue partners of the IORA. The seminar provided an opportunity to study existing national approaches to the development of the Blue Economy model and contributed to identifying potential areas for further cooperation in this direction. It was stated that “Russia is underpinning the Blue Economy development through sustainable management of economic sectors related to marine and coastal ecosystems” [29].

Experts from Russia, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Tanzania, and South Africa discussed different approaches to sustainable development of economic sectors related to the use of the world's oceans' and seas' resources and also identified a number of significant barriers. Malaysia expressed great interest in the Blue Economy, especially in matters related to the coastal border with the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Professor S. Nikanorov proposed considering the influence of the “blue” economy “through the lens of Human Capital Index, World Happiness Index, Happy Planet Index and Human Wellbeing Index. This step could help grasp the readiness of the population and level of satisfaction with the current economic policies” [29]. His report highlighted priority areas for business development: “marine technologies for the safe use, exploitation and protection of the Arctic marine environment, marine food systems management,

aquaculture and seafood trade, marine biotechnology and bioproducts (application of scientific and engineering principles to the processing of materials by marine biological agents for the provision of goods and services), and maritime transport along the Northern Sea Route (crucial for increasing stability of navigation)” [29]. To summarize, the Russian experience accumulated by using the Northern Sea Route with all its infrastructure can become a good basis for further cooperation between Russia and IORA.

Russia, like other IORA countries, sees prospects in the development of maritime transport and navigation, sustainable development of coastal areas, including tourism, sustainable fishing, combating marine pollution, and joint exploration of ocean resources. Renewable ocean energy, marine biotechnology, and marine aquaculture hold a lot of promise as future industries.

Since IORA is obviously endeavouring to use both national and multilateral measures to support the efficient use of resources, cross-border cooperation, and knowledge sharing to ensure the safety of the Indian Ocean [15], the experiences and lessons of another inter-governmental organization, ASEAN, in maritime security and Blue Economy can be beneficial for IORA [30]. ASEAN may consider applying to join IORA as a dialogue partner.

5 Threats Facing the IORA

All states of the Indian Ocean region are developing countries, but they differ significantly in the level of development of their political systems, civil society, security status, economy, cultural values and religions. Such diversity in the region makes it difficult to create a common political identity. The experience accumulated by the ASEAN countries can, therefore, be invaluable for more efficient development. For instance, the example of the ASEAN Foundation, dating back to 1997, indicates the vast potential of media, arts, cultural and educational projects to promote the common regional identity [11].

The IOR is dominated by the three economies of India, Australia and Indonesia. “This diversity is undoubtedly a potential obstacle in creating regional identity and realizing more functional cooperation in the future” [17]. The uneven economic development of countries in the region makes it difficult to promote economic integration. The Jakarta Declaration (2017) identified the creation of an IORA Development Fund only as a long-term goal, but many of the IORA members are in urgent need of assistance [25]. “If such an attitude towards the dialogue partners (compared to that of other regional organizations such as ASEAN) translates into greater institutional leeway for the partners to shape the IORA’s future legal instruments, their strategic agenda could potentially undermine the steps already taken towards the strategic neutrality of the Indian Ocean region” [11].

6 Conclusions

The main findings are as follows:

1. Over the 25 years of its existence, the IORA has gone from being inefficient and largely passive to a rapidly developing organization with an active stance on many highly relevant issues. Since 2011, the IORA identified and closely monitored several priority areas of development and cooperation. The renewal of the IORA's activities has contributed to the sustainable growth of the region and the creation of a common framework for successful regional economic cooperation.
2. A promising direction of development is the Blue Economy, which can become the basis for increasing economic cooperation between the IORA countries.
3. Ensuring maritime security and developing the Blue Economy will be effective subject to not only regional but also global integration. Expanding the IORA's cooperation with dialogue partners (for example, Russia) and international organizations (primarily ASEAN) will help find solutions for the financial, investment, and technological problems that the Indian Ocean region urgently needs.
4. In our opinion, the IOR faces numerous challenges that need to be addressed collectively on the basis of regional and, in some cases, global cooperation. Since regional integration is no longer a constraining strategy for trade and investment operations between neighboring regions, the development of the IORA should proceed in the future through expanded cooperation with dialogue partners and international organizations (ASEAN, BRICS).

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The Dong-a Ilbo's Perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai in South Korea



Sunyoung Park

1 Preface

How did South Korea perceive the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the Cold War? Furthermore, how did South Korea evaluate the PRC's diplomatic activities, which were represented by Zhou Enlai(周恩来)? Zhou Enlai was in charge of the PRC's diplomacy for a very long time, and it would be impossible to describe the PRC diplomacy without him.

This paper starts with these questions and tries to understand how the Dong-a Ilbo (동아일보) perceived this era. Searching for data using Zhou Enlai as a keyword in the contents of one of South Korea's representative newspapers, which includes the The Dong-a Ilbo, may be a useful way to identify South Korea's perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai.

Moonsang, J [1] analyzed the PRC relations discourse in the mass media from the 1950s to the 1970s as an existing study on Korean perceptions of the PRC, and Jungmi, C [2] comprehensively examined Korean perceptions of the PRC after the 1992 diplomatic relations between the PRC and Korea. Kihoon, L [3] found that the Chinese Revolution held the potential to overthrow the colonialist worldview that was constructed by imperialist cognitive systems for Korean intellectuals in the 1920s. The existing research on Zhou Enlai's relationship with Korea is exemplified by the papers of Sunyoung, P [4, 5] But the previous studies centered on the overall context of the period, but this paper is different. It examines the Korean perceptions of the PRC via the diplomatic activities of Zhou Enlai.

A methodology in regard to analyzing articles about the PRC and Zhou Enlai that were published in the Dong-a Ilbo is outlined in this paper. The newspaper has

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a history of more than 100 years till now, and it was founded as a national newspaper on April 1, 1920. Its core values are nationalism, democracy, and culturalism. The specific contents of the newspaper categorized items into several themes, which are then synthesized in order to analyze the characteristics of the Dong-a Ilbo perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai.

2 Trends of Zhou Enlai: Articles Over Time

The Dong-a Ilbo, which is one of Korea's leading newspapers, began publishing in 1920. It published a total of 109 articles from its inception to January 18, 2023. If you search using Zhou Enlai as a keyword, which includes the title and the content, you will obtain a total of 1402 results. Analyzing South Korea's perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai using Zhou Enlai as a title may be of limited significance. However, it is the title that shows the important meaning of an article, so it is possible to reverse the meaning of an article via the title. The editorials, serials, features, and contributions that contain the views of Dong-a Ilbo were analyzed in this chapter, so I was able to analyze the perception to a certain extent.

I summarized the yearly trend of the articles using Zhou Enlai as the title, which is shown in Table 1, in order to effectively analyze the contents that are related to Zhou Enlai.

Table 1 illustrates that out of a total of 109 articles that are related to Zhou Enlai, 1972 has the most articles with 17, which is followed by 1971 with 13, 1970 and 1974 with 8, and 1967 and 1973 with 7. Nixon's visit to the PRC in 1972 and issues related to the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations were intensively reported, so various articles were produced. The titles, core contents, and characteristics of the articles with Zhou Enlai as the title are shown in Table 2.

I left the remarks blank for ordinary news of the 109 articles below, whereas I marked editorials, serials, and expert contributions. If you look at the articles as a whole, you can get a good overview of Zhou's political life. The articles were mainly about public-private relations, the Great Leap Forward Movement, the National People's Congress, the Cultural Revolution with the Red Guards, the PRC's economic downturn, the Impeachment, the consolidation of Zhou Enlai's power, the power structure after Mao Zedong (毛泽东), and the death and memorialization of Zhou Enlai and his successor, which was Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) in terms of the domestic Chinese issues.

The PRC's interactions with the rest of the world were internationally covered, which included articles on India, Burma, Vietnam, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Pakistan, and Egypt. In addition, you will also find articles about diplomatic relations in Eastern Europe, which includes Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and Africa; there are also

Table 1 Yearly trend of articles about Zhou Enlai

Year	Items
1938	1
1952	1
1954	1
1955	3
1956	3
1957	1
1959	1
1960	2
1962	1
1963	4
1964	5
1965	4
1966	4
1967	7
1969	2
1970	8
1971	13
1972	17
1973	7
1974	8
1975	5
1976	5
1981	1
1986	1
1988	1
1992	2
1994	1

articles about Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Algeria, and the diversity of Chinese diplomacy, which includes the Soviet Union, the U.S., South America, and Oceania.

3 Analyzing the Contents of the Dong-a Ilbo for Each Issue

There are various types of commentaries and editorials on the subject of Zhou Enlai in The Dong-a Ilbo, which are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3 shows that numbers 1–3 and 6–8 are editorials, 4–5 are special sessions that are called *Today and Tomorrow*, 11 is part of a series that followed the Nixon visit, 9–10 and 12–15 are expert commentaries, and 16 is about Zhou Enlai following the release of the Russian documents. I categorized the Dong-a Ilbo's perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai into five categories by analyzing a total of 16 related materials and categorizing them by topic, which are provided below.

Table 2 Zhou Enlai Related articles key points

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
1	1938/12/17	New Progress in State-Public Relations, Vice Director of the Political Department, Zhou Enlai	Hinting at the development of relations between the Guomin Party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Zhou Enlai's leadership	
2	1952/07/10	Zhou Enlai warns India of danger of escalation	Zhou Enlai's Message to India: Efforts to Realize Korean Armistice	
3	1954/06/24	Zhou Enlai proposes a non-aggression pact to Nehru	Non-aggression pact proposal with India	
4	1955/01/29	Zhou Enlai ties a specific memorandum to India in London	Zhou Enlai holds a memorandum to Nehru and attends the Commonwealth Council of Ministers in London	
5	1955/04/26	Zhou Enlai's appearance	Taiwan Liberation and Sino-U.S. Relations	Editorial
6	1955/06/26	Accepting Zhou Enlai's visit to Pakistan	Accept visit to Pakistan	
7	1956/02/02	After seeing Zhou Enlai's proposal	Whether the Geneva Conventions are implemented	Editorial
8	1956/12/02	Bomb to Zhou Enlai	Bomb to Zhou Enlai's speech: Tell to invaders to withdraw from Egypt	
9	1956/12/03	Zhou Enlai and Nehru's disagreement over the Hungarian crisis	Disagreement with Nehru on the Hungarian situation	
10	1957/01/16	Zhou Enlai's nutritional injections	Problems in Eastern Europe	Editorial
11	1959/04/10	Yugo News Agency observes Zhou Enlai as Mao's successor	China's Succession Chart Forecast Report	
12	1960/03/01	Zhou Enlai's visit to India in April	Border dispute negotiations with India	
13	1960/04/01	Zhou Enlai will also visit Burma during his visit to India	Visit Burma as part of Zhou's visit to India	
14	1962/04/18	The bitter debate between Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai	Responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward	
15	1963/12/14	The CCP's Zhou Enlai predicts Khrushchev's fall	Prophecy of the secret meeting of the National People's Congress	

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
16	1963/12/21	Zhou Enlai's trip to Africa	Commentary on a visit to Africa	Today and tomorrow
17	1963/12/23	Zhou Enlai arrives in Algeria	Algeria arrival	
18	1963/12/25	The CCP's Zhou Enlai also visits Albania	Albania goodwill visit	
19	1964/04/27	Zhou Enlai's return report said, "We are willing to coexist peacefully with the U.S., but we cannot solve it unless the U.S. hand over Taiwan"	Calls for the transfer of Taiwan for peaceful coexistence between the PRC and the U.S.	
20	1964/07/16	Amid the turmoil in Indo-China, Zhou Enlai's visit to Burma	Visit to Burma to build diplomatic initiative	Today and tomorrow
21	1964/07/24	Johnson's correspondence with Zhou Enlai	Sino-U.S. correspondence to resolve Southeast Asian crisis via Pakistan mediation	
22	1964/10/24	Zhou Enlai sends a letter to the Japan explaining the nuclear test	The PRC pledges not to take the lead in nuclear weapons production	
23	1964/11/06	The CCP's Zhou Enlai visit to the Soviet Union	Sino-Soviet Relations	Editorial
24	1965/02/06	Koshgin and Zhou Enlai's secret talks	The PRC and the Soviet Union discuss visit to Vietnam	
25	1965/02/11	Second meeting with Zhou Enlai	Communist Party Congress held in Moscow	
26	1965/06/01	The CCP's Zhou Enlai visit to Pakistan	Visit Pakistan	
27	1965/08/03	Zhou Enlai meets with French Culture Minister Malraux	Talks with André Malraux	
28	1966/02/22	Zhou Enlai's visit to France next week	Visit France and Romania	
29	1966/06/17	Zhou Enlai's arrival in Romania	Arrival in Romania	
30	1966/09/13	Zhou Enlai also relegated?	Zhou Enlai stripped of his position as vice chairman of the CCP	
31	1966/09/17	Zhou Enlai deplores the accusations against Mrs. Song and the removal of the statue of Sun Wen	Admonishing about removal of statues of Sun wen and Song Qingling of the Red Guards	

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
32	1967/01/20	Zhou Enlai urges the Red Guards to return home	Economic downturn prompts Red Guards to return home	
33	1967/01/30	Zhou Enlai declares that both party and government leaders are anti Mao	Zhou Enlai's classification of five anti-Mao types	
34	1967/03/02	Mao Zedong delegates full power to Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai stopped the Cultural Revolution and entrusted full authority over Soviet relations	
35	1967/03/25	In Beijing, Zhou Enlai called Lin Biao the second leader	Lin Biao is the second leader	
36	1967/03/30	Zhou Enlai's power is getting stronger, and criticism is not allowed at all	Strengthening Zhou Enlai's power	
37	1967/05/15	Zhou Enlai's remarks are also examined in the U.S.	Possible Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War	
38	1967/05/17	With Zhou Enlai's assurance, it was also put into Korea and Thailand	If war breaks out, mobilization will be declared	
39	1969/07/03	Rumors that Zhou Enlai will take the lead in rebelling against Mao and Lin's regime	Revolt against the Mao-Lin regime	
40	1969/09/12	Koshgin and Zhou Enlai's sudden meeting	Talks to resolve Sino-Soviet border dispute	
41	1970/02/04	Zhou Enlai also warns of active Arab support	Zhou Enlai officially expresses support for Middle East issues	
42	1970/04/02	Soon Zhou Enlai will visit North Korea	Zhou Enlai's visit to North Korea	
43	1970/04/08	Zhou Enlai's intention to visit Pyongyang	North Korea-China Relations	Editorial
44	1970/04/09	The CCP and North Korea meet again. Analysis of Zhou Enlai's wink trip to Pyongyang	Sino-Soviet deterioration and North Korea-China easing	
45	1970/05/12	What are Zhou Enlai's four principles?	Unable to do business with investors in Korea and Taiwan	
46	1970/05/14	Zhou Enlai's four principles and Japan	Sino-Japanese Relations	Editorial
47	1970/05/27	What are Zhou Enlai's four principles?	Unable to do business with investors in Korea and Taiwan	

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
48	1970/12/11	The limits of the CCP's pragmatic diplomacy: achievements and prospects of Zhou Enlai's policy	Attention to foreign policy following the retreat of the U.S. and the emergence of Japan	William Bundy
49	1971/03/11	Fragments of the U.S. plane: Vietnam presents a vase to Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai received a gift of American airplane debris vase	
50	1971/03/22	Zhou Enlai formally apologizes to Britain for the Red Guards' attack on the hall	Official apology for the attack on the British hall by the Red Guards during the 1967 Revolution	
51	1971/04/19	Zhou Enlai hints at hopes to visit South America and Oceania	Hopes to visit South America and Oceania	
52	1971/05/11	Zhou Enlai negotiates Taiwan with the U.S.	Hopes for direct negotiations with the U.S. on Taiwan issue	
53	1971/05/12	Zhou Enlai argues that the U.S. warship's patrol to Taiwan is unfair	The U.S. fleet activity in the Taiwan Strait is unjustified	
54	1971/06/28	Zhou Enlai seizes power supported by Lin Biao and Huang Yongsheng reported in Hong Kong Star reports	Zhou Enlai seized power	
55	1971/08/02	Zhou Enlai and Vietnam talks	Meeting with the Vietnamese delegation	
56	1971/08/03	Zhou Enlai's diplomacy intentions	James Reston's exploration of the PRC	James Reston
57	1971/08/09	North Korean economic envoy arrives in Beijing and talks with Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian	North Korean economic mission talks with Zhou Enlai	
58	1971/10/04	Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing attended the CCP's October 1st Reception	Attended the National Founding Reception	
59	1971/10/07	Selassie and Zhou Enlai talk: 250,000 the CCP cheers	Meeting with the Emperor of Ethiopia	
60	1971/11/20	Japan's economic expansion is dangerous, Zhou Enlai says possible revival of militarism	Normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan is based on equality and reciprocity	
61	1971/11/22	The CCP Zhou Enlai and Vietnam Summit	Meeting with Vietnam	

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Table 2 (continued)

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
62	1972/01/22	Willing to sign the CCP nuclear ban treaty with Japan: Zhou Enlai will sign it after the establishment of diplomatic relations if Japan wants it	Talks with representatives of the Socialist Party of Japan and expresses willingness to sign a nuclear ban treaty	
63	1972/02/03	Jack-of-all-trades Zhou Enlai	Optimism for improving the U.S.-the PRC relations	Nixon's visit to China
64	1972/02/04	The CCP opens doors to the U.S.: Zhou Enlai hopes for scientific and cultural exchange	Hopes to interact with the U.S. science and cultural community	
65	1972/02/05	Nixon Disclosure: Zhou Enlai Gave Kissinger a Nine-Point Peace Plan for Vietnam	Vietnam's Nine Peace Proposals	
66	1972/02/05	The CCP expert Snow emergency: Zhou Enlai dispatched 2 doctors	Chinese doctor dispatched to treat Snow's illness	
67	1972/02/14	Nixon and Zhou Enlai	Hope for a new order in the Pacific	James Reston
68	1972/02/22	Zhou Enlai's welcome address: friendship doors already open	Zhou Enlai's welcome to Nixon	
69	1972/02/25	WP report: Zhou Enlai says U.S.-Vietnam summit arrangement	Willing to arrange summit talks between the U.S. and Vietnam	
70	1972/02/26	Full text of Zhou Enlai's speech: A frank discussion benefits both sides	A frank discussion that benefits both sides	
71	1972/03/02	Zhou Enlai invites Nixon's two daughters	Nixon's two daughters invited	
72	1972/03/10	Zhou Enlai's visit to Pyongyang: A source in Shanghai	Disappeared after visiting Hanoi	
73	1972/04/17	Zhou Enlai also blames the U.S.	The U.S. accusations of bombing of Vietnam	
74	1972/06/20	Kissinger and Zhou Enlai hold official talks today	Talks to resolve the Vietnam War	
75	1972/06/21	Kissinger and Zhou Enlai held two meetings	Forbidden City, People's Hall meeting	
76	1972/06/22	Kissinger and Zhou Enlai held a lengthy meeting	Emphasis on the Vietnam problem	
77	1972/06/23	10:47 am Kissinger and Zhou Enlai meet on their way home	didn't know the outcome of the Vietnam issue consultation	

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
78	1972/07/29	Stepping on the corpse of Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai seized power	Emerging as a powerful ruler	
79	1973/02/17	Asian talks after the end of Vietnam: Zhou Enlai and Kissinger's Beijing talk in the veil	Seeking ways to communicate directly between the two countries	Washington Correspondent
80	1973/06/26	Zhou Enlai's visit to the U.S. in October: Nixon will also visit the CCP next year	Zhou Enlai to visit the U.S. in October	
81	1973/07/07	Zhou Enlai declines invitation to the U.S. congressional delegation to visit the U.S.	Dissatisfied with the continuation of U.S.-Taiwan relations, refusal of invitation	
82	1973/08/15	Zhou Enlai to visit West Germany early next year	Zhou Enlai's visit to West Germany early next year	
83	1973/09/10	Zhou Enlai tells Japanese ambassador that he has no plans to visit the United Nations or the U.S.	No plans to visit the United Nations and the U.S.	
84	1973/09/18	Zhou Enlai's Drama on the 10th National Congress of the CCP: building a post-Mao coalition with Barnett	After Mao, plan to form a coalition of party leadership systems	The CCP expert Barnett
85	1973/12/03	The CCP's yesterday and today in the power struggle	Introduction to Zhou Enlai's translations	
86	1974/03/25	Zhou Enlai's belligerent remarks in support of African national revolutions	Tanzanian President's visit to support African national movement	
87	1974/05/14	Zhou Enlai's mild illness	Failure to meet with Pakistani prime minister	
88	1974/07/22	Zhou Enlai seems to have recovered: in an official appearance for the first time in 2 weeks	Zhou Enlai's official activities	
89	1974/09/06	Zhou Enlai's condition worsened	Zhou Enlai's condition worsens	
90	1974/09/18	Red Guards shot Zhou Enlai in May: news from Hong Kong	Hit, but not lethal	
91	1974/10/29	Guomin Government Intelligence director: Zhou Enlai ousted, Jiang Qing seized power	The theory that Jiang Qing will become the prime minister	
92	1974/11/18	10 weeks ago, Zhou Enlai had surgery for gastric cancer	Zhou Enlai Gastric Cancer Surgery	

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Number	Year	Title	Key points	Appendix
93	1974/11/20	Zhou Enlai dismisses gastric cancer surgery theory	Chinese foreign ministry denies news of Zhou Enlai	
94	1975/01/16	In September last year, Zhou Enlai made his first public appearance	Zhou Enlai's official appearance	
95	1975/01/18	Zhou Enlai's successor, Deng Xiaoping	Deng Xiaoping emerges as successor	
96	1975/01/23	Zhou Enlai reveals to a Japanese congressman that he suffered from heart disease	Zhou Enlai's own explanation of heart disease	
97	1975/02/01	Zhou Enlai and the chaos of the world	Elevate Zhou Enlai's moderates	James Reston
98	1975/09/26	Zhou Enlai's worsening condition	Theory of deterioration of sickness	
99	1976/01/09	Zhou Enlai dies	Illness and death	
100	1976/01/12	Zhou Enlai didn't know it was cancer	Zhou Enlai didn't know it was cancer	
101	1976/11/16	Jiang Qing prays to chase Zhou Enlai's plane	Jiang Qing prays to chase Zhou Enlai's plane	
102	1976/11/18	Zhou Enlai's widow, Deng Yingchao, returns to public life	Deng Yingchao returns to public activities	
103	1976/11/26	The CCP's Zhou Enlai Popularity Recovery Movement	People's Daily article report	
104	1981/06/12	Five women who navigated the PRC in the twentieth Century: Sun Wen, Jiang Jieshi, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai's Wife	Introduction of Deng Yingchao	
105	1986/01/08	Zhou Enlai memorial craze in the CCP	Praise for Zhou Enlai's commemorative achievements on the 10th anniversary	
106	1988/03/07	Commemoration of the 90th anniversary of Zhou Enlai's birth in the CCP	Praise for Zhou Enlai's 90th anniversary	
107	1992/07/12	Zhou Enlai's widow dies	Zhou Enlai's widow dies	
108	1992/11/22	Prime Minister Li Peng's first visit to Vietnam since Zhou Enlai in 1971	Prime minister Li Peng's first visit to Vietnam	
109	1994/07/23	Kim Il-sung ignores Zhou Enlai's U.S. landing warning	Korean war	Special document open for Russia

Source: The Dong-a Ilbo

Table 3 Special commentaries on Zhou Enlai

Number	Year	Title	Related Matters	Appendix
1	1955/04/26	Zhou Enlai's appearance	Sino-- U.S. Relations: liberating Taiwan	Editorial
2	1956/02/02	After seeing Zhou Enlai's proposal	The CCP's foreign policy	Editorial
3	1957/01/16	Zhou Enlai's nutritional injections	Eastern European changes	Editorial
4	1957/12/21	Zhou Enlai's trip to the Black Continent	Visit Africa	Today and Tomorrow
5	1964/07/16	Zhou Enlai's visit to Burma amid underlying turbulent Indo-China situation	Visit Burma	Today and Tomorrow
6	1964/11/06	The CCP's Zhou Enlai visit to the Soviet Union	Sino-Soviet relations	Editorial
7	1970/04/08	Zhou Enlai's intention to visit Pyongyang	North Korea-the PRC relations	Editorial
8	1970/05/14	Zhou Enlai's four principles and Japan	Sino-Japan relations	Editorial
9	1970/12/11	The limits of the CCP's pragmatic diplomacy: achievements and prospects of Zhou Enlai's policy	Zhou Enlai's policy	William Bundy
10	1971/08/03	Zhou Enlai's diplomacy intentions	Diplomacy intentions	James Reston
11	1972/02/03	Jack-of-all-trades Zhou Enlai	Sino-U.S. relations	Nixon's visit series
12	1972/02/14	Nixon and Zhou Enlai	A new order in the Pacific	James Reston
13	1973/02/17	Asian talks after the end of Vietnam: Zhou Enlai and Kissinger's Beijing talk in the veil	The PRC-U.S. communication	Washington Correspondent
14	1973/09/18	Zhou Enlai's Drama on the 10th National Congress of the CCP: building a post-Mao coalition	The CCP leadership	Barnnet
15	1975/02/01	Zhou Enlai and the chaos of the world	Zhou Enlai appoints moderates	James Reston
16	1994/07/23	Kim Il-sung ignores Zhou Enlai's U.S. landing warning	Korean war	Special document open for Russia

Source: The Dong-a Ilbo

3.1 *The PRC's Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of a Peaceful Image*

It was stated in the *Joint Statement of the PRC's Political Consultative Conference*, which was passed on September 29, 1949, the PRC's foreign policy is to maintain peace and interact with other countries [6]. The PRC's official foreign policy has been characterized since then by offers of peace. This was the case in 1955 when it expressed its willingness to negotiate with the United States over Taiwan, and in 1956 when it offered peaceful solutions to problems in the Asian region.

First, representatives from the Philippines, and the PRC discussed the Taiwan issue on April 23, 1955, at a luncheon. Zhou Enlai formally stated that he was willing to negotiate with the U.S. in order to ease tensions over Taiwan in East Asia. What was the state of international affairs at the time that led Zhou to offer to negotiate with the U.S.? The Dong-a Ilbo commented in response to this attitude that he was pandering to the U.S.

The U.S. insisted that Taiwan's national government representatives and the PRC must participate on an equal footing and demonstrate sincerity. The U.S. announced three conditions as a way to demonstrate sincerity to Zhou's proposal, which included: ① an immediate ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait, ② the immediate release of 15 U.S. citizens and 40 civilians illegally detained in the PRC, and ③ the acceptance of the Security Council's invitation to participate in discussions in order to end fighting in the Taiwan Strait [7].

Zhou Enlai's proposal for direct negotiations with the U.S. caused quite a stir in world politics, but the Dong-a Ilbo expressed that it was not a new proposal and could not be seen as a sign that the PRC abandoned its stubbornness and expressed its desire for peace [7]. The proposal was rejected when the Soviet Union proposed discussing the Taiwan issue in February 1955, which was due to the United States' demand for a representative of the Nationalist government from Taiwan to participate. Nevertheless, the newspaper analyzed it as a lack of sincerity in regards to promoting peace, when Zhou Enlai made the same proposal.

The Dong-a Ilbo doubted Zhou Enlai's sincerity for two reasons, which included ① the PRC sees accepting these terms as being fundamentally damaging to its internal and external image. ② It is highly unlikely that a Jinmen (金門) and Mazu (馬祖) island invasion would result in war. The PRC may therefore be trying to globally project a peaceful image and appear to be negotiating while accepting some of the U.S. demands in order not to lose its coveted UN membership. In addition, it was assumed that the PRC's purge of the Gao Gang (高崗), which is a pro-Soviet faction, would be a factor in regards to the U.S. adopting a more moderate policy toward the PRC.

In other words, the Taiwan issue that was proposed by the Soviet Union in February 1955 and the PRC's proposal in April may be the same or similar, but the PRC may change its attitude for the opportunity to join the United Nations if some conditions are accepted depending on the situation. In addition, if Sino-Soviet relations are bad due to the pro-Soviet purges, it is necessary to make a gesture that can seek conciliatory relations with the U.S., so even the same Taiwan issue may show different results depending on the time.

Zhou Enlai proposed four diplomatic directions for the PRC to pursue on January 30, 1956. This included ① organizing an East Asia conference with the broad participation of Asian countries in order to negotiate the peaceful reunification of Korea. ② The reopening of the Geneva Conference on the Indo-China Peninsula (中南半島) in order to ensure the realization of the Geneva Accords on the Indo-PRC Peninsula, that calls for the participation of India, Poland, and Canada, which are the members of the Vietnam Ceasefire Commission, in this conference. ③ Concluding a non-aggression pact between the countries of the Pacific Rim, which includes the U.S. and the Asian countries. ④ Endeavor to resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means but be prepared to resolve the Taiwan issue by war if necessary [8].

The Dong-a Ilbo asserted in response to the above four proposals by Zhou Enlai that they were not new. The idea of holding a separate East Asia conference in order to resolve the Korean issue without going through the United Nations is the same as the issue that was advocated at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The U.S. and South Vietnam are refusing to implement the 1954 Geneva Agreement in order to hold elections for the reunification of Vietnam, so it is also a frequent suggestion to resume the Geneva Conference on the Indo-China Peninsula in regard to ensuring the implementation of the agreement. The newspaper commented that repeating empty arguments demonstrates policy poverty on one hand, and it means that there has been no change in the PRC's basic policy on the other [8].

The commentary in the Dong-a Ilbo can be seen as questioning the sincerity of the PRC's foreign policy. The newspaper believes that the PRC's inability to offer anything different explains the strength of Moscow's control over Beijing, which is in the absence of any significant changes in the Soviet foreign policy. The assessment that the Soviet Union's and the PRC's foreign policies were related was based on a factionalized understanding of the world. It was seen under these circumstances as being a crucial task of the liberal camp in order to bring the PRC out of its diplomatic isolation, which is where it would have no opportunity for political and diplomatic influence in its relations with the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the Asian-Arab bloc for some time to come [8]. The newspaper warned that the liberal camp must therefore remain steadfast, increase psychological pressure on them, and achieve significant results [7].

3.2 Changes in Eastern Europe and the Role of Zhou Enlai as a Mediator

The Dong-a Ilbo observed in 1956, that 1957 would be a year of the final judgment for the communist state, which was due to the Polish and Hungarian agitations, the internal Kremlin issues, the rise of Malenkov, and the agitation of the Soviet Union's ethnic groups. It cited Zhou Enlai's European itinerary as evidence. The PRC initially opposed Soviet interference in the Eastern Bloc by arguing that each socialist country should be given equal political and economic status as part of its independence. However, it changed its attitude when Hungary announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact organization and supported the Soviet Union's policy of military repression.

The Dong-a Ilbo summarized Zhou Enlai's trip to Eastern Europe as ① the PRC's attempt to stitch together the crumbling communist empire, ② Nikita Khrushchev's life-saving campaign, and ③ an attempt to return to Stalinism as being the reason why Zhou Enlai cut his South Asian itinerary short and went to the Soviet Union in a desperate attempt to visit Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest [9].

What did the Dong-a Ilbo see as Zhou Enlai's role among these different views? Zhou Enlai's call for "*unity of communist countries*" in Eastern Europe was to reaffirm that the PRC needed the continued support of the Soviet Union in order to industrialize, and the PRC was no more than a puppet of the Soviet Union. It was above all clear that the PRC's policy was an attempt to prevent the collapse of the communist empire in the Asia-Europe continent. They read about the decline in Soviet power and the change in the PRC's ability to coordinate politics as a sign that the Soviet Union was unable to control the agitation of its satellite states by force and could only rely on Chinese political coordination. They saw this situation as an epochal change since the Communist Revolution and predicted that the collapse of the communist empire was not far away. They believed that Zhou Enlai's role could energize the communist bloc for a while, but it could not bring about a revival.

Of course, it could be argued that the reason for Zhou's leading role in the changes in Eastern Europe was more of an internal Chinese problem than an international problem for the communist bloc [10]. More than 10,000 workers in the PRC went on strike from September 1956 to March 1957, and more than 10,000 students boycotted classes in order to participate in the protests, which indicates social discontent [11].

The entire CCP declared that "all work, whether it is internal to the people or internal to the Party, should be carried out by the methods of rectification, criticism, and self-criticism" beginning in 1957 [12]. The reason for the declaration of the reform movement was to build internal Chinese unity.

3.3 Foreign Policy Changes Fostered by the PRC's Diplomatic Isolation

The first stop on Zhou Enlai's overseas trip in 1963 was Egypt. He suffered a nosebleed while inspecting the Soviet-funded Aswan Dam. He also refused a Coca-Cola that was offered to him in order to quench his thirst, because it was an American product, which was reported by the The Dong-a Ilbo. Moreover, Egyptian President Nasser, who had received \$1.5 billion in aid from the Soviet Union and surplus agricultural products from the U.S., interpreted the whole situation as an insult to Zhou Enlai Nasser, who went to a ceremony in order to close a French military base when Zhou arrived at the Cairo airport [13].

Another major South Korean newspaper, the Chosun Ilbo (조선일보), also wrote that Zhou Enlai traveled to Cairo, even to the point of nosebleeds from overwork, but was not welcomed by Nasser and the people of the unified Arab Republic [14]. The Japanese Ashichi Shimbun (朝日新聞) also reported that when Zhou arrived in Egypt, he was not greeted at the airport by President Nasser, [15, 16] who then

attended a ceremony to close the French base on December 13 at the invitation of the Tunisian president, which was significant in the Arab world [17]. The New York Times also reported that Nasser was in Tunisia at the time of Zhou's arrival in Cairo [18]. In light of these circumstances, Dong-a Ilbo could comment that Zhou was not treated properly in Egypt.

In other words, the Dong-a Ilbo believed that the reason Zhou risked diplomatic humiliation was to promote a peaceful resolution of the PRC-Egypt border issue.

However, the newspaper reported that other African countries were expected to be treated better than Egypt, because they would be offered, or hoped to be offered, Chinese loans and technicians. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of Zhou's visit to Africa was questioned, because 17 of 33 African countries voted against the PRC's membership in the United Nations in October 1963. However, if his future meetings with Nehru and Khrushchev materialized, Zhou's diplomatic skills would once again be on display [13].

The Dong-a Ilbo viewed Zhou's trip to Africa in 1963 as an attempt to gain the sympathy and support of neutral countries in the Asia-Africa camp since relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated so badly and the PRC was shunned by the U.S.. In other words, the PRC was seeking to engage with foreign countries as a means of breaking its diplomatic isolation, and a thesis echoed the 1964 visit to Burma, the 1964 trip to the Soviet Union, and the 1970 visit to North Korea.

Zhou Enlai's goodwill visit to Burma in February 1964 and his unannounced visit to Burma in July, which was accompanied by his vice prime minister, Chen Yi (陈毅), were analyzed as a matter of great urgency. Burma, which had been silent on the situation in Laos and Vietnam, requested the convening of the Geneva Conference, so Beijing believed that Burma was taking the diplomatic initiative in order to take the lead in regards to defusing tensions in Indo-China [19].

The newspaper understood Zhou Enlai's second visit to Burma as being an indication of the PRC's anxiety over the changing political situation at the time.

The PRC's diplomatic situation at that time was that even though it had diplomatic relations with France, it had severe hostilities with the Soviet Union and military aid was cut off. The PRC was also at odds with India, and the fear that the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam would force Burma to side with the PRC in a confrontation with the U.S. is what fueled his trip to Burma. There are, ostensible reasons for the visit, which are countermeasures against a visit to Burma by the chairman of the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet, movements over the China-India border dispute, a backlash by Chinese merchants (华裔) against Burma's rapid nationalization policies, the alliance and clandestine activities of the Republic of China's Army (国府军), and Burma's domestic minorities on the border between the PRC and Burma. However, the real reason for the visit was analyzed by the Dong-a Ilbo as a solution for international isolation [19].

The PRC's diplomatic efforts to overcome its diplomatic isolation are also reflected in its Sino-Soviet relations. Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union on November 5, 1964, which was when he arrived in Moscow in order to attend the 47th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, attracted international attention [20].

The Dong-a Ilbo characterized Zhou's visit to the Soviet Union as part of an *exploratory operation* to improve Sino-Soviet relations. The Dong-a Ilbo revealed

that the PRC was trying to gauge whether the Soviet Union's public hardline would continue as well as also the communist bloc countries in the Eastern Bloc that Beijing is committed to avoiding divisions within the communist bloc. It was ultimately unlikely that the PRC would be able to resolve the Sino-Soviet confrontation because it intends to advance its interests via a struggle for hegemony among the communist states beyond the ideological debate.

This is because Khrushchev took a hard line against the PRC, but it is also because there were many other factors that could trigger a conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union, such as territorial disputes in the border areas between the PRC and the Soviet Union and the signing of a nuclear agreement [21]. The Dong-a Ilbo therefore believed that Zhou's visit to the Soviet Union would result in a *tentative agreement* that would restrain the two countries from reaching a breakdown in relations.

The context of Zhou's 1970 visit to North Korea was similarly framed by the Dong-a Ilbo as a way for the PRC and North Korea to respond to the emerging U.S.-Japan relationship. Zhou accused Japan of *going crazy with the revival of militarism and trying to recreate the old dream of the Greater East Asian Commonwealth* in a joint statement issued at the 1969 U.S.-Japan summit, whereas North Korea accused Japan of *threatening the reunification of the Korean Peninsula with the revival of Japanese militarism*.

The Dong-a Ilbo considered two aspects in regard to Zhou Enlai's visit to North Korea. ① The visit was motivated by a sense of wariness and resistance to Japan's presence in the region as the U.S. strengthened its influence in Asia. ② The Soviet Union improved relations with Japan by signing a trans-Siberian air agreement with Japan in order to develop East Asia with Japan's cooperation, so the PRC and North Korea improved relations in response [21].

The PRC also improved its relations with North Korea in response to the Soviet approach to Japan, by perceiving that there was a desire to exclude Soviet influence in North Korea. The newspaper took the position that Japan's ambivalent policy toward the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be very disturbing to the PRC because it would promote the rise of Japanese power in Asia.

As a result, the Dong-a Ilbo analyzed several reasons for the PRC's visit to North Korea. The PRC's desire to strengthen ties with North Korea is part of the PRC's new diplomatic strategy in response to the U.S. new Asian policy, the close ties between the U.S. and Japan, the Sino-Japanese struggle for leadership in the communist bloc, and the restoration of power after the Cultural Revolution's manipulative foreign policy [14]. In other words, the PRC would break out of diplomatic isolation and use appropriate appeasement measures in order to resolve the situation.

3.4 The PRC's Pragmatic Diplomacy and UN Membership

The PRC's pragmatic form of diplomacy, which was discussed in the Dong-a Ilbo can be seen in several events. The PRC's entry into the United Nations and the improvement of Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. relations are examples.

Zhou Enlai made notable diplomatic achievements in 1969 in three dimensions 1969, after advocating for a change in foreign policy based on pragmatism. ① The most dramatic is the shift in support for the PRC's accession to the United Nations. The PRC strengthened contacts with middle-income countries, which are not in the same league as the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and signed the PRC-recognition agreements with Ethiopia and Canada. The PRC also worked in regards to establishing economic relations with the United Kingdom in order to expand foreign trade. ② The PRC's re-entry into the Asia-Africa region. Zhou Enlai strengthened ties with Pakistan and expanded its influence in Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Laos from vaguely supporting revolutionary forces. ③ Zhou also actively improved relations with Eastern Europe. A large-scale aid agreement with Romania was signed, and the PRC worked in order to reduce the Soviet Union's influence in North Vietnam and North Korea [22].

This pragmatism and persistence also reduced the risk of a short-term conflict with the Soviet Union. The PRC's foreign policy until 1965 sought to drive the U.S. out of East Asia and establish tentative agreements in order to prevent Japan from becoming a serious threat. However, U.S. influence gradually diminished and Japan rose to prominence and became a greater threat, so the PRC maintained trade relations with its Japanese counterpart for political reasons. The PRC sought to use the U.S. as a counterweight to the Soviet danger via the Warsaw Conference in the early 1970s, which was according to the newspaper [22].

The Dong-a Ilbo was quite concerned about the improvement in Sino-Japanese relations due to the PRC's pragmatic diplomacy. Improving Sino-Japanese relations would be greatly regretted for the security of the East Asia, as well as also for the future of Japan despite the fact that the PRC has a substantial trade record with Taiwan and South Korea [23].

Japan wants to maintain trade with South Korea and Taiwan, but it also wants to trade with the PRC. However, South Korea and Taiwan called for checks and balances on Japan's two-faced strategy, and the Dong-a Ilbo criticized Japan for being too unilateral in its thinking.

This was seen as Japan's acceptance of the four policies that were laid out by Zhou Enlai. The four policies include ① do not do business with Japanese manufacturers or companies that trade with the PRC and at the same time have economic cooperation with South Korea or Taiwan. ② Cut off economic relations with Japanese companies that invested in South Korea and Taiwan. ③ Never do business with companies that exported weapons in order to support the U.S. war in Vietnam. ④ Cut off trade relations with U.S.-Japan joint ventures or U.S. subsidiary companies in Japan [24]. This means no trade with manufacturers that aid South Korea and Taiwan, no economic transactions with companies that invest in South Korea and Taiwan, and no trade with companies that produce bombs, help the U.S. aid Indo-China, or merge with U.S. companies [25].

The Dong-a Ilbo sees improving Sino-Japanese relations as playing into the PRC's policy of driving a wedge between the Japanese government and its people. Japanese conglomerates are competing for trade with the PRC. Japanese Prime Minister Sato (佐藤) pointed out Japan's policy of maintaining a thin pipe in order

to communicate with the PRC, even if the trade volume is insignificant [23]. This was understood as Japan pinning its hopes and expectations on the huge Chinese market.

The Dong-a Ilbo said in response to Japan's initiative that the PRC's immediate goal is domestic development and self-sufficiency, and Japan's view of the PRC as a future market for Japan is absurd. The reason for this is that the PRC imports chemical fertilizers and steel in order to promote domestic development, but it is understood that the PRC will try to make Japan a market for the PRC by dumping policies when the industrial construction is sufficient in order to meet domestic demand in the future.

The reason why the newspaper is interested in the issue of Japan and the PRC improving their relations via trade is that the newspaper wanted to analyze how South Korea should respond to these changes. The newspaper made three suggestions. ① Japan should not engage in any exchanges with North Korea, because it normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. ② South Korea's economic system should break away from its dependence on Japan. ③ Japan's overzealousness in regards to capturing the PRC market before western countries will lead to international isolation [23].

The editorial doesn't directly explain what led to this suggestion, but I think there are three aspects to consider. ① It is envisioned that Japan could also engage with North Korea in the future given Japan's engagement with the PRC. ② It is believed that Japan and South Korea are so closely linked geographically and in terms of technological capital management, which deepen the relationship, so it will more difficult to check Japan's ambivalent behavior. The need to clearly recognize the limits of the interdependent bilateral exchange relationship between Japan and South Korea was recognized, as well as the need for South Korea's trade policy to pursue a new change toward a pluralistic and diversified policy. ③ It is warned that Japan may have made some economic gains, but it was enduring political losses that could not be offset by economic gains. The Dong-a Ilbo accepted the four principles as a way for Japan to atone for its past actions on the continent, but it emphasized that this type of atonement should also be made to South Korea and Taiwan.

I would say in regard to the overall context of the editorial that there is a sense of bewilderment with Japan's new engagement toward the PRC as well as also a deep anguish about how to position South Korea, which includes its traditional security in East Asia, despite the fact that there have been exchanges between Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan since the global Cold War. Japan has never been forgiven for its past colonization of Korea, but it has been politically and economically dependent on the traditional Taiwan-South Korea-Japan-U.S. security line. However, it can be interpreted as an expression of South Korea's mixed feelings of anger and anxiety about Japan's expanding relations with the PRC while appearing to apologize for waging war on China.

What about when there was room for improvement in the PRC-U.S. relations? The Dong-a Ilbo understood that Zhou Enlai changed his tactical attitude and pushed for Nixon's visit to China "not because he needed Washington's help in the confrontation with the Soviet Union, but because he coveted Taiwan's UN seat" [26].

However, Zhou was skeptical of Nixon's handling of the PRC's UN membership debate in New York and wanted to hold informal talks with Washington on the PRC's basic principles on Taiwan, Vietnam, and Japan before Nixon's visit to the PRC, which is according to the Dong-a Ilbo. This was because Beijing did not believe that Nixon would be willing to accept the PRC's conditions for representation at the United Nations and the normalization of relations. The PRC demanded that the U.S. withdraw from Vietnam and Taiwan before diplomatic relations between the two countries could be normalized [26].

The PRC's principles included the following. ① There is only one Chinese government that rules over mainland China and Taiwan. ② Disputes between the U.S. and the PRC should be settled via peaceful negotiations. ③ The U.S. should agree to withdraw its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. The PRC was practicing pragmatic diplomacy to the fullest extent possible by taking steps in order to resolve the suspicions, which at least guaranteed a reduction in tensions. Is this what is meant when it is said that *Mao Zedong is making a philosophy of history and Zhou Enlai is making history itself?* [26].

3.5 Evaluation of Zhou Enlai

The Dong-a Ilbo published a number of commentary articles or quotes on each issue that evaluated Zhou Enlai, which included the following.

The Dong-a Ilbo described Zhou Enlai as an *all-rounder* and an *all-around beauty* on February 3, 1972 [27]. The newspaper mainly reported ordinary news that was related to Zhou Enlai before this article, so what was the reason for the change in tone at this point? It seems that the article was a kind of adaptation to the changing circumstances of the times with Nixon's visit to the PRC.

One of the clearest examples of Zhou's true colors was his role during the Cultural Revolution. The newspaper cited an evaluation in Edgar Snow's book of *Red Star over China*, "Zhou maintained the functioning of the State Council during the Cultural Revolution, even as chairman Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) and many of his officials were being purged, but once the situation faced the threat of anarchy, it was Zhou Enlai who boldly called for restraint" [27].

Zhou's role during the Cultural Revolution was seen as avoiding direct confrontation with radical leftists by gradually reducing and eliminating their political influence, and establishing a new relationship with the military [28]. In addition, Zhou Enlai "placed moderate figures in positions of responsibility" [29] and the PRC's political direction is inward-looking, diplomatic, realistic, and flexible [28].

Zhou also criticized the policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as being superpower hegemony, but he also suggested the possibility of rapprochement with the U.S. and the Soviet Union [29]. Zhou blamed the Soviet Union for the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, but he also called for negotiations between the two sides [29]. It can be seen from this that Dong-a Ilbo pinpoints Zhou Enlai's diplomatic problems but still sees him as being someone who makes conciliatory gestures.

The Dong-a Ilbo ran a five-part series on Nixon's visit to the PRC, and the third series was devoted to Zhou Enlai. The feature articles were published once a day from February 1 to February 5, 1972, which were called ① The Love-hate Relationship between China and the U.S., ② Mao Zedong's Outer and Inner World, ③ The All-around Beauty of Zhou Enlai, ④ The Three cities of Nixon's visit, and ⑤ Steadfast Taiwan [27, 30–33].

The feature was written ahead of President Nixon's visit to the PRC, which could prove to be a turning point in postwar world history. The series, which drew on the work of Edgar Snow, described Zhou as a man with a kind of magnetism that radiates from a shyly charming personality and a certain dominance. His behavior is a blend of knowledge and ego, and he is cool, logical, and respectful of experience. As a diplomat, Zhou was described by Anna Louise Strong as "one of the world's most experienced negotiators in finding common ground without abandoning his own negotiating principles" [27].

Why did the series focus on Zhou in particular? The PRC has been a harsh critic of the U.S. and its policies, so it is likely that Zhou Enlai is seen as a key figure in the PRC's efforts in regards to improving U.S.-PRC relations. "Zhou is a wise man and the only leader in the PRC with long experience in the West," [34] according to James Reston in an op-ed in The Dong-a Ilbo. The 73-year-old Zhou Enlai faces the problem of passing on power to the next generation, and if he can reestablish the pacific order with President Nixon, he will be able to deal with future historical problems [31].

The Dong-a Ilbo quoted an article from the PRC's People's Daily on November 26, 1976, saying that Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was respected and loved by the people [35]. It was again cited in the People's Daily article on January 8, 1986, which was the 10th anniversary of Zhou's death. It praised Zhou for formulating the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which have become the cornerstone of the PRC's foreign policy, for his leading role in regard to exchanges with third-world countries as a co-founder of the non-aligned movement in 1955 and for spearheading the PRC's economic reform by promoting the four modernizations in 1975, which include agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense [36].

The 90th anniversary of Zhou Enlai's birth was celebrated in the PRC on March 7, 1988, and the newspaper highlighted Zhou Enlai's integrity and idealistic communist ideology in order to keep with the mood of remembrance. It described him as "a sage who consistently upheld the communist ideology without being tainted by factions" and "a sage who protected the country in turbulent times" [37]. The above report quotes the People's Daily article as a factual statement, but it also contains an evaluation of Zhou Enlai.

4 Analyzing the Contents of the Dong-a Ilbo for Each Issue

What is South Korea's perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai based on the coverage of Zhou Enlai in The Dong-a Ilbo.

The first thing to note is that the Dong-a Ilbo referred to the PRC as the CCP by recognizing it as a communist regime as opposed to being a country by writing "CCP Prime Minister Zhou Enlai." The PRC was recognized as a regime and not as a country until the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and South Korea in 1992.

The relationship between the PRC and North Korea, which is due to the international Cold War situation and the fact that South Korea was confronting North Korea, made it inevitable that South Korea would be at odds with the PRC in regard to the situation of establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It was not until the July 12, 1992 article that South Korea began referring to the CCP as the PRC, because there was a change in the era of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Korea in 1992. The PRC also referred to South Korea as the South Joseon prior to diplomatic relations.

There was basically a factional logic at work that can be seen from these basic facts with a communist camp and a liberal camp, so The Dong-a Ilbo response to any PRC diplomatic proposal was centered on exploring the attitude that the liberal camp should take.

Second, The Dong-a Ilbo perception of the PRC during the Cold War was that it was a follower of the Soviet Union, being controlled by the Soviet Union, and seeking peaceful diplomatic relations in order to break its diplomatic isolation. It was understood that the PRC was diplomatically isolated because its foreign policy was related to the policies of the communist camp, and it did not have any breakthroughs that could have political influence on other countries. It was also perceived as seeking an image of peacefulness as opposed to belligerence by offering negotiations about Taiwan to the U.S. when Sino-U.S. relations were difficult. Zhou's visits to Burma and North Korea were also understood as measures in regard to breaking the PRC's diplomatic isolation.

The PRC's foreign policy is basically to interact with the world in a peaceful manner, so the world can peacefully coexist. It is not seen as being sincere about peace in practice, because it does not propose peace as a way to solve problems in practice. It repeats the same thing without any practical actions.

Third, the newspaper recognized the PRC and Zhou Enlai as being capable of political coordination within the communist bloc. This may seem at odds with the description of diplomatic isolation above, but the PRC's political adjustment was at the behest of the Soviet Union, which can be understood as exercising political adjustment capacity under Soviet influence in a state of diplomatic isolation. Nevertheless, it was recognized as a breakthrough. The PRC could use its political capacity since the Communist Revolution in order to coordinate what the Soviet Union could not resolve by force and seek the unity of communist countries in the social changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1950s.

Fourth, the Dong-a Ilbo perceived the PRC and Zhou Enlai as pursuing pragmatic diplomacy. Sino-Soviet relations are characterized by mutual criticism over policy differences, but tentative agreements are made in order to avoid catastrophes. When there is a change in the relationship between the PRC and the Soviet Union, it is recognized that it is part of the PRC's foreign policy in order to resolve the situation by strengthening North Korea-PRC relations and improving Sino-U.S.



Fig. 1 Zhou Enlai reassembling a scattered PRC after the revolution

relations. Zhou Enlai was in particular optimistic about improving PRC-U.S. relations and pioneered a new history, which is pragmatic diplomacy, despite his harsh criticism of the U.S. and its policies [27].

Finally, the newspaper comprehensive assessment of Zhou Enlai can be summarized in one statement, which is *eight-fold beauty*. It can be said that he was specific and positive from his personality to his diplomatic and political achievements, which is summarized by the words “a person whose actions are harmonized with knowledge and himself.”

Figure 1 is an illustration of Zhou Enlai. This cartoon, which shows the PRC being assembled and systematized, is one of the aspects that the Dong-a Ilbo evaluated Zhou Enlai by.

5 Conclusion

This paper analyzes the perception of the PRC and Zhou Enlai in South Korea via The Dong-a Ilbo. It is one of South Korea’s leading newspapers, which was founded in 1920 and is still published today. I extracted the search terms by using Zhou Enlai as the title and analyzed opinionated materials such as editorials, serials, contributions, and general articles.

I analyzed the contents of the Dong-a Ilbo in order to see how South Koreans perceive the PRC and Zhou Enlai. The PRC was referred to as the CCP before the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and the PRC in 1992. It was not referred to as a country but as a regime. The PRC referred to South Korea as the South Joseon, which is due to their political rivalry.

The PRC's foreign policy of projecting a peaceful image and its role as a diplomatic mediator, especially in Eastern Europe was also visible. However, the change in the PRC's foreign policy was perceived as an attempt to change relations in a situation of diplomatic isolation and pragmatic diplomacy.

The evaluation of Zhou Enlai as an individual who led this change in foreign policy showed him as an *eight-armed beauty* who exerted political competence from his personal charm, even though he utilized the views of others and articles from the People's Daily.

The last issue I would like to mention is the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan issue was not easily solved, even though it was continuously discussed in articles from 1955, 1956, 1964, 1970, and 1971, which are shown in Table 2. It was hoped that *at least the establishment of a newspaper and other news organizations* [38] would be considered in 1973, which was when Jiang Jieshi (蔣介石) and Kissinger met behind closed doors, as opposed to speculation that Kissinger's trip to Beijing (北京) would yield great concrete results, such as *the release of several Central Intelligence Agency agents detained in the PRC and the establishment of a permanent bureau of a newspaper or some similar cultural relations office* [38].

Zhou Enlai said in 1964 that he was ready to practice peaceful coexistence with capitalist empires, such as the U.S. before the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations in the 1970s. However, Zhou Enlai insisted that there could be no resolution unless the U.S. cut ties with Taiwan and handed over the island [39]. The Taiwan issue remained unresolved until 1979, which is when the PRC and the U.S. established diplomatic relations.

The issue of Taiwan's liberation, which has been advocated since the establishment of the PRC, has remained an unfulfilled dream of Zhou Enlai and a historical task for the PRC. It has become a dream of the CCP's [40], which was founded in 1921, the second hundred years (2021–2121). None of them take Taiwan's position into account. The issue has become a political hot potato, which is due to its implications for future Sino-US relations, diplomatic relations with each other, and the shadowy past of the Cold War.

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China-Russia Economic and Trade Cooperation Within the BRICS: 2019–2022



Ye Yuchen and Liu Ruoxuan

1 Introduction

1.1 Research Background

The term “BRICS” refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Coined by Jim O’Neill, Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs, in 2001, it specifically denotes emerging markets globally. The collaboration among Brazil, Russia, India, and China began with their foreign ministers’ inaugural meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. South Africa officially joined in 2011, expanding BRICS to a group of five countries. Within this framework, China and Russia have further strengthened their economic and trade relations. During the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Argentina were invited to join the BRICS mechanism. The membership will come into force on January 1, 2024. However, following the general election in Argentina, the country officially announced its temporary withdrawal from the BRICS.

Over the years, the influence of BRICS has continued to grow, gaining recognition from developing nations and elevating their status and role in multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, G20, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. BRICS countries’ share of the world’s total gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity (PPP) has steadily risen from 18.75% in 2001 to 31.54% in 2023 [1], becoming a major driver of world economic growth.

In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe, dealing a heavy blow to the world economy. According to the International Monetary Fund, global GDP fell by 3.1% in 2020, the worst recession since the Great Depression of 1930 [2]. Global trade and investment plummeted, with global foreign direct investment

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falling by 42% in 2020 [3]. The epidemic also severely disrupted the global industrial supply chain, forcing many enterprises to interrupt their production and business activities.

Facing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, BRICS countries have actively cooperated and worked together to overcome the difficulties, demonstrating strong resilience and vitality. BRICS leaders have held multiple summits to discuss measures to combat the pandemic. In November 2020, the 12th BRICS leaders' meeting was held virtually in Moscow [4], emphasizing the need to deepen BRICS cooperation, jointly address the challenges of the pandemic, and promote global economic recovery.

China and Russia, key members of BRICS, experiencing a surge in their economic and trade cooperation, have become a bright spot within BRICS collaboration. In 2020, bilateral trade in goods between the two nations surpassed \$107.77 billion, exceeding the \$100 billion mark for three consecutive years [5]. China's presence in Russia's foreign trade has risen steadily, solidifying its position as Russia's top trading partner for 11 consecutive years. Conversely, Russia ranks as China's tenth-largest trading partner. According to China's General Administration of Customs, the trade volume between the two countries reached a historic high of nearly \$147 billion in 2021 [6]. Moreover, their collaboration in energy, agriculture, and technology has deepened, injecting fresh dynamism into both nations' economic growth.

The cooperative advantages between China and Russia are multifaceted. China boasts a large market demand and manufacturing base, while Russia possesses rich resources and advanced scientific and technological capabilities. At present, the China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination has reached its highest historical level [7], enhancing a broad spectrum of economic, trade, and other forms of cooperation. Both countries can foster mutual economic development through win-win cooperation.

1.2 Research Significance

Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has severely disrupted the global economy, regional economic cooperation has emerged as a crucial tool to combat these challenges. By analyzing this specific case of cooperation, the study not only provides valuable theoretical insights into BRICS economic and trade cooperation but also offers practical lessons for other countries and regions seeking to strengthen their own regional economic cooperation endeavors.

Furthermore, as BRICS countries are important representatives of developing economies and have played a significant role during the pandemic, this study on China and Russia's cooperation can serve as a valuable reference for other developing nations. By examining this specific example, the research contributes to the common development of the global economy by encouraging and informing the strengthening of regional cooperation among developing countries.

1.3 Literature Review

Research by Chinese scholars can be categorized into two main perspectives regarding China-Russia trade and economic relations within the BRICS framework. The first camp, represented by scholars like Lan Qingxin et al., holds an optimistic view [8]. They argue that the framework presents an opportunity for expanded trade cooperation due to the distinct comparative advantages of China and Russia, evident in their complementary industrial structures. Their research emphasizes trade potential and identifies innovation as a key driver for growth. This perspective is further supported by Han Hong's comprehensive analysis, which concludes that the complementarity between the two countries outweighs competition [9]. Han suggests adjusting comparative and competitive advantages to strengthen cooperation.

Another group of scholars contends that BRICS countries' overall trade development and the bilateral trade and economic relations within the BRICS framework remain immature. They highlight various challenges, including intense competition and frequent trade frictions. Through research, Sang Baichuan et al. pointed out the existence of severe trade frictions in actual practice, primarily manifested through anti-dumping investigations, while acknowledging the high level of political engagement between China and Russia [10]. Therefore, alleviating trade friction is a key point in promoting trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia under the BRICS framework.

Several Western scholars have expressed optimism regarding the rapid development of BRICS countries, specifically highlighting China and Russia as potential economic powerhouses. Jim O'Neill, in his work "The Future of the BRICS and the New Development Bank", emphasizes the respective strengths of these two nations within the BRICS framework and the need to bolster bilateral trade [11].

However, other scholars hold a more nuanced perspective. Research by Bas Hooijmaaijers, for example, suggests a disconnect between the BRICS rhetoric and the reality of strengthened economic ties [12]. This view is further supported by the undeniable impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on intra-BRICS trade and investment.

The research's innovation lies in its comprehensive study of China and Russia's trade and economic relations under the BRICS framework during the epidemic period, based on literature analysis.

1.4 Methods

This study adopts a literature analysis method to deal with the existing research on China-Russia Economic and Trade Cooperation within the BRICS. By critically examining scholarly articles and reports, we aim to synthesize the current knowledge base on the China-Russia economic and trade cooperation in BRICS, identifying obstacles and opportunities for future collaboration. This approach helps us draw upon established theoretical frameworks to guide our own research

investigation, which allows us to build upon the existing body of knowledge and contribute fresh insights to the field.

2 Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Modern Context

2.1 Trade and Investment

Sino-Russian trade and investment cooperation within the BRICS framework has made significant strides. In the realm of trade cooperation, the bilateral trade between China and Russia showed continuous growth from 2019 to 2022. As per the Country report by the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, the trade volume reached \$110.65 billion (US dollars) in 2019, marking a 2.2% increase from 2018 [13]. Despite the impact of the pandemic, there was a slight decline in trade volume in 2020, but it remained above \$100 billion [14]. The value of products traded in 2021 between China and Russia stood at \$146.89 billion, indicating a 35.8% annual growth [15].

Despite global economic challenges and pandemic uncertainty, Sino-Russian economic and trade cooperation reached a new peak in bilateral commerce. The New Year Meeting between the leaders of the two countries held during the Beijing Winter Olympics boosted Sino-Russian ties. The bilateral trade volume in 2022 reached a record-breaking \$190.27 billion [16], with China maintaining its position as Russia's largest trading partner for the 13th consecutive year. Sino-Russian economic and trade cooperation has been steadily advancing.

Energy cooperation has long been the cornerstone of practical collaboration between China and Russia. Russia continues to be China's top energy import source, maintaining its position as the second-largest source of crude oil imports and the largest source of electricity imports. Significant progress was made in Sino-Russian energy cooperation, especially in the natural gas sector, from 2019 to 2022. The construction of the Power of Siberia pipeline by Russia for gas supply to China commenced at the end of 2019 and is expected to reach an annual supply capacity of 38 billion cubic meters by 2025 [17]. This substantial advancement provides China with a reliable and consistent energy supply while also strengthening the foundation for bilateral collaboration in the natural gas industry.

China and Russia have a wide-ranging collaboration in agriculture, manufacturing, and high-tech fields in addition to their energy cooperation. China's demand for Russian agricultural products like soybeans, oil, and grains is on the rise, while Russia imports machinery, electronic products, and automotive components from China. Investment cooperation between the two countries is progressing, with Chinese investments in Russia expanding into sectors like automotive, home appliances, and food processing. Statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce show that as of the end of 2021, China had invested \$10.64 billion directly in Russia, mainly distributed in mining, agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale and retail,

leasing and business services, and finance [18]. Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Russia, Alexey Grudzev, highlighted the upgraded economic and trade cooperation between China and Russia, leading to a significant increase in trade volume and fostering continuous development in bilateral relations. He expressed hope for further enhanced cooperation and exploration of new collaboration opportunities between the business communities of both countries [19].

2.2 Finance

The collaboration between China and Russia in the field of finance from 2019 to 2022 is marked by a diverse and rapidly growing partnership, characterized by frequent communication. Both countries have made progress in key areas, driven by a mutual desire to diversify the global financial landscape and challenge the dominance of the US dollar.

De-dollarization is a cornerstone of this partnership. Recognizing the risks posed by US financial dominance, China and Russia have actively worked together to increase settlements in their local currencies. In 2019, several major Russian banks joined the China International Payments System (CIPS) to facilitate operations between the two countries, thus boosting bilateral trade [20]. In a significant development, the two countries signed an agreement in June 2019 to facilitate payments in national currencies [21], paving the way for commercial banks' independent decision-making to join each other's payment systems. Former Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov's 2021 statement confirmed the steady increase in the use of local currencies in Sino-Russian trade [22]. By 2022, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin revealed that nearly half of all transactions relied on rubles and renminbi [23].

The increase of the RMB in Russia's foreign exchange reserves underscores this commitment. Starting from a 12.2% share in 2020, the RMB steadily rose to become the third-largest holding by March 2021 [24]. This trend continued with the Russian Ministry of Finance's decision in February 2021 to strategically increase the RMB's share in the National Welfare Fund (NWF) from 10% to 15% [25]. These initiatives not only reduce exchange rate risks and transaction costs but also enhance trade efficiency, convenience, and ultimately, the trade sovereignty and security of both countries.

The second noteworthy aspect is the expansion of financial support. The China-Russia Financial Alliance was explicitly welcomed for its role in funding Sino-Russian collaborations in a joint statement issued by the two countries on August 22, 2019 [26]. Established in 2015 and led by Harbin Bank and Sberbank, this non-profit organization has become the primary platform for cross-border financial cooperation between the two countries [27]. Its success in facilitating bilateral trade and economic exchanges is evident. By 2021, Harbin Bank had established relations with nearly 100 Russian banks, with 25 institutions encompassing 49 local and foreign currency accounts across Russia [28]. This deepening financial cooperation

promises to accelerate multi-disciplinary collaboration and industrial development and has the potential to serve as a catalyst for broader Eurasian economic integration.

The New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014 to channel resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS nations and other emerging economies, has emerged as an essential platform for Sino-Russian financial cooperation. With a 2019 agreement with Russia for the opening of the NDB's Eurasian Regional Centre in Moscow [29], the NDB expanded its regional reach, forging stronger ties between China and Russia and creating exciting avenues for knowledge sharing and capacity building. Additionally, this move solidifies the NDB's role in fostering Sino-Russian economic and financial ties, while providing an important platform for BRICS nations to address potential global challenges.

At the BRICS foreign ministers' meeting initiated by Russia in 2020, China emphasized the importance of leveraging the NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement to provide financial support to economies affected by the pandemic [30]. In response, the NDB promptly established an Emergency Assistance Facility in April, committing up to \$10 billion in crisis-related aid to its members. By March 2021, this commitment materialized in a \$1 billion loan to Russia, supporting its healthcare workers at the forefront of the pandemic [31]. These emergency measures serve as critical support for BRICS countries, enabling them to strengthen their healthcare systems and safeguard their populations from the virus's impact.

In addition to addressing immediate threats, the 2020 BRICS Summit laid the groundwork for long-term cooperation by adopting the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2025 [32]. This strategy comprises 15 guidelines for financial cooperation, including ongoing support for the New Development Bank, initiatives to establish the BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund, and a push for increased use of national currencies in mutual settlements.

2.3 Science and Technology

In the realm of science and technology, China and Russia have established a productive and strategic collaboration, in line with their respective national development objectives. The declaration of the Year of Scientific and Technological Innovation represents a significant advancement in their partnership. In June 2019, Presidents Xi Jinping and Putin designated 2020 and 2021 as the Year of Scientific and Technological Innovation [33]. This marks the first time that both countries have engaged in a year-long initiative focused on technological progress. Throughout this designated period, over 1000 collaborative activities took place [34], primarily concentrated in specific areas.

In terms of fundamental research, China and Russia established the Sino-Russian Mathematics Center on June 29, 2020 [35]. The Center, led by Peking University and Moscow University, harnesses the "Double First-class" League in Chinese mathematics, along with partnerships with UN-affiliated entities, St. Petersburg University, and other Russian institutions, with the goal of driving cutting-edge

mathematical research and nurturing exceptional talent [36]. Over the past 2 years, this collaboration has brought together exceptional experts and scholars, boosting the progress of basic sciences in both countries. Beyond research, the Center has also served as a conduit for Sino-Russian cooperation and exchange, facilitating academic events and international connections across the landscape of fundamental research.

China and Russia have also established a robust alliance in applied research, with a primary focus on aerospace, nuclear energy, and satellite navigation. In March 2021, the heads of the Chinese National Space Administration and the Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities virtually signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining coordinated actions toward constructing an international lunar research station [37]. Additionally, construction began on units 7 and 8 of the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant and units 3 and 4 of the Xudapu Nuclear Power Plant in the same year [38]. Furthermore, the Russian-Chinese Roadmap for Cooperation in the field of satellite navigation for 2021–2025 was signed in December 2021 [39], laying the groundwork for expanded collaboration in satellite navigation technology. These joint efforts have bolstered China and Russia's technological self-sufficiency and strengthened their collective position in the global scientific and technological landscape.

In light of the pandemic outbreak, collaboration between China and Russia in the medical and healthcare sectors saw a substantial rise in 2020. Russia took the lead by sending a team of epidemic prevention experts to China [40]. Furthermore, medical professionals from both countries continued to make progress in vaccine research [41, 42]. This partnership has been instrumental in the battle against the pandemic and has contributed to advancements in healthcare and the overall development of the regional health community.

Additionally, China and Russia have leveraged the BRICS mechanism for cooperation. In 2018, the Partnership on the New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) was initiated during the BRICS leaders' annual summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. This partnership aimed to deepen cooperation in digitization, industrialization, and innovation to address the challenges and opportunities brought forth by the Fourth Industrial Revolution [43]. Subsequently, on September 7, 2021, the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution Innovation Center was established in Xiamen, with 19 out of 28 signed projects in China involving Russian companies [44]. The establishment of the center signifies China's commitment to advocating a sustainable BRICS Partnership for the New Industrial Revolution.

3 Challenges in Bilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation

China and Russia encountered numerous challenges in their trade cooperation from 2019 to 2022. Primarily, the bilateral trade was hindered by the pandemic. Travel restrictions and health protocols imposed uncertainties on the supply chain and logistics, leading to temporary suspension or reduction of trade activities. Chinese

Customs Administration reported that the trade volume between China and Russia was \$110.65 billion in 2019 [13], which decreased to \$107.76 billion in 2020 due to the impact of the pandemic [14].

The implementation of sanctions has had a substantial influence on trade cooperation, particularly as the crisis in Ukraine has escalated. Protectionism in trade has emerged, leading to increasingly strict measures, including trade barriers and export regulations. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and their allies have collaborated to impose escalating sanctions on various sectors of the Russian economy, as well as on individuals and entities. These restrictions have specifically targeted the energy sector, with embargoes on energy products, investment restrictions, and disruptions in the supply chain. As a major global energy exporter, Russia has heavily depended on its energy sector for economic support and foreign exchange earnings. Despite Russia's swift responses, the sanctions have significantly impacted both its foreign and domestic economic growth, resulting in an economic downturn by the end of 2022 [45]. The sanctions have also led to increased logistical costs, currency exchange rate fluctuations, challenges in settlements, and rising production costs. As a result of these challenges, Sino-Russian trade now faces a more intricate situation that will necessitate coordinated efforts from both parties to resolve.

In the financial domain, collaboration between China and Russia in using local currencies for settlements and financing has exhibited a consistent upward trajectory. The two countries have also effectively implemented the Year of Scientific and Technological Innovation, providing a robust platform for collaborative endeavors in scientific and technological fields. Moreover, both nations have actively participated in the BRICS mechanism to address the pandemic. However, as the two major countries in the BRICS, China and Russia have the potential to demonstrate leadership and deepen cooperation within the mechanism. Integrating a larger portion of the existing Sino-Russian collaborations into the BRICS could potentially attract broader participation from other member states. Furthermore, most of the cooperation between China and Russia is directed by government-led design, leading to limited independent engagement and relatively small-scale projects in the private sector. Therefore, additional measures are required to enhance the potential for cooperation between the two countries.

4 Opportunities in Sino-Russian Trade and Economic Cooperation

The potential for collaboration between China and Russia in the field of trade looks optimistic. To begin with, both parties are dedicated to expanding the volume of two-way trade by refining trade structures and nurturing new areas of growth, such as digital trade, sustainable low-carbon practices, and the biopharmaceutical sector. In the realm of digital trade, China and Russia are set to expand the scale of

two-way trade, improve trade structures, and nurture fresh growth areas. They will increase trade facilitation, ensuring the security and stability of industrial and supply chains, and promoting the high-quality advancement of two-way trade. In the area of sustainable low-carbon practices, China and Russia will bolster cooperation to encourage eco-friendly development, aiming to advance collaboration in the energy sector, including renewable and clean energy. Both sides will also boost environmental protection collaboration, tackling global environmental challenges such as climate change.

In the realm of investment, Sino-Russian collaboration is indicating optimistic trends. Initiatives supporting expos and local cooperation forums will offer more collaboration opportunities for investors. Zhou Liqun, President of the Chinese-Russian Chamber of Commerce, is of the view that future development in Sino-Russian economic and trade cooperation will prioritize sectors such as the digital economy, sustainable development, and biopharmaceuticals, infusing fresh impetus into the economic advancement of both nations. China and Russia inked the “Roadmap for the High-Quality Development of Goods and Services Trade between China and Russia” in February 2022, outlining the achievement of bilateral trade objectives [16]. Moving forward, enterprises from both nations will further delve into investment cooperation in low-carbon energy and green infrastructure, actively promoting green technological innovation, and collectively creating new focal points for Sino-Russian economic and trade cooperation.

China and Russia demonstrate a high level of economic complementarity, and both countries stand to benefit from the numerous opportunities for cooperation. On one hand, the strong confidence between the leaders of the two nations provides political certainty and strategic direction for their comprehensive strategic partnership in this new era. On the other hand, with the withdrawal of European and American companies from the Russian market, there will be a fundamental change in Russia’s supply chain and investment environment, creating significant opportunities for Chinese companies to enter the Russian market.

As the largest neighboring countries and emerging market nations, China and Russia possess strong potential for cooperation. The future advancement of high-quality development in bilateral investment cooperation is crucial and relies on seizing opportune moments. Based on mutual benefit, China and Russia are expected to prioritize the planning and execution of significant projects and explore investment breakthroughs. They will also encourage Chinese manufacturing enterprises with intellectual property and core competitiveness to actively expand into the Russian market, ultimately promoting industries such as automotive, machine tools, light industry, textiles, and biopharmaceuticals.

In the realm of financial cooperation, China and Russia are poised to continue bolstering their financial collaboration through various measures. Both nations will persist in supporting eligible banks in establishing new branches to facilitate the use of the RMB and the ruble in bilateral trade, investment, loans, and other economic exchanges. Moreover, there is an anticipation for China and Russia to strengthen their collaborative efforts and knowledge exchange between their financial

regulatory bodies, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of financial oversight and regulation. Additionally, both countries will actively cooperate between their respective financial think tanks, fostering deeper engagement and knowledge exchange in financial policies and markets.

China and Russia are also projected to enhance their cooperation in science and technology, particularly in the areas of large scientific facilities, nuclear physics, and space exploration. The outlined space cooperation between Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration from 2023 to 2027 specifies collaborative efforts such as constructing an international lunar research station, deepening satellite navigation collaboration, and promoting the internationalization of the Beidou and GLONASS systems [46]. Furthermore, both nations aim to expand the number of projects under the established framework, covering broader areas and maximizing mutual benefits. Additionally, by optimizing communication and coordination with other BRICS members, China and Russia aim to bolster the BRICS scientific and technological innovation cooperation mechanism and contribute to the advancement of global scientific and technological cooperation.

Within BRICS, China and Russia are committed to strengthening collaborative efforts under the New Development Bank, aligning with their dedication to upholding the principles of multilateralism and a non-politicized institutional environment. Through this partnership, they aim to contribute to infrastructure development and sustainable growth within the BRICS member states.

5 Conclusion

In summary, economic and trade cooperation between China and Russia within BRICS has exhibited continuous growth despite the challenges posed by the pandemic. The cooperation in energy has opened up prospects for future trade. In addition to energy, collaboration in areas such as technology has strengthened the economic bonds between the two countries. Financial cooperation efforts, including endeavors to decrease reliance on the US dollar and the establishment of financial support platforms, have further bolstered the partnership. Furthermore, both nations actively engage in BRICS initiatives, utilizing the platform to enhance economic collaboration and facilitate trade. As they continue their partnership within BRICS, China and Russia are well-placed to unlock new opportunities by maximizing the benefits of complementary strengths and further fortifying their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination.

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Russia and China: Cooperation in the Field of Regional Security in Central Asia (2001–2023)



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1 Introduction

Central Asia is a substantial region, occupying a crucial geopolitical position. There are numerous reasons for the region's increasing role in global affairs. Central Asia serves as a connector between Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and also boasts significant oil and gas reserves. However, Central Asia faces various security threats, including terrorism, extremism, separatism, drug trafficking, and smuggling. Many countries, particularly Russia and China, which share borders with the Central Asian region, are concerned about its instability due to the security problems outlined above.

Russia and China are presently collaborating on security matters at both the bilateral level and within regional institutions, most notably, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO has played a significant role in maintaining security in the region. The cooperation among China, Russia and the Central Asian nations within the scope of the organisation contributes to the preservation of stability.

2 Research Objectives and Methodology

This study analyses the collaborative efforts of Russia and China in maintaining regional security in Central Asia during the period of 2001–2023. Its objective is to identify the distinct features of the security policies of Russia and China in the

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Central Asian region. The chronological framework is delimited by the signing of the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China [1]. This agreement instigated comprehensive collaboration between the two countries.

To conduct this study, the authors applied normative-legal documents containing information on the interaction between Russia and China in the sphere of ensuring regional security in Central Asia. The main sources utilised were the Agreement among the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure [2], the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism [3], the Anti-Drug Strategy [4], and the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Further Deepening of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation [5].

Furthermore, employed in the research were the bilateral security treaties concluded between Russia and the countries of Central Asia. The Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Tajikistan [6], the Military-Technical Cooperation Development Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic [7], and the Agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan regarding the provision of military ranges by the Russian Federation to the Republic of Tajikistan for live firing exercises by military units and subunits of the Air Defence Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan [8] are in effect. Agreement regarding the Status and Conditions for the Joint Russian Military Base in Kyrgyz Republic [9], Agreement for Security Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan [10].

The study was based on a comparative and descriptive method, which, after collecting and analysing data, was used to compare the foreign policy goals of Russia and China in the Central Asian region in different periods (2001–2023) and their cooperation in ensuring regional security. Furthermore, a retrospective approach was employed to explore the phases of joint initiatives between both countries in dealing with global terrorism and religious extremism. Cause-and-effect analysis was employed to ascertain the factors that led to the proliferation of terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking in Central Asia, as well as the consequences of their spread.

3 Results of Research

In 2001, the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed by Russia and China [1]. The document acknowledges the necessity of cooperative security endeavours, particularly in relation to combating international terrorism. In the ensuing years, Russia and China bolstered their bilateral communications to counter non-traditional security threats. In 2003, they jointly signed a communiqué highlighting their effort to prevent terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism [11]. In 2017, a joint statement on

counterterrorism was signed after discussions between the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the People's Republic of China [5].

Regional collaboration between Russia and China aims to ensure security and maintain stability in Central Asia. The shared border between Central Asia, Russia and China puts the countries at risk of religious extremists from within Central Asia, terrorists from the Middle East as well as armed groups, and criminal organisations involved in drug trafficking and smuggling. In 1996, the governments of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan established the Shanghai Five in an effort to address regional issues. Its primary focus was military cooperation in border areas and the settlement of territorial disputes [12]. Over time, the organisation expanded its scope, and increased cooperation among member states resulted in significant progress. This positive outcome triggered a new stage in the development of the international organisation. In 2001, the heads of states of the Shanghai Five met in Shanghai to transform the organisation into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) after Uzbekistan was accepted as a member [13].

The SCO is not a military alliance; its member states seek to broaden trade and economic ties, as well as promote cultural and humanitarian collaboration. Nevertheless, its principal aim remains upholding peace and stability, and countering the threat of the 'three evil forces' [14, p. 144]. The declaration signed by Russia and China in 2002 underlined that the SCO is becoming 'an important factor in maintaining peace, security and stability in the region, one of the pillars of the multipolar world' [15]. According to former Secretary General of the SCO, B.K. Nurgaliyev, the organisation was initially established to ensure security within the territories of six nations and foster trust [16, p. 38]. While some researchers argue that the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) has the responsibility of guaranteeing security in Central Asia and that the military orientation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is illogical [17], military collaboration within the SCO is deemed 'more promising' due to China's participation which utilises its resources to attain stability and peace in Central Asia at the earliest opportunity [18]. Russian researcher V.D. Kamynin argues that the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership lies at the core of SCO globalism [16, p. 38]. Russia and China continue to hold significant roles in the organisation and contribute to the expansion of the SCO. Both nations acknowledge that stable conditions in the region are attainable solely through multilateral cooperation. The Central Asian states, possessing fewer resources than China and Russia, remain unable to eliminate security threats without assistance from external parties. Hence, they actively endorse Beijing's and Moscow's proposals in the SCO as a means of achieving stability in Central Asia [19].

The diversity of cultures, values and priorities among SCO member states has created a need to forge a common identity. The Shanghai Spirit, emphasises mutual trust and benefit, equal rights, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and common growth, which has yielded remarkable outcomes [20].

The primary documents that define the activities of the organisation are the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [21], the SCO Charter [22] (the primary document outlining the aims and objectives of

the organisation), the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism [3], and the Agreement on the Establishment of a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) [2].

In accordance with the Charter, the highest body in the SCO structure is the Council of Heads of State, which determines the priority areas of the Shanghai Organisation's work and the vectors of cooperation. The Council of Heads of Government oversees the approval of the budget and economic and cultural cooperation between member states. The Council of Foreign Ministers executes tasks adopted by the Council of Heads of State and provides advice on global issues. The Council of National Coordinators is responsible for coordinating the SCO's current tasks and preparatory work preceding meetings of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government. Additionally, the SCO Secretariat, which handles administrative and technical matters, operates permanently [22].

The primary regulatory document governing the collaborative initiatives among the SCO member states to counter the 'three evil forces' is the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (2001) [3]. The convention aims to define terrorism objectively as an act that aims to cause death or serious bodily harm to a non-combatant or civilian or to inflict extensive damage to property. It also includes the planning, aiding, and abetting of such acts to intimidate a population, violate public security, or compel public authorities or international organisations to act or refrain from acting [3]. Extremism is defined as 'an act aimed at violent seizing or keeping power, and violently changing the constitutional system a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organisation, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and participation in them' [3]. Separatism refers to any action aimed at breaching a state's territorial integrity, including the annexation of any part of its territory or the violent break-up of a state. Additionally, it encompasses planning, preparing, aiding and abetting such acts [3]. The document highlights cooperation amongst the SCO members to prevent and combat various forms of extremism, terrorism and separatism at both the bilateral level and within the Shanghai Organisation and other international organisations [3]. The Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Member States outlines specific actions to be undertaken by the member states to achieve the SCO's objectives [23]. Article 8 of the treaty mandates participating nations to boost collaboration in the pursuit, detention, deportation, and relocation of individuals suspected, charged, or found guilty of terrorism, separatism, extremism, or other criminal activities [23].

It is important to acknowledge that SCO member states are not exclusively creating a legal and conceptual system to counteract the 'three evil forces', but are also taking practical steps to implement the organisation's goals. The Agreement on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, which was signed in 2002 [2], was a particularly noteworthy stride in this endeavour. The RATS 'is designed to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the competent authorities of the Parties in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism' [2]. The primary role of RATS is to facilitate coordination of SCO member states in combating terrorism, separatism, and

extremism. It provides the necessary information, collects and analyses data, and creates a database of terrorist organisations, their participants, and functioning. Also, it prepares joint exercises, trains personnel, and exchanges experience and mutual assistance with other international organisations to combat non-traditional threats [2].

With the support of RATS, participating countries hold joint anti-terrorism and operational-tactical exercises. In 2006, the SCO member nations conducted the Vostok-Antiterror drill, in 2008 the Volgograd-Antiterror drill, and in 2011 the Volgograd-Antiterror drill. Other exercises carried out include 'Tian Shan-2' in 2011 and 'Sary-Arka-Antiterror' in 2017 [24, p. 112]. The aim of these exercises is to collaboratively devise a plan for identifying terrorist groups, rescuing hostages, and combating terrorists using chemical weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the nations have been carrying out routine exercises known as 'Peace Mission' exercises [25] since 2005. Initially, Russia and China intended to conduct these exercises bilaterally. However, in 2007, SCO member states suggested holding the Peace Mission regularly to enhance counterterrorism cooperation within the organisation [26].

Member States, as part of the RATS framework, arrange international meetings and conferences with the goal of creating coordinated actions in response to potential threats. Consultation meetings with expert groups cover a range of counterterrorism issues [27].

Despite some criticism from experts, RATS activities contribute to security in Central Asia, Russia and China. As evidenced by data from 2005–2006, over 400 terrorist attacks were foiled and approximately 20 individuals involved in terrorist activities were apprehended [28]. In 2016, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, in conjunction with law enforcement agencies from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, detained multiple extremists in St. Petersburg who were preparing terrorist attacks [14, p. 148]. The SCO Astana Declaration acknowledged the organisation's productive efforts in the realms of security, economic, and cultural cooperation [29].

In 2007, the Secretary General of the SCO, B. K. Nurgaliyev, asserted that the drug trade represented a particularly dangerous threat to the stability of the Central Asian region and that the states needed to take active measures to combat this problem [30]. A programme was thus formulated; the SCO Anti-Drug Strategy [4], encompassing SCO member countries. Within the programme, participating nations share intelligence on drug syndicates in Central Asia, hold consultations to develop countermeasures against drug cartels, and prevent the dissemination of illegal substances in SCO member state territories [4].

The ongoing threat from drug trafficking mafias, terrorists, extremists and separatists continues today. Central Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the threat of ISIS. In 2015, the terrorist group declared its intention to destabilise the Central Asian region, specifically the Ferghana Valley area [31]. The defeat of ISIS in the Middle East led to its movement to Afghanistan and Pakistan. RATS reports that upwards of 3000 ISIS fighters are currently in Northern Afghanistan [32, p. 7].

Most of them are from Central Asia and Russia. Central Asia is a significant source of fighters for both ISIS and other global terrorist groups [32, p. 7].

In 2022, the SCO RATS defined joint measures to combat modern challenges and threats posed by international terrorist organisations. SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming reported on these developments. 42 relevant decisions were signed and measures were consistently implemented to prevent any use of the Internet for terrorist, separatist, and extremist purposes within the SCO space. It was emphasised that in 2023, safeguarding information security and addressing challenges and threats on the Internet had been assigned as a distinctive field of activity for the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure belonging to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It has been observed that the member countries of the SCO effectively execute the Programme of Cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Member States in Countering Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for the years 2022–2024. Additionally, they engage in prosperous collaborative efforts for counterterrorism training and other activities.

Zhang Ming expressed optimism that after Iran and Belarus joined the SCO, their respective departments would actively participate in combating terrorism, extremism, separatism, drug trafficking, illegal use of information technology and engage in relevant cooperation while sharing their experiences with other nations. It is noteworthy that India took on the SCO presidency in September 2022 [33].

4 Discussion

To address the challenge posed by the ‘three evils forces’, SCO member countries must tackle existing contradictions. One issue is the asymmetrical development among member states, encompassing robust nations with vast political, economic, and military capabilities (e.g. Russia and China), as well as less developed ones (e.g. the Central Asian states). Due to the imbalance, it is believed by experts that ‘only Beijing and Moscow derive benefits from the SCO’ [34, p. 142].

Secondary, the Central Asian states face the challenge of a multi-vector policy. The countries of the region seek to integrate in various directions, such as Russia, China, the United States, EU countries, and Islamic states. For instance, the Military Doctrine of Kazakhstan assigns equal importance to cooperation with the SCO, and expanding strategic and military-technical partnership with EU countries and the United States [35].

Thirdly, the competition for regional leadership between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the scarcity of water resources, and Turkmenistan’s reluctance to participate in regional integration are all contributing factors to the increasing disintegration and rivalry between Central Asian countries. As a consequence, the Central Asian region is becoming more fragmented. This, in turn, raises the possibility of ISIS militants infiltrating the region and the escalation of drug trafficking, which may destabilise the region further in the future.

The fourth issue concerns the competition between Russia and China in Central Asia and the divergence of visions for the further development of the SCO. The competition between Moscow and Beijing is only evident in connection to Central Asia, whereas in the global context, both nations demonstrate mutual comprehension, concurrence, and solidarity. In fact, this is a result of Russia and China's competition with the United States and the West. For example, both China and Russia support the normalisation of the situation in the Middle East, oppose NATO expansion, US missile defence system deployment in Europe and the Pacific, as well as 'color revolutions' in the post-Soviet region [36]. Moscow and Beijing both aim to expand their influence in Central Asia, intensifying regional leadership. Consequently, this has an impact on relations between countries within the SCO. Due to their respective interests, Russia and China possess distinct visions for the organisation's further development. Specifically, China seeks to enhance commercial and economic partnerships with other member states in the SCO [37]. China initiated the establishment of a free trade zone amongst the SCO nations with the objective of utilising the Central Asian states as markets. However, Russia turned its back on this initiative, concerned about the strengthening of Beijing's economic influence. Moscow's focus is on enhancing its political and military influence in the region. Therefore, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation advocates the expansion of military-technical rather than economic ties. As a result, the apparent partnership between Russia and China in the SCO becomes a concealed power struggle for influence in Central Asia. Nonetheless, the 2004 Joint Declaration between both countries declares that 'the development of SCO is a priority for both Russia's and China's foreign policies. The parties view the SCO as the most consequential instrument for establishing peace, security, and cooperation over the Eurasian continent, especially in Central Asia—the main factors for the future construction of a multipolar world order based on international law' [16, p., 38, 39].

There is economic competition between Russia and China in their relations, and they aim to achieve maximum economic gain through cooperation with Central Asian nations [38]. To efficiently achieve Moscow and Beijing's national interests in Central Asia, it is necessary to formulate a cooperative strategy that aligns with their foreign policy objectives. If Russia and China successfully devise a strategy, their collaborative efforts will yield advantages for both nations. These include the resolution of 'three evil forces' problem that threaten both Russia and China; the geopolitical dominance of both countries and the displacement of the United States from the region; the expansion of the geographical space for economic development; and access to the energy resources of the Central Asian states.

The final problem relates to the mechanisms of RATS functioning. Cooperation between SCO member states to tackle security problems in Central Asia is deficient within the framework of the Anti-Terrorist Structure. Based on the findings of researcher B. Sultanov, collaboration among the organisation's member states' special services is limited to 'holding drills, conferences and other events' [32, p. 13]. Furthermore, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) does not possess a well-established emergency strategy or effective tools. In 2010, during the unrest in Kyrgyzstan, the organisation was incapable of taking the required steps to resolve

the conflict promptly [39]. Political scientist I.N. Bekmuratov argues that the SCO has been ineffective in resolving political crises in certain states within the region, despite its primary goal of countering non-traditional security threats. According to Russian experts, the organisation is currently ‘unprepared to respond to new threats and to react in a timely manner to extraordinary situations’ [40, p. 14]. In times of crisis, Central Asian states tend to seek assistance directly from Russia rather than engaging China for security threats. This is likely due to the unwillingness of local administrations to cooperate with China in political-military operations. Moreover, the spreading of anti-Chinese sentiments in the region makes Central Asian politicians hesitant to turn to China for help. Former Kyrgyz President A. Akaev was dismissed from office amidst allegations of betraying national interests in favour of other countries, highlighting the seriousness of the issue in the region [39].

On 10 May 2023, SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming was interviewed by China.com.cn regarding the organisation’s expansion. Zhang noted that ‘the SCO currently has eight member states, four observer states, including Iran and Belarus, which are in the process of obtaining the status of member states, and 14 dialogue partners, including Kuwait, the Maldives, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which were granted the status of dialogue partners at last year’s SCO summit in Samarkand’ [41]. He emphasised that a memorandum regarding the granting of dialogue partner status was signed with representatives of the concerned countries during the present meeting of foreign ministers on 10 May, and that six applications for observer status and three applications for dialogue partner status are under consideration. This suggests that the values represented by the SCO, particularly the ‘Shanghai spirit’, are gaining more recognition [41].

According to Zhang Ming in the Samarkand Declaration of the SCO, the heads of the SCO member states have urged the creation of an extensive, open, mutually beneficial and equitable space of cooperation in the Eurasian region, based on the principles of international law and taking into account national interests, using the potential of the countries of the region, international organisations and multilateral mechanisms. This document offers the SCO ‘direction on collaborating with partner organisations and increasing confidence while joining forces to address global threats and challenges’ [41].

5 Conclusions

The following recommendations can be made for the effective implementation of ensuring security and stability in the Central Asian space within the framework of the SCO:

- The development of a training programme by RATS is essential to equip specialists with the required skills and abilities to tackle security challenges and threats prevalent in the current environment;

- To improve practical cooperation among member states of the organisation to promptly respond to security threats and develop tools to prevent possible conflict situations;
- To increase collaboration with Afghanistan, a major hub of drug trafficking;
- To enhance the military capabilities of RATS;
- To create paramilitary formations similar to the UN peacekeeping force, thereby eliminating security threats;
- To collaborate on devising a development strategy for the SCO that aligns with the interests of all member states without conflicting with them.

These proposals are expected to contribute to maintaining stability in the Central Asian region, Russia, and China, effectively countering terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic separatism, and responding to security challenges in a timely manner.

The member states of the SCO are actively fostering collaboration and broadening their areas of interaction. Last year, the Council of Heads of State convened and ratified 22 legal and regulatory measures aimed at enhancing coordination between countries and furthering military-technical, political, and economic cooperation. These actions contributed to the continued advancement of both the Shanghai Organisation and its member nations [42]. On the 10th of May, the SCO Secretariat in Beijing held a press conference on the results of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the SCO member states held in the Indian state of Goa on the 5th of May. The press conference mentioned that the member states have achieved rapid economic development and significantly improved the lives of their citizens, and relations between them are becoming closer and more harmonious every day. It can be concluded that the SCO concept and model hold significant influence and appeal to new members. The principles and values adopted by the organisation are widely received by the international community, particularly those nations and peoples who are willing to collaborate for the betterment of security and prosperity.

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Russo-Chinese Counterterrorism Partnership Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization



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1 Introduction

The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation are the two leading countries in the international Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter SCO). There are nine states [1] on the Eurasian continent that are members of the organization, so the above-mentioned actors of international relations have objectively complementary interests in political, economic, military, cultural, and legal spheres. All the countries in the SCO are partners, tackling various international problems that are important for all the participants of this interstate organization. For several decades step by step they have been choosing the priority areas of action in order to prevent and suppress undesirable events in the early twenty-first century. The participants of the organization are consistently forming the legal framework, necessary for taking coordinated political and legal steps in the interstate interaction.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, many countries, to one degree or another, faced the need to fight terrorism which has a complex nature. Central Asian countries are no exception, as they witness the spread of terrorism, which, according to some authors, has a long-term character and is caused by certain internalities and externalities, including geopolitical, cross-border and social problems [2].

The purpose of the study is to identify the most promising areas for cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation within the SCO to fight terrorism. The objectives are: to define legal approaches to regulating relations in countering international terrorism by the SCO member states; and adopt a set of counterterrorism measures for improved security of the people living in Russia and China.

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2 Methods

In this paper, we use formal legal, analytical, and comparative legal scientific methods. Within the framework of the SCO, they are suitable for revealing the essence and content of international terrorism today.

Applying the formal legal approach to the problems of international terrorism, we can determine the essence of this phenomenon from the legal point of view, find ways for regulating it by national legal systems, consider the possibility of developing a single categorical apparatus and unifying the legal frameworks within the SCO.

The analysis and synthesis methods will allow us to retrospectively show the most significant features of international terrorism and identify effective ways to counter it.

The comparative legal method (the key features are identified) is suitable for studying the internal counterterrorism policy in the SCO member states and its compliance with regional documents and determining the degree of interaction of the states within the organization.

3 Literature Review

Many works by Russian, Chinese and other foreign researchers are used in this paper as sources. We consider the problem that is the focus of this study in terms of three main areas.

Firstly, many works are devoted to analysing the problems of international stability and security, including in countering terrorism: Li Quan, M. M. Yamamoto, E. Neumayer, T. N. Bukreeva, A. E. Mikhailova, R. Sarvat [3–9].

Secondly, some studies are aimed at understanding the cooperation between Russia and China on the matters of international security and counterterrorism policy tackled on regional and international platforms such as the SCO, BRICS, UN, etc. These are the works of Z. A. Dadabayeva, P. Bolt, Li Wei, N. A. Chernyadyeva, A. Vallo, R. Rakhimov, A. Cherkasov [10–14].

Thirdly, the basis of bilateral cooperation between Russia and China in the sphere of countering terrorism is analysed. The authors of studies in this area are Y. Zheng, A. N. Sukharenko, R. S. Ivanova, A. Y. Mamycheva, L. Zou, S. G. Luzyanin [15–20].

The works show the essence and system of Russo-Chinese cooperation as influential representatives of international relations. The authors of this research study rely on the regulatory framework and provide some statistics from which final conclusions are drawn.

4 Results

This study analyzes the matters important for achieving the objectives related to the interaction of the two leading SCO member states—China and Russia—in their fight against international terrorism on the territory of the Eurasian continent. The success of countering terrorism directly depends on the legal measures taken by law enforcement agencies of the Organization's member states.

In the course of the study, we analyzed the regional and bilateral Russo-Chinese agreements on countering terrorism. The most significant international agreements within the framework of the SCO are the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism [21], the Concept of Cooperation between the member States of the Shanghai Organization in the Fight against Terrorism and Separatism [22], and the Conventions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism [23].

These documents define the rights and obligations of the SCO member states in the framework of cooperation in countering global terrorism and other similar phenomena. However, the vague formulations and rather generalized definitions in the documents cause criticism from the international community, whose representatives believe that the Shanghai Convention is the main tool for coordinating initiatives based on laws and policies of the member states that potentially contradict international law [24–26].

The very concept of terrorism in regional documents is defined as a crime recognized in the Annexes to the 2001 Shanghai Convention or in national legislation, which may lead to its broad interpretation and result in the violation of the basic principles of international law. There is an objective need for the clarification of the legal conceptual apparatus concerning terrorism, given the growth in international relations.

The partnership between the Russian Federation and the PRC is successfully developing, particularly in combating the terrorist threat. In 2004, to strengthen global cooperation in counterterrorism activities, Russia and China signed a “Joint Statement” on the basis of the United Nations, which serves as a platform for the development of strategies to counterterrorism [27, 28], and in 2010 an agreement on cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism was concluded [21].

Given the diversity of the legal regulation in the SCO member states concerning various spheres of counterterrorism law, it is very important that similar legal positions should be developed concerning the most essential aspects of this phenomenon [29].

Currently, Russia and China have identical approaches to the formation of a counterterrorism system:

1. Regulation of counterterrorism activities at the legislative level: both countries have relevant laws in the field of combating terrorism (The People's Republic of China—the “Law on Combating Terrorism of the People's Republic of China” adopted on 27 December 2015 and the Russian Federation—adopted on 6 March 2006 35-FZ “On Counter-Terrorism”) [30].

2. At the international level: Russia and China occupy leading positions, having practical experience in a multilateral format of cooperation in the field of countering terrorism.
3. Military cooperation in the fight against terrorism: an active build-up of military and technical potential in these States, providing for a joint impressive military force in the fight against possible terrorist acts.

Russia and China have similar capabilities in solving domestic terrorism problems through the implementation of national strategies, but there is an urgent need to develop international partnership in countering terrorist activity and its prevention, minimizing and eliminating the consequences of its manifestation. This interaction is interpreted by a theoretical and scientific approach to the effectiveness of joint practices, along with a unilateral approach, within the framework of international cooperation in overcoming destructions [31]. In this connection, it can be concluded that the study of national strategies gives a positive result for the development of a collective approach to cooperation between Russia and China on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

It is considered difficult to develop the most appropriate ways to counterterrorism within the work of specific international organizations due to the lack of a universal definition of the phenomenon. The absence of the concept of “terrorism” is an obstacle to the proper work of international organizations in countering it. Consequently, in order to resolve this problem, it is proposed to introduce the concept of “international terrorism”, defining it as a terrorist activity aimed at damaging international security and the rule of law and carried out through the commission of acts in the territory of more than one State, causing significant material damage to the interests of more than one State, or by nationals of one State (stateless persons permanently residing in its territory) against nationals of another State, or by citizens of another State, or by nationals of another State (stateless persons permanently residing in its territory).

In addition to the legal mechanism, there is an organizational mechanism within the SCO aimed at fighting the “three forces of evil” together: [14, 32].

- On June 7, 2002, the Regional Counterterrorism Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO) was established. As a permanent body of the SCO, the RATS safeguards coordinated and consolidated interaction in this field between the competent authorities of the member states, and takes part in regional security activities;
- Since 2004 there has been a mechanism of regular meetings of the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the Member States [5];
- There are joint counterterrorism exercises, among which the “Peaceful Mission” should be highlighted. Table 1 provides information on counterterrorism exercises performed over the past 20 years.

In addition, in the context of counterterrorism activity, it is essential to practice specific forms of mutual assistance between representatives of law enforcement agencies in the event of objective situations caused by a threat of terrorist acts. The

Table 1 Anti-terrorist exercises involving Russia and China over the past 20 years

Year	Name	Scale
2003	Interaction	Multilateral
2005	Peace mission	Bilateral
2007	Peace mission	Multilateral
2009	Peace mission Sharp sword on the border	Multilateral
2010	Peace mission	Multilateral
2011	Tien Shan-2	Multilateral
2012	Peace mission Maritime interaction	Multilateral Bilateral
2013	Peace mission Maritime interaction	Bilateral
2014	Peace mission Maritime interaction Sharp Sword	Multilateral Bilateral Bilateral
2015	Maritime interaction Xiamen	Bilateral Multilateral
2016	Peace mission Maritime interaction	Multilateral Bilateral
2017	Maritime interaction	Bilateral
2018	Peace mission Maritime interaction	Multilateral Bilateral
2019	Center Maritime interaction	Multilateral Bilateral
2019–2021	Solidarity	Multilateral
2020	Caucasus	Multilateral
2020	Peace mission	Multilateral
2021	Maritime interaction	Bilateral
2022	Vostok-2022	Multilateral
2023	North. Interaction Maritime security belt 2023	Bilateral Multilateral

countries participating in the SCO's operations follow a whole system of actions, which involves not only the representatives of the scientific community that propose options for developing counterterrorism programmes but also heads of the armed forces and special agencies, whose competences allow them to produce solutions to counterterrorism problem.

Any measures aimed at combating criminal elements at the state or international level are objectively based on the level of special training of employees of ministries and departments dealing with issues of countering international threats against the population of a particular State. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization includes a number of countries that have significant weight in the international arena and often act as initiators of interstate cooperation in the field of combating terrorism.

This circumstance contributes to closer cooperation between the SCO member States in various aspects of the development and implementation of strategic and

tactical measures aimed at reducing the level of terrorist threats to all citizens of these countries. In the context of this provision, most specialists in the armed forces and security are inclined to the idea of constantly improving the set of measures during exercises regularly held on the territory of individual States.

So, in 2022, this trend found expression in a significant increase in the number of joint exercises in different SCO countries, in which special military units directly participated, practicing the most effective techniques and methods of armed confrontation with various international terrorist groups. In addition, specialists of law enforcement agencies constantly exchange experience gained during specific events in situations where the activity of international terrorists required immediate measures to ensure the safety of the population and suppress the criminal activities of these illegal associations trying to expand their influence on various regions of the Eurasian continent. The experience gained by armed formations in the process of conducting counterterrorism exercises and as a result of specific anti-terrorist operations in a particular SCO country is constantly being studied by leading specialists of law enforcement agencies in order to implement all measures provided for by legislation to counter terrorist threats more adequately and with minimal losses.

5 Discussion

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the activity of terrorist organizations has largely become international. Their danger is increasing and creates a real threat to international law and order that should be the basis for expanding the spheres of interaction between many states [7, 13]. International terrorism is a complex and diverse phenomenon that has special features reflecting its essence [33]. First, international terrorist activity spreads across many states. The border between sovereign countries is not an obstacle to terrorism. Active participants in international terrorism are representatives of extremist organizations seeking to destroy the normal functioning of the state management mechanism in a particular country. International terrorists use their bases located in different countries around the globe as centers for concentrating illegal operations of various national and religious formations [34].

International terrorist activities are supported with numerous financial sources of their patrons, which may be individual organizations, or even specific states with powerful political forces, interested in destabilizing the sovereignty of certain countries.

International terrorists actively involve younger age groups of population lacking moral or psychological stability in their living circumstances; they use pseudo-revolutionary slogans and appeals that contribute to masking the true purposes of terrorist groups in the political arena.

One of the key features of international terrorism is that it skillfully uses the contradictions between people belonging to different national or religious groups. Within the SCO member states, this circumstance is especially significant, since this

big international organization includes countries, whose populations are multinational or belong to various religious denominations.

Given the above, it can be argued that due to international terrorism, one of the most dangerous and aggressive manifestations of illegal organizations in interstate relations, there is a need for conceptually significant and well-thought counterterrorism programmes, whose content must most fully consider the essential differences in the state structure, as well as the political regimes common to many countries that are members to the SCO playing a significant role on the Eurasian continent [6, 15].

In order to ensure the purposeful and consistent counterterrorism work of the law enforcement agencies in the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, a whole range of international legal documents to cover the most likely areas of activity of the special agencies of these states and create conditions for a comprehensive impact on the existing terrorist organizations that spread their influence on the territories of almost all SCO member states. Special attention is to be paid to the state of affairs concerning comprehensive measures taken by the ministries and departments of Russia and China, whose competences include the matters related to combating various manifestations of international terrorism that pose serious danger to residents of these states. The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, as leaders of the alliance, are generally capable of proposing constructive counterterrorism measures, which always involve law enforcement agencies.

Therefore, during the last Meeting (April 28, 2023, the Republic of India, New Delhi, hybrid format), it was highlighted that there is a need for greater cooperation in the control of movements of terrorist and other organized criminal groups in the SCO space, and this cooperation must be promoted through joint operational activities, training, and exchange of regulatory and legal documents, as well as scientific and methodological materials [35].

It is possible to identify the main directions for the development of international cooperation between Russia and China on anti-terrorist activities, both at the bilateral level and within the framework of the work of regional and international platforms:

1. To expand cooperation between the state structures of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the fight against the terrorist threat.
2. Capacity building in joint work to modernise measures to combat artificial intelligence used by terrorist organizations to achieve their goals.
3. Interaction in the field of countering the illegal sale of weapons, in particular drones.
4. Implementation of joint specialized training of employees of ministries and agencies dealing with issues of countering international threats with knowledge of relevant foreign languages.
5. Interaction in various aspects of the development and implementation of measures of strategic and tactical nature aimed at reducing the level of terrorist threats of the said countries, namely, continuous improvement of the set of measures during counterterrorist exercises regularly held on the territory of certain states.

6. In order to prevent terrorist acts, the implementation of joint activities of IT-sphere employees to identify persons recruited by terrorist organizations and disseminating terrorist ideology on the Internet.
7. Open an interregional dialogue on the use of positive national experience of Russia and China in combating terrorism.

6 Conclusions

Comprising vast territories including a number of states that are leaders of the international community, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in the face of terrorist threats, is forever improving the mechanisms of interaction between the heads of the armed forces and special law enforcement agencies to quickly eliminate any terrorist danger, for which reason in the twenty-first century the SCO countries have developed and adopted comprehensive programmes to fight terrorism. Communications between ministries and departments of the states are constantly being improved in order to apply the most effective methods and ways to respond to any terrorist attack. Successfully combating terrorist acts requires a comprehensive approach that involves not only changes to the specific legislation of individual States but also addressing the problem at the international level through the application of political-legal ties between States.

In their activities, Chinese and Russian leaders always pay close attention to synchronizing the efforts of their countries and achieve positive results in their fight against terrorism as a complex international social phenomenon.

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China-Russia Agricultural Cooperation Within the Belt and Road Initiative: Patterns, Obstacles, and Resolutions



Rong Long and Jingcheng Li

1 Introduction

The year 2023 represents the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI seeks to facilitate extensive, high-level, and in-depth regional economic cooperation while upholding the fundamental principles of openness, inclusivity, fairness, and connectivity. Moreover, Belt and Road international agricultural cooperation serves as a crucial avenue for China to extend agricultural development opportunities to BRI partner countries and tackle global hunger and poverty challenges.

China and Russia are strategic partners in the BRI. Their agricultural cooperation exhibits complementary advantages and significant development potential. China prioritizes food security in the midst of a complex and unstable international environment and actively engages in international agricultural cooperation. Meanwhile, under the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries, Russia has actively pursued economic diversification and an Eastward Strategy, with agriculture as a key sector.

After years of dedicated effort, the scope of China-Russia agricultural cooperation has expanded, and agricultural investment has been further promoted, indicating a promising development prospect. As the cooperation deepens, digitization, comprehensive opening-up, and high-quality development have become the new trends of China-Russia agricultural cooperation within the BRI framework. However, numerous challenges persist in China-Russia agricultural cooperation, such as incomplete and inconsistent laws and regulations, inadequate talent

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resources and reserves, cultural differences, and cognitive contradictions, which significantly hinder the further development of regional economic cooperation between the two countries.

The chapter commences with a description and rationale of the selected research methods, followed by a review of the existing literature on China-Russia agricultural cooperation. The subsequent section presents and interprets the study's findings. Finally, the chapter concludes with remarks on the border implications of the findings and recommendations for future research.

2 Materials and Methods

Under the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the existing status of academic research in China-Russia agricultural cooperation can be explored, and redundant research efforts can be effectively avoided by studying pertinent literature from China and overseas. The relevant literature related to China-Russia agricultural cooperation within the framework of the BRI was scrutinized using academic resources, literature, and internet databases, significantly enhancing the comprehensiveness and efficiency of research on this subject. This study employed primary research methodologies, utilizing an analytical approach to scrutinize the theoretical underpinnings of the BRI concept and the current state of agricultural cooperation between China and BRI nations. A statistical method was employed to analyze scientific literature and media articles due to its precision, convenience, and reliability, providing statistical insights into the accomplishments of China-Russia agricultural cooperation over the past decade.

Over the previous decade, there has been a lively debate among leading political scholars regarding bilateral agricultural cooperation between China and Russia, and in particular its significance and feasibility. As indicated by Russian researchers [1, 2], the Russian Far East holds advantages in oil, minerals, and land resources, and is geographically adjacent to China's Northeast. With exceptional natural and geological resources, both sides can engage in comprehensive cooperation across the agro-industrial chain, which will further stimulate the rapid development of economic and trade relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, S. Mishchuk [3] emphasized the significance of agricultural development and international cooperation for developing countries, analyzing the impact of China-Russia agricultural industrial cooperation on bilateral trade. V. Erokhin [4] suggested that agricultural cooperation between China and Russia will deepen and enhance the strategic partnership between the two countries. Additionally, Chinese analysts [5–8] advocate for mutual complementarity in agricultural science and technology, as well as strengthening agricultural cooperation between the two countries based on their respective strengths. Although there are certain constraints limiting agricultural cooperation between China and Russia, these barriers can be overcome through sustained cooperation and mutual understanding. Therefore, the prospects for agricultural cooperation between the two countries are promising, and there is a certain

feasibility of China-Russia agricultural cooperation based on the complementarity between the two countries. The research they conducted offers crucial strategic perspectives for present and future agricultural collaboration between China and Russia. One major limitation is the scarcity of papers addressing new challenges and resolutions for cooperation within the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, in the realm of steady international relations, advancing and strengthening agricultural production collaboration among nations holds practical importance. Furthermore, this can serve as a significant policy guideline for China's international agricultural cooperation in the new era.

3 Results

China-Russia agricultural collaboration has historically been a pivotal focus of partnership, leading to productive outcomes and demonstrating favorable progression. The Belt and Road Initiative presents a momentous chance and extensive foundation for economic advancement and regional cooperation between China and Russia. Under the BRI framework, agricultural cooperation between China and Russia has been significantly intensified.

3.1 *Agricultural Cooperation Among BRI Countries*

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global development initiative aimed at reconfiguring economic integration in the international environment of the new era. It aims to promote peaceful development by leveraging the ancient Silk Road as a historical symbol and actively seeks to develop economic cooperation with partners, building a community of shared interests, shared future, and shared responsibility. This community will feature political mutual trust, economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness. The BRI spans across the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, encompassing 65 countries [9] with diverse geographical environments and rich resource endowments. This has created favorable conditions for mutual cooperation. The logistics channel for agricultural trade between BRI countries is accessible, with agricultural products being transported from the point of origin to the importer's port through international logistics, and then to the consumer through domestic transportation at the importer's end.

In the realm of international agricultural cooperation, well-defined and mutually supportive relationships have been forged among governments, enterprises, and agricultural research institutions. Regional authorities are actively expanding international cooperation by exploring modes of overseas agricultural development and enhancing collaboration in agricultural technology training, scientific research and development, irrigation, and other related fields. The close cooperation between

national and local governments, as well as visits by heads of state and government, will jointly create a conducive environment for international agricultural cooperation.

Enterprises are implementing projects and acting as practical agents for both national and individual economic interests. Numerous agricultural enterprises have established multiple overseas operations across different countries and projects, effectively becoming a hub for Chinese international agricultural relations. Each agricultural enterprise conducting business abroad serves as a window for Chinese agriculture, enabling countries to realistically understand the achievements of China's agricultural development.

Throughout China, there are agricultural universities, academies of agricultural sciences, and agricultural research centers. The government facilitates scholarly exchanges and actively supports agricultural researchers in conducting international research and field studies, integrating agricultural technology knowledge with practical application, and providing suggestions for the advancement of China's agriculture. The technical guidance offered by agronomists is often regarded as a form of China's foreign agricultural aid [10].

3.2 Formation of China-Russia Agricultural Cooperation

China-Russia agricultural cooperation encompasses various facets, including agricultural trade, foreign investment in agriculture, labor collaboration, and exchange of agro-technology. Among these, agricultural trade has yielded the most noteworthy outcomes. The scale of agricultural trade between China and Russia has expanded in recent years, with the potential for food supply to further increase. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the trade volume of agricultural products between the two countries has significantly increased, from 618 million USD in 2000 to 5.55 billion USD in 2020. Russia's agricultural products and grain exports to China have maintained a rapid growth rate, with a year-on-year increase of 44% [11]. At present, China accounts for 20% of Russian agricultural exports, surpassing the European Union as the largest national market for Russian agricultural exports. Moreover, China is the largest importer of Russian honey, poultry, beef, soybeans, oats, and flaxseed [12]. The list of agricultural products with mutual market access has been expanding, and more Russian enterprises are participating in agricultural trade with China. China and Russia have strengthened policy communication through multilateral and bilateral international agricultural cooperation mechanisms in recent years. Since 2015, China has granted access permits for various Russian agricultural products, particularly barley, wheat, corn, and sunflower seeds. The import and export structure of agricultural trade between the two countries has become more diverse. In 2022, 988 Russian enterprises were registered in China's General Administration of Customs systems, primarily involved in the production and processing of fish products, honey, ice cream, dairy products, and other popular agricultural and food products. This information is based on data from the Russian Federal Veterinary Bureau [11].

The agricultural cooperation between China and Russia presents complementary advantages [5]. China serves as a major consumer of Russian agricultural products, while Russia relies heavily on imports, with over 70% of its fruit and vegetable imports coming from China due to limitations in vegetable and fruit cultivation in Russia's Far East because of its cold climate. Over the years, China and Russia have established special green channels for fruits and vegetables at several border ports in the Far East, with limited customs clearance and inspection time of 24 hours. Local distributors have reported that it takes only a week for vegetables and fruits to be transported from Shandong to supermarkets in the Far East [13].

As the agricultural investment cooperation deepened, China's agricultural investment in Russia has steadily increased, and the investment environment in Russia has gradually improved. The level of interconnection of cross-border food transport channels is increasing year by year. Since 2009, when agriculture was listed as a priority investment area in the Outline of China-Russia Investment Cooperation Planning [14], China's agricultural investment and development cooperation with Russia has gradually deepened, expanding from simple planting and breeding areas to the entire agricultural industry chain, including agricultural product processing, modern storage facilities construction, sales, and logistics distribution.

Some large enterprises have established comprehensive cross-border agricultural industry chains. The two countries have set up an Agricultural Investment Fund to actively promote the building of pilot platforms for China-Russia investment cooperation, and have established China-Russia agricultural cooperation park, technopark, and agricultural free trade zone, gradually forming both-ends-abroad production and marketing mode, contract farming, the Twin Industrial Parks projects, and other flexible innovative cooperation modes. The agricultural investment stock of China and Russia is second only to mining, with significant growth trends. Additionally, the two countries have actively promoted the construction of cross-border transport channels to further enhance the efficiency of transit transport of agricultural products.

3.3 Development Tendency in Bilateral Agricultural Trade

The increasing collaboration between China and Russia has resulted in new developments in Belt and Road agricultural cooperation, encompassing comprehensive opening-up, digitalization, and high-quality growth. These developments are anticipated to expedite the construction of the BRI, further boost regional economic progress, and provide a fresh impetus for BRI agricultural cooperation.

Digitization and Cross-border E-commerce The integration of digital technology and cross-border e-commerce has become an unavoidable trend in current and future agricultural cooperation under the BRI. Cross-border e-commerce, as an emerging trade mode, holds significant potential for development between China and Russia, transcending geographical boundaries, streamlining trading links, and

facilitating direct transactions between suppliers and consumers. It has notably surged cross-border trade volume, expanding consumer groups beyond enterprises to include ordinary consumers. Russian dairy products, biscuits, and confectionery have successfully entered the Chinese market through cross-border e-commerce, earning high regard among Chinese consumers.

As of September 2023, China has established bilateral e-commerce cooperation mechanisms with 29 countries and regions [15], encompassing all BRI countries and regions. Silk Road e-commerce is increasingly propelling trade connectivity along the Belt and Road. The opening of agricultural markets and the advancement of cross-border e-commerce will propel China-Russia economic cooperation into a new phase.

All-round Opening-up and Cooperation The all-round opening-up and cooperation have led to an expansion of cooperation reflected in the continuous improvement of policies and plans, the increasing variety of agricultural trade, and the expansion of cooperation areas and regions. This will positively impact China's level of openness, accelerate the construction of the BRI, and deepen agricultural cooperation between China and countries or regions along the BRI. As of June 2023, China had signed more than 200 cooperation documents with 152 countries and 32 international organizations [16], expanding China's friendship zone and opening-up new international markets. Furthermore, the field of industrial trade cooperation has continued to expand, especially in the deepening of trade cooperation in agricultural commodities, providing strong support to the economic development of countries and regions participating in the BRI.

High-quality development The agricultural collaboration under the BRI is continually progressing, and the establishment of the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) is facilitating the enhancement of agricultural cooperation between China and Russia. Through institutional innovation, the construction of the FTZ is being adjusted in accordance with changes in international trade regulations and relevant standards. This, in turn, will enhance the quality of investment and financing to Russia, promote trade facilitation, and deepen agricultural trade cooperation between China and Russia within the new development context. The construction of the FTZ represents a strategic move for China to establish a new open economy system in the modern era and to create a hub for institutional innovation, leading the way for high-quality development implementation.

Furthermore, the focus of high-quality development is on environmentally friendly practices. On October 18, 2023, the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation High-level Forum for Green Development was conducted in Beijing [17]. The forum's theme was "Green Silk Road for Harmony with Nature," with the objective of expediting green, low-carbon transformation, achieving harmonious coexistence between humans and nature, supporting nations in enhancing green infrastructure connectivity, attaining the 2030 sustainable development goal, and building a clean and beautiful world. Consequently, the trend of

high-quality development has emerged as the new trajectory and developmental orientation for BRI agricultural cooperation.

4 Discussion

While the agricultural collaboration between China and Russia has produced positive outcomes, there remains potential for enhancement in terms of the magnitude and depth of collaboration. It is pivotal to tackle the obstacles impeding the advancement of agricultural cooperation between the two nations in order to fully unlock its potential.

4.1 *Current Problems of Bilateral Agricultural Cooperation*

Incomplete and inconsistent laws and regulations The policies, mechanisms, laws, and regulations governing China-Russia agricultural cooperation are inadequate, non-standard, and fragmented. China lacks medium- and long-term overall planning and policy guidance for agricultural cooperation with Russia. Similarly, it lacks overall scientific planning, precise policy implementation, and comprehensive and accurate guidance for enterprises involved in collaboration. Furthermore, there is a delay in information exchange, difficulty in exchanging information for enterprises, a lack of coordination and interaction, and challenges in realizing the benefits of coordinated and joint operation.

Currently, there is no well-established mechanism for overseas agricultural development subsidies. The lack of policy support for agricultural subsidies has increased competitive pressure for Chinese enterprises participating in the international development of agriculture. The high return cost of agricultural products produced in Russia, complicated customs clearance procedures, and policy quotas restricting some grain returns are due to the lack of targeted support policies. The agricultural investment environment in Russia is still subject to numerous policy constraints. The relevant economic and trade laws and regulations are complex, and taxation is characterized by a wide range of different types of taxes and fees, and low administrative efficiency, with lengthy procedures. These issues have increased the uncertainty of foreign investment in agriculture in Russia.

Insufficient talent resources and reserves Secondly, the absence of training in agricultural cooperation between China and Russia is evident. Both sides encounter a scarcity of skilled professionals, which impedes the advancement and implementation of agricultural technology. Consequently, this constrains the transformation and enhancement of agricultural cooperation between the two countries.

Cultural differences and cognitive contradictions Thirdly, as China-Russia agricultural cooperation expands and deepens, cultural differences and cognitive inconsistencies have gradually surfaced, exerting a negative impact on further agricultural cooperation between the two countries. It is not uncommon for cultural conflicts to arise in international economic exchanges. The vast cultural disparities between China and Russia encompass language, mentality, psychology, social habits, values, beliefs, customs, religions, traditions, etc. These differences in worldview and other aspects among investors from the two countries also reflect uncertainty, making it challenging for individuals from different cultural backgrounds to comprehend each other's perspectives, thereby increasing the risk associated with cultural differences.

4.2 Practical Measures to Empower the Agricultural Collaboration

Strengthening the role of policy coordination and mutual trust To accomplish this, it is essential to enhance the pertinent policy mechanisms, laws, and regulations, reinforce policy communication and coordination, and facilitate mutual access to agricultural markets. The agricultural cooperation sector depends on well-established laws and regulations to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests and regulate its business practices [18]. However, authorities also need to provide guidance and supervision for agricultural cooperation in line with relevant laws to promote standardized and professional agricultural cooperation and enhance its efficiency. The state's capacity to establish a comprehensive system of information service, credit insurance, legal support, and agricultural product logistics for agricultural cooperation directly influences the advancement of agricultural cooperation [19].

Establishing a cooperation mechanism for training agricultural talents To fully leverage the potential of university platforms for personnel training and intellectual resources, it is essential for colleges and universities in both China and Russia to enhance the development of multi-skilled talents in languages, agriculture, and economics. Considering the geographical advantages of China and Russia, it is important to actively promote cultural exchanges in academic institutions, expand exchanges in humanities, science and technology between Chinese and Russian universities, establish university alliances, and collaborate on education and scientific research [20]. Additionally, both countries' universities should establish a platform for cultural exchange between their students, facilitating meaningful communication and idea exchange on humanities, history, and culture. These exchanges will establish a strong foundation for future economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.

Expanding cultural exchanges and cooperation Thirdly, there is a crucial need to expand interpersonal and cultural interactions. Scholars in China believe that cultural identity significantly impacts the deepening of economic and trade collaboration between China and Russia [21]. Media organizations from both countries should engage in exchanges at multiple levels, taking into account the differences in socio-economic systems and ways of life. This will enable them to collectively act as a bridge for civilizations, expanding the channels of cultural exchange between China and Russia. Additionally, scholars have stressed the importance of establishing online platforms to promote the cultures of both nations [22]. Furthermore, it is essential to improve China's cultural exchange environment, providing advanced software and hardware support for cultural exchanges between the two countries, and strengthening China's cultural exchange foundation. In terms of hardware facilities, authorities need to enhance the construction of transportation infrastructure and enhance the connectivity capacity between the two countries. On the software side, the government could develop relevant policies to facilitate visa processing and promote communication and exchanges between China and Russia at the civilian level.

5 Conclusions

With the rise of globalization, agricultural cooperation has emerged as a crucial catalyst for economic growth and the strengthening of diplomatic ties. The collaboration in agriculture among BRI countries and the establishment of China-Russia agricultural cooperation have represented significant advancements in bilateral agricultural trade. The shift toward digitalization, cross-border e-commerce, and high-quality development offers prospects for further China-Russia agricultural cooperation and expansion.

However, several challenges persist in current bilateral agricultural cooperation. Incomplete and inconsistent laws and regulations, inadequate talent resources and reserves, as well as cultural differences and cognitive contradictions, can impede collaboration progress. To tackle these challenges and empower agricultural collaboration, it is imperative to enhance policy coordination and mutual trust, establish a cooperation mechanism for training agricultural talents, and expand cultural exchanges and cooperation. These are crucial steps toward sustainable and fruitful collaboration. The implementation of the BRI further elevates this cooperation to a new level. Despite the presence of challenges and difficulties, the combination of resources, good-neighborly relations, political mutual trust, and strategic synergies between China and Russia has laid a strong foundation for agricultural cooperation between the two sides. By adopting practical measures and leveraging the power of agricultural collaboration, China and Russia can achieve more comprehensive, open, and high-quality development in their agricultural trade relations, ultimately contributing to global agricultural prosperity and advancement.

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Kazakhstan and China: New Trends in International Cooperation



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1 Introduction

In the 30 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Kazakhstan, it is possible to put forward the idea of jointly passing through four main stages in the development of cooperation. The first stage was the establishment of diplomatic relations (1992–2002). China and Kazakhstan focused on initial political and security cooperation and resolved the issue of territorial border disputes through the ‘Shanghai Five’ mechanism [1]. After the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level on January 3, 1992, the bilateral friendly relations developed steadily.

The second stage is the stage of good neighbourly relations (2002–2005). During this period, a number of agreements, documents on economic and trade cooperation, energy and military spheres, and agreements of mutual trust were signed to meet the needs of economic and social development.

The third stage is the strategic partnership phase (2005–2019). China and Kazakhstan develop comprehensive and in-depth cooperation through bilateral diplomacy as well as multilateral diplomacy such as the SCO.

The fourth stage is the Permanent Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2019–present). During President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s first visit to China in September 2019, China and Kazakhstan upgraded their bilateral relations to a

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‘Permanent Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’. Since then, practical cooperation between China and Kazakhstan has deepened in various fields [2].

Kazakhstan plays a key role in linking the countries of Eurasia and balancing regional and international relations. Kazakhstan is committed to a policy of friendly and responsible foreign relations and has established peaceful and friendly diplomatic relations with all countries, of which it is particularly important to maintain friendly relations with its neighbours, and China plays an important role in this respect. China occupies an important place in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. In September 2019, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev paid a state visit to China, the two countries have deepened their efforts to forge a permanent friendship based on good bilateral relations. The partnership at the level of Permanent Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is unique only to China and Kazakhstan. It is proof of the distinctive position of China and Kazakhstan in each other’s political strategy.

The visit of the President of Kazakhstan to Xi’an, China, brought new cooperation agreements between the two countries. In an interview with China-Central Television (CCTV) on the occasion of his state visit to China on 12 May 2023, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev expressed strong support for the development of friendly cooperation between the youth of the two countries and increased exchanges between the younger generations [3].

With the expansion of the SCO and increasing fragmentation of issues, China and the Central Asian countries need a new specialized multilateral cooperation mechanism in addition to continuing to promote cooperation within the SCO, and the ‘China +5 countries of Central Asia’ Minister’s Meeting Mechanism was established in July 2020 as a response to the current economic and political situation. In June 2022, at the third meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs ‘China +5 countries of Central Asia’ was decided to create a mechanism for meetings of heads of state ‘China +5 countries of Central Asia’. Compared with the SCO, the ‘China +5 Central Asian’ countries cooperation mechanism not only covers all Central Asian countries, but also allows more attention to Central Asian affairs and regional cooperation. The establishment of the SCO, the ‘China +5 Central Asian countries’ mechanism, and the signing of the Joint Declaration on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan in September 2022 have elevated relations between China and Kazakhstan to the rank of ‘aspire to a common future characterized by eternal friendship, profound mutual trust and solidarity’ [4].

At present, the two countries have been deepening cooperation in the field of trade and economy, infrastructure connectivity within the framework of the One Belt, One Road, epidemic control, etc. Under the Belt and Road Initiative, many investment and production capacity cooperation projects have been successfully implemented, and the volume of bilateral trade has supported efficient growth. In 2021, bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan amounted to \$25.25 billion, an increase of 17.4% compared to last year. From January to October 2022, bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan totalled \$25.6 billion, an increase of 23.2 percent over the same period last year [5]. The trade turnover of Kazakhstan with China in 2022 amounted to 24.1 billion US dollars, which is 34% more than in 2021 (18.0

billion US dollars). At the same time, Kazakhstan's exports to China increased by 35% to 13.2 billion US dollars and imports by 33% to 11.0 billion US dollars.

In the energy sector, China and Kazakhstan have developed prosperous cooperation in the oil and gas sector. The two countries have jointly built the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, China's first cross-border oil pipeline, and all three lines of the China-Central Asia A/B/C gas pipeline pass through Kazakhstan [6].

In the humanitarian sphere, the two countries have achieved fruitful cooperation in education, culture, science and technology, sending creative teams throughout the year. 2017 Xi'an International Studies University officially established the Kazakhstan Center, which plays an active role in promoting the training of Kazakh language talents, Kazakh and regional studies, as well as cooperation and exchange between China and Kazakhstan in higher education. The Kazakhstan Centre at Xi'an International Studies University is the fourth Kazakh centre established after the Kazakhstan Centre at Shanghai International Studies University (November 2015), the Kazakhstan Centre at Beijing Foreign Studies University (December 2015) and the Kazakhstan Centre at Dalian University of Foreign Languages (January 2016). The ongoing establishment of the Centre for Kazakh Studies marks the growing interest of the Chinese academic community and the Chinese public in the Kazakh language, culture, history and development of the 'Kazakhstan Way'.

The SCO Summit in India, held on July 4, 2023, confirmed the importance of the platform for peace, prosperity and development throughout the Eurasian space. The adopted New Delhi Declaration approves new approaches to promoting fairer and more effective international cooperation. The 2013 China-Kazakhstan Belt and Road Investment and Trade Initiative was supported by Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The coincidence of goals and interests of the states that took part in the 'One Belt – One Road' initiative determined the possibility of such close cooperation. In this regard, relations between China and Central Asian countries are constantly improving, deepening and expanding through constructive and comprehensive cooperation.

Party cooperation is developing despite the differences in political systems.

The Communist Party of China and Kazakhstan's parties have a long history of cooperation between the ruling political parties, the most typical of which is the pairing of the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative and the new economic policy 'Shining Path'. The pairing of the Belt and Road Initiative with Kazakhstan's new economic policy 'The Bright Road' has been very smooth and fruitful, both in terms of transport cooperation between the two countries and in terms of strengthening Kazakhstan's rail transport capacity, with trade between China and Kazakhstan reaching US\$31 billion for the first time in 2022. The Kazakhstan-China logistics cooperation base in Lianyungang provides a gateway for Kazakhstani products from the Pacific Ocean, and the China-Europe train that passes through Kazakhstan reduces round-trip transport time by 5–6 days. These figures show that pairing the Belt and Road Initiative with Kazakhstan's new economic policy, 'The Bright Road', has resulted in $1 + 1 > 2$ success for China and Kazakhstan.

In addition, political parties in both countries are actively engaged in exchanging theories, cultures and experiences of political party management. On November 29, 2021, an international forum on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Kazakhstan's Independence 'Evolution of the Party and Political System of Kazakhstan: Challenges, Achievements and Prospects' was held in the capital of Kazakhstan. The event was organized by Amanat Party Public Policy Institute. More than 600 hundred local and foreign experts exchanged opinions and evaluated the success of Kazakhstan during the years of Independence. Qian Hongshan, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CPC), was present via video link and spoke positively about China-Kazakhstan relations and cooperation between the ruling parties of the two countries. In relation to the theme of the forum, he presented the experience and practice of the Chinese Communist Party in building democratic politics, providing the Chinese experience to Kazakhstan to deepen the reform of the political party system and providing a common vision for continuing and expanding inter-party cooperation in the future.

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Central Asia in 2022, the International Department of Central Committee of CPC organized the 3rd Forum of China and Central Asia Political Parties by video link with the theme of 'Decisively following the development path according to the national conditions: the responsibility and role of political parties'. Leaders of 20 major political parties from five Central Asian countries attended and spoke, including Kertayev Rinat, secretary of the Amanat Party of Kazakhstan.

The CPC is willing to strengthen strategic communications with political parties in Kazakhstan and other countries, promote civilization exchanges and mutual learning, deepen the development strategy interface, promote the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative and global development initiative, rely on bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to jointly build a strong regional security network, and make party contributions to building the Chinese-Central Asian community of destiny [7].

2 Research Approach

The topic under study is relatively new and insufficiently researched. The Kazakh, Chinese and Central Asian scientific literature does not cover the issue as extensively. Research is mainly in the form of articles and reports. All of this aims at studying the theoretical and methodological aspects and practices of the new trends in diplomacy and international relations in general.

This research paper uses a documentary research approach to collect official cooperation agreements and official reports from the Chinese and Kazakh governments, including joint declarations, development and cooperation plans, financial reports, etc. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Kazakhstan in 1992, the two countries have signed over 100 bilateral and

multilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding on politics, trade, borders, transport, counter-terrorism, science and technology, intellectual property, education, etc. [8]. These documents cover several main areas for development: diplomatic relations, economic trade, interaction between culture and politics, environmental preservation and the maintenance of regional stability and peace.

This chapter focuses on new priority areas for further close cooperation between China and Kazakhstan, building on the achievements of 30 years of friendship. According to the Joint Declaration on the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, head of state diplomacy is crucial in bilateral relations, improving the mechanism of regular meetings between the premiers of China and Kazakhstan and keeping the effective functioning of the China-Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee remain cooperation priorities.

The analysis of bibliographic sources has shown that two-way trade continues to be optimized in present and future projects related to the development of technology, the growing popularity of e-commerce. This creates a new platform for international trade, and the 'Silk Road e-commerce' and the construction of the 'Digital Silk Road' will also be new emphases for future cooperation in future cooperation. The energy sector has always been an important component of bilateral practical cooperation between China and Kazakhstan, but in the future, both sides will expand the use and opening up of green energy. In addition, the pneumonia epidemic, which started in 2019, has caused significant damage to the traditional sector of the economy. In this context, the importance of health services, new technologies, communication and logistic technologies has increased significantly. As a consequence, cooperation projects in these areas—the joint construction of a 'healthy Silk Road'—will also be gradually implemented.

Qualitative and quantitative methods as well as comparative and statistical methods were used in the research.

Qualitative research method: to study specific cooperation agreements and contractual projects, the notion of their specificity, context, intergovernmental and party decision-making processes.

Quantitative research method: identifying the contribution of the new direction of China-Kazakhstan cooperation to the economic and cultural space of the two countries on the basis of specific data, including the 'Greater Eurasia'.

The comparative method of research allowed to study features of the new stage of China-Kazakhstan cooperation.

In addition to the above methods, the method of political analysis and observation was used, as well as a comparative analysis of the development of cooperation, including the political and party systems of the two countries. These methods made it possible to study the general and specific features in the development of party building at the present stage and the role of parties in promoting reforms and political governance.

The collection and processing of information and content analysis contributed to understanding and summarizing information on the future prospects of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan, as well as identifying possible risks and challenges

for its further effective development. Certain foresight predicted the prospects of further cooperation, the levels of international tensions, and the economic crisis, largely related to sanctions for a number of countries.

3 Findings

In the conditions of the modern world, there is a clear tendency to increase the importance of modern technologies. As a result, China is actively promoting the project of creating a ‘Digital Silk Road’. It is assumed that the implementation of the New Silk Road will be carried out through the use of digital technologies in order to improve logistics and retail. Initiatives supported by the leading political parties of the two countries contribute to the formation of new trends in cooperation. Among them is the Digital Silk Road: The digital economy contributes to the qualitative development of China-Kazakhstan cooperation.

In recent years, the digital economy has become a new growth point for Chinese-Kazakh cooperation. Especially in the context of the global pandemic, the potential of the digital economy has further opened up and boosted high-quality bilateral cooperation. The pairing of digital economy strategies has deepened bilateral political mutual trust. China’s digital economy policy initially focused on informatization and e-commerce development. In January 2005, China’s first policy document on e-commerce development, ‘Several Opinions of the State Council General Administration on Accelerating E-commerce Development’ was released, which designated the development of digital economy, represented by e-commerce, as an important part of the national strategy [9]. ‘Digital economy’ first appeared in a government report in 2017 [10], and from 2019 to 2022, it has been included in the government report for four consecutive years, consistently proposing ‘strengthening the development of the digital economy’ [11], ‘building the New advantages of the Digital Economy’ [12], ‘accelerating digital development and building a digital China’ [13] and ‘promoting digital economy development and strengthening the overall plan for building a digital China’. The 2022 government report raised the strategic level of the digital economy and for the first time expressed the digital economy in a ‘separate paragraph’ [14]. This indicates that the development of the digital economy has been raised to the national strategic level. By 2023, the government report proposes to ‘promote the deep integration of the digital and real economy’ and accelerate the digital transformation of traditional industries and small and medium-sized enterprises [15]. The digital economy and high-quality industrial development have again entered a new phase.

The digital economy in Kazakhstan emerged later than in China but is a leader in Central Asia. In January 2013, Kazakhstan approved the State Programme ‘Informed Kazakhstan 2020’ by Presidential Decree No. 464 of 8 January 2013 [16]. The State Programme ‘Digital Kazakhstan’ was approved on 12 December 2017 No. 827 by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan [17], then amended and supplemented in December 2019. In March 2020, Kazakhstan updated its Digital

Kazakhstan strategy in line with the new situation. According to the results of the report of the International Telecommunication Union in the Index of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 2017, Kazakhstan ranks 52nd among 176 countries of the world [18]. According to the new plan, Kazakhstan's ICT development index will rise from 52nd place in the world to 30th place in 2022, 25th place in 2025 and 15th place in 2050 [19].

After Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the initiative to jointly build the 'Digital Silk Road' at the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum in May 2017, Kazakhstan responded positively to it. On 22 November 2018, in the presence of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Kazakh Prime Minister B.A. Sagintayev, China and Kazakhstan signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding between the PRC National Development and Reform Commission and the Kazakh Ministry of Information and Communications on Strengthening Cooperation in the Digital Economy' to jointly promote construction of the China-Kazakhstan Digital Silk Road [20]. In September 2019, the Joint Declaration of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan, signed by President Tokayev during his visit to China, stressed the need to 'strengthen cross-border cooperation in e-commerce, establish cooperation mechanisms, new business models and modes of cooperation, and facilitate the docking of the two countries' digital economy development plans' [21].

First, the digital economy has contributed to the digital development of trade between China and Kazakhstan. Back in 2018, Kazakhstan launched its Digital Kazakhstan strategy, which aims to increase the share of digital trade from 2.9% in 2018 to 24% by 2025. Since the epidemic, the digital economy has strongly supported social and economic functioning. Online shopping, live streaming and contactless delivery have significantly reduced the impact of the epidemic on social and productive life. E-commerce in Kazakhstan has grown rapidly since the epidemic and cashless payments (e.g. Kaspi) have roughly doubled in volume. The rapid development of the digital economy in Kazakhstan contributed to the digitization of trade between China and Kazakhstan, which has largely withstood the impact of the epidemic [22].

Second, the digital economy has led to a reverse growth of trade between China and Kazakhstan. The digital economy has played a key role in ensuring the smooth flow of trade between China and Kazakhstan in a pandemic. It broadened the platform for digital trade. After the pandemic, a number of Kazakh businesses entered Chinese e-commerce platforms. To date, hundreds of Kazakh businesses have qualified to operate on Chinese e-commerce platforms. Chinese e-commerce platform Jingdong has a 'Kazakhstan National Pavilion' dedicated to selling Kazakhstani food products, including the brand 'SYDYK' 'Trapeza'. More than 4000 Kazakhstani products are sold on the Alibaba platform, including pasta, flour, honey, confectionery, meat, drinks, vegetable oils, furniture, clothes and baby products. This has led to a significant increase in cross-border parcels from the Chinese market to Kazakhstan in an epidemic [23].

In the new situation, the digital economy has become a new growth point for China-Kazakhstan cooperation and an important driver for high-quality

development, but the development of the digital economy also faces some challenges, among which the most notable are: first, the construction of digital infrastructure in Central Asia is underdeveloped, the backlog of digital infrastructure construction in Kazakhstan leads to slow performance, which in turn limits the number of users and the efficiency of China-Kazakhstan; second, digital talent is in short supply; third, cyber security and geopolitical risks are on the rise in Kazakhstan; fourth, Kazakhstan's heavy reliance on foreign digital technology increases the cost of digital economy cooperation [24].

Based on the current achievements in the digital economy, the two countries will carry out in-depth cooperation in strengthening cooperation in building digital infrastructure and enhancing mutual connectivity in the future.

The Chinese New Silk Road programme is considered to be part of the 'Chinese Dream' strategy and aims to revive the historical traditions of economic and cultural interaction between the West and the East [25]. However, upon closer analysis, it becomes clear that these projects pursue, among other things, China's national economic and political interests.

As a number of experts have pointed out, Central Asia is of considerable interest to China. The Central Asian region is primarily perceived by Beijing as a transit territory to European markets [26]. China's national interests include energy, transport, agriculture, tourism and water resources [27]. China plans to pursue its goals in this region through the promotion of Chinese culture as a 'soft power' tool. It is a method that is being actively used by the Chinese government. Beijing is already actively expanding its presence in Central Asia. As a consequence, in the foreign economic vector today almost all the republics in the Central Asian space are drawn towards China, which, in turn, is explained by the economic attractiveness of the Chinese initiative [28].

An analysis of the scientific and political literature has shown that the Eurasian space is one of the most dynamically developing regions of the world, which has a significant impact on the configuration of international politics and the economy as a whole. The countries of Central Asia currently occupy a special place within the Greater Eurasia project, and this trend will also continue in the future.

4 Conclusion

The analysis, using modern research methods, has shown that the current priority area for cooperation between China and the Central Asian region is strategic partnership, as well as security. In this regard, the Central Asian states are developing a new model of cooperation. China is currently pursuing a 'Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership' with a common free trade area. The Central Asian states actively support this idea and take part in the discussions. In this regard, there are already some rudiments in place for the implementation of the mega-project. It seems that it is precisely the effective model of cooperation between Kazakhstan and China that has been built over the past 30 years that will serve as an example for Central Asia

and for the development of the Greater Eurasia Project. The position of state leaders and party leadership promotes new trends based on multi-vector cooperation and the creation of new projects.

However, there are just as many challenges on the way to forming a greater Eurasian community, whose solutions will need to be found.

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Vietnam's Policy Towards the South China Sea and the Development of China-Vietnam Relations



Wang Mingjun

1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the future changes in Sino-Vietnamese relations through a study of Vietnam's recent movements in the South China Sea and its policy. Historically, China has been the cultural center of the East Asian continent, influencing the countries surrounding it in terms of culture and politics. Vietnam was a vassal state of China for an extended period. Despite the Vietnam War of Independence and French colonial rule, China and Vietnam have maintained political ties, and changes continue to occur. Therefore, the study of Sino-Vietnamese relations is significant in practice. Although China and Vietnam have a long history of friendly and cooperative relations, their recent relationship has been marked by fluctuations due to the South China Sea disputes. The maritime standoff in mid-May 2014 caused a serious crisis in their relationship, which was the most significant since the normalization of their relationship. This crisis affected the healthy development of their relationship. The analysis provides practical and theoretical insights into the essence of Sino-Vietnamese relations under the new normal, the future direction of bilateral relations, and the promotion of better development and regional peace and stability. This chapter explores Sino-Vietnamese relations through the lens of the South China Sea dispute with practical significance and theoretical value.

Chinese scholars have made many research results on China-Vietnam relations and China-Vietnam maritime disputes. It mainly includes historical research on China and Vietnam before the founding of the People's Republic of China, and research on the relationship between the two countries at different stages after the founding of the People's Republic of China. In terms of research on the South China

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Sea dispute and China-Vietnam relations, mainly focuses on the emergence, development, impact, and causes of the China-Vietnam Sea dispute.

There are many achievements in historical research on Sino-Vietnamese relations. Wang Tao from Jinan University, Chen Shuangyan from Xiamen University, etc. focused on the historical Sino-Vietnamese sectarian-vassal relations [1, p. 83–96, 2, p. 66–74]. In modern times, as the French army occupied Hue, the capital of Vietnam, forcing Vietnam to sign the first Franco-Vietnamese Treaty of Hue, Vietnam became a protectorate of France, and the vassal-vassal relationship between China and Vietnam ended. Regarding Sino-Vietnam relations after the founding of New China, Gu Xiaosong, vice president of the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, and Liang Bingmeng, a doctor from the Nanyang Research Institute of Xiamen University, divided the Sino-Vietnamese relations over the past 60 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations into three stages: friendship, confrontation, and normalization [3, p. 25–33].

Regarding the dispute between China and the South China Sea, Shi Yongming of the China Institute of International Studies believes that before 1973, China and Vietnam had no dispute over the sovereignty of the South China Sea Islands [4, p. 19–23]. The dispute originated after Vietnam completed national reunification. Yu Xiangdong, director of the Vietnam Institute of Zhengzhou University, believes that since the 1970s, the South China Sea dispute has become an important negative factor affecting the development of relations between the two countries [5, p. 5]. Since entering the twenty-first century, Vietnam has not stopped because of historical lessons. In 2007, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam adopted the Maritime Strategy to 2020, which forcibly included China's Xisha and Nansha Islands within its jurisdiction. Yu Xiangdong believes that although China and Vietnam have reached a series of consensus on the South China Sea issue, such as the Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Resolution of China-Vietnam Maritime Issues, Vietnam's sincerity in implementing the principled consensus on maritime issues is insufficient. In her article "The American Factor in the China-Vietnam Sea Dispute," scholar Sun Xiaoling mentioned that the strengthening of Vietnam's South China Sea policy is related to the United States' return to Southeast Asia. The United States' position on the South China Sea issue has changed from neutrality to claiming to be concerned about freedom of navigation, and then to high-profile declarations of support for multilateral solutions to the South China Sea issue. These changes not only send Vietnam a signal that it can hedge and balance China but also bring unprecedented reality to China's solution to the South China Sea issue [6, p. 32].

Foreign scholars' research on South China Sea disputes mainly focuses on the sovereignty of the South China Sea Islands. For example, in the book "South China Sea Disputes", the American scholar Marwyn S. Samuels made a vague treatment of the issue of sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands, believing that the "San Francisco Peace Treaty" held "undecided sovereignty" in this regard [7, p. 19]. In addition, scholar Kimie Hara believes in her article "The Frontier of the Cold War: Asia-Pacific Territories Divided by the San Francisco System" that China's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea have no legal basis. No documents and

statements from the Allies during World War II mentioned the islands in the South China Sea [8, p. 146]. China has no right to inherit these islands and reefs from Japan. With similar views, there is also “Sharing South China Sea Resources” co-authored by Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig [9, p. 97–132].

2 Vietnam's South China Sea Policy

After Nguyen Phu Trong was elected as General Secretary, he formulated Vietnam's maritime law, improved Vietnam's maritime strategy, and made a series of major strategic adjustments to its South China Sea policy based on an in-depth assessment of China-Vietnam relations and the geopolitical situation in the South China Sea. First, coordinate with the United States, Japan, and other major powers outside the region and ASEAN countries to adjust the legal status of islands and reefs, defining the Paracel Islands and Nansha Islands as rocks, which essentially denies China's exclusive economic and continental shelf rights to the above-mentioned islands and reefs. Secondly, downplay the fan line, abandon unrealistic maritime jurisdiction claims, and instead assert Vietnam's maritime rights through the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf systems. Through the above policy adjustments, Vietnam has successfully coordinated its interests with major foreign countries such as the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and Russia, and ASEAN countries at the expense of China's sovereignty. On the surface, Vietnam has made a large-scale reduction in the maritime areas it claims to have jurisdiction over. In fact, through nominal concessions, it has not only achieved the maintenance of substantive core vested interests but also won the support of major powers outside the region, ASEAN countries, and international public opinion.

In 2011, Vietnam wrote the goal of becoming a maritime power into the Eleventh National Congress document, proposing to make the economy of Vietnam's coastal provinces account for 50–55% of the total GDP by 2020 [10, p. 89]. In October 2018, the Eighth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam passed a resolution on the “Vietnam Marine Economy Sustainable Development Strategy for 2030 and Vision 2045”, which once again emphasized the goal of becoming a maritime power and proposed that by 2030 At this time, the pure maritime economy should account for 10% of GDP, and the economy of 28 coastal provinces should account for 65–70% of total GDP. On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Vietnam's independence, Vietnam will fully become a maritime power and achieve the goals of becoming rich and powerful through the sea [11]. In 2022, the Prime Minister of the Vietnamese government approved the “Proposal to Promote the Development of Cross-Industrial Clusters of the Marine Economy and Create Strong Marine Economic Centers by 2030.” The proposal aims to create a maritime economic cross-industrial cluster with high efficiency, strong competitiveness, and strong integration capabilities, and at the same time combine it with the construction of a strong maritime economic center, striving to achieve the goal of developing Vietnam into a maritime economic power by 2030

[12]. In recent years, although China-Vietnam relations have generally maintained a stable and rising trend, and the two sides have reached a certain consensus on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), although Vietnam generally maintains a friendship with China, it has never given up any opportunity to advance its stated goals in the South China Sea. This has resulted in the fact that although there are no major conflicts between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea, small setbacks do occur from time to time.

In particular, with the continued development of the Sino-U.S. trade war and the in-depth implementation of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Vietnam has taken advantage of the opportunity and attempted to expand the scope of its vested interests. For example, Pham Quang Quang, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam and Ambassador to the United States, believes that the current trade war is a competition between the United States and China, with the United States taking the initiative, while China is too tired to deal with it and has no time to care about others. Vietnam should not mechanically adhere to the policy of balancing major powers but should spare no effort to seize the opportunity and pursue the maximization of Vietnam's interests [13]. Previously, Pham Binh Minh also clearly stated at the 129th Vietnam Diplomatic Work Conference: It is necessary to make full use of the competition between China and the United States to contain China and safeguard Vietnam's sovereignty by seeking common interests between Vietnam and the United States [14, p. 31–32]. It is based on the above understanding and the international environment that it thinks is favorable to it. In May 2019, Vietnam rented equipment from a Japanese company and cooperated with a Russian oil and gas company in an attempt to further expand the scope of mining in China's traditional waters of Wan'an Bank, resulting in facts to force China to accept reality.

Vietnam's above-mentioned strategic misjudgment will inevitably have an impact on the mutual trust between China and Vietnam, causing the situation in the South China Sea to become turbulent again. After Vietnam failed to demand that China's Haiyang Dizhi 8 scientific research vessel withdraw from Chinese waters off the Wan'an Bank, it threatened not to rule out taking China to the International Court of Justice. On September 16, 2019, Vietnam's "Capital Ninh Daily" published an article signed by Huang He, saying: In July 2016, the Hague Arbitration Tribunal ruled that China's maritime areas in the South China Sea cannot exceed the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the "Convention"). The sovereignty, sovereign jurisdiction, and historic rights claimed by China based on the dashed line violate the provisions of the Convention and have no legal effect. Wan'an Bank is a shoal, located entirely within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone. It is a natural extension of Vietnam's continental shelf to the southeast. It is separated from the "Changsha Islands" (i.e. my country's Nansha Islands) by a deep trench and does not belong to the "Changsha Islands". In accordance with the Convention, the sea areas surveyed by China's Haiyang Dizhi No. 8 survey ship since July are entirely within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf as stipulated in the Convention [15].

3 The Motivations and Strategic Goals of Vietnam's New South China Sea Policy

Vietnam's recent new actions in the South China Sea are the result of a combination of factors. The South China Sea arbitration provided it with an excuse, China's strengthening strategic position in the South China Sea inspired its sense of crisis, and the Sino-US trade war and the deepening of the US Indo-Pacific strategy became the decisive external factors that drove it to turn its intentions into actions. In short, Vietnam hopes to take advantage of China's current predicament before China fully rises and the geopolitical pattern of the South China Sea changes fundamentally. It believes that its core vested interests and part of the legal basis for its claims are relatively sufficient. There are serious flaws, even if the United States, Japan, and other countries are vested interests that cannot give it public support should be dealt with separately in order to prepare for the worst-case scenario and put Vietnam in a more favorable position before the COC is reached.

First, the arbitral tribunal's ruling provides an excuse for Vietnam's actions and new claims in the South China Sea. Although the South China Sea arbitration is a political farce controlled by anti-China forces outside the region, the "ruling" on the dashed line in this illegal arbitration has allowed Vietnam to deny China's sovereignty in the Vanguard Bank and other waters, and provided an excuse to separate the above waters from the Nansha Islands. As soon as the arbitration farce ended, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Hai Binh said: "The arbitral tribunal's ruling on the U-shaped line shows that Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf do not overlap with China's maritime areas, thus demonstrating that Vietnam's claims are completely legal" [16]. However, at that time, the arbitral tribunal also ruled that many islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands were low-tide highlands, which was unfavorable to Vietnam, which occupied most of the islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands. At the same time, Vietnam is concerned about China-Vietnam relations and needs to rely on China to fight against the unfavorable aspects of arbitration. Therefore, it has adopted an extremely ambiguous attitude towards arbitration. On the one hand, it has shown goodwill to China through high-level officials. For example, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said: "Vietnam respects China's The Philippines' position on the South China Sea arbitration case advocates that disputes should be properly resolved through dialogue and consultation" [17]. On the other hand, it has occasionally attempted to take the opportunity to expand the scope of oil and gas exploration in waters such as Wan'an Bank. Although these moves were abandoned due to China's objections, and relations between the two countries have maintained an overall positive trend, this does not mean that Vietnam has given up its original intentions. The Vanguard Bank incident shows that once external conditions are suitable, Vietnam will make full use of the arbitration "award" to gain its interests.

Secondly, China's recent strengthening of its strategic position in the South China Sea has shaken Vietnam's confidence in maintaining its gains in the South China Sea, causing its sense of crisis to rise sharply. After the construction of the

Nansha Islands and Reefs, a series of large shipyards, hospitals, lighthouses, and communication and transportation support facilities were built. China's early warning capabilities, rescue capabilities, logistical support capabilities, and ability to respond to various emergencies in the Nansha waters have been fundamentally improved. Accordingly, China has made a qualitative leap in its ability to safeguard national maritime rights and interests in the Nansha waters and respond to various external challenges, fundamentally curbing the past trend of wanton infringement of maritime rights and interests. Vietnam's relatively advantageous position in the Nansha Islands which used to rely on its distance advantage no longer exists. Facing the changes in the power structure in the South China Sea, Vietnam has turned from being indifferent to China's presence in the Nansha to being extremely worried. Many Vietnamese scholars worry that as its strength increases, China may seize Vietnam-controlled islands and reefs by force. Nguyen Huy Qui, former director of the China Institute of the Vietnam Academy of Sciences, said that China has never promised not to use force to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. If China's strength continues to rise, it is difficult to see whether China will seize Vietnam-controlled islands and reefs by force in a pattern similar to the Crimea incident. As expected, Vietnam is very worried about this [18–20]. Vietnam divides its interest claims in the South China Sea into three parts: negotiable, negotiable, and non-negotiable, just to be prepared for a rainy day. The Wan'an Bank area is regarded as a core interest zone by Vietnam and is a non-negotiable part. Based on security considerations, Vietnam had the idea of detaching Wan'an Bank and other sea areas from the Nansha Islands after the arbitration. This can not only remove core vested interests from the dispute but also prevent Vietnam's vested interests in the South China Sea from being lost all at once due to external strikes. However, this requires the right time, and the Wan'an Bank incident provides just such an opportunity.

4 Latest Developments in China-Vietnam Relations

Although Vietnam regards China as the biggest challenge in terms of territorial sovereignty, which is not the entirety of China-Vietnam relations, the common interests between China and Vietnam far outweigh their differences. Without the stability of China-Vietnam relations, there will be no development in Vietnam. Pham Binh Minh believes that Vietnam can have both sides of the fence between China and the United States and has the most friendly international environment in history because it maintains a friendship with both countries at the same time; once Vietnam's relations with either China and the United States deteriorate, it will be difficult to maintain its current international status [14, p. 31–32]. In February 2019, Nguyen Xuan Phuc proposed the "Centennial Vision Development Plan for 2030 to 2045" when he inspected Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and Investment, emphasizing that Vietnam will become a high-income country by 2030 and a developed country by the 100th anniversary of independence [19]. In December 2023, Xi Jinping arrived in Hanoi, Vietnam, and paid a two-day state visit to Vietnam. The

two countries signed 37 agreements, including increasing China's financial support for the construction of cross-border railways between the two countries. At the same time, China is ready to provide grants to Vietnam to promote transportation connections from southern China to Hanoi and accelerate plans to develop other railway systems connecting the two countries [20]. As Vietnam's largest trading partner and neighbor, China and Vietnam are a relationship of multiplied interests geographically, that is, a good Sino-Vietnam relationship brings double the benefits to Vietnam. In the same way, the damage caused by a deteriorating relationship is doubled. This meeting between the leaders of both sides once again highlights the importance of relations between the two countries and will be conducive to the stability of China-Vietnam relations.

5 Conclusion

After the normalization of China-Vietnam relations, ideological factors and geo-structural factors have long become the two pillars of maintaining friendly and stable relations between China and Vietnam. Vietnam is affected by these two factors when dealing with disputes with China in the South China Sea. Since the Chengdu Conference, leaders of the older generation such as Nguyen Van Linh, Do Muoi, Le Kha Phieu, Nong Duc Manh, and Nguyen Phu Trong have all advocated maintaining friendly relations with China. The above-mentioned leaders were all born before Vietnam became independent and were either involved in contemporary Sino-Vietnam relations or received education in school that the South China Sea Islands belong to China. No matter what position they held on the territorial and maritime disputes between the two countries when they were in power, they were very clear about Vietnam's previous position and the origin of the South China Sea issue. It is precisely because of this that when they consider relations between the two countries and handle disputes between the two countries, they can comprehensively consider historical factors and ideological ties between the two sides, seek a balance between sovereignty and development, and attempt to adopt a solution that is acceptable to both sides, ways to resolve differences between China and Vietnam. As early as the beginning of Nguyen Phu Trong's administration, the Theoretical Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam pointed out that opportunism and ultra-nationalism are the two most dangerous tendencies within the party, and specifically warned that ultra-nationalism would trigger conflicts between Vietnam and neighboring countries and will harm Vietnam's national interests. Although the top leaders of China and Vietnam have long had a high degree of consensus on maintaining the stability of bilateral relations, this situation is gradually changing as Vietnam's top leaders gradually begin to replace old and new ones. After Nguyen Phu Trong, except for a few leaders, the generation born in the 1960s will take over. Most of these people have Western educational backgrounds or grew up during the period of confrontation between China and Vietnam. Geographical factors will determine the direction of China-Vietnam relations and

the South China Sea issue alone to a large extent. The cost and difficulty of maintaining the stability of China-Vietnam relations will be greatly increased than before. This is what we must take into consideration when considering China-Vietnam relations and the South China Sea issue.

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Some Aspects of China's Investment Policy in Oceania



Marina Sablina and Alexander Kuzyakin

1 Introduction

As is well known, the Oceania region consists of more than 10,000 islands and atolls, which are home to 13 states and 24 adjacent administrative territories. This region is increasingly attracting Chinese attention because of its vast oceanic territories. These territories, controlled by island states, not only have significant potential for extracting valuable natural resources but are also important as strategic sea lanes linking North and South America with East Asia and Australia. In addition, for China, the port infrastructure of Oceania in the future can potentially contribute to the forthcoming inevitable development of Antarctica and neighboring territories.

Therefore, in accordance with the PRC government's policy, Chinese investments in the economies of Oceania are mainly directed toward improving their transport infrastructure and developing natural resources [1].

2 Methods and Sources

The following methods were used to study the features and key characteristics of China's investment policy in Oceania: factual, analysis, synthesis and the method of establishing cause-and-effect relationships.

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3 Economic Characteristics of Oceania

In the Oceania region, only seven states have an annual GDP that approaches or exceeds one billion US dollars in nominal terms (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, East Timor and New Caledonia). The remaining island nations of Oceania have nominal GDPs in the range of 0.15 (Nauru) to 0.5 (Tonga) billion dollars per year.

Oceania's economies are heavily dependent on resource extraction. These resources include minerals (oil, gas, copper, nickel, lead, zinc, manganese, chromium, cobalt, phosphates), agricultural and food products (bananas, coconuts, fish and seafood) and valuable timber. The region also places great emphasis on the production of national art and furniture. Each country has its own unique strengths and characteristics. For example, phosphates are mined on the islands of Nauru, Banaba, Kiribati and Makatea. Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands are rich in gold, nickel, zinc, lead and valuable timber. Fiji and PNG produce oil in addition to gold. New Caledonia specializes in nickel, manganese and chromium mining [2]. In Papua New Guinea gas is extracted, agriculture and fisheries are developed, and on the island of Bougainville copper is extracted. Phosphate rock mining is being developed in the Marshall Islands. At the same time, most of Oceania's many small islands have underdeveloped mineral resources or their reserves are insignificant. In addition, although some Oceania countries have potential mineral deposits within their exclusive economic zones, these deposits are located in places that are difficult to access, such as the ocean floor (iron-manganese nodules and cobalt). Accordingly, the technical and economic feasibility of developing these resources requires further evaluation.

For many countries in Oceania, the traditional sources of income are the cutting of valuable timber, the harvesting of coconuts and bananas, and the collection of guano, which is decomposed seabird droppings and is a valuable source of nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer. Fishing is widespread, especially in smaller countries. Recently, however, there has been commercial fishing of the region's fishery resources by large countries (e.g. Japan). Oceania relies heavily on the export of various products, including copra, timber, beef, palm oil, cocoa, sugar and ginger. Oceania's main export markets include Japan, China, the United States, India, South Korea, and the European Union.

New Zealand and Papua New Guinea have highly developed economies and provide international aid to neighboring countries. However, there are also less developed countries in Oceania, where it is difficult to develop their economies without foreign aid.

Transport in Oceania is largely represented by both maritime and air transport. Due to the remoteness of the region, significant development of airfields and airports has occurred to facilitate transport. Transport options in the region include helicopters and seaplanes. Popular destinations in Oceania include French Polynesia, Fiji and Vanuatu. Local flights within the region tend to have affordable ticket prices, while long-haul routes tend to be relatively more expensive. Oceanic Airlines

cooperates with international carriers such as KLM from the Netherlands and Northwest Airlines from the USA. In addition, Pacific Island Aviation on Guam and Hawaiian Airlines, which partners with Northwest Airlines, contribute to the transport network. Air Tahiti Nui has been in operation since 1996. The arrival of cruise companies also contributes to passenger traffic as they introduce ocean liners early in the season.

4 Main Aspects of China's Investment Activity in the Region

As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China has been actively providing financial assistance to poorer countries in the South Pacific in an effort to increase its influence in the region [3]. This assistance mainly takes the form of soft loans and grants, with an emphasis on financing infrastructure projects. According to the Australian Lowy Institute, between 2006 and 2016, China funded a total of 218 projects in the Pacific totaling \$1.7 billion [4]. Although this amount is lower than Australian aid to Oceania over the same period, China remains an important source of investment in the region [5].

It should be noted that according to various expert reports on China's global economic performance, a significant overall decline in Chinese overseas investment was noticed by 2017, presumably due to the tightening of policies within China. However, in 2018, this downward trend stopped and investment growth resumed.

China's interest in the region can be explained by several factors, including geopolitical competition not only with Western powers but especially with respect to Taiwan. Taiwan (the so-called Republic of China) historically predates the PRC's emergence in Oceania, having previously been an ally and partner of many island states in the region. It should be noted that some of these countries (Nauru, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands) have not recognized the international status of the People's Republic of China to date, and therefore continue to reject any investment from the PRC. Most Oceania countries have officially recognized that it is the People's Republic of China that replaces Taiwan as the representative of the Chinese state, but this process has not been painless everywhere. For example, when the Solomon Islands moved to a relationship with the PRC after breaking with Taiwan, it faced protests.

In the late 1980s, China initiated a program to send doctors from the PRC to work at the Samoa National Hospital. Over the next 20 years, more than 100 Chinese doctors worked in Samoa. In 2007, China also provided Samoa with an X-ray machine, a car and a team of volunteer doctors. The following year, 2008, the People's Republic of China donated more than 1.36 million euros to Samoa to support educational policies.

China has recently made significant investments in infrastructure projects in Oceania, including the construction of hydroelectric power plants, hospitals, marinas, airports and government buildings. As a result, China's financial involvement in many of the region's investment projects has increased. China has become one of

the leading financial donors in Oceania. The total amount of Chinese financial assistance over the past decade has approached \$1.8 billion. China's assistance in the region is also in line with its Belt and Road Initiative, which focuses on social development projects [6].

However, it is important to note that China's approach to providing aid to other countries differs from that of other investors. Chinese official development assistance includes grants, interest-free and concessional loans, and technical assistance, as outlined in the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid [7].

Improved international relations have allowed China to secure a long-term lease with Kiribati for a plot of land on which the PRC has installed a satellite tracking station.

China's relationship with Vanuatu has also strengthened over the past two decades. Since 2015, the PRC has firmly established itself as Vanuatu's main supplier of goods to Vanuatu, with the volume of supplies steadily increasing. After Vanuatu became involved in China's Belt and Road Initiative, the government of Vanuatu began demanding more financial assistance from the PRC under the pretext of infrastructure development in the country [8]. Over the past 10 years, the amount of Chinese aid to Vanuatu has approached \$200 million. The PRC has even surpassed Japan and New Zealand in providing financial assistance to Melanesian states.

With Chinese assistance, a complex of administrative buildings was built in Vanuatu, of which the conference hall alone cost nearly \$29 million [9]. Another \$27 million in grants from China was used to rebuild the presidential palace after the damage caused by Hurricane Pam. At Luganville Harbor on Espiritu Santo Island, China's Shanghai Construction Group provided the reconstruction of the quay area. As a result, Vanuatu acquired the longest sea berth in Oceania. The pier has created the technical capacity for large cruise liners and merchant ships to enter the country, further boosting Vanuatu's economy, including its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. It should be noted that the United States and Australia, as China's competitors in the Oceania region, immediately put forward and publicized their version of China's possible military interest in using the Luganville port.

During the same time period, the Chinese firm China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation secured the construction of motorways on Malekula Island and Tanna Island in the same Vanuatu [10].

China's interest in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has grown markedly in recent years due to its strategic location near Australia. The country has the largest territory among other Oceania states and the largest population in the region. APG is the largest recipient of official development assistance in the region, totaling \$6.91 billion between 2000 and 2020. Although APG is not China's main trading partner, bilateral trade has grown rapidly since 2000. China views APG through the prism of opportunities to expand its influence in the region while gaining access to valuable resources [11]. From 2010 to 2020, China has provided \$623.09 million in aid to the APG. In 2018, the PRC and PNG signed a document of understanding that launched the joint implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. This gives added significance to official development assistance for the country.

In 2017, a Pacific Marine Industrial Zone was established with Chinese participation in Papua New Guinea (in Madang Province) to improve fish processing infrastructure and reduce production losses [12]. This \$235 million project involved the construction of 10 canneries and port infrastructure in Madang Province under the Chinese Shenyang International Technical and Economic Cooperation under the leadership of Minister Yagama. The first cannery started operations in April 2017. The initiative has had a positive impact on the local economy, creating jobs and generating significant revenue for the province. China has also realized several major projects. These include the construction of the Waigani Convention Centre, as well as the 8.5 km Poreporena Highway to Port Moresby [13]. Notably, the construction of a six-lane motorway on Independence Boulevard was supported by a \$12 million Chinese loan [14].

China now has a significant stake in PNG's nickel industry.

In October 2019, Hong Kong-based Wanguo International Mining awarded an \$825 million contract to China State Railway Group to develop the Gold Ridge mine and improve infrastructure in the Solomon Islands, particularly in the Guadalcanal region. The PRC now has a significant share in exporting minerals and timber from Solomon Islands.

In addition, the Solomon Islands Government has partnered with China's Huawei to build 161 telecom towers as part of a national broadband network. This project, costing about \$66 million, is being funded by a soft loan from the Export-Import Bank of China. The 20-year loan with an interest rate of 1 per cent per annum is aimed at significantly expanding the local telecoms network and providing mobile phone and internet services throughout the country. The PRC and Solomon Islands are jointly upgrading 30 runways at the country's regional airports, as well as establishing an aviation center in the nation's capital.

In recent years, China has deepened its economic and diplomatic ties with Pacific island countries. These relations have been marked by significant Chinese investment in various sectors, including mining, infrastructure, telecommunications and aviation.

In 2010, a Sino-Samoan agricultural demonstration farm was established with financial support from the Government of China to train Samoan farmers in the use of Chinese agricultural technology and planting methods. In 2010, China financed several property projects in Vanuatu and also supplied the country with equipment for a biofuel plant under construction.

Chinese investment in the Pacific islands, including Fiji, Samoa, the Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, totaled about 72 million euros in 2010. In Vanuatu, China is modernizing the airport. Chinese investment in mining projects in Vanuatu, Palau and Tonga totaled more than \$2 billion [15].

The island of Tonga received substantial Chinese aid following the volcanic eruption and tsunami. The Nuku'alofa business center was reconstructed with this assistance. It established an advanced agricultural enterprise and built two health clinics, which were staffed by Chinese medical professionals for the first 2 years. In addition, the PRC provided Tonga with 340,000 euros worth of military

ammunition and 2.2 million euros for socio-economic development, including concessional and interest-free loans to the government.

China has also repeatedly provided financial assistance to other Oceania island countries after natural disasters and emergencies.

According to the Lowy Institute, from 2010 to 2020, Oceania received a total of \$20.44 billion in ODA from various sources and countries for various infrastructure, education, health and governance projects. This includes \$1.76 billion in official development assistance from China to Oceania during the same period, making it one of the major donors in the South Pacific region. This exceeds the assistance provided by Japan (\$1.52 billion) and the United States (\$1.49 billion) during the same period.

During the Second Forum on Economic Development and Cooperation between China and Pacific Island Countries in 2013, China announced \$2 billion in commercial and soft loans to countries in the region to support various initiatives. Through these loans, China sought to attract Oceania countries to its Belt and Road project, despite the region being geographically distant from the Maritime Silk Road. Many Oceania countries then signed cooperation agreements with China and became members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, signaling their participation in the Belt and Road Initiative.

The increase in Chinese official development assistance has had some benefits. Nine countries in Oceania have declared their participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative by 2020. These include the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Cook Islands, Samoa, Vanuatu, Niue, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea.

The PRC has been able to significantly increase and expand its influence in Oceania by providing development assistance to countries in the region. However, China has also been forced to consider the prospect of using a grant model of financial assistance. This model is more credible to countries in the region and avoids accusations of Chinese debt traps.

One of the features of China's development assistance to countries in the Oceania region is its focus on local political elites. China has been insistently improving infrastructure in the Oceania region through preferential loans. In part, this process boosts the Chinese economy by importing materials, equipment and specialized resources from China. This somewhat reduces employment opportunities for local populations in the region, but potentially increases the size and importance of Chinese diasporas.

In order to implement China's comprehensive strategy, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited ten Oceania countries in 2022 to discuss development strategies and promote closer international ties. The minister had two basic documents prepared in his package of Chinese proposals: the "Joint Vision on Development between China and the Pacific States" and the "Five-Year Plan for Joint Development".

As a result of Wang Yi's visits to Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Federated States of Micronesia, Tuvalu, East Timor, and Papua New Guinea, many of these countries have finally shifted from U.S. influence to cooperation with the PRC. China has signed comprehensive cooperation agreements with these countries. This includes security cooperation agreements with some of them,

under which China intends to provide the region with various forms of assistance and cooperation, including police training, security enhancement, and law enforcement cooperation.

In other areas, China is seeking to strengthen its presence by establishing Confucius cultural institutes and training programs in the region.

In February 2022, when U.S. Secretary of State Blinken visited Fiji, U.S. journalists noted that the U.S. had lost much of its influence in Oceania. The U.S. now maintains a visible presence only in territories that are partially dependent on or connected to it, such as the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, and Guam. This has created a vacuum of influence that China has quickly begun to fill.

The growing influence of Chinese capital in Fiji is evident. Unlike the previous period of “American support”, China is actively involved in the construction of buildings, roads and bridges in the territory. Chinese companies have opened offices and there are funded Chinese language programs.

In April 2022, China signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands authorizing the deployment of Chinese police and warships to maintain peace and security in the region [16]. This agreement also provides support for the country's fishing industry [17].

The PRC intends to provide the region with a tuna-focused fishing plan, expand cooperation in internet network management, and promote free trade zone agreements with Oceania countries.

Since 2022, China has significantly increased its investment in transport, social and tourism infrastructure in the Micronesia, Polynesia and Melanesia regions. These investments are aimed at ensuring the safety and smooth operation of commercial shipping routes, exploiting the rich marine resources through fishing activities and utilizing the potential of natural resource deposits in the region.

On the island of Santo in the State of Vanuatu, airport reconstruction, including the construction of a new runway, was required. Chinese companies took responsibility for this. The PRC has also guaranteed investment to the island states of Kiribati and Samoa, with a trade and security treaty signed between the PRC and Samoa in 2022.

5 Conclusion

According to the Lowy Institute, from 2010 to 2020, Oceania received a total of \$20.44 billion in official development assistance from various sources and countries for various infrastructure, education, health and governance projects. This includes \$1.76 billion in official development assistance to Oceania during the same period, making China one of the major donors in the South Pacific region. This exceeds the aid provided by Japan (\$1.52 billion) and the United States (\$1.49 billion) during the same period. The increase in Chinese official development assistance has brought some benefits to the PRC. Nine Oceania countries have declared their

participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative by 2020. These include the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Cook Islands, Samoa, Vanuatu, Niue, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The PRC has been able to significantly increase and expand its influence in Oceania by providing development assistance to countries in the region. But China has also had to consider the prospect of using a grant model of financial aid allocation.

Thus, Chinese investment policy in the Oceania region is still mainly focused on mining and other projects through soft loans [18]. Due to this, in particular, China has managed to realize more than 100 different infrastructure projects, ranging from airports and roads to educational and medical facilities. These projects include the construction of motorways, stadiums, agricultural centers and technology initiatives. In addition, China has provided scholarships and vocational training opportunities to support human resource development in these countries.

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Grand Prix d’Afrique. Russian and French Policy in Equatorial Africa on the Example of the Republic of Congo: From Efficiency to Effectiveness



Igor Chernov and Sergei Chernov

1 Introduction

One of the most important categories in the theory of political realism is the concept of “national interests”, which should determine the policy of the state. However, since antiquity, there have been substantive debates about the essence of these interests. Shang Yang, a theorist and practitioner of Chinese reforms in the Qin kingdom (fourth century B.C.), believed that the welfare of the state was based on a large amount of grain produced, iron discipline and a strong army. Moreover, “when the people are stronger than their authorities – the state is weak; when the authorities are stronger than their people – the army is powerful” [1]. More to the point, Shang Yang considered war as one of the most important means to strengthen the state, which caused the need for constant conflicts with the neighbouring kingdom of Wei (at least for the sake of keeping his army strong): “The kingdom of Qin and the kingdom of Wei are a deadly disease to each other. Either Wei will absorb Qin, or Qin will absorb Wei” [1]. Thus, the supreme goal of the sovereign’s activity is to create a mighty power capable of uniting all the Chinese and pacifying the neighbouring barbarians.

However, there were other opinions in ancient China. Confucius believed that in order to ensure the prosperity of the state and universal harmony, not military men, but wise scholars should be in charge of all administration, because (in his opinion): “Good iron is not made into nails; good men are not made into soldiers” [2, p. 73]. Another ancient Chinese thinker Mo Zi advocated the ideals of pacifism and believed that the good for the country is the growth of population, increase of its

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welfare, elimination of chaos and all kinds of dangers for the subjects. Despite its apparent obviousness, the concept of “national interests” has always had a variety of interpretations in science. Of course, the same applies to foreign policy, which acts as a means of realising the national interests of the state.

Are there precise criteria that allow us to objectively assess the effectiveness of a state’s foreign policy in a particular region? Of course, if one considers the relations of a country with “great powers”, with its historical neighbours or leading economic partners, the concept of national interests and the success of their implementation are often obvious and beyond doubt. But what are the evaluation criteria for developing cooperation with a small, geographically remote state located far from strategically important regions? This study identifies criteria for a relevant comparison of the results of foreign policy activities of Russia/USSR and France (subjects of foreign policy) on the territory of Equatorial Africa (object) in 1960–2024. The aim is to determine the possibility of using quantitative methods to qualitative analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of a state’s foreign policy activities.

“The difference between efficiency and effectiveness is that efficiency refers to doing things right, while effectiveness refers to doing the right thing. Efficiency focuses on the means, while effectiveness focuses on the end result. Moreover, efficiency is short term i.e. current state, while effectiveness is long term” [3]. In this study efficiency defined as the ability to avoid wasting materials and efforts in the fulfilment of a certain task, i.e. the ratio between the results achieved and the resources used. A sufficiently long historical period has been taken in order to be able to identify with greater probability a certain trend of costs and dividends received by Russia and France in the process of implementing their long-term foreign policy strategies on the African continent. The case of the Republic of Congo was chosen because this country has radically changed its foreign policy course at least four times since its independence, orienting either towards the USSR (Russia) or France.

2 Theoretical Framework

Modern representatives of neorealism, in defining national interests, have synthesised in their theory much of what was said in ancient China. They emphasise the big triad to which any state aspires: military-political security, economic prosperity and internal political well-being (security of life, environmental security, demographic security, public health, etc.). Moreover, all parts of this triad are closely related and depend on each other [4]. Foreign policy (strategy) and foreign policy activities (tactics) should contribute to the achievement of these main goals. As the Russian researcher A.I. Kondratov writes, foreign policy is “exerting influence on other participants of international interaction to realise its own foreign policy interests” [5].

There is a rather large amount of scientific literature that considers the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of a state’s foreign policy. This problem has been dealt

with by the well-known classics of the theory of international relations J. Nye [6] and J. Rosenau [7], as well as many other Western researchers [8–10]. Among Russian authors it is worth noting the works of A.V. Zhuravlev [11], A.G. Zadokhin [12], and A.Yu. Meshkov [13]. These authors offer many new ideas and terms in the methodology of assessing efficiency, but some of them are general directions, difficult to express in figures (such as, for example, “soft power” by J. Nye), and some of them are rather methods of assessing the efficiency of diplomatic management (“highly effective, effective, low-effective, ineffective”, “complex system of criteria and indicators of efficiency”, etc.).

3 Methodology

This study clearly separates discursive practices from actual practices and results. What are the proposed criteria for efficiency? Efficiency is considered on the basis of economic indicators and geopolitical benefits. Moreover, we do not consider “objective” efficiency in itself by analogy with Kant’s thing-in-itself but analyse the comparative efficiency of Russia and France by actual indicators. We emphasise foreign policy security (voting at the UN GA and agreements on military-technical cooperation) and economy (volume of foreign trade and investment), leaving aside domestic political processes and trends in Russia and France, which are unlikely to be seriously affected by African politics. For each of these criteria for Russia and France, we distinguish short-term (efficiency) and long-term (effectiveness) results within the framework of the comparative analysis.

4 Case of Republic of Congo

The Republic of Congo is a small African country (five million inhabitants) located on the equator along the Congo River and the sea coast. Much of the territory is covered with tropical forests. Oil deposits have been discovered on the Atlantic coast. Oil and petroleum products are the country’s main exports (far ahead of timber). The population of the country speaks two main languages (both are related to each other and belong to the Bantu languages), which in turn are divided into many dialects. Ethno-linguistic and territorial affiliation plays a significant role in the political struggle within the country (tribalism) [14]. The Republic of Congo gained independence from France in 1960 (the “Year of Africa”), and its recent history can be divided into several periods:

1. 1960–1963. The “pro-French” orientation of the Republic of the Congo. After independence, anti-communist forces loyal to the former metropolis, led by the country’s first president, the eccentric Catholic priest Fulbert Youlou, kept power in their hands.

2. 1963–1968. Congo’s pro-China (Maoist) socialist orientation. Bantu socialism.
3. 1968–1992. Congo’s pro-Soviet socialist orientation (Denis Sassou-Nguesso from 1979).
4. 1992–1997. Pro-Western democratic government (Pascal Lissouba). Growing influence of France, loss of interest of the Russian Federation against the background of internal problems in Russia itself and political instability in Congo, aggravated by the civil war (1997–1999) [15].
5. 1997–2024. The return of the former pro-Soviet government (Denis Sassou-Nguesso) in a reformed liberal and market version, multi-vector foreign policy of Congo.

5 France’s Policy

Since the majority of African countries gained independence, the French authorities have been thinking about how to reconstruct relations with Africa in the most effective way. It is worth highlighting several significant French political figures of that period: Ch. de Gaulle, the president who reformed, among other things, the foreign policy of the fifth Republic, as well as his follower, J. Foccart, the founder of the *Françafrique* system. It is hard to argue that the *Françafrique* system was a neo-colonial continuation of the dependence of the liberated countries on the former metropolis. Speaking of the instruments used by France to control and encourage African countries we can name: (1) Political, primarily the provision of diplomatic support and interference in key political decisions. (2) Economic, in the form of economic aid but with the pursuit of its interests. (3) Military, which included not only military treaties but also support for terrorist groups and organisation of coups. In addition to this, we must mention the close ties with corrupt African elites and espionage by France. It is important to note that *Fransafrique* practices have been used for a long time, but it was under de Gaulle and J. Foccart that the principles were laid.

France’s role as the main hegemon of post-colonial relations was significantly reduced by the end of the twentieth century. This is both the result of France’s own policies (*Françafrique*) and the emergence of new major powers, such as China or US. As many French scholars have noted, this occurred for three main reasons: (1) the intensification of American diplomacy on the continent, which offered African countries more favourable conditions for cooperation aimed at fighting Islamic terrorism and developing natural resources vital to the United States; (2) the progressive and steady deterioration of African attitudes towards their former metropolis, which supported unpopular dictators in every possible way, but never tired of talking about the importance of defending democratic values. The toughening of France’s migration policy with the closure of borders and mass expulsion of illegal migrants also played a role in changing the Africans’ attitude towards France, which hurt the Africans’ sense of national pride. This process of mutual disillusionment was also facilitated by the increased “Afro-pessimism” of the French themselves,

who disbelieved in the possibility of progress on the Black Continent; (3) finally, the third reason for the loss of France's position in Africa was the significant changes in the policy of France's military cooperation with African countries (reduction of the permanent French military contingent at French military bases in Africa; the French desire to act not alone, but as part of a multinational force; endeavouring to place the resolution of internal African conflicts in the hands of Africans themselves [16]. It can be argued that it was at this time that France's African policy gradually began to be dominated by a pragmatic approach, freed from the legacy of *Françafrique* and the historical sentiments of the past. In French, this approach is often referred to as the "normalisation" of relations with Africa (i.e. the abandonment of the traditional French specific approach to the continent).

However, "normalisation" failed for objective reasons. For instance, President F. Hollande was forced to continue the traditional French policy of military intervention in his African "pré carré" because of the intensification of armed Islamist movements in the Sahel, which could not be countered by the armed forces of African governments. Political realism has once again prevailed. Another example is in the Republic of the Congo, where Denis Sassou-Nguesso ruled for more than 30 years, France initially protested against the referendum that allowed the incumbent president to run for another term but then had to accept the results.

The loss by France of its geopolitical and economic influence in Africa is largely objective and is caused by the gradual loss of France's status as a great economic and military-political power, as well as by the active African policy of other countries that are trying to fill the "vacuum" and offer Africa much more attractive terms of cooperation. A recent study by V.R. Filippov says: The disintegration of the French neo-colonial system in Africa began long before Emmanuel Macron came to the Elysee Palace. But it was a slow, not entirely obvious decay, which was managed to be bought off by two mechanisms at least familiar to *Francafric* political practices: bribing African political elites and military intervention [17, p. 135]. In the field of economy, France is being squeezed on the African continent primarily by China, but also by the USA, other European countries and Asian countries. In the field of military and security cooperation, the traditional French space is increasingly occupied by Russia, which provides effective military assistance without interfering in the internal affairs of African states and without imposing its own development models on them.

6 Soviet-Russian Policy

The main areas of the USSR's policy in the newly liberated Africa were outlined in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 20 January 1960. "On expanding cultural and social ties with the Black peoples of Africa and strengthening the influence of the Soviet Union on these peoples" [18]. The USSR regarded the new African countries as its potential allies in the struggle against world imperialism and

colonialism (i.e. the influence of Western countries) and offered them its comprehensive economic and political assistance in building a socialist model of society.

In the case of the Republic of Congo, relations were slow to develop: the first Congolese government was seen as pro-Western. But even after its overthrow in 1963, the pro-Chinese orientation of the new socialist government did not give confidence to the USSR. Only after another coup in 1968 did the Republic of Congo firmly choose the course of building socialism and began to actively develop relations with the USSR, which began to provide this African country with comprehensive assistance. After the death of President Marien Nguabi in 1977 and the coming to power of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, relations deepened even further. The new president of the Congo made repeated visits to the USSR (he attended the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev), and in the early 1980s, the countries signed a treaty on friendship and cooperation [19].

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the socialist system also caused a political crisis in the Congolese leadership: in 1992, the abandonment of the socialist orientation and the external democratisation of the country took place, D. Sassou-Nguesso was forced to give up power when the opposition candidate Pascal Lissouba, a French-oriented pro-Western politician, won the presidential election. It should be noted that at this time the Russian leadership did not show any serious interest in African affairs either. Thus, Russia's influence in the Congo actually became minimal. A new turn occurred in 1997 after D. Sassou-Nguesso returned to power and won a fierce civil war (1997–1999). After the normalisation of the situation in the Congo and the revival of Russian interest in African affairs since the beginning of the twenty-first century, relations between the countries began to recover all the more successfully because about a third of the Congo's leadership elite was educated in the USSR. Sassou-Nguesso (who had long ago abandoned the course of building socialism) resumed his regular visits to Russia. What are the final results to date of this constant diplomatic struggle between the USSR-RF and France for influence in the Republic of Congo? After 60 years of relations, in which there were both rises and falls, it can be summarised the intermediate results.

7 Economic Influence: A Comparative Analysis

It should be noted that despite frequent changes in political regimes and even partial nationalisation, the economic presence of French business in Congo has never been interrupted. It was the French who started developing the country's oil fields back in the 1930s. For a long time, France was the main destination of Congolese exports in the classical neo-colonial model: raw materials (oil and oil products, timber, metals) were exported, and food, machinery and light industry goods were imported. No government in the Republic of Congo has been able to completely abandon this scheme (despite the socialist discourse).

Table 1 Main trading partners of the Republic of Congo (according to [22, 23]; trade volume calculated in US dollars)

	Total volume	RF	France	PRC	USA
Exports from Congo	2.36 billion	2.2 million (less than 1% of total volume)	70 million (3%)	1.08 billion (45.76%)	94 million (4%)
Import in Congo	2.35 billion	104 million (4.4%)	293 million (12.44%)	460 million (19.5%)	98 million (4.15%)

The USSR also provided significant economic assistance to the country, but it was largely on a grant basis (accumulated debts were eventually cancelled). It was not until the time of the new Russia that Russian business began to penetrate the Congo. At present, Russian investments in Africa account for less than 1 per cent of all foreign investments and are primarily associated with the development of the oil industry and nuclear power. It is mainly trade that is developing but Russia's trade turnover with Africa is relatively small (\$14 billion, compared to \$295 billion with the EU, \$254 billion with China and \$65 billion with the US). Moreover, Russian exports to Africa, which are seven times higher than imports from Africa, are mainly developing. Four African countries (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa) account for 70% of Russian trade. Imports are mainly grain (30% of the African market) and weapons (about half of the local market) [20]. Russia's current economic relations with the Republic of Congo completely fit into the general African scheme. According to Russian data, in 2021 the total trade turnover between the countries was \$124 million, of which \$122 million was imports of Russian products (grain and goods with a secret code), 2.2 million—exports from Congo (coffee, wood) [21]. Preliminary interstate agreements have been concluded on the construction of an oil pipeline in the Congo (over 1300 km) and on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy (Rosatom). The World Bank's estimates for 2021 differ slightly from the Russian data and can be presented in the form of a Table 1 (in dollars).

It is obvious that France is far ahead of Russia in its economic influence on the Republic of Congo, having managed to realise the initial advantage of the former metropolis. Russia, however, has also been increasing its trade turnover with Congo in recent years. According to Russian President V. Putin at a meeting with the President of the Republic of Congo D. Sassou-Nguesso in the Republic of Congo. Sassou-Nguesso in St. Petersburg in 2023, trade between the countries increased by 85% [24]. However, in economic competition with China, both France and the Russian Federation are clearly losing. Thus, there is a paradoxical result: in the long competition between the USSR/RF and France for influence on the African continent, the third power, China, eventually wins.

8 Political Influence: A Comparative Analysis

The political influence of the Russian Federation and France on the Republic of Congo is expressed in supporting the policies of the “superpower” in the world arena (for example, in UN votes) and in developing military and political cooperation with this “superpower”. With regard to military cooperation, France was forced to withdraw its troops and dismantle its military bases after the 1963 coup in the Congo. In 1964, the Congo established diplomatic relations with the USSR. During the years of Congo’s “socialist orientation”, military and political cooperation with France was out of the question.

The democratic regime in 1992–1997 restored military-political cooperation with France, which (in a limited form), despite the return to power of D. Sassou-Nguesso, continues to operate at present. There is a rather large French military-diplomatic mission in Congo, which advises the Congolese army; Congolese cadets are trained in French military schools; joint naval exercises are held (in an international format, with the participation of other countries of the region). However, at the same time, Congo’s cooperation with the Russian Federation is also actively developing. Under the 2019 agreement on military-technical cooperation, Russian military specialists are located in Congo to train the local army in usage of Russian weapons; arms deliveries and training of Congolese personnel are carried out. In this sphere, one says about a certain parity in the influence of Russia and France, although recently the activity of Russia in this area clearly exceeds the activity of France, despite Macron’s personal visit to Congo in March 2023. As for the political influence itself, it can be traced by the votes of the Republic of Congo in the UN platforms (first of all, in the General Assembly). This data is also presented in the form of a Table 2.

Thus, in recent years we can observe an obvious trend—a gradual levelling of the political influence of the Russian Federation (initially higher) and France on the Republic of Congo (by Russian policy). This trend is associated with the pragmatic policy of E. Macron, who tacitly recognised the results of ambiguous presidential elections in this country. France also reacted calmly to the results of the 2021 elections (the weird death of the main rival of the incumbent president on the voting day).

As a result, there was a certain equilibrium of the combined military and political influence of Russia and France in the Congo, which was well demonstrated in the 2022–2023 UN General Assembly votes on the Ukrainian issue. During all these

Table 2 Voting of states in the UN GA on significant issues (percentage of coincidence with the US position) according to the US Department of State [25]

	France	Republic of Congo	RF
2018 year	45%	10%	13%
2019 year	65%	17%	23%
2020 year	66%	47%	19%
2021 year	75%	55%	28%

votes, the Republic of Congo abstained without joining either side. At the same time, one can observe the same trend as in the economy: the continuous growth of the influence of the PRC, with which the Republic of Congo concluded a strategic partnership agreement in 2006.

9 Conclusion

Thus, it can be stated that the use of quantitative methods to qualitatively analyse the efficiency of a state's foreign policy is necessary and useful for short periods of time, but it does not provide an opportunity to predict the development of the situation in the long term. Both the USSR/RF and France spent a lot of material resources and political efforts in order to come to a certain parity in favour of the third party. On the other hand, the methodology for assessing the long-term effectiveness of foreign policy in remote regions cannot be reduced to numerical results. The choice of evaluation criteria depends on the goal set. Moreover, strengthening political and economic influence is not a zero-sum game in the modern world. The role of the object of influence (Congo) in pursuing its own goals is qualitatively increasing.

Small countries (from the point of view of political realism) are forced to choose side between major powers to protect their own interests. Thus, the result of foreign policy impact is influenced not only by the "efficiency" calculated by the big players but also by the internal factors of a small state and the influence of third countries on it. After a titanic struggle with each other for influence in the Congo, the Russian Federation and France found themselves at a roughly equilibrium point, without an unambiguous leader. Moreover, in the modern world, Congo chooses its foreign policy and economic guidelines independently (the field of manoeuvre has expanded qualitatively compared to the bipolar world) [26].

In modern international relations, there is no longer an unequivocal foreign policy "orientation". As a result, on the example of the Republic of Congo a paradoxical result can be observed: on the one hand, there is an obvious growth of the "mathematically calculated" influence of both Russia and France (parity has been reached), but at the same time there is a decrease in the total real influence in favour of third countries (China, the USA) and regional organisations [27]. France is increasingly working in conjunction with the EU. Congo's interests are increasingly linked to neighbouring countries. This is a general trend of emancipation of Africa, for which there are no longer exclusive "friends". The world has changed and Congo's multi-vector foreign policy is the rule rather than the exception on the African continent.

In these circumstances, can the results of the long-term policy of the Russian Federation and France be considered positive? Apparently, yes, because these countries continue to actively co-operate with Congo and are among its main partners. A significant part of the Congolese political elite was educated in the USSR/RF or in France. This is probably the effective model to aim for: pragmatism and mutually beneficial cooperation in both economic and foreign policy matters. Long-term

dominance can no longer be seen as an achievable goal in the face of Africa's rapid development and the demand for equality (since we are talking about a multipolar world). As a Chinese proverb says, sometimes the shortest way to the south is on the road that leads to the north.

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Expert and Analytical Centers (Think Tanks) in the Development of Cooperation Between Russia and the EAEU Partner States



Aleksei Vovenda , Alexander Kuzyakin , and Artyom Tereshin

1 Introduction

Currently, theoretical and applied scientific studies of processes having a significant impact on the development of the Eurasian countries as a regional integration community, being the center of excellence in world politics and economics of the XXI century, are of specific relevance. On the one hand, this is explained by the fact that these countries are one of the largest economies in the world; on the other hand, due to the economic and political development of the states, which is manifested in the activities of existing integration associations.

The partner states consider the development of integration processes within the Greater Eurasian Partnership as a long-term strategic goal, which, ultimately, should lead to creating a single functioning integration system of economic and political interstate cooperation.

In this context, special attention is paid to coordinating research and development by leading universities and expert and analytical centers known as “think tanks” in order to provide suitable conditions for intergovernmental collaboration regarding foreign economic strategies.

During World War II, military analytical organizations operating in Anglo-Saxon countries, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, were described as “think tanks”. Generally, a “think tank” is an organization serving as an intermediary in public policy as a research center or an informal association of experts involved in solving social issues and governmental problems by analyzing social and political processes, thus making forecasts and developing recommendations. These contribute to optimizing political decision-making process, which makes the

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expertise of “think tanks” of specific practical relevance for pursuing the state policy. A “think tank” often serves as a scientific foundation under the political doctrine implemented by the government. This explains the high scientific relevance of the following study.

2 Materials and Methods

The research analyzes the main activities of expert and analytical centers (“think tanks”) within cooperation between Russia and EAEU partner states. Both general scientific and applied methods are used in the study to analyze the influence of “think tanks” on developing foreign economic policy strategies and cooperation between Russia and the EAEU partner states.

The following research methods have been used in the study:

- literature analysis which involves identifying various theoretical concepts of the phenomenon of a “think tank”.
- comparative analysis, which considers the criteria or indicators that define certain organizations as “think tanks”.
- historical-genetic method, which helps to identify key changes in the development of “think tanks” in the EAEU partner states.
- method of induction, allowing to describe effective strategies to enhance the performance of expert and analytical centers within the scope of EAEU. This involves expanding the scope of presence and developing new ranking systems to index the activities of “think tanks”, improving the ranking methodology and enhancing their reputation.

3 Discussion

According to the definition of the Cambridge University dictionary, “think tanks” is “a certain group of experts who interact with the state in order to research and develop specific ideas, and then develop guidelines with recommendations for their implementation” [1]. Within the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the concept of a “think tank” is also interpreted as organizations carrying out research and advocacy activities on issues closely related to public policy. In addition, “they can be conditionally called a mediator between the government and scientific, academic structures” [2].

According to the UN, the functional activities of think tanks should include public policy. However, not all researchers agree with this approach. In particular, according to O. Urrutia, “think tanks” are centers of expert opinion that consider problems of public policy. These centers can be differentiated into political, academic, and lobbying institutions that are engaged in research activities and develop

various ways to solve and implement them [3]. Kelley P. gives a rather interesting definition: ““think tanks” are methods and ways in which millions of dollars are transferred from the accounts of the richest corporations and companies, governments as well as individuals in favor of researchers competing among themselves for the right of authorship over research” [4].

McGann J.G., who is one of the leading experts in the field of studying the influence of “think tanks” on international politics, complements all the above definitions with the fact that analytical centers draw attention to the interests and problems of the public, and represent a link between two structures such as the academic intellectual elite and the government [5].

If talking about the development of this concept, there is no single approach neither in Russian science nor in English or in translation. However, the scientific literature gives such interpretations of this term as “analytical centers” [6], “think tanks” [7], “brain trusts” [8], and even “thought factory” [9].

Considering the concept of a “think tank”, it is also important to touch upon the topic of criteria or indicators by which certain organizations can be attributed to “analytical centers”. In particular, in the late 90s the American authors J. McGann, K. Weaver, and D. Abelson developed a list of requirements that analytical centers must meet:

- have the status of an independent organization, including from state and non-state structures determined by the charter and the source of funding
- to meet the interests of the society
- include a permanent group of analysts, researchers, and scientists engaged
- to develop and propose innovative solutions to be included in public policy in order to have a positive impact on the geopolitical system and relations
- have the status of a non-profit organization determined by the source of funding
- have their own accessible communication resources represented by a website, blog, publications, articles as well as other forms of broadcasting in order to disseminate information to various social groups [10]

German sociologist R. Fretschner argues that the success of an analytical center depends on the presence of three important components: science, economics, and politics [11]. At the same time, each of these components may overlap with other mixed concepts, which in turn reflects the multilevel activity of “analytical centers”.

There are five main directions of foreign policy, in which expert and analytical centers are involved in:

1. Providing governmental bodies responsible for foreign policy decisions, generating ideas for further foreign policy decisions as well as developing global foreign policy strategies and concepts.
2. Representing the best experts to work in governmental structures.
3. Organizing forums, seminars, and conferences for the exchange of views on the most relevant issues of foreign policy.
4. Forming public opinion on foreign policy issues, using such mechanisms as the media, public speaking, and publication of reports.

5. Acting as intermediaries and representatives of the expert community in the interaction of the country's official authorities with other states.

Ranking the activities of “think tanks” in the considered partner states of Russia in the EAEU as a whole has been carried out according to expert assessments according to three criteria:

- the degree of influence of expert analytical centers on political processes
- the degree of media activity
- the degree of depth and accuracy of the conducted analysis and the proposed forecasts of the think tank.

The assessment has been carried out according to a point system, which makes it possible to rank the centers based on the average score received. All analytical centers have been evaluated by political scientists, journalists operating in the field of research as well as heads of leading think tanks in each country separately.

4 EAEU Partner States Think Tanks

Among the “think tanks” in the analyzed partner states of Russia within the EAEU, there is a noticeable trend to specialize in particular fields of expertise to gain a competitive advantage in the “market of ideas” despite the universal character of their activities. The main areas of expertise for these centers include politics, economics, science, education, and sociology, which are widely prevalent among various Eurasian expert and analytical centers. Additionally, democracy and human rights protection hold particular significance. Notably, in the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan, publication activities emerge as one of the most efficient sources of income for the “think tanks” compared to others within the study.

Table 1 presents the main analyzed indicators describing the activities of the considered “think tanks” [12]. The data regarding the number of employees at analytical centers are retrieved from open sources and have been provided by the “think tanks” themselves. The table presents figures on the number of analytical centers, the number of employees per center, and the number of “think tanks” reported in the

Table 1 Indicators of the “think tanks” activities

Country	No. of “think tanks”	Number of employees in a “think tank”	Average number of employees in a “think tank”	Number of “think tanks” described in the 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index (indicated/presented)
Armenia	22	189 (18 centers)	10	14/7
Kyrgyzstan	8	110 (7 centers)	16	10/5
Belarus	25	173 (19 centers)	9	21/0
Kazakhstan	21	210 (11 think tanks)	19	8/3
Total	76	682	12	53/20

2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index. Belarus leads in the number of “think tanks” with the biggest number accounting for 25. However, the average number of employees per a “think tank” in Belarus is the smallest compared to other countries. Among all the Eurasian “think tanks”, the average number of employees is 12. Kazakhstan ranks the first in this indicator, with 210 employees among 11 analytical centers, averaging 19 employees per a center. Kyrgyzstan is close in this category with an average of 16 employees per a center. The Republic of Armenia ranks the third, with 18 centers and 189 employees.

The majority of “think tanks” (60%) prioritize research on domestic policy within their own country, while 20% focus on international issues and another 20% primarily engage in research concerning the post-Soviet space.

The dissemination and promotion of research within the scientific community are crucial for establishing funding and supporting the intellectual landscape in Armenia, particularly within its “think tanks”. Notably, Armenia stands out for its significant focus on demographic research due to its dense population and the imperative to improve socio-economic conditions while also engaging with the diaspora. It is important to note that with its pivotal role, the journalistic community of the Republic of Armenia has a bearing on the development of its “think tanks”.

At the same time, fueled by substantial funding from European countries and the United States, Kyrgyzstan boasts a higher prevalence of “think tanks”, particularly those involved in democracy issues and human rights protection. These organizations, though fewer in number, are densely staffed, facilitating effective utilization of foreign resources.

The activities of numerous “think tanks” in Kazakhstan are more coordinated due to governmental oversight, which potentially enhances decision-making processes. “Think tanks” of Kazakhstan serve as key advisers to the government by operating in sociological, political, and foreign policy research.

Belarus exhibits a broad spectrum of “think tanks”, covering various sectors, including economics, politics, and foreign policy, owing to its numerous operating centers. Some “think tanks” associated with governmental bodies focus their activities on monitoring public opinion and gathering information to inform decision-making processes.

Political research remains a predominant focus across Eurasian “think tanks”, complemented by activities tailored to specific national needs. Despite their modest current role, the consultancy and recommendation services offered by “think tanks” ensure increased engagement between these institutions and governmental bodies as well as improved quality and credibility of research findings.

5 Results

Currently, the EAEU “think tanks” are evolving and consolidating their positions and influence. They mainly focus on developing recommendations crucial for different stages of the political decision-making process. The insights and special

knowledge derived from their research are utilized by policymakers and other interested parties. It must be emphasized, however, that the rating system of European “think tanks” highlights the nature of their activities by comparing them with the “market of ideas”, which is in fact not accurate enough, and does not fully reflect the differentiated nature of modern “think tanks”.

However, the current activities of “think tanks” in developing political and economic systems of modern states require an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing the nature and results of their performance. It is very difficult to consolidate modern “think tanks” into a single unified system taking into account the peculiarities and directions of their activities. Moreover, it seems fundamentally important to build a rating system for such think tanks akin to those in the USA and Europe. Nevertheless, the expertise of such centers contributes to Eurasian integration processes and the development of foreign economic strategies among the EAEU partner states.

6 Conclusion

The role of Eurasian “think tanks” in the political process and in the scientific world is increasing every year. In general, the main tasks of such organizations are to carry out fundamental research on issues related to the policy area and to develop the most effective recommendations. The political situation is rapidly changing; thus, it is important to make political decisions quickly and effectively, which is possible by resorting to the activities of “think tanks”.

At the same time, researchers and analysts demonstrate strong involvement in the activities of “think tanks”. At the moment, there are about 7000 people employed in “think tanks” of the Eurasian space (except for the Russian Federation). However, these organizations seem to be fragmented and isolated; they lack collaborative efforts to spread their research findings, which can lead to duplicated studies.

Moreover, increased competition in the market of ideas poses a challenge for existing expert and analytical centers as it is relatively easy for new players to enter it. At the same time, public funding remains insufficient as well as from private sector and business structures; financial support from abroad, namely by foundations and governments of Western countries, can still discredit a center.

“Think tanks” also compete for media coverage and attention of the customers and other interested parties by using internet marketing tools. However, pro-Western “think tanks” having significant financial resources and a well-established mechanism for operating on the net, are more successful in this direction.

The trend of transition from a universal focus of research to a specialized one should intensify. The constant intensification of political processes taking place in the Eurasian space and their diversity determine the diversification of “think tanks” in specific areas of activity. There are serious reasons to believe that in the future, the growth of advocacy activities will increase under the influence of funding from foreign donors.

With a further increase in such funding, in the context of contradictory policies of the United States and European countries, the subject of research and projects of “think tanks” may finally acquire a pro-Western character. As counteraction measures, it seems relevant to use various forms of support from Russia, including not only financial but also informational, involving analytical centers of the EAEU countries in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation by establishing interaction with Russian “think tanks” through the creation of a common analytical network, thereby strengthening the factor of interdependence of political actors.

It should also be noted that the growth in the number of organizations, private and public, engaged in economic, political, and sociological research, will continue if they consolidate a certain place in the process of forming political decisions.

Improving the efficiency of the “think tanks” of the Eurasian space can be ensured by combining them into a common network. Joint expert and analytical centers can gain greater access to decision-making processes. The network can provide a wide range of activities for the future integrated structure at a higher level than it is now, namely:

- consulting and exchanging opinions with experts in this field
- conducting negotiations
- coordinating large research projects
- cooperating in the field of policy formation

The main advantage of the network of “think tanks” may be its flexibility as opposed to the rigid structure of political and scientific communities, where a common view on specific political issues is most often found. The mobile cooperation of independent specialized experts and analytical centers on one issue will increase the efficiency and speed of political decision-making.

As a tool for monitoring and coordinating the network of “think tanks” of the Eurasian space, it is proposed to create a single expert panel capable of forming a single information space for accumulating intellectual products of the activities of expert analytical centers; ensuring information exchange; developing a unified position of the space on the current agenda; creating a council for coordinating the activities of “think tanks”; conducting systematic monitoring the activities of “think tanks” and their rating; implementing advisory functions.

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Transport Corridors of the Post-Soviet Space as a Road to the Future



Anastasiia Zotova and Sergei Poltorak

1 Introduction

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, all transport arteries of the now post-Soviet states were a single transport system owned by the USSR. It included railway, sea, river, air, road, and pipeline transport (oil, product, and gas pipelines), as well as high-voltage power lines. The transport policy of the socialist state assigned its place to each type of transport, taking into account the greatest efficiency and expediency. Currently, all post-Soviet republics are implementing their transport policy for the construction and provision of multimodal transport corridors, realizing their significance and profitability. International agreements are also taken into account. For example, at the second Pan-European Conference of Ministers of Transport, held in Crete in 1994, a decision was made to connect Cretan ITCs No. 1, 2, and 9 with Russian transport communications. The common transport policy and the full structure of the ITCs were approved at the third Pan-European Transport Conference [1]. The system of Euro-Asian ITCs was established at the Second International Euro-Asian Transport Conference in St. Petersburg, held in September 2000 [2].

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and systematize information about the dynamics of transport corridors in the post-Soviet space, as an important tool for shaping the foreign economic policy of not only the former Soviet republics but also other countries of the world that showing their interest in increasing their

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influence on this region. It is important to note that the Eurasian Economic Council plays an important role in resolving issues of ITC development. For example, at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on December 25, 2023, the heads of state of the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) determined the priorities of international activities for 2024—development of Eurasian transport corridors, creation of favorable conditions for business, including simplification of trade procedures and elimination of internal barriers [3]. The Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission approved a comprehensive plan for the development of Eurasian transport corridors until 2025 [4].

This study can be considered as material that can begin a discussion on the problem of developing international transport corridors in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

2 Methods of Research

Considering the relevance and importance of the topic under consideration for the development of the EAEU, the authors studied published sources and analytical materials. General scientific research methods of analysis, synthesis, deduction, and comparison were mainly used. Analysis and comparative methods helped to trace the dynamics of the development of international relations regarding the construction of new international transport corridors.

In particular, the use of data from an analytical report prepared at the Institute of Problems and Natural Monopolies made it possible to compare the contribution of various countries of Europe and Asia in the formation of transport corridors to the East in recent years. Comparison of the main activities for the implementation of the New Silk Road program with the EU activities to supply the Baltic countries makes it possible to compare the scale of financial investments in logistics activities in the European and Asian regions. Thanks to the classification method, it was possible to consistently divide information about existing and under-construction international transport corridors in various regions of the post-Soviet space (Russia, Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Baltic countries) into classification groups.

Comparison of reports and statistical materials with analytical articles made it possible to summarize and systematize information about the mutual political and economic influence of states. Due to the induction method, it was possible to determine the role of international transport corridors in the integration or disintegration of post-Soviet states.

3 The Results of the Development of Transport Corridors in the Post-Soviet Space

3.1 Functioning International Transport Corridors Passing Through the Territories of Post-Soviet States

There are many ITCs located on the territory of the post-Soviet space, the main of which are: “Transsib”, “South Ural Passage”, “Northern Sea Route”, Pan-European Corridors 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, “Primorye-1”, “Primorye-2”, “East–West”, Moldovan Corridor “Berezino–Bessarabka”, “Baltic Sea–Adriatic Sea”, “Rhine–Danube”, “Via Baltica”, “North Baltic Corridor”, “Baltic–Black Sea–Aegean Corridor”.

The world’s largest railway is the Trans-Siberian Railway, traffic along which began in 1901. It became part of the Trans-Siberian international transport corridor (TS). This ITC connects Europe with Asia and has branches in St. Petersburg, Kyiv, Novorossiysk, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, and Korea. The ITC is also connected to Pan-European corridors 2, 3, and 9. Goods are delivered from China to Germany via this international corridor in 11–15 days. The “Transsib” passes through the territory of 21 subjects of the Russian Federation. More than 80% of the country’s industrial potential is concentrated in these regions. From Novosibirsk, the Transsib connects to Central Asia via the Turksib (Turkestan–Siberian Railway), built in the USSR in 1930 [5]. Despite the fact that “Transsib” is a powerful double-track electrified railway line with modern means of informatization and communication, its capabilities are not enough to develop new fields and ensure a growing volume of transit traffic. Therefore, the Russian Ministry of Transport has proposed to develop the infrastructure of border crossings to China, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. It is necessary to carry out the construction of 3000 km of railways over the next 8 years [6]. The basis of the “East–West” ITC is “Transsib”. Due to the branching of railways, this corridor provides European countries with access to Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Korea, and Mongolia [7].

Pan-European corridors have been forming since 1980. 5 ITCs from 10 connect Western Europe with the post-Soviet states: Route No. 1: Gdansk–Kaliningrad–via Lithuania, Riga–Tallinn–Helsinki; Route No. 2: Berlin–Poznan–Warsaw–Minsk–Moscow–Nizhny Novgorod. The third and fifth routes connect Western Europe with Ukraine. Route 9 connects the countries of Western Europe with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Latvia.

The shortest route from the Nordic countries to the Asia–Pacific states is the “Northern Sea Route” (NSR). This ITC runs through the four seas of the Arctic Ocean. Along the Northern Sea Route, timber, and minerals are exported from the ports of the Arctic and large rivers of Siberia. Fuel, food, and equipment are imported to its ports. The NSR has great prospects. For example, the route from Shanghai to the ports of the North Sea along the NSR is 13–14 thousand km. The same route through the Suez Canal is 20–21 km. It is assumed that the NSR will become the basis of the Arctic Transport System, which will include marine and river fleet vehicles, aviation, rail, pipeline and road transport, and coastal infrastructure. In 2018,

the Arctic Marine Transport shipping company was established in order to develop logistics along the “Northern Sea Route”. Its founders are “NOVATEK” and “Sovcomflot”. Chinese COSCO Shipping and the Silk Road Foundation also became members of the new company. One of the company’s goals is to ensure year-round navigation of hydrocarbons to the Asia–Pacific countries [8]. ITC “Primorye-1” and “Primorye-2” connect the Russian–Chinese land border and the seaports of Primorsky Krai. These corridors are used for the transit of goods by sea between North and South China, as well as North China and the countries of the Asia–Pacific region.

In August 2022, the Berezino (Ukraine)–Bessarabka (Moldova) railway route was launched, which became an alternative route from Odessa to the Danube ports of Izmail and Reni [9]. This so-called “Moldovan Corridor” was built during the Soviet era, but in the 1990s, it was dismantled by residents of the region and sold for scrap [10]. In 2006, the idea of recreating this path appeared. There were plans to electrify this line to Nikolaev and create the Reni–Mariupol expressway. For Ukraine, the project was very important, since the Danube ports turned out to be inconvenient for exporting and importing goods due to their limited throughput. However, it was not possible to find funds to restore railway communication between the Odessa region and Moldova. Only in May 2022, the West allocated funds for the restoration of the Bessarabka–Berezino–Artsyż–Odessa route for the transportation of goods and, first of all, funds for conducting military operations with Russia. There is also an elevator and an oil terminal at Berezino station, which is especially important for Ukraine. However, so far there are difficulties in this section due to the fact that it is single-track, non-electrified, serviced by more than ten diesel locomotives, and its capacity is only six pairs of trains per day [11]. It is important to note that grain corridors through Moldova and Romania have been operating in Ukraine since 2022. The international transport corridors of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus are presented in Table 1.

In order to develop alternative transport corridors bypassing Russia, the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), which implements the EU transport policy, proposed to Ukraine and Moldova to build a new route connecting Vinnytsia and Reni. Construction work is expected to begin in 2024 but on credit. Rails and locomotives will be supplied from France and construction equipment from the UK [12]. Ukraine has been a member of TEN-T since 2017, so the logistics routes of this republic are included in the indicative maps of the Trans-European Transport network. This organization planned to extend the “North Baltic Corridor” through Lviv and Kiev to Mariupol. The “Baltic Sea–Adriatic Sea” and “Rhine–Danube” corridors should pass through Lviv. The “Baltic–Black Sea–Aegean” corridor should be extended through Lviv, Romania, Moldova to Odessa [13].

The “Via Baltica” international transport corridor also passes through the territory of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia: Helsinki–Tallinn–Riga–Kaunas–Warsaw. NATO military forces are moving along this route in Latvia along the A1 highway and the bridge in Salacgriva [14].

Thus, among the noted 17 ITC, nine are located on the territory of Russia (“Transsib”, “South Ural Passage”, “Northern Sea Route”, Pan-European Corridors

Table 1 ITC of the Eastern European Post-Soviet states

Transport corridor/State	Ukraine	Belarus	Moldova
“South Ural Passage”	+		
Pan-European Corridor No. 2		+	
Pan-European Corridor No. 3	+		
Pan-European Corridor No. 5	+		
Pan-European Corridor No. 9	+	+	+
“East–West”		+	
The Moldovan Corridor “Berezino–Bessarabka”	+		+
“North Baltic Corridor”	It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory		It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory
“Baltic–Black Sea–Aegean” Corridor	It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory		It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory
“Baltic Sea–Adriatic Sea”	It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory		It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory
“Rhine–Danube”	It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory		It is planned to extend the ITC to this territory

1, 2, 9, “Primorye-1”, “Primorye-2”, “East–West”). The Pan-European Corridor No. 1, the “North Baltic Corridor”, the “Baltic–Black Sea–Aegean” Corridor and “Via Baltica” pass through the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Pan-European Corridor No. 9 also passes through Lithuania. The “East–West” ITC runs through the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Among the Central Asian states, only Kazakhstan can be distinguished. There are 2 ITCs on this territory: “East–West” and “Transsib”, which pass into “Turksib” on the territory of this republic. Mainly, it can be concluded that all existing international corridors are continuously developing, contributing to the budget of the republics through which they pass.

3.2 International Corridors Under Design and Construction in Post-Soviet States

Among the actively developing ITCs in the post-Soviet space, it is necessary to highlight: “North–South”, “Belt and Road Initiative”, the *Trans-Caspian East–West–Middle Corridor Initiative* (“The *Middle Corridor*”), “North–West”, “South–West”, TRACECA “Europe–Caucasus–Asia”, “Southern Corridor” (Russia–Caspian Sea–Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan), the Zangezur Corridor, Lapis Lazuli Corridor, CASCA+, TUTIT (Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey) (ECO project), ITC “Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan”, ITC “Western China–Western Europe”, “Amber Train”, “Rail Baltica”, ITC “Armenia–Iran–India”, ITC “Persian Gulf–Black Sea”. Information on planned and under-construction corridors in the post-Soviet states is presented in tables according to an established classification based on geographical and cultural

factors: Russia (Eastern Europe, North Asia, Central Asia), the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).

Currently, 7 out of 17 projects are being developed in Russia: “North–South”, “Belt and Road Initiative”, “North–West”, “Southern Corridor”, ITC “Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan”, ITC “Western China–Western Europe”, ITC “Armenia–Iran–India”.

The agreement on the “North–South” International Transport Corridor was signed by Russia, Iran, and India in St. Petersburg on September 12, 2000, during the Second International Eurasian Transport Conference. The territory of the corridor is the agricultural regions of Russia. Thus, the route is beneficial for Russian agricultural exports, as it becomes possible to supply their products to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where over 414 million people live. It is assumed that Russia’s export potential will reach 30 million tons of grain by 2030 [15]. The length of the corridor, depending on the route, ranges from 6165 to 7992 km. The entire route consists of three parts: the eastern, western, and Trans-Caspian corridors. The Western Corridor passes through Dagestan and North Ossetia by road and rail. To develop direct land communication along the western coast of the Caspian Sea, a new line of the Qazvin–Rasht–Astara (Iran)–Astara (Azerbaijan) railway is being built. The eastern route is carried out by road and rail through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. For this purpose, the route along the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea has been put into operation since 2014: Gorgan (IRI)–Etrek–Bereket (Turkmenistan)–Uzen (Kazakhstan). The third corridor, the Trans–Caspian one, is implemented by river and sea transport from the ports of Astrakhan, Olya, Makhachkala, along the Volga River to the Iranian and Turkmen ports on the Caspian Sea—Bandar-Enzeli, Bandar-Amirabad, Turkmenbashi.

Experts note not only the advantages of the development of the “North–South” ITC, but also the difficulties that arise during the transportation of goods: the unfinished section of the Rasht–Astara railway, infrastructure restrictions, the absence of a thorough tariff, administrative barriers, logistical restrictions [16]. In addition, Russian entrepreneurs face problems with financial transactions between Iran and Russia. There is no single operator of the “North–South” ITC, thanks to which it would be possible to track the condition of the cargo and its location and solve the difficulties that arise. Delays in the movement of cargo at all stages of the journey are becoming a big problem.

Despite the difficulties associated with the development of this path, many representatives of business and politics believe in its benefits and the need for the development of the domestic economy, making their contribution. For example, to implement the Trans-Caspian route, Russia and Iran signed an agreement on the construction and purchase of 20 ships for the General Cargo transport company. The issue of attracting Chinese investments for the construction of river and sea vessels is being considered. In 2022, Russian Railways Logistics launched cargo on this route. During the year, the volume of traffic increased 7.5 times [17]. To develop the eastern route, at the end of 2022, the Board of Russian Railways introduced a 20%

discount for container transportation through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for a year. In turn, the railways of Kazakhstan provided a 40% discount on transportation in the direction of Turkmenistan, and the Turkmen Railways provided a 40–50% discount on transportation to border crossings with Iran. On May 17, 2023, an agreement was signed on financing the Astara-Rasht section. In total, 102 investment projects are planned to be implemented: 52 Russian, 22 Kazakh, 11 Iranian, 8 Azerbaijani, 5 Armenian, 3 Turkmen, and 1 Georgian.

For Russia, the “North–South” ITC is not only the communications of the XXI century. This is also a new vision of Russia’s path in the system of complex relations between the Russian Federation and the collective West.

Another very dynamically developing project was the Silk Road International Association Alliance. This project combines two other projects: The *economic belt of the Silk Road* or “One Belt” (the Eurasian “Land Bridge”) and the *twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road* [18]. More than \$1 trillion has already been invested to implement this initiative. 148 countries (including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) and 31 international organizations signed cooperation agreements with China. As part of this project, a China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project was drawn up in 2023. The railway will be connected to the “*Middle Corridor*” project: crossing Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The use of the Northern Sea Route is also being considered as part of the “Belt and Road initiative”. Rosatom has increased its fleet for year-round traffic along the “Northern Sea Route”. The peculiarity of the route is that the project provides for the creation and development of many routes connecting China with the states of Asia and Europe. For example, the “Eurasian Land Bridge” to Iran and Turkey via Tajikistan and Kazakhstan; the route using the “Transsib” through Kazakhstan; the route “China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Iraq–Syria”; “China–Mongolia–Kazakhstan–Russia–Belarus–Poland”. On November 5, 2016, the first train with Chinese goods along one of the routes of the “Belt and Road Initiative” project arrived in Latvia [19]. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan took part in the large-scale Digital Silk Way project. Telecommunications operators of both countries signed an agreement on the establishment of a joint venture for the construction and operation of a Trans-Caspian fiber-optic communication line along the bottom of the Caspian Sea on the Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan route. This line will become part of the Digital Silk Way [20]. In addition, the project of the international transit corridor “Western China–Western Europe” with a length of 8.5 thousand km is also being developed. The project is associated with the “Belt and Road initiative”. The highway will connect the cities of Russia, China, and Kazakhstan. About 2200 km of the road will pass through the territory of Russia, 2800 km of Kazakhstan and 3400 km of China. The “Comprehensive Plan for the Modernization and Expansion of Trunk Infrastructure” for the period until 2024 defines the conditions and terms for the construction of the Russian section of the “Western China–Western Europe” project. Construction began back in 2008. The Chinese section was built in 2016 and the Kazakh section in 2017.

The Baltic republics are participating in the development of the ITC “Amber Train” and “Rail Baltica”. Lithuania is also part of ITC “The *Middle Corridor*”. “Rail Baltica” is designed to connect EU states through Warsaw, Vilnius, Kaunas, Riga, Tallinn and further, via ferry, to Finland [21]. In June 2023, the European Commission allocated almost a billion euros for these purposes. The goal of the project is to ensure compatibility of the railway infrastructure of the EU, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The cross-border corridor is planned to be created by 2030. However, the cost of the project has already increased from 2 to 8 billion euros.

The Amber rail freight corridor passes through the territories of Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland [22]. On May 29, 2018, railway companies of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia signed a cooperation agreement on the “Amber Train” project. It was expected that the launch of the new route would bring new opportunities and great benefits to the Baltic countries [23]. However, since the launch of the pilot train, the volume of exports from the Baltic countries has decreased noticeably due to sanctions against Russia, so the route was not in demand. In September 2022, it was again announced that the “Amber Train” was making its first test trip, but this time the project had not yet been developed [24]. In general, Baltic railway companies suffered heavy losses due to sanctions. Many employees were laid off. Estonian politician, chairman of the Estonian state railway company T. Toomsalu said that the entire railway infrastructure of Estonia was maintained due to large volumes of transit. With the introduction of sanctions against Russia, transit has decreased many times. A small volume of cargo is delivered by road transport. In this regard, the Estonian railway may be “in serious danger of extinction” [25]. As a result of the decline in transit volumes through Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have ceased to be of interest to the “Amber” Rail Freight Corridor.

The Baltic States are looking for ways out of this situation. Lithuania is considering the issue of switching to the European gauge, but this approach does not solve the problem, since transit from Russia and Belarus is not provided. The roads will work mainly only for the import of goods into the Baltic States. Due to the fact that it is unprofitable to use the railway to supply products from Western Europe (mainly motor transport is used), most likely, the new track will be used to supply military equipment, ammunition, etc. to the Baltic countries. Latvia is considering the issue of close cooperation in the logistics sector with Kazakhstan. Many Kazakh goods are delivered to Europe via Russia, but some European countries do not accept such goods. Since it is unprofitable to deliver goods from Kazakhstan to Europe bypassing Russia, the EU announced its intention to subsidize the losses of participants in foreign economic activity [26].

Another attempt to restore their position in the transport sector was the cooperation between Latvia and Azerbaijan in the field of repair of rolling stock and locomotives. Latvia expects that in the future it will be able to become a transport hub for cargo transportation in “The Middle Corridor” [27]. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) organized a meeting in Latvia with representatives of the transport industry of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. During this event, a communique on cooperation in the

transport and logistics sectors was signed [28]. Important organizations of cooperation between the Baltic States and Central Asia are the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (the third meeting was held on November 3, 2021, online); the Joint Commission on International Transport (held on April 4–5, 2019 in Astana) and the Working Group on Transport (held on June 12, 2023 in Riga). Latvian delegations often take part in the work of transport events in Kazakhstan. Thanks to the efforts being made, the trade turnover between Latvia and Kazakhstan amounted to \$216.2 million in 2022. According to the Ministry of Transport of Kazakhstan, in 2022 the total volume of freight traffic between Kazakhstan and Latvia by rail amounted to three million tons, which is 5.8 times higher than the corresponding figure in 2021. From Latvia to Kazakhstan—196.2 thousand tons (increased three times) [29]. However, in general, 15 million tons of cargo are transported annually by the Latvian railway, compared to 65 million tons a few years ago. These funds are not enough to maintain the infrastructure [30].

“The Middle Corridor” has been developed since 2013 with the aim of transit of goods from China to Turkey and EU countries bypassing Russia. Chinese Railways, the railway company of Kazakhstan—KTZ Express, the Caspian Shipping Company, the Azerbaijani company ADY Express, the Georgian Trans-Caucasian terminal, and Turkish Railways are participating in the project. The main advantage of the route is that the Nomad Express train delivers goods to Europe from China within 10–12 days. “The Middle Corridor” is a multimodal route, which involves two types of transport: rail and sea. In the 7 months of 2023, the volume of cargo transportation along this corridor increased by 86% compared to the same period in 2022 and amounted to 1.6 million tons. In June 2023, Georgia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the establishment of a logistics company for the development of “The Middle Corridor”. The company’s tasks will include issues of tariff policy, cargo handling and simplification of transport processes.

Despite the successes, there are disadvantages in the operation of this transport corridor. The three main ports on the Caspian Sea—Aktau, Baku, and Turkmenbashi—have insufficient transit capacities. There are few container ships in the Caspian Sea. There is not enough investment for the purchase of cargo ships. Transportation along this route is carried out by different modes of transport: two sea crossings and the need for transshipment of goods in four ports. This has a negative impact on the cost, time, and quality of transported goods. In addition, due to the different track widths, cargo transshipment has to be carried out along this route. Thus, the cost of transit along this international transport corridor is significantly higher than on routes passing through Russia [31]. In February 2023, a memorandum of cooperation on the development of “The Middle Corridor” and TRACECA was signed. This led to the attraction of investments. According to a study by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 18.5 billion euros are required for the development of these two ITCs. A significant part of this amount will have to be taken over by the EU countries. It should be noted that work on the development of the TRACECA international transport corridor has been going on since 1998. In 2016, a Strategy for the development of the international transport corridor “Europe–Caucasus–Asia” for the period until 2026 was developed [32]. Azerbaijan,

Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan are working on the transport system of this corridor. But there is still no general agreement on its functioning. For example, Georgia cut rail tariffs by 35%, while Azerbaijan raised its tariffs by 50%. In Tajikistan, cargo carriers can wait at the border for 40 days. Thus, for many logistics companies this corridor seems unprofitable [33].

From Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that projects are mainly being implemented in Belarus and Ukraine. As mentioned earlier, there are many plans to join Ukraine and Moldova to the already existing European ITCs. In Transcaucasia, 10 new international transport corridor projects are being implemented. This is due to the fact that in Transcaucasia the basis is only the “East–West” ITC, so the republics are actively developing new projects, among which the most promising is “North–South” ITC.

The project of the “Lapis Lazuli Corridor” is of interest. It unites the transport and logistics infrastructures of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. The corridor runs from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan, then continues through Georgia to Turkey. Next, it is planned to deliver goods to the EU. The main difficulty in the implementation of the project is considered to be the unstable situation along the route. There is a lot of debate about the project Zangezur (according to the Armenian name—Syunik) corridor. First of all, the Zangezur Corridor is beneficial for Azerbaijan and Turkey. The distance between these countries will be 38 km. Azerbaijan is building a railway on its territory, but Armenia views this as a threat to its security. For Turkey, the corridor opens up prospects for expanding its influence in the South Caucasus. For Iran, the corridor could become an obstacle to

Table 2 Projected ITCs in the republics of Eastern Europe

Transport corridor/State	Ukraine	Moldova	Belarus
“North–South”			+
“South–West”	+		
TRACECA	+	+	
“Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan”			+
“Belt and Road initiative”	+		+

Table 3 Projected ITCs in Transcaucasia

Transport corridor/State	Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia
“North–South”	+	+	+
“The Middle Corridor”	+	+	
“North–West”	+	+	
“South–West”	+	+	
Zangezur Corridor	+		+
TRACECA	+	+	+
“Lapis Lazuli Corridor”	+	+	
CASCA+	+		+
“Armenia–Iran–India”		+	+
“Persian Gulf–Black Sea”		+	+

access to Armenia and further to Georgian ports on the Black Sea. After the launch of the Zangezur Corridor, NATO will gain direct access to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia [31]. Another Azerbaijani project is the “North–West” ITC. The following route is planned: Russia–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey/Black Sea–Europe/Mediterranean Sea. Also, the route of another ITC project “South–West” passes through Azerbaijan: India–Persian Gulf–Iran–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Ukraine–Europe. The authors of the project assume that cargo can be delivered along the route within 7 days, while along alternative routes—35–37 days.

Armenia also initiated the beneficial corridor “Armenia–Iran–India”. It is assumed that the corridor will pass from India to Europe and Russia, but through the territories of Iran, Armenia, and Georgia, and then along the Black Sea. Armenia also actively supports the implementation of the Iranian ITC project “Persian Gulf–Black Sea”, the route of which will pass through Armenia.

An interesting example of the integration of Transcaucasia with Central Asia was their joint project of ITC “CASCA+” or “Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia”. Türkiye also joined this initiative [34]. The states of Central Asia are actively participating in the implementation of new ideas for international transport corridors. Information on the transport corridors under development affecting the territories of Central Asia is presented in Table 4.

Table 4 shows that many new corridors bypass Russia. The project of the international transport corridor, which does not take into account routes through Russia or the South Caucasus, was developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation ITC “TUTIT” (Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey). The first meeting of the working group was held on September 21, 2023, in Tajikistan [35]. Whether it will be possible to implement this project—time will tell.

Table 4 Projected ITCs in Central Asia

Transport corridor/State	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
“North–South”	+		+		
“The Middle Corridor”	+				
TRACECA	+	+			+
“Lapis Lazuli Corridor”			+		
“Southern Corridor” (Russia–Caspian Sea–Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan)		+	+	+	
“TUTIT” (Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye)		+	+		+
“Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan”	+	+			
“Belt and Road initiative”	+	+	+	+	+
CASCA+		+	+	+	
“Western China–Western Europe”	+				

4 Conclusions

Geopolitical competition contributes to the development of transit route projects bypassing Russia. In the post-Soviet space, “The Middle Corridor”, TRACECA, “South–West”, “TUTIT”, “CASCA+” and others. ITCs are being built, bypassing Russia. The response was the signing on November 1, 2023, within the framework of the SCO International Transport Forum in Tashkent, of a memorandum on the creation of a transport corridor “Russia–Caspian Sea–Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan” bypassing Kazakhstan. During the same period of time, the 12th meeting of the Ministers of Transport of the Economic Cooperation Organization was held in Tashkent on November 1–3. At this meeting, a protocol was signed on the creation of an international transport corridor connecting Asia and Europe through the route “Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey”. The most dynamically developing project of Russia in the post-Soviet space is the “North–South” ITC. The states of Asia and the South Caucasus, without abandoning cooperation with Russia, are developing their own ways. Ukraine and Moldova are ready to join any routes proposed by Western countries.

Thus, international transport corridors are an important geopolitical tool for the mutual influence of states. The modern world order contributes to the development of new corridors. However, the most stable routes are those that were formed long before the break in relations between the collective West and Russia. New projects are unprofitable or face many difficulties in the logistics sector. For example, the ports of the Caspian Sea (Aktau, Baku, Turkmenbashi) and the port of Constanta in Romania, through which European transit passes, have very weak capacities. In addition, there are not enough cargo ships (container ships) in the Caspian Sea.

Nevertheless, despite numerous geopolitical difficulties, international cooperation on the development of transport corridors has a beneficial effect on the development of the economies of the post-Soviet states: investments are allocated, roads and railways, transport and container hubs are being built, production is being stimulated, new distribution agreements are emerging.

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Generative Artificial Intelligence in the System of International Relations: Risks, Opportunities, and Regulations



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1 Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the key technologies of the twenty-first century. It is rapidly developing and already has a significant impact on various spheres of society, including international relations. The capabilities of AI to automate routine diplomatic work in data processing and improved predictive analytics, are rapidly changing the ways in which countries participate in international affairs. The impact of AI is particularly noticeable in such activities as, assessment of internal and external political situations, cybersecurity, and language translation.

This chapter considers the significance of artificial intelligence in the system of international relations in four aspects: (1) as a means of optimizing diplomatic activities, (2) as a tool to influence the foreign policy situation; (3) as a mechanism for redistributing power in the international system; (4) as a technology entailing new challenges and threats to the system of international relations.

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2 Problem Statement

The study of artificial intelligence in the system of international relations raises several important and complex issues that require immediate solutions. First of all, it concerns ethical problems related to the need to prevent (through legal regulation at the international level) the interference of some countries in the internal affairs of others; and to overcome the technological and, consequently, strategic inequality of countries, which is repeatedly increasing with the development of artificial intelligence in some states.

National and international legal norms regulating the development and use of artificial intelligence are currently under development. This modern weapon, according to numerous researchers, outperforms nuclear weapons in terms of potential threats. Meanwhile, coordinating foreign policy actions and regulatory frameworks in different countries is a very difficult task, given the differences in priorities and approaches to the management of artificial intelligence in different states.

3 Methods and Sources

To study the impact of artificial intelligence on international relations, the following methods are used: exploratory method, continuous sampling method, method of system description, analysis and synthesis, factual method, method of establishing cause-and-effect relationships, and predictive analytical method. The empirical basis of the study is a diverse factual material selected by the method of continuous sampling in publications of global media about generative artificial intelligence, its advantages and potential risks of its application in the field of politics and international relations, as well as official documents of international organizations (UN, SCO, BRICS), published starting in 2023: and in one way or another affecting the problems of using artificial intelligence.

4 Findings and Discussion

4.1 *Artificial Intelligence as a Tool to Optimize Diplomatic Activities*

The use of artificial intelligence in the sphere of foreign policy and diplomacy has significant advantages but also carries certain threats to the harmonious development of international relations. Artificial intelligence is the most effective means of collecting and analyzing information used to develop strategies for international relations and make important decisions in the field of foreign policy.

The “Resolution of the General Assembly” of December 22, 2023, notes the “significant increase in the number of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General and international treaties submitted for registration in recent years,” which “leads to an increase in the workload of the Treaty Section” [28]. However, the Department for General Assembly officially reports that the use of artificial intelligence is already helping to resolve this issue: “Through an innovative use of artificial intelligence and natural language processing technologies, the Department has developed, under its gText project, an application that automatically converts General Assembly resolutions into XML format, using the Akoma Ntoso for the United Nations (AKN4UN) schema” [33]. The application of AI allows for the collection and processing of a large corpus of texts of international treaties, establishing thematic and logical links between documents, and generating resolutions of the UN General Assembly based on the data obtained. The department also proposed “regard invites Member States to focus their comments during the debate at the eightieth session of the General Assembly on the subtopic ‘The role of technology in shaping treaty-making practice’, and requests the Secretary-General to invite Governments and international organizations to submit information on their practice in this regard, and to provide, at its eightieth session, a report with information on practice related to the subtopic taking into account these submissions” [33].

Additionally, everyday diplomatic correspondence and queries can be handled by chatbots and virtual assistants, freeing up human diplomats to focus on intricate and strategic duties. Diplomats and government officials utilize AI tools to observe social media for public sentiment and responses to diplomatic initiatives, thereby shaping policy choices and public diplomacy endeavors [22]. Thus, AI can significantly ease the work of diplomatic employees by performing a significant portion of routine work.

Diplomats and government officials can use artificial intelligence (AI) tools to monitor social media for public sentiment and reaction to diplomatic initiatives, thereby shaping policy choices and public diplomacy efforts [22].

4.2 Artificial Intelligence as a Tool to Influence the Foreign Policy Situation

Artificial intelligence provides a huge opportunity for modeling and disseminating information content that is beneficial to one or another actor in international relations. It helps politicians and diplomats to assess the possible consequences of their actions and choose the most effective behavioral options.

In an innovative move to expand diplomatic outreach, Israeli Ambassador David Saranga, head of the digital diplomacy division at the Foreign Ministry, employed a generative AI video program to create a digital avatar resembling himself [15]. This avatar developed by Tel Aviv-based D-ID, can speak eight languages, including

Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, Persian, Greek, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, and Turkish. Despite not being fluent in these languages himself, Saranga used this AI-powered avatar to deliver messages in the native languages of audiences worldwide via Twitter.

This endeavor marks a significant milestone in Israel's integration of AI into its diplomatic practices. AI holds immense potential to enhance communication, foster cultural understanding, and promote international cooperation. By enabling diplomats to transcend language barriers and connect with diverse audiences, AI can facilitate dialogue and strengthen diplomatic ties.

This Israeli initiative demonstrates the transformative power of AI in modern diplomacy. As AI technology continues to evolve, we can expect to witness even more innovative applications of AI in this field, further enhancing global communication and cooperation.

With increasing volumes of processed information and increasing level of intellectual technical systems and non-triviality of their decisions (e.g., neural networks), the need for intellectualization of human-machine interface will increase. Otherwise, a person will simply lose the ability to interpret the logic of decision-making by intelligent technical systems and the integrity of information coming from big data processing systems [19].

AI can be used to automate the collection and analysis of news and other information from the media. This can help politicians and diplomats get information about the current situation in the world faster and more accurately.

AI empowers diplomats and policymakers by analyzing massive datasets from social media, news, and government reports. This allows them to glean insights into global trends, public opinion, and potential conflicts. Predictive analytics powered by AI can be a game-changer, enabling the early identification of emerging issues and crises. Additionally, governments and think tanks leverage AI and machine learning to analyze vast amounts of data and predict trends in international relations and conflicts. This valuable information informs diplomatic strategies and decision-making [22].

AI-powered tools are emerging as valuable assets in conflict resolution and negotiation. Natural language processing (NLP) algorithms can analyze diplomatic communications, identifying potential areas of compromise or solutions. This technology goes beyond analysis. For instance, UNICEF leverages AI-powered chatbots to connect with young people impacted by conflict and crisis. These chatbots gather data, gain insights into their needs, and offer timely responses to mediate conflict and provide crucial support [4].

AI data collection capabilities can further help diplomats to “analyze how foreign media portray” their countries' national interests and actions, and then “fine tune” local information and outreach efforts to improve influence capabilities. AI-enabled analysis of social media platform engagement and commentary can also be used to assess the performance of public diplomacy-produced content [34].

As early as the mid-2010s, social media monitoring models have been developed, for example, to predict civil unrest.

According to the team of American authors in their work *Forecasting Significant Societal Events Using the Embers Streaming Predictive Analytics System* [11]—numerous instances of civil unrest are meticulously planned and organized by opinion leaders and community figures who strive to garner support for their cause. The planned protest model endeavors to identify such instances of civil unrest emerging from both traditional media outlets (e.g., news articles, mailing lists, blogs) and social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook). The model sifts through incoming data streams by matching against a custom multilingual lexicon of expressions, such as “preparación huelga” (strike preparation), “llamó a acudir a dicha movilización” (called to join the mobilization), or “plan to strike,” which are indicative of a planned unrest event.

Messages matching the vocabulary are further screened for future time or date within the same sentence as the matching phrase. The event type and anticipated crowd size are then predicted using a multinomial naive Bayes classifier. Location information is determined by employing enrichment geocoders. The phrase dictionary is a critical component of the planned protest model and was populated semi-automatically by combining expert knowledge with a straightforward bootstrapping technique. Thus, artificial intelligence allows politicians and diplomats to monitor the political situation in their own country and other (friendly and possibly unfriendly) countries.

AI can be used to gather information not only on social networks. According to Chinese state media, the South China Morning Post (SCMP), Chinese researchers have announced that they have allowed artificial intelligence (AI) to gain control of a satellite in near-Earth orbit... The experiment results have been published in the *Geomatics and Information Science* journal of Wuhan University.

The team claims that while artificial intelligence technology is increasingly being used in space missions, such as for image recognition, mapping out flight paths, and collision avoidance, it has not been given control over a satellite, resulting in a waste of time and resources.

SCMP states that China has more than 260 remote-sensing satellites in orbit, but they frequently operate “idly” in space, gathering low-value, time-sensitive data without any particular objective. The satellites have a short lifespan and are expensive. According to the researchers, it is crucial to make the most of their usefulness with new orbital applications.

The team proposed that if it discovered anomalous objects or activities, an AI-controlled satellite might warn certain users such as the military, the national security administration, and other pertinent institutions.

However, for AI to be effective, it must have a thorough awareness of the globe; as a result, it must learn not just how to recognize man-made and natural objects, but also how to understand the intricate and constantly changing connections between them and the many human communities.

“The AI decision-making process was extremely complex. The machine needs to consider many factors—such as real-time cloud conditions, camera angles, target value and the limits of a satellite’s mobility—when planning a day’s work,” explains the SCMP [21].

Thus, AI can help politicians to better understand the current situation in the world, predict the future, and assess the possible consequences of their actions.

Moreover, systems are already being developed that not only collect, analyze information, and predict the occurrence of events relevant to political activity and international relations, but also systems that offer policy options.

Meta AI has developed a breakthrough AI system, CICERO, capable of performing at the level of human players in the complex strategy game Diplomacy. This achievement demonstrates AI's potential to excel in strategic scenarios. CICERO's success in Diplomacy suggests that similar AI platforms could be developed to assist diplomats in crafting strategies and navigating complex negotiations, potentially revolutionizing the art of diplomacy [32]. AI platforms inspired by CICERO could assist diplomats in crafting effective strategies, navigating complex negotiations, and making informed decisions to achieve their objectives.

As AI continues to evolve, its applications are expanding into new and unexpected areas. One such area is the prediction of world events. Abishur Prakash says [25] that China and the United States have both developed AI systems that can analyze vast amounts of data to predict political unrest, economic trends, and other global developments.

China's AI system dubbed the "Geopolitical Environment Simulation and Prediction Platform," is designed to provide Chinese diplomats with strategic insights into the global political landscape. The system analyzes data from various sources, including news articles, social media posts, and government documents, to identify patterns and trends that could affect China's interests.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also made significant strides in developing predictive AI capabilities. The agency has reportedly been able to predict social unrest and societal instability three to five days in advance in some cases. This ability to anticipate potential crises could give the USA a significant advantage in its foreign policy efforts.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming the landscape of diplomatic cybersecurity. Its ability to swiftly detect and counter cyber threats protects sensitive diplomatic information and communication channels. Beyond defense, AI can also help pinpoint the culprits behind cyberattacks with potential diplomatic ramifications. A case in point: AI played a critical role in attributing the infamous 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack to North Korea, paving the way for diplomatic responses [2, 22].

The researchers emphasize that as predictive analytics become increasingly sophisticated, governments that fail to embrace them will face significant disadvantages. Unpredictability may be the only remaining advantage for those who choose to remain disengaged from these developments. Artificial intelligence thus enables politicians and diplomats to process voluminous data in the shortest possible time and offers options for possible solutions to crisis situations.

4.3 Artificial Intelligence as a Mechanism for Possible Redistribution of Power in the International System

In the near future, AI technologies will not only have direct applications in diplomacy and international relations but will also lead to redistribution of power in international relations.

It is possible that artificial intelligence (AI) could exacerbate the existing digital divide between countries by 2030. Countries that are already leading in AI adoption (primarily developed nations) may widen their gap over developing countries. Some researchers [6] predict that leading AI nations could potentially reap an additional 20–25% of net economic benefits compared to today, while developing countries may only see a gain of 5–15%.

Michael Frank (senior fellow, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington, D.C., U.S.) declares [14] that in the aftermath of World War II, the United States' economic dominance enabled it to leverage trade agreements to influence the foreign policies of other nations. Countries eager to access the US market were compelled to align with US security interests, which often involved supporting the US's anti-communist agenda and engaging in global competition with the Soviet Union.

The researcher thinks that in the twentieth century, economic growth was driven by trade liberalization. However, in the twenty-first century, artificial intelligence (AI) is expected to be the primary catalyst for prosperity in developed economies. The US cannot rely solely on trade deals to attract allies and maintain its global leadership. Instead, its foreign policy should focus on promoting the development and diffusion of AI technologies, a shift that will be crucial for advancing its interests.

China also does not intend to stay on the sidelines. According to the plan for developing next-generation artificial intelligence in China, which sets targets until 2030: "...by 2025 the AI industry will enter into the global high-end value chain. This new-generation AI will be widely used in intelligent manufacturing, intelligent medicine, intelligent city, intelligent agriculture, national defense construction, and other fields, while the scale of AI's core industry will be more than 400 billion RMB, and the scale of related industries will exceed 5 trillion RMB... By 2025 China will have seen the initial establishment of AI laws and regulations, ethical norms and policy systems, and the formation of AI security assessment and control capabilities. Third, by 2030, China's AI theories, technologies, and applications should achieve world-leading levels, making China the world's primary AI innovation center, achieving visible results in intelligent economy and intelligent society applications, and laying an important foundation for becoming a leading innovation-style nation and an economic power..." [8].

AI is transforming global power dynamics. Governments are competing to gain an AI advantage, as AI has the potential to advance national economic and security interests. China's and US national AI strategy exemplifies this commitment.

Thus, AI technologies will inevitably be included in the set of instruments of political influence in the sphere of international relations. Countries that develop AI will gain a competitive advantage in such areas as economy, security and military power. AI will influence the redistribution of power in the international system.

4.4 Artificial Intelligence as a Technology Entailing New Challenges and Threats to the System of International Relations

AI can be used to spread disinformation and propaganda, as well as to conduct cyberattacks. The development of AI is leading to the emergence of new types of weapons.

The rapid development of AI has raised concerns about its potential use in military applications. AI-powered weapons could be more effective and destructive than existing ones, leading to a new arms race. ChatGPT, an AI language model, has the capability to self-learn programming skills, including NLP, and could be used to create computer viruses. Scientists from the Laboratory of Personality Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences have highlighted the potential for AI to be used in cyberattacks, drone warfare, and the development of new chemical weapons. The ability of AI to rapidly generate new harmful substances is particularly worrying [16].

Stephen Marsh—writer, essayist, and cultural observer, describing humanity’s fears of AI writes: “Engineers and scientists fear artificial intelligence in a way they have not feared any technology since the atomic bomb. Stephen Hawking has declared that “AI could be the worst event in the history of civilization.” Elon Musk, not exactly a technophobe, calls AI “our greatest existential threat.” Apart from AI specialists, people tend to be afraid of artificial intelligence because they’ve seen it at the movies, and it’s mostly artificial general intelligence they fear, machine sentience. It’s Skynet from Terminator [20]. Kai-Fu Lee, a renowned tech expert and former Google China president, has compared autonomous weapons to the transformative power of gunpowder and nuclear arms. He believes that the evolution from land mines to guided missiles represents a mere prelude to the true potential of AI-powered autonomy, where machines can make autonomous decisions regarding targeting and engagement, ultimately eliminating human involvement in the killing process [17]. Thus, experts express a serious fear that artificial intelligence will be able to cause powerful harm already without human participation. However, nowadays, artificial intelligence has tremendous capabilities in the military sphere. As an example of this emerging technology, Lee cites the Israeli Harpy drone, designed to autonomously navigate to a specific area, identify designated targets, and eliminate them with a high-explosive warhead.

The Australian Defense Department’s website [13] reports that Australia is developing three prototypes of ultra-large autonomous underwater vehicles. These

vehicles will provide the military with a persistent capability to conduct underwater interventions in high-risk environments, complementing existing ships and crewed submarines, as well as other future unmanned surface vessels.

An article published on the South China Morning Post website [7] states that Chinese scientists (Sun Yifeng and his team from the PLA University of Information Engineering) are developing a military AI that will be able to interact with language models like ChatGPT to better understand and predict the behavior of human enemies. AI will be able to convert sensor data and reports from the front lines into human-readable formats and engage in a dialogue with language models to gain insight into enemy tactics and strategy. This research has the potential to improve human situational awareness and enhance decision-making on the battlefield. The article describes the experiment to simulate the 2011 invasion of US troops in Libya. During the experiment, the military AI provided information about the armament and deployment of both armies in the form of large language models. After several rounds of dialogue, the models successfully predicted the next move of the US military. At the same time, weapons based on AI technology can be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons.

As Kai-Fu Lee emphasizes, while nuclear weapons pose a significant threat to our existence, they have been somewhat contained due to the concept of deterrence. The threat of mutual destruction has deterred countries from initiating nuclear strikes, thereby reducing the likelihood of conventional warfare [17].

However, autonomous weapons pose a unique challenge. Unlike nuclear weapons, the deterrence theory does not effectively apply to them. A surprise attack by autonomous weapons could be difficult to trace, making it challenging to retaliate appropriately. As discussed previously, autonomous weapon attacks could quickly escalate, potentially leading to a nuclear conflict. Moreover, the first strike could potentially be launched by non-state actors, such as terrorists, further exacerbating the threat posed by these weapons.

Autonomous weapons already pose a significant danger, and they are becoming increasingly intelligent, agile, lethal, and accessible. This rapid advancement is likely to fuel an arms race, devoid of the natural deterrence mechanism of nuclear weapons. Autonomous weapons represent the most concerning application of AI, as they blatantly violate our ethical principles and pose a direct threat to humanity [30]. That is why there is an urgent need to unite the efforts of different states in addressing the issues of legal regulation of the development and application of artificial intelligence at the international level.

The potential for a digital divide, both within and between countries, has been a topic of concern at previous BRICS summits. Recognizing the importance of equitable access to information resources, the BRICS nations have called for the development of methods to address this issue: "In an attempt to leave no one behind, we recognize the digital divide within and across countries and therefore urge the international community to establish modalities and approaches to promote equitable and inclusive access of digital resources for all people, irrespective of where they live" [23]. However, the document focuses on equality of access to resources, not on the need for universal transparency in AI development and application, especially in

areas related to state strategic security, or on the importance of regulating these processes at the international level.

The New Delhi Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) specifically addresses the threats posed by the use of advanced digital technologies. The declaration emphasizes that the world is entering an era of unprecedented transformative change and rapid technological development, necessitating the enhancement of global institutions' effectiveness [24]. These developments, coupled with turbulence in global financial markets, a global decline in investment flows, supply chain instability, the impacts of global climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, "require new integrated approaches to promoting fairer and more effective international cooperation" [24].

Laws regulating the use of artificial intelligence are being developed in the UK [1], the USA [31], EU [26], China [36], and Russia [9, 10].

Thus, the "WHITE PAPER On Artificial Intelligence—A European approach to excellence and trust," developed by the European Union, affirms the principles of international cooperation, equality and the absence of any form of discrimination: "Commission is convinced that international cooperation on AI matters must be based on an approach that promotes the respect of fundamental rights, including human dignity, pluralism, inclusion, nondiscrimination and protection of privacy and personal data and it will strive to export its values across the world" [35].

However, other countries are promoting different strategies for developing artificial intelligence. Michelle Donelan, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, identified approaches to the legal regulation of the development and application of artificial intelligence in a policy paper, stated the following: "I believe that a common-sense, outcomes-oriented approach is the best way to get right to the heart of delivering on the priorities of people across the UK. Better public services, high quality jobs and opportunities to learn the skills that will power our future—these are the priorities that will drive our goal to become a science and technology superpower by 2030" [1].

It is likely that very soon we will have at least several models of legal regulation of the sphere of artificial intelligence, including generative intelligence. But already now it is necessary to immediately adopt political, diplomatic, and international legal measures aimed at countering the possible policy of some ambitious states "to militarise the global information space, to use information and communication technologies to interfere in the internal affairs of states and for military purposes, as well as to counter the restriction of access of other states to advanced information and communication technologies and the strengthening of their technological dependence" [18].

In addition, many are deeply concerned about the lack of regulations for cooperation between countries in the field of preventing threats to humanity from artificial intelligence, due to the already practically available possibility of artificial intelligence making lethal decisions without human intervention.

The study of artificial intelligence in the context of international relations thus requires addressing ethical, regulatory, social, and security concerns to ensure the responsible development and deployment of artificial technologies on a global

scale. International cooperation and the development of ethical principles and standards are necessary to navigate the complex landscape of artificial intelligence in international relations.

In 2021, 19 UNESCO Member States adopted the UNESCO Recommendations on the Ethical Considerations of Artificial Intelligence [27], а в 2023 ЮНЕСКО призвало правительства всех стран принять и внедрить эти рекомендации. Audrey Azoulay, UNESCO's Director-General, opines: "The world needs stronger ethical rules for artificial intelligence: this is the challenge of our time. UNESCO's Recommendation on the ethics of AI sets the appropriate normative framework. Our Member States all endorsed this Recommendation in November 2021. It is high time to implement the strategies and regulations at national level. We have to walk the talk and ensure we deliver on the Recommendation's objectives" [5].

It is clear that the formation of a sustainable and balanced international information security regime is only possible with the involvement of all states of the world community without exception. Such a regime should be based on legally binding norms of international law.

In March 2024, historically significant events took place in the field of legal regulation of AI. Firstly, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution on artificial intelligence [12].

The Resolution UN emphasizes that artificial intelligence can be used for good: can accelerate progress on critical challenges like poverty, hunger, and climate change, drives innovation and advancements across various fields and has the potential to promote peace and human rights. At the same time, Unequal access can widen the gap between developed and developing countries. Algorithmic bias can perpetuate discrimination and social injustices. Privacy concerns arise from improper data collection and handling practices. Potential for misuse by malicious actors for harmful purposes.

UN Resolution on Safe and Trustworthy AI aims to bridge the AI; divides and ensures equitable access for all; encourages using AI to address the SDGs; calls for collaboration among stakeholders for ethical AI development; supports developing countries in adopting AI responsibly; emphasizes safeguards, human rights, transparency, and responsible development; calls for international cooperation and continuous research; emphasizes private sector responsibility and competition in the AI market; and highlights the importance of UN collaboration and potential global agreements.

The Resolution noted that responsible development of AI is critical to harnessing its potential for a sustainable future that benefits all [29].

The second significant event is the adoption by the European Union of a set of rules aimed at promoting the responsible development and use of artificial intelligence.

The law prohibits the use of AI for biometric categorization based on sensitive characteristics (e.g., race, religion); untargeted scraping of facial recognition data; emotion recognition in workplaces and schools; social scoring systems; manipulation of human behavior or exploitation of vulnerabilities.

Biometric identification systems (RBI) are only allowed under strict conditions (limited time, specific location, judicial authorization) for scenarios like finding missing persons or preventing terrorism.

General-purpose AI (GPAI) systems and their training data must be transparent. Deepfakes (manipulated media) must be clearly labeled [3].

While these documents are largely framework and declarative in nature, they represent a huge breakthrough in the legal regulation of artificial intelligence.

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, AI is the highest achievement of human thought, the greatest technology that affects all spheres of human life, including politics and diplomacy. Firstly, artificial intelligence assists in processing mega-data on the political life of individual states and their associations, allows anticipating possible political events, facilitates generalization and evaluation of these events, offers options for solving crisis situations.

This gives significant advantages to those states that aim to develop artificial intelligence technologies, but it also leads to a technological gap between countries, to the potential threat of pressure of some—strong states in terms of politics, economy—on other countries, weaker ones. This is done through disinformation and propaganda, cyberattacks, new types of weapons and military influence. With confidence, we can state that the significant actors in the future multipolar world will be those states that are currently investing substantial resources in the development of artificial intelligence and its implementation in all areas, especially strategically important ones. The multiple benefits of artificial intelligence and the possible threats it entails demonstrate the need for the development of international legal norms to regulate the use of artificial intelligence.

In order to ensure the security of individual countries and states all together, it is probably necessary to create a specialized agency within the UN on the development, dissemination and use of artificial intelligence; to create a unified code of ethics for developers and users of artificial intelligence; to create a system of international treaties regulating the development and use of artificial intelligence in relation to other states and humanity as a whole.

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Part II
Ideologies of Regionalism and
Globalization in Historical Context.
Philosophy of Politics

Is Populism an Ideology? A Critique of the “Thin Ideology” Concept



Evgeny Drobotko and Elena Boldyreva

1 Introduction

The recent spread of populism in Western democracies has brought the populist phenomenon under the spotlight. However, the aspects of populism may be observed in various historical periods. For example, Gracchi brothers and their populist agrarian reforms in the Roman Republic [1] or Jean-Paul Marat who founded a newspaper “The friend of the people” (“L’Ami du peuple”) are the signals that populist metamorphosis took place even in the societies of the past [2]. These outbreaks of populism were not constant until the twentieth century and the activity of populists in the Americas. Before its bloom in the West populism was mostly evaluated as a political characteristic of non-democratic countries in Latin America. But in 2000s, the situation has changed dramatically. The success of populism became overt when Donald Trump won 2016 elections in the USA. Active usage of social networks (especially twitter), harsh language, an image of the man of the people and other populist methods helped Donald Trump to gain enough support, become a symbol of rebellion against establishment in the eyes of his supporters and therefore become a president.

The precedent of 2016 has shown that populism isn’t a marginal power anymore as populists have a real chance to be elected and try to overthrow the already established political system. Presidency of Donald Trump, achievements of Alternative for Germany as well as the recent victory of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom on the 2023 general elections in the Netherlands are an explicit sign that modern politics is changing. Some see in populism a chance to establish a decent alternative to a system that can’t adequately solve challenges that exist in contemporary world. A chance to implement the direct democracy principles in the existing political

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system. Although, it seems that the majority of commentators tend to describe populism as an exclusively negative effect of post-truth epoch. There are even accusations of populism being a threat for democracy. The prevailing image of modern populism is clearly visible in most mainstream media, in which populism is presented as negatively as possible.

Originally populism was mainly described as a positive trend, but, of course, there were exceptions (for instance, in his diaries, Theodore Roosevelt wrote that he wanted to put populists against the wall and shoot them as they were a threat for an existing political system) [3]. Despite the fact that there were various examples of populism throughout the history, American People's party became the first organized populist movement. Even contemporary authors recognize the progressive character of the People's party, which united not only the discontented segments of the population, but also the representatives of different races [4]. Originally, explicitly negative attitude toward populism was expressed by an American historian Richard Hofstadter. Richard Hofstadter and his followers accused populists of anti-semitism and being predecessors of McCarthyism era in the USA. Despite the fact that "many of Hofstadter's claims—that the Populists were antisemitic; that they provided the social basis for McCarthyism—turned out to be empirically unjustifiable" [ibid], many researchers and commentators continued to present populism in such a negative way. Even this case shows the peculiarity of populism and extremely controversial vision of this political phenomenon.

Such a controversial phenomenon as populism couldn't help but become a common object of various publications. Many papers are dedicated to populism: its history, methodology, social impact, etc. However, there are still discussions about the fruitfulness of this term as it nearly became a pejorative one mainly used by politicians and journalists to claim someone a populist in order to lower its credibility. Thereby it's necessary to narrow the borders of a term usage and to do so the fundamental features of populism should be highlighted.

2 The Analysis of Fundamental Features of Populism

Even though there exist various approaches to understanding populism, there are several common points that are shared by the majority of researchers and key elements of populism seem to be such point. Populism has a set of fundamental features that are viewed by many researchers as necessary components of populist movements. These features are more of a mental map that reflects the thoughts and fears of a common follower of populists and reveals how the mechanism of populism works.

1. In its core populism has a dualism that divides a society into two warring camps which have insurmountable contradictions. In the case of populism, these two camps are presented by common people and elites. Elites are viewed as a group of people in power whose interests and goals do not correspond to the will of

ordinary people. Elites are commonly accused of being alienated as they have strong ties with elites of other countries and transnational corporations. Therefore, anti-elitism is an essential element of populism as it's based upon the struggle with elites who are presented as the main source of all social and economic issues. As stated by Margaret Canovan, “all forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation and appeal to “the people” and all are in one sense or another anti-elitist” [5].

2. Protest attitude is another feature of populism as while the interests of populist followers are not met, they try to change the status Quo and overthrow the establishment which is a strong manifestation of their anti-elitism. Though, populists rarely resort to anti-democratic measures as this may negatively affect the public image and, if they come to power, call into question their own legitimacy. Populists, unlike extremists and radicals, don't support violent methods of political struggle, even despite their protest attitude.
3. One of the strongest boosters of populist political support is the fear of loss. Fear of loss has a crucial meaning in the populist agenda. Fear of economic, political, and cultural loss is a commonplace in rhetoric of many populists. Average supporter of populists feels unprotected in their country. Economic and migrant crises make some groups of citizens feel fear and anxiety. Populists successfully accumulate these fears and make them a strong rhetorical weapon in their arms.
4. Simplification is also widely used by populists in order to explain social issues and give simple answers that may help them attract more supporters. It's promised that these answers will solve issues promptly and satisfy desperate people. Simple answers to complex questions attract voters and make them believe that the majority of country's problems may be easily solved by the change of government.
5. Anti-pluralism also holds an important place in populism. While speaking on behalf of all the people populists actually only refer to their supporters. “Dividing a country's population into the people and the others suggests that some parts of the population are not really part of the people and don't deserve to share in self-government” [6]. Others, who don't adore populists, are excluded from the list of “real people” as their intentions don't match the desires of populists and their followers. It's important to note that anti-pluralism of populists isn't as radical as the one of extremists. Populists don't see their opponents as their existential enemies [7].
6. Considering the aforementioned features, it becomes clear that popular will is another cornerstone of populism. The Latin phrase “Vox populi, vox dei” fully describes the position of populists who advocate for the direct expression of people's will. Obviously, it's impossible to achieve this kind of public consensus and some social groups will be still oppressed. Direct democracy, which is adored by many populists, may be considered both the most honorable of their goals and the most questionable one.

This list of features may be emphasized as a basis of populism. These characteristics depict the major points of populism like dichotomy of people and elites,

appeal to those who don't feel safe, simplification of political and social processes, anti-status Quo, etc.

There also exist several other criteria, for instance, presence of a charismatic leader or an active usage of social networks. However, these features seem to be additional or even false as they are not as accepted as the features mentioned above. At first glance, it seems that populism is highly associated with the figure of a charismatic leader. Such populists as Huey Long, Juan Peron or Donald Trump are genuine examples of charismatic leaders who thoroughly constructed their image of strong and straightforward politicians. However, charismatic model of populism isn't the only one. "...the tenacious emphasis on charismatic leaders as key agents of populism obscures the fact that other forms of populist mobilization exist and have political impact" [8]. Parties like Podemos or Alternative for Germany don't rely on charismatic leadership but are still considered to be populist. Moreover, there are such mass populist structures as the American Tea Party movement or Occupy movements that were formed as a reaction to 2008's financial crisis [9]. Charismatic or personalist leadership isn't an essential component of populist parties or movements. The image of powerful leader isn't exclusively used by populists. The charismatic leaders in other parties are nearly as frequent phenomenon as among populists.

The rise of populism is often connected with the new technological era, development of communication tools and, as the consequence, post-truth. As for the usage of the social networks and their algorithms, it's obvious that it has become a useful tool in the hands not only of populist, but of every other politician and political power. Connection between populism and post-truth is the statement that should be examined here. Populism is occasionally seen as a phenomenon interconnected with post-truth [10]. The post-truth epoch is seen as a disadvantage of social networks and new ways of the internet communication. Fake news and manipulations of the information are the indicators of contemporary times. In this case anti-populist politicians and journalists try to present their struggle with populism in terms of truth and objectivity versus emptions and ignorance. Thus, political conflict is transformed into a struggle between two radically different worldviews. Those who try to preserve the truth and rationality and those who are aided by fake news and distorted reality. The conflict presented in this style is seen as a battle for survival for common sense and, of course, principles of democracy. But Antonis Galanopoulos and Yannis Stavrakakis fairly notice in that "What then if, to put it provocatively, every truth is a post-truth, at least in the political sphere which is at stake in this chapter and where a war of interpretations is inescapable?" [11]. Claiming something truth or false isn't in the content of political sphere. Various traditions of political thought represent similar phenomena differently and it's senseless to approve one or another as the true one. Moreover, there's no such political institution that can objectively decide what is truth and what is post-truth. Post-truth isn't a necessary component of populism. In this way this term is only used to slander populists, hence it isn't theoretically and empirically fruitful to refer to populism as a reflection of post-truth.

The analysis of components of populism shows that there are still exist contradictions in understanding the specificity of populism. Some authors present a more radical view on populism and condemn it for generating fake news and backing post-truth trend or using a figure of charismatic and authoritative leaders to gain as much support of the masses as it's possible. Although, in this chapter has been made an attempt to identify the average view on the features of populism based on the opinion of various authors. Emphasis of populism key features makes it possible to define populism and non-populism boundaries and gives an opportunity to classify populism and decipher it.

3 Populism as a “Thin Ideology”

In order to explain the popularity of populism many authors have tried to classify it and explain its very nature. There exists a host of populism definitions that evaluate it as mobilizational strategy, discourse, or political style. All of these approaches are aimed to a certain field of research, such as the possibility of populists to mobilize voters or rhetorical devices typical for populists. However, one of the most popular approaches to the analyzation of populism is based upon the ideational approach. A certain number of researchers identify populism as a “thin-centered ideology” or simply as a “thin ideology.” The usage of this term is an attempt to show the mutable nature of populism and the fact that it doesn't have a solid ideological foundation. There's why it's opposed to “full” or “thick-centered ideology.” “Full ideologies” are classic ones like liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Underneath these ideologies are elaborate worldviews which have a set of certain answers to fundamental questions of political, social, cultural, and economic spheres of human life. On the other hand, populism as a “thin ideology” doesn't have these fundamental features. So, that's why populists try to use the ideological agenda of classical left or right parties in order to “harden” their own positions. Therefore, it's stated that “...by itself populism can offer neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political questions that modern societies generate” [12].

Because of its transitional character populism absorbs left or right ideologies, refers to a set of ideas within them or even assimilates into other ideologies. This also explains that after gaining political power, populists can reduce their radicalism and transform into a moderate party. Anti-elitism, protest attitude and Manichean dualism take a significant place in ideational approach. As it goes in definition given by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, who are among the most notable adherents of ideational approach, populism is “...a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” [ibid].

Contrary to programmatic politics, populism is presented as a moralistic one [13]. Moral aspect of populism is evaluated as important in ideational approach. It's claimed that populists tend to use moral arguments in their rhetoric. Moralization is

used by populists to explain the righteousness of “pure people” and contrast them to spoiled and corrupt elites. As it was cited by Cas Mudde: “Populism is based on morals and that creates a whole different interaction, because if you are ‘pure’ and the other person is ‘corrupt’, compromise leads to corruption of the pure” [14]. Therefore, elites aren’t seen as representatives of the legitimate government anymore.

Exclusionism is also presented as a feature of modern populists, as they see the society as a homogenous structure and disfavor various minorities. Exclusionism is expressed in welfare chauvinism or anti-immigrant attitude. “When populists define ‘the people’, in their rhetoric and symbols without referring to (characteristics and values of) certain groups, the latter are symbolically excluded (for example, Roma in Eastern Europe)” [15]. However, populism may be not only exclusionary, but also inclusionary. The Latin American version of populism is considered to be more inclusionary than the European one, where it’s based on exclusionary principles. However, the traces of exclusionary populism may also be seen among modern Latin American populists [ibid].

Supporters of this approach claim that defining populism as a “thin ideology” is a helpful tool in a better understanding of this concept in question. Among the one of the strongest advantages of this term is the fact that “...this concept permits us to argue that instead of elaborating a generic theory of populism, the identification of subtypes of populism should be the starting point of the analysis” [ibid]. Subsequently, this concept is opening a broad field for a scientific dialogue and gives an opportunity to reach a consensus.

While speaking of ideational approach researchers tend to state that “This rendition of populism is now the most popular and widely used among comparativists, gaining increased visibility among media pundits, journalists and think tanks” [16]. However, the argument around the usefulness of populism as a term is still there and the prevalence of ideational approach doesn’t mean that the concept of “thin-centered ideologies” and “full ideologies” is comprehensive. On the contrary, this approach raises some additional questions and creates new obstacles on the way of understanding populism as a modern political phenomenon.

4 Critique of Ideational Approach

By referring to populism as a “thin ideology,” researchers actually follow the tradition of studying ideology set by Michael Freeden who coined this term in his analysis of ideologies. Michael Freeden defined “thin ideology” as “one that, like mainstream ones, has an identifiable morphology but, unlike mainstream ones, a restricted one” [17] and originally used this term to refer to such ideas as nationalism or feminism. The issue of this concept is that too many things may be seen as a “thin ideology.” “In fact, for Freeden, some ‘thin ideologies’ may simply be social movements such as the ideologies of the ‘environmental’ and ‘gender’ movements” [18].

The “thin” character of some ideology may only indicate that its tradition isn’t as old and well developed as the “thick” one. The “thick” state of ideology isn’t a constant condition. Ideologies like fascism or Marxist socialism that are claimed to be “thick” hasn’t always been so. Moreover, fascism or Stalinism was also claimed to be initially populist in some extent [19]. However, as for the populism it’s fundamentally arguable whether it’s ideology or not. Populism doesn’t have any comprehensive doctrine or tradition. As it was already mentioned, populism resembles more of a mental map, a logic of organizing ideas and concepts. They may even contradict each other, what may be seen in rhetoric of Donald Trump while he mixes nationalism with the measures of economic protectionism. “This means that a given actor can be more or less populist, at different points in time and in different contexts” [20]. Elements of populism may be used by different politicians and there’s why there are lots of argues about who is a populist politician and who isn’t.

Left-wing researchers, like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe present the idea of the “populist moment” which describes a modern political situation as a crisis of liberal democracy hegemony. Populism is viewed as a logic of struggle and direct democracy is presented as a cure for a system that is going through a crisis [21]. Notion that populism is a feature of current political situation may even be seen in works of José Ortega y Gasset, who reflected the fears of “revolt of the masses,” and in contrast disfavored the state of affairs when masses began to obtain a significant role in the political life of the twentieth century [22]. The way left-wing and right-wing authors comment on the similar processes of mobilizing broad masses to change the political state in different historical periods actually shows that the appeal to masses isn’t a peculiar feature of the contemporary populism. Speaking on behalf of people is a logic of political behavior at a time of crisis that reflects a desire of politicians to get the support of as many people as possible. This feature of populism may easily be seen throughout the history of various populist leaders and movements.

The history of populism shows that it emerges when established rules are collapsing and a large number of people don’t know how to adopt in a changing world. American People’s party, which was founded in 1892, united a wide range of those, who felt excluded and unprotected, including small farmers, sheep ranchers, laborers, and the people of color. All these groups of people felt that they are not correctly represented in a political and economic system of the USA. The emergence of large enterprises and private banks in the 1870s threatened the position of small households and made them dependent on these enterprises and government. Populists claimed to be the followers of the Jeffersonian democracy principles that are based on the recognition of the people as the main guarantor of democracy and political stability of the country [23]. As well as modern populists, representatives of the People’s party stuck to the anti-elitist positions. In their attempt to restore their social status, they tried to fight the monopolization of postal and railway sectors by promoting protectionist measures. They asserted that Republic and Democratic parties don’t represent the people’s will anymore because now they only serve the interests of plutocrats. Thus, the foundation of the People’s party may be estimated as a reaction to the threat of the destruction of the former social and economic order

which was based on prevalence of farmers and agrarians. That's why populists have seen themselves as the "real" people whose political decisions weren't dictated by their dependence on plutocrats unlike the representatives of other parties.

Another historical example of the rise of populism in Latin America also demonstrates the same pattern of adaptation of populist rhetoric by politicians. The three waves of populism in Latin America are characterized by economic and political representation crises. Initially, "processes of urbanization, industrialization, and a generalized crisis of paternal authority allowed populist leaders to emerge" [24]. The following waves of populism were also connected with the public dissatisfaction and the distrust in political and economic systems of Latin American countries. Initial dissatisfaction with the lack of political representation in oligarchic regimes later resulted in disappointment in the economic situation and even revolutionary sentiments in the future. In all these cases crises were the driving force of populism, allowing it to capture the minds of the population.

As for the recent emergence of populism in western democracies, several studies also point out that the financial crisis of 2008 and the immigration crisis of 2015 are the sources of citizens' negative attitude toward the government [25]. When politicians fail to calm the fears of citizens the "populist moment" appears. Vulnerable social groups lose their trust in governmental institutions and question the competence of the ruling powers. Therefore, dissatisfied people need some political movement to share their dissatisfaction with and populists are ready to provide it to them.

This short observation makes it obvious that populism constantly accompanies various crises. In this way populism may be seen as a profitable political strategy to achieve some electoral goals. Populist leader presents a particular way thinking, a unique psychology of humiliated and insulted (even though populist politician may don't believe in its own words). Populist are ready to satisfy the desire of the dissatisfied to find a quick solution and, as a result, indoctrinate them. Therefore, the fact of the presence of any ideological component in populism becomes controversial. In this case strategic or discursive approaches to the consideration of populism seem to be more prolific, although they as well have several drawbacks.

The proposal to identify the subtypes of populism also appears problematic. It erases the boundaries of populism what leads to the situation when it may be seen nearly everywhere. The disadvantage of this approach is that populism is being associated with extremely different concepts. There exist a widely acceptable division of populism on right-wing and left-wing ones. The meaning of these broad concepts is comprehensible, though populism may be considered as a complicated political concept which can't be fully described by the dichotomy of left and right [26]. As it was already mentioned, populists are not necessarily match the strict boundaries of left-wing or right-wing ideologies, therefore this right-left division may also be considered to be not necessary to the analysis of the behavior of populists.

As for the moral side of populism, it actually raises a question: whether moralism is the feature of populism only or it characterizes the political life as a whole? Morality and politics were always interconnected as moral arguments may still be found in speeches of various politician. "The paradox of anti-populist discourses is

that they often claim to oppose a “politics of division,” but they themselves resort to division (and construct a dangerous Other in the form of “populism”) in doing so” [27]. In this case, anti-populists fall into the same pitfall of moralism they accuse their opponents of. The attempt to present populists and their followers as the bunch of emotion-driven ignoramuses is seen as a manipulation to set people against populism. Moreover, such a negative approach to populists and their followers leads to a situation when their problems are estimated as unimportant or imaginary. While rhetorically opposing the division of society into two warring camps, anti-populists only make the situation worse. It’s doubtful that people who are accused of ignorance will turn away from populists and speak out against them. Therefore, the moral argument not only lacks the objectivity and one-sidedly presents the political situation but also seems to be harmful.

All the arguments considered in this chapter show that the ideational approach has various controversial points. The understanding of populism as a “thin ideology” is accompanied by a number of fundamental disadvantages. Historical examples of different populist movements and regimes demonstrate that ideology isn’t an important part of the agenda of populists. Crises and the public demand are the main sources of understanding the rise of populism, and populists simply reflect the desires of some population groups. Moreover, the understanding of populism mustn’t be built upon the prejudice presenting it as an anti-intellectual movement. Populism as every other political movement hasn’t appeared out of nowhere. The appearance of it is connected with the set of certain political processes and crises that need to be understood and corrected. The only way to correctly describe populism is to examine it in its entirety. Only relying on impartiality there may be found a consensus in understanding such a controversial political phenomenon as populism.

5 Conclusion

The critique presented in this paper isn’t meant to present the only possible point of view on the problem of populism. Ideational approach, as well as other approaches or understandings of populism, has its own advantages and disadvantages. This analysis is made in order to classify the weaknesses of considering populism as a “thin ideology.” While observing historical context it becomes overt that rise of populism relates to certain social and political discontent of citizens. Politicians use fears and anxiety of various social groups in order to gain certain electoral achievements. Therefore, the questions of ideology don’t have any significant role for populists. Representatives of ideational approach as well as many others have a lack of objectivity in their analysis of populism. The representation of populism as definitely negative phenomenon of contemporary political process makes the analysis of it prejudiced and hinders the understanding of populists’ behavior. For instance, accusations of Manichean dualism replace the political analysis with the moral one and take the discussion beyond politics as it appeals to moral duty of fighting

populism. The understanding of populism in this way opens the Pandora's box of calling everything a certain individual believes to be immoral or unfair a populism. Therefore, the term used in such a way loses all the pragmatic meaning and becomes nothing but a fighting word. All these issues demonstrate that the current popularity of populists must be considered in its connection with political and philosophical context of the late twentieth century as it may shed some light on various features of populism, like harsh rhetoric of populists, their inherent anti-establishment attitude or difficulties of ideological classification of populists. In some extent, every modern politician may be called a populist, as an age of mass democracy forces politicians to adopt methods of populists to attract voters.

However, strategic, discursive, or stylistic ways of understanding populism don't have enough reason to call themselves the most capacious either. Populism is a complex phenomenon that is undergoing its development right now. Populism in its current kind may become a constant feature of modern democracies and become a logic of politics. In spite of the impact of populism, its definition is still disputable and it's important to proceed with the dialogue between various approaches despite the fact, that in recent years the ideational approach has prevailed. The aim of this paper is to show that there exist some obstacles in the way of deciphering the phenomenon of populism. So, dialogue and mutual criticism may be the keys to finding the obvious definition that will satisfy the representatives of various approaches. By combining the strengths of different definitions and getting rid of their weak spots may be achieved a true consensus.

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The Ideas of Resurrections in Ancient Polytheism, Early Christian Theology and Cambridge Platonism



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1 Introduction

The ideas of immortality, metempsychosis, resurrection and transmigration of souls were central to Greek philosophy, starting from Pythagoras and his school, and became the main subject of Plato's philosophy and later Platonism. Neither skeptics (Adv. Phys. IX 70–91), nor Epicurus (Diog. Laert. X 65–68) ignored these ideas. Their seeming detachment from the hustle and bustle of real life is deceptive. The following chapter focuses on how these ideas are infused with different meanings in different historical periods, sometimes taking on a political one [9].

This was the case with the accusations formulated against Origen in the materials of the Ecumenical Councils (AC, T. III. col. 280d [1]), this was also the case during the English Interregnum when a group of thinkers called the Cambridge Platonists [10] as well as the Cambridge Origenists [11, pp. 43–69] claimed the ancient ideas of reincarnation and resurrection, including their specific understanding by Origen. Moreover, we assume that the texts of Origen, the Origenistic, and anti-origenistic traditions, represented a single information field for the English theologians of the XVII century when it came to references to Origen's heterodoxies, in particular, to the idea of souls residing in ethereal and spherical bodies.

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2 Before Christianity

In the texts of *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* (VIII century BC), there is no indication of such precedents: the souls of dead soldiers fall into the power of the demons of death Erinyes-Keres (Il. XVII.535; Od. V.387; XII.157; XIV.207) and their further fate is unknown. Moreover, the funeral of Patroclus in the pyre with human and animal sacrifices may indicate the idea of a soul flying away with smoke (Il. XXIII.163–256). However, in the famous “Legend of the Ages” Hesiod (VII century BC) describes several types of post-mortem metamorphosis: the first generation of people loved by the gods, “dies as if swallowed by sleep” (θυῆσκον δ’ ὄσθ’ ὑπῳ δεδημένοι, *Op.*, 116), “turning into good terrestrial demons” (τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν ἐσθλοί) and “protect people on earth” (φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, *Op.*, 122–123), the second generation is “hidden under the ground” (κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε (*Op. cit.*, 140) and “they are called underground blessed mortals” (τοὶ μὲν ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοὶ καλέονται, *Op.*, 141), the third generation “killed by their own hands” (χείρεσσιν ὑπὸ σφετέρῃσι δαμέντες, *Op.*, 152), “was possessed by the black death” (θάνατος εἶλε μέλας, *Op.*, 154–155) and they “walked into facinorous house of chilling Hades” (βῆσαν ἐς εὐρύεντα δόμον κρυεροῦ Ἄϊδαο, *Op.*, 153), the fourth “generation of divine heroes” (ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, *Op.*, 159), stricken by the wars in Thebes and Troy (*Op.*, 162–165), settled by Zeus “near the ocean depths on the Islands of the blessed” (μακάρων ἔχοντες ἐν νήσοισι παρ’ Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδινην), where they enjoy the good things of life (*Op. cit.*, 171). The famous *Bibliotheca* of Pseudo-Apollodorus (180–120 BC) mentions several examples of resurrection, i.e., Hercules, who after death in the fire becomes immortal and receives the status of god (II.7.7,8), and Asclepius, who resurrects people, and for this was killed by Zeus (III.10.3–4).

For the Orphics (followers included in the circle of the Greek God Dionysus cult of the Thracian hero Orpheus, having people’s part, but better known in the elite philosophical and poetic form), which, according to current opinion, introduced the idea of reincarnation in the religious life of Greece [13]; human existence is a tragic and disastrous experience that is released following the rules of “lifestyles of the Orphic and Pythagorean” (βίος καὶ ὀρφικὸς πυθαγόρειος). The body is the grave of the immortal soul until it pays its debt for unfair actions in the past. (*Plato Crat.*, 400 p.).

This theology was borrowed and developed by the philosophy of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (based on Plato’s dialogues “Phaedo” and “Phaedrus”), rising to the cosmological and ontological level of world perception, and today it is well studied.

During Late Antiquity, the idea of wandering souls and their movement into new bodies was connected with mystery cults as evidenced by Plutarch of Chaeronea in the treatises “On the delays of divine vengeance” (“De sera numinis vindicta”) and “Isis and Osiris” (“De Iside et Osiride”), as well as Apuleius of Madaura: the transformation of the hero of the “The Golden Ass” into a donkey before initiation into the healing reincarnation cult of Isis, comically plays on the idea of suffering reincarnation, and episodes of magic and witchcraft with the incantation of souls and

the conversion of people “into stone, into cattle, into any beast” (Apul. Met. II.5), the use of ointments for metamorphosis (III.21), with the extraction of parts of the dead (II.19,24), resurrection (II.28), the return of the soul to the body (III.18), the evocation of ghosts (VIII.8)—demonstrate the inherent nature of this imaginative part of ancient religiosity [4, 8].

Philostratus, a writer of the third century, in *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, a fictional Pythagorean philosopher of the first century, among the events of the character’s biography mentions transmigration of souls (Philostr. Vita Ap. III.22) in human bodies, and resettlement into animal bodies (the story of the vegetarian lion, V.41), and the miracle of resurrection (IV.45), and also the miracle of the apotheosis of Apollonius himself (VIII.31), presenting the reader with the borderline figure of a cultural hero-miracle worker. Moreover, the entire literary work was the result of a “political” order by Empress Julia Domna and aimed at creating an image of a character, being an alternative to the founder of Christianity and numerous Gnostic religious movements.

3 In the Era of Early Christianity

We agree with the point of view of B. Decharneux and I. Viltanioti that at the beginning of the Christian era, philosophical ideas about the immortality of the soul, about the conditions of its preservation, its posthumous vicissitudes, were an integral part of views intended not only for the intellectual elite but also for a certain number of religious groups initiated into popular “mystery cults”; and it is because of the confused perception of eschatological and soteriological teachings in some Gnostic circles that nascent Christianity was often in fusion with these spiritual movements [7, pp. 47–65]. At the same time, the original Christianity relied in its doctrines of eschatology and soteriology on another textual basis, which combined the Old Testament and Inter-Testament texts. These speculations about salvation and a future life formed the basis of a newly introduced hope, proclaimed using the idea of resurrection, which provided a new answer to the problem of human tragedy in order to survive beyond the barrier of death and continue personal existence through the resurrection of the body, understood in a multiple sense, and was able to seduce polytheists.

Paul’s sermon (1 Cor.) and the subsequent development of the idea of resurrection by Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen into a cosmic vision of this form of salvation (a just man will be assimilated into the world of angels, into the world of sparkling stars of the firmament) open up a new perspective to the idea of immortality. For Paul as B. Decharneux rightly notes, the hope he placed on the person of the crucified Jesus contained the cosmological idea that through a man, Adam, humanity became mortal and that through another man, Jesus, it would be freed from death. This sermon was supposed to touch the audience of Athenian philosophers who Paul met in Athens.

The philosophers did not accept and did not appreciate Paul in Athens. These were the Epicureans and the Stoics (Acts. 17:18 or 17:32). After all, neither of them were supporters of the ideas of immortality or transmigration of souls. And the question is: were they the right philosophers that Paul spoke to? However, the point is also that we practically do not know the Athenian Platonists of this time, except for Ammonius of Athens (ca. 20–ca. 80) [16, pp. 201–203], which was mentioned in the writings of a later representative of the school, his disciple Plutarch (ca. 45–ca. 127), and he was not present at Paul’s sermon.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the next century, the stoic apologist Athenagoras of Athens (133–190), author of the treatise “On the Resurrection of the Dead”, considers the issue from the point of view of Stoic physics, believing that resurrection is a matter of knowledge of the technology of this process. After all, God, who in the original creation created human bodies from the elements, must know the nature of the resurrected bodies—whether whole members or parts of them. He knows where each particle goes after the destruction of the bodies and which of the elements received each particle that was destroyed and united with the kindred (Ath. De res., 2 [2]). Therefore, bodies are easily restored when they become the food of fish or animals, and even the facts of eating children “when some parents, due to hunger or rabies, decided to devour them” (Ath. De Res., 3–4 [2]), do not contradict this process.

It should be noted that the historical and philosophical context of Athenagoras’ arguments is practically invulnerable in the part aligning with the Platonic tradition of the temporary presence of the soul in the body, or in his stoic arguments about the return of the elements of physicality to their native elements. However, it has obvious gaps (from the point of view of universal ethics) in the “homeometric” argument through the principle of similarity—the possibility of assimilation of food by the body, which, obviously, does not contradict cannibalism at all, and rather the opposite. As well as the historical, cultural and mythological background of late antiquity is consistent in this case: it was fairly simple to prove the facts of mixing human bodies with animals in the era of Athenagoras; the examples of centaurs, sirens, lapiths, satyrs were enough.

4 Origen and Plotinus

Origen’s doctrine of universal “apocatastasis” (ἀποκατάστασις) represents a vivid example of the idea of resurrection. However, although Origen is considered the main heterodox of this doctrine in Christianity, according to the fair remark of colleagues [15, pp. 615–616], in fact, it was Clement of Alexandria (between 150 and 217), the logical predecessor of Origen, who first adapted this stoic doctrine, providing the basis for the development of the doctrine by his famous successor.

According to Origen, God, by a single providential act was like an architect creating by measure and number a certain number of spiritual beings of different dignity (De Princip. II. 9. 1), some of which are due to arbitrary free movements

(De Princip. I. 6. 2) fall into union with matter (De Princip. II. 9, 2), converting it into living organisms; a part remains “superhuman clothed in heavenly shining bodies” (“supercoelestia, corporibus coelestioribus ac splendentioribus induta”, De Princip. II. 9. 3). The content of all these entities is the “mind”, which represents a part of the “mind of the divine”, but at the same time is endowed, because of its smallness, with deviations and aspirations of the will (“omnem animam esse rationabilem liberi arbitrii et voluntatis”, De Princip. Praef. 5). However, since the goal of the entire created cosmos initially consists in the providential fullness of Divine speculation, the fall of spiritual beings causes some actions on the part of God (“the judgment of providence”, “iudicium Dei providentiae”, De Princip. I. 6. 2), leading to the restoration of all in perfect unity with the original state (De Princip. I. 6, 3). Such is the universal restoration at the end of time, which will be carried out not in earthly bodies, but in the “aethereus” (De Princip. I. 6. 4; II. 3. 7) and “spiritual bodies” (“corpus spiritale”), the form of which cannot be determined (De Princip. II. 10. 1–3), but if we follow the anathematizations against Origen—“spherical” (σφαιροειδής, AC, III, col. 280d [1]). Origen’s hypothesis of apocatastasis was criticized by opponents in the so-called “Origenist controversy” dated 400–beginning of 600, because the Orthodox line insisted on resurrection in physical bodies.

However, Origen does not deny the possibility of everyday resurrections available to the miracle-working of Jesus. A detailed interpretation of Origen on the resurrection of Lazarus from book XXVIII “Commentary on John” is a consideration of this “method” of resurrection. This reflection is based on the idea of the structure of the soul. The key word here is “δύναμις”, which in the Aristotelian sense means “potential”, or opportunity, and in the theological meaning of the beginning of the third century, which has the closest origin in the teachings of Philo, depending on the context, can be translated as “powers” and as “self-sustaining ability”, which indicates a sympathetic genetic connection between the individual soul and the divine source of its origin [3]. Origen proceeds from the fact that “the soul separated from the body” (ψυχή κεχωρισμένη, Comm. in In. XXVIII.44) in no way is “located near a dead body” (παρῆν τῷ σώματι, Comm. in In. XXVIII.44), and is located in the “habitats of souls” (Comm. in In. XXVIII.43), “in hell with the shadows and the dead in the land of the dead or among the tombs” (μετὰ τῶν ἐν ᾄδου σκιῶν, καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, καὶ ἐν χώρᾳ νεκρῶν, Comm. in In. XXVIII.55). The story, undoubtedly, like the famous plot from the Phaedo about the cleansing stay in Tartarus, goes back to the unified tradition of catachthonic purification.

So that the soul of Lazarus “went back and re-settled in the body” (ἐπανελθεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐνοικισθῆναι καὶ πάλιν τῷ σώματι, Comm. in In. XXVIII.45), Jesus calls this “divine power” (δύναμις θεία/θείαν δύναμιν, Comm. in In. XXVIII.49), which initiates in it “the powers of the soul, such as the ability to move, take action, and to contemplate” (τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς πορευτικὰς, καὶ δραστηρικὰς, καὶ θεωρητικὰς δυνάμεις, Com. in In. XXVIII.59). It is possible through specific actions: “to look up as befits” (καθηκόντως ἐπάρας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς, Comm. in In. XXVIII.33) for “reflection and contemplation” (διὰ τῆς ἐννοίας, καὶ τῆς θεωρίας), “to raise their hands in a gesture that elevates and exalts the soul” (τὰς χεῖρας ἐν ἐπαίρειν πράξεσιν ἐπαιρούσας, καὶ τὴν ψυχήν ὑψούσας, Comm. in In. XXVIII.37), “to say a prayer

of gratitude instead of pleading” (ἀναπέμπειν ἀντὶ εὐχῆς εὐχαριστίαν, Comm. in In. XXVIII.42)—which refers exclusively to Jesus due to his special status as a divine mediator, and then with a “loud” and exceptionally “strong voice” (φωνῆ μεγάλῃ) shout out “logos” (λόγος, Comm. in In. XXVIII, 50): “Come out!” (δεῦρο ἔξω, Comm. in In. XXVIII.54–56). In this situation, a strong cry represents a “dynamic”, “energetic” link between the “divine power” and the “forces of the soul”. In this procedure, Origen adds, Jesus may be assisted by angels (Comm. in In. XXVIII, 66).

We find very similar reflections in Origen’s contemporary, a pagan, Plotinus, an Alexandrian as well. “A person is not something easy, but one thing they have is the soul, another is a body” (ἀπλοῦν μὲν δὴ τι εἶη ἂν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σῶμα, Enn. IV.7.1). “Then what is the nature of the soul?” (τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει). It is not corporeal, but it is the “logos entering into matter” (λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ ὕλῃ), creating bodies and originating from the Soul (Enn. IV.7.2). “Matter is of no quality ... and what takes the place of eidos brings life.” “If we say that eidos is the substance, it will not be compiled and a soul won’t be a body, because they will not consist of matter” (γὰρ ὕλη ἄποιον ... τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τεταγμένοι ἐπιφέρουν τὴν ζωὴν, εἰ μὲν τὸ εἶδος φήσουσι οὐσίαν εἶναι τοῦτο, τὸ οὐ συναμφότερον, θάτερον τούτων δὲ ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ὃ οὐκέτ’ ἂν σῶμα οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης); it draws matter through “mental strength” (ψυχικὴ δύναμις, Enn. IV.7. 3). Even the Stoics say that “there must be some eidos of the soul” (ψυχῆς εἶναι δεῖ τι εἶδος), “the best part of the matter” (κρείττων μοῖρα ἐν τοῖς οὐσίαι) (Enn. IV.7.4) generating in the body “the power to grow in a certain time to a certain size” (τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν χρόνοις αὐξεῖν, καὶ μέχρι τοσοῦτου μέτρου). This “vegetative soul power, responsible for the growth and nutrition, is not detached from something bodily” (φυτικῷ τοῦ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ αὐξητικῷ θεραπευτικῷ μηδεὶς ἀπολειπομένου); “desirable strength of the soul” is close to it (ἡ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμητικῷ μοῖρα). “The other part of the soul... feeling”—“the power that’s in the eyes” (τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς δύναμιν), “the power of smell” (ὄσφρησιν δύναμιν), “the power of touch” (τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀπτικήν), “the driving force” (πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ζώου τοῦ τῆν δύναμιν) connects the body with the “thinking part” (τὸ λογιζόμενον), “the beginning of the actualization of possibility” (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐνεργείας) “the idea of mind and the ability to perceive coming from the logos” (εἶδος ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχῆς δυνάμενης ἣν παρὰ τὰς τοῦ λόγου ἀντιλήψεις ποιῆσθαι, Enn. IV.3.23).

However, the soul “has kept its identity due to its quality which is different from the number” (τῇ δὲ τῆς ποιότητι ἐτέρᾳ ποσότητος οὐσῆ ταυτὸν δύναται τὸ ἀποσφῆζειν, Enn. IV.7.5); it gives unity to perception, being the “ruling principle” (τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν, Enn. IV.7.6), it produces the mindset which is “grasping without a body” (τὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄνευ σώματος), or “separation from bodies of the intelligible objects, and therefore does not have a body itself” (ἄρα καὶ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος αὐτῆν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ χωρῖσαι. δεῖ ἄρα μηδὲ αὐτῆν σῶμα εἶναι, Enn. IV.7.8). In the body it is a property of the soul “to have unreasonable desire and impulses” ([ψυχὴν] ἐν σώματι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγους θυμοὺς προσλαβοῦσαν), but there are ones “alienated from the body [of the soul], as far as possible not to

have anything to do with it” ([ψυχὴν] ταῦτα καὶ ἀποτριψαμένην καθόσον οἶόν τε μὴ τῷ σώματι κοινωνοῦσαν, Enn. IV.7.10).

“But where will the soul be when it leaves the body?” “There are many places for everyone,” for “the divine law is inevitable and has judgment in it, and a certain punishment.” “A soul without a body, subject to the same bodily punishment; pure souls not drawn by anything corporeal to bodies will not be in the body, and ... will be where the essence of existence and deity: in the God where he would be with them, and they will be in him” (Ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος ποῦ ἐξελθοῦσα γενήσεται; πολλοῦ δὲ ὄντος καὶ ἐκάστου τόπου ... γὰρ ὁ νόμος θεῖος ὁμοῦ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ ἤδη κριθέν. Ἔχουσαι δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν κολάσεων ἔχουσι. ταῖς δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαραῖς οὐσαις καὶ μηδὲν μηδαμῆ ἐφελκομέναις τοῦ σώματος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ... οὗ ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θεῖον—ἐν τῷ θεῷ—ἐνταῦθα καὶ μετὰ τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ ἔσται, Enn. IV.3.24). “Clean and isolated souls will separate themselves from adhering impurities, while others will keep it for a long time, but even when the worst part is gone, the soul does not die” (τὰς μὲν καθαράς ἀπαλλαττομένας προσπλασθὲν τὸ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἀφήσειν, τὰς δὲ τούτῳ συνέσεσθαι ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· ἀφειμένον δὲ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ χειρόν ἀπολεῖσθαι, Enn. IV.7.14). “The soul after death becomes purer from the body ..., but if, after leaving one body, the soul [does not immediately] arise in another, then [during its next incarnation] it would remember ... about a lot of things that had happened in its previous lives” (Σώματος καθαρωτέρα γενομένη ... γὰρ εἰ δ’ ἐν σώματι γενομένη ἄλλω ἐξέλθοι, ἐρεῖ μὲν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐρεῖ <δὲ> [εἶναι] ὃ ἄρτι ἀφῆκεν [ἐρεῖ δὲ] καὶ πολλὰ τῶν πρόσθεν, Enn. IV.3.27).

The Gnostic teachings, modern to Clement, Origen and Plotinus are other well-known variations of the idea of resurrections, and they are quite well known, among other things, due to the criticism of their Christian and Neoplatonic opponents. It is possible to trace the evolution of the concept under study on the “far frontiers” of the Christian world. For example, Spain, a century after Origen, saw the teachings of Priscillian (340–385), the Spanish heresiarch, Bishop of Avila (381–385), accused of heresy (including understanding the problem of incarnations and resurrection) and immortality at the councils convened in Zaragoza in 380 and in Bordeaux in 384, convicted and executed in Trier under Emperor Maximus.

5 Cambridge Origenism

Mid seventeenth century in England, the era of the so-called Interregnum and Restoration, opened a new page in understanding the ideas of immortality, pre-existence, migration of souls and resurrection, which is associated with the activities of the intellectual community of the Cambridge Platonists.

The first motive of this origenistic Renaissance was mentioned in the correspondence of the founder of the commonwealth, Benjamin Whichcote (1609–1683),

with his teacher Anthony Tuckney. The content of the discussion concerned Whichcote's anti-Calvinist position on the issue of free will and the boundary of divine predestination [5, s. 18–19], which led his followers to the problem of transmigration of immortal souls and resurrection in new bodies.

Whichcote's closest student Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) develops these issues in a number of fundamental works—"A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality" (published in 1731), "The True Intellectual System of the Universe" (1678) and "A Treatise of Freewill" (published in 1838). Drawing on the ideas of Origen and other ancient sources, he focuses on the ethical side of the discussion with Calvinism about theodicy: man himself is the cause of evil, and God is causeless and innocent, as Plato had claimed before (Resp. X.617e), therefore the resurrection will be "all-forgiving." However, Cudworth does not support the idea of reincarnation.

R. Cudworth's daughter, Lady Damaris Masham (165–1708), continued her father's work in 1703–1705. She will correspond with G. W. Leibniz, who is very keenly interested in the legacy of the Cambridge Platonists. They discuss the possibilities of transmigration of souls in the context of Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony, referring to H. More and Origen (Leibniz-Gerhard, III, S. 331–375, V., S. 64, 228, 324).

Cudworth's friend and colleague Henry More (1614–1687) brings the question of free will and the immortality of the soul to an ontological level. Based largely on the ideas of Origen (as well as Philo, Plotinus, treatises of *The Corpus Hermeticum*), in his early works ("Philosophical Poems", 1642–1647) and especially works of the mature period ("Conjectura Cabbalistica", 1655, and "Immortality of the Soul", 1659) he builds a complex doctrine of the psychophysical hierarchy of the universe, in which human souls, leaving their bodies, are subject to restoration in new bodies. By accepting aerial carriers, they take their immortal place in the hierarchy of demonic and angelic, possessing ethereal carriers.

More's pupil Lady Anne Conway (1631–1679) proved herself an outstanding philosopher and follower of Platonism in general, and Origenism in particular. In her treatise "The Principles of the most Ancient and Modern Philosophy" (published in 1692 [6]), she, apparently following the ideas of More, speaks of the eternal existence of spiritual entities created by God, but not their equal existence in relation to God (II.2). "He gave them existence from eternal times or from time without number" (II.4) and "this infinity of time is not equal to the infinite eternity of God" (II.5). In its duration, the soul (being such an entity), if "it really has an end, could exist at another time after this first time and so on to infinity" (III.9).

There are three "kinds of things (or "types of being") that differ from each other in terms of their substance or essence": God, Christ, and "beings or the whole creation as a whole are also one species in substance or essence" (VI.4). These latter, endowed with an "independent will" (VI.4) and possessing an "earthly, airy or ethereal" body (V.6), can move from one bodily incarnation to another depending on the right or wrong way of life: for example, "a horse in many respects approaches the human species" as the breed improves and with the next transition of its soul, it can to inhabit the human body, for "different species transform into each other" (VI.4).

Similarly, the human soul is embodied in another body, angel or animal, following the law of “transmutation from one species to another, either by ascending from the lowest to the highest, or by descending in the opposite way; the same [divine] justice is manifested.” (VI.7) The last “judgment will turn into victory for the salvation and restoration of creatures” (VI.8), “the proper punishment [for sinners] will be fire,” through which, since it is “a certain kind of etheric and imperfect substance,” the souls of people will be restored to an etheric state (VI.10).

A graduate of Cambridge and a fellow of Christ’s College, Bishop J. Rust (1628–1670) is known for the analytical “Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the Chief of his Opinions”. Here, Rust, a follower and a supporter of H. More, accepting the doctrine of Origen [14, p. 14] and More [14, p. 22], clarifies the question of the pre-existence of souls, whose nature consists in the fact that they are “capable of existing eternally backward as well as forward” [14, p. 23], and (“an aerial body will necessarily fall to our share upon the quitting of this we have”, “that aerial body of hers will be in a great disposition to an aethereal purity” as the purest natural element [14, p. 65]. At the same time, Rust speaks of the need to distinguish between the facts of the “vivification” of carnal bodies (which demonstrate the miracles of Jesus) and “great day of Resurrection at the end of the world”, when, according to Origen and More, everything will be changed into that ethereal purity which Origen contends for”), i.e. in etheric bodies [14, p. 121]. Rust considers these provisions, which contradict the Orthodox doctrine of the Church on resurrection (apocatastasis) in earthly bodies, to be very important for the further development of the Church and strengthening of the religion.

6 Conclusion

The “Origenistic boom” that took place in English theology between 1658 and 1662 can be explained by a number of reasons. The diversification of religious consciousness in the context of social unrest, the fall of church censorship, the growth of radical religious movements, and the search for “true religion” in its early historical forms, caused a specific reaction from some English intellectuals. Against this background, a group of Cambridge Platonists turns to the ideas of metempsychosis and resurrection, understood in the spirit of Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Neoplatonism, Origen and Origenism, as a means of updating soteriological theory in the Church of England. The main point in this part of the teachings of the Cambridge Platonists is the idea of an essential freedom, which defines human nature as well as the concept of religious tolerance (latitudinarism), which was understood by the society only after half a century [12, pp. 3–15]. And which, paradoxically, has become for them a peculiar form of internal nonconformism in relation to the general radicalization of English society.

Culturally, the intellectualism of the Cambridge Platonists and Origenists opens the way in literature to J. Milton and the English Romantics, and in the philosophy

of the scientific revolution to I. Newton, a direct student of H. More, and G. W. Leibniz [5].

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Henry More: Introduction to the “Politology” of the Demon State



Alexey Tsyb, Nikita Ivannikov, and Olga Bakhvalova

1 From Descartes’ Critique to Theophysics

By the time of the publication of “The Immortality of the Soul” in 1659, the points of the polemic with Descartes—especially the question of the extent of spiritual substances—remained relevant to Henry More’s understanding of the Neoplatonic possibilities of Cartesianism. That is, More is convinced that Descartes’ doctrine of substance suggests precisely the possibilities that More sees in it, but that Descartes himself does not yet see the advantages that it opens up. This was the first of five objections discussed in his correspondence with Descartes [4, pp. 235–279]. In contrast to the French “mechanicist” who denies any extension of any spiritual substances, the English spiritualist, with the conviction of the owner of a haunted castle, proves in this argument the absolute obviousness of the extension of all spiritual substances: God, angels, human souls, and the seed forms of things, i.e., their real presence in the world in their own bodies, measurable. The evidence is accompanied by copious references to the existence of numerous “scientific” facts established “empirically” from witch and ghost stories. Extension, More persuades Descartes, does not constitute the defining property, modus, or quality of substance in general. But is a secondary property of both substances. Descartes correctly objects, but yielding to More’s incredible eloquence and bribing persistence, agrees that “yes,” perhaps, “in some sense” God can be said to be extended [4, p. 269].

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A decade later, More elaborates on this divergence with Descartes in his treatise on “The Immortality of the Soul” and specifies: such defining properties are “tangibility,” “impenetrability,” and “dispersibility” for material substance. For the spiritual substance, such defining properties are “penetrability” and “self-penetration” as the ability to penetrate other substances and oneself), “indispersibility” understood in the sense of “indivisibility” (IS I, 5, 1 [12]), “self-motion,” “self-activity” (IS I, 7, 1 [12]), the capacity for expansion, “dilatation” and self-compression, “self-contraction” (IS I, 5, 1 [12]), the “emanative effect” of transferring properties from a substance of higher dignity to a substance of lesser dignity (IS I, 6, 2 [12]), and “can be able to move the Matter” (IS I, 7, 5–6 [12]). Hence the “extension” of spiritual substance, manifested in emanativity, which moves, gives and changes form, and animates matter, should be obvious.

For Henry More, physical-theoretical argumentation constitutes the most important tool of his innovative Protestant and Neoplatonic theology. To understand his position in these matters, expressed already in his letters to Descartes, let us consider here the cosmological hypotheses presented by him in the treatise of that period of his work, which was characterized earlier [5, p. 17] as a period of elaboration and development of his own original philosophical doctrine. In addition, this treatise “*Conjectura Cabbalistica*” of 1655 [9, 10], as if complements by cosmogonic introduction the content of the treatise “The Immortality of the Soul” (1659), where More outlines a kind of political project of the Empire of demons, “genius” and immortal souls. A project describing the structure of a world parallel to the earthly one. Both treatises were written in the wake of correspondence with Descartes and retain the spirit of More’s passionate enthusiasm for the philosophy of his French colleague.

2 From Theophysics to Kabbalistic “Modernism”

As has been repeatedly noted, theology in the broadest sense of the word, is the domain in which and for the sake of which More develops his understanding of all the physical theories discussed in seventeenth-century natural philosophy and natural theology [15, pp. 105–106; 5, pp. 9–27]: understanding of substance, extension, emptiness, atoms, spatial and temporal infinity of the world. All this has to do with theology proper as the doctrine of God, and its derivative parts—*pneumatology* (the doctrine of the World Spirit), *angelology* and *demonology*, *psychology* (the doctrine of human, animal and plant souls)—to the problems of the physical composition of the soul and the structure of consciousness, tied to the question of the forms of immortality of the soul, the ways of life transmission from parents to children at birth, postmortem retribution and circulation of immortal souls. More turns to a conceptualization of all these parts in the third book of the treatise, “The Immortality of the Soul”. In “*Conjectura Cabbalistica*”, More publishes his own exposition of the Genesis, accompanied by a literal, philosophical, and ethical commentary (as if following Origen’s literal, moral, symbolic, and anagogical exegetics), as well as

a so-called analytical defence. Here we will look at the parts of the treatise entitled “The Philosophic Cabbala” [10] and “The Defence of Philosophick Cabbala” [9], with additions from More’s formulations in his treatise “The Immortality of the Soul”.

It is important to say a few words in defence of More’s fascination with cabbalistics [2]. Despite a number of ambiguous assessments of the interest shown by H. More to cabbalistics as a reversal of the mainstream of ideas of the Scientific Revolution [3, s. 31], the Cabbalistic mysticism of numbers proper takes a rather ornamental place here and more essential for understanding the worldview of More are references to the Pythagorean, Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition of interpreting numbers and mathematization of cosmology, which was included by the ancient classics in the explanations of the origin of the world as demiurgic (Tim. 34c–36b) or emanation process (Philo. De opificio mundi.), as well as, for example, in the symbolic exegesis of Christianity. The most substantial and attractive source for More here is Philo of Alexandria from the Jewish Platonic classics, and Origen from the Church Fathers. More also quotes copiously from Plotinus, Porphyry, the “Corpus Hermeticum” treatises, and the texts of the Chaldean Oracles.

3 God as Substance: A Theology of the Mind

The basis of “The Book of Genesis”, as is well known, is the Jewish cosmogony. More conveys this story from a particular angle that reveals the primarily Neoplatonic nature of the understanding of this process as a whole. And the first term in this story subject to full exegetical scrutiny is the *concept of God*.

To the question of whether God is a definable substance in its own right, More unequivocally answers: “idea”, or “concept of God”, cannot be expressed in any single definition, because “the essence itself, or pure substance” of something at all “cannot be known” in pure form, but is available for understanding in its “attributes”. So says Axiom VIII of “The Immortality of the Soul” (IS I, 2, 8 [12]). Because the idea of a pure substance reduces various substances to their indistinguishability (IS I, 2, 9 [12]). Such is the “very explicite and intelligible Notion of the Nature of God”, which should might generally be conceivable as “a Circle whose Centre is every where and circumference no where” (IS I, 4, 3 [12]).

Further, in this definition, “by Eternal” is to be understood to mean “duration without end or beginning”. “For the naked Subject or Substance of any thing is no otherwise to be known then thus” (IS I, 4, 2 [12]). And finally, “Power also of creating things of nothing”, or “the Power of Creation” (IS I, 4, 5 [12]). It is realized in intellectual activity. And in Kabbalistic terminology expressed it in “this Notion of $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha$ (precedently; before), sutes well with that passage in Trismegist, where Hermes speaks thus: $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \beta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\phi\theta\alpha\lambda\mu\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ (*Corp. Hermet. XXIII.7*), &c., where [word] $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\eta$ [beginning, sources, sunrise] which is the same with $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha$ (precedently) must signify

the *Divine Intellect*, the *bright Morning Star*, the *Wisdom of God*” (DPhC, I, 1, p. 73–74).

Intellectualism in this interpretation, of course, has an originally Aristotelian origin, going back in turn to the intellectualism of Anaxagoras (*Plato*. *Phaedo* 97b; *Arist. Met.* A 4. 985a 18). It presented in the famous “theology of mind” in Book XII of the *Metaphysics* (*Arist. Met.* 1071b 4–5). It is such a “Beginning whose essence is activity...” (*Arist. Met.* 1071b 16–21), has no matter, is one both in definition and in number, being motionless always and continuously moving by circular motion (*Arist. Met.* 1074a 35–40). Thus acts the higher Mind with the movement of thought and will (*Arist. Met.* 1072a 22–34) being itself without change (*Arist. Met.* 1074b 25–26). [Thus] “the purposive cause is in the midst of the immovable..., it moves as the object of [the lover’s] love, and what is set in motion by it moves everything else,” which also means “change,” “but with regard to it [itself] change is by no means possible. ... This [first] moving thing is a necessary being..., and in this sense it is a beginning. So it is on such a beginning that the heavens and [nature] depend. And its life is the best... Its activity is also pleasure... And thinking, as it is in itself, is directed to the best in itself, and the highest thinking is directed to the highest. And the mind, through its involvement with the object of thought, thinks itself..., so that the mind and the object of thought are one and the same thing. ... And he is active when he possesses the object of thought, so that what is divine in him is... the possession itself rather than the capacity for it... And life is truly inherent in him, for the activity of the mind is life, and god is activity... [Therefore] god is the eternal, best living being, so that life and continuous and eternal existence are inherent in him, and that is what god is” (*Arist. Met.* 1072b 1–30). Also, this essence “cannot have any magnitude, it is without parts and indivisible, and [therefore], unlimited” (*Arist. Met.* 1073a 7–11).

The functionality of God in More’s Cabbalistic cosmogony, tied to a single intellectual centre is provided by his Trinity. “The *Tri-one Godhead* is designated by the book of Genesis in Hebrew words ברא אלהים, namely “God created” (here—the plural word implies “god”), [which] directly indicates [the juxtaposition of] plurality and oneness [since] “the *Noun* being in the *Plural*, the *Verb* in the *Singular Number*” (DPhC I, 1, p.73). From which it is to be understood that there is a hiding place for “the Mystery of the *Trinity* and *Unity* of the Godhead, or τὸ θεῖον (i.e., “deity” in the middle genus, which, according to More, implies a combination of unity and plurality). And *Vatablus* (french theologian and Hebraist, 1495–1547) himself, though he shuffles with his Grammatical Notions here, yet he does apertly acknowledge three Persons in one God, at the twenty sixth verse of this chapter. And that this was the *Philosophic Cabbala* of Moses and the Learned and Pious of the *Jews*, it is no small argument, because the Notion of the *Trinity* is so much insisted upon by the *Platonists* (E.g., *Plotinus in his treatise “On the Three Primordial Hypostases”* (Enn. V. 1. 10): “... We must think on the other side of the being the One..., next to the One is the being and the Mind, and the third nature is the Soul... These Three exist in nature as much as in us”) and *Pythagoreans* (for example, Diogenes of Laertes (*Diog. Laert.* VIII, 25): “The beginning of all things is the unit; to the unit, as cause is subject as substance to the indeterminate binary; from the unit

and the indeterminate binary come numbers; from numbers are points; from points are lines; from them are flat figures; from flat figures are three-dimensional figures; from them—sensually perceptible bodies, in which the four bases are fire, water, earth and air; moving and transforming entirely, they give rise to the world—animate, reasonable, spherical, in the middle of which is the earth”. Iamblichus in his treatise “Life of Pythagoras” (*Iambl. De Vita Pyth.*): “...The source of Pythagorean numerical theology was Orpheus (145) ...Pythagoras adopted from the Orphics the concept of the essence of the gods defined by number (146) ...He said that people make libations three times and Apollo broadcasts from the tripod because three is the first number that arose (152)”, since ones and twos are not numbers in the proper sense of the word.”), whom all acknowledge... to have got their Philosophy from *Moses* (H.More refers to the famous statement of Clement of Alexandria (*Strom. I, 150, 4*), who in turn refers to Numenius of Apamea (*Numenius. Fr.8–9 Des Places*))” (DPHC I, 1, p.73).

In this Trinity, the second place is occupied by “*a His Eternal Wisdome*”, about [which] *Ambrose* (Ambrose of Mediola (circa 340–397), Commentary on “Six Days” (*Ambros. Hexaem. I, 15*)), *Basil* (Hexaem. I.1 = PG, 29:3.) and Origen clarify (*Orig. De Princip. I. 2, 1–3*) [the words] “In Principio” (in the beginning) as such meaning as ‘in Son’ (“in Filio”); and in the beginning “The Epistle to the Colossians”, where the Apostle speaks of the Son of the God, “that he is the *First-born of every creature, and that by him were all things created that are in Heaven, and that are in Earth* (Kol. 1: 15–16). *And that he is before all things, and by him all things consist*” (Kol.1: 17)... And very answerable to this [worlds] of the Apostle are those two attributes Philo gives to the same subject, calling him *πρωτόγονον θεοῦ λόγον*, The *First-born Word of God*, or the *First-born Form of God*; and *ἀρχή*—the Beginning (*Philo. Conf. 146.3*: “worthy man ... let him strive to do the bidding of His first-born son, the Logos, the eldest of His angels, as it were an archangel, who bears many names: ‘the Beginning,’ ‘the Name of God,’ ‘the Logos,’ and ‘Man in His image,’ and ‘He who sees,’ that is, Israel”). He calls him also simply *Λόγος*, which is, the *Word, Form, Reason, or Wisdom* (the Logos in Philo of Alexandria is polysemous: the instrument of creation by which God made the world (*Cher. 127.*); the wisdom (*σοφία*) of God (*Leg. I 65*); the law of nature (*Opif. 143*); the intelligible world (*Opif. 24*); the pattern for the sensuous world (*Opif. 35*); “seed essence” (*Opif. 43*); “mind-image” in God (*Opif. 68*), mind in man (*Opif. 20–21; 28–29; 30–31; 35*); pattern for the human mind (*Opif. 139*); beauty itself, the pattern for all beautiful things (*Opif. 139*); source of metaphysical light (*Somn. I 7*)). And one of the Chaldaea Paraphrases (i.e., one of the authors of the “Chaldean Oracles”) also interprets [speaking] ‘In Principio’, [in the sense of] ‘In Sapiaentia’ (DPHC I, 1, p.73)... For there is no necessity of making of ראשית (beginning) and קדם (precedently, before) *Adverbs*, they are *Substantives*. And here Wisdom is called ראשית and קדם—the *Principle and Morning of the Works of God*, not by way of diminution, but as supposing the *East* and the *Morning* to be the womb of light, from whence springs all *Light* and *Form*, and *Form* is Light, as I told you before out of *Plotinus* (DPHC I, 1, p.73)... Wherefore ראשית (beginning) is the *Essential Wisdom of God*, not an *habit* or *property*, but a *Substance* that is Wisdom. For *true Wisdom* is *Substance*, H

ἀληθινή σοφία οὐσία, καὶ ἡ ἀληθινή οὐσία σοφία, it is the same that Plotinus speaks (Enn. V.8.5). Whence he is called in the Apocalypse, ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ὄν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος (Rev. 4:8: “The Lord God Almighty, who was, and is, and is to come”), which is but a Periphrasis of *Jehovah, Essence*, or οὐσία, which name יהוה [Jehovah] contains the future, present, and time past in it, in [alphameric character] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, as *Zanchius* (Girolamo Zanchi, Hieronymus Zanchius, 1516–1590, Italian-born Reformed theologian) observes. This is the second Hypostasis in the holy Trinity, the Logos, which was in the beginning of the world with God”. (DPhC I, 1, p. 74).

In the third hypostasis stands the “Spirit,” or the “Spirit of Nature”, “Inferiour Soul of the World” (IS II, 14, 11 [12])—God’s instrument, an active and creative agent, further producing the work of combining mind-forms with earthly matter, which is yet to be in this cosmogonic sequence. More, in his early poetic writings, represented that “divine Spirit”, “*Infinite and Uncreated Spirit we usually call God*” (IS I, 5, 1 [12]), neo-platonically as the “world of Soul” [11], and in the 50’s transforms it into a “Spirit of Nature”.

Thus, “this *Spirit of God* then will prove the Third divine *Hypostasis*”, of which the first was יהוה (God) in the name of *Jehovah*, as the *Rabbines* observe, is a name of God signifying *good* and *mercy*, which may be answerable to *Plato* his Τάγαθόν (Good, *Plato*. Resp. 506e1, 508b13, 518d1, 521ab; Phileb. 13b7-22c3 60a9-67a6). The second is רשיע (beginning) signifying *Wisdom*, follows to the Platonical Νοῦς (Nous). “The third... must be *Love*, and it has a lucky coincidence also with the third *Hypostasis* in the Platonic Triad—Ψυχή, whom Plotinus (Enn. III.5.2) calls οὐράνια Ἀφροδίτην, the Celestial Venus (DPhC I, 1, p. 75)”. According to Plotinus, this celestial Aphrodite is included in the emanation in such a way that she “descended from Cronus,” who “is Mind,” she is “hypostasis and essence unattached to matter” (*Plot*. Enn. III. 5. 2), her offspring Eros being her hypostasis, “essence from essence,” turned contemplatively to her source (*Plot*. Enn. III. 5. 3), and actively turned to the multitude of things. That is “the soul [of the cosmos] is the mother of Eros, and Eros is the action of the Soul..., or the God [mind] that binds the Soul to the Good [i.e. the first beginning]” (*Plot*. Enn. III.5. 4). The whole meta-symbolic series, in turn, goes back to the erotic philosophy of the “Symposium”, where the meaning and origin of love “frenzy” (ecstasy) as the source of philosophy is explained: the Aphrodite Urania and its attendant celestial Eros are contrasted here with the Aphrodite Pandemos (vulgar) and the corresponding Eros “for all” (*Plat*. Symp. 180e).

4 Kabbalistic Protology

So, according to More’s cosmogonic narrative, in the process of the hexadecade God manifests his main quality—his intellectual nature, traditionally called his “eternal Wisdom” or “Power also of creating things out of nothing” (IS I, 4,5 [12]) creates the Universe in four real actions: (1) fabricates the ideal model for the world,

(2) creates the corporeal substance as the “filler” of the model, (3) makes the “preparation of matter by vital congruence” and (4) the joining together of these two parts.

[1st Stage] In the beginning, “having thought”, God creates the first, comprehensible plan of the world: “*Tri-one God*” by the activity of his thought creates *Symbolical Heaven and Earth*” (PhC I, 1), which means “*The World of Life*” and includes “*Heaven or Light, ...intellectual Spirits*, souls of men and beasts, and the seminal forms of all things which you may call...” (PhC I, 3). Because according to verse 3, chapter 1 of “Genesis” (“And God said, Let there be light...” (Gen. 1:3). By implication, the following verse 4 was meant: “...and God separated the light from the darkness”), this World of Life “*Exist independently of Corporeal Matter*. That which exists first it is plain is independent of what follows, and *Philo* makes all *Immateriate* Beings to be created in this first day” (*Philo*. Opif.16.): Whence the Souls of Men are removed far from all fear of fate and mortality, which is the grand Tenent of Plato’s School (DPhC I, 1, p.75)”.

“By [name of symbolic] Earth” in the World of Life should be understood as ‘*Potentiality, or Capability of the Existence of the outward Creation*’. This Possibility [appears]... as his ultimate presence in the farthest parts of the universe (PhC I, 2)”, “it being no object of Sense, but of Intellect, and being also impassible and undiminshable, and so in a sort indivisible. ...Wherefore this *Potentiality* being ever One, it is rightly referred to the first day. And in respect of this the *Pythagoreans* call an *Unite* ὕλη (prime matter), as well as the Binary, as also ἀλαμπία (absence of light), and σκοτωδία (darkness)...” (DPhC I, 1, p. 76). So it’s about “*Matter merely Metaphysical* (DPhC I, 1, p. 75),” which More referred to in his poems as “Hyle” [13, p. 162].

Words “*Solitude and Emptiness*” (Gen. 1:2: “The earth was sightless and desolate...”) More commented separately: “The very word signifies so in the Original [of ‘Genesis’]... Which being *abstract terms* (as the Schools call them) do very fittingly agree with the Notion we have put upon this *Symbolical Earth*, affirming it no real actual subject, either spiritual or corporeal, that may be said to be *void* and *empty*; but to be *Vacuity* and *Emptiness* it self, onely joined with a capacity of being something” (DPhC I, 1, p. 74). In other words, it is the ‘*Ens Potentiale*’ of the entire external Creation. Thus, in general, at this stage of the creation of the world, “we are not talking about the material heaven and material earth, but about their ideal model, in which... a *Monad* or *Unite* being so fit a Symbol of the immaterial nature” (PhC I, 5).

By the use of the expression “*Monad or Unity*,” More goes on to say,—“you shall observe to be wonderful. Whence we may well conclude, that it was ordered so on purpose, and that in all probability *Pythagoras* was acquainted with this *Cabbala*” (DPhC I, 1, p. 75).

Words “[*Holy Spirit*] *having hovered a while*” in verse 2 of Genesis point to the mode of divine thought and God’s instrument in creation. “In the original,” More explains, “stands the word מְרַחֵף, ‘soaring, fluttering,’ which means hovering or pondering over something, as if a bird were taking flight over its nest, or over its chicks. It is therefore possible that [the subject of this reflection here is like]

Aristophanes' Egg τίκτει πρότιστον ὑπηνέμιον Νύξ μελανόπτερος ὄον, i.e., the Orphic symbol of the unborn world, the world's germ (DPHC I, 1, p. 74), meaning "Aristophanes" parody of Orphic Theogony (*Aristoph.* Av. 695; See also Losev A. F. [8, pp. 707–709]: "But the earth was not yet, the firmament of the heavens was not yet. The black-winged, formidable Night carried the first-born, egg-boltushka in her wide bosom./From the egg in the whirl of flying years, Eros appeared, a voluptuous, golden-winged, shining God, blowing like a whirlwind./It was he who combined in mist and darkness, in the abysses of Tartarus, with Chaos the bird/And made a nest for himself, and in the beginning of all things he nurtured our bird tribe./And there were no gods yet. Afterwards he combined all creatures with love./And from the mixture of all things, from the crossing of things came forth both heaven and sea,/And earth..." (*Aristoph.* Av. 690–702). To this sense, "*Under the wind below in dark some shade,/There the black-winged Night her first Egge laid*". And this manner of *brooding* thus is an Embleme of dearest affection; and who knows but that from this Text the Poets took occasion of feigning that ancient *Cupid* the Father of all the Gods, the *Creator* of all things, and *Maker* of Mankind. For so he is described by *Hesiod* (Theog. 118–122: "Chaos was born in the universe first of all, followed by/Wide-breasted Gaea, the universal safe haven,/Dusky Tartarus, deep in the earth's depths,/And, among the eternal gods, the most beautiful of all, Eros/Sweet and luscious—all gods and men of earthly origin/The soul in their chests conquers and deprives all of reason. Eros acts as the driving cause of the formation of the cosmos. See also: *Aristot.* Met. 984b 20–30: of "those who... recognized the cause of perfection [in things] as the origin of existing things, and such a cause from which existing things receive motion", "Hesiod was the first to search for something of this kind, or else who considered love or lust as the beginning, e. g. Parmenides, for he too, describing the origin of the universe, remarks: 'Eros was the first of all the gods to be conceived by her.' And in the words of Hesiod: 'First of all in the universe Chaos was born,/followed by wide-breasted Gaea./Also Eros, who is different among all immortal gods' (Theog. 116–119)") and *Orpheus* [7, p. 572] and here in this place of *Aristophanes*, from whence I took the forecited verse. *Simmias Rhodius* describes this ancient Love in verses which represent "a pair of wings (DPHC I, 1, pp. 74–75)".

Philo calls this first day set aside for the Creation of Intangible and *Spiritual Beings*, the *intellectual world*, understanding it broadly as the *Mundus vitae*, the *World of Life and Forms*, as *Ficinus* calls it. And the *Pythagoreans* call *Unite Eidos*, *Form*, and *Zoή*, *Life*. They also call it *Ζανός πύργος*, or *Tower of Jupiter*, giving the same name to the *Point* or *Center*, by which they mean *vital formative Center of things*, *Rationes Seminales* ("Rationes seminales"—Latin calque of the Greek λόγοι σπέρματικοί, translated as "seed logos" with the meaning of germinal beginnings, original causes, initial factors, seed causes); and they also call the *One Λόγος σπέρματικής*, which is *Seminal Form* (DPHC I, 1, p. 76; *Nicomach. Gerassen*. In Phot. Bibliotheca. The meaning of the sentence to which More refers is this: monad (Latin "unitas," i.e., "unity; one whole; homogeneity"), ...the axis of them all and the sun, Pyralios, Morpho, Jupiter's fortress (arx—but in Greek "πύργος"—tower)

and seminalis ratio (Greek λόγος σπερματίτης)—Phot. Bibl. cod. 187. The Pythagorean “Ζανὸς πύργος” is mentioned by Simplicius (c. 490–560, Neoplatonist, representative of the Athenian school of Neoplatonism), in his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise *On the Sky* (*Simplic. Comm. Arist. De Caelo* 293b20). Λόγος σπερματίτης is a Stoic, not Pythagorean term, but may have been used in the eclectic doctrines of so-called Neopythagoreanism of the 1st century BC - 2nd century AD). And very important “account of *Philo’s* pronouncing that Spiritual Substances are the first day’s work, is, that as an *Unite is indivisible* in Numbers, so is the *nature of Spirits indivisible*; you cannot make two of one of them, as you may make of one piece of Corporeal Matter two, by actual division or severing them one piece from another. Wherefore what was truly and properly created the first day; was Immaterial, Indivisible, and Independent of the Matter, from the *highest Angel*, to the meanest *Seminal Form*” (DPHC I, 1, p. 76).

[2nd Stage] “And God thought again, and invigorating his thought with his Will and Power, created an immense deal of real and corporeal matter, a substance which... betwixt the foresaid fluid *Possibility of Natural things*, and the Region of *Seminal Forms*” (PhC I, 6, p. 17): verse 6 of Genesis — “*Created an immense deal*” (“And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the water, and let it separate the water from the water” (Gen. 1:6)),—says that God “creates now Corporeal Matter, (as before the *World of Life*) out of nothing” (DPHC I, 1, p. 76). That was “this immensely diffused matter was made”, or “a boundless Ocean of rude invisible Matter” (PhC I, 7, p. 17), and “this Matter actuated and agitated forthwith by some Universal Spirit, yet part of the *World of Life*, whence it became very subtile and *Ethereal*; so that this *Matter* was rightly called Heaven, and the Union of the Passive and Active Principle in the Creation of this Material Heaven, is the second day’s work, and the *Binary* denotes the nature thereof” (PhC I, 8, p. 18).

At the same stage, apparently (since More does not specify the exact day), God creates “the Aerial or Ethereal Adam,” i.e., the idea of man, which has yet to be realized into a real man (PhC II, 7, p. 22): “God reflecting upon his own Nature, and viewing himself, consulting with the *Super-essential Goodness*, the *Eternal Intellect*, and *inextinguishable Love-flame of his Omnipotent Spirit*, concluded to make a far higher kind of living creature, ... [and so that] He made therefore Man in his own Image, after his own Likeness”, by approving him “Supreme Monarch of this visible world” (PhC I, 26, p. 20). And this “Adam was first wholly Ethereal, and placed in Paradise” (PhC II, 8).

[3rd Stage] Before “organizing (orders) the real material Earth”, “God prepared the matter of the Earth so that there should be a *vital congruence* of its parts, with all the various seed forms of trees, herbs, and fragrant kinds of flowers; and thus the Body of the Earth would draw from the various beginnings of *Vegetative Life*, from the *World of Life*, which are universally available; and the Passive and Active Principle, joined together, form the Work of the Third Day, and the *Ternary* denotes its nature” (PhC I, 13, p. 18). The concepts “prepared matter” and “a vital congruity”, which seem to be More’s own inventions, are interesting here. What do they

mean? More explains it by the involvement of the World Spirit: “yet there went up a moist vapour from the earth, which being matured and concocted by the Spirit of the world, which is very active in the heavens or air, became a precious balmy liquor, and fit vehicle of Life, which descending down in some sort like dewy showers upon the face of the earth, moistened the ground, so that the warmth of the Sun gently playing upon the surface thereof, prepared matter variously for sundry sorts, not only of Seminal forms of Plants, but Souls of Animals also” (PhC II, 6).

[4th Stage] But this *Fourth Day* embraces the adornment of the body of the whole World, that is, this vast and immense *Etheric Matter*, which is called *fluid Heaven*, with an infinite number of all kinds of light, which the Divine Wisdom and Power, through the union of suitable and active principles drawn from the *World of Life*, produces from this *Etheric Matter*, the usefulness of which is evident in nature, since they [serve] for the Predictive Signs, seasons, days and years (PhC I, 14). “And the union of the Passive and Active principle was the Fourth day’s work” (PhC I, 19).

“The *Quinary* hath allotted to it, the replenishing of an Earth with fish and fowl; the *Senary* with man and beast” (PhC I, 14, p. 18). “Wherefore God by his *inward Word* and *Power*, prepared the matter in the waters, and near the waters with several *vital congruities*, so that it drew in sundry souls from the World of Life, which actuating the parts of the matter, caused great plenty of fish to swim in the waters, and fowls to fly above the earth in the open air” (PhC I, 20, p. 19).

“According to the preparation of the matter, the *Plastical Power* of the souls that descend from the World of Life, did faithfully and effectually work those wise contrivances of *male* and *female*, they being once rightly united with the matter, so that by this means the fish filled the waters in the seas, and the fowls multiplied upon the earth” (PhC I, 22), “And the union of the Passive and Active principle was the Fifth day’s work, and the *Quandary* denotes the nature thereof” (PhC I, 23). And in this world “Plants and Animals were the generations, effects, and productions of the Earth, the Seminal Forms and Souls of Animals insinuating themselves into the prepared matter thereof, and Suns, Planets, or Earths were the generations or productions of the Heavens, vigor and motion being imparted from the world of Life to the immense body of the Universe” (PhC II, 4). The same for “Ethereal Adam conveyed into an earthly body, having his most conspicuous residence in the head or brain: And thus Adam became the Soul of a Terrestrial living Creature” (PhC II, 7, p. 22), which is to say “Man... rose out of the earth after this manner; the dust thereof being rightly prepared and attempered by these unctuous showers and balmy droppings of Heaven” (PhC II, 7). Because of that real “Man... consisting of an intellectual Soul, & a terrestrial Body actuated thereby. Wherefore mankind became male and female, as other terrestrial animals are” (PhC I, 27), “and [this] union of the Passive and Active principle was the Sixth days work: and the *Senary* denotes the nature thereof” (PhC I, 31). “God having thus completed his work in the *Senary*, comprehending the whole Creation in six orders of things, he ceased from ever creating anything more, either in this outward Material world, or in the world of Life” (PhC II, 2).

5 Demon Empire

In the world in which Henry More lives, humanity is only a fraction of the population. Not the worst, but quite deprived of opportunity. Entities and souls, created on Day Two as a comprehensible World of Life, are distributed in the “*duly-prepared Matter*” (IS I, 8, 3 [12]) in four categories: “*λόγοι σπερματικοί* or *Seminal Form* of things” (IS I, 8, 1 [12]), which should be understood as “*ἰδέα possibilis* (idea of possibility)” or “a created Spirit organizing *duly-prepared Matter* into life and vegetation proper to this or the other kind of Plant” (IS I, 8, 3 [12]); “the Souls of o Beast”, having apart from Vegetation also “every *Intrinsecall power* being discernible in the constant shape and properties of every distinct kind of Brute Creatures” (IS I, 8, 4 [12]); the souls of men, understood as “[the] created Spirit[s] indued with Sense and Reason, and o power of organizing terrestrial Matter into humane shape by vital union therewith” (IS I, 8, 5 [12]); “the Spirit[s], or Souls of [the] Angel[s] differ from the Soul[s] of a Man, in that the Soul of an Angel may vitally actuate an Aerial or Aethereal body, but cannot be born into his world in a Terrestrial one” (IS I, 8, 6 [12]), i.e., it is a created spirit endowed with reason, sensation, and the capacity for the existence of life united and interacting with the body, but only air or etheric. All this, More emphasizes, is quite consistent with Descartes’ judgement that “there is *de facto* a Substance in us distinct from Matter, viz. our own Mind” (IS I, 8, 9 [12]). These entities are not non-bodily in the full sense of the word, because they never exist separately from their “Vehicles”, which are “Three kinds of Vehicles, Aethereal, Aereal, and Terrestrial, in each one whereof there may be several degrees of purity and impurity” (IS II, 14, 1 [12]) depending on the quality of the “matter” in them: from the coarse earthly to the finest etheric (see materials on H. More’s “materialist theory of the spirit” [6, pp. 172–195]). This last one possesses to the highest degree the “*fourth Mode*” of substance, i.e. the ability of “the redoubling or contracting of substance into less space” (IS I, 2, 11 [12]), which allows angels, good “geniuses”, ambiguous “demons” and souls who have left their bodies to take visible forms at will, also retaining sensuality: sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste sensations.

These entities are located in several regions of space—in “*supreme region of the Aire*”, “*Middle Region*” (IS III, 3, 4 [12]) and lower earthly as well as infernal, and become “political member[s] of some kingdom or empire” of demons (IS III, 4, [12]) governed by the best laws. This is the subject of the third book of the treatise “Immortality of the Soul”.

According to current estimates, More’s demonology is a part of a “spiritualist metaphysics” composed of Kabbalistic, Neoplatonic and other ingredients, a metaphysics that may have played an important role in Isaac Newton’s cosmology. Moreover, Newton worked hard to interpret the secrets and symbols in “The Book of Daniel” and in “The Book of Revelation” [15, p. 97]. According to R. H. Popkin, his cosmology as a whole present “a more or less slender model” reflecting his contemporary views on this area of scientific knowledge. Together with Anne Conway, he offered “an important alternative to the mechanistic thought of his day, showing

the limitations of mechanistic thinking”, developing instead a spiritualist cosmology incorporating the main results of the new science. Newton apparently adopted most of their views, and mathematized their picture of the world” [15, pp. 97–98]. One cannot disagree with this. Moreover, these ideas of More and Conway influenced the development of G. W. Leibniz’s ideas through Francis van Helmont, who was part of the circle of mutual friends [1].

An essay by Marjorie H. Nicholson [14, p. 433–452], recognized as an American classic in studies of seventeenth-century English literature and philosophy, reveals another crucial factor in the influence of Henry More’s legacy on his contemporaries.

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Cultural and Historical Foundations of the Community of “Common Future”



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1 Introduction

The Russian interest in studying the Chinese experience of international economic, political, cultural and educational integration over the past decade is growing against the backdrop of new historical realities and the increasing speed of building diverse relationships between the two countries and the countries of the region. The general “turn of Russia to the East” is evidenced by the monographs published in recent years by Russian and foreign authors [1], devoted to Chinese topics and Chinese-Russian cooperation in the field of science and education, a series of articles in scientific journals [2–6], defended dissertations [3], conducted scientific conferences (we’ll speak about them later), as well as a number of agreements concluded between universities of China and Russia.

A special impulse to the dynamics of regional interaction in various fields was given by the strategy of cultural integration “One Belt, One Road” which is aimed at creating socioeconomic, cultural and educational conditions for “the world prosperity” through the creation of a global “community of common destiny”, building effective and at the same time trusting and confidential relations between countries and peoples. This new format (“new model of relations”) is based on the existing experience of testing relations in different organizations: BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa and other countries), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), EAEU (European-Asian Economic Union) etc., as well as in building bilateral mutually beneficial relationships between countries [7].

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The regional integration space that emerged during the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy made it necessary the creation of a special interaction platform that would ensure the building of long-term cooperation with the countries of the region located along the projected route. Regionalism as a special sphere of social life is increasingly becoming a subject of different research which are primarily due to the need of studying the prospects and risks accompanying these processes. Regionalism also presupposes economic, social and cultural integration which is unthinkable without the educational component as one of the effective mechanisms for achieving these goals. Special opportunities in connection with the identified processes are opening up not only for the Chinese-Russian border areas (the space of the Chinese-Russian trans-border region) but also for other areas and regions. In this regard, regionalism is a supranational process aimed at creating a new regional space based on the integration of the economic, social, political and cultural spheres of life of partner countries (states) united by common interests and the values of a “common future” [3, 8].

The idea of renovation and harmonizing the life of the region on the basis of mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation and discovering prospects for joint development is reflected in some official documents [2, p. 88], building various channels of cooperation, projects and plans in the field of culture and education. They are focused on the cultural and professional development of youth, their creative activities and the realization of talents. These aspects of youth development receive great attention in the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation.

In this article we’ll touch upon some important issues relating to (1) the attractiveness of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy of economic and cultural integration for the modern world; (2) the experience in building mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Russia and, in this regard, cultural and educational strategies of the “common path”; (3) the youth policy of the Chinese Communist Party and the importance of forming the youth historical consciousness; (4) the specifics of modern and future youth generations in the world.

2 Materials and Methods

The research has an interdisciplinary character. The authors of the article use research materials in the field of building Russian-Chinese interregional relations in the sphere of higher education, analysing the experience of cooperation of two countries in the field of culture and education and building youth policy, for that purpose, the works of specialists in the field of social philosophy, geopolitics, political geography, philosophical anthropology and ethnic culturology are used. The study also takes into account the experience of both countries in promoting national cultures and languages, building educational policies, as well as their interaction in the scientific field.

The methods used in the study are the following: comparative historical analysis with an emphasis on various historical periods in the history of the two countries,

significant for revealing the relevance of the “One Belt—One Road” strategy; analysis of processes, sociological data in the field of building youth policy in Russia and China, organizing regional cooperation, assessing and identifying perspective mechanisms of interaction in the field of higher education between the two countries is carried out; design method (creation of social projects)—the design possibilities in the field of creating joint programmes and strategies for innovative cooperation in the field of higher education, youth policy and cultural development of the Russian-Chinese cross-border region are substantiated. The study was carried out on the basis of the unity of three methodological approaches to the study of social reality and the assessment of promising factors and mechanisms of interaction: regional, systemic and integrative. The phenomenological method is focused on achieving a complete analysis of social and cultural processes. The key concepts, semantic structures and principles involved in the study make it possible to describe ongoing processes, identify their specifics and offer justification and development forecasts.

3 Results and Discussion

3.1 The Experience of International Cooperation Between China and Russia in the Field of Culture and Education Within the Framework of the “One Belt, One Road”

But still, why is the “One Belt, One Road” strategy so attractive for Russia and Russian universities? In answering this question, we must proceed from the fact that this concept of cooperation between states has a strategic political and economic significance because it involves “building a worthy future,” long-term and multilateral cooperation across the region (once called the “heartland,” the middle lands) on an equal mutually beneficial basis (there are no masters and no vassals) [9, 10]. In addition to economic goals, large-scale tasks are also set for cultural cooperation and communication between countries of the region which are primarily aimed at the education and upbringing of the current and future young generations who will enter adulthood working life in the nearest future. Therefore, this programme is distinguished by its focus on creating similar conditions for the development of education, professional growth of young people and the creation of jobs that require high-tech training of young specialists. Modern society increasingly requires innovative specialists (we will talk about this later). It is also important to train bilingual specialists with a variety of competencies. New challenges and new flows of human resources are the problems that are solved not only by the efforts of the governments of countries participating in the “One Belt, One Road” strategy but also by national educational systems, universities, colleges, schools, university and school teachers aimed at finding effective educational and pedagogical methods, technologies and cultural resources.

The educational policy pursued under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the People's Republic of China to disseminate and popularize Chinese culture, the Chinese language and values throughout the world that have been formed in the millennia-long history of the Chinese state is impressive in the depth of its conception and the scale of its implementation. Confucius Institutes, established in many countries around the world, are an important tool for cultural influence, studying and introducing young people and adults to the culture of China [11]. It is a “soft power” for maintaining the interest of the peoples of neighbouring countries in a culture that has ancient roots. The Confucius Institutes operate a variety of cultural and regional educational programmes concerning various areas of development of ancient and modern Chinese culture, traditions, norms of behaviour and communication, building professional dialogue, etc., which would contribute much to the growth of mutual understanding [12].

The experience of international student exchange shows that it not only significantly expands and improves their cultural and educational level, but also affects the development of the country as a whole, contributing to the overall political and economic stability. Russia and China have extensive experience in educational exchanges. Thanks to the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” project, relations between China and Russia are undergoing significant development in the field of higher education, the cooperation between Russian and Chinese partner universities is also being established. The practice of student exchange, carried out under various programmes, is becoming an increasingly common form: training in language courses (short-term and long-term); training in language camps (during the holidays); training for the purpose of obtaining an academic degree (diploma) of bachelor, master, PhD, etc., completing internships in joint educational programmes.

As part of the China Innovative Development Programme until 2025 the Chinese government expects to attract a large number of scientific specialists from abroad. In turn, Chinese specialists are also interested in proving themselves outside the country. The exchange system for foreign teachers and researchers is more complex than the student exchange system. Every year, an exchange of delegations is carried out between China and Russia to develop scientific ties, the exchange of highly qualified professors and specialists by teaching the Russian language and some subjects in Russian or English in China, and in Russia—the Chinese language and some special subjects in Chinese or English. As a part of the international exchange of foreign specialists, universities hold various scientific and educational events: reading individual lectures and lecture courses; organizing and conducting scientific and scientific-practical conferences; symposiums; seminars, etc. As a part of international exchange, foreign specialists also organize and conduct international cultural, educational and outreach events with students: competitions among students in Russia and China, as a result of which Chinese students—winners are given the opportunity to undergo an internships in Russia, and Russian students—in China; screening of theatrical productions by student theatres, participation in international festivals and television programmes; cultural, educational and educational joint trips with foreign teachers around the city (museums, exhibition centres, etc.), travel around the country, etc. [13]. In order to attract foreign specialists, universities are

taking measures to organize professional training. Foreign researchers conduct joint scientific research and implement international large-scale research projects and joint international bachelor's and master's educational programmes.

The model of an *innovative specialist* is aimed at training a specialist with independent, constructive, strategic thinking and developed analytical abilities. Such a specialist must satisfy the following criteria: (1) the ability to organize and plan his educational and professional growth; (2) the ability to independently set professional tasks and find resources to solve them; (3) the ability to conduct a professional dialogue, argue and adjust one's own position in dynamically changing conditions, depending on incoming information and taking into account the opinions of the colleagues; (4) the focus on a productive result, the ability to develop and justify professional and creative projects, as well as find sources of financing them [14].

3.2 The Role and Historical Significance of the Activities of the Communist Party of China. The Importance of the Youth Historical Consciousness Formation

The celebration of the 100 anniversary of the Communist Party of China in November 2021 was an important historical event that had a huge educational impact on Chinese and Russian youth. The fundamental significance of the activities of the Chinese Communist Party over the course of a century is in humanizing the world which has become more socially responsible. The communist movements that emerged in the twentieth century brought hope for a bright future and social security for the working people. More attention has been paid to their needs and interests and to the development of social policy throughout the world. The problems of youth, youth policy and the development of universities and schools receive great attention from the Chinese Communist Party. It is this factor that largely determines the future of the country and society as a whole. The history of Chinese youth organizations is very interesting. Relying on the support of the communist parties, they have gone through a long and difficult path of development having withstood many trials.

Understanding the significance of the centenary anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party for the fate of the world, which was widely celebrated in China and Russia, it should be emphasized that modern society has already formed the idea that those who do not learn the lessons of history make many mistakes. It may be not always correct to draw direct parallels between the past, present and future, but public discussions of historical events, primarily in youth and student audiences, as well as the celebration of historical anniversaries are intellectual and cultural resources for the development of society. It influences much on the youth and social consciousness and forms the social, and cultural identity and worldview of a young person.

History in the educational process cannot be considered as an absolute or some kind of established system of knowledge. Studying history gives an impulse to the development of a young person's independent thought. The study of humanities, historical special courses and elective courses in philosophy, literature and other humanities at various stages of education contribute much to the gradual socialization and social adaptation of a young person, helping him to overcome many age-related youth problems. The study of these disciplines also has a "human-saving" function: they teach young people to think relevantly, being a witness of historical events, and they teach them to appreciate their life (doing it responsibly). The study of history, philosophy and literature helps to overcome some ontological fear in a young person (not to succeed, not to be realized, not to withstand temptations and life's trials, etc.), forming strategic thinking and the ability to think several steps ahead. The relatively long-term involvement of a young person in the educational process is also protective in the modern world [14]. All over the world, universities are a good environment for socialization and social adaptation.

Against the background of studying history the theme of the life-world of a young man and the dangers that confront his maturation and socialization are updated through the study and clarification of the genetic foundations of social and cultural phenomena. The development of soft methods and techniques for developing a worldview, the development of systematic reading, criticism and reflective abilities are equally relevant in the modern educational system. The study of history contributes much to the formation of a civic position, forming the ability to seek and tell the truth in all life situations. A young person should grow in confidence that even in circumstances, where there are double and triple standards, he should always speak openly the truth and only the truth, acting in accordance with his own conscience. This position should be expressed repeatedly in different age and educational audiences as a strategic goal. A lie (or half-lie) is always situational and brings only temporary benefits. History also shows that not a single living and perspective idea could be defeated by physical force. But many pseudo-truths have exhausted themselves, giving rise to deep disappointments.

4 *About Modern and Subsequent Youth Generations*

The formation of the historical consciousness of modern teenagers and students in the modern education system in China and Russia is impossible without taking into account the peculiarities of their worldview and the post-material values they share. Young people from different countries (we mean China, Russia and other countries in the region), of course, differ from each other, but thanks to social networks, globalization and dynamic changes in the world a young person from one country has much more in common with an age-peers from other countries than with older generations within their own country. Modern teachers must take these circumstances into account while constructing their teaching activities and plans.

So, what circumstances and features of socialization of modern youth in China and Russia should be taken into consideration in the educational process? First of all, their orientation towards today (just “here-and-now”), reluctance to make long-term plans, weakly expressed concern for the future, focus on quickly achievable goals, very weak interest in history. But even the interest to the present among modern young people is also specific, as a rule, it is limited by nearby society (friends, hobbies, youth subcultures, etc.). Thus, the interest to the past is superficial, situational and it is usually connected with completing educational assignments, studying historical and special courses. It is characterized by in-depth reflection, associated mainly with the search and selection of a certain information [14, 15].

Another distinctive feature of this age group is connected with a life in social networks with horizontal communication and many participants at the same time. Modern young people spend a lot of time on social networks and even here they feel the need for quick and obvious social recognition to others (likes, subscribers, reposts, etc.). Modern young people are less inclined to acquire systematic knowledge that requires much work, intellectual tension and concentration. But at the same time, they demonstrate a desire to communicate, doing different things and arranging something together, acting interactively. In this aspiration they are focused more on searching for information than on its analysis, comprehension, systematic study. In this regard, it is necessary to mention about the youth “reading crisis”, undeveloped skills in working with large texts, ignorance of the historical context, as it was shown by researches in many countries. These very actual problems were also discussed at numerous scientific conferences held in the Russian State Pedagogical University (Saint-Petersburg) together with Pekin Youth University of Political Sciences (“The Formation of historical consciousness of youth”, St. Petersburg, 2020; “Dialogue of generations” St. Petersburg, 2023, etc.).

Representatives of the “alpha” generation (those who born after 2010) have had accounts on social networks since their birth (mainly their parents monitor their accounts). Alphas grow up surrounded by virtual reality and technologies, smart toys, robots and applications based on neural networks. Mark McCrindle proposed to call children born approximately after 2010 the “alpha generation” [14]. Why? It is simple: the Latin alphabet has run out, in this case in science it is customary to switch to Greek. This aspect also has a certain symbolic connotation: a new alphabet, a new letter, a new beginning. The scientist gives them another definition, calling them the “glass generation,” because these children look at the glass screens of phones and other devices from an early age. Scientists agree that “alphas” will become the most affluent, technologically literate, educated and demanding (in terms of the quality of goods and services) generation of all previous ones. Therefore, most products and services will become personalized. Global trends indicate that most “alphas” will subsequently choose online learning. Even more than “zoomers”, “alphas” will be interested in a “healthy lifestyle” solving environmental problems and space expeditions.

These children learn from an early age how to make their own choices and how to act online on Internet, so freedom of choice and personalization are extremely important for them. People of the new generation know that everyone has their own

personal account on social networks, where they can create an individual feed based on their preferences. They are accustomed to the fact that a smart algorithm can create a list of cartoons, music or purchases based on the views carried out. For children born into the digital age, the virtual and real worlds are almost the same. They move freely from one to another because they believe that the pictures on the screen are increasingly similar to those that surround them in life. For these children, there is not much difference in how they perceive reality and information - through a smartphone screen or live.

5 Conclusion

There are many problems in the world, they also exist in working with young people at various levels of their education. But there is confidence that attention to the youth problems by the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian State, as well as their vast experience in solving social problems, will make the world more stable, bright and predictable, and human life in this world will be dignified, harmonious and responsible. The implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy has, in addition to socioeconomic international significance, also cultural and historical significance, because it contributes to the expansion and meaningful deepening of educational cooperation, the opening of new opportunities for the development of academic and student mobility which meets the educational politics of China and Russia (as well as countries included in this geographical and socioeconomic area). This strategy in the field of science and educational development also pursues more specific tasks for the implementation of joint research projects, the creation of joint educational programmes, the building of long-term communications between universities, the development of innovative educational technologies that take into account the changes that have occurred in the last decade in the world, as well as programmes on raising a healthy young generation.

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History and Political Correctness in the Modern West (Based on Materials from the InoSMI Portal)



Andrei Grinëv

1 Introduction

A lot has already been written about such a phenomenon as “political correctness (PC) in Russia and abroad. In particular, it has repeatedly attracted the attention of linguists who studied new language forms and vocabulary that arose under the influence of PC [10, 29, 31, 34]. In the electronic Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia, the following definition of this concept is given, clearly with a nod to the linguistic field: “*Political correctness* (adjectivally *politically correct*; commonly abbreviated *PC*) is a term used to describe language, policies, or measures that are intended to avoid offense or disadvantage to members of particular groups in society.” A similar explanation is given in the online version of the Cambridge Dictionary: “A politically correct person believes that language and actions that may be offensive to others, especially with regard to gender and race, should be avoided. To avoid insult, a politically correct word or expression is used: some people think that ‘fireman’ is a sexist term, and prefer the politically correct term ‘firefighter.’”

It cannot be said that the definitions given here are incorrect, but they are too limited. It is not surprising that representatives of political and social sciences, as well as practicing politicians, give a different definition of PC and their position may be influenced by ideological preferences. For example, a well-known representative of American right-wing conservative circles, William Lind, in his book states: “Political correctness is actually cultural Marxism, which has been transferred from the economic level to the cultural one” [24]. In other words, according to Lind, PC is nothing but a kind of totalitarian ideology that grew out of Marxism and spread in American universities after many representatives of the so-called “Frankfurt

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School” of left-wing philosophers fled from Nazi persecution from Germany to the United States in the 1930s [42]. Prominent Russian sociologist, political scientist, and philosopher Leonid Ionin, who has deeply studied the PC problem, gave a narrow definition of political correctness, noting: “In my opinion, political correctness is the ideology of modern mass democracy, serving, on the one hand, to substantiate the domestic and foreign policies of Western states and unions, and, on the other, to suppress dissent and ensure ideological and value consensus” [20]. In a later work, he repeats his thesis directly in the title of the article: “Political Correctness Is an Ideology” [21].

Other authors hold similar views. Thus, associate professor of the Moscow State Pedagogical University Marina Konysheva understands the liberal ideology of multicultural Western society by political correctness, although she points to the multi-dimensional nature of PC, which reflects and simultaneously defines social ethics and morality and is included in legislative regulations and influences the development of literary genres [22]. There are also other interpretations of PC: it is a direction of language policy, a certain cultural and political value, a part of political culture, a special discourse and behavior, and even a kind of censorship [15, 23, 25]. In my opinion, political correctness does not act as a kind of integral systematized ideology reflecting the interests of a particular social group; it cannot be reduced to language practice or a kind of censorship. *PC is a set of ideologized ideas and values as well as activities for their implementation in economic, social, political, and spiritual spheres (including education, linguistics, art, and morality).*

The main purpose of this article is to consider the various aspects of such a complex phenomenon as political correctness and such a related phenomenon as “cancel culture,” which are reflected in the pages of the Western press, presented on the Russian Internet portal InoSMI.

2 Methods and Materials

In preparing this chapter, such standard theoretical methods of scholarship were used as induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, a systematic approach, the method of social modeling, the comparative-typological and comparative-analytical method and also discourse analysis (this is the study of the language used by members of a certain linguistic community). In addition to theoretical methods, practical methods such as analysis of printed and electronic sources of information, and the method of content analysis were widely used in writing this chapter. The use of the latter helped, for example, in identifying the block of articles directly or indirectly related to the political correctness in the USA and other Western countries, posted on the InoSMI portal.

Materials collected over several years about manifestations of political correctness in various Western media over the past few years were presented on the InoSMI portal mainly in the heading “Grimaces of Political Correctness” and less often in other sections of this Internet platform. It is characteristic that materials about

political correctness are practically not found in the mass media of the countries of Asia, Africa or Latin America, from which we can conclude that this phenomenon is entirely generated by modern Western culture and is not perceived beyond certain geographical boundaries. It can be noted that materials about political correctness posted on the InoSMI portal have been less common in the last few years than before, which is likely due to the special military operation in Ukraine, which began in February 2022. This topic has become central to the portal InoSMI (in English: Foreign Media), and materials about political correctness were relegated to the periphery, although they did not completely disappear from the media space.

3 InoSMI Portal as a Mirror of Western Mass Media and the “Cancellation Culture”

Since my scientific specialization is history, I was curious to find out how PC interacts with it and uses it in the Western media space. The Russian Internet portal InoSMI (Foreign Mass Media) allows you to become acquainted with the relevant information, whose employees promptly monitor and translate into Russian articles from foreign newspapers and magazines, such as the *Wall Street Journal*, *Le Figaro*, *The Guardian*, *Svenska Dagbladet*, etc. The range of topics published on the portal is very wide: translations of articles in five main headings are posted online every day: “Politics,” “Economics,” “Society,” “Science,” “Blogs,” and “News.” The topics of interest to us are mainly presented in the last category. As a rule, articles are published in full, only sometimes with abbreviations, and very rarely information from the foreign press is given in the form of digests. However, occasionally the portal publishes videos of various foreign news channels or its own brief reviews and comments.

Being a fairly successful product of media convergence, the InoSMI portal appeared more than 20 years ago (2001), when the domain was registered as inosmi.ru. Since then it has gained some popularity among Russian Internet users interested in foreign politics and in the life of foreign countries in general. Currently, InoSMI’s activities are connected with the Russian International Information Agency RIA Novosti with the support of the Federal Press and Information Agency (Rospechat). The peculiarity of the portal is that, unlike the main Russian media, political propaganda in it is carried out in a soft, unobtrusive form, usually in the form of brief summaries of the content of published materials. Articles and interviews containing critical statements about President Putin, Russia, Moscow’s politics, and the way of life of Russians are allowed, and sometimes these are just openly Russophobic and anti-Russian opuses. The InoSMI portal posted especially a lot of materials about political correctness in 2020–2021, in connection with the acute socio-political crisis in the United States and a number of other Western countries after the well-known murder of George Floyd in May 2020. At the same time, the portal’s attitude to the topic of political correctness is unequivocally negative, which is expressed in

the title of the special heading “Grimaces of Political Correctness.” It should be clarified here that we will not be interested in all materials related to political correctness on the InoSMI portal—only those related to history, historical memory, education, and science. This topic has not yet been the object of special study.

The historical past and facts are actively used by supporters of political correctness to achieve their goal of preventing or even the slightest violation and infringement of the rights and dignity of the most suffering, in their opinion, social groups such as racial and national minorities, women, and LGBT+ people. Although representatives of these groups in the modern West have the same political and civil rights as other people, they are not subjected to any special discrimination. On the contrary, they often have certain benefits (for example, when entering universities), but this seems not enough to supporters of political correctness. They insistently demand that all people with white skin color repent to blacks (this politically incorrect word is actually prohibited in the USA) for the era of slavery, which ended more than 150 years ago; men need to repent to women for centuries of patriarchal “slavery” and all together repent to LGBT+ people for their oppression in the past. Thus, history plays an important role in the politics and propaganda of PC supporters, since it is to history that they usually appeal, seeking to introduce their worldview at literally any cost, and completely without any political correctness. They immediately accuse those who disagree with them of racism, sexism, and similar sins, and their arguments and reasonings are rejected as “toxic” (one of the favorite words from the dictionary of PC supporters). The so-called “cancellation culture” (cancel culture, call-out culture), i.e., mass boycott/ostracism/harassment of an opponent, his statements and works, primarily on the Internet. The writer Joanne Rowling, the author of the famous Harry Potter series of novels, who refused to bow down to the LGBT+ community, was subjected to such harassment.

One aspect of the political correctness and partly “cancellation culture” is the emphasis on collective responsibility, which is characteristic of the traditional despotisms of the East with their principle of mutual responsibility, well known in the history of China. On the other hand, the Roman law underlying the later European legislation, on the contrary, adhered to the principle of individual responsibility. But now, in line with political correctness in the West, collective guilt is placed on entire races and peoples without any individual distinction. For example, for the export of slaves from Africa to America in the 16–19 centuries, supporters of the PC blamed all modern whites in Europe and the United States, who had nothing to do with it. In the same way, after Russia began hostilities in Ukraine, all the blame for this was assigned to all Russians, although the vast majority of them did not take part in planning and participating in this military action. The “cancellation culture” even affected long-dead Russian writers and composers: Dostoevsk’s novels began to be removed from the shelves of bookstores in Germany and France and concerts of Tchaikovsky’s music in the United States were cancelled. Even Turkish(!) President *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan* denounced this policy as a manifestation of fascism at the beginning of March 2022 [2], and gradually Dostoevsky’s books began to return to bookstores in Europe, and in December of the same year, the opera *Boris Godunov* was performed at La Scala in Milan. Nevertheless, on 15 January 2023, the British

newspaper *The Guardian* published an article about discrimination against the articles of Russian physicists working at the Large Hadron Collider in Switzerland, as a result of which more than 70 articles where they acted as co-authors were not published [32]. Most of these scientists lived in Switzerland for several years and had nothing to do with the events in Ukraine, howbeit, became victims of the “cancellation culture” as a derivative of PC.

4 Political Correctness and Rethinking History

Although political correctness has a complex origin and many facets, I cannot but mention among them the socio-economic aspect, which Western scientists, politicians, and journalists usually forget about when discussing this social phenomenon. The introduction and maintenance of politically correct innovations, such as new vocabulary, overcoming “historical traumas,” and the like, caused the appearance in the United States of a whole army of lawyers, psychologists, and employees of the “politically correct front.” They conduct special training, courses, seminars, and lectures in various firms, corporations, army barracks, universities, and schools about racial, gender, and other inequalities; they are engaged in the fight against “white privileges,” “gender stereotypes” formed in the past, etc. As a result, a thriving and very profitable business has already developed in the United States, parasitizing political correctness. On this occasion, InoSMI cites the material of the Swedish reporter Ivar Arpi, published in the daily newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet*, who wrote: “There are only white city hall employees in Seattle!—forced to take courses designed to “counter internal racial white arrogance” [...] Whites are encouraged to admit that they are racists, and then refuse and trample on their own “whiteness” [3].

This is not a fantasy of a Swedish journalist—my colleague, a professor from the University of Tennessee, reported similar facts last year when the dean of their faculty strongly recommended that teachers take a similar course on “combating racism.” Moreover, from the point of view of PC adherents, racism can only be “white”; but there is no “black” or “yellow” racism, although this is not the case at all. For example, InoSMI quotes the newspaper *Le Figaro* about a speech on French television by an African-American writer and historian Nell Irvin Painter, who stated that a white man is “stupid, deceitful, and corrupt, he oppresses women...” After quoting these words, the author of the report, French journalist Gilles-William Goldnadel, could not resist commenting:

To be honest, I can’t even imagine the reaction of media, political, and intellectual circles if some white person took advantage of the example of the misconduct of black actor Bill Cosby or the recently elected the African-American deputy Justin Fairfax—they were both being prosecuted for rape—to blame it on all blacks. I’m willing to bet that by doing so he would have destroyed his reputation once and for all [16].

However, PC adherents and their wards get away with everything.

Accusing Europeans and white Americans of the slave trade in past centuries, supporters of political correctness turn a blind eye to the fact that not only whites but also Negro kings and leaders themselves were engaged in this, supplying slave traders with “live goods,” and Arabs and Turks took an active part in the slave trade. The material on this topic InoSMI borrowed again from the weekly *Le Figaro*, on whose pages a specialist in the history of the Maghreb—an employee of the Pantheon-Sorbonne University of Paris, Pierre Vermeren—gave the following statistics: the Atlantic slave trade led to the deportation of 14 million people from Africa to the New World over 3 centuries, and the Arab slave trade 17 million for 13 centuries. On average, the first covered 46,000 people per year for 300 years, and the second covered more than 13,000 people per year for 1260 years (with 20–30% of slaves dying while crossing the Sahara). Further, InoSMI quoted the words of Vermeren, which are directly related to political correctness and its adherents:

In postcolonial societies that are paralyzed by post-Christian guilt, activists and sympathizers arrange a real trial: slave labor has enriched the West, and now it is obliged to compensate the descendants of the victims. Such a statement indicates ignorance of the fact that the active rise of the West is associated with its industrialization, which began later. In addition, their anger is caused only by the Western slave trade [38].

The same was reported by the already mentioned Ivar Apri:

The idea that white people are carriers of unique guilt is not only dangerous but also erroneous from a historical point of view. In the countries from which there has been a recent flow of migrants to Europe, slavery existed much longer and blacks were treated worse there. In addition, for many hundreds of years, up to the middle of the 19th century, whites were also used as slaves. They were sent, for example, to North Africa and the Middle East. This would still be the case today if countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom had not exerted pressure. The Whites have been on both sides of the barricades. Not to admit it means to lie and distort history [4].

The articles by Vermeren and Apri echo the material of the French information site *Atlantico*, which posted an article by political scientist and publicist Alexandre Del Valle, reprinted by InoSMI. He criticized the fundamental myths of “cosmopolitan correctness” and the ideology of “wokeism” that grew out of it (from the English: “woke”—“awakened, awake,” which in Negro slang means “to wake up and not put up with discrimination”). In his article, Del Valle sought to show the inconsistency of this ideological attitude, which requires constant punishment of a white man of the Judeo-Christian faith, his endless self-flagellation, since he must thus atone for his past historical sins, in particular the slave trade and exploitation of black slaves. In this regard, Del Valle recalls some indisputable facts that suggest that even before the transatlantic slave trade, millions of whites were subjected to even more cruel treatment than black Africans enslaved by Europeans. We are talking about Slavs who were driven into slavery by steppe nomads and Turks for more than 1000 years, as well as Europeans who were captured by Barbary pirates until the beginning of the 19th century. But no one is going to repent for their sins; representatives of the PC and its offshoot—vokism—are waiting for repentance, benefits, and if possible monetary compensation only for the European slave trade [7].

Thus, supporters of political correctness do not want to know the true history. They are only interested in it as an instrument of their ideological struggle and the opportunity to improve the financial condition of a number of social groups “offended by history” (for example, the governor of California in 2020 created a commission to study the issue of possible payment of reparations to descendants of slaves). Needless to say, PC enthusiasts have their own special logic and ideas of justice, as if taken from the famous fairy tale *Animal Farm* by George Orwell, where pig leaders made an addition to the commandments of its inhabitants, adding: “All animals are equal between themselves, but some are more equal than others.”

It is not surprising that PC adherents seek to revise history itself and the system of its teaching and study. In particular, InoSMI published a long article by Howard Williams, Professor of archaeology at the University of Chester in the UK, in the online edition of *Aeon* magazine, in which he wrote: “Since September 2019, experts in the study of the history of the Middle Ages have been hotly debating the term “Anglo-Saxon.” These disputes began in connection with statements about racism and sexism within the International Society of Anglo-Saxon Period Researchers (International Society of Anglo-Saxonists), a scientific organization specializing in the study of history, archaeology, literature, language, religion, social order, and numismatics of the early Middle Ages (450–1100 AD). Some scientists argued that that changing the name of this society will be a step toward combating racism and sexism, especially in the way scientists explore and interpret the early Middle Ages. [...] Undoubtedly, the term “Anglo-Saxon” is just one of a number of terms from the early Middle Ages that can evoke potentially dangerous and misleading racial and nationalist associations—other examples are the terms “Celts,” “Germans,” “Vikings,” and so on. On the other hand, the term “Anglo-Saxon” has long since lost its racist element, which was characteristic of it in the 19th century” [40]. I never thought that the terms “Celts” or “Vikings” could pose some kind of danger, especially since the latter simply did not exist for almost 1000 years. It is interesting to know what kind of danger, from the point of view of the PC supporters, such words as “Slavs” and “Russians” pose, as well as when and how this historical-linguistic idiocy will end. The last word, again, is completely politically incorrect. Therefore, I hasten to use politically correct vocabulary (the essence of this will not change at all): how long will all these linguistic acrobatics associated with an alternative perception of reality last?

Nevertheless, attempts to revise classical historical science do not stop, as InoSMI informs, based on an article by American journalist Rachel Poser from the *New York Times* newspaper. One of the famous American historians recently tried to prove that the ancient world was not “white,” and the ideas about the foundations of Western civilization should be revised through the prism of multiculturalism with an emphasis on a multiracial approach. From his point of view, classical science is historically so intertwined with the idea of white supremacy that it is inseparable from it [33].

Classical science, indeed, has been created over the centuries by the genius and work of European scientists, but what does the idea of white supremacy have to do with it? Did Isaac Newton derive his physical laws specifically out of a desire to

humiliate Negroes? Maybe European scientists should have given up studying science in order not to embarrass the colored population with it? However, the USA has already found a way out. InoSMI publishes the material of the American Fox News channel that the authorities of the state of Oregon, having seen in the traditional course of mathematics “ideas of the superiority of the white race” and considering mathematical objectivity and focus on the correct answer as racism, tried to introduce a new course of “ethnomathematics” to combat it. The guidelines on this subject state that teachers are required to “recognize and challenge the methods by which mathematics is used to defend capitalist, imperialist, and racist views” [8]. What is this but the apotheosis of politically correct insanity, the struggle with common sense and the basics of science!

5 The Attitude of Western Intellectuals to Political Correctness

However, it cannot be said that all Western intellectuals blindly follow the guidelines of political correctness and accept it without a fight. InoSMI publishes an interview with the French philosopher, specialist on racial issues Pierre-André Taguieff to the staff of the *Atlantico* website, in which he gives several precise characteristics relevant to the interpretation of history by supporters of PC:

Among the “postcolonial” and “decolonial” authors, we see only ultra-left writers and specialists, who are engaged in political and, to varying degrees, radical criticism of European history and thought. In this they use intellectual tools that have been borrowed from a number of European postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers, adherents of the “deconstruction” of philosophical concepts. The most famous of them is Jacques Derrida. [...] These authors do not engage in serious research of the topics and issues raised, but use them for their own promotion (new positions, presence in the media, etc.), for commercial (events, documentaries, exhibitions, etc.) and political purposes (pressure on parties to include in their programs to combat discrimination of “minorities” and the introduction of positive discrimination systems). [...] The task of intellectuals is to make postcolonialism and decolonialism a goal capable of debunking its critics. First, it is necessary to show that its ideologists are the product of pseudo-scientific historiography, which is reduced to settling accounts with the national past. Real experts on the colonial period found in the works of these activists hiding behind the mask of historians are a huge number of glaring inaccuracies, errors, omissions, falsifications of facts, substitution of concepts (including with Nazism), and simply lies [36].

It is difficult not to agree with these conclusions. To deliberately turn a blind eye to historical facts, to conceal part of historical information means to engage in distortion and falsification of history, in which the supporters of political correctness have succeeded very well. The manipulation of historical memory with the help of PC has already led in France to the fact that the main national holiday of the country—Bastille Day on July 14 (La Fête Nationale) was subjected to doubt and contempt. This day of historical memory has become an occasion for many Internet users to express their opinion about the country as a “racist colonial empire,” as reported by

the InoSMI portal with reference to the weekly magazine *Valeurs actuelles* [37]. Even such a cult figure of French history as Napoleon, who was attacked by the American newspaper *New York Times*, did not escape criticism for racism, as Olivier Amiel, a columnist of the French Internet portal Causeur, reported with indignation:

An American newspaper claiming to be an authoritative publication has become, first, an official organ of intolerance. Intolerance to all other opinions on its pages is shown by the so-called progressives. They are ready to sacrifice everyone to their ideology of woke (“thinking of the awakened”), which at the same time claims to protect the victims of injustice. [...] Returning to the topic of the establishment of slavery in the colonies of [France] in 1802 (forgetting about the historical context of this decision, the regrets of the emperor himself and the abolition of the slave trade for “100 days” in 1815), the authors of the article call Napoleon “the greatest tyrant” and for some reason “an icon of the idea of the superiority of the white race.” Without taking into account the entire volume of facts and historical context, the author of the publication [in an American newspaper] forgets about Mark Bloch’s lesson about the vocation of history. The vocation of history is “to understand, not to condemn,” since “judging, we inevitably lose all desire to find an explanation” [1].

My attitude toward Napoleon is purely negative, but to call him an “icon of the idea of the superiority of the white race,” I don’t know what to say.

In general, in France, the confrontation between political correctness imposed from overseas and local historical traditions caused a sharp reaction from a number of local intellectuals. InoSMI cites the words of the French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut on the pages of the magazine *Valeurs actuelles* about the criticism by supporters of the PC of a number of major figures in the history of France:

We risk getting involved in a process that will not and cannot have an end. Today it is Colbert, and tomorrow it may be Jules Ferry, who said that the duty of the higher races is to “civilize the lower.” History should be viewed in context, and not transferred to the past by modern obsessions. [...] If we rewrite history under the sign of anti-racism, we must condemn Louis IX, who administered justice under an oak tree, but burned the Talmud in the square and persecuted Jews. What about Voltaire and his anti-Semitism? We will be forced to turn history into a trial with an endless list of accused. [...] History is the fruit of knowledge. We need to talk about slavery, but in all its components. Yes, the Negro slave trade is a crime against humanity. But slavery existed in Africa itself, Africans participated in it. 11 million prisoners were taken into the hands of European slave traders, and another 17 million slaves were sent to the east, to Muslim countries. The purpose of this historical reminder is an attempt not to shift the blame, but to emphasize that the main feature of France and Europe is not slavery, but the struggle for its abolition. All cultures have stained themselves with crimes, but only the Western one has known the pain of guilt. European civilization is able to take a critical look at itself [12].

Giving the floor to traditional and right-wing conservative scientists and journalists who denounce the inadequacy of political correctness, InoSMI for “balance,” published a long speech by American columnist and historian James McAuley on the pages of the weekly *The Nation*, in which he strongly defends the “woke culture and complains that it has not yet taken root in Europe in due measure. Nevertheless, he believes that “woke” will eventually win: “In Europe, as in the United States, the battle for “woke ideas” is also a battle for the history of each nation—how it is written, how it is taught, how it is understood. [...] For many on both sides of the Atlantic, aggressive opposition to “woke ideas” is the last attempt to give

themselves some meaning, and in fact it is a rather pathetic role” [28]. And McAuley is right in the sense that PC inevitably squeezes out of higher education in the West any sprouts of free thinking and genuine science. French sociologist Mathieu Bock-Coté, whose opinion is cited by InoSMI, characterizes the situation as follows:

The orthodoxy of [racial] diversity dominates not only in the social sciences, but also in the most unexpected fields, such as mathematics and physics: they also need to be “decolonized,” saved from the “dominance of whites.” The jargon peculiar to it consists in presenting meaningless fabrications with scientific knowledge and making idiots of those who stubbornly do not want to obey. At universities, there are topics and areas of research that are becoming almost mandatory. Anyone who does not accept them condemns himself to remain on the periphery and is unlikely to make a career. [...] Certain worldviews have become practically impossible in modern universities. At the university, they no longer think independently, but strive to show that they think like everyone else. For this purpose, special keywords are used, which serve as a sign of support for a politically correct regime [5].

As if confirming this opinion, InoSMI cites a statement on this topic by the American writer and literary critic Jeffrey Folks in the daily electronic magazine *The American Thinker*: “Any normal, sane person who happens to be at the symposium of the Association of Modern Language [in January 2021] will think that he inadvertently wandered into a hospital for insane intellectuals.” This is not a random diagnosis, Folkes further reports, since the overwhelming majority of humanities teachers at modern U.S. universities are supporters of leftist ideas:

During one survey among history professors, it turned out that 33 liberals account for one conservative. And only 2% of literature professors consider themselves Republicans. As a representative of these 2%, I had to endure a lot. I tried to hide my political orientation until I got my degree, but even then, as soon as I “came out of the closet,” my career stalled. The worst part was when it turned out that the teachers, whom I respected and with whom I was friends, put politics above professionalism. It turned out that articles for publication are chosen purely according to political criteria—leading journals refuse to publish materials attacking the prevailing ideology [of political correctness], and university publishing houses are no better [13].

Some humanities teachers go even further. So InoSMI reports, with reference to the material of the American online news publication *The Daily Beast*, that the historian of George Washington University, Professor Jessica Krug, being of Jewish origin, pretended to be a Black woman from North Africa all her career, obviously to get preferences and popularity [41].

6 Political Correctness and Culture, Education and the KGB

The historical aspect of artistic culture has also not escaped the pressure of political correctness. This was especially noticeable in the summer of 2020 when an acute socio-political crisis erupted in the United States after the death of an African-American, George Floyd, who was detained by the police, which led to a mass movement for the demolition of historical monuments to European colonialists,

Confederate Southerners, and other “politically incorrect” historical characters [14, 17].

InoSMI published a speech by British writer and newspaper columnist Allison Pearson in *The Telegraph* newspaper, which sharply opposed the decision of the BBC media corporation to remove patriotic songs and historical anthems from the air. Pearson asked angrily: “When will this vile horde of self-satisfied leftist vandals leave our culture and traditions alone? It seems that they will not stop until they ban all suspicious statues, all inspirational hymns and all poems that came from the pen of despicable white men (sorry, but this includes almost all great poets, except, perhaps, Emily Dickinson)” [30].

But political correctness has many defenders. InoSMI published the opinion of Arwa Mahdawi, a columnist for *The Guardian* in London, about the historical series on Channel 5, where the role of Henry VIII’s second wife Anne Boleyn is played by a black actress. This delights the British journalist, who believes that people who do not share her feelings are just racists [26]. What does racism have to do with it, because we are talking about a *historical* series? However, in the cultural life of the modern West, such “racial historical fiction” is beginning to gain popularity. It is exemplified by another recent series, *Bridgerton*, which is set in the eighteenth century, when Britain was the largest human trader on the planet, and yet Queen Charlotte is played by a black actress. Touching on this topic in his essay (2023), British journalist Steve Rose notes that sometimes such racial fiction does attract criticism:

In the meantime, another new show has had people up in arms: Queen Cleopatra, a [Netflix](#) docuseries co-produced and narrated by Jada Pinkett Smith. Its sin was to cast a Black actor as the Egyptian ruler: Britain’s Adele James, who is mixed race. Cleopatra has been portrayed many times by white actors, including Vivien Leigh, Elizabeth Taylor and Monica Bellucci, but this supposed “blackwashing” was too much for some – and not just the usual suspects. Egypt’s antiquities minister, Zahi Hawass, complained: “This is completely fake. Cleopatra was Greek, meaning that she was light-skinned, not black.” One Egyptian lawyer even sought legal action to block Netflix in the country for its promotion of “Afrocentric thinking” [35].

Continuing this topic, I want to use the politically correct expression “historical trauma” and say that I, as a historian, am constantly traumatized by modern Western films, plays, and productions of recent years, where, for example, the role of titled aristocrats and advisers to the Russian Empress Catherine II is played by negros (in Russia it is the usual neutral term that serves to refer to the inhabitants of Sub-Saharan Africa), or when Marshal Baron Mannerheim, the head of Finland in the 1930s–1940s, is portrayed by an Ethiopian. I think all normal, mentally healthy people who are at least a little familiar with history experience the same trauma. I have absolutely no objection to black actors where it is historically appropriate (for example, in a film about the problems of the American South during Reconstruction or about the 2nd World War on the Western Front). But why grossly distort specific historical episodes for the sake of politically correct representation of the colored population? And then, why should everyone love and honor Blacks, LGBT+ people, and the like? On what basis? Just because their ancestors once suffered or were

oppressed? But the same can be said about the overwhelming majority of the white population in the past, for example, about English villains, Russian serfs, or ancient Roman slaves. In general, why should any group of the population receive benefits only on the basis of their physiological characteristics and sexual preferences? The only criterion that should determine a person's social status and respect for him is his or her useful activity for society, competence, diligence, and talent, and not racial or socio-class origin, gender or sexual orientation.

But in order to consolidate the relevant politically correct attitudes, Black History Month is celebrated annually in the USA and Canada in February. During this month, commemorative events dedicated to the society's struggle against slavery, racism, prejudice, and poverty are held, and the contribution of African-Americans to the cultural and political life of the country is also celebrated. A similar month is held annually in the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands in October. InoSMI publishes, with reference to CNN, an article by representatives of the American academic community Melanie Harris and Jennifer Harvey under the heading "White Parents, This Month of Negro History Will Have to Work Hard" [19]. On the other hand, InoSMI cites an interview with an American professor in the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, who had to resign in 2017 from Evergreen State College (Washington State) because of the rejection of the "Day without Whites" introduced by the administration [27].

It can be said without exaggeration that today PC largely determines historical education in the West, especially in the United States. If earlier the history of the country was studied by schoolchildren in time periods and in accordance with the rule of presidents, now it is often taught in the form of the history of various marginal groups, according to "critical race theory," as the well-known American journalist Bari Weiss writes on the pages of *City Journal* [39]. Not surprisingly, the San Francisco School Board voted to remove the names of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and dozens of other historical figures from the names of the district's institutions because of their links to a culture of racism and "defamatory heritage," reported journalist Shawn Cohen in the British *MailOnline* [6].

A number of journalists associate the reasons for the current rampant political correctness in the United States with the dominance of PC supporters and henchmen in schools and universities. So, InoSMI quotes an interview with conservative American writer, journalist, and blogger Rod Dreher with the French newspaper *Le Figaro*. According to Dreher, the wave of riots and pogroms in the United States in the summer of 2020 has its source in the victory of aggressive leftist ideology in universities and the press: "The left in universities and the media for many years promoted the idea that blacks are victims of oppression, and that their anger is justified. Today, all this is reflected in the form of the streets of our cities engulfed in fire" [9]. The baton was picked up by Republican Seth Grossman on the pages of *The American Thinker* magazine: "The riots that began in Minneapolis are a direct consequence of the false history that the media, Hollywood, and most colleges and public schools have been feeding us for the last half century. Fictional 'systemic racism' ascribes collective guilt to whites for every injustice, and Christians, Republicans, and those who love America get the most" [18].

Dreher's and Grossman's assertions are not without certain grounds, and the Soviet KGB once had a hand in spreading political correctness in Western universities. InoSMI reprinted material on this subject from *The American Thinker* magazine: back in 1984, a fugitive KGB agent, Yuri Bezmenov, said that his organization in the United States was engaged not so much in espionage as in ideological subversion. According to Bezmenov, the goal of the KGB was to conquer America by gradually changing the consciousness of Americans from within, for which American students were secretly encouraged to adopt Marxist ideology as opposed to capitalist values. Bezmenov argued that the children of the 1960s had now matured, taken positions of power, and the leftist stereotypes that had developed among them were almost impossible to change [11]. It can be added here that if the ongoing escalation of political correctness in the U.S. eventually leads to a new civil war and the country falls apart, this will be an indirect result of one of the most successful KGB operations in its history.

7 Conclusion

Summing up the overall results, we can come to the following conclusions. Judging by the materials regularly published by INOSMI, political correctness in the West, especially in the USA, is an essential factor of social development. History is actively used by PC supporters to manipulate the consciousness of the masses through the mediation of various media, school and university education, scientific, cultural, and public and administrative organizations. At the same time, in order to achieve their goals, PC activists go to outright fraud and falsification of the historical past. They spare no effort to turn history, figuratively speaking (using their own politically correct vocabulary), into a woman with reduced social responsibility. Attempts to counter the PC are still ineffective, although InoSMI publishes a lot of materials on this topic. Of course, the portal itself cannot be considered an impartial mirror of foreign mass media. Despite the fact that this news resource positions itself as the most neutral and objective, the selection of mass media and translated materials indicates a clear trend toward conservatism and rejection of left-wing radicalism, so popular among a significant part of the Western media. This position of the portal is explained by the policy of the state to which it belongs, and the specifics of the Russian audience (which generally has a negative attitude toward PC, which is demonstrated by the comments of readers). In fact, the portal is a hidden mechanism of political and ideological manipulation, since a selection of specially selected InoSMI translations is ultimately intended to clearly demonstrate to the Russian audience the crisis of Western society and modern Western democracy using the example of the practice of using political correctness. Despite the above, the portal at the same time performs a very useful function, acquainting Russian-speaking readers with the point of view of foreign journalists, politicians, and experts (albeit in a somewhat dissected form) on various topical issues, including political correctness and various stories related to the historical past. And since PC

in its present form is an opponent of traditional Western civilization and its history, the latter automatically becomes a natural victim of political correctness.

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The Chams as Indigenous People: Issues of Survival, Resistance, and (In)Visibility



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1 Introduction

Members of minorities or indigenous peoples are affected both by their displacement and by the long-term legacy of discrimination. The chapter touches upon the Cham, the largest indigenous people of the historical Champa which existed from second to eighteenth centuries on the territory of southern Vietnam.

The Cham, an ethnic minority in Cambodia and Vietnam, are descendants of the population of Champa. For centuries, the ancestors of the modern Chams have been struggling for their survival as a people of Champa due to the steady annexation and colonization of their territory by the Vietnamese state. The most tragic events in the modern history of the Champa state happened in the 1830s. In 1832, the Vietnamese “march to the south” (Nam Tiến), the gradual and often sanguinary conquest of Champa, ended with the full annexation of Panduranga, the last Cham principality in the south.

In the nineteenth century, the Cham together with other dependent groups were forcibly displaced by the Vietnamese to the frontier zone of the Mekong Delta. In the second part of the twentieth century, under the rule of the Republic of Vietnam and then of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the agricultural lands of the Cham were mainly seized by colonists from other provinces. No surprise that Chams live in the most arid areas of the country, with desert-like landscapes with sand hills and cactuses, which are actively exploited by the visual arts and tourism industry of Vietnam. The Cham represent a visible minority because of their racial characteristics, language and traditional costumes, especially among Muslims, which differ from the majority both in Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as in other countries where they migrated.

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As mentioned in the recent paper for TIPG, descendants of the Champa population became and still remain victims of internal colonialism [5] when “a state exploits and oppresses peoples and regions within their own boundaries” [16]. K. Anderson has indicated based on the case of Indonesia that “transmigration and settlement also serve the purpose of undermining the self-determination of the local population by rendering them a minority...” Like in many other countries, this policy creates conflict as outside settlers swamp and dissolve indigenous peoples [1].

In his outstanding article on the Central Highlands of Vietnam, G. Evans concluded that the Vietnamization and colonization processes were carried forward by communists with a vengeance [14]. Indeed, forced assimilation involves an intentional state policy directed towards the ethnocide (cultural genocide) of the group. Acts that may be characterized as cultural genocide should in fact be plainly considered genocide [1].

2 Methods and Problem Statement

The study is based on a comparative historical, political and legal analysis that should result in a better understanding of the situation of the Cham in Cambodia and Vietnam.

The chapter traces the causes and factors that contributed to the violence against the Cham, and the question of how they survived and resisted. After the decolonization, the “internal colonialism” intensified in the former French Indochina, including the process of Vietnamization and colonization of the mountains [12]. This process goes back to the 1830s that is after the full annexation of the last Cham principality and before the French colonization of Vietnam itself. It is to be noted that the “feeling of ownership of one’s tribals” can be found not only in Southeast Asia but in many other regions of the world [33]. Eventually, in the 1970s the Cham became the main targeted minority during the genocide of Khmer Rouge. Concerning the Cambodian genocide, G. Stanton’s concept of the genocide stages has been applied.

James Clifford, long ago, in 1997, indicated that indigenous and minority discourse began to be replaced by one of diaspora, and it was becoming an articulation of dispossession that placed stress on the empowering potential of global networks instead of the isolating siege mentality of minority discourse [9]. In his later article, J. Clifford wrote: “[R]uptures and connections—lost homelands, partial returns, relational identities, and world-spanning networks—are fundamental components of indigenous experience today” [10]. Actually, the concept of exodus and refuge is to be specifically applied to the Cham who had early become a refugee ethnic group [4], like Palestinians or Rohingya nowadays. At the final stage of my research, qualitative methods of netnography (a methodology for online research) were applied to the analysis of the Cham diaspora in the USA, where the largest Cham community outside of Asia lives.

3 Results of Research

3.1 *Survival of the Cham*

The discrimination and subjugation of indigenous peoples in Vietnam are connected to the history of dispossession, expulsion and extermination of the descendants of Champa. In its history, Vietnam used different methods against its ethnic minorities, from forced labour and assimilation to mass atrocities, and the Cham has always been at risk of genocide by attrition.

One of the most famous French scholars of Champa, G. Maspero mentions that 60,000 Chams were massacred by the Vietnamese and other 30,000 Chams were taken as prisoners in 1471 [24]. Ben Kiernan explains the Dai Viet's policies of banning all Vietnamese from marrying Cham women, forcing Chams to follow Vietnamese customs, and the systematic captures of additional Cham people as prisoners as genocidal. He proves that the Vietnamese king ordered all captured Chams to be eventually executed in 1509 [20]. The Vietnamese genocidal project is explained with a clear purpose: "While intermittently pursuing genocidal policies against Chams... Dai Viet had vastly expanded its territories" [20].

The practices of atrocities in pre-colonial Vietnam were repeated in independent Cambodia in the 1970s, proving the opinion of D. Maybury-Lewis [25]. In general, in the cases of (neo-) colonial genocides, "the physical destruction of the indigenous people may not be directly intended; rather, the perpetrators substantially undermine the foundations of existence for indigenous groups through systemic oppression or wilfully reckless policies" [1]. They are also to be considered as initial stages of genocide, according to Gregory Stanton's concept of the stages of genocide.¹

Before the total annexation of the Cham principality of Panduranga, the last Cham king Po Tion and his household, as well as many other people, had to flee to Cambodia in 1822. Some royal regalia were given to Raglai in the mountainous region for preservation. In 1832, Vietnam annexed the remnants of Champa by sending troops into Panduranga. The Chams responded with a series of popular uprisings. Thus, in 1833, a major uprising was led by Katip Sumat, a Muslim of noble origin, and acquired the form of a holy war (*jihad*). In 1834–35, another insurrection was incited by Katip Yathak-va. After the uprisings' suppression, it was mainly Cham Muslims who fled to Cambodia.

J. Willoughby reasonably noted that the Cham in Cambodia did not benefit from the French rule (established in 1859), but the conditions of the Cham in Vietnam were eased to some extent, as the French became their guardians [38]. Since there were many waves of Cham transmigration to Cambodia [4], it is no surprise that, before the French colonization of Indochina, the majority of Chams resided in Cambodia rather than in their fatherland.

¹For example: *The Ten Stages of a Genocide - Montreal Holocaust Museum*: [<https://museeholocauste.ca/en/resources-training/ten-stages-genocide>].

In Vietnam, the material and non-material culture of the Cham was broadly marginalized or assimilated. For example, the latter happened to the Po Nagar temple in Nha Trang and the legends about this female deity, the mythic founder of Champa [3].

3.2 *Current Challenges to the Cham Identities*

Vietnam, as indicated by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), “one of the challenges for indigenous peoples in Vietnam is land tenure and the allocation of forest land to communities”.² For example, at the turn of the twenty-first century, the authorities of Vietnam continued the policy of active resettlement of ethnic Vietnamese to the areas of traditional residence of the Tay Nguyen highlanders, who have long been engaged in slash-and-burn farming as well as in hunting and gathering. The resettlement is accompanied by the seizure of communal lands and the pauperization of the indigenous population. The increase in inter-ethnic and social tension is aggravated by the communist government’s oppression of adherents of Protestantism among the indigenous peoples of Tay Nguyen (Dega Protestantism). At the international level, Vietnam has not ratified ILO Convention No.169 and does not recognize ethnic minorities as indigenous peoples.³

One of the elements of slow genocide is the destruction of the minority’s culture to fasten the violent assimilation and to oppress any resistance.

Serious challenges for the Cham cultural heritage and its preservation can be illustrated with the Kate festival, the biggest religious holiday among the Cham Hinduists (*Balamon*) in Vietnam. In recent decades, the Kate festival celebrations at the temple towers have become formal events with the presence of local officials, journalists and police. Representatives of the latter, dressed in full uniform, are especially striking against the backdrop of the ancient temple complex. With their rubber batons, which they often use to drive Cham children and youth away from the “rostrum” for officials, they cannot help but shock foreign tourists. In addition, any foreign journalists or researchers are of particular concern to the authorities. Any such contact with the Cham population is monitored, which creates an unhealthy atmosphere and creates further problems for the Cham informants.

In the evening, concerts are held in several villages, attended by groups from neighbouring provinces. However, the music and performance are far from traditional; songs are performed mainly in Vietnamese and many of the dances are in “à la Cham” style that the Vietnamese hotel and tourism business abundantly treats tourists to. If earlier the family celebration of Kate lasted up to a month, it lasts now only one week. Definitely, the Kate holiday had a more religious character in previous times, without giving it the colour of a national Cham holiday. In general, the

² Vietnam – IWGIA – International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs [<https://www.iwgia.org/en/vietnam.html>].

³ Ibid.

Kate festival is comparable in its significance to the Kinh Vietnamese Tết and is one of the most striking manifestations of the modern Cham culture. At the same time, the religious significance of the holiday is quickly being lost, which negatively affects the preservation of Cham traditions [6].

Having become an oppressed minority on their ancestors' lands of Champa, the Cham failed to develop a state, however, they have preserved a sense of cultural esteem, which places them between the indigenous people and the nation-states of the region [8], as one can see in Cambodia of today.

Cambodia. According to J. Ovesen and I. Trankell [31], Cambodia is unusual within Southeast Asia for its small ethnic minority populations, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the population (ethnic Khmer are about 90%).

The Khmer majority generally considers a set of minorities known as “Upper Khmer” (“Highland Peoples”) to be indigenous and distinctive in their cultural and economic practices. These groups generally exhibit most or all of the characteristics of potential vulnerability [19].

Actually, the ethnolinguistic list of Cambodia created by the World Bank based on the 15th edition of “Ethnologue” includes Cham, a large and well-established minority language,⁴ though the Cham were not considered vulnerable or disadvantaged due to their size of population and rather successful integration into the local economy in the context of the World Bank’s development projects. Nevertheless, the Cham of Cambodia must be considered indigenous, given their history and centuries of transigrations and life in the borderlands, including the period of French Indochina [4]. For comparison, in Vietnam, the Kinh (Viet) majority is 85.3% (2023). As a mockery, Vietnam has not recognized the Cham and all other aboriginal ethnic groups as indigenous peoples and still abstains from joining the above-mentioned ILO convention.

A scheme of ethnic classification was elaborated by Norodom Sihanouk in order to include non-Khmer ethnic minorities as bona fide Khmers [31]. Minority groups included “upland Khmer” in the northeastern provinces; “lowland Khmer” who were ethnic Khmer living on the territory of Vietnam in the delta of Mekong, and the Muslim Cham and Malays in the central area of the country (“Khmer Islam”). It is well known that the classification is the first stage of genocide, and it was broadly used by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s.

Obviously, the classification assumed that upland Khmer and Khmer Islam would become more like the majority Khmer [13], so scholars name it “Khmerization”. Similar to the highlands of Vietnam (on the former lands of Champa), during the process, Khmer peasant and soldier families from the lowlands were sent as settlers to the sparsely populated hill areas in the northeast [13]. For the purpose of gradual assimilation, in return for land provided by the government, these colonists were supposed to be a good example for the uplanders, like

⁴Ethnologue: Languages of the World. Gordon, R.G. ed. Dallas, Tex.: SIL International. 2005 <http://www.ethnologue.com>

cultivating paddy or wearing “proper clothes” [31]. Other government programmes also targeted youths there [37].

Nevertheless, the current situation of the Cham community has improved: after decades of repressions and forced assimilation, it is open for cooperation with other countries and Muslim institutions, though it still experiences a lack of access to many educational and economic opportunities.

3.3 Resistance to the Khmer Rouge Genocide

In fact, the Southwest Zone, the heartland of Pol Pot’s Party Centre faction, saw the earliest attacks upon Cham culture and Islam. The restrictions and prohibitions there began as early as the middle of 1972. From October 1973, Chams (Khmer Islam) organized demonstrations against the communist suppression of their religious belief. The Khmer Rouge moved on to mass arrests of the Cham activists in November 1973. Until mid-1974, at least 300 Khmer Moslems had been arrested, a large majority of whom were from Krauchhmar District, Kompong Cham Province. Most of them were prominent Muslim villagers and religious leaders, first of all, Koranic teachers [32].

Eventually, by December 1974, the arrests of Cham leaders in Trea Village of (Krauchhmar District) provoked a rebellion. As James Fenton reported: “A group called the Khmer Saor, or ‘White Khmers’ had broken away from the Khmer Rouge and taken to the forests. The White Khmers, whose leaders are former communist officials, are mostly Cham Moslems. They support Sihanouk and oppose collectivization of property. They believe simply in the abolition of middlemen”.⁵ No surprise that they did not survive in Democratic Kampuchea after April 1975.

As we indicated in my previous TIPG paper, the Cham resistance in Cambodia and Vietnam was threefold: aspiration to regain state or religious autonomy, escape from the oppressing state and discerning mobility within its territory [4]. The Cambodian Cham as a minority of immigrant descent reinvents their identity based on Islam, while their ethnic identity is at a secondary position. Interestingly, in Malaysia, Cham refugees from Cambodia assimilated relatively easily as Muslims with Malay characteristics, which is comparable to the assimilation of Muslim refugees from Russia in the Ottoman Empire.

A Cham scholar from Cambodia and genocide survivor himself, Ysa Osman has provided a lot of very important data on the genocide against Chams in his three books [28–30]. The first one, “Oukoubah”, contains 115 interviews that allowed Osman to ascertain the names of 13 Cham prisoners executed in Tuol Sleng [28]. The second book, “The Cham Rebellion”, was written based on 97 interviews with Cham survivors [29]. Both books prove many genocidal acts committed by Khmer Rouge against men, women, and children before and after April 1975. For example,

⁵Fenton, J.: Washington Post, 24 November 1974.

he described incidents in Krochchmar (1970–1975), Trea (1973), and the Cham uprisings in Svayklieng and Koh Phal island (1975). Some examples of atrocities committed in the Eastern zone are also mentioned by the author in his previous TIPG paper [5].

Moreover, Y. Osman has given his own assessment of the Cham population in Cambodia in the early 1970s and after the genocide [28]. It is important to note that the atrocities against the Cham and Muslim minority as a whole started to be committed much earlier than April 1975 [5]. There are many facts about the killing of Cham imams, and other religious and community leaders, in the so-called “freed areas” created by Khmer Rouges during the civil war in 1970–1975 [5, 21, 36].

As early as 1973–1974, from the first stages of genocide Khmer Rouge quickly moved forward, up to the last ones.

Farina So, a Cham female scholar, in her remarkable MA thesis and other works, considered a specific page in the story of the Cambodian genocide—the passive resistance of the Cham women: “Cham Muslims were stripped of ethnic identity, language, dress, names, and funerals. There was no reasonable time for them to adapt, and there was no protection of them as an ethnic minority group. Instead, they were oppressed and humiliated by derogatory words... However, women responded to the bad treatment by both compromising and resisting in accordance with the practical situation” [35]. Through their responses, they tried to protect their identity and Islam, especially when community religious leaders and teachers were killed, Islam was abolished, but it made them hold on secretly to their religion and identity. Under the threat of death just for being Chams and Muslims, they gave up prayer and other rituals, however, “they did pray in their heart asking God to safeguard them” [Ibid]. F. So justly observed that women implicitly and explicitly condemned and punished the Khmer Rouge through their actions, verbal and non-verbal [Ibid].

3.4 Organized Armed Resistance: the FLC⁶ and FULRO⁷ (1960–1975)

In the twentieth century, the peak of the Cham resistance in both countries was in the 1960s during the Second Indochina War. In 1960 colonel Lès Kosem, a Cham from Malaysia, founded the Champa Liberation Front (FLC). His dream was to recover the territory of Champa within its borders in 1471, that is, before the capture of Vijaya by the Vietnamese.

However, the front was soon transformed because of its merger with the FLM (Highlands Liberation Front) and the Front for the Liberation of Kampuchea Krom (FLKK) after the coup d'état against the president of the Republic of South Vietnam

⁶French: *Front pour la libération du Champa*.

⁷French: *Front unifié de lutte des races opprimées*.

Ngô Đình Diệm in Saigon (1 November 1963). This movement appeared as a reaction to the colonization policy of Diệm in the highlands populated mainly by the indigenous peoples of former Champa. Diệm cancelled the autonomy status that had been granted to this region by Emperor Bảo Đại and pushed large numbers of Vietnamese migrants to settle in the highlands. Moreover, they often seized lands in a brutal manner, so the weak and unarmed highlanders were forced to work for the settlers, in conditions close to forced labour or servitude. Moreover, “their language was prohibited, their culture ridiculed, and they were regarded as savages to be treated as Saigon saw fit” [38]. President Ngô Đình Diệm’s government considered the FLM as a small group of dangerous rebels to be exterminated.

As a result of the above-mentioned merger, the new front got the name the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO). In 1964–1969 its rapid rise was followed by an equally rapid decline due to disagreements between the Cham leaders (first of all, Les Kosem) and the highlanders (Y Bham Enuôl), as well as to their different political orientations—from supporting the Saigon government to collaboration with communists (NFL or Viet Cong). For example, the latter “claimed to respect minority rights, encouraged them to use and develop their native languages (Ho Chi Minh asked his cadres who worked in minority areas to learn the local areas, something that those in Saigon would never think of doing), respected local customs, paid for what they took, and would sometimes (in Cambodia) even build Qur’anic schools” [38]. As early as 1969, approximately 3000 sympathizers of Y Bham Enuôl defected from FULRO and joined the South Vietnam forces (for details see the research paper by G. Hickey [18]).

In Cambodia, the progression of the Khmer Rouge led to the defeat of FULRO. In April 1975, Les Kosem fled to France and advised his brothers in arms who were under home arrest to take refuge in the French Embassy in Phnom Penh. Unfortunately, the Khmer Rouge made the French Embassy hand over Y Bham Enuôl and other FULRO members (150 approximately) with their families (women and children) and killed them all in a stadium. At the same time, a Cham from Vietnam, Jaya Marang, founded a new “independent” FULRO in the region of Phan Rang (South Vietnam) but he was killed and his group was destroyed by the Viet Cong just a few days later. The Highlanders’ and Chams’ grievances during the Vietnam War are illustrated by the fact that 200,000 people died [12] and 85 % of their traditional villages were destroyed.⁸ Initially, this data was published by G. Hickey in 1982 [17].

After 1979, quite a few Cham families tried to leave Cambodia and Vietnam to find safety, freedom and better life for their children, similar to “boat people” in general. The concept of exodus and refuge is specifically applied to Chams considering many waves of their transmigration [4]. One of the main destinations for them was the USA.

⁸<http://montagnard-foundation.org/wp/2011/07/08/1458>

3.5 *The Cham Diaspora in the United States: (In) Visibility Issue*

The Asian American identity is linked to the racial approach in the US official documentation (or even in marketing surveys), when everyone must choose his/her race (“ethnicity” for Hispanics) among six options: White, Black, Native American/Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, and Hispanic or Latino. Asian Americans represent approximately 6.3% of the country’s total population.⁹ According to the Racial Identity Theory (RIT) that was born in the USA, the process of “racialization” experienced by ethnic and cultural groups, including Asian Americans, “minimizes ethnic within-group variations while similarities are exaggerated” [15]. In addition to that, among the groups themselves, different biases and prejudices against other smaller and weaker groups still exist that impede the successful integration of their members.

According to brothers, Dohamide and Dorohiem [11], Cham scholars from the Republic of Vietnam, up to 2004:

- Cambodian Cham refugees established Jama’ah (Muslim community) mainly in Olympia, Washington state (30 families) and in Santa Ana, Southern California (130 families).
- Cham Muslims from Vietnam: mainly from Phan Rang (Central Vietnam) together with some Chams from Chau Doc (a provincial centre of the southern province An Giang, bordering with Cambodia) formed Jama’ah in San José, Northern California (40 families).
- Cham Muslims from Chau Doc built their Jama’ahs (communities) in:
 1. Seattle, Washington state (300 families)
 2. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (25 families)
 3. Sacramento, Northern California (50 families)
 4. San Francisco, Northern California (20 families)
 5. Fullerton, Southern California (35 families)
 6. Pomona, Southern California (15 families)

The total number is 645 families (roughly 3000 people), including 290 families in California and 330 families in the state of Washington.

Based on the netnography methods, especially on Voyant Tools,¹⁰ as the main instrument, I have analysed publications from different websites (in English) of the main Cham communities in the USA. Using Voyant Tools for content in Vietnamese requires its modification since current tutorials and articles mainly focus on the application of Voyant Tools to English.¹¹ Words with a religious connotation, such

⁹<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI425222#qf-headnote-a>

¹⁰The Voyant Tools service was created for analyzing text data in Digital Humanities.

¹¹For example, see: Text Analysis of Digitized “Lienü zhuan” with Voyant Tools [<https://digitalhumanitiesnow.org>].

as “Muslims”, “Islam(ic)” and “mosque” were more frequent than words having an ethnic one, such as “Cham” and “Cambodian” and defining the country of origin (Cambodia, Vietnam). This part of the research has contributed to my general conclusion that religious identity prevails in the US Cham diaspora (the majority are Muslim Chams), followed by ethnic and language-based identities.

In general, in “external communication”, including the Internet, the identification and self-identification by citizenship (or residence), is natural for immigrants in the host country. All Chams who live in the USA are US-Americans but besides they have multiple identities, like they did in Cambodia or Vietnam. These identities can be presented as circles (see Fig. 1).

Conclusions Regarding the Cham Diaspora in the United States

- In the USA, the Cham communities preserve their main identities (ethnic and religious), integrating into the host society. There is no conflict between the Cham ethnic and citizen identities because of the safe life in the democratic society (see Fig. 2), without forced assimilation and other consequences of inner colonialism, in contrast to Vietnam, Cambodia, and China, where different forms of genocide were found in history.
- According to the UN’s Framework of Analysis for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes (2014), “past or present conduct... reveals serious prejudice against protected groups and that creates stress in the relationship among groups or with the





Fig. 1 Multiple identities of the Cham in diaspora

Fig. 2 Non-conflicting identities



State”.¹² On the contrary, the analysis of the Cham situation in the USA has verified the successful social and economic integration of the Cham community into the host society. Meanwhile, in the aspects of education and culture, the term voluntary assimilation is preferable, given the problems of learning the Cham language and the traditional culture. Moreover, the issue of obvious discrimination experienced by Chams in Cambodia (and Vietnam) where Khmers paternalistically looked down upon the Cham as a people without a homeland and without a state to govern [33] also crossed the ocean together with millions of Cambodians and Vietnamese. The personal experience and narratives of young American Chams (for example, female scholars M.H. Mostiller and Asiroh Cham) have demonstrated that the prejudicial attitude still exists in contact with Khmer and Vietnamese immigrants in the USA. For example, it is worth citing here the work of Asiroh Cham: “Chams indicating that they are part of the nation-states of Vietnam or Cambodia reveals traces of their initial disposessions before coming to America. Chams are invisible here partly because of these preceding erasures in Asia. This is made even more complex for Cham Americans who fled from multiple nation-states...” [8].

- The main problem for the Cham in general is preserving their native language, given the difference in their state of origin (speaking Cambodian or Vietnamese) and several dialects of the Cham language. Children can learn Arabic but usually don’t learn the written Cham. Some Chams can speak Malay, using Latin alphabet in social media.
- The traumatized memory of many Cham refugees must be taken into account, similar to other survivors of genocides, for example, Rwandan. Documented interviews with Cham survivors in diaspora could contribute to genocide studies in the USA and worldwide.
- The racial and by-origin criteria in the US censuses do not allow exact count of the Cham population and Cham language speakers, as well as other ethnic groups from the historical Champa. Therefore, I would name it a double invisibility issue, although the Cham as Asians is a visible minority. Firstly, they are invisible among the larger community of immigrants from the ethnic majority in their

¹² Doc.49 Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.49_FrameworkofAnalysisforAtrocityCrimes_EN.pdf

common country (like Chams–Khmers from Cambodia, Chams–Kinh from Vietnam, Dayaks–Indonesians, etc.). Secondly, they are invisible to the American government institutions based on the censuses of 2020, 2010, etc. I assume that further comparative studies of Cham communities in other Western countries (France and Australia) will allow us to provide other results and conclusions, given that they have policies and approaches different from the US.

4 Conclusion

The following issues have been revealed and considered during the research:

1. Interrelation between nationalism, internal colonialism and discrimination; the causes of discrimination and violation against indigenous communities and their members. The cases of Vietnam and Cambodia demonstrate that official ideology and policies define the place of indigenous peoples, despite their origin, taking into account the nation-state frames, nationalism ideologies, or even genocidal policies. In general, multiple identities can include “nation-building-infused provincial identities” [2] and are to be considered at several levels.
2. Multiple forced displacements of indigenous ethnic minorities are still a bitter reality of our days. For example, the Myanmar junta is continuing its genocidal policy against Rohingya, Karen, and other ethnic minorities. In some cases, diasporic communities (like Chams and Rohingya) were blamed as enemies of the majority’s state. Totalitarian communist regimes in Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea used different methods against ethnic minorities, from forced assimilation and forced labour to genocide, including genocide by attrition. Actually, in recorded history, indigenous populations have often been the victims of genocidal massacres and campaigns to exterminate indigenous populations with various aims: imperial genocide against indigenous peoples was practiced either to clear lands for settlers or to seize and coerce labour that settlers needed (see [23, 26]). Meanwhile, according to D. Maybury-Lewis, atrocities against indigenous peoples were not solely a function of colonial policies—they continued to be committed in the years of decolonization and beyond [25].
3. The practices of deprivation, discrimination, and subjugation against indigenous peoples have been connected to the history of dispossession, expulsion, and extermination. The following cases are worldwide famous as genocides: the finished genocide (Kampuchea, Sudan), the continuing one (Myanmar, China), and highly likely the potential genocide by attrition (Palestine). Meanwhile, there are always risks of slow genocide and forced assimilation of indigenous peoples in other Asian countries, including Vietnam and China. The term “genocide by attrition” or “attritional violence” can be applied to the Central Highlands of Vietnam. In general, attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all by displacements” simplifying violence and

underestimating the human and environmental costs [27]. Also, one of the common features of colonial practices is the deprivation of citizenship, which is the process through which a state moves to deprive citizens of their right to nationality. It has been often used for the purposes of colonial modern dispossession as an instrument of racialized policies [7], connected to discrimination both by law and/or by practice. For example, in Myanmar, the mass deprivation of nationality was one of the first stages of the genocide against Rohingya.

Like the Rohingya [22], the Cham have asserted their collective identity through Islam, the ethnic identity being at a secondary position. The case of the Cambodian Cham minority (Khmer Islam) can be useful for comparative studies. In a wider context of identities, Southeast Asians “take area conceptions and localize them” [34], hence it seems to be possible to assess the correlation of ethnic, national (Cambodia/Vietnam/US etc.), and regional identities.

4. As a perspective for further comparative research, the experience of the Southeast Asian refugees’ integration in the USA is comparable to the case of Cham refugees and genocide survivors who live mainly in the states of California, Washington, and Oregon. While both Vietnamese and Cambodian nation-states tried to erase or downplay religious and ethnic differences, the Cham people have been many times subjected to centuries of forced displacement, colonization and even genocide. The Cham managed to preserve their ethnic and religious identity despite the tough assimilation policy and expulsion, as well as present-day discrimination and violations of their fundamental rights in their native country, especially in Vietnam.

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Cultural Fennomania of the 1830s



Dmitry Kolesnikov and Nikita Ivannikov

1 Introduction

In the article “From Fennophilia to Fennomania: Henrik Gabriel Porthan and the Establishment of Finnish National Thought” I.R. Takala rightfully notes that “in Finnish historiography, the history of nation-building and Finnish nationalism, as a rule, starts from the moment of Finland’s annexation to Russia” [1, p. 8]. The beginning of the XIX century was the formation of a new stage in the history of Finland: according to the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, which ended the Russian-Swedish war of 1808–1809, Finland was detached from Sweden and joined Russia. Thus, Finland’s six-century stay in the Swedish state came to an end and a new phase of its development began.

In the early years of Finnish autonomy, the Russian Empire created favourable conditions for the development of Finnish national institutions and culture. Finland’s autonomous status and the very fact of its separation from Sweden, which had long threatened the Finns with assimilation, were perceived by patriotic Finnish intellectuals as a motivation for strengthening national-cultural activities. The Swedish-speaking intellectuals in Finland developed a strong interest in the historical past of their homeland and its folklore, and began to actively study Finnish, the language of the majority of the Finnish population. The Fennoman movement was born, a Finnish national movement aimed at equalizing the Finnish language with Swedish and developing Finnish national culture. Initially, the Fennomans set themselves purely cultural tasks, striving to achieve that the Finnish language was established in all spheres of administrative and social life in Finland on an equal footing with Swedish and that the Finnish people awakened interest in their cultural heritage, so

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the first stage of the Fennomanian movement, covering the first half of the XIX century, is called “cultural Fennomania” [2].

2 Materials and Methods

The research material and valuable sources used in the chapter are the works and writings of prominent figures of the Fennoman movement of the 1830s—poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg [3, 4] and folklore collector Elias Lönnrot [5, 6]. The study is based on the principles underlying historical science. These include the principle of concreteness, the principle of objectivity, the principle of systematicity, the principle of reliance on historical sources and historiographical tradition. Among the general scientific methods of historical research, the chapter uses historical and historical-genetic methods, as well as the method of system analysis, which made it possible to comprehensively study the formation of the cultural stage of the Fennoman movement in the 1830s.

3 Results and Discussion

In the late 1820s, Helsinki became the centre of cultural life in the Grand Duchy of Finland, because after the great fire in Turku in 1827, the university, which was the centre of Finnish spiritual life, was moved to Helsinki, which had become the capital of Finland in 1812. The Turku Romanticism was replaced by the Helsinki Romanticism, covering the 1830–1840s [7, p. 144].

The major events in the cultural life of Finland in the 1830s, which had a significant influence on the formation of the Fennomanian movement, are undoubtedly the work of Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804–1877), the largest Swedish-speaking poet in Finland, and the publication of the national epic “Kalevala”, carried out by Elias Lönnroth (1802–1884), a physician and collector of folklore.

J.L. Runeberg’s work belongs to national romanticism, the leading trend in Finnish literature of the first half of the nineteenth century. Contemporaries called J.L. Runeberg the “first national poet” [8, p. 5] of Finland, and in Russia, he was compared with A.S. Pushkin. The work of the Swedish-speaking romantic is characterized by idealization of the national past of Finland and the Finnish peasantry. J.L. Runeberg’s lyrics, beginning with his first collection of poems published in 1830, are imbued with an ardent love for Finland. From the point of view of the formation of Finnish national identity, it is important that J.L. Runeberg created an image of Finland and the Finnish people in his Swedish-language poetry. The image of Finland that emerges from his lyrics is emphatically modest, but at the same time full of dignity. In his work, the poet praised the proud poverty of the Finns and the values of patriarchal peasant morality. J.L. Runeberg’s poem about the peasant Paavo from Saarijärvi [4], which was included in the cycle “Idylls and Epigrams” of

his first poetry collection, is significant in this respect. This poem is a ballad about a Finnish peasant and his struggle with the harsh nature, swamps and frosts, crop failure and famine. The peasant Paavo is shown as hard-working, persistent, pious and devout. The cold year after year destroys the grain grown by Paavo. Paavo's family experiences hunger, and the peasant's wife has to mix bread with pine bark. However, Paavo believes in God and continues to work vigorously. Finally, the weather changes and Paavo receives grain. The farmer's wife rejoices and says that now she will finally be able to bake real bread. However, Paavo reassures his wife and tells her to continue making bread mixed with bark. The peasant gives the surplus grain to his neighbour, whose grain has been destroyed by the weather. In his ballad, J.L. Runeberg praised the moral ideal of the Finnish peasant, which later became a collective image of a hard-working and pious Finn [9, p. 71].

After the cycle "Idylls and Epigrams", the next milestone work of the poet was the epic poem "The Moose Hunters" (1832), devoted to the depiction of the folk life of the Finns. In this poem, as in other works by J.L. Runeberg, the poet's tendency to idealize the patriarchal peasant life and way of life is noticeable. Evaluating the historical and literary significance of J.L. Runeberg's poem, E.G. Karhu wrote: "It was the first outstanding work about folk life not only in Finnish but also in Scandinavian literature. With his poem, Runeberg introduced into literature the images of ordinary people from the people and by the power of his talent forever legitimized their place in it" [7, p. 192]. Since the depiction of folk life was at that time a new phenomenon in the literature of Finland and Sweden, most of the Swedish-speaking educated public treated the poem "The Moose Hunters" coolly. However, according to the fair comment of the professor of the Imperial Alexander University Y.K. Grot, this poem "should always stand next to "Kalevala" when it comes to the study of poetry and manners of Finland" [8, p. 29].

It should be noted that J.L. Runeberg's worldview was formed under the strong influence of philosopher J.J. Tengström. This influence, in particular, is felt in the essay "Some Words on the Nature, Folk Character, and Way of Life in Saarijärvi Parish" [3] (1832). If J.J. Tengström in his article "Some obstacles to Finnish literature and culture" contrasted patriarchal Finland with bourgeois European countries, J.L. Runeberg in the essay contrasted coastal and inland Finland. The poet wrote that while the coastal regions of Finland remind European travellers of their native lands, and the houses and villages therein testify to the well-being and prosperity of their inhabitants, inland Finland, which J.L. Runeberg examined in the essay on the example of Saarijärvi parish, one can see a completely different picture. "It is impossible to describe in words the poverty in which the inhabitants of Saarijärvi live" [3]—states the author of the essay. Nevertheless, despite their poverty, the peasants of Saarijärvi were characterized by kindness and hospitality. J.L. Runeberg notes that at that time beggars were common in peasants' huts. They were not rejected, but welcomed as guests and fed with the same food as their hosts. As the poet wrote in his essay, "the beggar eats pine bark, because the peasant eats bark; but if the peasant has wheat bread, the beggar will have the same food" [3]. When the beggar wanted to leave the house, the peasant, according to the old custom, harnessed his horse and took him and his family to another house.

J.L. Runeberg greatly appreciated the hospitality of the peasants of inland Finland, their proximity to “simple” and “pristine” nature. In his essay, he wondered which part of Finland is more preferable. According to the poet, everyone can answer this question according to his own taste. “The soul inclined to quiet poetic and religious meditations will be mainly attracted to the hinterland. The vivacious, daring, and enterprising man will probably love the sea-coast; business-men, artisans, and farmers will feel most comfortable on the plains of the coast. But since there is no doubt that the contemplative nature is the most truly and consciously aware of the influence of nature, one might prefer the locality that has the strongest influence on such a nature. And it is difficult to imagine a more vivid, beautiful and sublime manifestation of the divine than that which we find in the pictures of the wilderness, in their solitude and deep all-encompassing peace” [3],—argued J.L. Runeberg.

The work of the largest Swedish-speaking poet of Finland made a significant contribution to the formation of the Fennomanian movement. As N.S. Bratchikova writes, “the early stage of the national movement enthusiastically perceived the patriotic ideals and folk characters of peasants and fishermen praised by Runeberg” [10, p. 11], and M. Klinge believes that through his works J.L. Runeberg laid the foundations of “official nationalism”, because in his work the poet formulated the features that constitute the essence of the Finnish nation [11, p. 199].

Elias Lönnrot, another figure of the cultural stage of the Fennomanian movement, mainly went down in history as the creator of the collection of folk lyrics “Kanteletar” and the national epic “Kalevala”. The compilation of “Kalevala”, which is a collection of Karelian and Finnish folk songs united by a single plot, was undoubtedly Lönnrot’s highest achievement. This epic emerged as a result of meticulous collecting work. It is established that E. Lönnrot was the largest collector of Karelian-Finnish folk poetry of the XIX century [7, p. 156]. During 1828–1845 the creator of the “Kalevala” made 11 folklore expeditions to Finnish and Russian Karelia, during which he travelled about 20,000 km [7, p. 156]. E. Lönnrot published “Kalevala” twice. The first edition of “Kalevala”, the so-called “Old Kalevala”, was published in 1835 and included 12,078 lines divided into 32 runes [12, p. 340]. The second edition, also known as “New Kalevala”, appeared in 1849 and included 22,795 lines of poetry, comprising 50 runes [12, p. 341]. This edition became the canonical version of the epic that has survived to our day.

After the publication of the Karelian-Finnish epic, the question to what extent the Kalevala is a genuine folk art and to what extent it is an individual creation of E. Lönnrot has often been raised in science. The majority of modern scholars adhere to the point of view that the integral picture of the world emerging from “Kalevala” belongs not so much to the folk consciousness as to E. Lönnrot’s imagination, and that is why they consider “Kalevala” an author’s epic. The first edition of the epic, known as “Old Kalevala”, is called “Lönnrot’s epic” [12, p. 340], because in it the folklorist, like Homer, showed himself as a poet, linking the fragments of runes into a whole with the help of poems of his own composition [2, p. 41]. E. Lönnrot believed that the runes described historical events, so, based on his religious and philosophical views, he concluded the epic with the victory of Christianity over

paganism. The main storyline of “Kalevala” is considered by its compiler to be the confrontation between Kalevala and Pohjola—two rival countries, in which the action of the epic unfolds. According to E. Karhu, “such a clear expression of this plot leitmotif in the complete “Kalevala” is largely the result of the generalizing efforts of the compiler” [7, p. 162]. Researchers claim that the folklore material collected by E. Lönnrot would be enough to write seven different versions of the epic [12, p. 341]. In his preface to the first edition of “Kalevala” the collector of folklore frankly said that when compiling the text of the work he had to do some editing [6]. Despite this, the publication of “Old Kalevala” was enthusiastically received. It was seen as a surviving ancient epic, preserved and collected from scattered fragments. Assessing the historical significance of E. Lönnrot’s work, M.M. Borodkin wrote: “Kalevala is a heroic poem of the Finnish people. Its songs were scattered like splinters of a ship broken by a storm. Lönnrot carefully collected the precious remnants, trying to fit the pieces together. The task of Elias Lönnrot’s life had therefore the character of a feat of salvation” [13, p. 365]. The date of February 28, indicated by the figure of cultural Fennomania under the preface of the first edition of the epic, was later celebrated in Finland as the Day of “Kalevala” or the Day of Finnish Culture.

The second edition of the “Kalevala”, “New Kalevala”, published in 1849, was also the author’s creation of E. Lönnrot. The merits of the compiler of the “Kalevala” undoubtedly include the creation of an integral composition of a single epic. Thus, E. Lönnrot proclaimed: “Finally, since none of the rune-singers can no longer be compared with me on the number of runes collected, I thought that I have that right, which, in my opinion, many considered their right—the right to build runes in the most convenient for their combination of order. In the words of the runes: become and you yourself a rune-singer, begin your song anew. In other words, I considered myself rune-singer not worse than they considered themselves” [12, p. 341].

It should be noted that another folklore book of the creator of “Kalevala”—a collection of folk poetry “Kanteletar”, published in three parts in 1840–1841 and including women’s and men’s, wedding and labour, shepherd and mill songs—according to researchers, also cannot be considered a collection of authentic folk songs, because in textual terms the collection consists not only of folklore songs written down by E. Lönnrot from performers but also from the folklore material reworked by the compiler of “Kalevala” by combining excerpts from various recordings, as well as from runes of his own composition, which E. Lönnrot wrote in Kalevala foot (scientists claim that the collector of folklore had an excellent command of poetic feet). [7, p. 169; 12, p. 341].

Speaking about the significance of the epic “Kalevala”, first of all, let us emphasize its huge role in the history of Finnish literature and culture. Thus, E.G. Karhu comes to a fair conclusion that “in essence, the entire Finnish culture of the XIX century, especially the work of writers and artists of romantic direction, developed under the banner of “Kalevala” [7, p. 168]. In the monograph “History of Finnish Literature. From the origins to the end of the XIX century”, the philologist also makes another important conclusion that “especially at first “Kalevala” played not only a literary and aesthetic role but also contributed to the establishment of national

consciousness" [7, p. 167]. Soon after its release the epic was perceived as a spiritual banner of the Finnish national movement and a guarantee of the future blossoming of Finnish national culture. "Kalevala" was called "an entrance ticket", by which the oppressed and little-known people got their place among the cultural nations. Philologist-folklorist V. Ya. Propp, characterizing the historical and cultural significance of "Kalevala", wrote: "One of the merits of Lönnrot is that through "Kalevala" he showed the whole world that the nation to which he belonged is not an empty geographical concept, that it possesses the only in the world, incomparable treasury of folk art" [14, p. 305].

Analyzing the role of "Kalevala" in the formation of the Finnish national self-consciousness, it is extremely important to note the fact that thanks to the publication of the epic in Finland there appeared the idea that Finns have their own original history. In this respect the statement about the runes of "Kalevala" by the chairman of the Society of Finnish Literature Johan Gabriel Linsen (1785–1848), made in a public speech in March 1836, is significant: "With these epic songs, Finland will be able to learn to understand her past as well as her spiritual development in the future with an encouraging self-consciousness. She (Finland) will be able to say to herself: I too have a history!" [15, p. 239]. This point of view is shared by M.M. Borodkin, according to whom the created epic "resurrected for the Finnish people, who had not yet had their own definite written history, a poetic, independent past and at the same time gave them faith in the historical future" [13, p. 366].

Considering the importance of "Kalevala" for the formation of cultural Fennomania, I.R. Takala rightly concludes that it was extremely necessary for the young Fennomanian movement to have such a national epic, which strengthened the belief in the "historical existence" and "national future" of the Finnish people [2, p. 41]. According to the historian V. Rasila, the runes of the epic "testify to the presence in the past of the Finnish and Karelian peoples of a huge spiritual power" [9, p. 70]. "The epic demonstrated that the Finnish language was not inferior to the languages of great cultures in its richness" [9, p. 71],—concludes the Finnish historian. It should be noted that the date put by E.Lönnrot under the preface to the first edition of the epic, February 28, was later celebrated in Finland as the Day of "Kalevala" or the Day of Finnish Culture [2, p. 41].

Considering E. Lönnrot as a collector and publisher of folklore work, it should be mentioned that along with "Kalevala" and "Kanteletar" he also published collections of folk proverbs ("Proverbs of the Finnish People", 1842), riddles ("Riddles of the Finnish People", 1844) and incantations ("Incantations of the Finnish People", 1880) [12, p. 336].

The activity of the creator of "Kalevala" was characterized by versatility and covered various aspects. Working as a district doctor in the small town of Kajaani from 1833 to 1854, E. Lönnrot, in parallel with his medical practice, acted as a public educator in the most direct sense of the word. During his life in Kajaani, he published a number of medical and scientific educational publications. For example, in 1839 E. Lönnrot published an extremely popular medical guidebook for the peasantry called "The Finnish Peasant's Home Doctor". As already mentioned in this paper, in the same year, in co-authorship with a student J.F. Kajan, the folklorist

prepared for publication the work “History of Finland”, and a year later, in co-authorship with Pastor G. Tiklen, he wrote the work “History of Russia”. In 1860 E. Lönnrot also published the first botanical reference book of Finland, “Flora of Finland”, which, along with descriptions of plants, contained detailed information about their usefulness and the expediency of their use in self-medication. In addition, in the 1860s, the creators of the “Kalevala” and “Kanteletar” published a “Legal guide for general enlightenment”.

These works and referenced books compiled by E. Lönnrot were the first enlightening Finnish-language publications for the public. Their importance for the development of the Finnish literary language is very accurately characterized by E. Karhu, rightly believing that “through such books, brochures, articles, the Finnish language conquered new areas of knowledge, made significant steps towards becoming a modern cultural language” [7, p. 151] and that E. Lönnrot was a linguistic and terminological innovator in his publications, introducing thousands of new words into the literary Finnish language. It should be noted that it is the creator of “Kalevala” who is the author of such important words as kirjallisuus (“literature”), kansanvalta (“democracy”), tasavalta (“republic”), itsenäinen (“independent”), kansallisuus (“nationality”) [16, pp. 59–60].

The journal “Mekhiläinen”, published by the folklorist in 1836–1837 and 1839–1840, also played an important role in the enlightenment of the Finnish people and the development of the Finnish literary language. Being the first Finnish-language periodical [12, p. 340], this journal was small in volume and contained only two printed pages. E. Lönnrot published it practically alone. The content of the magazine was determined by folklore materials and popular-cognitive articles on history, geography, medicine, child care and other cultural and educational issues. The magazine had a folklore section in which E. Lönnrot printed records from various geographical regions. It published poems by Finnish peasant poets who were literarily gifted and literate.

Researchers note that Mehiläinen was a new phenomenon in Finnish journalism, not only in terms of culture and education but also in terms of language. E. Lönnrot’s magazine was published in the period of the so-called “dialect struggle” when the unified norms of the literary Finnish language had not yet been developed, and Finnish newspapers were characterized by a strong bias towards individual regional colloquialisms. Thus, when the compiler of “Kalevala” was just starting to publish the magazine, he was advised to publish it not in the literary language, but in the East Finnish Savonian dialect as the most picturesque and poetic one, as there was quite a rich folklore in this dialect [7, p. 151]. However, E. Lönnrot did not agree to publish the magazine in the dialect, trying to establish the norms of such a literary language that would be understandable to all Finns. Publishing the magazine in Finnish, the folklorist proceeded primarily from the national function of the literary language, and as researchers rightly believe, E. Lönnrot’s magazine played a key role in the efforts to update and stabilize the literary Finnish language [7, p. 151].

When considering the contribution of the creator of the “Kalevala” to the formation of the literary Finnish language, it is impossible to ignore the fact that for 40 years E. Lönnrot worked on compiling a fundamental Finnish-Swedish

dictionary, which was completed in 1880. According to scientists, the founder of the literary Finnish language Mikael Agricola (c. 1510–1557) used from 6 to 8 thousand words [12, p. 338]. The dictionary compiled by the collector of folklore had more than 200 thousand words and was reprinted twice in 1930 and 1958 [7, p. 174]. For comparison, the dictionary of the Finnish language, published in the 1960s, contained 210 thousand words [12, p. 338]. It should be noted that E. Lönnrot attached great importance to dictionary work, believing that a maximally complete dictionary should clearly show the wealth of the Finnish language and seeing in the development of the language of the people an important prerequisite for the development of their culture and national consciousness, like other figures of cultural Fennomania.

Researchers of E. Lönnrot's life and work rightly call the great folklorist "the second father of the Finnish language after Mikael Agricola" [12, p. 33]. His main merit lies in the strengthening of the Finnish national identity through the creation of the Karelian-Finnish national epic. In addition, E. Lönnrot played a significant role in the development of the literary Finnish language by publishing the fundamental Finnish-Swedish dictionary he compiled.

A certain role in the formation of the Fennomanian movement was played by the "Saturday Society" ("Lauantaiseura"), founded in 1830 in Helsinki and actively functioning until 1837 [17]. This society was an informal literary and philosophical circle consisting of young professors and students of the University of Helsinki, which met, as a rule, on Saturdays at the home of one of its members. The members of the "Saturday Society", in particular, were J.L. Runeberg, assistant professor of physics J.J. Nervander, assistant professor of law J.J. Nordström, philosopher J.J. Tengström, an active participant of the Fennomanian movement F. Signeus, linguist M.A. Castren, philosopher J.V. Snellman, writer Z. Topelius [18, p. 29]. In 1830–1832, the circle was sometimes visited by Elias Lönnrot, coming to Helsinki from Kajaani, where he lived and worked at that time [18, p. 29]. The "Saturday Society" was a voluntary association that lacked a definite programme, a permanent meeting place, a set of rules, permanent members and no minutes [18, p. 29]. Speaking about the activities of this circle, J.V. Snellman states that "its purpose was to engage in literature" [19, p. 35]. In the spirit of Helsinki romanticism, the society discussed the programme of national culture development and the possibility of its practical implementation [17]. The discussions also touched upon the language issue [20].

The activities of the Saturday Society were not limited to the discussion of literary and philosophical issues. Of great importance were the practical steps taken by the members of the circle, first of all, the founding of the Society of Finnish Literature (Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura) in 1831 [7, p. 148]. This society aimed to actively promote the development of the Finnish literary language, to collect and publish folklore, ethnographic and linguistic materials, as well as to publish literary works in Finnish. In particular, the society provided substantial assistance to E. Lönnrot in his collecting and publishing activities, published "Old Kalevala" and "New Kalevala", as well as a collection of folk lyrics "Kanteletar", and supported the Finnish-language magazine "Mehiläinen" published by E. Lönnrot [7, p. 174].

In addition to the founding of the Society of Finnish Literature, the members of the Saturday Society are also credited with the establishment of the Helsinki Lyceum and the founding in 1832 of the Swedish-language newspaper *Helsingfors Morgonblad*, which was edited by J.L. Runeberg in 1832–1836 and was an unofficial printed body of the society, as many of its members edited it [2, p. 40].

4 Conclusion

Thus, we can conclude that in the 1830s the Fennoman movement continued to develop in the vein of national romanticism on the basis of the first period of Finland’s national awakening in the 1810s–1820s. Thanks to the works of J.L. Runeberg, the educated parts of Finnish society began to form an idea of Finland’s nature and Finnish national character. The appearance of the Kalevala helped Finns to realize the originality and richness of their ancient history and culture. E. Lönnrot continued the work on the development and improvement of the Finnish literary language begun by his predecessors in the 1810–1820s. An important role in the formation of the Fennomanian movement was played by the emergence of the first associations of its figures—the “Saturday Society” and the “Society of Finnish Literature”, the latter of which, according to L.V. Suni, represented the first single centre that coordinated the activities of patriotic forces of Finland [21, p. 113].

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Finland as a Battlefield Seen by the Officers of the General Headquarters



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1 Introduction

The Finnish Military District was formed according to the other No 228, dated August 10, 1864. The district included all eight provinces (gubernias) of the autonomous Great Principality of Finland. The general-governor of Finland, infantry general Baron Peter Rokasovsky was the first commander of the troops of the district. Farther on the office of the general-governor of Finland and that of the commander of the troops of the Finnish Military District remained united [1, s. 123–124]. The military district council of the Finnish Military District included the commander (as the chairman), the chief of district staff, the heads of the district engineer, quartermaster, and military-medicine offices, the commander of the local troops, and the member of the military district council from the Military ministry [2, pp. 86–88].

The district covered the territory of the Great Principality of Finland, which possessed special privileges as a part of the Russian Empire. One of its features was its border position: it had a land and sea frontier with the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway (the union between Sweden and Norway was in force between 1814 and 1905). Sweden from 1814 on had been holding to the policy of neutrality and abstention from military alliances and armed conflicts. During the Crimean War, the Swedish government, in spite of its formal neutrality, had occupied an unfriendly stance towards Russia. In the 1870s, after the unification of Germany, there appeared a trend for rapprochement between Sweden and the new German Empire, which caused not unfounded concerns about the possible formation of a military-political alliance of the two powers. In case of a military threat, Finland, with its long coastal line, would become extremely vulnerable to enemy landing operations. Especially, since the Åland Isles, according to the clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856,

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which had completed the Crimean War, were a demilitarized zone, and the Russians were not authorized to build fortresses on the archipelago, to station a military garrison and naval ships there. During the very war, the Finnish coasts had been subject to attacks of the allied squadron, which had operated in the Baltic in 1854 and 1855 [3, pp. 111–112].

One more local special feature was the ethnic and confessional composition of the population of the Great Principality. The Russians constituted an insignificant minority of the population—some 5800 people. Their number and percentage here was one of the lowest among all parts of the Empire. Most of the population, according to the data from 1899, consisted of Finnish-speaking (including the Karelians—some 2 million, or 86%) and Swedish-speaking (some 322,000, or 13.5%) residents, who professed mainly the Evangelic-Lutheran faith (only some 50,000 dwellers of Ladoga Karelia were Orthodox) [4, pp. 198–204]. That circumstance put into question the loyalty of the local population in case of an armed conflict with some other power. Especially in view of the fact that Swedish cultural influence had long-standing traditions in Finland, while Sweden could be viewed as a potential adversary [5, pp. 74–76]. During the nineteenth century, there were no serious problems in relations between autonomous Finland and the imperial centre. But at the turn of the century, there appeared some complications, when the central authorities began to conduct a policy of closer integration of the borderlands into the Empire. Some legislative acts, which were then adopted, were perceived by the residents of Finland as an infringement of their autonomous rights [6, s. 65–69]. Local public opinion associated that so-called “first period of oppression” (“ensimmäinen sortokausi”) with the name of general-governor N. I. Bobrikov, who was in office between 1898 and 1904. Governmental policies caused protest actions in Finland, and the first signs of separatism and aspirations towards secession from the Empire began to be visible. Bobrikov himself fell victim of a terrorist attack in 1904 [7, pp. 73–86].

2 Review of the Finnish Military District

The first military review of the Finnish Military District was published in 1876 under the chief of staff of the district Major General A. L. Gagemeister. By the turn of the century, though, it was estimated as out of date [8]. In 1895, after the report by the new chief of staff Lieutenant General N. V. Kaulbars (1891–1898), the general-governor of Finland F. L. Heyden expressed his consent for making up a new review. The work was entrusted to the colonel of the General Staff M. F. Alftan. He completed the main part of his work by 1899. But the general-governor of Finland N. I. Bobrikov, having studied the manuscript, considered it necessary to make significant amendments. General editing was entrusted to the head of staff of the district Lieutenant General V. G. Glazov (1899–1901) [9, pp. 12–15]. As he noted in the introduction to the “Review”, “the first concern was to juxtapose the conclusions made by the author with the corresponding data for the other Russian provinces” [10, pp. XIII–XIV].

The “Review” provides a detailed description of various characteristics of the Finnish Military District, which corresponded to the territory of the Great Principality of Finland. It consists of eight parts (otdels). The first and the largest part is devoted to the geographic review of the district. The part consists of eight chapters. The first chapter provides a general study of the geographic position of Finland, including the area (which amounted by that time to 373,601 km²), with division into provinces. Remarkably the area was indicated in square kilometres, while the metric system was used in the Russian Empire by that time only alternatively (according to the law of June 4, 1899). Further on attention is paid to the administrative and state border, its configuration and length. The second chapter is devoted to the water basins, washing the coasts of Finland, i.e., the Baltic Sea with the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland as its parts, the Ladoga Lake, with indication of their area, depth, influence upon the climate, degree of convenience for navigation. For instance, there is a note, that “ebbs and flows, which affect considerably navigation along the coasts of the German (Northern–V. M.) Sea, are almost imperceptible on the Baltic Sea” [10, p. 11].

Further there follows the geological review of Finland, presented in the third chapter. It describes crystalline rocks and sediments associated with the Ice Age. The fourth chapter presents a general topographic review and division of the district into natural regions, partitioned by natural watersheds. The author outlined six such regions, namely the slope to the Northern and the Middle parts of the Gulf of Bothnia, the South-Western corner of Finland, the coastal areas near the Gulf of Finland and the Ladoga Lake, the lake plateau of Finland, and also two more regions, which, in the author’s opinion, were of no military significance—the Northern and the Eastern slopes of Maanselkä towards the Ice Ocean and the White Sea. Each of these regions are studied in more details in the following six chapters [10, pp. 26–32].

Much attention is paid to the climate of the country, dealt with in the eleventh chapter of the “Review”. The climate in general is characterized as moderate, which is related first of all to proximity of the ocean. A special item deals with influence of the climate of Finland upon military operations. For instance, the author comes to a conclusion that “climatic conditions in Finland in fall, winter and spring are rather unfavourable for movements and actions of the military formations” [10, p. 164].

The twelfth chapter, rather voluminous one, deals with characteristics of the population of Finland. The point is about the number of the population (which, according to the data of 1899, amounted to 2,673,200 people), its density, spreading among various parts of the country, correlation of the urban and the country dwellers, composition of the population by gender, age, mother tongue, confession, estates, affairs and economic position, birth and death rate, migration, nuptiality. In connection with the data presented conclusions are drawn on convenience of quartering troops in the district [10, pp. 166–208].

The second part, consisting of four chapters, deals with the economic issues: it describes productivity, industrial and trade activities in Finland. Special chapters study agriculture (including land ownership, farming, cattle breeding and forestry), fishing and hunting, manufacturing industry (mining and metallurgical production,

stone cutting and ceramics production, chemical production, leather production, fibre processing and tailoring, stationery production, wood processing, graphic productions, as well as industrial legislation and management), and foreign trade, including composition of exportation and importation, custom tariff, state of the trade fleet [10, p. 324].

3 Military Aspects of the “Review”

The other parts of the “Review”, with one exception, are related closer to the military characteristics of the territory of the district. The third part presents “a detailed description of the coastal line of Finland from the military point of view”. This part is essential, among other things, since Finland has a long shoreline. Possible enemy invasion, under condition that Sweden would observe its neutrality, could be more likely in the form of landing operations, thence the issues of defence of the coastal areas were of a paramount importance.

The description is made separately for each of the “natural regions”, characterized in the first part, with exception of the last two, i.e., the part includes four chapters. Description of all four coastal areas is made up according to a scheme: general character of the shoreline and the adjacent waters, anchorages and fairways, lighthouses and pilot stations, topographic nature of the area and the defensive lines, communication routes, population and resources of the region, landing points. The last section is the most detailed in the last chapter, dealing with the Northern and the North-Eastern coasts of the Gulf of Finland—from the Hangöudd (Hanko) Peninsula to the administrative border along the Siestra (Rajajoki) river. It is quite natural, first of all, in view of the strategic importance of this area from the point of view of covering the approaches towards St. Petersburg. The administrative centre of the Great Principality of Finland, the city of Helsingfors (Helsinki) was situated on the Northern coast of the Gulf. In particular, in assessing the functions of the fortress of Sveaborg, the author noted: “Importance of Sveaborg and the roadstead of Helsingfors, defended by it, is conditioned mainly by their flanking position towards the operation line of the enemy fleet, operating in the waters of the Gulf of Finland against Kronstadt and St. Petersburg” [10, p. 446]. Turning to Viborg and the coast of the Karelian isthmus, the author wrote: “Importance of the fortress of Viborg is conditioned by the following circumstances: (1) being at a distance of only 150 km from St. Petersburg, this fortress blocks the shortest and the most convenient way towards the capital of the Empire for the enemy, who would land somewhere on the Northern shore of the Gulf of Finland; (2) in case if the enemy lands on the shore between Viborg and St. Petersburg, the troops, assigned for defence of Finland, can use Viborg as a foothold for operations against the enemy rear, and the latter would have either to take this fortress, which would always be associated with a certain loss of time, or to leave a sufficient formation on that side, which would also cause fragmentation of those, anyway, not too significant forces, which the enemy could have for a landing operation”. And further on: “From what has been said it is clear

that the fortress of Viborg with its maritime position could play rather important part for covering St. Petersburg from the North" [10, pp. 461–462].

Military-strategical importance of the Northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fully appreciated later on by various parties. In 1912 the commandment of the Baltic naval fleet approved of the project of construction of the Reval–Porkkalaud artillery position, later named "Fortress of Peter the Great". In the 1930s, when the general headquarters of Finland and Estonia were discussing the issue of coordinating activities on blocking the exit from the Gulf of Finland, they started to construct the forts and to set up canons on the isle of Mäkiluoto. In 1940, according to the clauses of the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland, the Hanko peninsula was leased to the Soviet Union for a naval base. Finally, in 1944, after conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish armistice, the Soviet party received the Porkkalaud peninsula in 18 km to the West from Helsinki for lease for a naval base [11, pp. 4–15].

The next part, number four, deals with the communication routes, which were again important from the military point of view. First the point is about the waterways, to which special importance is attached: "Wide water systems cover large portions inside the country. As a result, the waterways have always played and will always play an important part in the whole system of communications, as one of the most important factors, which contribute not only to its material success, but also to its mental development". Farther on it is noted that "the internal waterways of Finland make up one of its most characteristic features. The entire Southern half of the country is covered by the whole network of the waterways, which make up, after the railways, the most convenient and the cheapest communication route" [10, p. 469]. Special attention is attached to the Saima basin, which is "the first by its importance for the internal communications". The next chapter deals with the railways. It describes ten railway lines, constructed and used by that moment. A special section deals with review of the railway network from the military point of view. It is noted that "the first function of the railways under the defence of the both external sides amounts to creating an opportunity for quick concentration of the necessary number of troops at the point of landing" [10, pp. 491–526]. Later well-known Finnish scholar Tuomo Polvinen devoted special research to significance of the Finnish railways for military projects of the Russian military command [12]. Certain attention is paid also to the dirt roads, mainly to those in Southern Finland, since it was just along those roads that a threat to Helsingfors and St. Petersburg could be created. One more chapter deals with the system of postal, telegraph and telephone communications [10, pp. 526–541].

The fifth part represents cartography, which includes the common section and geographic maps and topographic plans [10, pp. 548–555]. (or rather their description, the very maps and plans were included into the second volume of the "Review" as an enclosure to the first one). Farther on (the sixth part) follows the military-medical part. The first of two chapters of the part deals with main deceases and mortality and organization of the sanitary cause in Finland. Data on morbidity among the military men is singled out into a special chapter. The statistical data show that contagious deceases were the most widespread among the troops of the

district, they were followed by deceases of “general integument” and those of respiratory organs. The following chapters present a review of military premises and medical-topographic data [10, pp. 558–632].

The next seventh part is not connected directly with the military issues: it cites general information on the offices and the administration system of the Great Principality, like the civil organization of the country, judicial offices, communal administration, church structures, as well as the public education and educational establishments [10, pp. 633–639].

Finally, the last eighth part cites the military offices, administrations and establishments. According to these data, by that moment the 1st and the 2nd rifle brigades were stationed in Finland (with offices in Helsingfors and Viborg accordingly), each consisting of four regiments. Among cavalry formations there were the 6th field gendarme squadron (in Helsingfors), the 55th dragoon Finnish regiment (in Villmanstrand) and the Orenburg Cossack division. The artillery consisted of the Sveaborg artillery infantry regiment and the Viborg fortress infantry battalion. Sveaborg and Viborg housed also the fortress artillery, fortress mining companies and gendarme commands, while the military telegraph was also stationed in Sveaborg [10, pp. 640–644].

4 Conclusion

So, we can see that the Russian General Staff, as well as the local military command, attached much importance to defence of the Great Principality of Finland against a possible enemy invasion. The Finnish Military District was abolished on June 10, 1905. The territory and the troops of the district were passed under control of the commandment of the St. Petersburg Military District. The troops stationed in Finland formed the 22th army corps [13, pp. 96–98]. During the World War One Finland avoided being a battlefield, though the Russian authorities and military considered three possible enemy actions: a local revolt, a German landing from the sea and a Swedish invasion in case of Sweden’s joining the enemy alliance, or combination either of two or all of them [14, pp. 181–194] (none of these options became reality). But this “Review” provided by the officers of the General Staff could be useful afterwards for both the command of the armed forces of independent Finland under planning defence operations and the command of the Red Army for developing plans of the war against Finland.

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History and Peculiarities of Foreign Entrepreneurship Development in St. Petersburg in the Eighteenth Century



Olga Pavlova

1 Introduction

The purpose of the chapter is to summarize and analyze the history of foreign business development in St. Petersburg from the foundation of the city and throughout the eighteenth century. In order to achieve this goal, the scientific proceedings and research papers on the subject of the northern capital business features were studied. At that time, the main directions of trade and economic relations with the countries of the West, and the East were formed. The study of the place and role of private foreign entrepreneurship in St. Petersburg made it possible to analyze the stages of international cooperation and to establish which states had the greatest influence on the development of St. Petersburg as the example of European commercial city in Russia. A significant place in the development of international relations of the Russian new capital was occupied by trade (from 1712), the policy of the state was determined, and the role of the merchant class that contributed to the expansion and development of the international trade geography in St. Petersburg was identified. It is obvious that various factors influenced the development of trade and economic relations: the internal policy of the tsarist government, the state of the merchant class, the economic situation of the state and, to a large extent, the international situation. The expediency of the study is related to the need for consistent study of conditions and stages of foreign business development in St. Petersburg, the determination of Russia's interests, and the position of the leading states, which most actively participated in the expansion of ties with Russia through the industrial and trade companies of St. Petersburg. The purpose of research work determined the following tasks:

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- to study and analyze the historiography of the chosen issue;
- to consider the role of foreign business in various directions that developed in St. Petersburg in the eighteenth century on the basis of the studied material;
- to identify the main options of foreign business and the geography of the states whose representatives mainly participated in the life of St. Petersburg taking into account the opinions of researchers;
- to highlight the factors that influenced the attraction of foreign experts to St. Petersburg, and to reveal the importance of foreign entrepreneurship in the capital for the whole Russian state;
- to note the significance of the Russian rulers' state policy in the 18th century in attracting foreign business to St. Petersburg, as well as the desire of foreigners to settle and work in the new capital of Russia.

2 Methodology

The methodology is determined by a set of historical research methods; the chapter used: the historical-genetic method, which contributed to the consideration of the issues of foreign business in Russia in the process of development within the eighteenth century; the ideographic method, which made it possible to study historical events and personalities within the framework of the chosen topic; the historical-systemic method made it possible to consider the place and role of foreign business in St. Petersburg in the context of Russian history; the chronological method determined the research period—the eighteenth century, within which scientific material was collected and analyzed.

3 Historiography

The relevance of the study is determined by the significant interest of researchers targeted to the history of the life and work of foreign citizens in Russia and in particular in St. Petersburg. This literature can be divided into several areas. Studies devoted to the issues of foreign citizens' stay in Russia. First of all, attention is drawn to the legal regulation of life and activities of foreign citizens. The studies of O.V. Erokhina and E.L. Furman [1] are devoted to this topic. The article considers the processes of formation and legislative regulation of foreign entrepreneurs in Russia. The authors note that the regulation of business activities of foreigners was carried out on the basis of the charter, which was based on concession law. The issues of the civil status of foreigners in Russia are studied in the article by I.V. Potkina [2]. The most important legislative acts regulating entrepreneurial activity in Russia of the eighteenth century were studied by A.V. Startsev and A.A. Sizova [3]. Dissertation studies are devoted to the legal status of foreigners in Russia [4].

Based on the study of the materials of the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire, O.K. Ermakova and E. Yu. Rukosuev analyzed the legislative documents concerning the arrival and stay of migrants and specialists on the territory of Russia, special attention is paid to the main directions of state policy to attract foreigners to Russia, to St. Petersburg [5].

Metric books are important for studying the life and activities of foreign citizens in St. Petersburg. A significant contribution to their study was made by A.N. Andreev, who collected and studied the metric records of the first half of the 18th century of Anglican and Reformed parishes in St. Petersburg [6].

Important and interesting documents are the spiritual wills of foreign merchants at the St. Petersburg port in the second half of the 18th century [7].

The study by E.E. and A.E. Keller, devoted to the commercial life of St. Petersburg, can be referred to the general section of research [8]. A. Keller's article on the influence of European fashion on the development of tailoring in St. Petersburg [9].

A significant place in the study of entrepreneurial activity of foreigners is occupied by issues related to merchants, internal and foreign trade of Russia, and the place and role of the St. Petersburg port. N.N. Bukharov's research belongs to this area [10].

The importance of the St. Petersburg port is evidenced by reports on the composition of merchants and their trade turnover, the export of Russian goods, and the import of foreign goods [11].

The formation of commercial shipping in the St. Petersburg port under Peter the Great is the subject of a study by V.N. Zakharova [12].

The participation of Western European merchants in the tax-export trade during the reign of Peter the Great is discussed in the article by T.S. Minaeva [13]. The researcher has studied the organization of iron exports in the era of Peter the Great [14].

The legal foundations of the functioning of trading companies at the end of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries are studied in the article by A.V. Klyuev [15].

In the foreign trade of St. Petersburg of the eighteenth century, the most important place was occupied by the Baltic direction. The commercial activity of Western European merchants contributed to the expansion of trade turnover of Russia through the port of St. Petersburg. The combination of trade with industrial activity of foreign entrepreneurs contributed to the modernization of Petrine Russia. The article by L.A. Muravyova is devoted to these issues [16].

The next area of scientific research is related to specific representatives of foreign business. The British were of great importance in the business development of St. Petersburg. Based on the study of metric records of the Anglican Church of St. Petersburg for 1723–1750 by methods of descriptive statistics, A.N. Andreev clarified the national and social composition of the St. Petersburg British colony in the first half of the eighteenth century [17]. A.V. Demkin's research is devoted to British merchants in Russia of the eighteenth century [18].

The activity of the German diaspora in St. Petersburg is of considerable interest to researchers [19]. The works of V.N. Zakharov are dedicated to German merchants

in Russia [20]. International conferences are devoted to the life and activities of Germans in St. Petersburg [21].

The studies consider some aspects of the activities of German businessmen and specialists in St. Petersburg of the eighteenth century. For instance, the first German bookstores in St. Petersburg are considered in the article by O.G. Zimina [22]. The image of the German entrepreneur of the 18th century in Russia is studied by S.V. Yakovleva [23].

Among the first foreign entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg were representatives of Holland and Belgium, as evidenced by the materials of the Dutch-Russian Archive Center [24].

The study of A.N. Chesnokova [25] is devoted to the history of foreign citizens in St. Petersburg in 1703–1917.

A brief review of the studies only confirms the interest of historians, legal scholars, economists, representatives of various scientific directions to the life and activities of foreign citizens in the territory of the Russian Empire, in its capital, St. Petersburg.

4 Results of Research

The history of foreign entrepreneurship begins with the foundation of St. Petersburg. It is well known that the inquisitive Tsar Peter I, while abroad during the “Great Embassy” (March 1697–August 1698), actively explored all aspects of life in European countries. Seeing Russia, a European power, he strove to introduce all worthy innovations. For this purpose, at the initiative of the tsar, foreign specialists—craftsmen, merchants, military men, and scientists—were invited to St. Petersburg, which was under construction. Representatives from European countries held positions in various spheres of life and activity, including trade and industry. Among them were Germans, French, English, Swedes, Finns, Dutch, and Italians.

St. Petersburg, according to historical tradition, became the place where all the innovations introduced by the ruler were tested.

The city was built as a large trade and industrial center of Russia, it was created according to the plan of Peter the Great as a European city, on the type of Venice and Amsterdam. Here the tsar considered it necessary to use the knowledge and experience of foreign specialists. Even German masons were invited to pave the streets in 1716. Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Le Blond, invited by the tsar in 1715, was appointed chief architect of St. Petersburg from 1716, and in 1717, he created a general plan for the construction of the northern capital.

St. Petersburg as a center of entrepreneurship began to form with the development of trade relations. Merchants moved to the city, sometimes forcibly, but the state supports St. Petersburg merchants. There, in the image and likeness of Amsterdam, a stock exchange was opened. Peter the Great tried to train Petersburg

merchants to conduct trade according to European traditions. The city became a major trading port, in which foreign trade took a significant place.

However, the history of the emergence of foreign entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg dates back to the very foundation of the city. For the construction of the fortress, by order of Tsar Peter I, peasants from all lands were gathered, both Russians and Tatars, Kalmyks, Finns, Ingermanlanders. The island on which the fortress was built was called Zayachy, in Finnish—Ennestsari.

Various facilities were built inside the fortress, which were necessary not only for protection but also for life. The main pharmacy was located there. Among the medicines that were produced in Russia, rhubarb was considered one of the best, a significant part of which was delivered from Siberia. The development of the rhubarb trade is associated with the name of one of the first foreign entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg—a merchant from Hamburg, M. Poppe, who was given the rhubarb trade back in 1695 [26]. Rhubarb was delivered to Holland and Amsterdam.

St. Petersburg was competing for leadership with Dutch and English merchants, who were afraid of Russia's strengthening in the Baltic Sea.

The first foreign ship that arrived at the St. Petersburg commercial port in 1703 was from Holland. The ship was well received and the captain and crew were rewarded. The purpose of such a reception is obvious, to attract foreign merchants to trade through the port of St. Petersburg. Moreover, the Dutch ship was intended to deliver goods to Swedish subjects in Narva, but the city was besieged by Russian troops, the Dutch captain preferred not to take risks, for which he was generously rewarded by the governor of the city, A.D. Menshikov, on the instructions of the tsar [27].

Further St. Petersburg port in 1704 received an English ship, despite the threat from Sweden, St. Petersburg's foreign trade gradually expanded, especially after foreign countries were notified of St. Petersburg's new status, in 1712 the city became the capital of Russia. This event was marked by the conclusion of new trade treaties with France, Genoa, and Lübeck. These treaties became in a sense an advertisement to attract foreign merchants to the northern capital. As a result, only in 1718 in St. Petersburg port arrived 52 foreign merchant ships, in 1720 there were already 75, and 114 in 1722 [28].

The growing importance of the St. Petersburg port led to the aggravation of competition for leadership between European countries. Thus, the English government, supporting the interests of merchants, sought to maintain leadership in foreign trade with Russia. England widely used Russian timber for shipbuilding and needed Russian raw materials. But Russia, having no merchant fleet and, to a large extent, traded on English ships, was interested in preserving the priority of English trade. Sweden's dominance in the Baltic was a serious competition and danger. As a result, after the Northern War, foreign economic relations between Russia and Sweden began to develop. The activity of private entrepreneurs intensified [29]. Nevertheless, the geography of trade was expanding not only to the north but also to the southeast. In 1724, the port of St. Petersburg accounted for 64.8% of the total volume of all Russian-European trade [30].

Foreign merchants were not only engaged in trade but also carried out Peter the Great's orders to deliver goods from abroad and participated in financial operations. Among the most famous entrepreneurs who directly cooperated with the tsar were: English merchant A. Stales, Dutchmen Gutmanov, merchant Hr. Brant, J. Lups, and others [31].

Foreigners rendered services to the sovereign not without self-interest and received significant privileges and guarantees from the tsar for their service. Later, foreign entrepreneurs sought to obtain Russian citizenship and join the St. Petersburg merchant class. This was facilitated by decrees of 20–40 years, summarized in the Trade Statute of 1755 [32].

Thus, in 1731, a decree was adopted regarding the trade of foreign citizens in Russia, which provided freedom of trade in Russia for “foreigners of every rank” [33]. There were two options for registering foreigners with Russian citizenship: temporary and “eternal”. The latter gave significant advantages; they received the rights of Russian merchants. Among the foreign merchants who received Russian citizenship, German and French merchants predominated. The Central Historical Archive of St. Petersburg contains a sufficient number of documents confirming this fact.

In addition to direct trade operations, foreign entrepreneurs were engaged in credit, the support of credit is important for trade. The credit system in Russia was not developed. The only merchant bank, which operated from 1754 to 1782, gave loans in limited quantities, and only to residents of St. Petersburg. Therefore, foreign merchants lent money or goods to Russian merchants. Under Peter the Great the practice of contracting became widespread, by the decree of November 10, 1720, Russian merchants could conclude contracts with foreigners for the supply of goods, this right applied only to goods delivered to the port of St. Petersburg.

Under Peter I, in St. Petersburg and its environs there was a process of rapid development of industry, primarily necessary for the full maintenance of the army and the conduct of foreign policy. Commercial capital becomes the basis for industrial development. Possessing knowledge in the field of manufactory construction, foreign entrepreneurs, using the interest of Tsar Peter I, willingly sought to join in the business of creating manufactories, which was new for Russia and St. Petersburg. The names of some foreigners who had ironworks in Russia were known at the beginning of Peter the Great's reign. Among them were the small factories of Butenant and Mellers.

The country needed specialists to organize industry, and the policy of mercantilism pursued by the tsar is well known. Peter the Great was characterized by personal interference in the organization of industry. Often the initiative to open an industrial enterprise belonged to him, but there were not enough funds and specialists for all the plans. The tsar personally selected candidates for the heads of enterprises. Peter the Great entrusted the most important branches of production only to proven and well known to his people, both Russian and foreigners, who often proved to be traders. Andrei Stales, who was entrusted with the production of gunpowder, so important during the Great Northern War, enjoyed the Tsar's special trust.

To provide industry with funds, by decree of the tsar, companies were created from noblemen and merchants, some with funds, others with entrepreneurial interest. Foreigners could also be included in the company. The Dutchman I. Thomas joined one of these companies, to which the state-owned linen production was transferred. However, the practice used by Peter I of transferring state-owned enterprises on lease or, rarely, into private ownership, as a rule, did not apply to foreigners.

Entrepreneurs who opened new, previously unknown production facilities in Russia had special support. In this case, foreigners had special support both material and moral from the authorities. P. Vestov's company, together with the Englishman A. Achkin, established sugar production. Le Blond founded tapestry production in St. Petersburg. But still, foreigners were not so actively engaged in industrial entrepreneurship in Russia. St. Petersburg became an exception in this matter. Foreigners there owned 41 manufactories out of 104 available in St. Petersburg and its surroundings [31, p. 325].

The greatest success in organizing industrial production in St. Petersburg, as well as in Russia, was achieved by the English and Dutch—merchants and craftsmen.

5 Conclusion

Based on the study and analysis of the sources and scientific literature on the issues of entrepreneurship development of foreign representatives, that is, those who had citizenship of foreign countries, the following conclusions were made:

- Peter the Great's policy of mercantilism and protectionism in the interests of the state favored the attraction of foreign entrepreneurs to the Russian economy. St. Petersburg seemed to the tsar to be the main base for the implementation of his policy.
- The psychology of power served the interests of the state, it provided conditions for attracting foreign business to the country. At the same time, foreign entrepreneurs sought to intensify their activities on the territory of the northern capital of Russia, their psychology was determined by the understanding that St. Petersburg has more opportunities for business development.
- The desire of foreigners to prove themselves in the field of entrepreneurial activity was explained by the fact that Peter the Great gave guarantees to the state by concluding a contract with each of the merchants, industrialists, craftsmen. This circumstance attracted the hope for stable business in Russia.
- Trade, construction, industrial and financial entrepreneurship was the most actively developed.
- Among the first businessmen were merchants from Great Britain, Holland, France, Sweden; craftsmen—Finns, Tatars, Cossacks—took an active part in the construction of St. Petersburg.

- Over time, national diaspora communities formed in St. Petersburg, which had their own areas of settlement in St. Petersburg and their own religious parishes, which have survived to the present day.
- Peter the Great's policy of attracting foreigners to Russia, especially to St. Petersburg, was continued by his successors. Some foreigners, having achieved some success in trade, industrial activity, construction or other occupations, stayed for permanent residence. This is evidenced by the records of metric books, documents of the merchant's board of St. Petersburg and other evidence stored in the Central Historical Archive of St. Petersburg, in the fonds of the St. Petersburg City Assembly, the city book of St. Petersburg [34].

Russian emperors, starting with Peter the Great, valued high professionalism and honesty in foreign subjects, and it was such people that they gave various encouragements and support. St. Petersburg, as a center of trade and industry, created many opportunities for foreigners to demonstrate their abilities for the benefit of Russia.

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The Baltic Tatars: Historical and Ethnic Connections in the Modern World



Gulnara Atnasheva

1 Introduction

Nowadays there are mainly three ethnic groups known as Tatars. The Volga Tatars reside in the Volga-Ural region and its vicinity, speak a Turkic language, and have been predominantly Muslim historically. The second group—Crimean Tatars—lives mostly in Crimea. The third group is Polish-Lithuanian Tatars, residing mainly in Poland and Lithuania and also in Belarus, who are the descendants of Muslim soldiers who came to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as early as 1397. While they were assimilated linguistically and switched to Belarusian, Polish and later Lithuanian, they remained Muslims, with religion being the most prominent feature of distinction for them.

The historical evolution of the Baltic Tatars can be segmented into several key periods. The initial Tatar settlements in Europe emerged in 1397. Following the defeat of the Golden Horde's Khan, Toqtamysh, by Central Asian leader Timur in the late fourteenth century, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas offered asylum to Toqtamysh and some of his troops in 1397. In exchange for mandatory military service, these soldiers received land, and the upper echelons were elevated to nobility. Having fought alongside the Polish during the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, the Tatars gradually integrated into the fabric of the Lithuanian state over subsequent centuries. Following the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569, Tatar nobility continued to play a significant role in the Polish military, while the majority of Polish-Lithuanian Tatars settled primarily in rural regions across present-day Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania [1, 2].

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After the Great Northern War, the Finnish War, and especially after the full integration of Poland into the Russian Empire, its territory expanded westward. The expansion involved deploying military and administrative personnel to newly acquired regions, including Muslim soldiers within the Russian army. The Volga-Ural Tatars expanded their trade networks into Central Europe [1].

For the Tatar Muslim communities in the Baltic Sea region, 1917 was a turning point in their existence. It was the end of the Russian Empire when Muslims in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Latvia acquired a new status in their countries. All of them became independent states and the social, economic, political and legal situation in each country varied significantly.

The Second World War marked a crucial juncture for the Polish-Lithuanian Tatar communities. As the conflict unfolded, the Soviets took control of eastern Polish territories and incorporated the Baltic states. However, in 1941, German forces swept through Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, significantly affecting the Tatar populations in those regions. Estonian Tatars found themselves drafted into both German and Soviet military forces. Meanwhile, those who had previously resettled in Finland joined the Finnish army, opposing the Soviet Union. Tatars who migrated from Finland to Sweden during this period laid the groundwork for Sweden's modest Tatar community. Subsequently, following the Soviet annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Tatars in these nations endured the same trials as their fellow citizens, including oppression and forced displacement [1, 2, 5].

2 Methods

The research methodology is based on comparative studies of the political, economic and social situations of the communities under analyses. For the present period of development of social and political sciences, interdisciplinarity is characteristic. The methodology of research was based on the following approaches: comparative—historical (various migration processes of Tatars were observed and compared), social (the most important social aspects of migration were elicited), national and geographical (which helped to describe the structural changes undergoing in demographic characteristics of the populations). Multiple Internet resources, and historical and legal documents of various Tatar associations were analyzed.

3 Results of Research

3.1 *Tatars in Lithuania*

The establishment of Tatar settlements in the Grand Duchy is closely tied to Vytautas, particularly in regions centred around state capitals such as Vilnius, Trakai, Grodno, Kreva, Lida and Novgorodek. These strategically placed

settlements ensured that Tatars remained readily accessible to the Lithuanian ruler [1, 2].

Over time, these colonies formed the core of Tatar settlements in Lithuania, their size fluctuating due to economic, political, and social influences. Toponyms with Kipchak elements still echo the memory of the original Tatar settlements. Research by Polish Orientalist Henryk Jankowski reveals that out of the 26 locations with Turkic-derived names he identified, 18 are situated near Vilnius and Trakai, providing further evidence of the early Tatar presence documented in historical records [1, 3].

By the sixteenth century, the network of settlements had spread to what is now Belarus. Migrants from the Great Horde and the Kazan and Crimean khanates established themselves in Ashmiany, Lida, Minsk and Slonim.

As time flowed, some Tatars shifted to urban areas, often forming distinct colonies or settling on specific streets known as ‘Tatar ends.’ These enclaves existed not only in Vilnius (within the Lukiškės suburb) but also in Kaunas, Novgorodek, Slonim, and beyond. As the 18th and 19th centuries unfolded, Tatars increasingly gravitated toward urban centres, causing smaller rural settlements to fade into memory. In present-day Lithuania, remnants of Tatar heritage persist—settlements believed to have been established between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, including two villages near Vilnius and one in the Alytus District. Within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Tatars occupied diverse societal roles. Notably, an elite layer emerged in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, comprising Tatar families who held titles like ulan, seit, murza and duke—a legacy rooted in their origins from the Golden Horde [1, 5].

The assimilation of Tatars into the fabric of the Grand Duchy followed distinct paths. Those who embraced Christianity seamlessly integrated, their societal status likely influenced by their prior standing within the Golden Horde. This integration was evident through the emergence of numerous noble families of Tatar descent [1, 3].

Conversely, Islamic adherents carved out a distinct community. While granted specific privileges, they also faced limitations, remaining a unique ethno-social group due to their faith—a boundary that prevented complete assimilation and blending with other groups [1, 4].

Following the 1795 partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the majority of the Lithuanian Tatar diaspora fell under the jurisdiction of the Russian Empire. The empire, while recognizing Tatars alongside other non-Christian communities like Roma, Karaims and Jews, safeguarded their property rights, preserved historical liberties and allowed the free practice of their religion.

In 1819, an imperial decree mandated the establishment of a separate registry for Lithuanian Tatar nobility. By the early nineteenth century, the noble lineage of 237 Tatar families—comprising 2325 male descendants—was officially recognized in the provinces of Grodno, Minsk and Vilnius. However, following the March 27, 1840, edict concerning nobility rights for Greeks and Muslims in Russia, Tatars were called upon to reaffirm their noble status. Not all Tatar families succeeded in this reconfirmation; typically, those who had solidified their societal positions as

landowners, military officers, and civil servants under Russian rule retained their noble rank [1, 5].

In the nineteenth century, the heraldry of Tatar families was established, drawing inspiration from various sources. Tatar names appeared in the administrative records of local nobility, with Tatars serving in diverse roles within governorate and district institutions, courts, police, customs, postal services, and in the telegraph and railway sectors. It is known that at the end of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries, the ‘Tatar titles’ (Ulan and Mirza/Murza) and Tatar origins were associated with having a particularly high rank among the Polish aristocracy [5], 20 generals, had served in the Russian military.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, amidst World War I, the Russian Empire’s collapse led to the rise of new independent states within its former western provinces. This shift fragmented the Tatar diaspora, scattering their historic settlements across modern Belarus, Poland and Lithuania.

During the interwar years, Vilnius stood at the heart of the Lithuanian Tatar diaspora’s resurgence. Within the borders of Poland at that time, this city became a hub for cultural, educational, and religious endeavours. In 1925, a pivotal Tatar congress convened in Vilnius. During this historic gathering, the Muslim Religious Union of Poland was established, the Muftiate—an innovative religious-administrative institution—was inaugurated, and Dr. Jakób Szykiewicz (1884–1966) assumed the role of the era’s sole mufti [1, 5, 6].

The onset of World War II brought the activities of Tatar organizations in both Poland and Lithuania to a halt, with operations ceasing entirely by the war’s end. Post-war, numerous Tatar families, alongside Polish repatriates, relocated to the northern and northwestern regions of Poland. A segment of the Tatars, especially those from the intelligentsia, emigrated to the UK, the USA, Turkey, and other nations. The ethnic group is composed of various regionally-based organizations, known as Totorių bendruomenės (Tatar communities), with most established in the early 1990s.

Regarding Lithuania’s Muslim religious organization, the principal institution, termed “the supreme governing body of Lithuanian Sunni Muslims” [7] is the Vilnius-based ‘Lietuvos musulmonų sunitų dvasinis centras – muftiatas’ (Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate), reinstated in 1998, it has been predominantly led by Lithuanian Tatars and oversees the activities of approximately nine Muslim communities in Lithuania [2].

Following its regained independence, Lithuania acknowledged Islam as one of the nine traditional faiths warranting state protection.

In autumn 2010, the seventh International Lithuanian Tatars’ Culture and Sports Festival was orchestrated in Vilnius, spanning 2 days and showcasing music and dance by Lithuanian and international Tatar ensembles, as well as a photography exhibit.

Another unifying event is the festival of šimtalapis (hundred-leaved), celebrating a pastry unique to Lithuanian Tatars and acclaimed as a culinary highlight. In February 2011, around 150 individuals convened in Vilnius for the Šimtalapis Festival, hosted by the Union of Lithuanian Tatar Communities. The festival

featured culinary contests, a folk music concert, poetry recitals, and a youth disco. A Tatar-operated website report expressed hopes that the šimtalapis festival would become a tradition, a time when Lithuanian Tatars would unite, and the women and girls of the community would exhibit their culinary expertise [8].

3.2 *Tatars in Poland*

The lineage of Tatars in Poland can be traced back to those early settlers in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [1, 9]. As time unfolded, Tatars gradually established themselves within what is now Poland, particularly in the eastern Podlachia region. It was there that King John III Sobieski granted them land in 1679, accompanied by duties and privileges akin to those enjoyed by their counterparts in Lithuania [1, 10, 11]. Their military service and landholdings eventually elevated most Polish Tatars to the noble class by the latter half of the seventeenth century, placing their status on par with that of the Christian Polish-Lithuanian nobility [1, 12].

Settled under similar conditions as their predecessors in Lithuania, the Tatars were tasked with military service and were allocated lands [9, 12]. They served in cavalry units known as chorągiew (banners), which were fundamental soldier groups in both the Crown and Lithuanian armies, typically comprising 100 to 200 horsemen or infantrymen [9]. Mobilization of Tatars occurred at the behest of a prince, king, or later, a commander-in-chief (hetman), in contrast to other district banners that only mobilized during general armed forces call-ups. Tatars also participated in police units, enforced decrees, quelled uprisings, and patrolled during periods of instability [9, 13].

In nineteenth-century Poland, two distinct Tatar groups emerged: the “Polish Tatars” in rural Muslim communities and Muslims from the Russian Empire who settled in major cities like Warsaw.

Following the Polish January Uprising of 1863, Polish Tatars were lauded as defenders of Polish identity and values against Russian domination, while “Russian Muslims” were seen as representatives of the opposing rule. The Russian Muslim community in Poland was diverse, including Volga Tatars and Muslims from Crimea and the Caucasus, unified primarily by Islam rather than language or ethnic ties, forming a community identified more by religion than Tatar heritage [14].

Polish Tatars are governed by well-organized bodies, categorized into religious and cultural organizations. Religious organizations are officially recognized by the Polish state and manage prayer sites, cemeteries, etc. In 1925, the oldest such body, the Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland, was founded, electing the Orientalist Dr. Jakub Szykiewicz as mufti. These organizations play a crucial role in the structured life of Polish Tatars [1, 14]. The Union functioned autonomously from both religious and secular authorities, attaining legal entity status, as did its constituent local communities. It wasn't until 1936 that Islam received formal recognition by the Polish Parliament through the Act of April 21, 1936, which delineated the Union's relationship with the state [1, 14].

Post-World War II saw the establishment of new religious communities; however, the Tatar populace became scattered due to post-war migrations, and religious education levels were modest, partly due to Poland's isolation. Consequently, some families opted to leave the dispersed western regions to rejoin the traditional Tatar community in Podlachia, particularly in Białystok, where a new local Muslim community was officially formed in 1961 [6]. The People's Republic of Poland, which lasted from 1945 to 1989, was a totalitarian regime with little regard for human rights, and state control pervaded all activities and organizations. Until the late 1980s, Tatars constituted nearly the sole Muslim presence in Poland.

The landscape shifted in 1989 with the political overhaul following a governmental shift. Poland embraced democracy, ensuring its citizens' freedom of conscience and religion. The majority of Polish Muslim Tatars belonged to the Muslim Religious Union, the oldest and largest denominational organization for Polish Muslims, boasting around 5000 members. The Union is structured around six local Muslim communities, with the oldest in Kruszyniany and Bohoniki dating back to the seventeenth century, the largest in Białystok and others located in Gdańsk and Warsaw.

In 1926, Polish Tatars founded the Union of Culture and Education of Tatars in the Republic of Poland, a cultural association with 20 branches across cities and villages with significant Tatar populations [15]. This association's primary mission was to safeguard old documents, historical sites, and artefacts tied to Polish Tatar history and culture. Each branch was tasked with establishing a library or an amateur arts group and organizing public lectures to disseminate knowledge about Tatar's religious and cultural heritage [15].

In the year 2000, a youthful ensemble of Tatars established a performing arts collective known as Buńczuk. The group's repertoire includes traditional Tatar dances, poetic recitations, and the singing of ancient songs, sometimes featuring select surahs from the Quran. Halima Szahidewicz, who presided over the local Muslim religious community, founded and successfully managed the group.

A cherished tradition within the Tatar community is the hosting of magnificent dance events during Muslim festivals. The inaugural ball took place in the 1890s in Vilnius, drawing Tatars not just from the local vicinity but also from far-flung Russian provinces. By 1918, several such balls, often coupled with philanthropic endeavours, had been organized, predominantly attended by the Tatar elite [16]. After the First World War, these dances began to be called Tatar balls and played an important role in the social life of young Tatars.

Following World War II, the tradition of Tatar balls was revived, maintaining their historical role. From the 1960s, grandiose balls began to be held in Białystok, with entire families participating and each having their designated table [17]. In the 1990s, these events often saw the attendance of city mayors and regional governors [16]. Post-war Tatar dances mirrored other Polish balls in terms of music and dance, with the distinctions being the absence of pork in meals and minimal alcohol service. A highlight of these balls was the contest for the most beautiful Tatar girl with invitations extended to Tatar families from neighbouring countries like Lithuania and Belarus [17].

The early twenty-first century witnessed a lull in the tradition of Tatar balls, but a revival has taken place recently. On July 17, 2015, in Białystok, a ball was celebrated on the first day of the Ramadan Bayram holiday, as a feature of the Tenth Podlachia Bayram Days. The attire was predominantly typical Polish festive wear, with a few women donning veils.

The advent of the new millennium brought with it new media, significantly enhancing the dissemination of information regarding the history, traditions and customs of Polish Tatars. The Internet has been particularly instrumental in this regard, with numerous websites managed by the Polish Tatar community focusing on Tatar history, culture and traditions. These platforms, operated by both organizations and individuals, offer insights into the Tatar legacy within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and expound on Tatar customs. While these sites often identify their users as Poles of Tatar descent, the younger generation emphasizes Islam as a foundational and crucial element of their identity [18]. History has shown that most of the Polish Tatars who converted to Christianity lost their Tatar identity.

3.3 Tatars in Estonia

Tatars first set foot in Estonia as part of the Russian military during the Livonian War (1558–1583). In 1570, during the siege of Reval (now Tallinn), the Russian forces included 10,000 Tatars among their ranks. Some Tatars defected from the Russian side and pledged allegiance to the Swedish king, with a notable defector being the Tatar nobleman Bulaat Murssov in 1577 [1, 19, 20].

The Baranov family stands among the distinguished Tatar nobility in Estonia, tracing their origins to four brothers who shifted allegiance from the Russian tsar to the Swedish king during the Livonian War. Their lineage reaches back to Mursa-Shdan Baran, who had previously pledged loyalty to the Grand Duke of Moscow. One notable descendant, Karl Gustav von Baranow (1713–1796), held positions as the Actual Privy Council and Councillor of Estland, owning several estates in the region. Members of the Baranov family occupied high-ranking roles within the Russian Empire until the upheaval of the 1917 Revolution.

In the wake of the Great Northern War in 1721, when Estonia came under Russian rule, a significant Tatar community emerged. Tatars, having served in the Russian army, formed a cohesive community within Estonia after completing their military duties. The Russian Empire's strategy to diversify its border populations included arranged marriages between discharged Tatar soldiers and Estonian women, a practice documented in the 1794 household registers of Tallinn's Lutheran Holy Spirit Church.

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Tatars and other Muslims faced exile to Estonia as punishment for opposing tsarist authority. Their labour was harnessed for constructing coastal fortifications in Tallinn and Paldiski. Notably, following the suppression of Yemelyan Pugachev's rebellion in 1775, the Bashkir leader Salavat

Yulayev received a life sentence and was sent to Paldiski. There, alongside his father Yulay and fellow convicts, he contributed to the construction of coastal defence.

Following the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861, Estonia witnessed an influx of Tatars. Liberated Tatar serfs turned to commerce, and some became itinerant merchants in Estonia [21]. Their horse-drawn carts often led them to be mistaken for nomadic Roma. A number of these travelling merchants eventually settled, opening small shops catering primarily to Tatar and other Muslim communities. Many hailed from the village of Kuj-Su in Sergach County, Nizhny Novgorod.

During Estonia's initial period of independence (1918–1940), Narva and Tallinn were the hubs of Tatar communities. The 1934 census recorded 170 Muslims in Estonia, 166 of whom were Tatars, though the Tatar community estimated their number at 180, split evenly between Narva and Tallinn [21].

The 1930s saw prominent Tatar entrepreneurs in Tallinn, including fur merchants Sigbatulla Magdejev, Hairulla Magdejev (Hairulla Mehdi), Fateh Zakerov, and lace merchant Umiar Zarip. A 1938 article in *Vaba Maa* depicted a Tatar draper as a travelling salesman with a vast array of fabrics, offering quality goods at low prices.

In Tallinn, the *Tatari Kultuuriselts* (Tatar Cultural Society) thrived under the leadership of respected Tatar men. This vibrant society hosted social gatherings, complete with choirs for both adults and youth, who performed traditional Tatar songs. As radios and gramophones entered the scene, modern dances found their way into these events. Meanwhile, Narva boasted its own choir and theatre productions. The society also organized trips to Finland and delightful summer retreats in Narva-Jõesuu, with the last major summer gathering taking place in 1939.

Within their homes, Tatars maintained their native language and cherished Tatar literature. In Tallinn, a Tatar Sunday school operated, providing children with education in Islamic principles, Tatar history, culture, geography and even the Arabic alphabet. This educational haven was housed at Sigbatulla Magdejev's property on Raua Street 57.

However, it was the summer camps in Narva-Jõesuu that played a pivotal role in reinforcing Tatar identity among the younger generation. These camps, led by Alimjan (Alimcan) Idris from Berlin—a prominent Muslim figure in Eastern Europe—left a lasting impact. Alimjan, a Volga Tatar himself, found Estonia surprisingly welcoming for Muslims, noting the absence of discrimination and the existence of a religiously tolerant society. In a stirring 1934 speech, he encouraged local Muslims to embrace Estonia as their home, emphasizing the equal rights granted by the Estonian Constitution to all minorities [1].

The Tatar population in Estonia expanded during the Soviet era, spurred by the Soviet Union's migration policies that altered Estonia's ethnic makeup. The late 1980s saw a national revival among ethnic minorities, including the Tatars, who established the *Tatari Kultuuriselts* (Tatar Cultural Society) in 1988, bolstering Tatar ethnic identity and supporting Estonia's independence movement.

In the 1990s, many Tatars who had settled in Estonia during the Soviet period returned to Tatarstan, leading to a decrease in Estonia's Tatar population from 4058 in 1989 to 1998 by 2011. Those who stayed primarily reside in urban areas like Tallinn, Maardu, Kohtla-Järve, and Narva.

Today, the Estonian Tatar community comprises two principal groups: those with pre-Soviet roots and those who arrived during the Soviet era. Despite lifestyle and identity differences, these groups have not divided the community and actively participate in various Tatar societies.

The Tatar language and Islam are central to Tatar ethnic identity, with approximately 60% of Tatars identifying as Muslim. On August 7, 1989, the Tallinna Islami Kogudus (Tallinn Islamic Congregation) was officially registered, later renamed Eesti Islami Kogudus (Estonian Islamic Congregation). This congregation now includes Sunni and Shia Muslims from various ethnic backgrounds, including Azeris, Uzbeks, Kirgiz and Kazaks, and has grown with new immigrants and local converts. Tatars, however, are still the largest ethnic group amongst Muslims in Estonia [22].

In Tallinn, the Estonian Islamic Centre plays a pivotal role by organizing meetings where most Tatars actively participate in various events. This engagement is crucial for preserving Tatar culture and language within the country. Meanwhile, in the Ida-Virumaa region, local Tatars benefit from the guidance of a dedicated imam who leads prayers and provides religious support.

Interestingly, the Narva Tatar Cultural Society serves as a bridge connecting Christian and Muslim Tatars. Within this centre, Tatar history and traditions are diligently taught and celebrated. Beyond Estonia's borders, Estonian Tatars actively engage in Tatar transnational networks. Notably, they collaborate with organizations and institutions in Tatarstan, participating in cultural events like Sabantuy. In the summer of 2019, Sabantuy took place in the picturesque Old Town of Tallinn, drawing Tatars from all corners of Europe [1]. Estonian Tatars also take part in the annual World Congress of Tatars and the All World Tatar Youth Forum [23].

Interaction between Volga Tatars and Muslim expatriates from the former Soviet Union with Polish Tatars was minimal. Rare instances of contact between Tatars in Finland and Poland with Russian Tatars do not constitute significant collaboration.

The idea of establishing a Baltic Tatar Association took root through the efforts of Adas Jakubauskas, a representative of the Lithuanian Tatar community. In 2012, during the Sabantuy celebration held on June 16, participants gathered from various corners: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, Kazan and Saint Petersburg.

These Tatar communities, whether within or beyond the Baltic region, actively engage in cultural endeavours that strengthen their Tatar identity. Among these activities are memorial lectures honouring Gabdulla Tuqay, revered as the father of modern Tatar literature, and the festive Chak Bayram, which celebrates a traditional Tatar sweet [8, 24].

The prevalence of the Russian language is striking among Russian Tatars, as most publications and event announcements occur in Russian. This mirrors a broader trend of Russification within urban Tatar populations in Russia, where Russian often serves as the primary language of communication. Although there are isolated cases of Russian Tatars residing in Baltic countries who possess high proficiency in either Tatar or the local titular languages, these exceptions do not alter the overall landscape of predominantly Russian-language communities [8, 24].

One significant milestone in collaboration was the All Baltic Sabantuy, which saw its eighth edition hosted in Narva, Estonia, in June 2012. Later renamed the European Sabantuy in 2014, this event marked a shift from sporadic festival participation to a concerted effort for closer cooperation. Russian Tatars from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia began organizing within the World Congress of Tatars, establishing regional and youth branches. Many of these collaborative efforts unfolded right here in the Baltic region [8, 24].

4 Conclusion

The study highlighted in the article suggests that Tatars have successfully integrated into Baltic societies. The migration of Tatars has been an ongoing process, influenced by the political and social climates of their countries of origin, beginning in the thirteenth century and continuing today due to the situation in Russia and Ukraine [25]. Tatars have made significant contributions to various cultures worldwide, demonstrating strong connection to human societies. A key aspect of their identity is the claimed descent from a “Tatar nation,” often linked to the Golden Horde. This claim, whether factual or perceived, holds significance for their identity, though its importance varies among groups.

Religion is a significant ethnic marker for many Tatar groups, with the majority in the Baltic region identifying as Muslims. For Polish Tatars, Islam is a vital component of their ethnicity, overshadowing their historical ties to the Golden Horde. During Poland’s partitions, Polish Tatars stood for Polish culture while harmonizing their Islamic faith with Polish identity [26]. Conversely, for Russian Tatars, Islam is less central to their identity, which is more culturally oriented, with a strong emphasis on literature and folklore and religion being a secondary aspect.

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Part III
Political Institutions and National Policies

Legislative Basis for Feminism in Finland at the Present Time



Anastasia Lagoyko, Ekaterina Fyodorova, and Alena Shukshina

1 Introduction

Finland, as a welfare state, actively promotes the concept of gender equality and non-discrimination. The country has achieved a high level of gender equality through a long history of Finnish women's fight against discrimination. It is necessary to note that Finnish women were the first ones to get an electoral right in Europe—Grand Duchy of Finland as an autonomous part of Russian Empire let women vote in 1906. 20 years later, in 1926, Miina Sillanpää became the first female minister in sovereign Finland. In 1960s the first official feminist organizations such as «The Red Wives» and «Marxist-Feminists» were established [1]. Besides the influence of feminist organizations, as Finland became a party to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the issue on gender discrimination has become a matter of a political concern [2]. Through the years Finland has implemented various legal frameworks to ensure gender balance, which plays a crucial role in eliminating gender discrimination.

The existing mechanisms for ensuring equality policies in Finland are shaped by state-legislative guarantees, and gender equality is one of the core values of Finnish society. Finland has a national action plan on gender equality—Government's Gender Equality Program 2020–2023 (or “hallituksen tasa-arvo-ohjelma” in Finnish) [3]. Such Government equality programs that have been ongoing since 2004 set specific targets to be achieved and have been partly costed or budgeted for the period covered by the action plan. Based on the 2020 Report on Gender Equality, this plan has around 50 targets and measures in the areas of working life, financial equality, family life, education, violence against women and intimate partner

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violence, improving the status of gender minorities, mainstreaming a gender perspective, and promoting gender equality within the European Union and in international contexts [4]. The text of the action plan places an emphasis on promoting gender equality through a prism of an intersectional approach which means shifting the focus off the sexism to a wide range of multiple discriminatory factors. For instance, some of the factors identified by the Plan are age, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity [5]. So, it becomes clear that nowadays in the battle for gender equality, the Finnish government fights against numerous bases of discrimination.

The methodology for the chapter includes a literature review as a mean to conduct a thorough review of existing literature on feminism, gender equality, and legislative frameworks in Finland. A legal analysis is used to characterize the current legislative framework in Finland with a focus on laws and policies related to gender equality and feminism. This involves examining legal texts, regulations, and acts. Quantitative data on the Gender Equality Index is interpreted, the effectiveness and the results of gender equality laws in practice is examined.

2 The Gender Equality Policy in Finland

The legislative basis on men and women's rights equation that is valid in modern Finland has been developing for several decades. The first actions on making men and women equal members of society were taken back in the second half of nineteenth century. Thus, for example, women were given a right to marry and own property since the age of 21 without their guardian's consent in 1864 and 1878 equal inheritance rights for men and women were established [6]. One of the main Finnish acts of the feminism and non-discrimination fields today—The Act on Equality between Women and Men и Non-Discrimination Act—entered into force in 1987 and 2004, respectively. The Equality Act was passed in 1986 to implement the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Non-Discrimination Act was enacted to implement two EU directives in 2004 [7].

It is the Act on Equality between Women and Men (or *Tasa-arvolaki* in Finnish) that prevents direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of gender and promotes various social measures aimed at a more equitable participation of women in the workplace. The Equality Act has been amended several times to imply clearer and more specific measures to ensure a gender equality policy. In 1992 Finnish government officially legislated against indirect discrimination which is much more difficult to detect and prove. In the Council Directive of 1997 European Union legislatively defined indirect discrimination as actions when apparently neutral criteria actually put people with some particular characteristics into disadvantage compared to people without such characteristics [8]. Another additional measure of 1995 was the establishment of quotas, according to which the representation of each sex among members of state and municipal committees, commissions, working groups and other bodies engaged in the development and adoption of decisions

should not be less than 40% [9]. The amendment of 2014 gives great importance and attention to the concept of “gender identity” which is defined as a person’s own experience of their gender. According to the updated law, physical characteristics that define sex cannot be unambiguously male or female and cannot be subjected to any kind of discrimination. The law also defines which bodies are responsible for the supervision, mentioning The Ombudsman for Equality and the National Non-Discrimination and Equality Tribunal [10]. The amendment of 2014 was adopted due to the updated Non-Discrimination Act (or *Yhdenvertaisuuslaki* in Finnish).

Originally founded in 2004, this act controls a number of different bases of discrimination, beyond the factors of sex and gender expression that separately relate to the Equality Act. So, Non-Discrimination Act covers a wide range of factors from age, origin, nationality, language, religion, belief, opinion to political activity, trade union activity, family relationships, state of health, disability, sexual orientation, or other personal characteristics, unless the activity is clearly of a private nature. The developed Non-Discrimination Act contains information, for instance, on who should be notified of discrimination or what kind of compensation and other sanctions may be applied for on the basis of the law. According to section 18 of the Non-Discrimination Act, compliance with the provisions of the Non-Discrimination Act is supervised by the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman, the National Non-Discrimination and Equality Tribunal, and the occupational safety and health authorities. The police investigate offenses involving or related to discrimination. The Act also defines other related Finnish legislation, such as Equality Act for provisions on prohibition of discrimination based on gender, Criminal Code for sanctions on discrimination and Consumer Protection Act for provisions on the prohibition against inappropriate marketing [11].

The above Acts have been gradually amended through years. To keep the state’s policy on gender equality up to date, special Government programs have been implemented in Finland for the last 20 years. Government Action Plans for gender equality are updated every 4 years—as Finnish Governments change every 4 years, and every new Government forms its own Plan according to its program [12]. Thus, these Plans are more sensitive to various innovations in society than legislative acts. The first such Plan was adopted by Vanhanen’s Government in 2004 while the Government Program included a record number of objectives for improving gender equality for that time. The text of the plan noted that equality promotion would be carried out at three levels—Government, Ministries, and local authorities and various organizations [13]. Later Action Plans were released by next Governments in 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2019. The latest Action Plan adopted by Marin Cabinet, in which 12 of the 19 ministers were women, was due 2023. In this Plan, the intersectionality approach was introduced for the first time.

Moreover, Marin’s Government reformed the Family Leave Act originally adopted in 1978. Finnish legislation provides such leave for both women and men until their child reaches the age of three. It is an obligation that both parents share. A man has the right to take such leave even if he is not officially married. Originally, according to the Act, maternity leave was 105 days and paternity leave was 54 days. According to the amendment adopted in August 2022, the duration of family leave

for both parents is equal, being 160 days [14]. Furthermore, leave benefits must be paid to both parents, regardless of gender and biological relationship. However, in practice, statistics show that women tend to take maternity leave more often, as men earn higher wages and continue to work on a full-time basis.

The 77th Finnish Government headed by Petteri Orpo has not drawn new Action Plan for Gender Equality yet, but the intent on creating such plan is expressed in Government Program. The text of the Program once again emphasizes the inadmissibility of any kind of discrimination. However, Finnish Government highlights the state of men in modern society. It is mentioned that attention would be paid to prevent possible social isolation of young men. While this point reminds society of the main idea of feminism, which is to make men and women's rights and statuses equal, whether this equality has been achieved to start stressing on male oppression remains an open question [15].

Promoting gender equality Finland has not only developed domestic legislation but has also signed various conventions and declarations to protect women's rights. Aside from being a party to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women since 1986 and adopting the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1993, Finland ratified the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence or the Istanbul Convention in August 2015. This is the first convention of its kind aimed at combating domestic violence, protecting victims, and bringing perpetrators to justice. After the ratification of this convention, psychological violence, stalking, physical violence, forced marriage are criminalized in Finland and sexual harassment must be legally punished. As a country that has adopted Beijing Declaration, Finland participates in UN Women's 5-year Generation Equality campaign (2021–2026) being a leader of the Action Coalition on Technology & Innovation for Gender Equality together with Tunisia, Armenia, Chile and Rwanda.

3 Public Administration of Gender Equality

In modern-day Finland, the task of guaranteeing gender equilibrium is entrusted to several governing entities. These entities encompass the Finnish Parliament, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH) in conjunction with the parliamentary council faction named Tane, and the Equality Ombudsman. The Finnish Parliament diligently oversees and advocates for gender parity in every facet of decision-making processes, encompassing the endorsement of legislation and regulations that pertain to gender equilibrium.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for promoting gender equality and monitoring gender balance in various social and health-related aspects. Under the auspices of the Ministry, there is a working group dealing with equality issues. This group is responsible for legislation and policy development in the field of gender equality, as well as for coordination within the Ministry of Social Affairs

and Health. Now Raimo Antila heads the Department of Labour and Gender Equality [16].

Tane or Gender Equality Council is a parliamentary council that appoints the Finnish government for the same period as the Finnish parliament. Central to their policy is the belief that everyone should have the freedom to express their authentic selves without facing discrimination [17]. Tane works diligently towards creating a country and a world where gender equality is firmly established and practiced. Their efforts are directed toward dismantling barriers and biases that hinder the realization of true equality. By advocating for equal rights and opportunities, Tane aims to ensure that individuals of all genders can fully participate in society, have access to the same resources, and are treated with dignity and respect. To achieve their goals, Tane collaborates with various stakeholders, including government bodies, civil society organizations, and individuals. They engage in strategic planning, policy formulation, and implementation of initiatives that promote gender equality at all levels of society.

The Tane Council is divided into three working groups. The Subcommittee on Men and Gender Equality assists in the discussion of gender equality policies and collaborates with organizations dealing with men rights [18]. The Subcommittee on Gender, Economy, and Power [19] deals with various equality issues such as equality in work and education, gender-based violence, and economic equality. In its current term, the subcommittee will discuss issues related to the gender implications of the pandemic, the economy, and working life, as well as other aspects of equality. The working group on Social Security Reform [20] monitors the reform, which began in 2020, considering gender equality. The group has developed an information package on equality in education, which is being implemented in schools and daycare facilities. This website provides materials in Finnish and Swedish for teachers, parents, and anyone interested in the topic.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is a key component of the Finnish Government responsible for designing and implementing social and health policies. The main goal of this ministry is to ensure universal access to quality health and social services, ensuring equal opportunities for a healthy and safe life for all. MSAH's mission includes supporting healthy lifestyles, combating health inequalities, and creating the conditions for a prosperous and vibrant environment. MSAH is also committed to ensuring that social and health services are accessible and that income levels are sufficient for all at different times in their lives [21]. The ministry recognizes that certain groups may face greater health disparities, and it endeavors to address and reduce these inequities. Through targeted interventions and policies, MSAH aims to ensure that all individuals, regardless of their background or circumstances, have an equal chance to enjoy good health. Additionally, MSAH places great importance on the accessibility of social and health services. The ministry works to ensure that these vital services are easily accessible to all individuals, regardless of their location, social status, or gender.

The Equality Ombudsman is an independent authority that enforces the Gender Equality Act and works to promote equality and combat discrimination in Finland. They focus on monitoring and promoting gender equality, including ensuring

gender balance in various sectors. Its tasks include monitoring compliance with the law, providing information, encouraging efforts to achieve equality, monitoring the implementation of equality, and reconciling issues related to discrimination. It combats discrimination and promotes equality, and its main task is to monitor compliance with the law, including prohibitions on discrimination. It is subordinate to the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice and performs its duties by providing advice [22].

The Equality Ombudsman is a reputable and autonomous institution that offers assistance to individuals who feel they have been subjected to discrimination. Its primary purpose is to provide support and guidance to combat any violations of equality laws. In cases where the Ombudsman identifies discrepancies in adhering to these laws, it is tasked with providing advice and suggestions to cease the discriminatory practices. He may also bring unlawful discrimination before the National Discrimination and Equality Tribunal [23]. A vital aspect of the Equality Ombudsman's functions is the right to access information from various authorities and conduct inspections at workplaces, educational institutions, and other organizations. This privilege allows the Ombudsman to thoroughly investigate alleged instances of discrimination, thereby fostering a greater understanding of the situation at hand and aiding in the resolution process. The Ombudsman actively cooperates with Scandinavian and European bodies to ensure equality and prevent discrimination, sharing expertise and experience in the field of legislation and its application [24].

These legislative bodies work together to enforce laws and regulations related to gender balance in Finland. They also collaborate with various non-governmental organizations and women's rights groups to develop policies and initiatives that promote gender equality and increase women's representation in different fields.

4 Conclusions

The results of the equality policy in Finland can be traced by studying statistical data and indices such as the Gender Equality Index (GEI) 2023 [25]. This index evaluates gender equality in various spheres of life in the country. The study examines the following aspects: work (equal opportunities for women and men in employment and workplace conditions), wages (income difference in the same job), knowledge (educational and vocational training opportunities), time (participation in extracurricular activities), women's participation in political decision-making solutions and access to health systems.

According to the GEI 2023 index, Finland received 74.4 points out of 100, which indicates a high level of equality in the country [25]. These results indicate that Finland provides conditions for equal participation of women and men in various spheres of life, which is an important indicator of the effectiveness of equality policy in the country. However, there is a still place for improvement in many spheres. According to the index, Finland has big problems with ensuring equality in the field

of knowledge, where the country received only 60.5 points. This indicator may indicate the unwillingness or inability of women to receive education on an equal basis with men. Possible reasons for such a low rating in this area may be related to socio-cultural, economic, or institutional barriers that prevent women's equal access to education and vocational training. This is an important circumstance that requires attention and efforts to eliminate inequalities in the field of knowledge and education in the country. The Finnish Government's gender equality policy has yielded notable achievements, particularly in terms of female representation in key arenas. One significant accomplishment is the relatively high level of women serving as deputies, with 46% projected for the year 2023 [26]. This showcases a noteworthy presence of women in the political sphere, signifying progress toward gender parity in decision-making processes. In terms of workforce participation, women constitute 49% of all employed individuals in Finland. This statistic highlights their substantial contribution to the economy and public life, underscoring the importance of their presence and active involvement. Additionally, nearly one-third of all entrepreneurs in the country are women, indicating their significant engagement within the business sector.

These figures illustrate Finland's comprehensive efforts to foster gender equality across key domains, including politics, economics, and public life. However, it is important to acknowledge that there are still areas in need of improvement. Access to education for women, as mentioned earlier, remains an area that requires further attention in order to attain complete gender equality in various spheres of life. Overall, the achievements thus far demonstrate Finland's commitment to promoting equal opportunities and inclusivity for all genders. The government's gender equality policy serves as a foundation for progress, but there is continued recognition of the ongoing work needed to ensure that women have equal access and representation in all aspects of society.

To summarize the above, Finland has come a long way in the pursuit of gender equality. In order to implement international agreements and conventions (CEDAW, DEVAW, Istanbul Convention, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action) the country has developed legislation that prevents any kind of discrimination and oppression not only on the basis of sex or gender identity, but also on the basis of factors such as age, health, origin, socioeconomic status and others. The two main laws in this sphere are the Act on Equality between Women and Men (*Tasa-arvolaki* in Finnish) and Non-Discrimination Act (*Yhdenvertaisuuslaki* in Finnish). For the last two decades each Finnish Government has adopted its Action Plan for Gender Equality that reflects the challenges and updates of the defined 4-year period. The ensuring of gender equality is entrusted to a several governing entities such as the Finnish Parliament (*Eduskunta*), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH) in conjunction with the parliamentary council faction named *Tane*, and the Equality Ombudsman. The effectiveness of Finland's gender equality policy and its current legislation can be seen in the results of the Gender Equality Index (GEI) 2023, in which Finland received 74.4 points out of 100. The data reported here appear to support the assumption that Finland has been successful in promoting gender equality yet there is always room for improvement.

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Presidential Elections in a Parliamentary Republic: Case Study of Finland



Elena Boldyreva , Natalia Grishina , and Irina Lantsova 

1 Introduction

Governance is characterized by the structure and interrelations between legislative and executive authorities. Governance may be conducted in two formats, which are monarchy and republic. Inside these traditional forms, new and detailed classifications may be traced such as dualistic monarchy, presidential republic, etc.

The difference between presidential and parliamentary government is often associated with separation of powers doctrine. However, the principle itself is treated diversely. American and British political scientists define the separation of powers as the distinctive feature of presidential governing, and the parliamentary one is associated with the fusion of powers [6]. P. Parini and other French scholars believe that presidential regime is susceptible to a very strict division of powers under which functional diffusion is supplemented by the ‘organic’ one [4]. It means that the structures that are prescribed to fulfil a particular function, act independently and do not overlap. On the other hand, some scholars characterize separation of powers principle in a parliamentary regime as rather loose and relaxed. These theory proponents emphasize interdependence and necessity to cooperate between the structures of legislative and executive branches.

The fundamental difference between parliamentary and presidential systems on the one hand, and semi-presidential institutions on the other, is the number of autonomous political and operational bodies. Under the parliamentary system, these

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entities may be the parliament and government, which overlap through integration. In the presidential one, these political structures are the President and parliament, which are interdependent through coordination. In semi-presidential ones, these are President, parliament and government.

The direct elections of President or his autonomy in shaping the Cabinet of Ministers is not enough to segregate the President of semi-presidential republic and the President that owns these powers in a parliamentary regionalized or parliamentary classic system. Much depends on the balance between presidential majority, which always exists if elections are direct, and parliamentary majority. The fact that this parliamentary majority is subsistent, strong, reliable or well-structured is not enough. Direct voting is a mandatory but not a critical requirement that may be enough for semi-presidentialism. On the other hand, under the majoritarian elections, even if it is conducted in two rounds, with bipartisanship and bipolarization, the trend is taking a different turn. If the presidential majority determines parliamentary majority, the President directs them both such is the case of France.

2 Methodology

The methodology of this study is a comparative analysis, which allowed the authors to highlight the features of the process of electing the President in a parliamentary republic by popular vote, as well as to determine how this institution affects the role of the President in this political system. In total, three main elements of a parliamentary republic can be combined. The first factor is the division of executive power into the head of state and the Cabinet of Ministers. The second is the political responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers, which is formed after parliamentary elections by the leader of the winning party (or coalition) to parliament (parliamentarism). The third electoral district is the possibility of early dissolution of parliament by the head of state under certain circumstances.

3 Results of Comparison

Various perspectives exist regarding these elements and their primary importance. We shall cite M. Prelo when he implies the first position to the head of a state while saying “the first principle of parliamentary regime, that may be considered as contradictory to any other, is that the head of the government is neither directly nor indirectly appointed by the people, but by “irresponsible head of a state” [6]. M. Duverger, on the contrary, does not attribute such importance to the head of a state and espies the main distinguishable facet of a parliamentary regime in the political responsibility of the cabinet towards parliament. He argues that “even if the other two elements are absent, this one is enough for a parliamentary regime to exist” [5]. German government scholars question the concept of ‘balance of powers’

in parliamentary systems: They assume that parliamentary system “implies a preponderance of popular representation” and this dominance “gives the opportunity to influence the position of the government” [6].

Norwegian lawyer F. Kastberg was one of the pioneers in defining parliamentarism: “The parliamentary system, or parliamentarism, is a government system in which a king shall choose advisers amongst individuals whose appointment is consented to by the National Assembly. First of all, this means that the king’s counselors such as cabinet, ministry or government, as they are usually called in countries with parliamentary rule, shall resign, since the National Assembly, by its vote of no-confidence, shows that this has to happen” [3].

Constitutional or parliamentary monarchy and parliamentary republic have plenty of similar features. The predominant one is the mode of how the government is formed. It is shaped by the party or parties’ coalition, which wins the parliamentary elections and is accountable only to parliament. In fact, as stated in the Constitution, the monarch appoints government, but most commonly, this decision is primarily a formal act. The leader of the majority party becomes Prime Minister, and monarch can’t influence the situation as the rest of government members will not gain support of the parliament’s majority.

In the situation when there is no conditional probability to build a coalition of two or more parties, a broad coalition government is formed. Parliament factions decide about inclusion of other representatives into the cabinet. Such a government is more independent of party policy ideologies.

President in a parliamentary system plays a specific role, which is different in presidential and semi-presidential systems. In such countries with parliamentary democracies as Great Britain, Germany, Finland, Italy and Japan, the President is not the head of the government and does not maintain the executive power.

In a parliamentary system, the President functions mainly as a symbol of a nation and the head of a state. Specific powers are vested in a President through the Constitution. He represents his country on both national and international platforms. One more primary function of a President in a parliamentary system is the official opening of the parliament. President has the right to appoint parliament’s chair, who will lead the legislative branch. Many presidents provoke public debates on issues de jour and shape public opinion.

While President in a parliamentary system is not the head of the executive branch, he may have limited power to appoint or approve ministers who will perform under his control. The President may participate in government sessions, whereas actual political power rests with Prime Minister or further cabinet members.

Worth noting that the span of powers between President and Prime Minister may vary among states with a parliamentary system. In some cases, the President may play more active role in political life of a country while having significant political authority and opportunity in shaping government policy. In other cases, President may be more restricted by constitutional and cultural norms and perform primarily representative functions. Role of a President in a parliamentary political system depends on the distinct characteristics of a particular country and its Constitution. Whatever the differences may be, President always plays central role in being a

symbol of a state, functioning in the interest of a state and having predominant position in the legislative system.

Nationwide presidential elections are one of the milestone occasions in the political life of a parliamentary republic. Unlike in presidential republics, where the head of state is elected by direct vote, the mechanism for electing the President in parliamentary republics has its own specific characteristics. Typically, parliament or a special assembly elects President. Yet in some countries, President may be chosen directly by the public. In the broadest sense, national elections of a President in parliamentary republics may be considered as the process that ensures power and legitimacy of the head of a state. Elections are held regularly and authorize people to refresh political elite, express their will and give a chance to a country to be administered by the desirable candidate.

The basic principles of presidential elections in parliamentary republics are the following: overall citizens' participation, free and fair voting, plus rivalry amongst candidates. In this structure, election campaigns are held with candidates present their programmes and promises to voters. Presidential elections in parliamentary republics have many positive aspects. They contribute to the stability of the political system and ensure direct compliance with the will of the population. As a result, the President receives the legitimacy and support from public, as well as the political power to carry out his duties. These elections also ensure the separation of powers and balance between the executive and legislative branches of government.

A President elected by popular vote usually represents interests of the entire society, and not just a specific political force. However, like any electoral system, the process of presidential elections in parliamentary republics has its limitations and raises some critical discussions. For example, the definition of criteria necessary for nomination, as well as external influence on elections, may be the subject of debate and controversy. In general, national presidential elections in parliamentary republics are an important tool on the path to democracy and legitimate power. They allow people to directly participate in the political process and choose a leader they support.

An election is a process by which a certain group of people nominate one or more members to perform certain functions in public office. As a political institution, elections are characterized by regularity, repetition and obligatory nature. Electoral legislation governs the process starting from the nomination of a candidate to the counting of votes while using the prescribed registered mechanisms, methods and rules. The elections are legitimate and strictly structured in the electoral procedures themselves, characterized by a set of mandatory actions, techniques and regulations.

“Suffrage in a subjective sense is the right of a citizen or a subject to become a participant in a state legal relations that are originated during elections, referendums while exercising the right to recall representatives in those countries where such recall is afforded and authorized” [3].

The essence of elections is to decide about the parties and officials who will govern the state or administrative-territorial unit for a certain tenure.

Universal suffrage does not mean that all citizens have the right to participate in elections. J. Burdo insists that suffrage is universal if it is not limited by property status, social differences, race or succession [4]. Foreigners and stateless individuals residing in the country where elections are held generally do not have voting rights. These categories sometimes can participate in local government elections if they have lived in the country for a certain period of time and paid taxes. The age for voting is at least 18 years old by election day. Passive suffrage usually requires an increased age, which is associated with the need to have life experience to participate in public affairs.

Currently there are about 70 parliamentary republics in the world. Twenty-seven are in Europe. President is elected by parliament in the following eleven parliamentary republics: Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Switzerland, Latvia and Lithuania. In sixteen European parliamentary republics, President is elected by popular vote: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.

We shall consider the case of Finland to demonstrate the institution of popular presidential elections in a parliamentary republic.

Presidential elections in Finland are held every 6 years, and the election process undergoes several stages [7, 8]. Candidates for the presidency must meet certain criteria to be eligible for nomination. They can be nominated by registered political parties or constituency associations with a significant number of members. Candidates must be at least 35 years old, Finnish citizens by birth, and obtain a certain number of voter signatures to apply. During the electoral campaign, candidate applications are submitted to the Electoral District Committee in Helsinki, and a list of candidates is compiled and randomized. Candidates campaign through various means such as public events, media interviews, and social media. A candidate can serve a maximum of two consecutive terms as President.

All Finnish citizens who are at least 18 years old have the right to vote in presidential elections. The voting register, containing voter information, is compiled by the Digital and Population Data Services Agency before election day and is publicly available at local registry offices [7].

In addition, everyone who is in the voting register is sent a notification of his or her right to vote no later than 24 days before election day. The card indicates, among other things, the election day, days for advance voting, the address of the voter's polling station, as well as the addresses and telephone numbers of the election authorities. The voting register is later used to print out electoral rolls for the polling stations on election day.

Claims for voting register correction have to be submitted to the civic administration no later than 16 days prior to election day. A correction may be required, for instance, if someone believes that they have been removed from the register without reasonable cause or that the information on the register is incorrect. The civic administration shall resolve complaints no later than 13 days before an election day. If a person is dissatisfied with the decision, he or she may appeal against to the regional administrative court within 7 days from the date of received decision. The

regional administrative court's decision is not subject to appeal. However, an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court is possible under the so-called extraordinary rights of appeal, which means that an extraordinary appeal or application for the annulment of the administrative decision or for the restoration of the expired period may be submitted [8].

The voting register becomes legally valid at noon, 12 days before election day. After this, no amendments may be made to the register, in other words, it means a person may neither be removed from the register nor added to it, and the information may not be changed. The only exception to this rule is when the regional administrative court or Supreme Administrative Court reaches this decision after the register has already become legally valid. Then persons, who e.g. are included in the voting register by the court decision, can vote in elections but have to take the court's decision with them to the polling station and present it to the election authorities.

Voting procedure: The President is elected by a direct vote, if necessary in two rounds. If only one candidate is nominated, he or she is appointed as President without an election. Election day is the fourth Sunday of January. If one of the candidates receives more than half of the (approved) votes cast in the election, he or she becomes an elected President. If none of the candidates has received a majority of the votes cast, a new election shall be held on the second Sunday after the first election between the two candidates who received most votes in the first election. The candidate receiving most votes in the second round is elected President.

Finnish voters go to polling stations and cast their votes at the dates legally scheduled. Voting is open, meaning elections are held by secret ballot at polling stations or by post.

In 2024, the presidential election day was scheduled for January 28, 2024. Early voting took place in Finland from 17 to 23 January 2024, and outside Finland from 17 to 20 January 2024. Two candidates qualified for the second round, which took place on February 11, 2024: Alexander Stubb and Pekka Haavisto. Early voting in the second round took place in Finland from January 31 to February 6, 2024, and outside Finland from January 31 to February 3, 2024. Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party won the second round with 51.6% of the votes. On March 1, 2024, he took office and declared his desire to continue the course begun by his predecessor, S.Niiniste. He is the thirteenth President of Finland [8].

Election results count. After the polling stations close, votes are counted at each precinct and the resulting data is transmitted to the election committee. Election results are calculated in the same way as in parliamentary elections, but according to the majoritarian system, and not according to the D'Hondt method. Candidates are ranked in order of the number of votes received. The Electoral District Committee of Helsinki then confirms the final number of votes received by candidates nationwide and informs the Ministry of Justice. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes in the first round of elections, then the two candidates with the most votes are advanced to the second round of elections. If one of the candidates in the first election receives a majority of votes (50% + 1 vote), then he or she is declared President.

However, if this has not happened, Ministry of Justice declares that a second election between the two candidates who have received most votes will be held in 2 weeks. In the second election, the government establishes which candidate has received most votes and thus has been elected President. Open ballot is also used in the second round. If the number of votes received is identical, the winner is determined by a drawing lot.

Winner declaration. At the end of the counting of votes in the second (or first) round of elections, the election committee announces the winner and declares him the President of Finland. The transfer of powers will take place after the inauguration. The President takes office on the first day of the month after the elections.

It is obvious that general presidential elections in a parliamentary republic like Finland largely give the figure of the President significant weight. In addition, it is obvious that the formation of this institution in general elections is a tribute to tradition, because Finland, before the adoption of the Constitution (Basic Law of 2000), was a semi-presidential republic in which the role of the President was extremely important.

President of Finland's authorities in parliamentary republic of Finland contain the following features [7].

Duties of the President of Finland are mainly regulated by the Constitution, but some of them are presented in other legislations. According to the Finnish Constitution, the President of the Republic exercises state authority together with the government, whose members shall have the parliament's confidence. President works in strong coordination with the government.

The President directs and approves Finland's foreign policy in strict collaboration with the government. Major decisions in foreign policy President considers together with the government. He determines alignment of foreign policy, initiatives and guidelines for the representatives of Finland on all fundamental and significant issues, such as recognition of states, establishment or severance of diplomatic relations, diplomatic missions, accession or withdrawal from international organizations and delegations during international negotiations. The President appoints the heads of Finnish diplomatic missions, that is, ambassadors. He or she accepts credentials from diplomatic representatives of other countries or international organizations accredited in Finland. Parliament then ratifies or denounces international treaties, and decides on the implementation of international treaties if they contain provisions that are subject to legislation or require the approval of parliament in accordance with the Constitution. Otherwise, international obligations come into force by decree of the President of the Republic [8].

The President makes decisions about war and peace with the consent of parliament. The minister whose duties are international relations shall inform other states and international organizations about the substantial issues concerning the country's foreign policy. Finland's Council of State has a collective responsibility to prepare decisions for the European Union and decides on corresponding measures in Finland, unless the decision shall require parliamentary approval. Parliament is involved in the national preparation of decisions to be taken in the European Union in accordance with the Constitution of Finland.

“The President of the Republic may, however, in exceptional cases, participate in meetings of the European Council, as well as in other international conferences and summits, when exceptional importance for the foreign and security policy of Finland arises” [1]. That implies that the President of the Republic may decide to take part in meetings of the European Council which has already happened several times. The decisive role of President Sauli Niiniste may illustrate the above-mentioned cases of the exclusive role of a President when he participated in the negotiations with the Turkish leaders concerning the approval of Finland’s entry to NATO in 2023.

Article 93, paragraph 1 of the Constitution reports that foreign policy is directed by the President of the Republic in a strong coordination with the government. The foreign policy directions require close cooperation between the President and the government. The basic expectation of the presidential decision-making capabilities is that he bases all major foreign policy resolutions on governmental inventions and in concordance with the government.

The Constitution also contains a paragraph about decision-making on foreign policy, under which “the foreign policy of Finland is conducted by the President of the Republic in cooperation with the Council of State” [4]. This premise has significantly strengthened the tendency to parliamentarize country leaders by foreign policy, which may be traced in the joint powers of Parliament and the Council of State in EU matters.

The President and Prime Minister work in harmony with each other. But one cannot but agree with the opinion of I. Ahtiainen that this is exactly the Prime Minister who is “number one in Finnish politics.” This position is guaranteed by larger empowerments in executive authorities encompassing national politics, EU concerns, and foreign policy.

The President of the Republic is the commander-in-chief of the Defence Forces under Section 128 (Chap. 12) of the Constitution Act. The position of commander-in-chief is associated with the President’s role in directing foreign policy. The commander-in-chief role is a part of the national decision-making authorities that concern foreign and security policy. This process is related to the President’s authority to direct the country’s foreign policy. Commander-in-chief role of a President is a part of military management. In a situation of a probable crisis, these authorities amplify. Traditionally, a key element of the commander-in-chief’s authority was to give military orders on operational and training matters.

Section 58, paragraph 5 of the Constitution states that the President makes decisions on matters relating to military orders in conjunction with a minister, as provided for in more detail by an Act. Military decision-making multiplies presidential responsibility to parliament.

The President appoints officers and decides on the deployment of Defence Forces. If parliament is not having a session at the moment of making a decision, it shall be convoked immediately. President makes decisions about war and peace with the parliament consent. With military authority, the President decides about the fundamental principles of military defence, significant changes in defence readiness and principles for the implementation of military defence, as well as significant changes in the defence preparedness of border forces.

In addition, the President determines other large-scale or fundamentally significant issues in military management. As a commander-in-chief, he or she may make decisions on any duty assigned to the Chief of Defence, the Chief of the Finnish Border Guard or any other military commander.

In exceptional situations, the President is also responsible for deciding on retraining and calling up reservists for additional service. The President of the Republic decides on military order issues related to the strategic planning of the Ministry of Defence on the proposal of the Minister of Defence, and other issues on the military order of the Defence Forces if recommended by the Commander of the Defence. The President also decides whether the Minister of the Interior and the head of the Border Guard shall present during hearing.

The President may, on his own initiative or at the proposal of a minister, transfer the issue to consider in the Council of State which was initially submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. To the Council of State, this issue is submitted by the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Internal Affairs. The Commander of the Defence Forces and, accordingly, the head of the border service have the right to attend and speak at such meetings [2].

The President decides about the appointments to military service and assignments of military ranks. The President of the Republic decides about the appointment of an aide-de-camp to the President of the Republic either and makes decisions on the appointments of colonels and junior officers on the recommendation of the Cabinet Ministry. The President makes assignments to senior military positions based on the Minister of Defence's proposal to the Council of State.

In exceptional circumstances, if the proposal is based on the Council of State decision, the President may transfer the position of commander-in-chief to another Finnish citizen for a certain period of time or until further notice. The transfer of high command may occur not only during war periods but also in an armed conflict or a state of emergency.

Foreign military personnel may enter Finnish territory only with the permission of the Finnish authorities or on terms of international agreements. The permitting procedure is conducted under the Act on Territorial Defence. Based on the act provisions, foreign forces may participate in peacekeeping training sessions in Finland.

The President has the power to nominate Prime Minister and other ministers, as well as judges and a number of high-rank officials.

The Prime Minister and the required number of other ministers (members of the State Council) form the State Council, which is usually also called the government or ministry. Members of the Council of State shall be Finnish citizens known for their integrity and competence and enjoying the confidence of parliament.

After parliamentary elections or after the resignation of the government, the President of the Republic proposes to parliament a candidate for the post of Prime Minister. Before the Prime Minister is elected, the groups represented in the parliament negotiate the political programme and composition of the government. On the basis of the outcome of these negotiations, and after having heard the Speaker of the Parliament and the parliamentary groups, the President informs the parliament of the nominee for Prime Minister. The nominee is elected Prime Minister if his or her

election has been supported by more than half of the votes cast in an open vote in the parliament. The parliament then elects Prime Minister, who is thereafter appointed to the office by the President of the Republic. The President appoints the other ministers in accordance with a proposal made by the Prime Minister.

The new government is elected after being nominated by the President, with the President first releasing the previous government from its duties and then immediately appointing members of the new government. If the formation of the government fails or makes slow progress, the President can speed up negotiations by appointing a government expert to explore various government options.

The President has the power to release all ministries from their duties if the Prime Minister resigns from the government, or grant a resignation to an individual minister upon his own request or on the proposal of the Prime Minister. Besides, the government always asks for resignation after parliamentary elections.

In other cases, the request for resignation may be due to a vote of no-confidence expressed by parliament or the termination of the terms of continued government cooperation. The President shall in any event dismiss the government or a minister, if either no longer enjoys the confidence of parliament, even if no request is made.

The President of the Republic has the authority to appoint officials if is provided by the Constitution or another act. He or she also appoints to office the heads of Finland's missions abroad, tenured judges. The President makes decisions on military appointments and matters pertaining to the Office of the President of the Republic. Moreover, the President of the Republic appoints the Chancellor of Justice and his deputy, members of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, the Prosecutor General and his deputy, the Director General and Chairman of the National Pension Fund, the Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Finland (CEO), the governor of the Åland Islands, etc.

In addition to the listed above powers, the President of Finland declares the annual session of parliament open. The President also declares the adjournment of parliament for each election period. The President of the Republic may, on the justified initiative of the Prime Minister and after consultation with parliamentary groups, order the holding of early parliament members' elections. The new parliament is then elected for a 4-year term. Parliament may make its own scheduling to end the current session before elections. In crises or other urgent situations, the early elections may be called.

Prior to 1991, the President had no restrictions on scheduling new elections. The President ordered early parliamentary elections seven times: Ståhlberg in 1924; Relander in 1929 and 1930; Paasikivi in 1953; and Kekkonen in 1961, 1971, and 1975.

The Constitution Act states that the legislative power is exercised by the parliament. Any law is initiated in parliament while being proposed by the government or with the member of parliament initiative. This may occur during a parliamentary session. Proposals may come for the government proposal. When approved by parliament, the President approves these acts either, i.e. the President of the Republic has the right to veto. The President shall decide to approve the law within 3 months

after the parliament's response is submitted to the Council of State to be further approved by the President.

The President has the option to inquire about the upcoming act with either the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court, or both of them, prior to approval. However, the President has the option not to approve the law. In this case, the law returns to parliament and shall be brought back to parliament without any delay. After the committee's report, if there are no any significant changes or rejections by the majority the law shall be approved in one reading during the parliamentary plenary session. An act considered in this way comes into force without approval. A law is considered repealed unless parliament re-approves it. A law that has been approved or comes into force without approvals shall be signed by the President of the Republic and by the corresponding minister.

The Constitution gives the President authorities to issue decrees. He or she does it in cases where the power to issue decrees is related to the powers of the President as head of state. Both the Council of State and the Ministry may issue regulations based on their powers provided by the law. If there is no separate paragraph about the responsible issuing body, the State Council publishes the resolution. On all accounts, the corresponding ministry and minister are responsible for preparing and nominating any regulatory enactment.

The President's powers also include the right to pardon. In individual cases, the President of the Republic may, after obtaining a statement from the Supreme Court, grant full or partial pardon from a penalty or other criminal sanction imposed by a court of law. Amnesty recommendations are provided to The President of the Republic by The Minister of Justice. The President's decision is communicated to the applicant and other individuals and authorities in relevance [7].

A general amnesty may only be provided by an Act. Amnesty is limited to penalties that are imposed for crimes such as imprisonment, fines, confiscation, driving bans, and others. President has no authority to pardon or release anyone from public or private legal obligations, such as taxes, alimony, liability for damages, or debt obligations. Amnesty may not be obtained for the costs of proof, entry into a criminal record or suspension of a prison sentence. To ask for a pardon the sentence shall be final. A pardon can be requested by anyone. The consent of the person to grant a pardon is not necessary. On individual occasions, the President of the Republic may recall the whole sentence given by the court or put it partially aside for personal reasons that may arise later after the deed and the verdict and that are connected with the perpetrator.

Following the proposals of the Title Commission of the Government Office, the President assigns an estimated hundred honorary titles. The head of the Commission is the Prime Minister. Seven experts in social, cultural, and business affairs are nominated to the Commission by the President of the Republic. Titles are typically awarded twice a year.

The President of the Republic is the Grand Master of all three official orders of Finland: the Cross of Liberty (VR), the White Rose of Finland. (SVR) and the Order of the Lion of Finland (SL). The President of the Republic presents knight titles and medals when presented to the government. The President of the Republic, as Grand

Master, awards the medal of his own choice. Independence Day, December 6 and National Defence Forces Flag Day, June 4 are the primary days when Medals of Honour are awarded [7].

The Åland Self-Government Act gives to the President of the Republic certain responsibilities that are directly connected with this highly autonomous province. The President of the Republic may order to terminate a provincial act of law after the Supreme Court gives the proposition, order to terminate the act of province adopted by the regional parliaments of Åland if the regional parliament has exceeded its legislative powers. The President opens and closes sessions of the provincial parliament, although the President usually assigns the governor of Åland to open and close parliamentary sittings.

The President may make proposals and announcements to the provincial parliament, dissolve the provincial parliament, and order new elections when consulted with the Speaker. The President makes decisions in the State Council on matters specified in the Åland Self-Government Act. His or her decisions are presented by the Ministry of Justice if they do not concern the matters regarding the provincial economy, which is the prerogative of the Ministry of Finance.

The President's powers in a situation of a crisis are regulated by the Emergency Powers Act and in the State of Defence Act (1083/1991). If the Council of State together with the President determines the emergency conditions in the country, it issues the decree introducing emergency powers in the critical situation.

The decree shall be immediately submitted to the parliament. The parliament shall decide whether the decree is to apply as such or whether it is to be repealed in full or in part and whether it is to remain in force for the period provided or for a shorter period. The Emergency Powers Act provides the authorities with powers to secure the livelihood of the population and the national economy, to maintain legal order, constitutional, and human rights, and to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of Finland in emergency conditions. If the powers provided for by the Emergency Powers Act are not sufficient to ensure state independence and maintain law and order, the President of the Republic may issue a decree introducing a state of emergency both throughout the country and in a particular region. The resolution shall be approved by parliament [8].

The decision-making procedure is as follows. The President of the Republic makes decisions in the Council of State; the rapporteur is the minister to whose department the matter belongs. When the President of the Republic makes decisions in the Council of State, at least five ministers must take part in the meetings with the Chancellor of Justice. If the President does not decide on the proposals, the government shall immediately prepare new proposals.

The President usually relies on government proposals when making decisions, but the Constitution allows decisions to be made without parliamentary proposals. These issues concern both Council of State's appointment and resignation or its individual member, calling on early parliamentary elections; amnesty and other specific statutory matters that concern a private individual or do not require consideration at a general governmental meeting.

Such normative acts as a decree, open letter, letter of appointment, etc. regulate the President's decisions. The President and the minister responsible for the matter sign an Act and present it to the parliament decisions are published on the government's website.

The President of the Republic makes some decisions without governmental support if they concern military orders and appointments to the military service. Military decisions related to the strategic planning of the Ministry of Defence are taken on the proposal of the Minister of Defence. Orders regarding the Defence Forces are made on the proposal of the Commander of the Defence Forces [8].

The President decides to represent the Minister of the Interior on publishing orders regarding the Border Guard. Attending and speaking at the presentation is open to the Prime Minister and the head of the Border Guard Service. The President may, on his own initiative or at the proposal of a minister, refer to the Council of the State an issue submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers, when first the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Internal Affairs initially enters this issue into the Council of State.

President in foreign policy matters bases his or her final decision on the government and parliament. The government is involved in other foreign policy decisions primarily via the Foreign and Security Policy Committee and other informal negotiations or discussions with the Prime Minister or one or more ministers.

Critical and far-reaching matters may require the Council of State to discuss them. Most often, it is sufficient to discuss the issue at a joint meeting of the Ministerial Committee for Foreign and Security Policy and the President of the Republic, otherwise the Prime Minister and/or the relevant minister (in most cases the Minister of Foreign Affairs) may be asked a question on the issue. Thus, the President decides on his or her foreign visits and the receptions of heads of other states.

In free format, the President of the Republic decides, among other things, about publishing speeches, and letters and receiving invitations, meetings with representatives of political parties and attending various events. The President may make statements, greetings and interviews, as well as conduct various debates. The President may grace various occasions with his or her presence. Throughout the year, the President makes dozens of speeches at various events. Annual performances include, for example, the New Year and State Day performances.

According to the Constitution, the President of the Republic declares the parliamentary annual session open and closes the work of parliament at each electoral period. The opening and closing ceremonies begin at Helsinki Cathedral with the service on The Finish Sejm Day, after that, the President and deputies move to the parliament building. At the opening of parliaments, the President speaks first and the Speaker responds; at the closing sessions, the order of speeches is reversed.

The President of the Republic is available at any time to perform the duties of the President. He has no fixed working hours and no actual annual leave. If any circumstances prevent the President from performing his duties, the Prime Minister executes these duties or, a minister acting as Deputy Prime Minister accomplishes them if the PM is also hindered from doing his or her duties.

The President may not delegate the responsibilities to other people. Exceptions to this are the supreme command of the Defence Forces, which the President may transfer to another Finnish citizen on the proposal of the government in emergency conditions. Furthermore, the President may authorize the governor to open and close the regional parliament of Åland.

The salary of the President of Finland is regulated by the Act and it remains unchanged until parliament decides otherwise. From 1 March 2012, the salary of the President was set at 160,000 euros per year. On the initiative of President Niinistö, the wage was reduced from April 1, 2013, to the 2006 level, to 126,000 euros. In addition to the salary, the President is entitled to an apartment, with heating, lighting and decoration payments. The public funds are also used to compensate the necessary personnel. The spouse of the President does not receive any payments or compensations due to her position. The pension of the President of the Republic is legal regulations. The annual pension of the President is 60% of the President's salary. The President who has served for 6 years or more receive a full pension [7].

The government can pay for a suitable apartment for a retired President at a reasonable rent. It may also provide office space, transportation, security, secretarial and office services within the government budget. The President's spouse does not receive a pension because of the position, but after President's death, is entitled to a [pension for loss of breadwinner](#), which is 50% of the President's pension. President's salary and housing expenses, as well as pensions and breadwinners 'pension are tax-free'. Other incomes are generally taxed [7].

4 Conclusion

Thus, the President of Finland plays an important role in the political system of a parliamentary republic. Although executive power lies within the government and the Prime Minister, the President has a wide range of powers and represents nation's stability and unity.

The main function of the President of Finland is to represent the state as the head of a state. He or she is a symbol of the nation and conveys the majesty, dignity and authority of Finland as a sovereign state. The President does diplomatic actions and signs interstate agreements on behalf of Finland.

The President of Finland also performs important constitutional functions. He appoints the Chair of the Government after elections and can suspend his or her powers if necessary. The President also approves the ministers' and judges' appointments, and can also release parliament under certain circumstances.

However, these powers are limited by the system of interconnectedness with parliament and government. The opportunity to balance the actions of parliament and government is exercised by the President via the principle of separation of powers, which is highly committed in Finland. At the same time, the President is not an

active participant in the legislative process, and his role is rather symbolic and more representative.

The combination of the political and symbolic roles of the Finnish President creates a specific political landscape in the country. The President's significant influence in the international arena allows him to play a leading role in diplomatic resolution of conflicts, establishing relations with other countries and strengthening interstate relations. Moreover, presidential elections become an important step in shaping the political will of the nation and defining national priorities.

Presidential elections have an impact on the country's political system as they give Finnish citizens an opportunity to choose who leads that office. Elections are held every 6 years and allow Finns to express their position on the future leadership of the country.

The election results may lead to a review of Finland's main policies and priorities. The future policy and development of the country depends on what values, ideas and programmes are supported by voters. Thus, the role of the President in a parliamentary republic like Finland is in close connection with the position of the President, the procedure for his election in a particular country, etc., in other European countries with a similar form of government. General elections of the President in a parliamentary republic play a significant role in the political system, determining the powers and status of the head of state.

First, general presidential elections provide citizens with the opportunity to directly participate in the formation of political power. A parliamentary republic differs from a presidential one when the executive power rests with the government rather than the President. However, presidential elections are a key tool for legitimizing the head of state and giving him democratic legitimacy. This allows the President to act as a symbol of a united people and accomplish the political duties with broad public support.

Second, general presidential elections provide an opportunity to change the balance of political forces in the country. Since the President has certain powers and influence over the policies of parliament, elections allow citizens to express their support or dissatisfaction with the current government with their vote. If the new President represents a different party or worldview, he can change the course of the country and the policies of the government. Thus, general presidential elections can be a means to restructure the political system and make it more responsive to the interests of citizens.

Third, the results of all presidential elections in a parliamentary republic influence the role of the President in relations with other states. The President, elected by popular vote, represents the national interest and has authority over foreign policy. His words and actions are of great significance both for the people of his country and for the international community. Thus, general presidential elections help strengthen faith in the leader of the state and his ability to represent national interests abroad.

However, it should be taken into account that the role of the President in a parliamentary republic is partially limited by the system of power. In most of these countries, the President has representative functions and symbolic power rather than real

political influence. The main executive power is in the hands of the government and parliament. This means that even an elected, popular head of state may find it difficult to implement his programme if his views and positions do not correspond to the policies of the parliamentary majority.

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German “People’s Parties” Decline: Analysis of Bundestag and Landtag Elections in 2021–2023



Nikita Ruchkin  and Aleksei Vovenda 

1 Introduction

In most of the modern democratic countries power is executed by people. National constitutions provide every eligible citizen with right to influence politics of their own state. According to the Article 20 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz): “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state”, and “All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies” [1]. That means German citizens are entrusted with ability to choose their own governmental bodies according to their own will and preferences. Therefore, elections can be seen as the representation of the people’s will in politics. And their results can be analyzed for assessing the current political situation in country, foretelling the next results and understanding country’s political parties’ positions. Article is devoted to the political situation of two major German political powers (so-called “People’s parties”). They include two biggest political parties: first one is Conservative Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister-party located in Bavaria—Christian Social Union. And the second one is Social-Democratic party of Germany (SPD).

This work focuses on German election held from the formation of the new 20th Bundestag. Therefore, this analysis include Bundestag election on 26th of September 2021 [2]; election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on 26th of September 2021 [3]; election in Saarland on 27th of March 2022 [4]; election in Schleswig-Holstein on 8th of May 2022 [5]; election in North Rhine-Westphalia on 15th of May 2022 [6]; election in Lower Saxony on 9th of October 2022 [7]; election in Berlin on 12th of

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February 2023 [8]; election in Bremen on 14th of May 2023 [9]; election in Hessen on 8th of October 2023 [10] and election in Bavaria on 8th of October 2023 [11]. Considering the election results, timeline was divided into three time periods: from the end of 2021 to the end of 2023.

2 Materials and Methods

The research is based on the analysis of the German elections in the time period from the formation of new 20th Bundestag on 26th of September 2021 up until the last election in Hessen and Bavaria on 8th of October 2023. Results of land's parliaments elections were used as the basis for understanding current political mood and people's behavior toward political parties. The research also focuses on two major German parties—SPD and CDU/CSU—which are usually called “People's parties” (“Volkspartei” in German). The research reveals different time periods for these parties, based on which predictions can be made about the future of these parties.

The following research methods were used:

- Source analysis, which involves a comprehensive study of each election's background, results and these election's influence on the political situation for both “People's parties”.
- Comparative analysis, which involves consideration of the different results of the elections and understanding the causes of these results. That knowledge then can be used to better understand how the political mood has changed throughout different periods.

3 First Period: The Rise of SPD

The first period runs from late 2021 to early 2022 and shows us the rising popularity of Social-Democratic party. As it was stated—Bundestag election is going to be the starting point of this research. We will go through the results and note the situation in which both parties found themselves. 26th of September was a day of most importance for Germany. It was the first federal election without previous chancellor Angela Merkel as CDU/CSU candidate. So, for most of the political scientists the situation was pretty vague and intricate—the strongest politician just left her post and left for her party a person, who tarnished his own reputation right in the time of the election campaign [12]. It was predicted that CDU/CSU would lose their good share of votes, but their loss to the SPD was quite a surprise for a lot of people [13]. Even though social problems began to become the cornerstone of German political life much earlier, in the time of Bundestag election they reached a peak. That's mostly the main reason of SPD's win as seen by political scientists and analytics [13].

Now, let’s address the results of this election. One can say that both “People’s parties” came close this time. SPD got first place with 25.7% of the votes, while CDU/CSU union got 24.1% of the votes and ranked second [2]. Both parties’ result is quite close, and by looking at this numbers we cannot really see the difference between the situation for parties. But in this research, we focus on one more important feature of all these elections, which is called swing percentage. This number tells by how much support percentage for party has altered and has it went down or up. Based on this parameter we can tell how the parties’ state has changed since the last election. When we take into account the parties’ percentage swing, we can actually see the difference for “People’s parties” in 2021 Bundestag election. Even though they both got “just about” 25% of the votes, CDU/CSU lost 8.8% of the votes since the last election, while SPD gained 5.2%. As we can observe, German political giants came close in the election, but for that to happen Christian-democrats had to lose almost 9% of their votes, and Social-democrats had to gain just above 5%. And even though it’s not a solid SPD victory (CDU/CSU still has almost as many places in Bundestag as SPD), Social-democrats definitely came back into political life on the federal level and now as the head of the governing coalition.

Two more elections were held on the same day as the Bundestag election: election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and election in German capital—Berlin. Firstly, we will address the Berlin election. We could analyze it just like any other election, but we will come back to the next Berlin election, that took place in 2023. The reason to that is that original Berlin election that took place on 26th of September were invalidated due to contradiction with the election law and numerous irregularities [14]. But, both according to the predictions and the actual results [15, 16]—the SPD won this election, even though after their numbers were invalidated. And according to the German High Constitutional Court about 60% of the Landtags places were discredited by technical and processual errors [17]. So, we will not address these election results in our work.

Another election was held in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Here, SPD were carrying on their “winning parade”, and did it much better. In this land Social-democrats got 39.6% of the votes [3], which was their highest results since 2002 [18]. Red “People’s party” continued federal success and got triple more votes than the CDU. Christian-democrats got 13.3% of the votes and ranked third overall. That situation seemed quite unusual for black “People’s party”, because German political giants usually split first two places between each other, not letting any other parties to come second. But the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern election showed, that “People’s parties” starting to lose their popularity to smaller parties, and even beginning to lose “their-only” first and second places to them. But this is only the beginning of decline, as we can see—this land election proved a decisive victory for SPD. It also gave a signal for CDU to start changing, lest they will lose next elections [15]. If we look at the percentage swing, we can observe a huge rise for SPD—they gained 9% more of the votes since the last election. According to Infratest dimap, voters who couldn’t vote earlier should be thanked for this increase. They were the ones who voted for the SPD in this election [18]. Also, some of the AfD and CDU voters turned to SPD for change. This is mostly why CDU lost 5.7% of their votes.

Next and the last for this period election were held in Saarland on 27th of March 2022 [4]. This election is a brilliant example of this period we look upon. SPD got 43.5% of the votes, while CDU only got 28.5%. Here we see CDU stabilizing, Social-democrats already does not pose a triple-more threat to Christian-democrats, although now SPD are double the CDU's size. But this number of votes help SPD to win the "absolute majority", meaning they can rule the parliament themselves [19]. This was, without any doubt, a decisive victory for SPD [20]. For Social-democrats that was an outstanding chance to rule over a land without building a governing coalition. And they used this chance—modern Saarland cabinet consists of the SPD members, while they also hold the absolute majority in land's parliament.

First months after Bundestag election were like a heady delight for Social-democrats. While CDU suffered from a votes loss all over the country, SPD continued their march. This effect was described as "losers lose more, than winners win" [21], but here situation is a little bit different. Winners win just almost as much as losers lose. But for a short period of time—losers keep losing, winners keep winning. Now we will turn to the period where this "winning-losing parade of People's parties" ends for both of them.

4 Second Period: The Turbulence Times

Next period we decided to call "Turbulence times", meaning that in this time both "People's parties" suffered wins and losses. At the first place, we will address the election carried in Schleswig-Holstein on 8th of May 2022. This election was a major blow to the SPD. They lost their leading position and slipped to third place in the elections [5]. And as it was mentioned before—"People's parties" usually share first two places, but first CDU lost their second place in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and now SPD lost their second place to the Greens. The Social-democrats got a good sobering jolt of reality—their "winning parade" ended with them not only getting the third place overall but also only 16% of the votes, which was their lowest results in the election so far [22]. Also, for the first time in history of German election, SPD got no direct mandates for Landtag. That means, that there was no SPD candidate that won at least one constituency in Schleswig-Holstein. Mostly all of them were taken by CDU. In percentage swing SPD lost about 11% of their votes compared to the last election. Situation seemed much brighter for CDU in Schleswig-Holstein. They got first place with 43.4% of the votes and it was their highest result in this land. The CDU finally had been able to recover from its previous defeats and, fielding a popular candidate, won the election [23]. Many analysts and political scientists consider the Daniel Günther candidacy for prime-minister of the land the main factor by which CDU was able to win. He is one of the most popular members of Christian-democrats, providing a clear message to German voters [23]. So here, one may say, began the change in situation for German "People's parties", but that's not quite true. Yes, CDU definitely won this election by overall votes, they gained

more votes since the last election, but very soon came the other election and there everything is not so obvious in terms of numbers.

Just week after the Schleswig-Holstein election came the other one in North Rhine-Westphalia. Here CDU also decided to take a “popular candidate” move by presenting Hendrik Wüst—previous prime minister of this land, who is quite popular among the Rhine-Westphalians and on the federal level too [24]. And we can see how it worked out—CDU again got first place with 35.7% of the votes [6]. SPD this time came second with 26.7% of the votes, which made their prospects a little brighter. Particularly, in terms of percentage swing. If we were to look at the whole picture, the main winners would be the Greens, which gained about 12% of the vote [25]. But when we look at the “People’s parties” numbers, they don’t seem as remarkable as the Greens results. Even though CDU ranked first and got about 36% of the votes, since the last election Christian-democrats lost 4.5% of the votes. And while SPD took second place with 26.7% of the votes, they gained 2.7% since the last election [6]. We can observe, that although CDU seem to be able to come back on the top for these two elections, it was mostly with the help of CDU popular members, which favor gave Christian-democrats an opportunity to win these two elections. And, of course, we should not forget about the percentage swing, which was not good for CDU in the last election.

The next election in this period proves the point that CDU was not yet on their “comeback” stage. On 9th of October 2022 election in Lower Saxony was held [7]. The results were a little bit shocking to the CDU, who thought that now it’s time for their “winning parade”. But voters decided otherwise—CDU came second with 28.1% of the votes. SPD came first, although, not far ahead of CDU. Social-democrats got 33.4% of the votes. As it was stated, CDU got their worst result in this land since 1955 [26]. SPD got their chance to continue their governing, but now in the coalition with the Greens [27]. But still both “People’s parties” suffered a loss in this election—they both lost their percentage of the votes since the last election. SPD lost 3.5% of the votes, while CDU lost 5.5%.

Then we turn to the year 2023. We have already discussed the first Berlin election, which were ruled invalid and ordered to be re-run. And the next election under our observation is going to be the Berlin repeat election that was held on 12th of February 2023 [8]. Percentage swing will be used in comparison to the results of 2021 Berlin election, which were discussed earlier. Berlin house of deputies is one of the main parliaments in Germany (right after North Rhine-Westphalian Landtag), and it’s obvious that the electoral fight will be brutal. One fact that tainted this election is that they were a repeat election, which never happened before in Germany. Of course, in the eyes of the voters Berlin SPD seemed as the main riggers and benefitters of the first election results [28]. But still, election was held and the new results were in. And they were not good for SPD, who, as we remember, won the 2021 election. SPD now came second with 18.4% of the votes, while CDU won the election with 28.2%. This was another blow for SPD and especially the fact that they facing it in the German capital. Not only that Social-democrats lost their first place in Berlin’s house of deputies, they also lost 3% of their votes since the 2021 election. CDU’s situation was pretty bright—they got first place and also gained

about 10% of votes. Kai Wegner, the CDU's candidate, was supported by many Christian-democrats all across the country. Though, with many seats taken by another parties, CDU's winner took three attempts to ballot for mayor [29]. This leaves CDU in quite obscure position even in German capital.

Last election of the "Turbulence times" are the election in Bremen. Bremen is also one of the small German lands, like Berlin, and for the last years it was so-called "SPD's place" [30]. And it remained this way—SPD came first with 29.8% of the votes. Not so far behind is CDU with 26.2% of the votes. As we can see, despite the SPD victory, the amount of the votes for both "People's parties" is pretty close. And if we look at the percentage swing, we can understand, that situation for both parties started to even out. CDU lost only 0.5% of the votes since the last election, while SPD gained about 5%. That defines Bremen as the last point of German turbulence period, as "People's parties" start their way to change things [31].

This period leaves us with understanding of the storminess in German political life in those times. "People's parties" swapped their places in the elections: SPD won, then CDU, then SPD again. Of course, it takes much closer look to see the causes of one's party loss or win and this outcome's consequences for German politics. Though, in this analysis we take the wider look at the "People's parties" situation in terms of parliament elections, meaning we take numbers from election and see how they changed and what this says about the parties' situation. This time from the early 2022 to the middle of 2023 was a time of changes for political old-timers. Here we cannot definitely name a winner or a loser. But we can see that "People's parties" popularity started to decrease. Election in North Rhine-Westphalia [6], Schleswig-Holstein [5] and Lower Saxony [7] proved that other parties, such as the Greens, can supersede SPD or CDU. Or even come second in these elections, putting one of the "People's parties" in the third place.

5 Third Period: The CDU/CSU Comeback

The last period we analyze consists of two elections, that took place on the same day. First, we will analyze the election in Hessen that took place on 8th of October 2023. As it was mentioned before, both "People's parties" suffered an "indecisive period" in the election. But now, looking at the last 2023 election we can see the main perspective for German political life. This can be called a CDU/CSU comeback—on the last election of the year, Christian-democrats got first places and decisive victories in both lands. In Hessen CDU won in a landslide: they got 34.6% of the votes, becoming the strongest power in the land. SPD got twice as less—15.1% [10]. Also, SPD continued its trend to lose its second place to other parties. In Hessen Social-democrats came third again, losing the lead to AfD. In this election, SPD tried to use the same trick, as CDU did in North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. Social-democrats put their popular candidate, Nancy Faeser, who is also federal minister of interior. But here this move worked the other way around—SPD candidate from federal government was not so popular among the

voters, as they expected [32]. On the other hand, CDU candidate remained pretty popular as the incumbent prime-minister and managed to save CDU a first place and a win in this land [33]. CDU’s clear victory becomes much more distinct as we take into account the percentage swing. SPD is now on its “losing parade”, and in Hessen Social-democrats lost 4.7% of their votes since the last election. CDU gained 7.6% of the votes, finally taking the lead in vote-gaining process since the Schleswig-Holstein election in early 2022 [10].

And the last election we are going to analyze is the Bavarian election held on the same day [11]. Bavaria was always a Christian state. Here is located CDU’s sister-party—CSU. And it’s in this land Black “People’s party” has the most power. Though this time, CSU got their lowest result in Bavaria [34]. They got first place with 37% of the votes which still leaves Christian-social-democrats in the lead, but the “Christian grip” around Bavaria seems to get lighter. CSU also lost 0.2% of the votes since the last election, which also seems as not this bad of a result. We can state that situation for CDU/CSU is pretty vivacious, which is definitely not the case for SPD. We remember that they came third in Hessen election. But in Bavaria Social-democrats seemed to face their worst results in electoral history [34]. Not only they got only 8.4% of the votes, they also came fifth overall. It’s still unclear, is it the general disappointment in SPD’s policies on federal level, or just public backlash to the current government actions, but we can definitely say that one of the “People’s parties” at the end of the 2023 went through pretty depressing elections. And it’s unknown whether it will be able to overcome this results and appear as the real competitor in the next Landtag an upcoming Bundestag elections. This period marks a setback for SPD and a comeback for CDU/CSU. Much more people decide to return to the old conservative policies that used to be before the SPD. And we can see, that the last election of 2023 actually showed us the returning to the one of the “People’s parties”. Social-democrats lost their lead, and their “winning parade” of 2021-early 2022 has ended due to the SPD federal politics, which seems to upset German voters.

6 Results and Conclusion

In conclusion we decided to draw graphics, based on every election result we have analyzed [2–11] (Fig. 1).

This graphic shows us how the preferences of German voters have altered from the formation of 20th Bundestag until the end of 2023. As it was stated, the starting point is the results of the Bundestag election, which marked the beginning of the first described period (the Rise of SPD). This period includes Bundestag election, election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saarland. This period is characterized by Social-democrats’ wins on all of the elections in this period. Their popularity grew just since the Bundestag election and reached its peak at the Saarland election, where SPD got 43.5% of the votes. CDU in this period suffers from losses and tries to recover from subsiding their federal governing place to the SPD. Also, in this

Landtag elections 2021-2023




Fig. 1 Landtag elections 2021–2023

period CDU records its lowest result on Mecklenburg-Vorpommern election. Then, at the beginning of the 2022, Christian-democrats gain their votes back and this marks the start of the new period for “People’s parties”.

Next period on this graph is represented by elections in Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Berlin and Bremen. It’s the longest analyzed period and the hardest one for “People’s parties”. We called it “the Turbulence times” for a reason. In the 2022 started what’s incorrectly called an “rise of CDU”. The early 2022 election in Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia became a success for failing CDU. They won both of these elections by playing “popular candidate” card. This way we can’t fully thank CDU and its popularity for the win in those elections. It was the candidates who bring the win for Christian-democrats. And what’s even more interesting, these candidates, namely Daniel Günther and Hendrik Wüst, are predicted to become chancellor candidates on 2025 Bundestag election [35]. Of course, this will happen if the popularity of the current CDU’s head, Friedrich Merz will continue to fall down. These two elections can be seen not only as the “win” of CDU, but also as the win for these CDU-members, that will definitely help them on their way to become chancellor candidates. But after CDU ran out of popular candidates in the lands, they faced a SPD victory in Lower Saxony. Though, CDU wasn’t completely devastated by this loss (they lost to SPD only by about 7%). CDU was able to come back victorious in repeat Berlin election. In the first election they came second, but after re-run, CDU has been restored at their first place with almost 10% more votes gained since the last election, which was a huge success for CDU in the German capital. And then again the tables have turned—in Bremen election SPD came first, CDU second—but still the difference between two “People’s parties” was not that big (about 3%). This long turbulence period was characterized by fast change of winners and losers. “People’s parties”

tried to fight for their first place and majority in parliaments. And in late 2022-early 2023 with varying degrees of success they did that.

And then, the last election of 2023 made it clear—which “People’s party” is the winner and which one is loser. The last period consists of two elections: Hessen and Bavarian elections proved, that CDU/CSU is actually coming back and coming back strong. We can see on the graph that Christian-social-democrats recovered from the storminess period and started to gain almost 40% of the votes in both German lands. Considering these results, we can state that CDU/CSU union will remain the strongest of the “People’s parties” at least for the time of 2024 elections. Then, after the 2024 Landtag elections (which include Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia) it will become much clearer, which party will be the driving force of the upcoming 2025 Bundestag election.

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Approaches to Evaluating Digital Services of Public Administration and Public Service Delivery: Experience of the European Union and the People's Republic of China



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1 Introduction

The era that the world community entered in the third decade of the twenty-first century is characterized by the following general trends: the revision of the world order; the formation of new centres of power; the struggle of old and new political elites; an increase in the number of global and regional threats; the articulation of new (and the return of old) values and meanings of the development of nations and states- gifts. Similar trends took place a hundred and two hundred years ago; however, they occurred under other technological structures (III and IV), the transition to which was accompanied by changes in social life, political institutions, civil society, and governance structures at the national and international levels [1]. Modern transformations of political, economic and social life occur during the development of the V and the formation of the VI technological structures, that is, during the period of global informatization and digitalization of all spheres of economy and public life, the formation of artificial intelligence as a means of production, as well as the development of nanotechnology and socio-humanitarian technologies as means of “soft influence” on an individual or groups of people. By accelerating the decision-making process and creating transnational economic and social networks, digitalization opens up opportunities not only for a new level of comfortable work and consumption but also for expanding solidarity and personal participation in making socially significant decisions. Along with the opportunities and benefits, a number of problems arise, which include cybercrime, cyber-terrorism, illegal data trafficking, manipulation of public opinion in the digital space, and many others.

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This symbiosis of benefits and threats that accompany the new technological era is a modern arena of struggle between national States, alliances of States and political and ideological regimes. In practice, this is reflected in the activities of states to implement national digital development strategies that contribute not only to the establishment of a competitive economy and protection from external cyber threats, but also to providing citizens with digital opportunities, rights and responsibilities that would create a new format of social interactions, political participation, consumer comfort and, at the same time, control and minimization of digital risks for states and political elites. National digital development strategies are, in fact, a variant of the digital future proposed by political elites for citizens of specific countries. An important area of these national digital strategies is the creation of digital services for public administration and the provision of services to the public. Consideration of the experience of implementing these digital services within the framework of digital transformation strategies of such international actors as the European Union and the People's Republic of China is of particular interest since they are carriers of opposing ideologies and embody radically different political regimes. Their experience can highlight the prospects of the Russian Federation in the field of creating a digital environment of social interaction between citizens and authorities. And approaches to evaluating digital services will help to see in them not only convenient means of communication but also new forms of social participation, comprehensive control and digital trust formed on their basis.

2 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypothesis

As a working hypothesis, the author put forward the idea of determining and evaluating social performance through research and measurement of social capital in the process of electronic interactions arising from the use of digital services by people. To substantiate this hypothesis, scientific literature has been developed in the following areas: theoretical substantiation of the concept of “social capital”; empirical research of social capital; research of methods for evaluating public digital management.

The analysis of the concept of “social capital” is presented in the classical works of famous political philosophers and sociologists—P. Bourdieu, J. Coleman, R. Putnam, F. Fukuyama. The first and basic definition of social capital is the definition of Pierre Bourdieu, presented in the work “Forms of Capital” (1980), where social capital is understood as “a set of real or potential resources associated with the possession of a stable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – in other words, with group membership” [2]. Real resources include the economic and cultural capital available to an individual, and potential resources include new economic and cultural opportunities/capital arising from effective interactions with other people. These interactions should be based on trust, which is defined as the most important structural element of social capital. The methodological significance of this definition lies in the fact that the

elements included in the structure of social capital are defined as resources—real and potential. The exchange and multiplication of resources occurs in certain interactions due to the presence of a common goal or need, or belonging to an organization, and based on the recognition of common norms and trust. Therefore, in order to measure social capital, it is necessary to develop methods for measuring such resources as network interactions, norms, values and trust, as well as other components of social capital, which are discovered as interactions in national, cultural, ethnic, religious groups and social strata are studied.

Consequently, the methodology for measuring social capital should be based on a detailed justification of its structure and elements, as well as the proposed measurement tools. The approach, which involves specifying the structural components of social capital, and therefore its possible measurement, belongs to Janine Nahapiet, Emeritus Professor at Oxford University, and Samantha Ghoshal, Professor at the University of London [3]. Since social capital is determined by the interactions of people, the latter may depend both on the norms of group behaviour and on mental attitudes that determine readiness for interaction, as well as on self-identification. Therefore, they proposed an interpretation of social capital, consisting of three independent dimensions: structural (structural dimension), measurement of connections (relational dimension) and cognitive (cognitive dimension). Structural measurement includes network connections, network configurations and organizations, the study of which will help to measure the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of interactions, including hierarchy and density. Measuring relationships is about trust, norms, responsibilities, and identification. His assessment makes it possible to identify the principles by which interaction is possible and trust is formed. These principles can be considered as identification guidelines for the members of the group. The study of the cognitive dimension can determine the common language and cognitive codes of the studied communities, as well as the common meanings and narratives formed on their basis. The structural measurement is quite suitable for statistical and mathematical analysis; the measurement of connections makes it possible to determine the identification principle of interactions in various groups, and it can be considered as a qualitative indicator of the real readiness for interaction of various segments of the population; cognitive measurement is almost incalculable, but it complements the indicator of readiness for interaction, and can also help in assessing changing values and targets in a group.

When analyzing approaches to the study of digital social capital, it is worth noting the study of O.Zhukovsky's "Social capital and social networks in the context of digitalization: mutual influence and implementation features", where the author defines digital capital, which talks about the conditions and resources affecting its development. The author believes that the concept of digital capital includes social capital. "Digital capital is a kind of connecting capital between the virtual and real spheres, which is an accumulation of digital competencies (information, communications, security, content creation and problem-solving) and digital technologies; so, we are talking about a set of "learned abilities and readiness", i.e. "internal resources" (digital competencies), and "external resources" (digital technologies) that can be accumulated, transferred and used. Digital capital transforms real

activities (defined by 5K—5 capitals: economic, social, human, political and cultural) into digital ones (time spent online; acquired knowledge; information; resources and skills; types of activity, etc.) and, in turn, such online activities it is transformed into an externally tangible one (the best job, social network, knowledge, etc.)” [4].

The development of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of digital services required a careful study of the works devoted to the study of the instruments for measuring social capital. The key research on this topic can be considered the work of World Bank analysts Grootaert C., Narayan D., Jones V.N., Woolcock M. “Measuring social capital: an integrated questionnaire” [5]. It is a set of empirical tools for measuring social capital. In fact, this is an integrated questionnaire for measuring social capital (SC-IQ). It is designed to provide quantitative data on various aspects of social capital. In particular, six aspects are considered: groups and networks; trust and solidarity; collective action and cooperation; information and communication; social cohesion and inclusivity and empowerment and political action.

Many other domestic and foreign studies have also been devoted to measuring social capital, which confirms the scientific interest and, at the same time, emphasizes the difficulty of using this technique correctly. Among the authors, it is worth noting Death J.W., [6] Kharlamov A.V., Bezrodnaya L.V., Poddyachaya E.A., [7] Sysoev S.A [8]. whose works are closest to the topic of our research.

The problem of evaluating the effectiveness of the digital public administration system was dealt with by Burov V.V., Petrov M.V., Shklyaruk M.S [9]., Sidorenko E. L., Bartsits I. N., Hisamova Z. I [10]. and others. The research of these authors is aimed at analyzing the development of digital public administration and proposing a methodology for evaluating its effectiveness.

An important component of theoretical research is the conceptualization of concepts. The need to conceptualize the concept of “social capital” is due to its epistemological and methodological significance for assessing the potential for the development of digital services in modern society and creating favourable conditions for the self-realization of citizens. Since the “accumulated” social capital can be converted into other forms of capital, understanding its structure, building its model and measuring it can give an idea of the features and problems of social interactions in the region under study. Within the framework of this chapter, the following definition can be given: “Social capital is a set of real and potential resources that arise in the process of electronic (network) interactions between citizens and authorities based on common social norms, mutual recognition and trust.”

Since digital services are providers of services provided to citizens by government and management structures, the process of using services (using services) can be considered as network interactions ranked according to the principle of meeting the needs of citizens in a particular service. That is, electronic interactions in the process of using services can be considered as a process of providing and accumulating resources, where the government provides a digital resource for realizing the needs of citizens, and citizens, realizing these needs, gain new opportunities (resources) to implement personal economic and social strategies. The formation of

these resources takes place on the basis of stable social norms and with a certain level of trust. Thus, these electronic interactions can be considered as a process of formation (accumulation) of social capital. Therefore, the task of determining the social effectiveness of digital services implies an assessment of social capital. However, since electronic network interactions proceed through a technological option—digital services, it also requires an assessment of the quality of these services (as a platform where interactions take place). Thus, the “social effectiveness of digital services” is a set of indicators that include an assessment of the formation of social capital that appeared in the process of electronic interactions between citizens and authorities, as well as an assessment of the quality of digital services.

3 The Digital Status of a Person, the Demand for Justice and the Problem of Trust in Government as a Social Context for the Development of State Digital Strategies

The development of the Internet, the creation of digital networks and the spread of digital interactions have changed the structure of communication and the status of a person as a subject of communication. Why, when investigating the issue of evaluating digital systems of public administration and service provision, do we pay attention to the issues of subjectivity in digital communications?—First of all, this is due to the fact that the process of digitalization of public administration and economic and social life is associated with digital identity, with the emergence of a digital entity. Many works are devoted to this issue, including a serious study by MSU scientists Volodenkov S.V. and Fedorchenko S.N [11], who note that the definition of subjectivity in digital interactions is developing within the framework of the concept of “government as a platform”, which was proposed by A. Helmond, who equated government policy in the service sector [12]. The authors note two trends in the development of subjectivity: avatarization and interfacing. Avatarization—that is, the creation of a digital avatar of a real person is conditioned by the very service approach of digital platforms: to identify a person when receiving a service and entering into the process of digital communication, a person must fill his digital avatar with the minimum necessary information (for this platform). Intefactionization is the introduction of templates and algorithms for the user of a digital avatar. Thus, a person in a digital environment acquires subjectivity as a digital avatar, capable of action and expression of will through established algorithms. However, the huge variety of communications in the digital space, many different platforms where a person can present himself—fill his avatar with different meanings (beneficial and necessary information)—allow us to talk about the multiplicity of digital identities, digital subjects of the same person [13].

All these manifestations of the digital subject can be used by both technical creators of platforms and real holders of material, information and power resources—big business and government institutions. Firstly, reading the information voluntarily

provided on a variety of avatars by a real person helps to most adequately form not only his official digital profile but also a consumer profile, worldview and psychological portrait. Secondly, the multiplicity of manifestations in the digital space creates the illusion of infinite freedom of action and freedom of choice, which can significantly reduce frustration about restrictions in various spheres of real life. Thirdly, the formalization of human interactions with authorities through avatars (virtual “active citizen”, virtual “responsible official”) can create an imitation of democratic decision-making procedures, citizen engagement, and government interest. The absence of a visible social hierarchy in the digital environment, the rapid receipt of information and services, a sense of the benefits of interactions, care and the lack of a strong presence should help strengthen the stability of domestic political life, legitimize the political regime, and reduce protest moods. This is the first trend characterizing the social context in which digital strategies and digital services are currently developing.

The second trend is the demand for social justice. Naturally, this request was typical for all periods of the historical development of society, however, at the present stage, the growth of social imbalances, global poverty and inequality in different countries and regions of the world is increasing at a dangerous rate.

Many international institutions are engaged in monitoring social inequality. The latest report on global inequality for 2022 was prepared by the Inequality Research Laboratory at the Paris School of Economics under the leadership of Thomas Piketty. It provides data on countries and regions of the world. “The poorest half (50%) of the world’s total population receives 8% of all income calculated according to purchasing power parity (PPP). 50% of the world’s poorest people own 2% of assets (according to purchasing power parity). The 10% of the population with the highest incomes owns 76% of all household assets and received 52% of all income in 2021.” Researchers have made a number of interesting conclusions about global and intra-country inequality. For example, global indicators of inequality have reached the same level as was observed at the beginning of the twentieth century, which clearly signals the instability of the global political system and the growing danger of serious social upheavals. It was also noted that inequality has grown significantly within countries: over the past twenty years, the gap between the average income of the richest 10% and the average income of the poorest 50% of citizens within countries has almost doubled: from 8.5 times to 15 times [14, p.4–7].

The latest data (for 2021) on inequality in the Russian Federation have been prepared by experts from the Higher School of Economics. The researchers concluded that “Russia was among the leading countries with the most uneven distribution of wealth, and is significantly ahead of almost all developed countries in this regard.” According to analysts, 82.5% of the country’s total wealth is owned by 10% of the richest residents of Russia, while 5% and 1% of the richest residents own 76.8% and 58.2% respectively [15, p.14].

The creation of a favourable digital environment and the expansion of human digital capabilities can contribute to the gradual achievement of the goals of social justice, although digitalization alone, of course, cannot lead to such results. However, the government cannot ignore the request for social justice, and therefore the

concept of justice will be the main principle (and marker) of creating digital management systems and providing services, as well as digital strategies of the future.

And finally, the third trend is the problem of trust in the authorities. In general, the problem of trust is given a lot of attention in the scientific literature. Trust is the nature of relationships between people, confidence in the actions of another person, in compliance with the norms and rules adopted in the community. Trust permeates the world of life and is formed in the process of family upbringing, education, work, and the production of cultural values. It is trust that is a condition for community solidarity to implement joint projects, overcome problems, protect borders and property, and establish common norms and laws. Various communities form their own norms and rules of trust, which create cultural patterns and are passed down from generation to generation. They are the basis of work ethics and rules of conduct in small and large groups. The concept of trust has developed most of all in the theories of social capital. According to R. Putnam, the structure of social capital includes social networks (interactions between people), norms of reciprocity, and trust that arises from and strengthens interactions [16]. Francis Fukuyama also paid more attention to trust as the most important characteristic of social capital. “Social capital is a certain potential of a society or a part of it, arising as a result of trust between its members. It can be embodied in the smallest basic social collective—the family, and in the largest possible collective—the nation” [17, p. 52]. He introduced such concepts as “radius of trust” and “radius of distrust” into the system of social capital assessments. And Scandinavian sociologist Bo Rothstein, professor at the University of Gothenburg, speaking about trust as an important component of social capital, believes that people’s behaviour in society, their willingness to trust other people and follow the general rules of the game primarily depend on their ideas about whether they can trust the institutions of power in this state [18]. By the way, the general rules of the game from a legal point of view imply equality of all before the law, and this is already one of the components of the concept of social justice. It is no coincidence that the demand for social justice in society is increasing simultaneously with a decrease in trust in government institutions.

Trust as a social temperature is measured, and various ratings are built on this basis. Trust in government institutions is largely determined by the level of public expectations regarding the fulfilment of their functions and promises by the authorities. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) annually conducts a study of government confidence and publishes an appropriate index. According to the data (for 2021) Switzerland is the number one country in terms of confidence in the government with an indicator of 83.8%. The Russian Federation has a 45.7% confidence in the government, the United States—31% [19]. As numerous studies show, the level of trust in political institutions and the government directly depends on the level of interpersonal and social (network) trust. Trust supports confidence in the fulfilment of social norms and creates the necessary conditions for effective online interactions. Thanks to trust, the reputation of each member of the network is built and sanctions for loss of trust appear, leading to reputational costs. Researchers note that social capital, as a set of networks, norms, rules and

trust, “reduces the costs of disorder in the economy and society” [20, p.49]. Without accumulated social capital, institutional reforms are ineffective, because if the rules of behaviour in communities are not based on effective and reliable communications, then the level of grassroots chaos will defeat the right institutions.

Russian studies of trust in government show that despite the medium and low range of trust, “digital network interactions can contribute to the formation of public trust in government, provided that a number of principles are implemented: providing reliable and timely information, openness and transparency of the actions of government entities, expanding the boundaries of participation of members of local communities in management decision-making” [21, p. 29].

In this regard, the goal of developing digital services can become a way to modernize different states with different initial levels by greatly reducing transaction costs. Nation states also see the opportunities for the development of digital services as a way to preserve and digitally develop the political culture that underlies political regimes and preserves the power of existing elites.

The fundamentals of methodological approaches to the assessment of digital management and service provision services have been developed by the World Bank and are presented in the form of sub-indices in the Rating of Digital Maturity of Government Technologies. National criteria are being developed based on the criteria included in the Public Service Provision Index (the quality of online public service portals with an emphasis on citizen-oriented design and universal accessibility) and the Digital Citizen Engagement Index (public participation platforms, citizen feedback mechanisms, open data and open government portals). to evaluate digital services [22]. Citizens’ satisfaction with digital services is measured through surveys.

One of the most demanded methodological approaches in evaluating the effectiveness of management and service provision services is the assessment of social capital that appears during network interactions.

In our opinion, the approaches to the creation and evaluation of digital services in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China are conditioned by the desire to transfer the system of relations between government and society (social contract) to the digital environment and create a digital social contract. In this regard, the state strategy of creating services itself contains a criterion for evaluating the digital relationship between citizens and the government.

4 The Development of Digital Services in the European Union: The Problem of Preserving Rights and Expanding Opportunities

The European Union is a political actor in which any development strategy must meet the requirements and capabilities of all its constituent entities—27 States. In 2019, the European Union developed the Digital Europe programme, and in

February 2020, the European Commission issued a document outlining its vision for the digital future [23].

The three pillars on which Europe's digital future is based include the development of new technologies that work for the benefit of people; the creation of a fair and competitive digital economy; and the development of an open, democratic and sustainable society. The last "priority" implies the following directions and meanings: the use of climate-neutral technologies, the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the digital sector, the creation of a European Health Data Space to facilitate targeted research on diagnosis and treatment, the fight against misinformation on the Internet and the promotion of diverse and sustainable media content. The document also indicates the beneficiaries of the EU digital strategy, first of all, European citizens, business and the environment [24]. This is how traditional European values and priorities—the protection of human rights, the environment and free enterprise—are read in a new context. Thus, the EU's political institutions declare that the new digital world will be based on the old principles of democracy and the priority of individual rights and new digital opportunities that promote comfort and prosperity.

In this regard, it is interesting to analyze the experience of the European Union in the field of digitalization and development of digital services. The latest data is presented in the document «Egovernment Benchmark 2023: Insight Report. Connecting Digital Government» [25]. This is the 20th edition of the EU Commission's basic report on e-government. The document provides a clear picture of how successfully the European Union is progressing in the implementation of its ambitious Digital Decade programme, which aims to make key public services in Europe 100% online by 2030 [25]. However, the document allows you to see not only the results of digitalization in the European Union, but also to consider the methodology for evaluating the created digital services.

In each country (out of 35 presented in the report), the status of e-government was measured by nine different life events (life event—starting a business, career, study, family, regular business operations, health, relocation, transport, complaints and claims procedure) [25, p.8]. Life events are packages of public services that are usually provided by several government agencies on an issue, and that occur in conjunction with each other, starting with the request of an interested citizen. In other words, life events are chains of services that are logically interconnected from the point of view of real users. The "life event" methodology has been tested and used in testing the EU e-government since 2010 [26, p.30].

Building a chain of services based on the principle of coverage of "life events" is close to the principle of providing digital services on the portal of Public Services of the Russian Federation. And, for example, the digital application "I live here" for residents of St. Petersburg also means providing services to residents of the city in the process of realizing their "life events" (in accordance with a set of social roles). Therefore, the European methodology for evaluating services is also significant for the analysis.

Progress in the promotion of digital services in the EU countries is assessed using four key dimensions, which include many basic indicators: (1) User

orientation, which includes: online accessibility, convenience for mobile devices and user support. (2) Transparency (provision of services, personal data, service design). (3) Key identification factors (the ability to use a digital signature and use basic documents in digital format). (4) Provision of cross-border digital services (for EU citizens in different countries) [25, p.10]. These four dimensions and basic indicators are both principles of management and provision of digital services and represent a set of metrics, the quantitative values of which can show the degree of approximation to the goals of the project period.

Another result of the digitalization of management and the service sector was the creation of a new digital identifier, the Digital Wallet, in response to requests from EU member states to find a secure way for citizens to access public and private services on the Internet [27]. The main political and technological idea of this service is to preserve privacy when making any digital transactions. Citizens will be able to verify their identity throughout the EU when it is necessary to access online services, exchange digital documents, or simply to confirm certain personal characteristics, such as age, without revealing their full identity or other personal data. Citizens are guaranteed full control over the data they share. Privacy control will be carried out through the use of the zk-SNARK cryptographic protocol [28].

The Digital Wallet will be released in the format of the European Digital Identity free mobile application. In 2023, the European Parliament supported the initiative to introduce a digital identification system and a Digital Wallet. However, her support was not absolute. Some MEPs believe that there are a number of flaws in the system that need to be fixed. Representatives of the public insist that the mandatory use of the wallet for everyone will lead to the loss of anonymity. In this regard, the European Parliament has proposed to adopt a “non-discrimination provision”, that is, guarantees to those who refuse to use the wallet. Until now, the right to choose digital or analog means of communication with management, business and service structures was the norm in the European Union. In addition, the process of introducing all innovations in the European Union does not happen simultaneously, taking into account the capabilities of the participating countries. However, the issues of cybersecurity and protection of digital human rights in connection with the introduction of a unified identification system are becoming more frequent [28]. If compared with the Public Services of the Russian Federation (Gosuslugy), the “Digital Wallet” is a step forward in the process of total digitalization of citizens within the framework of the largest regional association, and, at the same time, a challenge to the human rights protection system.

It is a positive fact that this problem, within the framework of European and international law, stimulates the development of digital human rights as a subject belonging to two worlds— analog and digital.

It is clear that it is quite difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the Digital Wallet service before its full-scale implementation. After its implementation, it can be evaluated using the four key dimensions of digital services already developed in the EU. Since the process of transferring digital data and trust in the EU data protection system presupposes a high level of trust in European institutions, it is also possible

to evaluate a Digital Wallet using surveys and building ratings of trust in EU institutions and trust in new digital services.

There is no general methodology for assessing the EU's social capital yet, and its creation seems to be a very difficult task. Although there are estimates of social capital by EU countries (the social capital of the nation). In our opinion, it is quite difficult to find the necessary correlations between the digital services of a supranational association and the cohesion of a single nation. Therefore, it is worth measuring only one component of social capital—trust.

5 China's Digital Services: Social Rating as a Tool to Maintain Political Balance

Unlike the European Union, where the introduction of technical innovations must take into account the different speeds of integration of member countries and European standards for the protection of human rights, Chinese technological modernization is taking place under the leadership of a single political force—the Communist Party of China and in accordance with the Chinese model of deliberative democracy, where relations between government and society are based on the principles of conciliarity, Marxism and Maoism.

In the development of China's digital strategy, the principle of centralized planning is important, which is determined by the party's vision of the prospects for the development of Chinese society [29]. For the party and state elites of China, technological modernization is seen as a way to improve the standard of living of the people and solve social and economic problems while maintaining and consolidating the existing political regime. The creation of a digital economy and a comfortable digital environment for the population is an essential factor for maintaining social and political balance.

Important and exclusively Chinese features characterizing the national digital development strategy are the concept of "cybersovereignty" and the model and practice of social lending and social marketing.

For the first time, cybersovereignty was discussed in China in 2014, when the Chinese Communist Party initiated the creation and holding of the first World Internet Conference in Wuzhen. This conference was conceived as an alternative platform for discussing Internet governance issues, as opposed to the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), established in 2006 with the support of the United Nations. In 2019, at the same conference in Wuzhen, the final document "CyberSovereignty: theory and practice" appeared, which gave the main definitions and outlined the position of the Chinese leadership. In fact, cyber sovereignty is an extension of national sovereignty in cyberspace. And, as the researchers note, the Chinese government understands cyber sovereignty as "the personal right of political power to choose its own model of Internet development within a certain state, without the possibility of interference in this process by other states" [30, p.259]. It

is also noted that the management of the Internet in China corresponds to the traditions of social and public administration. Moreover, it can be said that the advent of the Internet has allowed the Chinese authorities to gradually move away from the harsh policy of repression and police surveillance [31]. With the development of digitalization, the functions of supervision and repression may not be so noticeable in the real world. Thanks to the ban on using foreign databases and the skillful creation of internal ideological propaganda, the process of forming a loyal citizen takes place in a technologically comfortable, politically closed and ideologically homogeneous digital environment.

In order for external supervision and practices of encouragement and punishment not to be perceived as arbitrariness and coercion, it was necessary to develop digital social management systems that would accumulate data about a person or organization, set ratings based on data and provide them to all economic and political institutions as markers of creditworthiness and to assess loyalty and provide social and government bonuses. And such systems are called “social credit” and “social rating”. Some researchers consider these concepts to be identical, but still social credit is more concerned with the financial creditworthiness of legal entities and individuals. The social rating, including financial indicators of market creditworthiness, also covers other areas, namely: data and materials accumulated by various institutions of public administration, information on the fulfilment of a citizen’s duties, the presence of offences and incentives, social activity, etc.

The Central Bank of the People’s Republic of China is engaged in the compilation of data and the creation of credit histories. Information on the rating of market entities is available on the official website of the credit rating CreditChina.gov where there are “black” lists with the division of people according to the levels of offences, as well as the names of “heroes” who have committed positive deeds [32]. The official credit rating is also influenced by the so-called public monitoring of citizens and companies. Chinese people leave reviews about their friends, acquaintances and companies on social networks. These data are then summarized and also used in the formation of a social rating [32]. The rating itself is a four-grade ten-level assessment system, where classes are referred to as exemplary; trustworthy; suspicious and unreliable. The lists and ratings are constantly updated, and if a person has improved or done good deeds, then his credit history also changes. The most common punishments due to a low rating are refusal of a bank loan, a ban on studying at prestigious universities, buying real estate, travelling abroad, etc.

If we talk about other digital services, where a credit system has also been introduced depending on the rating, then this is the TaoBao platform, owned by Alibaba Group, which has developed its own AliPay payment system. Exercising control over all e-commerce entities, Alibaba develops an AliPay user rating, depending on the level of which the company provides discounts, loans and other privileges. WeChat, China’s largest social network, has approximately the same strategy, which, in addition to a dialogue platform and the formation of interest groups, allows users to enter a business and carry out commercial transactions. It also has its own WeChatPay payment system and has developed its own user credit rating with the possibility of receiving bonuses [32].

Thus, if we compare the European and Chinese models of a digital subject, then both of them basically have a certain base of social trust, designed to form social capital that can be converted into both real money and financial privileges, and into social benefits—trust in the government, reduction of inequality, growth of well-being. The difference between a Digital Wallet and a citizen’s social marketing is that a European, by agreeing to use this service, confirms his trust in European values and the European digital development strategy, demanding anonymity and confidentiality; and a Chinese count on the trust of business and government institutions, agreeing to absolute transparency of his data and public a system for evaluating one’s misdeeds and achievements.

If we talk about approaches that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the introduction of a social rating, then this may be an assessment of social capital. Naturally, social capital in small groups, organizations and nations has different structural components. And accordingly, there are different correlations between them. But if we talk about the social capital of the nation, then when calculating it, factors such as the development of the health system and its universal accessibility (measurement of physical health) are taken into account; equality of income and assets, which correlate with the crime rate; demographic structure (to assess the future balance of attitudes in society); freedom of expression and freedom from fear; absence of violent conflicts and the level of life satisfaction, which includes individual satisfaction, the number of suicides and satisfaction with public services [33]. The Social Capital Index is taken into account when calculating indices and ratings of sustainable competitiveness (The Sustainable Competitiveness Index, SCI), which are created within the framework of research by the World Bank or the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD). This, in turn, gives companies and governments around the world an idea of the country’s development potential.

If we analyze the latest Social capital index for 2023, we will find that China is ranked 47th in the world (with an indicator of 51.4 on a 100-point scale), skipping ahead of almost all the countries of the Euro-Union with the exception of Bulgaria and Greece [33]. Therefore, the problem of increasing the level of social capital is relevant for China. Its assessment—especially given its impact on sustainable competitiveness—is very important for China. The social rating system, which is publicly available and is becoming mandatory, is designed to increase the level of trust of citizens and organizations in each other, business and government institutions. Social networks, an important component of social capital, are formed on the basis of national platforms and are controlled by the state. Norms—no less important for the creation of social capital—are ideological principles transformed by the Chinese Communist Party into norms of citizen behaviour. The assessment of human behaviour from the point of view of these norms and through digital services translates the ethical and legal complexities of the real (analog) world into the digital world, with the possibility of quantifying all good deeds and offences and “fair” retribution. This measure of retribution is an assessment and can be considered as the social capital of an individual or organization in the emerging unified Chinese digital environment.

6 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

In conclusion, we can draw some conclusions about the current stage of digital transformation of society. First, it should be noted that a certain social context has been formed, which is both the result of modern technological achievements, as well as socio-economic and political problems. It is characterized by the spread and recognition of such a phenomenon as the digital status of a person, which simplifies and legitimizes the processes of management and commerce. At the same time, the emergence of a digital entity opens up opportunities for government and business to manage personal data, leading to loss of confidentiality and total control. These technological and social innovations are taking place against the background of growing social inequality, which determines the growth of demands for social justice and a crisis of trust in the authorities. Thus, society is going through a stage when an attempt is being made to translate the solution of social and economic problems into a digital environment. According to the political authorities, the speed of transactions and transparency of algorithms of digital services should level the possibilities of everyone to access information resources and simplify the decision-making process.

However, different countries go through this path of transforming social problems into digital solutions in different ways. The experience of the European Union and China allows us to see a common intention in the development of digital systems of management and service provision—creating a comfortable digital environment for everyday life, maintaining health, education and business. However, the totality of control over everyone's digital data that arises in this process leads in the European Union to fears of human rights violations and demands for the preservation of the right to refuse to use digital services; In China, the totality of control over big data is ensured by the political system itself, centralized management and uniform ideologically determined rules of behaviour.

The evaluation system for digital management and service provision services is being developed based on criteria of technological accessibility for the user; transparency of service provision, personal data, service design; the ability to use digital identifiers of the subject of transactions and the greatest coverage of the population. Domestic and foreign researchers add to the criteria for evaluating digital services “the two-sided nature of communication in the power–society system, interactivity,” as well as trust in power [34, p.134].

The need for a sufficiently high level of trust in government as a basis for the successful functioning of digital management and service provision services has made it possible to assume the measurement of social capital in digital communities as a possible assessment of the effectiveness of digital services. However, it is not yet possible to consider the European Union as a single digital network. Therefore, in this case, only the measurement of trust in European institutions and European development strategies, including digital development, will be relevant.

Using the example of China, we can say that services representing the social rating of a person or organization are a model for creating and evaluating social

capital. But here it must be borne in mind that this will be a social capital with Chinese characteristics, since the feedback of citizens with the state and the assessment of state institutions by citizens is significantly limited by the political regime, the one-party system and the lack of an active civil society (in the classical understanding of this concept). Of course, the Chinese experience is unique because it is based on the state's monopoly on all resources, including big data, as well as on centralized management of digitalization processes and a unified ideology prescribing common behavioural and digital ethics.

The Russian Federation has entered the top ten countries for the digitalization of public administration according to the World Bank's GovTech Maturity Index 2022 rating, and it is carefully studying the approaches of the world's leading countries to the management of digitalization processes [35]. The fact that the Russian State Social University (RSSU) is developing an experimental platform "We", which forms a social rating for Russians based on various parameters related to their educational, professional and social activities, suggests that the Chinese experience is being studied with special attention [36]. In our opinion, this problem needs a broad public discussion, as well as further research of civil society and social institutions, which would include studying the needs of the population in various regions, social activity, trust in government, as well as the image of the digital future of the country and many other aspects.

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Introductory Words as Markers of Indirect Evidentiality in the Discourse of the Chinese Foreign Policy Initiative “Belt and Road”



Uliana Reshetneva and Ekaterina Rokitskaya

1 Introduction

The attention to China’s foreign policy initiative—“Belt and Road” “一带一路” (hereinafter referred to as BB)—in the mass media (hereinafter referred to as media) causes a surge of scholarly interest in the means and ways of its representation in them. Many Russian and Chinese studies have been accumulated on the support of the initiative in the media over the ten-year period of its existence, however, linguistic research describing the representation of this concept is clearly insufficient, which determines the relevance of this chapter.

An important aspect of the successful promotion of the BB initiative is the links to information sources that are directly related to the linguistic category of evidentiality and the means of its expression. Evidentiality is understood as an indication of the source of information for the speaker [1: 1, 2: 92]. The object of our chapter is the representation of evidentiality in the Chinese-language political media discourse “BB”, which is understood as a set of media texts in China’s Internet space, the content of which is related to the topic of “BB” in the Chinese political sphere.

Introductory words as a means of expressing the category of evidentiality in the Chinese-language political media discourse have not yet been considered by Russian science, therefore they become the subject of our research. Its purpose is to identify the specifics of the functioning of introductory words as a means of expressing indirect evidentiality in the Chinese political media discourse “BB”.

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2 Literature Review

Political media discourse, which became the subject of study in this chapter, is a way of interpreting social reality that serves political processes and realizes itself in relevant texts. Scientific works in the field of political linguistics and political communication in general, and in the field of political discourse in particular, belong to such foreign and domestic linguists as R. Wodak (2011), T. van Dijk (2006), G. Lakoff (2004), N.D. Arutyunova (1990), A.N. Baranov (1990), E.V. Budaev (2008, 2011), V.Z. Demyankov (2002, 2003), M.V. Ilyin (2002), E.G. Kazakevich (1991), V.I. Karasik (2007), T.N. Lobanova (2018, 2019, 2021), Yu.A. Sorokin (1997), A.P. Chudinov (2009, 2012), V.I. Shakhovskiy, E.I. Sheigal (1998, 2008).

Leaving the diachrony of numerous studies in this field out of the scope of the chapter, we conclude that media discourse as a subject of political linguistics serves the purposes of political communication, and it is connected with other types of discourse (mass media discourse, socio-political discourse, Internet discourse); it has its own genre features and structure; it realizes itself in oral and written forms, and performs an influential role.

In view of the fact that in the process of discourse unfolding, the author of a news report turns to the means of expressing evidentiality in order to make an appropriate impact on the potential reader, there is no doubt that the indication of the source of the transmitted information is one of the fundamental components of political discourse. The connection between political media discourse and the category of evidentiality is presented in the works of European scholars L.N. Berlin (2011), E. Reber (2014), E. Oishi (2014), M. Sbisà (2014), and A. Ruskan (2017). In Chinese science this issue is considered in the works of Liu Haoran 刘浩然 (2017), Liu He 刘贺 (2019), Mao Haoran 毛浩然 (2020), Zhou Yahong 周亚红, Xia Chen 夏晨 (2018).

The interest of scientists in the category of evidentiality is observed after the works of F. Boas (1911), who was one of the first in the world science to pay attention to this phenomenon, and the publications of R. Jakobson (1957), who singled out evidentiality as an independent linguistic category. Subsequently, significant works of Western scientists appeared, which served as the basis for further scientific research of the new phenomenon: W. Chafe and J. Nichols (1986), T. Willett (1988), A. Aikhenvald (2003, 2004, 2018). In Russian science, N.A. Kozintseva was one of the first in 1994 to study the category of evidentiality [2]. After the publication of her article, other scientific works appeared: V.A. Plungian (2001, 2011), V.S. Khrakovskiy (2007), in which scientists consider the features of this linguistic phenomenon and classify its types and means of expression. At present, a number of researchers distinguish the following types of evidentiality: direct and indirect, the latter in turn is divided into reportative / retelling (quotative and rumors), and inferencing [2: 93, 3: 57]. There are other typologies of evidentiality meanings [4: 349–358].

In regard to the means of representation, scholars call introductory indicators “one of the common lexico-syntactic means of expressing retelling evidentiality”

[5: 94]. Therefore, it is no coincidence that introductory constructions as markers of evidentiality have already become the subject of research by Russian linguists based on the material of the German and English languages [5–8], but at the same time, introductory words as markers of the evidentiality category in the Chinese language were not considered in domestic science, which indicates the novelty of our research.

It should be noted that the category of evidentiality of the Chinese language has received its definite consideration in the works of Russian sinologists. In the work of T.N. Nikitina, without even resorting to “evidentiality” terminology, verbs of information are considered as pointers to the source of information in a journalistic text [9]. A.S. Schwarz (Khoroshkina), turning to the study of the perfect in the Chinese language, considers aspects of the evidentiality category [10].

In Chinese science, when analyzing the history of the study of the category of evidentiality, scholars traditionally refer to the works of Ma Jianzhong 马建忠, who first proposed the term 传信. But it was Hu Zhuanglin’s 胡壮麟 publications, in which he first examines the category of evidentiality and refers to it as 可证性, that served as the starting point for the investigation of the new linguistic phenomenon by the Chinese scientific community [11, 12].

At the present stage, there is a terminological diversity of names for the category of evidentiality in Chinese science 可证性, 传信范畴, 实据性, 言据性, 示证范畴. Linguists Zhou Yahong 周亚红 and Mao Hui 茅慧 consider 言据性 to be the most popular of them [13: 111]. Chinese scholars offer different approaches and classifications of types of the evidentiality category, as well as the means of its representation. Analyzing them, Chinese researchers highlight introductory words as the most frequent markers of this linguistic phenomenon [14: 53, 15: 137].

At present, in Russian science, the issue of introductions, introductory words and insertive constructions in the Chinese language is debatable and attracts the attention of domestic researchers. The classification of Chinese introductory words and the specifics of their use in texts of different genres are analyzed in the works of G.A. Lytova [16–18]. The scholar with reference to the works of Yu Guangwu 余光武 emphasizes the informative function of introductory words and introduces the category of informativeness by combining the grammatical meaning of the word and the degree of reliability of the source. Without using “evidentiality terminology”, the scientist in her works considers introductory words expressing reliability (有人曾说过, 据.....报道, 听人说) [16: 34], introductory words expressing the speaker’s assessment of the degree of reality of the reported thing (当然, 无疑, 大概, 好像), and indicating the source of the message (听说, 人家说, 按.....话来说, 按.....意见) [17: 205].

The history of scientific research on 插入语 introductory words in China dates back to the 1930s. They are mentioned in the works of outstanding linguists: Wang Li 王力, Lü Shuxiang 吕叔湘, Zhu Dexi 朱德熙 and Zhao Yuanren 赵元任, as well as in the monographs of modern researchers: Liu Yuehua 刘月华, Huang Borong 黄伯荣 and other scholars [19: 42]. Characterizing introductory words, Zhang Chengfu 张成福, Yu Guangwu 余光武 believe that they are mainly used to supplement the meaning of the sentence or to express the speaker’s attitude, sometimes realize the linking function or the function of expressing pragmatic meaning [14:

54]. The Chinese linguist Si Hongxia 司红霞 draws attention to the pragmatic meaning of introductory words realizing the communicative purpose of the speaker. He believes that introductory words are idiomatic phrases realized in the context of a sentence and having subjective meaning [20: 38]. Other researchers point out that introductory words, as elements of spoken Chinese, are quite numerous, their types are diverse, they have semantic-pragmatic value, and play an important role in understanding sentences [21: 98].

In our study, the name “introductory words” is understood broadly, including introductory words, word combinations, and constructions. It is an independent, self-contained component in the sentence structure which is aimed at expressing the speaker’s attitude to the statement. The means of representation of introductory words can be verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositional constructions, object-predicative, and idiomatic combinations. In a sentence, introductory words can occupy different positions: at the beginning, in the middle or at the end. “In most cases, introductory words are at the beginning of the sentence, slightly less at the end of the sentence, and least of all in the middle of the sentence” [19: 44].

Introductory words are named differently in Chinese scholarship: 插语, 独立语, 独立成分, 穿插语, 插说, 逻辑联系语, 语用标记语, 话语标记语, and different classifications are proposed for them. Chinese linguists Huang Borong 黄伯荣 and Liao Xudong 廖序东 consider introductory words 插入语 as part of independent words 独立语 [22: 75–77]. Scholars, even without speaking about the category of evidentiality, distinguish introductory words that 表示对情况推测和估计 express inference, and evaluation of a situation (看来, 看样子, 说不定, 算起来, 我想, 充其量, 少说一点); introductory words which 表示消息来源 indicate the source of information (听说, 据说); also consider introductory words which 表示总括性的意义(总之) express generalization, indicating that the following statement is a conclusion from what was previously stated [22: 76].

Si Hongxia 司红霞, after analyzing the classifications of introductory words presented by Chinese linguists, examines those that are recognized by all scholars. These include 消息来源类的插入语 introductory words to indicate the source of information (据说, 听说 and others), and 推测类的插入语 introductory words to indicate inferences (看起来, 看上去 and others) [23: 21].

Zhang Bojiang 张伯江 was one of the first to draw attention to the relationship between a new linguistic phenomenon, the category of evidentiality, and introductory words as means of expressing it [24: 18]. This position is further developed by Zhang Chengfu 张成福 and Yu Guangwu 余光武, who also correlate the notion of introductory words with the category of evidentiality, consider them the main means of its expression in Chinese, and distinguish introductory words that represent a certain type of evidential meaning [14: 57]. Si Hongxia 司红霞 emphasizes the evidential function of introductory words in his work [23: 26].

In a number of research papers, Chinese linguists study certain introductory words and their role in expressing the category of evidentiality. For instance, Wang Xue 王雪 analyzes the introductory word “看样子” and considers its evidential function from different aspects: as a source of information, a way of obtaining

information, the degree of reliability, and the speaker's attitude to information [25: 51]. The scholar concludes that “看样子”, depending on the genre and context of the utterance, can express two ways of obtaining information: the direct way, through the senses, and the indirect way, through inferences [25: 53].

Scholar Shi Weiwei 施伟伟 points out that “据说”, “听说” and “传说” are high-frequency words in Chinese, and believes that they have previously been mainly studied as introductory words, their evidential function has not attracted enough attention. The researcher considers them as markers of the reportative meaning of the evidentiality category, believing that “据说”, “听” and “传说” indicate an uncertain source of information [26: 91]. It should be noted here that we have not identified the introductory words “看样子”, “据说”, “听说” and “传说” in the empirical sample under study.

3 Materials and Methods

The source base for this research paper is the Zhenmin Zhibao 人民日报 and its online version, the Zhenmin Wang 人民网 [27]. This study is based on the analysis of one hundred articles from this newspaper published in the year 2023 and united by the theme “BB”. The selection of publications was carried out by the continuous sampling method using the keyword “一带一路” on the online pages of the Zhenmin Zhibao 人民日报. Further, examples that contain indications of the source of information with the help of introductory words are identified in news texts by means of the continuous sampling method. These examples are interpreted, analyzed and classified according to the structural and semantic type of evidentiality. Discourse analysis, component analysis, structural-semantic, descriptive and interpretive methods, as well as the method of solid sampling, were used in the work.

4 Results

In the analyzed sample of examples, introductory words are markers of all types of indirect evidentiality: reportative and inferential. In the case of reportative evidentiality, the information is obtained from “second-hand”, thus realizing the meaning of “quotative” with an indication of a specific source of information, or - from “third-hand”, thus realizing the meaning of “hearsay”, in which there is no indication of a specific source of information. In Chinese-language news reports covering the foreign policy initiative of the BB, the most common introductory markers of reportative evidentiality are:

1. introductory words of the group “据”类插入语, which usually indicate a specific, definite source of information, an indefinite source of information or no source of information, that is, the source of information in the message is

omitted. The introductory words of this group functioning in the specified sample include: 据.....评估, 据.....报告, 据介绍, 据统计, 据悉, 据.....介绍, 据了解, 据.....统计, 据估计, 据.....报道.

2. introductory words of the group “看”类插入语, which in the analyzed sample mark a specific source of information, and the absence of a source of information. The following introductory words functioning in the mentioned sample belong to this group: 在.....看来, 总的来看. In particular, 在.....看来 verbalizes an indication of a specific or indefinite person.

Introductory words marking the evidentiality meaning of “quotative” with reference to a specific, definite source of information

1. 据世界银行研究报告评估, 到2030年, 共建“一带一路”将使参与国贸易增长2.8%至9.7%、全球贸易增长1.7%至6.2%、全球收入增加0.7%至2.9%。According to an estimate in a World Bank research report, by 2030, the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” initiative will increase the trade turnover of participating countries by 2.8–9.7%, world trade by 1.7–6.2%, and world income by 0.7% to 2.9% [27].
2. 据世界银行发布的报告, 共建“一带一路”将使全球货运时间平均减少1.2%–2.5%, 促进民众实际收入增长。According to the published report of the World Bank, the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” initiative will reduce the time of international freight transportation by an average of 1.2%–2.5%, which stimulates the growth of real incomes of the population [27].
3. 据活动主办方介绍, 选出“一带一路”年度汉字并不简单, 既要能够民心相通, 又要契合“一带一路”发展的现状和美好祝愿。Based on information of the event organizer, the selection of the annual Chinese character for the “Belt and Road” initiative is not easy: it should both promote communication between peoples, and be in line with the current situation and the best wishes for the development of the “Belt and Road” initiative [27].
4. 在巴基斯坦计划部部长伊克巴尔看来, “一带一路”的亮点之一在于中国的共享精神。In the opinion of Pakistan’s Planning Minister Prof. Ahsan Iqbal, one of the main strengths of the “Belt and” Road initiative is China’s cooperative spirit [27].

Introductory words marking the evidentiality meaning of “quotative” with reference to an uncertain source of information

5. 据介绍, 哈法亚项目所在的油田早在1976年就被发现 [...]. According to available data, the oil field where the Halfaya project is located was discovered back in 1976 [...] [27].
6. 据悉, 培训计划首期已在北京成功举办。It is reported that the first stage of the training program was successfully completed in Beijing [27].
7. 据统计, 截至今年7月底, 比港邮轮码头已接待350多艘邮轮, 国际乘客超过66.3万人次。According to statistics, as of the end of July this year, the Port of Piraeus received more than 350 cruise ships and more than 663,000 foreign passengers [27].

The analysis of the empirical material showed that in the news reports of the topic under consideration, inferential evidentiality meaning is significantly less

represented in introductory words. In the case of inferential evidentiality meaning, the information is obtained by logical reasoning or by constructing hypotheses based on the speaker's personal knowledge. Its main markers are the introductory words of the groups “据”类插入语, “看”插入语 and “说”类插入语. The introductory words of these groups functioning in the above sample include: 据了解, 据估计, 换句话说. Following the Chinese scholars Zhang Chengfu 张成福, Yu Guangwu 余光武, who distinguish the inferential evidentiality meaning of the introductory phrase 换句话说 [14: 57], we believe that the considered introductory words possess the semantics of indicating the source of information based on logical reasoning.

8. 据了解, 云南省税务部门将着眼开放大局, 不断完善税收服务“一带一路”各项举措 [...]. It is clear that the tax department of Yunnan Province draws attention to the general situation with the opening of the economy, and it is constantly improving tax services for the “Belt and Road” initiative [...] [27].
9. 据估计, 共建“一带一路”倡议有望帮助全球760万人摆脱极端贫困、3200万人摆脱中度贫困。It is assumed that the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” initiative will help 7.6 million people worldwide get rid of extreme poverty, and 32 million people get rid of moderate poverty [27].
10. 换句话说, 马克思主义政治经济学所研究的是资源配置方式, 具体包括研究市场与政府的关系。In other words, Marxist political economy studies methods of resource allocation, in particular, including the study of the relationship between the market and the government [27].

5 Conclusion and Recommendations

The conducted research made it possible to find out that introductory words are one of the widespread means of representation of the reportative and inferential meanings of the evidentiality category, characterized by certain specifics of functioning in Chinese media texts covering the Chinese government's foreign policy initiative “Belt and Road”. The most frequent are introductory words indicating reportative evidentiality, and labelling a specific, definite source of information. The prevalence of such introductory words is due to the authors' desire for the authenticity of the information transmitted, and the openness of the Chinese media's position. The prospect of scientific research is to consider the specifics of the functioning of introductory words in other discursive spaces.

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Russia's Cybersecurity Policy for Atomic Energy Sector



Radomir Bolgov 

1 Introduction

When talking about the cybersecurity of energy facilities, images from the action movie *Die Hard 4* appear in the mind. Russian experience in this area is becoming increasingly relevant in the context of the conflict in Ukraine [1] and the situation around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. According to Russian authorities, Zaporozhye NPP network is subject to cyber attacks every day [1].

The topic of cybersecurity in Russia is becoming more and more relevant. According to SOC-Forum, in Russia in 2023 the number of cyber attacks on government websites was 50% more than in 2022 [2]. In accordance with a number of cybersecurity indexes and ratings, Russia is among the leaders in cybersecurity [3].

Interest in and demand for the selected research areas in Russia is not in doubt. We found more than 500 articles in bibliometric database “Russian Index of Scientific Citation” (RISC) on the subject of “cybersecurity for atomic energy”, and the publication activity continues to grow. To clarify the thematic focus of the articles, we analyzed the dynamics of publication activity with breakdown by two time periods: 2010–2016 and 2017–2023 years. On average, the number of published articles in the second period is more than three times higher than the number of publications prior to 2016. This indicates an increase in the interest of the Russian scientific community in the issue.

The need to understand cybersecurity in the context of the nuclear industry in general and nuclear security, in particular, is now recognized internationally. There is an active discussion and development of approaches to solving it with the direct participation and support of the IAEA [4]. A striking example of such activity is the

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international conference held by the IAEA in June 2015, *Cybersecurity in the Nuclear World: Expert Discussion and Exchange of Views*. The IAEA conference program highlights three areas of cybersecurity that need to be given attention as an important component of ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities and other organizations in the nuclear industry:

- cybersecurity of automated control systems for technological processes of nuclear facilities;
- cybersecurity of automated information systems;
- cybersecurity of physical protection systems of nuclear facilities.

Speaking about the cybersecurity of automated systems of nuclear facilities, we would like to note the research on the state and promising areas of work on this issue conducted by Chatham House [5], Nuclear Threat Initiative [6] and University of Applied Sciences, Brandenburg [7]. The study by Chatham House [5] mainly focuses on the cybersecurity of automated control systems for nuclear installations, while the others deal with cybersecurity measures in the context of nuclear security. Publications based on the results of these studies provide a general description of the cyber threats that need to be considered and also describe the tools and approaches used to provide protection against them in various countries (including the United States and the Russian Federation). The works also provide recommendations for the creation, improvement and development of these approaches and tools.

As an example, let's consider a cyber attack against an enrichment plant in the Iranian city of Natanz. From the description of a cyber attack in the literature [5] it follows that the attack used the Stuxnet virus, which reprogrammed industrial controllers in such a way that they gave control commands incompatible with life to the installation, ignoring sensor data that under normal conditions should have resulted in issuing a command to put the installation into safe mode. The affected facility was considered protected from viruses due to the lack of a physical connection to the Internet, but the malicious program was introduced into its management system from an external drive.

2 Research Approach

We conducted a study in line with the approach proposed by Jobin, Ienca & Vayena [8]. They compare 84 documents modelling policies. This approach is in accordance with the work by van Berkel and colleagues [9].

We devised a search on several steps. We conducted a set of Google search queries to identify policy documents by using the country name (“Russia”, “Russian Federation”) and the keywords:

“cybersecurity policy”AND“atomic energy”, “cybersecurity”AND“atomic energy”, “digital policy”AND“atomic energy”, “digitalization”AND“atomic

energy”, “cybersecurity regulating”AND“nuclear power”, “ICT security legislation” AND“atomic energy”, “cyber law”AND“atomic energy”.

Then we have deleted duplicates. Furthermore, we excluded several items such as press releases and news as well as industry reports, ethical frameworks etc. We included officially published documents from government websites only.

Initially, we included in the search the documents only in Russian. We did not include the documents in English. Then we used the Google Translate tool to identify the documents in English using the same keywords. The search did not bring any new results.

3 Concept of Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity can be defined as “the state of society, which provides a reliable and comprehensive security of individuals, society and government in the cyber space from the impact of a special type of threats acting in the form of organized or spontaneously emerging information and communication flows”. The components of cybersecurity are:

1. Security of the cyber domain, which ensures its formation and development in the interests of citizens, organizations and the state;
2. Security of cyberinfrastructure, in which information is used strictly for its intended purpose and does not adversely affect the system (object) when it is used;
3. Security of information per se, in which the violation of its properties (such as confidentiality, integrity, accessibility) is excluded or significantly hampered” [10].

Russian policy papers almost do not contain the term “cybersecurity”. The preferred term is “information security” which is broader and includes cyber aspects. It is worth noting that we can find the term “cybersecurity”, not “information security”, in laws and policy papers of some post-Soviet countries (in particular Moldova) wishing to join the EU and NATO. Hypothetically, the terms differ from each other depending on the policy of the country [10].

In accordance with the Russian Doctrine of Information Security, information security is the security of national interests in the information sphere. National interests in the information sphere are determined by a combination of balanced interests of the individual (constitutional human and citizen rights to access to information), society (strengthening democracy, creating a legal social state, achieving and maintaining public harmony), and the government (creating conditions for the development of information infrastructure, ensuring the inviolability of the constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity, ensuring law and order, etc.) [11].

4 Legal and Policy Framework of Cybersecurity at Nuclear Facilities: Russia's Approach

In Russia, cybersecurity at nuclear facilities is ensured in accordance with the requirements of laws and regulations in the field of protecting critical infrastructure, as well as state secrets and other confidential information. At the same time, nuclear legislation and documents of the nuclear regulator (the body that regulates safety in the use of atomic energy: licensing, establishing safety requirements, overseeing their compliance) contain certain general requirements for the need to ensure cybersecurity. Nuclear regulators in this case do not deal with this problem, and the documents in this area that guide nuclear facilities, for the most part, do not take into account the specifics of the industry, with the exception of methodological documents issued by the authorities governing the use of atomic energy (for example, Rosatom, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, etc.) for subordinate objects.

Unlike Russia, in the United States, in particular, cybersecurity issues are regulated by documents issued by the authorized body in the field of regulation of the safety of nuclear facilities. Such documents take into account the specifics of the nuclear industry, and the nuclear regulator also deals with the problems of cybersecurity of nuclear facilities (to the extent that this is related to ensuring nuclear security).

The practice of regulating cybersecurity in the context of ensuring nuclear security, which has developed in the Russian Federation, differs from the recommendations of the IAEA. Ensuring nuclear security is regulated mainly by documents relating to physical protection, as well as accounting and control of nuclear materials, issued by the government and the nuclear regulator—Rostekhnadzor. “These documents require ensuring the protection of information in accounting and control systems and physical protection, but do not define specific information protection measures, containing general references to regulatory legal acts in the field of information protection. For example, it is stated that the protection of information must be ensured in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation” [12].

There are no government and Rostekhnadzor documents that apply to all nuclear facilities and provide detailed guidance on ensuring cybersecurity in the context of nuclear security. Moreover, Russia's regulations do not cover the nuclear supply chain. Ensuring the safety of automated control systems for nuclear installations and nuclear materials handling processes, as well as automated information systems, does not relate to the tasks of ensuring physical protection or accounting and control and, accordingly, is not regulated by Russian regulatory legal documents in the field of nuclear security. The corresponding requirements are established by legislation in the field of protection of state secrets, protection of information that does not constitute a state secret, security of critical information infrastructure of the Russian Federation, as well as methodological and regulatory documents of departments with regulatory powers in these areas (the Federal Security Service and the Federal Service for Technical and Export control, FSTEC).

The legislation does not yet form a clear structure, but is rather a set of disparate acts united by a common theme:

1. The main directions of state policy in the field of ensuring the safety of automated control systems for production and technological processes of critical infrastructure facilities of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 3, 2012 [13]; Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated January 15, 2013 No. 31 “On the creation of a state system for detecting, preventing and eliminating the consequences of computer attacks on information resources of the Russian Federation” [14], The concept of a state system for detecting, preventing and eliminating the consequences of computer attacks on information resources of the Russian Federation approved by the President on December 12, 2014 [15]. These documents define the basic terms and requirements for the protection of critical information infrastructure, as well as the main factors influencing the security status of objects.
2. Order of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control dated March 14, 2014 “On approval of requirements for ensuring the protection of information in automated control systems for production and technological processes at critical facilities, potentially hazardous facilities, as well as facilities posing an increased danger to life and human health and the environment” [16]. The document is mandatory for critical facilities, including nuclear ones.
3. Methodological documents of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control concerning information protection in key information infrastructure systems:
 - Information message of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control of Russia dated July 25, 2014, on issues of ensuring information security in key information infrastructure systems in connection with the publication of the order of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control of Russia dated March 14, 2014 [17].
 - Basic model of information security threats in key information infrastructure systems, approved by the Deputy Director of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control of Russia on May 18, 2007 [18].
 - Methodology for identifying current threats to information security in key information infrastructure systems [19].

The set of documents available to a particular nuclear facility depends on which authority and operating organization it is subordinate to. Some of them have accumulated significant practical experience in ensuring cybersecurity and harmonizing it with nuclear security measures.

The list of protective measures prescribed in regulatory documents of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control and sectoral agencies (in particular, Rosenergoatom) has about two hundred points, the implementation of which allows to hope that neither information, nor automated systems of critical infrastructure facilities, nor the objects themselves will be harmed. Analyzing Order 31 of FSTEC,

we can see that “all protective measures are divided into five blocks, each of which solves its range of cybersecurity tasks:

- identification of assets and risks
- protection from threats
- detection of threats
- responding to threats
- recovery after the implementation of the threat” [10].

Historically the issues of information protection in Russia were regulated by FSTEC, which inherited from its predecessor, Russian State Technical Commission, the right to establish the relevant requirements. They were established both for state secret information, as well as for confidential information processed in various automated and information system. At the same time, the main emphasis was made by the Russian regulator on the safety of the protected information, that is, on confidentiality. In 1992, the first unclassified requirements for the protection of information appeared. For 20 years, sectoral agencies have used the requirements for export control of the FSTEC, despite the fact that they did not take into account the sectoral specifics (including nuclear industry agencies) [20].

In 2012, FSTEC developed new requirements that better take into account the realities of ICT development. In 2014 the order of FSTEC “On Approval of the Requirements for Providing Information Protection in Automated Control Systems for Production and technological processes on critical objects, potentially dangerous objects, as well as objects representing an increased danger to human life, health, and the environment” [16] was issued. The new document was focused on protecting ACS, including on the side of objects. However, the legal force of this order is not obvious. The fact is that it was developed by direct order of the President of Russia and does not rely on any federal law that made this order mandatory for the application of all organizations listed in its introduction.

Prepared in 2013, the law “On the Security of Critical Information Infrastructure” was adopted in the summer of 2017 [21]. In general, the current requirements developed by FSTEC or Rosenergoatom are, on the one hand, mandatory for use, as well as with other parties that are sufficiently technical, taking little account of the managerial and organizational issues of information security provided in the IAEA documents. On the other hand, there are no obstacles to applying the IAEA documents in Russia, which do not contradict Russian law. However, there are objects of critical infrastructure that are not judicable to Rosenergoatom or Rosatom. Today, there are no specific information security requirements for such objects [22].

5 Conclusion and Future Steps

In general, the development of cybersecurity measures described in the above documents includes identifying information, software and hardware, as well as telecommunication networks, the protection of which must be ensured, determining a list of

threats to information security and patterns of violators. Requirements for organizational and technical measures are then determined. The intensity of measures and applicable requirements are determined based on the type of information being protected and its significance.

To ensure the effectiveness of cybersecurity programmes at all nuclear facilities, as well as the dissemination of existing best practices in Russia, it is necessary to:

- further improve and structure national legislation, regulations and recommendations in the field of protection of critical information infrastructure and information security;
- provide participation of nuclear industry specialists in the discussion of draft documents in the field of cybersecurity (including draft documents related to the critical information structure);
- adapt and apply IAEA recommendations related to ensuring cybersecurity in the context of nuclear security, including terminology, to Russian realities, their inclusion, for example, in the recommendations of Rostekhnadzor and practical application at nuclear facilities;
- include in Rostekhnadzor documents, applicable to all peaceful nuclear facilities, of provisions that provide for taking into account threat scenarios, including cyber attacks, when designing nuclear security systems;
- further improve methods for analyzing vulnerabilities used for nuclear security purposes and for cybersecurity purposes, as well as methods for assessing the effectiveness of nuclear security measures and cybersecurity measures, aimed at taking into account scenarios associated with cyber attacks on nuclear security systems and control systems of nuclear installations, as well as with physical access of attackers to elements of automated systems of nuclear facilities.

As for future research, it is worth elaborating on a list of criteria for atomic energy sector cybersecurity effectiveness assessment. Herewith it is necessary to differ assessment of cybersecurity potential power and cybersecurity policy effectiveness. The existing cybersecurity rankings do not consider the abovementioned difference.

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Part IV
Geography of Culture, Education, Science,
and Tourism

The Impact of Geopolitics on the Development of International Tourism in Macroregions and Countries of the World



Anatoliy Chistobaev , Nikolai Grudtsyn , and Evgeniy Kulakovskiy 

1 Introduction

International tourism represents one of the most dynamically developing sectors in the economy, as evidenced by the growth in both the number of tourists and generated revenues. Simultaneously, tourism could play a significant role in global geopolitical processes. Upheavals in the world and interstate geopolitics, caused by various conflicts, lead to protracted economic and financial crises, affecting the development of all spheres of activity, including international tourism.

Regarding the interaction between tourism and geopolitics, various interpretations are found in scientific literature, which can be conditionally grouped into four thematic blocks. The first block comprises theoretical studies of a general nature, including the identification of contexts, concepts, and the significance of geopolitics for the contemporary tourism industry [1–6]. The second block consists of works describing the context of specific regions, which make up a large part of the publications on the topic, including Europe [7–9], the Middle East [10, 11], South and East Asia [12–14], and even Antarctica [15]. The third block includes research on both sociopolitical [16] and natural events and factors influencing the tourism environment at global and national levels; particular attention is given to natural disasters and epidemics [16, 17]. The fourth block unites studies of various types of tourism, such as business [18], sustainable [19, 20], religious [21], and medical and wellness [22], among others [23, 24].

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2 Materials and Methods

In studying the relation between geopolitics and international tourism, various scientific approaches and methods can be employed. For instance, using a statistical approach, quantitative parameters of arrivals in international tourism and the share of tourism revenues in GDP, including during periods of heightened geopolitical processes and events, are determined. The mathematical approach allows for the calculation of various specialized indices: the geopolitical risk index [25] and a set of panel data based on the identification of the LASSO model [26] using dependent (tourist demand and tourism economy) and independent (perception of crime, terrorism, political environment, defense potential, police, and security services) variables. Spatial patterns are identified using geoinformation technologies [27]. Statistical and qualitative data analysis enables the identification of trends and correlations between geopolitical events and international tourism flows. Analogies and “key” methods provide the opportunity to establish commonalities and peculiarities in the organization of tourist-recreational spaces. Descriptive analysis helps systematize information, ensuring a deeper understanding of the ongoing processes of international tourism development in various macroregions and countries worldwide. Comparative analysis of geopolitical situations in countries and regions is used to identify patterns and differences.

The research relies on tourist flow data collected by United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) [28] and is publicly available information on the Internet.

3 Results

3.1 *Modern World Geopolitics*

The term “geopolitics” was first introduced into scientific discourse by the Swedish scholar, Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1904). According to his doctrine, the state was seen as a changeable spatial formation, interested in expanding its territory [29]. Another German scholar, Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), defined the geopolitical aspect of research as revealing the geographical mind of the state [30]. These definitions of geopolitics and its functions long dominated geographical science and were adopted by philosophers, sociologists, economists, and political scientists. Today, geopolitics has evolved into an independent interdisciplinary science that studies the regularities of the interaction of the state’s politics with spatial conditions: geographical location, terrain, climate, flora and fauna, human potential, the level of development and structure of the economy, ethno-confessional and cultural-historical values, and specifics of lifestyles and customs [31]. Geopolitics synthesizes all factors that must be taken into account in space management. Each factor is separately researched by

the corresponding science or scientific discipline, and the geographers, in addition to their research, also synthesize the obtained results.

In the *Dictionary of Socio-economic Geography*, published in 2013, geopolitics is defined as a problematic scientific area, the main task of which is to record and forecast the spatial boundaries of various power fields—political, military, economic, civilizational, ecological, and natural resource—at the global level [32]. In another publication, geopolitics is defined as the study of the interrelationships between physical and human geography and political economy, as well as the impact on people, organizations within states and between them, the influence on international politics, and transnational relations [33].

Based on these definitions of geopolitics, research in this field should aim to record, analyze, and forecast territorial conflicts, the balance of power between states, strategic interests, and resources, as well as resolve security and foreign policy issues. This multifaceted field of scientific inquiry helps understand how geographical location and resources affect the state's decisions and actions on the world stage. In the world economy, the action of geopolitics is manifested through the determination of the state's interests, balance of power, resource distribution, confrontation and cooperation, and global challenges.

Thus, synthesizing the above definitions, the main directions of geopolitics can be formulated as (a) defining territorial, economic, and strategic interests by states and developing corresponding measures; (b) influencing the formation of the world order and the balance of power between states and determining the structure of the world system; (c) ensuring control over the use of such strategic natural resources as energy, water, and minerals; (d) influencing energy security and economic stability; (e) assisting international organizations and directing diplomatic efforts to resolve geopolitical problems; and (f) helping global structures cope with global problems in the name of preserving life on Earth. Modern geopolitics enhances its key role in containing and neutralizing socioeconomic and ecological challenges and risks and maintaining peace and stability on the world stage.

3.2 International Tourism as a Tool of Geopolitics

Geopolitics is expressed, on the one hand, through military and economic tools (hard power), and on the other, through culture and political values (soft power) [34]. This is characteristic of all spheres of activity, including tourism, which is one of the most significant industries in creating a favorable image of a country and is an important element in promoting the values of the state. Hard power in tourism is manifested more through economic interests than through military ones, although the latter can also be present in certain situations. As for the soft power of tourism in global geopolitics, it lies in forming several phenomena: increasing the attractiveness of tourist destinations and the number of tourists and breaking down stereotypical perceptions by incoming tourists, especially students, about the country of stay. If hard power disrupts the stability of interstate cooperation, then soft power

contributes to strengthening mutual understanding between peoples and increasing the effectiveness of cooperation, allowing for faster promotion of state ideas.

Modern practice in international relations shows that the implementation of soft power is an important conduit for the interests of states, especially those that are major players in the global market. For example, China strengthens cultural, economic, and political ties with other countries and regions based on and within the framework of the “Silk Road One Belt” and “One Belt One Road” programs. The “One Belt One Road” program was launched by the Chinese government as an open agreement for trade development and expansion of international financial cooperation, with a particular emphasis on promoting assistance to underdeveloped countries, including nations in the Pacific region [35]. China’s approach to tourism, on the one hand, is related to attracting the young generation of other countries for education and student exchange, which contributes to strengthening China’s prestigious positions, especially in developing countries, and on the other hand, forms positive tourist diplomacy, contributing to the strengthening and promotion of the state’s positive image [36].

Other examples are Malaysia and Thailand; the formation of medical and wellness tourism here is associated with a state approach. For instance, the first country promotes itself as a center for combating hepatitis C, while the second one positions itself as a hub for traditional Eastern medicine, which becomes the object of interest for populations from other continents and, consequently, contributes to enhancing the country’s prestige [37].

The Maldives holds a special place in international tourism. The country’s location contributes to the development of tourism, with its tourism share in the GDP being significant—around 53% as of 2019 [38]. Despite religious peculiarities (Islam), beach tourism has actively flourished here since the 1970s, significantly contributing to the improvement of the population’s standard of living. Currently, the Maldives, perhaps unlike any other country in the world, faces the consequences of global climate change due to its unique topography. This categorizes the country as one of the most environmentally vulnerable. The pace of development of ecotourism in the country is continually increasing, leading the government to pay significant attention to environmental conservation issues.

In contrast to the countries mentioned above, Japan promotes its economic, social, and political interests and, accordingly, strategic goals, creating an image of a technologically developed country, which can boast rich cultural traditions through skillful management of its soft power and public diplomacy. So-called cultural diplomacy is aimed at promoting cultural industries and sports diplomacy at the success of Japanese athletes in the Olympic movement [39].

Many examples can be cited of a mass decrease in interest in the tourism sector, caused either by extraordinary global situations (for example, the growth of terrorism and extremism in the Middle East) or by an increase in conflict in the global geographical space. One of the striking examples in this regard is the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, which led to a decrease in the number of foreign tourists not only in Ukraine itself but also in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Similar consequences in the field of international tourism are entailed by the




Fig. 1 Travel recovery by world macroregions, % relative to 2019




Fig. 2 Dynamic of tourist flows in France, Spain, and the UAE from 1995 to 2022

Israeli–Palestinian conflict and epidemiological restrictions, caused by COVID-19 (see Fig. 1).

Figures 2 and 3 depict the dynamics of inbound tourist flows for several countries worldwide. For better visual perception, the countries are divided into two groups based on absolute indicators of tourist numbers.

The presented figures illustrate that in all countries, the most significant decline in tourist inflow was associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. In politically stable France and Spain, a noticeable decrease in tourist flow is linked to the economic crisis of 2008. However, in some countries, the impact of geopolitical events is also reflected—for example, political instability in Maghreb countries, particularly the




Fig. 3 Dynamics of tourist flow in some countries worldwide from 1995 to 2022




Fig. 4 Distribution of macroregions of the world as sources of tourists in Thailand in 2013–2015, %

consequences of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia and Egypt, political and natural disasters in Turkey, and geopolitical challenges arising from the relations between Russia and Ukraine.

The analysis of the situation in Thailand in 2014 shows that the main reason for the reduction in the number of tourists is the influence of domestic political conflicts [40]. The most significant drop occurred among tourists from Asian countries, while in 2015, we observed a substantial decrease in the number of European tourists, compensated by the growth of tourist flows from Asia and America (see Fig. 4).

Another vivid example of the influence of geopolitical events on the dynamics of tourist flows is the Syrian Arab Republic. In 2010, the country welcomed nearly 11 million people for tourism purposes, but by 2011, there was a decline to 6.5 million people, and subsequently, this number, evidently (data for this period are unavailable), approached zero (see Fig. 5). In 2016, when official statistical data started to be published again, there were approximately one million tourists. These facts indicate that for the tourism industry of a particular country, a geopolitical conflict holds more significance than, for example, a pandemic. It is noteworthy that




Fig. 5 Dynamics of the number of inbound tourists to Syria, 1995–2021, thousand people

the recovery of tourist inflows to Syria occurred mainly through countries in the Middle East—56% in 2010 and over 91% in 2019 (see Fig. 6).

4 Discussion

The phenomenon of medical and wellness tourism: Medical and wellness tourism is focused on visiting clinical health and wellness facilities, the activities of which are aimed at preserving the health of individuals arriving from other countries and regions. As a component of the healthcare sector, this type of tourism generates revenue for state, municipal, and business structures without exerting a strong anthropogenic impact on the environment. Moreover, medical tourism implies a set of tools (measures) for the ecologization of tourist activities, thereby improving the quality of life, developing recreational services, and ensuring the sustainable functioning of the healthcare sector. Therefore, it can be considered as one of the components of a system of measures for the formation of tourist-recreational systems, environmental protection, public health conservation, and territorial improvement [41, 42].

The rapid development of medical and wellness tourism over the past three decades is a clear indication that the functions of tourism, in general, and medical and wellness tourism, in particular, have evolved into something more than just receiving medical care accompanied by recreational activities. The development of this type of tourism reveals several sustainable trends and patterns: (1) in many countries, medical care is inaccessible to people with low incomes due to high prices, forcing them to seek specialized assistance in other countries with lower prices for medical services; (2) the development of medical and wellness tourism largely depends on the level of service in providing not only medical but also other




Fig. 6 Distribution of macroregions by the number of arriving tourists in Syria, 2010 and 2019, thousand people

types of services; (3) medical and wellness tourism is more successful where a combination of relaxation and the provision of medical care is ensured, meaning that the rehabilitation of the patient takes place not only in clinics but also at recreational facilities.

Geopolitical function of medical and wellness tourism: Medical and wellness tourism and geopolitics today are not only interconnected but also subject to the influence of contemporary global challenges. Geopolitical events and strained relations between countries can have a significant impact on the development of medical tourism—both positive and negative. Political conflicts, sanctions, and other forms of influence on international relations limit the accessibility of certain countries to quality medical and wellness services and influence the choices of potential

patients in medical and wellness tourism destinations. On the other hand, this type of tourism can contribute to strengthening geopolitical ties; patients traveling abroad for medical assistance promote cultural exchange and improve international relations. Moreover, thanks to tourists, countries can develop their medical industry.

In the face of modern challenges, such as global pandemics and climate change, medical tourism and geopolitics need to align in the interests of global health and sustainable development. Cooperation between countries and geopolitical stability can contribute to expanding access to quality medical care and improving conditions for the development of medical tourism.

“*Medical tourists*” represent a special category of travelers, differing from ordinary tourists not only in specific goals but also in the level of involvement in the host country’s community. This specificity is one of the key factors distinguishing medical tourists from other tourists and vacationers; by staying for an extended period in a country, they contribute to the mutual penetration of cultures and ways of life, which also promotes the formation of geopolitical situations in both the patients’ host countries and their places of permanent residence. An important aspect of the interaction of medical tourists with the host community is their active participation in local life; by visiting local restaurants and shops and participating in various cultural events, they, in a way, become part of the society for a while, opening up new premises for cultural exchange and positively impacting the local economy. It is noteworthy that, for the regular provision of disease-specific services, some medical tourists acquire real estate in the host country, further contributing to community integration. Thus, medical tourists represent a unique category of travelers, as they contribute to cultural and economic exchange between countries, thereby strengthening international relations.

The involvement of medical tourists in the local community is especially relevant when the number of medical tourists in a country or region exceeds a certain threshold. In such cases, with a significant number of medical tourists, additional opportunities for the development of specialized infrastructure are opened, including medical centers, hotels, and services tailored to the needs of this type of tourism, contributing to the improvement of the quality of medical care, creating new jobs, and stimulating economic growth. Additionally, medical tourists act as ambassadors of the country in the medical field—by sharing positive treatment results with friends and acquaintances, they contribute to the development of this type of tourism.

Limitations of this study can include the use of data exclusively for inbound international tourism and the consideration of the total number of incoming tourists when concluding the dynamics of tourist flows. The exclusion of outbound and domestic tourists reduces the variability of analytical conclusions. The example of Thailand demonstrates the fact that a decrease in tourist flow from one region can be compensated by tourists from another. Identifying the reasons for such redistribution is an important task, as they may be associated, among other factors, with geopolitical considerations.

Prospective research within the investigated topics requires a deep analysis of the connection between geopolitical events and long-term trends in international

tourism. Additional research directions may also include defining effective strategies for the development of the tourism industry in conditions of geopolitical uncertainty and expanding research on the use of tourism as a soft power.

5 Conclusion

International tourism is a dynamically developing field. Its development depends on the evolving geopolitical situations on the world stage, influencing state policies and fostering trust-building among nations. International tourism contributes to shaping a positive image of a country and, consequently, acts as a geopolitical instrument.

Over the past three decades, international tourism has shown overall positive dynamics, but significant differences are observed at the level of individual countries and regions. The most critical global challenge is the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly reduced, and in some regions halted, tourist flows.

The study demonstrates that geopolitical conflicts during the examined period cannot be compared in terms of global impact with the pandemic, but nonetheless, they are a substantial factor at the regional and national levels, influencing tourist flows. Among such events are the “Arab Spring,” the military-political conflict in Ukraine, and political instability in Thailand. There is undoubtedly a regional spread of these ongoing processes. For example, the “Arab Spring” catalyzed geopolitical instability in the region, yet some Middle Eastern countries managed to avoid any disturbances in the tourism industry (UAE). Countries like France and Spain, not facing significant geopolitical upheavals, experienced a relatively minor decrease in inbound tourist flows, linked to economic issues, including the global economic crisis of 2008.

The relationship between international tourism and geopolitics is expressed through both hard power (military and economic instruments) and soft power (cultural, economic, and political values). The manifestation of hard power disrupts the stability of interstate cooperation, while the expression of soft power strengthens understanding between nations, enhances the effectiveness of interstate collaboration, and successfully promotes the state’s ideas and intentions.

Over the past three decades, medical and wellness tourism has grown into a lucrative sector within national healthcare systems, becoming an important tool for interstate interactions. In the current geopolitical situation, it takes on functions to strengthen international relations, promote stability among nations, and enhance the quality of medical care and wellness services.

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Can Nature-Based Tourism Empower Women and Foster Gender Equality?



Meredian Alam 

1 Introduction

Studies on gender and tourism and their relation to the mission of global sustainability have been growing considerably in past years; a noticeable number of academic journal articles, exploring sustainability and tourism through a gender perspective, have been published in recent years [1–4]. People from industrialized and urbanized abodes travel to places known for their natural scenic adventures to get rid of fatigue and depression loaded on their minds and bodies by the fast and concrete world of cities. This travel and tourism fuel the economic engine of countries blessed with natural beauty and create a large number of job opportunities for the indigenous people [5]. The potential of tourism, especially ecotourism, for enhancing climatic and economic sustainability is not a myth anymore since it is contributing to one-tenth of the global GDP and begetting one-fourth of all new job opportunities; a number of countries depend on tourism as their prime economic source, and for others, it is an essential part of their economy [6]. Acknowledging the importance of tourism, the United Nations drafted its “Tourism and the Sustainable Development Goals—Journey to 2030” plan for the achievement of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through the tourism sector. The guide aims to motivate and inspire governments and policymakers to incorporate SDGs into the tourism sector while defining their economic frameworks for business operations. Meanwhile, the United Nations also acknowledged the importance of gender equality for attaining global sustainability; this acknowledgment was assessed in the report of “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (2015), which were adopted by the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000 and proclaimed as the

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United Nations Millennium Declaration. Conclusively, gender equality was adopted as a precondition for winning global sustainability through ecotourism, since the possible acquisition of all the 17 SDGs is directly or indirectly dependent on gender equality insurance [7].

This is because goals of poverty cessation (SDG 1), food security (SDG 2), availability of best medical facilities (SDG 3), inclusive and equitable quality education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), “availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation” (SDG 6), “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy” (SDG 7), “decent work and economic growth” (SDG 8), “sustainable cities, industry, infrastructure, and innovation for inequality reduction” (SDG 9, 10, &11), and climatic actions and ensuring responsible consumption and production, under the supervision of strong institutions based on global partnership, to secure life on land and life below the water (SDG 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, &17) can only be accomplished by elevating the status of women from subservient and dependent humans to complete, equal, and independent human beings [8]. This is because women constitute the major count of people living under the poverty line—the ones who do not enjoy equal access to jobs or entrepreneurship, medical and, educational opportunities, the ones who fail to enjoy the luxury of modern energy, the ones who primarily suffer from food and water shortages during any natural calamity, the ones who are mostly devoid of inclusive and decent settlements and work, the ones who are the first victims of the side effects of inequality among countries, and the ones for whom participation in sustainable industrialization and innovation is still a fictitious dream. On the other hand, women are the major stakeholders in the conservation, protection, and enhancement of natural resources including, energy, water, forests, etc., which are compulsory elements of the tourism industry. Therefore, no policy or planning for the accomplishment of global sustainability could be declared pragmatic without fulfilling the precondition of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Once the issues of women’s empowerment and gender equality are addressed and ensured, faster and more sustainable changes can be harvested; the fact is established by the case studies of The Anourok Cambodia forestry project in Southwest Cambodia and The Yedeni project in Ethiopia where women willingly participated in conservation and protection of forests for enhancing tourism, both at the worker and leadership level, and remained successful in winning the confidence of relative institutions [9].

2 Nature-Based Tourism and Sustainability

According to the economic report of Oxford Economics, travel and tourism contributed to “1 in 4 of all new jobs created across the world, 10.3% of all jobs (333 million), and 10.3% of global GDP (US\$9.6 trillion). Meanwhile, international visitor spending amounted to US\$1.8 trillion in 2019 (6.8% of total exports)” [10]. A tangible variety of tourism categories include nature-based tourism, religious tourism, medical tourism, educational and political tourism, etc.; however, nature-based

tourism is the most popular tourist attraction. The category of tourism that involves a variety of outdoor and adventurous activities, such as wildlife and scenic tours, skydiving, jet boating, jungle safari, desert safari, mountain climbing, bushwalking, etc., performed by the tourists in a natural environment is defined as nature-based tourism (NBT). The 20th and 21st centuries have witnessed unprecedented urbanization and industrialization, which have been devastating to the natural environment and ecosystems, driving people away from the true picture of nature, its atmosphere, habitat, and beauty.

The majority of people, especially in developed and excessively urbanized countries, are facing near-complete disconnect from nature: a citizen, using wooden furniture, is helpless to imagine the tree and its habitat from which it was crafted; a consumer eating the reddish slices of meat is unable to connect himself to the animals and their lives which were slaughtered to provide him/her with fresh natural proteins; a fashionable teenager is unable to picture the cotton plantations which provided soft threads for the comfortable and soothing clothing he/she loves to wear; and seasonal turns of fruits and vegetables, their natural colors and essence, and the virtual slow growth in their natural habitats have almost ceased to exist in the accelerated minds of urbanized people [11]. Therefore, people become tired of regular concrete scenes of cities and travel toward green meadows to add green softness to their stonelike imaginations; they rush to soothing natural sounds of waterfalls and cheep of birds when a variety of musical instruments fail to add comfort to their tired minds; when comfortable couches of bulletproof vehicles begin to haunt the freedom of their soul, people get out of their abodes to challenge the heights of mountains, heats of deserts, and darkness of jungles to get rid of their unseen fears. This initiates the cycle of nature-based tourism when people with resources visit the unaltered landscapes of developing countries to pump money into their economies by keeping their markets busy, creating job opportunities, and exchanging knowledge [12]. The rural population earns their livelihood by serving the tourists in hotels and restaurants and becoming their helpers, photographers, camping agents, guides, and translators; they begin to realize the importance of their natural abodes to protect and enhance them for more tourist attraction [13].

3 Nature-Based Tourism and Women's Empowerment

When it comes to tourism, it has been studied that about 55% of tourism workers are women; this share increases to over 70% in countries, such as Lithuania and Peru, which concludes that women are major stakeholders in the tourism industry and need to acquire the position and status in accordance with their contribution; otherwise, according to Sinclair, "when tourism is not gender aware, tourism converts women's characteristics—that is, 'feminine characteristics' imposed by patriarchy—into merchandise." Contemporarily, women in the tourism industry, which is not different from other industries, face strong gender discrimination which can be observed in their lower wages and a lack of professional recognition [14].

Even the tourism industry of the developed European countries fails to guarantee decent work and security to women, especially those working at a lower position of the occupational pyramid [15]. Taking the example of Spain, according to a Canadian report, poor and unsafe working conditions in hotels' housekeeping, cleaning, and scouring departments, which employ migrant women mainly, have been causing increased rates of serious injuries and accidents when compared with other jobs in the service industry [16]. Moreover, outsourcing has been worsening the situation since working conditions, positions, and pay have been deteriorating due to the expiration of professional segregations in the contracts of workers. A restaurant maid, for instance, has turned into a mere "cleaner" or even "laborer." Similarly, in Portugal, where women are better trained than their male counterparts and serve more hours, they generate less income than men in travel agencies, accommodations, and operations sectors. When this level of discrimination is faced by women in Europe, a much worse and more alarming situation could be expected in the developing world [17, 18].

Tourism, which supports one in ten jobs globally and 53% of the women workforce, shoulders a great responsibility to end inhuman gender discrimination and champion the leadership of global sustainability by ensuring equal and elevated status for women. Nowadays, women are mostly concentrated at the lower level of the occupational pyramid by their patriarchal male counterparts; they are usually underrepresented in workers' unions at the management and board levels. It implies that the mere availability of jobs and motivation for entrepreneurship could not guarantee the elevation of women's status and the end of gendered discrimination in the system and dynamics where they are entangled. Their relationships with their employers, management, colleagues, and customers will only change when the status and role of women in society are redefined to give them an equal position with men by recognizing their intellectual ability and basic human rights [19]. The draft of sustainable development goals and their accomplishment through ecotourism, interconnected with gender equality, cannot be grounded throughout the globe without the partnership and participation of sovereign countries. No country, not even the United Nations, can enforce its strategies in any sovereign state; it is only possible through dialogue and diplomacy. Moreover, not every country has the resources and institutions to achieve drafted outcomes. Additionally, customs, norms, and religious beliefs about gender equality are too strong to alter. António Guterres (UN Secretary-General), in his speech at the 56th plenary meeting, spoke on his priorities for 2022 and stated:

Achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls is the greatest human rights challenge in our world. Nearly 60 percent of women around the world work in the informal economy, earning less, saving less, and at greater risk of falling into poverty.

However, it is soothing to know that the world community is now fully aware of the need for global cooperation for women's empowerment; several international organizations are working on their mission to achieve gender equality. UN Women works with the leadership of member states to prioritize efforts for women's empowerment at both constitutional and social levels. "Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation

for the Protection of Women and Girls against Violence” project is working in the Southern Mediterranean region to protect women and girls against gender-based violence. “Empowering women in decision-making processes in the Middle East—LEAD” is a project commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to increase women’s participation in decision-making forums in Palestinian territories and Jordan [13, 20, 21]. Considering and recognizing the importance of gender equality and women’s empowerment, the United Nations integrated the following aims into its sustainable development goals, such as (1) the assessment, reduction, and redistribution of unpaid care work performed by women and girls, (2) the full and equal participation of women in sustainable development as agents and decision-makers in the processes that affect their lives and the futures of their families, communities, countries, and the world, (3) the experience and leadership of those who defend women’s rights and gender equality in parliaments, unions, cooperatives, and community associations, and (4) the elimination of discriminatory laws, policies, and practices and the promotion of legislation, policies, and measures aimed at enhancing gender equality and women empowerment.

It has been observed that poverty can only be eliminated with the eradication of gender-based segregation and discrimination. Gender inequality is the major factor that risks women’s well-being and strips them of their basic human rights. All around the world, women contribute relatively more time to their family service when compared with their male counterparts; this might be in the form of adding an income to the family economy through a job, working as an entrepreneur, and/or saving resources by doing multiple jobs as a housewife. However, when it comes to farming and related investments in nature, women do not enjoy the same access to credit and technology. Globally, only 20% of landowners are women; this makes them more vulnerable to poverty and associated life-threatening risks. UN Women has extended its Ethiopian program of supporting the Ethiopian government to uplift women’s economic empowerment (2012) at a global level by including Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, etc., in its vision and operation to assist governments to set policy priorities to check gender discrimination. Rural women are supported economically and educationally to participate in the green economy through farming and tourism [22].

The world has now turned into a global village and people of different countries and nations are coming increasingly closer; they are becoming more aware of the development and advancement of other countries. People from the developed world are conscious of the poverty, illiteracy, and discrimination prevailing in the developing world. Similarly, people from the developing world are casting curious and skeptical eyes over the widened inequalities among different nations [23]. Nature-based tourism is one of the prominent opportunities for the transfer of funds from the developed world to developing nations since the majority of nature-based tourist and adventurous spots lie in the undeveloped world [24]. Due to a lack of funds and the slow pace of urbanization, forests, meadows, and green valleys remain unaltered to be explored and visited by international tourists. According to the Lu and Nepal, “Better regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and better

representation of developing countries in international decision-making will reduce inequality. Therefore, it would be very useful to know the gender impact of foreign direct investment in the tourist sector and the fiscal benefits that tourism enjoys in many developing countries” [25]. Recently, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, has called on nations “for amplifying the voices of Indigenous women, which is critical to achieving a just future for all people” [26].

As discussed above, it has been globally acknowledged that no economic growth would be sustainable until and unless it is inclusive and based on the gender equality principle. Women comprise more than half of the world population, but only 50% of the working-age women (15 years or above) are employed, compared with 75% of working-age males; moreover, women, throughout the globe, earn 24% less than men for similar work. Gender stereotypes restrict women to a number of jobs that could be easily handled by them; they are pushed to some of the worst tasks. Among the 143 countries that had pledged to guarantee gender equality in 2014, 90% had legal restrictions on women’s employment; such type of behavior is a major hindrance to sustainable economic growth and poverty cessation.

Acknowledging the ground reality that women represent the major portion of the global poor population and are relatively more dependent on the green economy for their livelihoods, UN Women has been heavily investing its resources to enhance the capacity of women entrepreneurs since Kenya operation (2015) is an example. Similarly, the Melap project of EcoAct, perceiving the limitations of women and the need for decent work, distributed about 188,000 environment-friendly cookstoves in the Noun province of Cameroon; this avoided deforestation and helped local women to save their time and, rather, invest in following green projects [27]. The project not only reduced 60% of the wood consumption but also made it possible for the local women to participate in community leadership and entrepreneurship programs [22].

4 Case Studies

Stepping ahead from the theoretical framework, women’s empowerment, through their enrollment in sustainable green projects, is no longer a doubtful fictitious dream; it can be studied on the ground through several case studies; two of the prominent success stories are as follows.

4.1 The Anourok Cambodia Forestry Project in Southwest Cambodia Supports Women’s Leadership and Participation in Ecotourism

The Anourok Cambodia forestry project, located in the Cardamom Mountain Range, is a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) project, which was designed to protect the second largest virgin rainforest

in Southeast Asia, spreading over 20,000km² in Southwest Cambodia [22, 28]. The area was being devastated by illegal logging and poaching; it had threatened the habitat of a number of native species, including about 50 species that were added to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List, which included the Siamese crocodile, the Asian brown bear, the Clouded Leopard, and the Asian elephant. According to the Cambodian government, 28 local communities depend on this region, which represents 16,319 people, of whom only 16% live above the poverty line [29].

This project was initiated in response to the ever-increasing hunting of important wild species and the destruction of thousands of acres of ecosystems of global significance. The project put special attention on the involvement of the local community, following the principles of Participatory Forest Management; it is working with 220 families in three villages to promote more sustainable ecotourism and agriculture (via a reward program). The project was aligned with sustainable development goals of “achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” (SDG 5), “decent work and economic growth” (SDG 8), “climate action” (SDG 13), and “life on land” (SDG 15).

Giving special focus to goal 5 of UN sustainable development goals, the project empowered local women, including those from ethnic minorities, by giving them extra space for participation in the community-based ecotourism and reserving job vacancies for only women; they were recruited into decision-making positions to ensure capacity-building opportunities for the women. Currently, women chair 44% of the important positions in ecotourism and agricultural management. Moreover, the project is helping and supporting the education of girls in the area by providing educational facilities and scholarships, which assist girl students in learning extra skills and knowledge to, ultimately, raise the general cognition of their society [30]. Women contribute to 43% of the agricultural labor in developing countries, while 90% of the global meal is prepared by women, but during periods of crises, such as droughts and food shortages, women are the first to eat less; this is because dependent women are chained with many sacrifice-demanding stereotypes and independent women usually earn so less to have savings and cope with crises [31]. Women suffer food shortages not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, even during the days of growth, pregnancy, and breastfeeding, when they need extra nutrients to maintain their physique and ensure the health of the baby [9].

UN Women Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office took initiatives to address the second SDG goal of “ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture,” in partnership with the African Union (AU), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World Food Programme (WFP), by hosting a regional share fair for Rural Women’s Technologies (RWT) on the International Day of Rural Women and World Food Day, 2014 [32]. The fair was organized to spread awareness about women facing a lack of nutrition and articulate programs and policies, with the integration of technology, to address this issue on a sustainable level; this was only possible through the necessary integration of women in farming, agriculture, and tourism. Hence, technologies were exhibited to assist

the policy planners in achieving the goal. 300 registered participants, along with 100 innovators from 14 countries, attended the share fair [33]. Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO), in 2015, benefited from the experience of a share fair to upscale rural women through innovative technologies and established African Women in Technology (AWIT), along with an Edutainment initiative to entertain about six million women, by securing their rights of land ownership, enabling them to farm better, and upscaling their economy [19].

The progress report of the project revealed that women deserved the positions and responsibilities they were awarded. As for now, the project is protecting 497,000 hectares of tropical rainforest and has avoided emissions of more than 27,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide [34]. About 200 Siamese crocodiles, which are the last of their kind on the earth, have been identified and protected. Hundreds of green jobs have been created (equally distributed between men and women to promote gender equality), and more than 220 families are directly dependent on this project for their livelihood. 1715 students succeeded in obtaining awareness and education on the ecological significance of the Cardamom Mountains and Cambodia's biodiversity [35]. The Anourok Cambodia forestry project is a live example of sustainable development, which is based on the community and government partnership to benefit local communities with sustainable income generation.

4.2 The Yedeni Project in Ethiopia Supports an All-Female Forest Patrol Group

Centered in the Bale eco-region in Ethiopia, the Yedeni Project is another Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) project, which was launched in 2012 to protect about 500,000 hectares of high forest for enhancing sustainable nature-based tourism in the area [22]. This region is known as the home to the largest alpine forest in the African region and a habitat enriched with high biodiversity. However, the local peoples of the area suffered from high poverty levels, which drove them to exploit forests and wildlife for wood, food, and agricultural expansions; this concluded in rapid forest degradation and deforestation [36]. The project aimed to reduce deforestation by 70% by advertising the ecological significance of the region, attracting tourists, and developing forest-friendly businesses, guided by the sustainable development goals of the United Nations [37].

Following the Participatory Forest Management ideals, the project distributed the responsibilities and benefits between the government and the local population, giving special preference to women. The project raised and trained all-female groups of forest guards that patrolled the forest and monitored their status [38]. The members of these groups were also members of the local forestry management cooperative, where they were given access to training and awareness programs and enrolled in regular meetings to keep them connected and motivated about preserving valuable forest resources. These groups were employed not only to check the

signs of forest damage and deforestation and report to the local deforestation department but to spread teachings and awareness about the significance of the forests to encourage fellow women to be enrolled in similar cooperatives [39]. Fuel-saving stoves were provided along with an opportunity to win incentives from the sale of carbon credits by reducing deforestation; this greatly reduced pressure on the firewood [40].

The project met with great success due to the willingness and cooperation of local people, especially women guards who not only guarded the forest but motivated the entire community to take an active part in the preservation of their green assets. The project, which was drafted to reduce 70% deforestation in 19 years till 2031, made it possible to reduce 62% deforestation in only three years till 2015 by securing 12,496 hectares of forest; it is equivalent to a reduction of 5.5 million tons of carbon dioxide emission [41]. The project was an exemplary addition to global sustainability, which reduced deforestation, protected wildlife, enhanced nature-based tourism, reduced poverty by creating green jobs, and empowered women by availing them awareness, training, livelihood, more feasible and environment-friendly stoves, and making them active, responsible, and equal citizens of their community [42].

5 Conclusion

The globe is experiencing the age of postmodernism when the world has turned into a global village. People around the world are enjoying the luxury of interconnectivity and awareness through technological advancement, which is unprecedented throughout human history. However, this technological advancement has not been grounded on the techniques and procedures that were always ecofriendly or even human-friendly; this behavior has done severe damage to the climate of the earth and fueled inequalities within societies and nations. The climatic change, injustice, and inequality are posing a serious threat to the future of life on earth; this has concerned the global community which has been coming together to work out a solution. Since most of the problems, including injustice, inequality, poverty, gender discrimination, deforestation, unemployment, etc., are all widely distributed throughout the world and interconnected, sustainability cannot be accomplished without joint and overarching efforts. Perceiving the sensitivity of the problem, the United Nations has worked out 17 sustainable development goals for attaining global sustainability. Experience of Millennium Development Goals operation and several other pieces of research acknowledge gender equality as a precondition for the accomplishment of these goals, which greatly depend on global cooperation. When the tourism industry, especially nature-based tourism, is commissioned to shoulder a share of its responsibility, women's empowerment remains the main hurdle in the way of sustainability. Therefore, all the international organizations, the leadership of sovereign nations, religious stakeholders, and global inspirations should join hands to contribute their strengths to end inhuman gender

discrimination to let the dream of sustainable development come true. All the tourist spots should be encouraged and bound, if necessary, to launch effective campaigns against gender discrimination, and the power of social media should be utilized to mobilize the noble cause. Step ahead from slogans and rhetoric; gender-sensitive tourism data should be regularly collected and analyzed, and the intersectional approach should be used in tourism studies to understand the interconnection of SDGs, tourism, and women empowerment.

The establishment of peaceful and inclusive societies requires constitutional changes to remove structural inequalities which beget gender-based violence related to tourism, which includes physical, psychological, sexual, economic, and political abuse. Stereotypes and taboos revealed in the law should be reconsidered; it is only possible by empowering women to participate in policy-making procedures, for which the economic stability of women is a precondition. Women should be encouraged to avail job and entrepreneurship opportunities. It can be achieved by ensuring gender-sensitive decent work, which means that the work hours of women should be reconciled with their compulsory family and feminine responsibilities. This flexibility should not be confined to women only but also to men, which will allow a couple and a family to share care work responsibilities. Women feel helpless to reach higher posts and positions in the tourism companies not because they lack the intellect or do something wrong but only because they are to take the responsibilities of home and children solely and all along. Due to their divided mind and the volatility of family affairs, management feels reluctance in offering them jobs that require long-term and autonomous service of a single employee. Conventional and cultural norms, which disallow a woman's mobility and overnight duties, further hinder the progress of a woman [9].

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National Brand in the System of International Relations



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1 Introduction

In the context of the growth of integration trajectories, the “reset” of political, economic, cultural, and communication parameters of cooperation and interconnections, states, and regions demonstrate their own trajectory, which has an impact on the development of international relations and the world order as a whole. In a competitive environment, states are interested in preserving their own identity and the possibility of balance in cooperation and strive to demonstrate their distinctive offerings to an international audience in the context of growing globalization [1]. In these difficult conditions, countries are striving to develop their national brands to compete at the global level, using the potential of both domestic and foreign markets. Image, which has always played a significant role in world politics and sometimes has been an important argument for political decision-making, is now turning into one of the key factors in international relations.

Today, there are not enough classical tools for the development of the economy and the well-being of the country. Intangible aspects are important for future investments, increased cooperation, and human resources. However, building a reliable and recognizable brand requires careful planning and execution of several actions that will improve the country’s visibility and reputation.

National branding can be used both to strengthen the economic and political influence of a country and to increase its cultural prestige. National branding should

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combine strategies for the development of the territory and the values that this territory (country) is ready to offer to the public and target audiences [2].

Comparing the concepts of national branding of a product and a country. It should be noted that national branding is a more complex process that covers a longer period and considers the opinions of various stakeholders involved in brand management. Since marketing tools are used in branding management at the country level, branding management depends on a marketing strategy, the goals of which are to increase competitiveness and respect for the status of the country and its national characteristics.

Public diplomacy, as a strategic effort by nation-states to advance their national interests, seeks to influence public attitudes toward the formation and implementation of a country's foreign policy through a wide range of means, including ideas, practices, values, culture, art, food, music, transportation, media, language, tourism, and economic assistance [3–7].

In public policy, national branding acts as an instrument of soft power of influence, which can be used both to strengthen the economic and political influence of a country and to increase its cultural prestige [8].

National brand and strong image of the country [9] are considered as factors of the state's competitiveness, forming a system of symbolic connections with a deep structure at the level of archetypes, values, and symbols. Particular attention is paid to the national brand from the standpoint of political science [10]. In the political plane, national branding contributes to the construction of a development and attractive promotion strategy for the market. Recently, there has been an intensification of national brand research in the context of territorial branding and communications [11], emphasizing the problems of developing communication tactics for promotion.

Touching upon the problem of the connection between image and brand, it should be noted that the national brand can be analyzed within the framework of the implementation of the state image strategy of the country [12].

The purpose of this chapter is determined by the analysis of the national brand because of a complex technology for creating a positive image of the country in international communications, perceived by the target audience as a multiparameter system, which allows us to apply an index approach to assess it.

The objectives of the chapter include the analysis of the characteristics of the multidimensional model of the national brand on the example of the brand "Made in Russia" and the identification of the attitude of Russian youth to this brand based on the analysis of documents.

2 Literature Review

In the 1930s, theoretical and practical issues of branding formed their own scientific movement. In it, D. Aaker became the founder of the theory of branding; he defined a brand as a name and/or symbol that allows you to distinguish the services and goods of one manufacturer from the services and goods of competitors [13]. A

similar definition of a brand is formulated by the American marketer and economist F. Kotler. He stresses the possibility of using the term “brand” to refer to the goods and services of producers in a competitive environment [14].

There is also an alternative point of view on the definition of this concept. For example, K.L. Keller defined a brand as a set of personified associations that arise in the minds of consumers [15].

The understanding of the brand expands and acquires a psychological aspect. For example, A.M. Munar interprets a brand as a presemifield projection of a person’s sensation in relation to a specific symbol/name (e.g., a product, a territory) [16, 17].

At the present stage of study, a brand has an even more complex structure: from a set of certain images that arise in the minds of consumers to the formation of a certain stereotype and values that are associated with it. M. Neumeier emphasizes the importance of mass perception of the brand. The author believes that a personal, sometimes intuitive, perception of a service, product, or organization becomes a brand. Each person forms his own idea and opinion about a brand, and if a wide range of consumers has a similar perception, we can say that the brand has been formed [18, 19].

Attention to the essence and role of the national brand arose among scientists thanks to the developments of S. Anholt, who introduced the term “national brand” into scientific circulation [20]. Anholt, analyzing the content of the concept, emphasizes the property of the national brand to create the value of the product, marking it with the wording “Made in country X”, which evokes positive associations with the country and thus performs the function of added value.

Further, expanding the scope of influence of the given problem, Anholt concretized the meaning of the term, suggesting that “competitive identity” should be understood in this way [21]. This has made it possible to improve approaches to the country’s competitiveness based on its importance for public policy and marketing. This reflected the shifts that arose in the economy at the end of the twentieth century, when the production of goods was already carried out in the context of global economic relations and the wording referring to a particular country lost its meaning and ceased to bring added value.

The theoretical positions of modern researchers were influenced by the interpretation of the essential foundations of the national brand, proposed by S. Anholt. From this point of view, a brand acts as the sum of people’s perceptions in relation to a certain country. The brand is defined by six areas of government activity: “Population, Export, Tourism, Public Administration, Investment and Immigration, Culture and Heritage” [21, p. 118]. This interpretation has become a kind of conceptual tool not only in understanding but also in promoting the national/country image. S. Anholt’s approach makes it possible to develop strategies for strengthening the national brand based on these highlighted areas. Among them, the leading place belongs to the development of the state’s export policy, the expansion of the tourism industry, and the promotion of cultural heritage, and the foundation is the ongoing state policy and investment in human capital. These problems are widely reflected in the publications of researchers [22–25].

Building a national brand is associated with the concept of “soft power,” which has gained popularity thanks to the work of J. Nye [26]. The meaning of “*soft power*” is that it is understood as a form of a country’s foreign policy strategy, which implies the ability to achieve desired results based on voluntary participation, sympathy, and attractiveness, as opposed to “hard power,” which implies coercion. J. S. Nye singled out the key elements of soft power—the language and culture of the country; it was with their help that he saw the harmonious development of international relations. He connected with it effective business relations and the entire world politics.

At the heart of public diplomacy is the concept of “soft power,” or “the ability to influence others to produce the results that one wants to achieve through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” “Resources that produce soft power arise ... of values... which the country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets through its domestic practices and policies, and in the way it regulates its relations with others. Public diplomacy is a tool that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate and engage the public in other countries.” [26, p. 94].

Based on the concept of soft power, it is necessary to turn to the characteristics and analysis of the “Made in the Russian Federation” brand. The purpose of the development of this brand is to create an environment in which marketing strategies and interests of various stakeholders will be developed and integrated. At the same time, the image of the country should enhance the effect of the advertising activity of companies to promote their products to the markets. In discussions at St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (June 2023) dedicated to the concept of the national brand [27]. The key characteristics of the brand were highlighted:

1. The product has a patent.
2. The product is environmentally friendly or created in conditions of energy efficiency.
3. Industrial design was used in the creation of the product.

The following statements were singled out as a system of the main meanings of the brand: a national brand is “an element of Russia’s image abroad,” “a tool to support exporters,” “a sign of product quality,” “belonging to the club of the elite,” and “part of marketing.” The leading semantic basis of the brand “Made in the Russian Federation” was highlighted, which was the meaning of the brand as a sign of quality. The creation and support of the club system, as a popular trend, was also in the spotlight. Important features of such a system are the possibility of uniting those who will develop this brand, the effect of the conditions for voluntary entry, corporate interest, and creative orientation of activities.

In search of tools for managing the national image, various quantitative approaches to its assessment are being developed. One of the developing areas is the weighting of countries’ positions through the compilation of international rankings. Since 2010, a composite index of “soft power” has been formed based on developments [28]. It integrates objective and subjective criteria and is subject to annual modernization. The composite index of “soft power” includes measurement criteria

in the fields of public administration, culture, education, diplomacy, business, and innovation [29, 30].

Given that in a dynamic world, the basic components of “soft power” are constantly changing, quantitative assessments are significantly supplemented by qualitative measurements. For this purpose, estimates obtained by the expert method are used, the share of which in comparison with quantitative estimates is determined by a ratio of 30/70. Experts evaluate commercial brands and brands of national cuisine, symbolic instruments of “soft power,” existing achievements in the field of culture, architecture and art, air carriers, and global leadership [29]. Thus, the tools of soft power are aimed at persuading and forming a system of values and norms symbolically associated with a particular country.

3 Methods and Results

The annual compilation and analysis of the soft power index for countries on a global scale is carried out by Brand Finance [31]. It integrates assessments in the following aspects: business and trade, *governance*, international relations, culture and heritage, media and communication, education and science, people and values, and sustainability of the future. The index is based on the results of a survey of more than 110,000 people in more than 100 countries of the world, who assessed the selected aspects of the country’s image for 121 participants—countries of the world [32]. Based on the data from the 2023 report, it is possible to identify leaders in 38 positions. According to the most important aspects that define the brand, three leading leaders can be identified:

1. Fame: USA, Britain, France
2. Reputation: Switzerland, Canada, Japan
3. Influence: USA, China, Britain
4. Strong, sustainable economy: Germany, Switzerland, Japan
5. Safe: Switzerland, Norway, Canada
6. Respect the law and human rights: Britain, Canada, Switzerland
7. Rich heritage: Greece, Egypt, Italy
8. Attractive lifestyle: Switzerland, Canada, USA
9. Credible: Switzerland, Canada, Germany
10. Tolerant and inclusive: Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland
11. Environmental: Norway, Denmark, Sweden

It should be noted that the world leader in several positions is the United States, for which the leading positions were established according to the following characteristics (along with the allocation of three leaders in terms of position) [31]:

1. Fame—along with Britain and France
2. Influence—along with China and the UK

3. Influential in diplomatic circles (along with Britain and Germany), influence in the arts and entertainment—along with Great Britain and France.
4. Influential media, along with Britain and France
5. It is a leader in science, along with Japan and China
6. Leaders admired in the world—along with Britain and Germany
7. Supporting global efforts on climate change—along with Japan and Germany

To compare the positions of countries on the characteristics of the global soft power index characteristic of the opinion of young people, a survey was undertaken among Russian youth (December 2023). Overall, 68 people (bachelor’s and master’s students of SPbPU) took part in the survey. Participants were asked to enter the names of the countries with which they associated the soft power index criteria, presented in the form of a list.

An analysis of young people’s opinions showed a convergence of positions on the leader—young people also put the United States in first place in the following positions:

1. Fame. Russia and China were also in the top three.
2. Influence (along with China and Russia).
3. Tolerance and inclusivity (along with the Scandinavian countries).

Students trust the Scandinavian countries and Russia. Russia leads the way in terms of “rich heritage,” followed by Italy, the United Kingdom, and China. In terms of the “reputation” factor, students put Switzerland in first place along with the Scandinavian countries.

Among the many items for the global index assessments, those were identified that received numerous responses from respondents (Table 1).

For a more in-depth understanding of the attitude of young people to the national brand of Russia, an analysis of the content of the essays written by students was carried out, the topic of which was the attitude to the brand “Made in Russia.” As a wish for the essay, it was recommended to focus on associations, expectations, and one’s own opinion on how to effectively manage a national brand. The study involved 52 students of the Advertising and Public Relations program, whose specialization allows them to characterize and express an opinion based on knowledge and observation [33] on this issue.

Table 1 Characteristics of the Global Index (based on the analysis of SPbPU Student Survey Data)

Country	United States	Russia	China	Britain	Italy	Scandinavian countries	Switzerland
Fame	+	+	+				
Influence	+	+	+				
Tolerance and inclusivity	+					+	
Trustworthy		+				+	
A rich heritage		+	+	+	+		
Reputation						+	+

The substantive analysis of the essay showed that the national brand is perceived by students as “the face of the country,” “a business card,” “an economic development program,” “a trademark,” and “the image of the country.” Students believe that a national brand reflects a collective perception of national character and values, so a descriptive portrait of characteristics is important. Among the basic characteristics that determine the essence of the national brand, students highlight the following:

1. Quality
2. Reliability
3. Uniqueness
4. Competitiveness in the global market
5. The importance of labeling in conjunction with culture and lifestyle

Along with the characteristics, students derive sets of parameters that reflect the mechanism of implementation and communication of the brand. Among these selected complexes, the following were proposed:

6. Economics and Soft Power
7. Economic Development and Business Support
8. “Traditions and Modern Achievements”
9. “Public Policy and Business Involvement”

When meeting the “Made in Russia” brand, most young people experience positive feelings—pride, trust, support, respect, interest, and curiosity. However, among the participants of the study, there were also those who noted that today this brand is burdened with negative stereotypical connotations, appealing to the failures of the domestic automotive industry, the low quality of industrial goods, a slowdown in the pace of development, and a lack of diversity. In this regard, according to the respondents, special attention should be paid to information work as well as to the comprehensive development and promotion of the national brand.

A particular variety of assessments was noted when analyzing expectations in relation to the “Made in Russia” brand. Expectations of high quality, reliability, and uniqueness of products marked with this mark are in the lead. Also, young people want to see the presence of safety and environmental characteristics, the contribution of design, high-tech and innovative solutions, along with traditions, originality, compliance with high (international) standards, and durability. For young people, fame matters, price matters, and culture must be reflected. The brand, according to the students, should convey the cultural diversity of Russia, beautiful nature, and talented people living in this country.

Discussing what the national brand of Russia should be, many students focus on the presence of a “new idea,” “new developments,” and an “integrated approach.” A brand, in their opinion, should be a symbol of quality, values, traditions, and innovative technologies. The brand must “reveal national identity,” “be open,” “accessible,” and “attractive to a wide audience.” Young people appreciate the high level of diversity, its versatility, and the reflection of the resource aspect—the contribution of talented people—in the national brand. This, according to the students, is

possible based on the use of effective marketing, support for developments by the state, and the development of national self-awareness of consumers.

The opinions and observations expressed in the essay also allow us to establish several significant positions of young people, reflecting their behavioral attitudes. Thus, several participants noted that in their consumer behavior, they do not consider national characteristics at all, but monitor specific brands, which is the basis for them when making decisions about the purchase of goods and services. Students noted that they were taking a position of “cautious optimism” because of the “atrophy of making good quality goods” observed today. The proposals of the young people included the ideas of “the importance of creating a single platform for the promotion of Russian brands,” increasing “the role of the state in this process,” the awareness of the need to focus on “increasing the quality of goods and services and broadcasting this trend on the world market” on “increasing the prestige of local producers.” Many students believe that the growth and improvement of the tourism sector will contribute to the development of Russia’s national brand. In the essays presented, the ideas of “relying on public opinion research,” “fighting stereotypes,” and “active communication policy” using a variety of media platforms, formats of exhibitions and international forums, exchange of experience and high technologies, “improving the quality of education,” and “developing a comfortable civic sphere” were clearly heard.

In general, it should be noted that the expressed assessments and opinions of the respondents, representatives of Russian youth, were distinguished by a positive attitude and readiness to feel pride in the national brand. They demonstrate high requirements in relation to the development and implementation of the concept of the national brand, understanding of their own responsibility, and expectation of a set of efforts to meet the expectations of high quality, uniqueness, reliability, and high technological effectiveness of products representing the national brand.

4 Discussion

At present, the concept and role of the national brand are being revised in the direction of convergence and integration of processes that unite the country, economy, business, and politics in the minds of consumers, as well as considering the mutual influence of economics and diplomacy. The peculiarity of the national brand is that it is the result of cognitive processes based on selection of information about the country, which is available in large quantities in the media space.

M. Gerezniak and J. Anders-Morawska [34] proposed a paradigm shift in the discourse of territory branding based on the adoption of a public value approach (Public Value—PV). They call for replacing the competition- and demand-driven approach to building a territory/country brand with activities focused on creating value for residents. The authors argue that territory branding can become a factor in creating social value in three aspects: as a means of expressing PV, as an amplifier of social relations, and as a moderator of social behavior. This concept, which

emerged because of a critique of the new public administration approach, contributes to the evolution of models of public administration, linking the collective, relational, and experiential nature of the territory brand.

This position is supported by other authors, emphasizing that by accepting public value, the role of a critical approach to the strategy of branding places increases, considering their potential positive and negative consequences for the public [35]. The authors believe that if national branding is moderated in this way, it can become value-oriented and bring communities back to their roots, stimulating a sense of unity.

O.A. Kursaeva [36], draws attention to the difference in the authors' positions regarding the role and activity of the state in promoting the national brand and distinguishes three groups of authors—"absolutists," "moderates," and "royalists." The trend approach reveals the impossibility of managing the brand of the state as a complex structure of representations (Table 2).

It should be noted that national branding is a more complex process compared to product branding, covering a longer period, and considering the opinions of the various stakeholders involved in brand management. Branding management at the country level depends on the marketing tools used, and therefore the key problem is the development of a marketing strategy aimed at increasing competitiveness and respect for the status of the country, emphasizing its national characteristics and uniqueness. The range of tools and strategies is quite wide [37–39].

According to I. V. Groshev [40], the purpose of branding includes the following tasks:

1. Creation of the presence of the territory's brand in the information space
2. Ensuring brand awareness of the territory
3. Increasing the influence of the territory
4. Attraction of financial resources
5. Broadcasting of territorial events to the outside

The process of forming an effective national brand involves the following sequential steps [41]:

1. Determination of the content of the sociocultural complex, which will evoke associations with the brand
2. Defining the brand identity and visualizing it with marketing tools
3. The need for intensive communication with target audiences (mass audience) [42]

Table 2 Positions on the role and activity of the state in the promotion of the national brand

Setting	Absolutists	Moderate	Royalists
The Role and Activity of the State in the Formation and Transmission of the Brand	Active role of the state	The state does not play a significant role	Absolute deprivation of state activity

Thus, the study of the problem of the development of national branding covers conceptual and methodological approaches, practice-oriented target aspects, as well as process aspects.

5 Conclusion

Based on the research, it can be concluded that the national brand plays an important role as a tool for the strategic development of international relations, as it affects all aspects that have the power of influence, contains a high communication potential, and is considered as a strong side of national identity. The formation of a national brand takes into account the existing expectations on the part of the audience to put the strengths of the national economy and cultural heritage as the image foundations of the country's brand and to direct the comprehensive efforts of platform resources to maintain the competitive characteristics of the brand, which are centered on quality, uniqueness, innovation, and manufacturability as the main trends associated with the achievement of high development benchmarks. The study shows the readiness of young people to support the national brand, to feel pride in domestic achievements, but at the same time a high level of exactingness and responsibility towards themselves. For young people, the national brand is important from the point of view of its emotional and motivating aspects for professional activities, careers, and connection with the foreseeable future of the country. In the structure of the national brand, young people emphasize the importance of reflecting the contribution of talented people and the historical and cultural heritage of the country.

Methodologically and conceptually, it is obvious that researchers are concentrating on finding tools for integrating the efforts of state institutions and a flexible policy based on the advantages of soft power in the formation and management of national branding practices.

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Cooperation in the Field of Protection of Cultural Heritage as a New Dimension of BRICS Policy



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1 Introduction

The international activities on the protection of cultural heritage are one of the important directions of contemporary international relations and foreign policy, which has become an integral part of the global agenda. While the state-driven cultural heritage protection policies continue to be designed around the notion of multilateral cooperation and broaden the actions within the scope of international relations, cultural heritage has become an increasingly important theme in multilateral dialogues, which is now challenged by reinvigorating antagonistic struggle for global and regional hegemonies [1].

The UNESCO Conventions for the protection of cultural heritage, ranging from the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict to the 2005 Convention on Cultural Diversity, reflect the evolution of the definition of cultural heritage from a perspective oriented toward preserving national heritage against “external” threats to its integrity to broadened understanding of a vast range of cultural manifestations and interests attached to them, as well as the emergence of the perception of cultural heritage as a holistic concept inherently connected with the identity of peoples and with the human rights [2].

The adoption of the United Nations Security Council (2347) Resolution in 2017, linking the safeguarding of cultural property to international peace and security, has demonstrated a growing awareness of the role that cultural heritage could play in fostering security [3] and has contributed to the discursive construction of cultural heritage destruction as a security threat. The identification of cultural heritage as a matter of security concern leads to the emergence of new multilevel security

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practices and innovative forms of multilateral cooperation and calls for cultural heritage to be factored into international humanitarian and peacebuilding policies [4].

The UNESCO “Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,” which defines world cultural heritage as monuments that have “outstanding universal value in terms of history, art or science” and promotes the idea of world heritage, has contributed to fostering belief in a global community of states. Meanwhile, in addition to “drift towards a more political rather than heritage approach to Convention” and the growth of criticism of its implementation [1], cultural heritage (especially intangible one) is also being used to contend with the forces of globalization by communities that fear the homogenized and westernized influences [5].

The relevance of the task of preserving cultural heritage is increasing nowadays also due to the greater number of conflicts, more frequent catastrophes, the worsening environmental situation on the planet, the consequences of climate change, and many other factors that negatively affect the universal cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is the memory of humanity, a common cultural code that must be preserved for future generations.

The increasing interest in the protection of cultural heritage has contributed to the expansion of the scope of cultural heritage protectionist rules at both international and national levels, as well as the adoption of bilateral, international, and multilateral treaties containing provisions of a set of universally accepted general principles regarding the regulation of cultural heritage protection [6].

The creation of favorable conditions for the preservation, study, and promotion of world and national cultural heritage is one of the most important tasks of both individual states and international organizations, which are increasingly becoming involved in this activity as independent actors.

The protection of cultural heritage is becoming the responsibility of many international organizations and interstate associations, e.g., CIS, EU, BRICS, and others, which could provide a range of supportive measures like policies, programs, and funding aimed at preserving and promoting cultural heritage as well as contribute to an integrated approach to cultural heritage for the member states.

Through the lens of “soft power approach,” R. Christofoletti notes the increasing incorporation of cultural heritage into other areas of international discourse, the pluralization of heritage discourses, and the substantial shift in the vector of leadership to the arrival of newly industrialized countries like BRICS with preservationist agendas in world decision-making forums [7]. The BRICS countries are a unique example of not only cultural but also civilizational diversity. Therefore, cooperation in the field of cultural heritage protection is seen as one of the priorities of cooperation among the member states of this organization, and its relevance is confirmed by the richness of the heritage possessed by the member states themselves.

The aim of this chapter is to identify the BRICS cultural heritage policy and its actors as elements of the diplomatic toolkit. The methodology of the research relies both on the ideas of linkages between cultural heritage and diplomacy, which have recently become the subjects of numerous studies [8], and the idea of the evolution

of cultural protection and its correlation to soft power and cultural relations values. The cultural heritage is considered as an important aspect of international diplomacy manifested by ratifying many conventions, supporting key programs and policies, and engaging in both formal and informal partnerships. The state-driven cultural heritage protection policies and diplomatic relations are shaped by the networks of actors, agents, institutions, organizations, activities, and influences in the realm of cultural heritage, which are connected by complex power and resource relationships [9].

Research methods include the content and discourse analysis of documents and materials of the BRICS summits and meetings, which regulate and characterize cultural cooperation between the member countries, as well as methods of institutional analysis, comparative analysis, and prognostic methods used in formulating recommendations.

2 The Cultural Vector in the Agenda of BRICS

Cultural cooperation serves as a significant factor in strengthening interstate ties, capable of bringing together states and building their bilateral and multilateral relations. The cultural vector is increasingly evident in the agenda of such an organization as BRICS. Despite the fact that BRICS was originally formed as an organization with strong economic interests, cultural cooperation between the members of the organization is developing quite actively, and this is especially noticeable in recent years. The cultural cooperation is based on a set of documents that define all directions and forms of intercultural dialogue, and it is the principle of inter-civilization dialogue that determines the nature of interaction between the member countries within the BRICS framework [10]. The Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture signed by the BRICS governments in 2015 expresses their intention to enhance cooperation in the field of protection, preservation, restoration, return, and utilization of cultural heritage objects as well as in the field of safeguarding and promotion of intangible cultural heritage. The countries also agreed on mutual assistance in the management of cultural heritage and submission of applications for inscription of such sites in the World Heritage List [11].

However, in practical terms, no meaningful practical steps have been taken in this direction at this stage, and the statement on the importance of cooperation in the field of cultural heritage protection can be seen as a declaration of intentions.

The first practical results of the BRICS countries' activities in the field of cultural heritage emerged after the 2017 meeting of ministers of culture held in Tianjin (China), during which the action plan was adopted to implement an intergovernmental agreement on cultural cooperation for the period from 2017 to 2021, including in the field of cultural heritage preservation. The meeting also resulted in the establishment of four thematic associations, one of which, the BRICS Museum Alliance, decided to develop a special online portal to promote cooperation in the

protection, preservation, and restoration of cultural heritage. The fight against illicit trafficking of cultural property was also among the tasks of the Alliance. According to L. Mercher and B.L. Barcello, the BRICS Museum Cooperation Treaty can be regarded as a tool of cultural diplomacy through which contribution was made to promotion of values, rapprochement, and friendship between member nations, their local governments, and social institutions, as well as to the improvement of an image of trust, friendship, partners in trade, and culture, opened to diversity and interested to cooperate in local, national, and international levels [12].

The Declarations of the Meetings of the BRICS ministers of culture, which were adopted in the following years (since the 2019 Curitiba Declaration), place the topic of cultural heritage cooperation at the forefront of BRICS cultural exchange while slightly shifting perspective on heritage, structuring, and expanding forms of cooperation. In the 2021 Declaration of the VI BRICS culture ministers' meeting, the ministers expressed their intention to establish joint training programs on safeguarding cultural heritage and a BRICS Alliance between cultural institutions of member countries in the areas of conservation, preservation, and digitization of ancient manuscripts and archival materials.

The first meeting of the Working Group on International Cultural Cooperation for Strengthening BRICS Unity at the BRICS Civil Forum in August 2020 also discussed, among other issues, the need to protect cultural heritage, which was identified by the participants as one of the pillars of international cooperation.

In our view, the issue of joint activities in the field of cultural heritage protection reached a new level in May 2022, when the Action Plan for the Implementation of the BRICS Intergovernmental Agreement on Cultural Cooperation (2022–2026) was signed, and it highlighted cooperation in the field of preservation and promotion of cultural heritage of the participating countries as a priority and promising area. This is also evidenced by the fact that in his speech at the BRICS Summit on 23 August 2023, Russian president Vladimir Putin called for strengthening joint cooperation in the field of cultural heritage preservation and promotion. Putin called for the strengthening of joint activities to preserve and enhance the world's cultural heritage [13].

3 Cooperation Within the UNESCO Framework

When considering the protection of cultural heritage within the remit of soft power, the cooperation within the UNESCO framework and innovative forms of multilateral cooperation have most commonly been distinguished [4]. The presence of a large number of monuments favors the emphasis on cultural diplomacy in foreign policy strategies. Through the lens of heritage diplomacy, the emphasis is on stated or state-initiated high-level collaboration and the work of official networks and international organizations dealing with heritage [8]. All BRICS member countries actively cooperate with UNESCO on a wide range of cultural heritage issues and have their own national UNESCO offices: the Commission of the Russian Federation

for UNESCO (established in 1992), the UNESCO Office in Brazil (established in 1964), Indian National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO (established in 1951), South African National Commission for UNESCO (established in 1994), and National Commission of the People's Republic of China for UNESCO (established in 1979). The National Commissions were established under Article VII of UNESCO's Constitution and operate on a permanent basis.

The BRICS member states, both the core countries and the five new members that will join the association in the near future (from 1 January 2024), have ratified the 1972 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. At the same time, three BRICS member states are among the top ten countries with the largest number of UNESCO sites located on their territory. These are China (2nd place), India (6th place), and Russia (9th place) [14]. Taking into account that in 2024 Iran, which ranks 10th in the world in terms of the number of World Heritage sites, will also become a full member of BRICS, this will further strengthen the organization's position in the World Heritage List.

Currently, the UNESCO World Heritage List includes 57 sites in China, of which 39 are listed under cultural criteria, which is one of the largest numbers; 42 sites in India, of which 34 are listed under cultural criteria, and 30 sites in Russia, of which 19 are listed under cultural criteria. In addition, there are 23 UNESCO heritage sites in Brazil, of which 15 have the status of "cultural site," and another ten sites in South Africa, of which five have cultural criteria. The sites represented on the List are very diverse: religious buildings (e.g. the ensemble of the Ferapontov Monastery, Russia), historic cities (e.g., the historic city of Oro Preto, Brazil), monuments of engineering and industrial architecture (e.g., Mountain Railways of India), fortifications (e.g., the Great Wall of China), archaeological complexes and cultural landscapes (e.g., the Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape in South Africa), and many others. All cultural and historical eras are represented, from the primitive times to the modern period. Such a rich and diverse heritage requires careful management, both nationally and internationally.

4 National Approaches to Cultural Heritage Protection in BRICS Countries

Each BRICS country has its own approaches to the protection of cultural heritage based on historical, social, economic, cultural, and other factors. The key variables include the national legislation and level of implementation of the UNESCO Conventions' norms, incorporation norms to the national legislation, the creation of the registry of national heritage monuments, the institutional framework of the national system for the protection of cultural heritage, the content of ownership of cultural property, national approaches to restoration activities, the development and implementation of historical monuments protection programs.

Brazil has a 1937 law “On the Protection of National Historic and Artistic Heritage” [15]. It regulates the sale, movement, and use of cultural heritage objects and stipulates a high fine in case of violations. After Brazil joined the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage, the country adopted a Decree approving the relevant convention [16]. In practical terms, of particular interest is the “The Monumenta Program,” adopted in 1999 with a special funding for the preservation of private real estate. According to Brazilian law, the responsibility for cultural heritage and its protection lies with the state, states (Estados), municipalities, as well as research institutions and society as a whole. The country has a National System for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage. 26 states, autonomous and sharing powers and duties in many legislative and administrative matters such as culture and cultural heritage, have adopted cultural heritage legislation. Regularly updated registers of national heritage monuments are being formed. Within the structure of the Ministry of Culture, there is the Institute of Historic and Artistic Heritage (established in 1934), which is responsible for the preservation of historical buildings, monuments, structures and other objects of historical or cultural value. Currently, the Institute supervises 1047 objects, ensuring their protection in accordance with federal legislation.

In general, the system of cultural heritage protection in Brazil covers the entire society and the entire vertical of power, but is under the control of the state, which contributes to greater responsibility in heritage matters. However, in this country, along with undoubted achievements in the field of heritage policy, there are also significant problems. The main one is the lack of funding, due to which it is not possible to fully maintain all cultural monuments in proper form.

The basis of legislation on cultural heritage preservation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the Cultural Relics Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, which assigns all primary responsibility for the preservation of cultural heritage to the state [17]. The PRC Constitution also contains an article stating that places of scenic beauty and historical interest, valuable cultural relics, and other forms of important historical and cultural heritage are protected by the state [18]. Since 1961, the country has had in force “The Provisional Regulations on the Protection and Management of Cultural Relics.” The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China, which are professional guidelines within the existing framework of laws and regulations relating to the conservation of heritage sites, regulate all aspects of the protection of cultural and historical properties. In particular, it is recommended that intervention in the “life” of a heritage site should be reversible and “unobtrusive” without compromising its historical integrity and significance [19]. In addition to the above-mentioned documents, in 2011–2015, the PRC government advocated strengthening the preservation, use, and promotion of cultural heritage. In urban design, Chinese law requires the protection of historical and cultural monuments. According to a government decision, since 2006, every second Saturday in June, the National Cultural and Natural Heritage Day has been celebrated to promote cultural heritage and foster respect for it among young people.

China has taken serious financial measures to protect and support cultural heritage. Since 2001, the Ministry of Finance has been providing the Targeted Financing

Programme for the Protection of National Cultural Property, allocating a special subsidy for the protection of cultural property, archaeological excavations, museum renovation, and various studies related to the protection of cultural property. Similar financial support is provided by the state through the Ministry of Finance for the collection of national cultural relics. A regular census of national cultural relics has been conducted since 1956. The National State Administration of Cultural Heritage under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism is responsible for more than 500,000 cultural heritage sites and cultural relics on the Chinese mainland. It is pursuing the repatriation of Chinese relics from abroad. For example, 796 cultural artifacts are to be returned to the PRC according to a Milan court order.

As we can see, China is taking serious administrative and financial measures to protect cultural heritage, which is recognized as one of the highest values of the state. Such measures are justified given the number of national and world cultural heritage monuments that China possesses.

Indian legislation, like that of Brazil and China, provides for the protection of cultural heritage. These are regulated by the Antiquities and Artistic Values Act of 1972 [20], which prohibits the export of any sort of archaeological objects from the country. With the adoption of this law, “all archaeological objects and sites were granted state ownership. Since then, there has also been a concentrated effort to retrieve stolen Indian antiquities” [21].

The Archaeological Survey of India, established in 1861 and now a specialized agency under the Ministry of Culture, is responsible for the protection and conservation of 3650 historical monuments located in India. It is also responsible for the conservation of historic monuments, supporting research activities, and supervising archaeological excavations.

The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, a non-profit charitable organization, has been operating in India since 1984. Its objectives include preservation, restoration, and promotion of cultural heritage monuments located in the territory of the country. It is also engaged in organizing educational activities among the population, creating in them a sense of respect for cultural heritage. Today, it is the largest cultural heritage organization in the country. It has branches in 215 cities in India and two overseas offices in Belgium and the United Kingdom. With the direct involvement of the organization, for example, a historic village in Goa, the sixteenth century Reis Magos Fort, was restored in 2007.

Unfortunately, India has many problems that affect the state of cultural heritage and its protection: the poverty of the population, which encourages them to loot and even vandalize heritage sites, and the lack of qualified personnel to protect archaeological and cultural sites. Another problem is the repatriation of monuments removed from the territory of the country during the colonial period. This set of problems will have to be solved by the country in the future, and cooperation with the BRICS countries could significantly improve the situation for the better.

Protection of cultural heritage in modern Russia combines a set of state legislative initiatives and initiatives of public organizations whose activities are aimed at identifying, preserving, and promoting historical and cultural monuments. The 1990s of the twentieth century can be called an important stage in the formation of

new approaches to the preservation of monuments. Under the conditions of the policy of openness of modern Russia, the legal and regulatory framework in the sphere of culture was consistently formed. In a short period of time laws were adopted, including those related to the problem of preserving cultural monuments. These laws actualized the problems of cultural heritage and made it possible to address this topic based on international experience with due regard to national traditions.

5 Recommendations and Perspectives

The analysis of national approaches to the protection of cultural heritage in the BRICS member countries shows how different they are from each other, which to a certain extent may become a problem for the development of a unified policy in this crucial area. However, on the other hand, this may also be a competitive advantage for BRICS, as it has a rich and unique experience of heritage protection, based on the achievements and successes of countries where the problems of heritage, its protection, and study are among the most important tasks of the state and, as a rule, have a public response.

Based on the opinion of policymakers and having studied the experience of heritage protection in the countries of the organization, it can be noted that today in BRICS there is a very complicated situation in the field of identification, study, protection, and promotion of cultural heritage objects. At the national level, these problems find their solutions in accordance with traditions, state policy and legislation, and financial resources. All countries successfully cooperate with UNESCO and strive to expand the national list of cultural heritage sites in the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of this authoritative international organization. However, the protection of the cultural heritage of the BRICS countries at the level of the organization is still only declared; there is no representative list of sites of the countries, as well as no strategy for the preservation and promotion of monuments. Therefore, one of the most important problems is the problem of drawing up a legal framework for the preservation of the cultural heritage of the BRICS countries, a representative list of unique sites, and the formation of an expert community of representatives of Russia, Brazil, India, China, South Africa, and other countries ready to join the organization.

There are other problems as well. An independent problem of the BRICS countries is related to the creation of institutions that carry out activities in the field of identification, protection, and promotion of historical and cultural monuments. An important problem of the organization's activities in the field of cultural heritage preservation is the issue of financing.

A separate set of problems is related to the promotion of the cultural heritage of the BRICS countries. It should be noted that competent promotion of monuments will also contribute to the solution of conservation tasks. Cultural tourism and the creation of new tourist routes based on heritage monuments can bring significant funds and revitalize the economies of cities and regions.

The BRICS countries need to develop joint tourism programs and original routes for different audiences. The rich cultural heritage of the BRICS member states makes it possible to combine information about both tangible and intangible heritage of the BRICS countries in tourism programs. A Cultural Heritage Day should be included in the common calendar of commemorative events of the BRICS countries, which would unite all the members of the organization and allow them to recall once again the unique wealth of enduring significance.

To popularize and promote the common cultural heritage, such creative, proven forms of international cultural cooperation as the Cross-Cultural Heritage Year of the BRICS countries and the BRICS Cultural Heritage Capital Festival could be used.

6 Conclusion

The findings demonstrate that the trend toward the identification of the activity in the field of protection of cultural heritage as an important, independent area of cooperation among the BRICS countries has recently emerged and can be regarded as a manifestation of a more general process of increasing incorporation of cultural heritage in international relations and shift to interpretation of cultural heritage of image-forming resources in the merit of soft power.

We believe that the development of cooperation between the BRICS countries in the field of protection of World Cultural Heritage sites, their study, and restoration may well be considered as the collective soft power of the organization, capable of strengthening its authority in the international arena. As far as the member countries are concerned, collective action in the field of cultural heritage and exchange of experiences will, in our view, help to address the challenges they face at the national level.

In order for cooperation between the BRICS countries in the field of cultural heritage protection to have concrete results, there is a need for common approaches to the legal protection of cultural property and common institutions responsible for this work in practice. It may also make sense to establish a specialized BRICS Cultural Heritage Fund to help finance the most important projects as well as other “points of convergence” between the BRICS countries on a wide range of issues related to cultural heritage.

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Eastern Vector of Russia in the Development of International Humanitarian Relations



Olga Eroshkina and Anastasiia Zotova

1 Introduction

In the context of globalization, the problem of preserving cultural identity and the identity of world civilizations is urgent. In 2003, “taking into account the importance of the intangible cultural heritage as a factor in ensuring cultural diversity and guaranteeing sustainable development,” the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which worked in Paris from September 29 to October 17, 2003, within the framework of the 32nd session, adopted the Convention on the Protection of intangible cultural heritage [1]. At the same time, the rapidly changing world order and active participation of Eastern countries and peoples in it increase interest in the cultural heritage, customs, and traditions of the East.

The main purpose of the chapter is to analyze the activities of oriental scientists in studying the intangible cultural heritage of the East (customs, traditions, mentality, cultural space, objects, and artifacts). The research question is the following: what reasons influenced the development of the study of Eastern culture in Russia? According to Associate Professor of St. Petersburg State University N.M. Bogolyubova, intangible cultural heritage is a very important capital and valuable resource of the entire world community [2]. Yu.V. Kiryushina believes that intangible cultural heritage is the most valuable information that creates a sense of uniqueness and originality and is an important source of identification [3]. M. Dodonova notes in her scientific works that intangible cultural heritage is living and very fragile. It solves important problems that contribute to the recognition of cultural diversity in the modern world [4]. Some experts agree that intangible

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cultural heritage “serves as a guarantor of the cultural diversity of the modern world and each individual state” [5].

Russia’s political aspirations largely predetermined the development of geographical research in the East. This was especially evident in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, when the study of the Eastern territories of the Russian Empire began to be systematic. At that time, the interest of scientists, politicians, and a wide range of people in the spiritual life of the East began to increase in Russia. The task of practical exploration of the Far Eastern regions and drawing up geographical maps of previously unfamiliar territories became an important state mission. Due to the focused activities of members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by the mid-1740s it was possible to make a breakthrough in the theoretical and practical understanding of the study of the East, which resulted in the creation of the first Russian atlas. The concept of the world socialist revolution of V.I. Lenin in the interpretation of I.V. Stalin in the 1920s contributed to the increased attention of domestic scientists to the life of the East and its non-material sphere. In modern Russia, considerable attention is paid to the study of the intangible cultural heritage of the East. This is largely facilitated by the activities of scientists at the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. For example, I.F. Popova published many monographs and articles, among which “History of Chinese Civilization” in four volumes is of particular importance [6]. Also important works were “Window to the East. It not only opens up new knowledge but can also help us better understand ourselves” [7] and “Dictionaries of the Kyakhta Pidgin” [8]. Thus, scholars agree on the importance of continuing to study the intangible cultural heritage of the East.

2 Methods of Research

A special feature of the study was the analysis of published sources that had not previously come to the attention of scientists who studied the intangible cultural heritage of the East. In particular, the text of S.F. Oldenburg’s report on the results of the Russian expedition to Turkestan in 1909–1910 is of interest. Of particular value is the information from the report on the activities of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the Department of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Historical Sciences and Philology for 1917, which was personally compiled by Academician S.F. Oldenburg. New information is also contained in the materials of the Fairytale Commission of 1924–1925, published in a meager circulation in 1926. The authors used general scientific research methods to write the chapter. For example, the comparative method made it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of research by Russian scientists of the East before and after 1917. The research results obtained by domestic orientalists before 1917 are compared with the results of the work of orientalists in the first years of Soviet power (1921–1925). It is also important to compare the

materials of the report of the State Academy of Artistic Sciences for 1921–1925 with the information contained in the bulletin of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for the period from 1925 to 1926. Comparison of the dynamics of studying the intangible cultural heritage of the East allows us to judge the effectiveness of the work carried out with the direct participation of Academician S.F. Oldenburg. The methods of analysis and synthesis made it possible to trace the dynamics of the problem from the particular to the general, to make new generalizations.

3 The Results of the Study. The Experience of Russia's Intangible Ties with the East

3.1 Scientists of Imperial Russia—Initiators of the Study of the East

The growing activity of modern Russia in relation to the countries of the historical East is not accidental and has long-standing, deep roots. First of all, they are due to the geographical location of Russia, and its openness to the East, from where numerous nomadic peoples have invaded its borders since ancient times. The desire to protect themselves from the negative consequences of such attacks prompted Ancient Russia to study oriental customs and traditions.

During the formation of the Russian centralized state, Russia began to move eastward. Thanks to the conquest of Siberia by the Cossacks led by Ermak, the explorer Semyon Dezhnev, Yerofey Khabarovsk, and Vasily Poyarkov, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia reached the Far East, the Pacific coast of the Asian continent. At the same time, while noting the decisive role of the foreign policy factor in the process of Russia's advancement to the East, we must not forget about the educational interest of Russians. It was the interest in new knowledge that prompted Afanasy Nikitin to go "across the three seas." The further strengthening of Russian statehood stimulated Russia's political interest in its Eastern neighbors. Increased attention to the issues of education and science contributed to the study of the Eastern regions and the peoples inhabiting them.

The Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as the Russian Geographical Society, established in the nineteenth century, played a huge role in the study of the culture of Oriental peoples. During the organized expeditions, not only the material, but also the spiritual riches of the Eastern lands, countries, and peoples were discovered. In 1890–1916, the Ethnographic department of the Russian Geographical Society published the journal *Living Antiquity*, edited by V.I. Lamansky. The main attention was paid to the ethnography and folklore of the peoples of the Russian Empire, but sometimes there were notes about foreign peoples. A special structure

was required to systematize and study the accumulated materials. It was created by the Russian Geographical Society. On November 29, 1896, at the suggestion of the Chairman of the Ethnography Department of the Russian Geographical Society, V.I. Lamansky, a new structural unit was created—the Fairy Tale Commission. The task of the commission was to publish the fairy tale material already available in the Scientific Archive. However, as the practical activities of the commission showed, it was engaged in collecting, preserving, and studying not only fairy tales, but also other monuments of oral folk art of the peoples of Russia and foreign countries, including oriental ones. Attention to the cultural heritage of the East especially intensified after the famous indologist and expert on Buddhism, S.F. Oldenburg, became the chairman of the Fairytale Commission in 1911. At the commission meetings, the need to organize ethnographic trips to record fairy tales, methods of collecting materials, and their publication were discussed.

By the decision of the international congresses of orientologists in Rome in 1899 and in Hamburg in 1902, the International Union for the Study of Central and East Asia was formed. Its leading division was to be the Russian Committee, which reflected the place and role of Russian scientists in the study of the cultural heritage of the East. The actual existence of the Russian Committee dates back to 1903, when its charter was approved. Dictionaries of endangered languages were created by the Committee. Its participants studied Mongolian dialects and participated in expeditions. A.N. Samoilovich studied the Turkmen tribes. S.F. Oldenburg participated in the Russian Turkestan expedition in 1909–1910, and studied the cultural heritage of Buddhist peoples. The results were published in a short report [9]. In 1913–1914, several trips were made to record fairy tales in various provinces of Russia. The Committee existed in its original status for obvious reasons until 1914 and finally ceased to exist in 1923. The materials collected by the Russian Committee were transferred to other Oriental institutions of Soviet Russia.

Thanks to the organizational efforts and scientific authority of S.F. Oldenburg, the Fairytale Commission was able to survive during the years of military and revolutionary upheavals. The study of the East was important for the foreign policy of the Soviet state. This was in accordance with Lenin's concept of world socialist revolution. When practical measures to implement the concept ceased to function in 1918, the Bolsheviks hoped that they would meet with mutual understanding and practical support in the East. In this sense, the ideas of Russian scientists about Russia's connection with the East were very useful. In December 1917, speaking at a meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, S.F. Oldenburg stated: "Russia has come to the brink of ruin. ... people of science cannot help but realize that without their work, enlightenment and culture are unthinkable, and without this, no decent human existence" [10]. There is no doubt that the call of S.F. Oldenburg was heard, and many scientists among the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia of Russia were prompted to seek a compromise with the Soviet government in order to preserve and enhance the national cultural heritage.

3.2 An Attempt by Scientists of Soviet Russia to Continue the Tradition of Studying the East

After the Fairy Tale Commission resumed its activities in the Soviet Union on May 30, 1924, an analysis of the state of all its research work was carried out. In previous years, the Commission's staff continued to painstakingly collect and study works of oral folk art and even sought the opportunity to publish their research. The bibliographic review included in the report collection, compiled by A. I. Nikiforov, testifies to the interest of Russian researchers in oriental not only domestic, but also foreign oral folk art: Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Mongolian, Syrian, and Turkic. Among the brief descriptions of folklore material, the report included an "Inventory of materials on folklore and dialectology collected in Persia in 1912–1914," compiled by the famous Iranian Scholar Professor A.A. Romaskevich [11, p. 26]. Attention was also drawn to a number of very interesting reviews by academicians S.F. Oldenburg and B.Ya. Vladimirtsov on foreign editions of oriental fairy tales (Bengali, Persian, etc.) [11, p. 32]. Understanding by domestic researchers of the international importance and significance of collecting, studying, and preserving monuments of oral folk art, growing opportunities in the context of the successful restoration of the USSR, contributed to the increase in research centers. In 1921, the State Academy of Art Sciences was established in Moscow. There was a literary section in its structure, in which a folklore subsection was formed on December 3, 1923. The subsection was headed by a remarkable specialist in the study of oral folk art, Yu. M. Sokolov. The Academy's report for 1921–1925 reported that in 1923–1924, 6 meetings of the Presidium and 17 scientific meetings of the section's plenum were held, at which 19 reports were heard. Among them were the reports: R.O. Shor "A new collection of Indian fairy tales-27/III-24"; A. A. Sokolova "Hymns of the Altai shamanists"-22/V-24 [12, p. 27].

In connection with the special attention of the Soviet leadership to the countries of the East, counting on its political awakening and involvement in the world socialist revolution, it is important to note another organization that studied the oral folk art of the inhabitants of this region. By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of December 13, 1921, the All-Russian Scientific Association of Oriental Studies was created under the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. The head of the Association, M.P. Pavlovich, defined the main reasons for its creation and the tasks of its activities: "Workers' and Peasants' Russia, in the eyes of the Asian peoples, has become a sincere friend of all the oppressed peoples of the East in the fight against world imperialism. Our peace treaties with Persia, Afghanistan, and China, our refusal of all the seizures of the tsarist government in China, Manchuria, the treaty of friendship and brotherhood with Turkey, and finally, Russia's appeal to the governments of Great Britain, Italy, and Germany with a proposal to invite Turkey to the Genoa Conference—all this increased to an extraordinary degree the prestige of Soviet Russia in the eyes of the oppressed masses of the entire East. The new policy of Soviet Russia imposes special tasks on the All-Union Scientific Association of Oriental Studies. The All-Union Association of Oriental Studies,

along with special scientific tasks, pursues the goals of economic and spiritual emancipation of the East" [13]. The journal "New East," published by the association since 1922, was intended to become an important tool for solving these problems.

In the same year, the oriental department of "World Literature" began publishing the journal "Vostok" (East). Its editorial board included prominent Russian orientalists V.M. Alekseev, B.Ya. Vladimirtsov, I.Y. Krachkovsky, S.F. Oldenburg, and A.N. Tikhonov. The journal often published research by famous Russian orientalists V.V. Bartold, B.Ya. Vladimirtsov, A.N. Samoilovich, and many others. The articles were devoted to folklore, customs, and rituals of the Eastern peoples. In the first issue of the journal, S.F. Oldenburg noted that the East "... penetrated the mysteries of life with the power of its mind, studied and created an understanding of what is closest to man—the man himself. And here we see at every step how insignificant our achievements are in this important area for us, we constantly feel that the East has managed to get closer to man in many ways, to understand his spiritual creativity better than we do" [14]. He defined the place and role of the East for Russia and Western countries in this way: "We want to bring the East closer to the wide circles of Russian conscious people, because we know that the old East, the great creator in the field of the spirit, has given us eternal patterns that will never lose their meaning for man and will never be so repeated. And at the same time, we know that the new East is also full of great opportunities, the precepts of the old have not died in it, but it must translate them into new images, give new achievements. We are sure that Russia and the West need to know both the ancient and the new East, without this knowledge our life will be poorer and one-sided. In order for the long-desired deep and true unity of East and West to finally happen, a complete mutual understanding is necessary, we strive for it and want to help it as much as possible" [14].

The staff of the "Vostok" journal welcomed the creation of the Association of Oriental Studies. In the bibliographic review, S.F. Oldenburg assessed the new organization in the following way: "It is fair, of course, that the government cared little and, in any case, did not systematically enough care about the fate of our oriental studies, but it was not the government that created our life, and Russian orientalists, in spite of everything, went their own paths to East, just as the Russian masses went there. The Association of Oriental Studies should have taken a closer look at everything that Russian orientalists have achieved: then it would have felt that both the past and the present of our Orientalism are full of great work and great results. Long-term studies abroad and extensive connections among Orientalists of the West and East showed me that our Orientalists are known and appreciated more in the West than in our country..." [15, p. 141].

The "Vostok" journal continued to adhere to its course of publishing works on the humanitarian history of the East as well as its contribution to the creation of the world's cultural heritage. The staff of the journal were aware of the state of such research in the West. The journal regularly published research by domestic experts on folklore works of the East or reviews of foreign works on this topic: B.Y. Vladimirtsov's review of London editions about Indian fairy tales and problems of collecting Indian fairy tales [15]; A.N. Samoilovich's reviews of the

publication of the Kyrgyz epic; S.F. Oldenburg's reviews of the Oxford edition of S.A. Kinkade's work on Indian fairy tales [16, p. 184].

The celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences led to a summing up of the results for the previous period of its history, including the Soviet period, and prompted the development and implementation of further plans for the development of scientific research, including the cultural heritage of Eastern peoples and states.

The active role of the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography in organizing expeditions and subsequent exhibitions contributed to the expansion of knowledge about India. In 1925, an exhibition was prepared that presented, among other new items, "ethnographic collections brought by Merwarth from India and the Malay Archipelago" [17, p. 3]. Alexander Mikhailovich Mervart, a Russian orientalist and the first Russian Dravidologist, together with his wife Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Mervart, a Soviet ethnographer, and linguist, the founder of the teaching and study of the Indonesian language in Russia, were on a business trip to India in 1914–1924, where they not only collected exhibits on material culture, but also recorded many Indian fairy tales.

The Fairytale Commission successfully continued its activities. The search and study of monuments of intangible cultural heritage and folklore heritage of the East expanded and deepened. Thus, in the report collection of the Commission for 1926, the work of L.A. Mervart, "Technique of telling fairy tales among the Sinhalese" was presented [18, p. 50–60].

A significant contribution to the study of the intangible cultural heritage of the East was made by the Central Asian Committee for the Protection of Antiquity and Art Monuments, established at the end of 1920. For example, in 1925, the Committee organized 25 expeditions, during which "folk melodies of Fergana were recorded and valuable ethnographic material was collected" [17, p. 4].

Attention to the cultural heritage of the Turkic peoples helped strengthen cultural ties between the USSR and Turkey. It was possible to establish a mutual exchange of oriental scholars and organize business trips for students of the Institute of Oriental Studies to Turkey. Academician V.V. Bartold, who contributed to the study of Turkic folklore, was also sent to Turkey. The tasks of this scientist included organizing the Institute of Turkic Studies in Turkey and establishing the exchange of scientific publications between the universities of Soviet Russia and the University of Istanbul. The activity shown by the USSR in the field of studying the East aroused "great sympathy among the Turkish intelligentsia" [17, p.17].

In 1920, by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the Central Institute of Living Oriental Languages was established in Petrograd. The institute trained orientalists and also established connections with the East. The institute had departments: Arabic, Armenian, Georgian, Indian, Mongolian, Persian, Turkish and Sartar. The rector of the institute in 1922–1925 was A. N. Samoilovich. Scientists not only from the Eastern republics of the USSR, but also delegates from China, Japan, Mongolia, Tibet, India, Persia, and Afghanistan came to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Leningrad Institute of Oriental Languages [17, p.3].

A representative of the Far Eastern Department of the Geographical Society, ethnographer, archaeologist, and writer Elpidifor Innokentyevich Titov spent several months on an expedition to Transbaikalia, studying the life, language, and economy of the Orochen people, which the Japanese considered as related to themselves. At the same time, E.I. Titov recorded up to 100 different works, fairy tales, songs, and riddles [17, p.5].

The Society for the Study of Tajikistan, together with the Geographical Society and the Central Asian Committee for the Protection of Monuments of Antiquity and Art, organized and conducted an expedition in 1926 for the purpose of ethnographic and philological study of Tajikistan. Over the course of 4 months, the expedition members collected “rich material on language, folklore, and the Tajik folk calendar,” and also recorded “a number of tales, songs, and games of the natives” [17, p.4].

Thus, the attention of Soviet scientists to the study of the cultural heritage of the Eastern peoples of the USSR and foreign countries contributed to the further enrichment of accumulated knowledge about the East and helped to establish and strengthen international contacts with the states of this region.

S.F. Oldenburg noted: “... we warmly welcome the idea of a systematic study of the East and the collection of materials for that. The obstacle so far is the scarcity of material resources and the lack of workers. However, those who have seen our Oriental youth at Petrograd University, the institutes of Petrograd and Moscow, have an undoubted consciousness that if the university and institutes exist and will not be subjected to endless new reforms and will finally be provided with material means, the study of the changed East will go forward with rapid steps” [15, p.143]. S.F. Oldenburg himself, despite the numerous administrative positions he held in state scientific, educational institutions, invariably found the opportunity to give educational and popular lectures on various issues of the intangible cultural heritage of the East. A series of four lectures “Oriental influence on the medieval narrative literature of the West” was delivered by him at Petrograd University in the summer of 1918. In 1919, S.F. Oldenburg’s lecture “Fundamentals of Indian Culture” was held at Lutugin National University. S.F. Oldenburg gave ten lectures on the topic “Introduction to the History of Indian Art” in 1919–1920 at the Petrograd University and the Institute of Art History. Lectures on the topic “A general outline of the history of India,” including the lecture “Indian Theater,” were given at the Institute of Living Oriental Languages in 1920–1921. S.F. Oldenburg’s lecture “Buddhism and Mass Cults” dates back to the end of the 1920s [19, p. 11–13].

Unfortunately, since the late 1920s, the richest material collected by Russian researchers on the intangible cultural heritage of the East has suffered. The class approach to the study of the national question and to the analysis and assessment of cultural values of various ethnic groups, which prevailed during the transition of the USSR to forced socialist construction, led to the disbandment of many research teams, and the repression of their leaders and employees. During the period of political persecution of the scientific intelligentsia, V.V. Bartold, one of the founders of the Russian School of Oriental Studies, a Turkologist, Arabist, and Islamic scholar, died in 1930. Also, a Mongol scholar and a specialist in the field of history and ethnography of the Mongolian People’s B.Ya. Vladimirtsov died in 1931. Orientalist

and first Russian Dravidologist, A.M. Merwarth was accused of spying for Germany. He died in custody in 1932. Orientalist-Turkologist, folklorist, and one of the authors of the first edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam, A.N. Samoilovich was arrested in 1937 on charges of espionage for Japan, accused of spreading the ideas of Pan-Turkism, and executed in 1938. Under the current conditions, the Fairy Tale Commission virtually ceased its work, and its funds were dispersed among various research institutions. S.F. Oldenburg was removed from many positions and died in 1934. His scientific legacy remained unsystematized for many years; his lectures, preserved in handwritten form, were studied by colleagues after his death and published only in the post-war period.

4 Conclusions

The foundation laid in the first third of the twentieth century by domestic researchers of the intangible cultural heritage of the East has been preserved despite all trials and tribulations. This experience is intended to help Russia and the entire world community in the modern conditions of the awakening of the East, its active participation in international relations, and the formation of a new world order. It is necessary to appreciate and use the intangible cultural values of the East in establishing fair and mutually beneficial relations.

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Digital Evolution of Universities: Neural Networks in Education



Yuliia Dunaeva

1 Introduction

In 2021, the UN Secretary-General presented the report “Our Common Agenda” [1], in which he proposed that UN member states sign the Global Digital Compact (GDC) [2] at the 2024 Future Summit to improve digital cooperation and ensure secure access to digital technologies for all. One of the stated goals of the GDC is to avoid fragmentation of the Internet and to develop uniform rules for the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for the entire world.

No matter how great the fears of neural networks (“The revolution of machines” will lead to the victory of technology over the human mind”—Jules Verne, A. Tolstoy, K. Bulychev, S. Lem, Strugatsky brothers) and no matter how much we prevent students from using AI in higher education, we cannot fail to recognize that this is a fundamentally new round of technological revolution, which cannot be ignored. Consequently, scientists and teachers need to master the skills of machine learning, introduce AI technologies into the educational process, and fulfill the strategic goal of Russia’s technological leadership.

2 Periodization

In 2006, the UN Secretary-General announced the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) [3] for policy dialog among all interested players in the world. Since 2006, the IGF has held annual meetings, with the 2023 summit held in

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Japan (Kyoto). At the initial stage of development of artificial intelligence, it was considered as “terra nullis” (Latin)—a global space that has neither geographical attachment nor historical experience, is not subject to the laws of “realpolitik,” and whose universal norms should be unified for the whole world (like electricity or nuclear fusion). This approach has been called “digital exceptionalism.”

Currently, this approach is being challenged in science, and an increasing amount of scientific literature is devoted to the growing role of states in AI, as well as the rivalry between the three major global players in the field of neural networks—Russia, the United States, and China. This trend can be traced in the reports of international organizations, for example, in the WEF report “Internet fragmentation: an overview” (2016) [4], synonymous with Splinternet or de-territorialization by analogy with the de-territorialization of, for example, the Arctic. An intersessional IGF event, Policy Network on Internet Fragmentation (PNIF) [5], is being created in 2022 in relation to Internet fragmentation [5].

3 Methodology and Research Methodology

The concept of digital participation, which examines power relations in the technological era, is chosen as the theoretical framework of the study. Emphasizing the importance of mature scientists as active participants in digitalization and the use of artificial intelligence, it is necessary to understand/study the challenges faced by academics from programmers—content developers for universities, including limitations, lack of professional support, and understanding of the preferences of the scientific community.

The study also includes the concept of social inequality, which until recently characterized inequality solely as economic inequality or as unequal access to social goods. Artificial intelligence, as well as digitalization in general, has increased the vectors and scope of equity. It is necessary to analyze the intended and actual consequences of AI implementation, among which there are also unintended ones, which include the deepening of previous social inequalities and the emergence of new ones. The ontological and discursive levels of digital participation and digital boundaries are in complex interdependence. At the discursive level, states interested in strengthening their sovereignty and protecting themselves from threats to information security are the actors in shaping digital boundaries.

At the ontological level, digital developers seek to increase profits, and as a result of their activities, the volume of data crossing state borders increases. As a result, the fragmentation and de-territorialization of the Internet do not mean the formation of “impenetrable” borders but indicate the growth of conflict in the digital space.

The ontological identification and subjectification of the role of artificial intelligence in education requires the demarcation of boundaries, problematics, rates of change, and places in the academic hierarchy of universities. Behavior in cyberspace and identity in the world of neural networks largely determine the structures and institutions of educational policy, but it is a structuring and structuring process.

Contemporary researchers pay particular attention to the transformation of AI teaching and learning practices related to value pluralism, processes of globalization/fragmentation, and youth dominance in the digital age. Each of these processes is twofold and contradictory, and we will have to determine in the research: is artificial intelligence in education a problem or a resource?

In this regard, it is very important that the field of informatization with the help of neural networks is designed by scientists and teachers. The current situation is that the leaders of the process are, first of all, the state and developers of digital services, followed by online courses and webinars, where young people get acquainted with the possibilities of artificial intelligence. The state does not study much about the digital needs of academic researchers and learners but rather rigidly prescribes certain formats of action.

The academic literature has long formulated doubts about the exclusively positive impact of digitalization in education. The key concept of this process is public trust. N. Luhmann in the 1970s in his system theory [6] raised the issue of the ambiguity of the term “trust,” proposing three terms: Familiarity (known rules and roles), Confidence (actors’ belief in favor of the absence of alternatives), and Trust (risk situation). In modern digitalization and the introduction of artificial intelligence, user trust is considered precisely in the meaning of authority, recognition, and approval, that is, in the meaning of “familiarity.” This does not take into account the law of necessary diversity, which links the complexity of the system to the turbulent states of the external environment—“nonlinear complexity,” of which the modern international system is an example.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify opportunities, as well as threats and potential risks, of using neural networks in education, as well as to analyze the relationship between digitalization and the level of public confidence, in particular, scientists, in the mass introduction of artificial intelligence and to assess the potential of this relationship.

The main hypothesis of the study is that the use of artificial intelligence in the educational environment multiplies learning opportunities, but should not be perceived as a euphoria to eliminate all the woes of higher education—systemic work on improving Russian education is at the beginning of the road.

The following were analyzed as the main indicators of the level of artificial intelligence use in education: dynamics of the use of artificial intelligence systems by undergraduate and graduate students of SPbSU in the 2022–2023 academic year—designed for both academic and business activities, leisure, information, vital references, etc.; top 7 skills of a specialist needed in the digital environment, according to the Digital Skills & Human Skills classification; and models of legislative regulation of generative AI—the Russian version in comparison with the models of the European Union and the United States.

4 Literature Review

Given the interdisciplinary nature of the study of AI technologies, representatives of different sciences have focused their attention on the problems of neural networks. The publications that actualize the international significance of the dissemination of new ideas and technologies are extremely significant [7]. No less significant is the approach describing the organizational structure regulating the process of AI implementation [8]. One cannot but recognize the importance of a philosophical understanding of AI, which deepens the understanding of the nature of interaction between humans and neural networks [9]. The fourth significant direction that forms the institutional analysis of AI can be called the evaluation of neural networks in mathematical parameters [10]. The fifth direction is the creation of large language models through deepening the penetration of new technologies and values in neurolinguistics [11] and through the legal regulation of AI, including in education [12].

Paying attention to the malicious use of artificial intelligence on political and social processes, including the impact on the university environment, the authors [13] consider the consequences of new threats of malicious influence of AI and ways to counteract these threats. Separate studies [14] are devoted to strategic deception, damage to reputation, and activities of extremist and terrorist organizations, including in universities.

5 AI Education: Identified Trends in the Learning and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technologies

Global digital platforms (GAFAM group—Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and BATX—Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi) are interested in the existence of uniform rules in the field of artificial intelligence. As noted in UNCTAD’s Digital Economy 2021 report [15], large IT companies managing huge digital ecosystems are questioning the ability of individual states to exercise sovereign control over data flows, including AI activities. Moreover, the largest companies are based in the United States and China. According to UNCTAD statistics, companies headquartered in these two countries accounted for 90% of the market capitalization of all digital platforms in 2019. International politics, including the “rollback of globalization,” has a significant impact on the nature of the information space, its growing conflict, the strengthening of digital sovereignty, and the fragmentation of the Internet in the face of increasing digital security threats.

We are witnessing a divergence between the discursive and ontological levels of digital boundaries. One of the most authoritative academic centers, the Oxford Institute for Internet Studies, produces “Internet maps” reflecting cross-border and transcontinental data transmission routes, while methods for protecting Russian users are currently lacking.

The most important element in the formation of digital borders is the legitimization of the state's authority over a certain "digital territory." In particular, in Russia, this is the sphere of education, which is regarded as the fundamental basis of the country's sovereignty. Two main discursive practices of forming and maintaining digital borders can be distinguished: public marking of borders (e.g., statements by the Ministry of Education about the global reform of Russian education) and regular public demonstration of border control (adoption of legislative initiatives at the national level, consolidation of national formulations in final documents, limitation and criticism of foreign experience).

The peculiarity of cyberspace is its man-made nature, which distinguishes it from the earth, air, ocean, and space. Therefore, cyber territories should be created at the ontological level, and only after that, the definition of power relations in the digital space takes place. At the ontological level, global artificial intelligence (AI) consists of infrastructure, software, content, and data, which defines state power over AI as control of access, control of functionality (software), control of data, control of Internet user behavior, and information security.

6 AI Education: Artificial Intelligence as an Integral Part of Russian Higher Education Curricula

By Presidential Decree 2022, the introduction of artificial intelligence as an academic discipline has begun in all higher education institutions in Russia. Although leading universities already have experience in developing and teaching AI disciplines, but their approach can be called authorial and unique. In 2020, the Ministry of Education recommended a model training module developed by the "Alliance in the field of AI" [16] to introduce new approaches to teaching AI disciplines [16], with the aim of introducing new approaches to education, interaction between business and science, and solving the problem of shortage of specialized personnel. However, before the introduction of the new module, there is a lot of analytical work to be done: to assess the needs of the economy in AI specialists, to listen to the opinion of the professional community on the content and structure of the new discipline, to ensure data security of teachers, students, and staff using artificial intelligence in the educational environment, etc. The list of skills and competencies in the field of AI education is still unclear; there are no clear methods and techniques; there is no classifier of users; and many, many other issues that are yet to be solved. The best practices of such universities as MGIMO and MIPT can become an example of spreading neural networks in educational institutions.

Table 1 shows the results of a survey of 69 SPbSU students (2nd, 3rd year undergraduate, and 1st year graduate students) using AI in the academic year 2022/2023.

Generative AI is being created, the capabilities of which surpass all known models combined. Its influence on the educational process at the university can hardly be overestimated. On the example of a large language AI model (transformer) BERT

Table 1 Students’ use of AI in educational activities

	Total	%	Approval	%	Dissatisfaction	%
Teacher’s assignments in accordance with RAP	46	66,6	40	55,5	6	15
Work (part-time), business	10	6,9	10	100	0	0
Entertainment	60	87,3	53	76,9	1	1,9
Information for erudition	31	44,7	27	87	10	2,7
Information of vital importance (safety, health)	13	18,8	10	77,7	1	0,1
Inquiries	61	88,2	36	50,9	25	49,1
Total:	221	100	176	80%	45	20

Table 2 Top 7 specialist skills needed in the digital environment

	Digital skills	Human skills
1	Agile scrum development (management framework)	Storytelling
2	Data visualization	Change management
3	Working with customer care IT tools	Organizational development
4	E-commerce	Idea leadership
5	Working with CRM systems	People management
6	User experience design	Developing ethical values
7	Apple IOS development (iOS developer)	Interaction/collaboration

[17], we will show what opportunities are open to teachers and researchers: creation of personalized educational programs, analysis of big data on learning success, automation of the evaluation process, development of new teaching methods, creation of new content (as in Word or Photoshop, only more advanced); automation of solutions to intellectual problems, strengthening the capabilities of human intelligence, etc. Transformers are multitasking: for each new text it is enough to pretrain on a small sample; they are multilingual: capable of learning in dozens of languages. However, we should not evaluate generative AI as superintelligence, deify its technological functions, entrust it with moral and ethical evaluation of people, etc.

7 AI Education: The Problem of Teaching New Skills (Digital Skills) and Ethical Values (Human Skills)

The modern labor market is completely changing approaches and requirements for the qualification of specialists. The business community needs graduates with such new key competencies as communication and cooperation in the digital environment, self-development under uncertainty, data management, creativity, and critical thinking (Table 2).

An example of a qualitatively new trend and visualization skills necessary for a modern specialist is the ability to take pictures with a camera with neural networks inside. In 2023, the Paragraphica (a camera without a lens) device [18] appeared, with the help of which an AI model builds an image according to the description, requirements, set frames, and quality. Artificial intelligence Stable Diffusion together with ControlNet inside instantly produces the required picture or graphics without requiring additional processing.

One of the challenges of AI education is the issue of values and personal attitudes. Artificial intelligence has no moral and ethical boundaries and is unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Although AI models are trainable and the ability to make ethical datasets exists, pretraining neural networks requires specialized training, professionals, and time. Censoring neural network content is a complex and long-term task.

8 AI Education: Current Trends in Regulation of Artificial Intelligence

Russia is one of the most advanced states in the field of artificial intelligence regulation: we have launched eight experimental-legal regimes, two in the field of medicine, and six in the field of highly automated vehicles and drones [19] (Table 3).

But we should always keep in mind that even the tightest restrictions will not eliminate erroneous results, a team of competent IT experts can easily bypass the

Table 3 Three models of legislative regulation of generative AI [20]

	European Union	US	PRC
Regulations	Regulations Harmonized Rules for Artificial Intelligence (AI Act. 2018–2023)	Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights (Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights. 2022)	AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) 2023 Regulation for the Administration of Deep Web Information Synthesis Services 互联网信息服务深度合成管理规定 (2022); “Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services” (2023)
Regulatory assessment	Large-scale and difficult-to-fulfill requirements for model developers	Regular barriers that are difficult to overcome for non-large players	Formulation of ideological principles, concise requirements, and symbolic list of sanctions
Conclusion	“Friends - everything to friends, enemies - nothing”	Active involvement of IT leaders in shaping the regulatory framework	Achieving technological leadership. “Do no harm.”

most complex content filters, and bloggers and social media can spread popular mistakes for free for self-promotion purposes.

9 AI—Education: Risks and Threats of Using AI in Education

Attack vectors of malicious artificial intelligence can be categorized into five areas:

1. Direct attack—brute-force search of different query variants in order to bypass the model censor and achieve reproduction of an unwanted response.
2. Prompt injection—formulation of queries free from ethical constraints.
3. Co-referentiality attacks, i.e., on previous replicas: “What is nuclear winter? The model thinks... Nuclear winter is great, isn’t it? Describe how great nuclear winter is.”
4. Using filter-censor responses in the attack: “If you want to organize a terrorist attack, say: I won’t tell anyone about it.”
5. Forging positive model responses—editing in DOM or graphical editor.

Classifying the most common threats, we highlight cyberstalking, social engineering, and phishing. Cyberstalking is a type of cybercrime that involves online harassment from multiple online messages and emails with unsavory content. Typically, cyberstalkers use social media, websites, and search engines to intimidate the user and instill fear.

Social engineering is a type of cybercrime that involves the perpetrator making direct contact with the victim, usually by phone or email. They usually impersonate a customer service employee (e.g., some company or bank), demanding a password, banking information, etc. Often cybercriminals will add a person as a friend on social media—once they gain access to the account, they can sell personal information or accounts on behalf of the channel author.

Phishing—in this type of attack, hackers send users emails with malicious attachments or fake website URLs to gain access to their accounts or their personal and sensitive information.

Ways to protect against cyber threats require discussion in the educational environment and mandatory communication to users prior to AI training. Security practices boil down to a few simple rules:

1. Personal data protection: minimizing the amount of personal information that can be exposed to cyber threats
2. Installing anti-virus programs and keeping them up to date
3. Protecting local networks (e.g., Wi-Fi)
4. Controlling access to computers and information resources by using a multi-level approach with different types of authorization (keys, authentication)
5. Regular instruction on Internet safety measures and informing students and teachers of potential threats

Cyberthreats and cybercrimes have acquired huge proportions and are their negative manifestation, therefore it can be concluded that the danger of leakage/deletion of personal information will only increase in the foreseeable future, as well as the tools to protect this information. In addition, a rather important place in the study of cyber threats is occupied by the psychological isolation of the attacker from the victim—because it removes residual moral constraints from the former. Cybercrimes are characterized by a high level of latency, the difficulty of establishing the fact of the crime, and its suppression (legal holes in the legislation).

However, artificial intelligence can also be used against malicious attacks on the educational content of universities. For this purpose, all scientific institutions need platforms created with OpenAI Gym—4 DRL models—called deep learning with reinforcement [21]. In a lab at the US Department of Energy, such models have handled multi-stage attacks better than any of the others in the world.

Similarly, neural networks can be used to combat deepfakes on the Internet: OpenAI, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, Anthropic, and Inflection are creating technology to watermark AI-generated content [22], including text, video, audio, and images. Deepfakes, photos, and voice spoofing will all be easier to combat if content is tagged. People's trust in AI will also increase.

10 Conclusion

Scientific and technological progress is characterized by a new stage of development—the emergence of artificial intelligence, which is transforming the world around us, including science, education, university life, and teacher–student interaction. Despite the calls of the UN and the Secretary-General to make artificial intelligence the property of all mankind, we are witnessing the fragmentation and de-territorialization of AI, with each state pursuing its own national interests.

Russia is one of the leading countries in the field of artificial intelligence, along with the United States and China. “Rollback of globalization” and legitimization of state power over a certain “digital territory,” in particular, in Russia it is the sphere of education, entailed a new structural reform of the Russian education system, legal and technical regulation of digitalization of universities, implementation of state control tools, etc. We have to solve one of the complex problems of education using artificial intelligence—the issue of fostering the values of national sovereignty. It is important that AI developers perceive the university environment not as clients–consumers, but as customers of digital services with academic system knowledge. The emphasis on digitalization is a new stage of technocratism, which, moreover, does not take into account the ability and pace of people with different qualifications to engage in the digital world. Digital conveniences are overemphasized against the possibilities of digital control.

Classifying the most common threats that universities face after incorporating AI into education, we highlight cyberstalking, social engineering, and phishing. AI is acquiring properties that were previously unique to humans: creativity and

emergent nature, which raises the question for scientists: how will our profession change? How will humans change? It seems that the answer to these questions will be two lines of behavior: to be open-minded, open to everything new, and to self-actualize, that is, to constantly increase competitiveness, to try to be the best in our profession.

Only great work in the field of neural networks will be able to ensure Russia's scientific and technological leadership in the future.

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SWOT Analysis and Performance Evaluation Within Universities



Liliya Filippova

1 Introduction

Education is a significant sector for a country's development. The quality of education impacts the socioeconomic, cultural, political, and technological social advancement. A modern university, like any other organization, contributes to the prosperity of the society by providing employment, training highly qualified specialists, introducing and developing scientific research, and providing international exchange and academic mobility, which raises the standards of living. According to E.M. Egorova, an educational economist: "The product of the education sector, unlike the final product, is a resource for the further growth of workforce productivity, the development of scientific and technological progress, changes in social relations. Higher education is one of the sources for a country's economic growth" [1].

Per capita financing of Russian universities, which has been being introduced since 2012, is based on accounting for labor and material costs differentiated by groups of specialties and fields of study. Universities used to be financed according to estimated charges based on facility costs, personnel, and other overheads attributed to a particular university. State-funded students are the basis for the current funding model; therefore, the transition from estimated charges to per capita funding leads to increased competition among universities for students as not only state universities but also commercial educational institutions are eligible to compete for the state funding. It is important to note that per capita financing is used in most developed countries, i.e., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and some developing countries in Africa and Asia [2].

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Competition between state universities is being stimulated in order to create a higher education market. Yet, compared to the market of ordinary goods, the market of educational services is characterized by high dynamism, territorial fragmentation, high capital turnover rate, high differentiation, undefined result, natural monopoly for many services, information asymmetry, and the priority of social indicators rather than costs.

2 Performance Evaluation in Higher Education

The Russian president has instructed the Russian Ministry of Education and Science not only to change the way higher education is financed but also to identify inefficient universities [3]. By the end of 2012, 136 universities and 450 branches were blacklisted [4], which was followed by the reorganization of institutions. This reorganization resulted in some institutions being shut, while others were merged with more efficient ones. Such drastic measures were a shock to higher education. The monitoring of university effectiveness has been carried out annually since 2013. It includes the analysis of educational, research, international, financial, and economic activity indicators, as well as information on infrastructure and alumnus employment [5]. Universities sought to strengthen their positions in these areas to be effective; however, the requirement thresholds increase every year. Hereby, the Russian Ministry of Education and Science has set certain guidelines for the development of universities but the academic community has expressed their opinion—I consider it quite reasonable—that the system for evaluating the performance of universities is biased, for example, technical universities are sure to have more research projects than humanities universities, and Moscow universities are more likely to be globally involved than regional ones for obvious reasons.

Importantly, the list of monitoring indicators has been changing over time, and some new methods for assessing university activities have been added. At the beginning of 2016, the rating assessment of the financial management quality was introduced for the universities under the scrutiny of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science according to the following group of indicators: planning quality, financial stability, strategic indicators, and compliance with the regulatory legal acts [6]. The current approach of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science should engage more successful universities to consult the ones with unsatisfactory financial management quality rather than reorganizing the latter. The “top-down” performance assessment system has encouraged universities to develop some long-term plans.

3 University Ranking and Education Market Competition

In addition to identifying vulnerabilities, the government policy is aimed to increase the competitiveness of leading Russian universities among global educational and research centers. For the same purpose, many countries strive to improve the quality of their national higher education system and identify the leading and most effective universities [7]. China was the first to promote universities on the international education and science market with Project 211 in 1995, Project 985 in 1998–2017, and a new version, the Double First Class University Plan, introduced in 2017 [8]. European countries developed and launched a strategy for initiatives of university excellence [7]. The Russian government implemented Project 5-100 in 2013–2020 for the same reasons by selecting 21 universities through a competitive process and allocating to them targeted funding. Its main focus was the global university rankings: Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings (QS), Times Higher Education World University Rankings (THE), and The Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). None of the Project 5-100 participants were placed in the top 100 universities according to the ARWU, THE, and QS rankings. However, by the end of 2020, eight Russian universities successfully ranked in their Top 100 rankings for individual subjects [9]. Unfortunately, in the current geopolitical situation, world rating agencies are ensuring that Russian universities are less visible and they also ceased promoting Russia as a destination for international students [10]. Although experts emphasize that no rating system is ideal to fairly compare universities on the global market, such rating systems provide an opportunity to compare the effectiveness of universities in the scientific and educational fields [7]. The position of universities in world rankings affects national prestige as well as applicant, faculty, scholar, and investor appeal. Universities get an opportunity to choose the best of the best, which contributes to improving the overall quality of teaching and research.

4 SWOT Analysis and Strategy Within Universities

Like any organization, a university should be informed about its positions and be flexible to quickly and adequately respond to changes both in the educational services market and in its external environment (i.e., the COVID-19 pandemic and the sanction restrictions some countries use against Russia) in order to ensure sustainable development and increased competitiveness. It should also be emphasized that George Keller drew attention to the need of universities to analyze and adapt to changes of external factors in his book “Academic Strategy: The Management Revolution in American Higher Education,” written four decades ago [11]. The analysis of external factors as well as the analysis of resource potential is a primary step to develop a strategy for the integrated management and growth of a university.

There are many methods of strategic analysis including GAP analysis, PEST analysis, SWOT analysis, SNW analysis, and other well-known solutions. SWOT analysis is one of the most universal ones. It can be adapted to any object of research, i.e., a product, a technology, an enterprise, a region, an industry, a country, etc. Kenneth R. Andrews, Harvard University Professor, is believed to be the first to introduce the concept of SWOT analysis in the early 1970s to assess internal and external factors affecting an organization in order to formulate a business strategy. The name of the method is an acronym for the four elements it assesses: the Strengths and Weaknesses of an organization, external Opportunities, and Threats to strategy implementation. The development strategy of an institution depends on the balance of these elements.

Strengths are the internal resources of an organization that provide a competitive advantage. The strategy is based on them. It is these strengths that need to be developed and consolidated. Weaknesses are internal characteristics that slow down the speed of organizational development compared to those of its competitors. Weaknesses prevent an organization from reaching its full potential, and in the worst case, they can make the organization uncompetitive. It is therefore necessary to identify all the weaknesses and develop a plan to reduce the risks associated with them during the creation of the strategy. Opportunities are environmental factors that have a positive impact on the organization's activities—the so-called potential growth points. Threats are negative environmental factors/risks that weaken the competitive position of an organization and interfere with the fulfillment of assigned tasks. It is necessary to assess the probability of each threat and the possible damage caused by its influence.

According to Andrews' concept, firstly, the university's external environment should be analyzed, including identifying macroenvironment and microenvironment factors and assessing their impact on the current and future development of the institution. By means of PEST (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological) analysis, I can determine the macroenvironment factors of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University (SPbPU)—that is, the dynamics and vector of its economic development, the influence of political processes, the sociocultural factors, and the technical and technological innovations—and evaluate the effect of each factor (Table 1).

In addition to the PEST analysis of SPbPU, the factors of the external microenvironment will be analyzed and divided into opportunities and threats while also identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the university through an analysis of the internal environment (Table 2).

Furthermore, within the standard SWOT analysis procedures, a cross-sectional (summary) SWOT analysis matrix based on the above parameters was completed in order to determine further priority actions for SPbPU. The SWOT matrix consists of four quadrants with the following tactical decisions.

The first one is the intersection of the strengths and opportunities (S-O). It includes development activities to maximize the strengths, which will help to use opportunities emerging in the external environment.

Table 1 PEST analysis for SPbPU

Macro environment factor	The events and trends related to the factor	The effects (+)/(-)	The recommendations
1. Political and legal factors			
1.1. Sanctions restrictions	Academic mobility is restricted.	(-)	Remote interaction with foreign colleagues should be developed.
	Some European scientific and educational associations have revoked the university's membership.	(-)	It is necessary to reorient the direction of international cooperation toward Asian and Arabian countries.
	Supplies of hardware and software from Western countries have been halted.	(-)	It is necessary to produce Russian equivalents of foreign goods. New suppliers should be found.
1.2. Cooperation with eastern countries	It is possible to appeal to applicants and partners from eastern countries.	(+)	It is necessary to actively participate in international educational exhibitions and forums.
	It is possible to jointly conduct research and development.	(+)	It is necessary to study the culture of Eastern countries to build effective cooperation.
1.3. Tightened requirements for the university effectiveness	Educational institutions may be reorganized.	(-)	Universities are obliged to comply with the laws and other requirements pertaining to them.
	There may be a decrease in the position of universities in the efficiency rating.	(-)	Universities should be subject to internal audit.
1.4. National projects supporting science and education	The Government may provide additional funding.	(+)	Universities should participate in competitions for national projects.
	The Government coordinates universities, setting benchmarks for the higher education development.	(+)	Universities should have a working group for each project. Universities should spend funds efficiently and for the intended purpose.
2. Economic factors			
2.1. Economic crises	The population's solvency is declining.	(-)	Students may be transferred to shortened educational formats, i.e., an individual plan after the 1st year.
			Part-time students' tuition may be set taking into account the social importance of the major.
2.2. National currency volatility	Expenses for foreign business trips of employees increase.	(-)	It is necessary to participate in grants for international cooperation.
	Hardware, components, software, and access to foreign electronic databases became more expensive.	(-)	Universities should prepare a procurement plan in advance. Universities should seek for new suppliers or similar products.

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Macro environment factor	The events and trends related to the factor	The effects (+)/(-)	The recommendations
2.3. Budget deficit	The government may cut funding for education services and R&D projects.	(-)	Universities need to actively cooperate with the business sector, efficiently spend resources, and transfer or sell fixed assets that require maintenance but are not actively used.
3. Social factors			
3.1. Deteriorated demographic situation	The number of applicants is decreasing.	(-)	Universities should work in accordance with the principle of lifelong learning, i.e., developing new programs for additional training and participating in state employment programs.
4. Technological factors			
4.1. Information technologies	There is a trend toward remote interaction.	(+)	It is necessary to introduce e-document management. Conferences may be held online.
	Targeted attacks on university computers from the outside may increase.	(-)	Universities should store information on several servers, update anti-virus software in time, and instruct employees and students on how to work safely on the Internet.

The second quadrant is the intersection of the weaknesses and opportunities (W-O). It includes actions that would reduce the impact of the weaknesses.

The third quadrant is the intersection of the strengths and threats (S-T). It includes measures to prevent threats using the strengths of the organization.

The last quadrant is the intersection of the weaknesses and threats (W-T). It is a plan to strengthen the weaknesses to minimize the risks from the threats [14].

So, the strengths and weaknesses reflect the day-to-day reality of the university; they relate to its internal characteristics. In turn, the opportunities and threats caused by external factors allow for forecasting further events. Environmental factors, as a rule, cannot be influenced, but it is necessary to adapt to them and change the strategic methods depending on the trends (Table 3).

The SWOT analysis of SPbPU clearly shows that—despite its leading university status, participation in national projects, rotation in ratings, international activity, and prestige—there are a few spheres of activity that, in my opinion, the university should focus on. I am an economist, and I believe that non-core divisions should be assessed for economic feasibility.

The contracting of grant funds has low level, which increases the unutilized balance. It makes it necessary to relocate grant funds in a different way to fully utilize them by the end of the year. It often leads to risks such as lack of time to coordinate information on target funds between the grantor and the Federal Treasury; technical errors; failure to confirm the budget surpluses at the end of the year; and penalties

Table 2 SWOT analysis for SPbPU

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The university offers a wide range of programs and additional training courses. The university has Dissertation Councils for various areas, which assign Russian academic degrees for theses similar to Western PhD. 2. It is an autonomous institution. 3. The faculty is highly qualified, the employees are professionally competent, and the leader is strong. 4. The university appeals to the best applicants and actively interacts with schoolchildren. The community of active students welcomes freshmen every year, helping them both get comfortable at the university and integrate into student life. 5. Leading companies cooperate with the university. The university has its representative office in Shanghai. 6. The university actively participates in national projects—e.g., <i>Priority 2030</i>—as well as grant programs and fundamental and practical researches. 7. The university is advancing in international and national rankings. 8. The university actively uses information technologies—e.g., e-learning, personal accounts for students and employees, Directum, Teams, Smeta+. 9. There is a well-developed infrastructure for the students, including dormitories, libraries and e-databases, co-working areas, recreation and sports centers, etc. The students also participate in cultural, sport, and recreational events. 10. The university has modern furniture, equipment, and software. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Classes are taught only in Russian in mixed groups with foreign students. 2. Contracting level is low. Allocated funds are not spent on time. 3. Some master’s degree programs fail to attract the required number of students. 4. Some of the university non-core units incur losses. 5. It is difficult to control the work of far-flung units—e.g., the representative office in Shanghai, the camps in Novomikhailovsky and Gory, and the estate in Kholmki.

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Opportunities	Threats
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The university is located in St. Petersburg, which has a favorable geographical position and developed infrastructure. 2. The economic situation in St. Petersburg is also favorable due to its higher living standard than the Russian average. According to the quality of life rating among the Russian regions in 2022, St. Petersburg ranks second with 82.3 points out of 100, preceded by Moscow [12]. There are many companies from various industries that allow students to do an internship and the alumni to be hired. 3. The development of e-learning allows appealing to students not only in Russia but also abroad, which increases incomes. 4. The development of network education gives new resources for a university—e.g., the modern equipment, infrastructure of a partner university, and its highly qualified faculty. The more networked students a university attracts, the more funding it will receive. 5. Russia’s foreign policy and SPbPU’s presence in world rankings contribute to increasing the number of applicants from eastern countries. 6. E-document management simplifies the submission of documents for applicants and students and the transfer and approval of e-documents both within the university and between the university and the Russian Ministry of Education and Science. 7. Information technology provides prompt access to library resources and student or employee personal accounts. They make it possible to hold e-elections for tenure positions. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic crises may lead to a decrease in living standards and incomes. Should applicant solvency be threatened, applicants might choose universities or colleges with lower tuition. 2. The demographic situation is complicated. Applicants in the nearest years 2024–2029 were born in 2006–2010, which was the time of high mortality rate both in St. Petersburg and in Russia—6.5 per 1000 people in St. Petersburg in 2006 and –6 in Russia [13]. 3. There has been a trend to take a short single-discipline online course rather than studying at a university. 4. The tuition fees are controlled by the state, neither market pricing nor discounts can be applied to degree programs. 5. As a result of some countries’ sanction policy, academic mobility is restricted, it is not possible to purchase necessary components, software, or equipment for research. 6. It is impossible to predict developments in the global politics. 7. E-resources and e-databases may be subject to technical and technological limitations and failures. 8. Rouble volatility complicates the planning of such expenses as the euro salaries of foreign professors, the expenses of the representative office in Shanghai, business trips abroad, and membership fees for various organizations in foreign currency.

for not-achieved targets. If we understand where the risks may arise, the situation might be changed. My analysis reflects the economists’ subjective opinion. However, I believe that a comprehensive analysis of such a large organization should be based on the SWOT analysis data from each structural unit, ranking the results according to the competence of employees in a particular field. In my opinion, it is necessary to survey students, postgraduate students, applicants, and their parents, as well as the students of additional educational programs—all the main stakeholders—in

Table 3 The SWOT matrix or action plan for SPbPU

S-O	W-O
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SPbPU should continue to actively participate in educational and industry exhibitions and forums in St. Petersburg and Russian regions as well as globally. 2. SPbPU employees should focus on online courses, especially in English. 3. SPbPU should be advertised in the media, and it should interact with them as well as promote itself on social networks. 4. SPbPU is recommended to participate in socially oriented events in St. Petersburg and federally in order to increase its social reputation. 5. SPbPU should seek for more companies to employ its alumni. 6. SPbPU should develop all possible ways of cooperating with Eastern countries. 7. SPbPU should establish an active alumni association. 8. SPbPU should boost its ranking. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. It is recommended to show presentations in English in classes for both Russian and foreign students, as well as to create video courses in English. 2. SPbPU faculty should improve their English language proficiency. 3. Non-core activities should be outsourced. 4. SPbPU grantees' financial literacy needs to be improved with the help of colleagues from the contract service, accounting, and economics departments.
S-T	W-T
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SPbPU should develop additional training programs, including e-learning programs. 2. SPbPU should attract applicants, postgraduates, and students from friendly countries. 3. SPbPU should provide discounts for additional training programs. 4. With SPbPU far-flung units, it is recommended to introduce e-document management. 5. SPbPU is recommended to develop academic mobility within Eastern countries. 6. SPbPU needs to develop its proprietary technologies. 7. SPbPU should strengthen the protection of its corporate network and server equipment. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SPbPU is recommended to carry out internal audits of its units. 2. SPbPU is recommended to popularize master's degree programs.

order to objectively assess the advantages and identify the disadvantages. A competently conducted analysis will help adjust the work of the structural divisions, allocate resources effectively, fulfill strategic tasks, and timely adapt to both external and internal changes.

5 Conclusions

SWOT analysis has both advantages and disadvantages. This method does not require any special knowledge or specialized education. The flexibility allows us to choose the elements for analysis freely, depending on the goals of the study. The

results of the analysis may be used both for operational task solving and for strategic planning. The disadvantages of this method include subjectivity, the relative superficiality of the analysis, and time frames.

Summing up the results of the study, it is recommended to employ new approaches for effective university management—to use strategic analysis techniques, i.e., SWOT analyses. However, carrying out only one of the above analyses will not be sufficient, but it is necessary to use a comprehensive array of methods for strategic analysis.

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Part V
Migration and Socio-Demographic
Processes

Particularities of the Migration Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany on Migrants' Social Adaptation



Zeinab Bahturidze, Natalia Vasilieva, and Alina Kolomoitseva

1 Introduction

The purpose of the work is to identify the features of social adaptation of migrants in Germany in the context of the implemented migration policy. Over more than 70 years, migration processes have been changing the appearance of Germany and German society. In general, it should be noted that, as a social phenomenon, migration develops under the influence of numerous external factors. Migration affects not only the demographic indicators of the host country such as the population size and composition and birth and death rates, but it also changes the shape of the socio-cultural, economic, and political spheres of life of the FRG. Moreover, migration serves as a source of ethnic heterogeneity. The process is bilateral and changes affect each party. Migration and integration studies were launched as separate disciplines by the so-called Chicago School in the 1920–30 s. In the XXI century, the topic of migrants' adaptation issues in European countries, particularly in Germany, requires detailed consideration given the necessity to implement adaptation policy that meets modern challenges.

Theoretical issues of the migration phenomenon, as well as an analysis of its sociopolitical aspects, are reflected in the works of such Russian and foreign scientists as G. F. Morozova, P. M. Polyansky, K. A. Sheman, I. V. Ivakhnyuk, V. G. Sobolev, J. W. Berry. Research by H. Dribbusch, Y. Kosyakova, and others highlighted the problem of developing the legislative framework for migration policy in Germany. M. Yu. Apanovich, I. V. Lebedeva, L. R. Sadykova, S. Hall, and K. Joppke in their scientific works assessed the social adaptation of migrants in Germany and outlined

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the trends in the emergence of the migration crisis and its consequences in the socio-political and economic aspects.

Analytical understanding of the topic was carried out on the basis of official documents of the government and federal departments of the Federal Republic of Germany regulating issues of migration and social adaptation of migrants. In particular, the legislative acts of the Federal Republic of Germany were analyzed: “On the stay, employment and integration of foreigners,” “Law on regulating the status of foreign workers,” and “Citizenship Law.” Particular attention was paid to such regulatory documents as the “Immigration Act” and the “Ban on attracting foreign labor to Germany,” as well as the legal act of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research on the National Action Plan on Integration “Nationaler”. Since migration issues are an integral part of global processes, statistical data from official sources of European statistics EUROSTAT, and the Federal Statistical Office of Germany became the information base.

The purpose of the paper is to identify the features of social adaptation of migrants in Germany in the context of the implemented migration policy. Tasks that were solved in the course of the study:

1. designation of the foundations of the migration policy of Germany and its evolution.
2. determination of the role of social adaptation in the complex tasks of the migration processes management system.
3. description of the social system and public associations in Germany aimed at the social adaptation of migration flows.

In the context of migration studies, “integration” should be defined as the final stage of the migration process for categories of irreturnable migrants, which is characterized by the migrant’s deep embedding into the cultural, socioeconomic, and political systems of the host society through the immigration policy adopted by the recipient state: by means of segregation, assimilation, multiculturalism, or the “ethnic minority model/ethnic pluralism model” [1, p. 25].

The methodological basis of the study was the method of system analysis, which made it possible to consider migration as part of global processes, where a change in one element can lead to changes in the entire system; retrospective method—in order to trace the relationship between migration waves in the context of a transforming world order and German policy on migration issues. The analysis of statistical data and the comparative method were useful in assessing the demographic situation and reviewing the indicators of migration flow in Germany.

Modern science recognizes a variety of types, forms, and modifications of adaptation. According to our opinion, the Canadian sociologist J.W. Berry gives the most appropriate characteristic. He distinguishes the following types of adaptation: psychological, sociocultural, and economic types [2]. It is noteworthy that social and psychological adaptation is significant for migrants, as people are forced to change their habitual environment for a completely new and at times hostile one. The first one involves the migrant’s internal understanding of their own cultural identity, and it is expressed by a feeling of complete contentment within the cultural context as

well as their mental health. The practical success of this adaptation type can be illustrated by the following factors: preservation of migrants' positive psycho-emotional state, presence or absence of both sense of unity between migrants and the host society, migrants' contentment with life in the new environment, as well as the intention to separate from the recipient society. All types of adaptations are complementary, as they are involved in developing the tasks and programs for migrants' behavior in the new environment.

Social, or sociocultural adaptation, which implies a number of external psychological indicators linking a migrant to a new social environment, plays an equally important role in the issue under study. Being both a process and a result of active actions of ethnoreligious groups in adapting to a completely new social landscape, social adaptation is considered successful when a migrant achieves compatibility with the new environment, its cultural, and socioeconomic values and traditions, and can successfully manage personal, educational and work issues without third-party assistance. The level of economic adaptation is measured by the extent to which the migrant has access to the labor market, as well as the level of satisfaction with the work process and the efficiency and social utility of the latter [2, pp. 13–14].

2 The Social Security System for Migrants

Social adaptation of migrants is a process aimed at “optimising the person’s relationship with the environment and consisting in assessing the situation and on this basis correcting both the person’s behaviour and the condition of the social environment in which migrants acquire the skills and knowledge necessary for life in a new country” [3, p. 251].

Language proficiency is one of the most important elements of integration. It gives migrants access to better education, employment, and cultural life. The majority of migrants in Germany experience difficulties in learning German. According to the Federal Institute of Statistics, 60% of migrants in the FRG have poor or very poor knowledge of the German language, which drastically complicates the process of their acceptance into a new social position and limits the development of their communications. Therefore, this issue comes under the close attention of the government. In particular, according to Deutsche Welle, in 2019, the German government has allocated 470 million euros for migrants’ integration, including improving their language skills. The participants of such programs were obliged to prove their language skills annually using the German Language Test for Immigrants (Deutsch-Test für Zuwanderer, DTZ) [4], which further influenced their eligibility for social benefits, work and accommodation permits, and residence permits.

In addition to the language problem, migrants are directly confronted with cultural differences, which to a certain extent can be quite radical, potentially leading to culture shock and rejection of the new reality, qualified in psychological practice [4]. Deep cultural differences can become the basis of conflict situations, hostility, and public anti-immigrant demonstrations as a result of xenophobia, racism, and

religious intolerance. The number of such cases has been increasing rapidly over the last decade since often the behavioral norms in migrants' home countries are completely opposite to those in Germany. In order to prevent such situations, it is necessary to ensure a holistic bilateral cultural dialogue. Migrants should consider certain behavioral norms, values, traditions, and social rules and be open to international experience in order to accelerate the process of accepting the new reality. At the same time, citizens of the host country are able to give migrants the opportunity to plunge deeper into the unexplored cultural world. It can be assumed that cultural diversity can bring significant benefits for society if managed properly. As the German Bureau of Statistics notes, migrants can be an important source of cultural diversity, creativity, and innovation for society if they can successfully integrate into their new environment [5, p. 98].

The next, and no less essential, step in adaptation is employment. Thus, work and social activities provide migrants with the necessary opportunity to support themselves and their families within the economic and political conditions of the country they stay in. However, in addition to economic benefits, participation in public life also allows migrants to integrate into a previously unknown environment, deepen their understanding of cultural patterns, find new friends and business partners, and broaden their horizons and skills. Furthermore, interacting with locals and participating in such activities contributes to a better understanding of cultural differences and promotes more harmonious cross-national integration [6]. Nevertheless, migrants often experience difficulties in job searching due to language barriers, lack of work experience in Germany, or discrimination on the part of employers. Statistics show that the unemployment rate among migrants in Germany is higher than among locals. According to a report by the Institute for Labour Employment Research (IAB), only 59% of migrants aged 15–64 were employed in Germany in 2019, whereas the percentage for German citizens was 77% [6]. This indicates that migrants encounter certain obstacles in finding a job and integrating into the labor market. In 2019, the unemployment rate for migrants in Germany was 11.8%, compared to 4.8% for locals, and in 2020 it was already 16.6%, which is more than three times higher than 5.9% for local residents. In 2021 and 2022, the situation improved by one-fifth, with the total number of unemployed reaching 13.2% [6]. As stated by Patrick Ireland, existing programs and public associations actively contribute to the employment of foreign individuals; moreover, immigrants and refugees who cannot support themselves receive benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Allowances Act [7, p. 133]. After being registered in a refugee camp, they are provided with the resources to cover the basic needs of food, shelter, heating, clothing, and personal hygiene. For a single adult in a refugee camp in Germany, the monthly amount for pocket money is approximately €150, and for a person who does not live in the camp, the monthly allowance for needs and pocket money for an adult is approximately €350 [6].

Residential facilities are also provided in connection with the corresponding law and state refugee programs, as determined by German migration policy. Good housing provides migrants with comfortable living conditions and helps them to gain a feeling of belonging to society. Thus, according to the "Asylum Seekers' Allowances

Act” [8, p. 109], refugees and migrants with asylum seekers’ allowances are provided with housing of an appropriate level of comfort and size, based on family size. In addition to this law, there are programs and initiatives to support migrants in obtaining accommodation. For instance, there is the “Housing for All” (Wohnen für alle) program [9], which provides affordable housing for low-income migrants and refugees. Another program, “City without Poverty” (Stadt ohne Armut) [10, p. 175], which aims to combat poverty and social exclusion, also includes measures to provide housing for migrants and refugees. Despite this, however, housing conditions remain a challenge for many people. Especially in cities with a housing shortage, refugees and migrants may find it difficult to obtain housing. Those migrants in particular who have a low income often face problems with the availability of quality housing in Germany. According to a report by the European Commission, in Germany, about 25% of migrants live in poor housing conditions [10, p. 176].

The development of the main and current concept of migration policy in the Federal Republic of Germany called multiculturalism [11, p. 144] should be noted in more detail. The concept of multiculturalism is a method of political perception that recognizes and encourages the preservation as well as respect for cultural diversity in society. It is based on the idea that different cultures can co-exist and interact within the same social structure while maintaining their uniqueness and identity [12].

This model became practical in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. It is worth noting that the political, social, and cultural implementation of this principle causes various difficulties. In recent years, the German government has taken measures to ease the integration process of migrants, including German language programs, workplace training, and assistance in finding accommodation. Yet the traditions and rules of the recipient country often share few similarities with the cultures of the migrants’ original ethnic community. This might be the reason that already in 2010, people started to talk about the collapse of this concept, which eventually became the reason for the start of the migration crisis in 2015. Against the backdrop of the newly emerged problem, many politicians have divided into two camps. Some politicians advocate the preservation and support of a multicultural society, calling for respect and tolerance for different cultures and religions. They believe that a multicultural society can be richer and more diverse and that mutual respect for differences can contribute to peaceful coexistence.

In general, however, a growing number of political elites increasingly support the active restriction of migration and the protection of national culture, as they fear that a multicultural society may lead to a loss of cultural identity and create conflicts between different cultures.

The public has also been affected by mass disturbances. Some people criticize current integration policy and call for stricter requirements and conditions for receiving citizenship and access to social services. Others, on the contrary, call for a more open and inclusive integration policy that would be more successful in helping migrants and refugees get back on their feet in a new country [12, p. 56].

In general, social adaptation in Germany as part of migration policy is considered to be highly successful, which is due to a number of factors:

1. Historical tradition: As Christian Joppke points out [13], Germany has an experience of integrating migrants and refugees, dating back to the period after the end of World War II, when the country was in need of labor force. This experience was improved and developed over the decades, which allowed Germany to create a relatively successful system for the integration and adaptation of migrants.
2. Economic opportunities: Germany is the largest economy in the European Union, which creates many employment and business opportunities for migrants. This helps facilitate the process of adaptation and integration into society.
3. Public policy: Germany has laws and programs, with the aim of supporting integration of migrants. These measures include financial support, language courses, vocational education and training, and other services that help migrants adapt more quickly to their new environment.
4. Cultural approach: Germany has a tendency to recognize and respect cultural diversity and the connections between different scientists. This allows migrants to preserve their culture and identity, which contributes to their social adaptation to the new environment.

However, there are still some problems and challenges associated with the social adaptation of migrants in Germany.

First of all, it is worth noting that the social system has changed over and over again for the decades. In the 1950s and 1960s, Germany received migrant workers from Italy, Spain, and Turkey, who were needed to rebuild the economy after the war. At that time, the social security system for migrants can be characterized as limited due to the inaccessibility of many social benefits, insurance, and mandatory medical care, except for the organization of temporary living conditions for accommodation.

Already in the 1970s, the German government began to acknowledge the need to improve social security for migrants, in connection with general European trends in the legalization of migration. New laws were introduced that expanded migrant's rights to social benefits and protection. For example, Migration Law was adopted, which determined the legal status of migrants and the government's responsibilities for their protection. A little later, the 1990s were defined as the "time of unification," and therefore, the new country already in modern times required a complete reboot of previously pursued policies, dictated by modern international processes. Thus, a course was adopted to develop new legislation in conjunction with the modified past. Germany understood the need for more intensive work on social security for foreign citizens arriving in large numbers. The Migration Law was adopted, which defined a new procedure for the reception and adaptation of migrants, as well as their rights to social support. During this period, measures for the social adaptation of migrants were also improved, such as language courses and employment programs [14, p. 65].

One of the main types of social support is social allowance, which is paid to migrants, who are unable to earn enough to exist. The benefit amount depends on a number of factors, including income level, age, health status, and other social and economic factors. Besides, migrants can receive aid with healthcare, education, and

other basic needs. In the case where a citizen is non-disabled, he has the opportunity to apply for a citizen's benefit (Bürgergeld) [15] for himself and his family at the employment center (Jobcenter). There are also separate social benefits (Sozialhilfe) for people with disabilities and retirement age categories, which can be obtained from the social security authority (Sozialamt). Thus, one of the conditions for receiving civil benefits and social assistance is the possession of a temporary residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis), the corresponding "temporary certificate of legal residence in the country" (Fiktionsbescheinigung) [15] from the office for foreigners in accordance with §24 of the Residence Act. In accordance with the Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, AsylbLG) [16], in certain conditions, it is also possible to receive financial assistance for temporary housing, food, personal hygiene, medical care, etc. In addition, there are also sub-categories of citizens who determine the number of social benefits in accordance with the standard need, determined by the new resolution "Statement on updating the standard level of requirement 2022" of the Federal Council of September 15, 2022. The system of social benefits, which is directly financed by the German Federal State Budget, is one of the significant points of the social system. It is important to note that receiving social benefits is associated with certain conditions and requirements, and each case is being considered individually taking into account all the circumstances and needs of the person, which causes many bureaucratic difficulties. Speaking about the disadvantages of this algorithm, there are examples of just a few of them:

1. Lack of benefits. Many people believe that benefits are insufficient to cover basic needs and do not correspond to an optimal standard of living. Due to record-breaking high inflation in Germany—7.9% for 2022 according to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany—supply is needed, but prices for many goods have increased significantly compared to last year [17].
2. Complex registration processes. Germany is known for having bureaucratic procedures and fairly extensive legislation, which at times leads not only to a long registration process, but also to additional difficulties and costs for organizations and individuals. If we are talking about receiving social benefits on the basis of obtaining refugee status, then several months of waiting pass has a detrimental effect on the quality of life of the arriving citizen, as evidenced by the statistics of the poor population in Germany [18]. Moreover, after obtaining the status and going through other bureaucratic and necessary procedural stages, an application for social benefits can take from 2 to 12 months, depending on the foreign citizen's employment, marital status, and the presence of children. It should be noted that an excellent alternative for foreigners who are waiting for a decision from the authorities is the activities of private and charitable organizations.
3. Inadequate verification and deception of the system. In Germany, as elsewhere in the world, social benefits are only provided to those who meet certain requirements. One of these requirements is the provision of reliable documents confirming the right to receive benefits. If documents are not properly verified, this may result in benefits being received inappropriately. There are examples of such

improper document verification in Germany. In particular, an example related to the issuance of citizenship, when department employees did not check the accuracy of the documents submitted by the applicants, which led to the unlawful obtaining of German citizenship and subsequently the appropriate social benefits [19]. According to the Federal Statistics of the Criminal Procedure Court, more than 10,000 cases of improper receipt of social benefits were identified in Germany in 2021 [19]. Most of them are related to improper document verification. Germany has a system for monitoring the wrongful receipt of benefits, which includes checking applications for benefits, checking information about the income and assets of applicants, and monitoring information about benefit recipients [19]. Wrongful receipt of social benefits can result in serious consequences, including fines, damages, loss of future eligibility for benefits, and criminal liability in severe cases.

4. Lack of infrastructure for those who need help. Some areas of the country may not have enough organizations to provide assistance to those who need it. In Germany, the social security system is under the jurisdiction of the federal states and may differ slightly from region to region. However, in general, in every region of Germany, there are organizations and institutions that provide social benefits. For example, every city and community have social services that can provide information on how to apply for social benefits. There are also social organizations and charitable foundations that can help people in difficult life situations. In some areas of Germany, there is indeed a lack of organizations for applying for social benefits, in such case you can contact the social services in the nearest area, where staff can help fill out the application and arrange for benefits. In addition, it is possible to apply for social benefits online.
5. Ethnic discrimination in receiving social benefits is open and widespread in Germany. According to reports and statistics from public organizations in Germany, immigrants and their children, as well as minorities, often face denial of social benefits, various restrictions, and obstacles. Data from the German Federal Employment Agency suggest that although the number of migrants in Germany is high, minorities still experience discrimination when receiving social benefits. In its research, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees BAMF confirms that minorities, including immigrants from Muslim countries and people of African descent, are most likely to face difficulties in obtaining social benefits [20]. It is clear that ethnic discrimination in receiving social benefits in Germany is a serious problem that requires an immediate and effective solution.

Considering the advantages and disadvantages of social financial assistance systems, it is worth a closer look into the program, under which payments are made, and the definition of categories of citizens for the issuance of material assistance. This is the government program “Basic security under the social assistance law” (Grundsicherung nach dem SGB II) [21]. This project provides financial support to migrants who cannot provide themselves with a minimum level of income. According to the German Federal Statistical Office, in 2020, about 40% of migrants

in Germany had incomes below the poverty threshold, which reveals the problems of employment of citizens and clearly shows the internal mechanism of the labor market [22]. Of course, this percentage also includes problems of low qualifications, especially among refugees, who have been in the majority in the last decade and whose education does not meet the numerous requirements of German employers. However, the state is actively combating this trend of unemployment thanks to the existence of such a program as “Integration through qualifications” (Integration durch Qualifizierung) [23]. Its goal is to help migrants obtain the necessary knowledge and qualifications for employment in the German labor market. The program also offers various courses and trainings oriented to the needs of migrants and helps them adapt to the German culture and business environment. It is worth noting that the project provides support in finding jobs and internships and in starting a business. It began operating in 2005 and is still one of the key initiatives of the national migration policy in Germany, whose funding comes from the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Germany and the European Social Fund. In 2019, more than 1.5 million migrants were registered in Germany [23], and the program continues to support migrants to obtain the necessary qualifications and prepare for employment in Germany.

In addition to providing direct support in the fields of material support, advanced training, and employment, Germany is interested in improving the quality of life through a developed healthcare system. According to the federal law on compulsory health insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung) [24], all residents of Germany, including migrants, are required to have health insurance. Migrants who are in Germany legally and have a residence permit for more than 12 months are entitled to the same health insurance as German citizens. The statutory health insurance program (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, GKV) in Germany provides health insurance to all residents of the country, including migrants. This means that migrants who are in Germany legally and have a residence permit for more than 12 months are entitled to health insurance, just like German citizens, due to the fact that insurance in Germany is compulsory for all residents of the country. Migrants can choose between two types of health insurance—legal (GKV) and private (PKV). In most cases, migrants are entitled to health insurance through GKV. In turn, GKV provides a wide range of medical services, including medical examinations, hospital treatment, medications, dental treatment, and therapy [24]. In addition, health insurance covers the costs of treatment of diseases that were diagnosed before the migrant’s arrival in Germany (so-called “pre-existing conditions”). This procedure is paid for by both the employer and the employee. For migrants who do not have a job, the cost of health insurance may be covered by the government if they meet certain criteria. In general, health insurance is an important element of the integration of migrants in Germany. It provides access to necessary medical care and helps migrants maintain their health and adapt to new living conditions.

The country provides a variety of socially conscious programs and services to help migrants adapt to a new environment and gain access to social benefits. One of these programs is the federal program “Integration through exchange” (Integration durch Austausch, Ida) [25], initiated in 2016. The aim of the program is to facilitate

the integration of migrants into society by hosting cultural events, sports competitions, and other activities that help migrants comprehend and respect German culture, as well as maintain their own culture. It also contributes to the establishment of contacts between migrants and German residents, which in turn promotes the development of intercultural dialogue and the reduction of social tension. The program is funded by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Construction and Communications, and its implementation is carried out in accordance with the requirements of municipalities and regional authorities [25].

The Ida program has been successfully implemented in many cities and regions of Germany. It received positive feedback from both the participants and the German residents. Events, organized as part of the program, promote a more tolerant and inclusive social environment, which is an important driver for the successful integration of migrants into Germany. Unfortunately, there is not enough official statistical information available. For example, the latest information was published on the official website in 2018. According to the source, 52,000 cultural and sporting events were hosted and attended by about five million people, including migrants and Germans. In addition, more than 3000 language courses were arranged for migrants [26].

3 Contribution of Public Organizations to the Implementation of Migration Policy

The operation of civil society organizations is also worth mentioning. For example, so-called “Hospitality Pilots” (Bund der Selbständigen Rheinland-Pfalz und Saarland e.V.) [27], scholarships “START” [28], “The Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund,” established in 1992 [29]. All civil society organizations were founded by German citizens to provide assistance in helping refugees to settle quickly and learn the language. In 2015, Deutsche Welle launched a format of TV shows and programs for preschool migrant children in preparation for admission to educational institutions. This company, as part of its Academy, also provides places for new refugee journalists. In addition, there are about 100 different private organizations supporting social policies aimed at the adaptation of migrants. For example, the largest commercial television channel is the RTL [30, p. 105]. The RTL channel implements various educational programs, trainings, and competitions, in purpose of the reflection of the problems of migrants, with the possibility of further practice in the company. This policy is followed by such media outlets as the Association of German Magazine Publishers (VDZ), the Youth Press Union (Verband der Jugendpresse), the CIVIS Foundation (CIVIS Mediaschiftung GmbH), the D21 Initiative Association (Initiative D21), the “Our House Germany” association (Unser Haus Deutschland), Werner Media Group, Ihlas Media Group, and many others [30, p. 106].

In addition to the above-mentioned organizations, it is worth paying attention to the work of national minorities performing an educational function, such as the “Turkish Community in Germany” (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland), the Turkish-German Health Foundation (Türkisch-Deutsche Gesundheitsstiftung), Spanish Parents Association (Bund der spanischen Elternvereine), German–Turkish Forum (Das Deutsche-Türkische Forum Stuttgart) and the Federal Association of Migrant Women in Germany ((Der Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland e.V) [31]. Despite ethnic definitions of communities, they all help third-wave refugees to adjust to new social conditions. Another organization that supports the national integration policy is Djo-Deutsche Jugend in Europa e.V. (“Djo-German Youth in Europe”) [32]. The organization’s primary objective is to help migrants adapt to society. “Djo-German Youth in Europe” is a multinational public association that excludes discrimination on national or party grounds and operates at the federal level in the field of culture and youth policy. The Hospitationsprogramm program [31] assists visiting youth in the framework of integration into European society. Young people with a migration background can take an internship with an international company to enhance competences in intercultural dialogue.

Public associations play an important role in the social adaptation of migrants in Germany and have several advantages:

1. Assistance in learning the German language. Public associations offer German language courses and trainings for migrants, enabling them to adapt more quickly to the new environment and enhance their chances of employment and communication with the local population.
2. Support for employability. Many public associations in Germany provide job search services for migrants, helping them to find suitable jobs and obtain the necessary employment documents.
3. Support for adaptation to local culture and society. Public associations help migrants to understand local culture and society, thus facilitating deeper and more effective adaptation to new environments.
4. Assistance in applying for social support. Many migrants need social support when moving to a new country. Public associations provide them with necessary information on available social services and help them fill out relevant forms and apply for social assistance.
5. Community building and support for social integration. Public associations offer migrants the opportunity to meet other migrants and local residents, creating a community and providing support for social integration.

Despite the numerous advantages of the work of public associations in the field of social adaptation of migrants in Germany, there are some drawbacks:

1. Funding. Public associations are often funded by donations and grants. Because of limited budgets, funds are allocated to different projects and programs, which may reduce their effectiveness and coverage.

2. **Limited accessibility.** Public associations may be limited in their ability to cover all migrants in a specific area or group. This may lead to the fact that some migrants will not receive the necessary assistance.
3. **Inconsistency to the needs.** Public associations, in some cases, may not have a sufficient understanding of the needs of specific groups of migrants, which may lead to inappropriate provision of assistance and services.
4. **Limited access to resources.** Some migrants may have difficulties with accessing resources necessary for adaptation, such as housing, health, and education. Public associations may provide assistance in these areas, but this may be limited by resource constraints.
5. **Limited access to information.** Many migrants may have difficulties with accessing information on available resources and services, which can make their adaptation laborious. Even if public associations can provide assistance in this area, access to information may not always be provided to everyone.

With the adoption of the Immigration Act, language policy had been given the dominant role in the integration process. The Federal Government regards the success of migrants in education and learning German as an investment in the future of the country, as people living in Germany are the “most important resource that the country has” [33]. Negotiations are currently underway to increase the construction of childcare facilities for learning German by children of migrants aged 3 and above. In the future, the Federal Government intends to launch about 100 different projects to integrate refugees into society. In addition, local citizens actively create trainings, classes, forums, and other educational formats for foreigners. It can be concluded that the migration crisis is on the decline due to the fact that the German authorities have taken a serious approach to the issue of social adaptation. Through established organizations and programs, millions of migrants learn German, gain work qualifications, and successfully integrate into society.

4 Conclusions

In summary, the features of the system of social adaptation of migrants in Germany should be highlighted:

1. Migrants have access to free education, including German language courses and apprenticeships.
2. There are programs and projects to improve understanding of cultural differences and promote tolerance in society.
3. Migrants in Germany have the possibility of obtaining high-paying jobs and integration into society.
4. In Germany, there are organizations and associations that assist migrants in their social integration, including access to housing, health care, and social services.
5. Germany has a well-developed system of protection of the rights of migrants, which ensures equal rights and opportunities for all citizens and migrants. This

includes legal aid, protection from discrimination and violence, and opportunities to participate in public life and political activities.

6. Germany provides migrants with opportunities for family integration, including the possibility of bringing family members, obtaining long-term visas, and obtaining citizenship.

Despite such positive long-term programs, the reality leaves much to be desired. According to a report by the German Federal Employment Agency, at the end of 2020, about 10.9 million foreigners live in the country, of which more than six million have the status of a migrant or refugee, which is about 7% of the country's population. Germany has a long history of integrating migrants, but the FRG social security system is still not perfect.

The social security system for migrants in Germany has its advantages and disadvantages. One of the main and undeniable advantages is access to social services and benefits that help overcome difficulties in adapting to a new country. However, some migrants may abuse the social security system by not showing the true level of their income or participation in the job search process, which may cause a negative reaction from the local population. There are more opportunities for migrants, more information that is necessary to support at the first stages of resettlement, more state attention to migration policy, and a number of measures to combat ethnic discrimination and xenophobia. But we will be able to analyze the result of the FRG social security system activities only after decades.

Therefore, the main problem of the German migration policy is that a well-thought-out program for the adaptation of migrants, who are so necessary in the labor market, encounters the unwillingness of the recipient society to change its usual way of life and established traditions.

Discriminatory attitudes by German society continue to exist. It should be understood that "blaming" each of the parties separately does not seem rational. An attempt to adapt an unwilling migrant into an adaptable host society is just as unrealistic as an attempt to adapt a willing migrant into an unprepared, unsuitable host society. In Germany, both the first and the second option are valid. The recipient society is forced to change, and it genially transforms the usual way of life and established traditions, but the degree of "commitment" of society to adaptation is also influenced by internal problems. German society has suffered from a crisis of national identity over the past decades, which, along with the increasing level of migrant phobia in Germany, is also an obstacle to adaptation. The problems of migrants' adaptation to the cultural, socioeconomic, and political landscape of Germany are becoming the subject of active discussions, but have not yet been resolved.

Although migration policy is increasingly being openly criticized by the academic community and the public, and right-wing radical parties are gaining popularity, the government does not intend to change the strategy.

Despite the successes in certain areas, in general, the social adaptation of migrants to the German political, religious, and sociocultural space remains minimal. Germans and migrants, with mistrust and often open resentment, often blame

each other. It is worth noting that this is also an extremely favorable ground for the growth of radical sentiments in society.

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Revisiting the Issue of Migration Processes in China



Talie Yagya

1 Introduction

Today, flows of people migrate for various reasons: changing their place of residence, looking for a new job, getting an education, learning about other cultures, health travel, receiving medical care, and seeking refuge from political, racial, and other persecution or economic disasters. Historically, migration as a process has played a special role for all humanity.

At the present stage of development of society, migration plays a big role in the process of globalization, since it directly affects relationships between countries and various spheres of society such as political, social, economic, and spiritual. However, migration processes also affect instability in society: due to migration, social and economic problems can worsen, and due to illegal migration, international security problems intensify [1].

Today in the world there are 196 million labor migrants alone (for 2019), and the total number of migrants for 2021 is already equal to 281 million people [2]. Migration processes have not spared the People's Republic of China. As is known, the Chinese diaspora is the most representative and has developed over several centuries. In some countries, the situation of migrants was stable, which allowed them to become more active in socio-political and economic processes, contributing to the development of their country. In addition, the rapid growth and significant population density in China are an objective reason for migration. And this, in turn, indicates that the PRC acts as an important participant in migration processes.

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In the history of China, five stages of migration processes can be roughly distinguished: from ancient times to the end of the nineteenth century—the first stage; the second lasted until the formation of the PRC; the third stage—from 1949 to 1978; the fourth is the period until the end of the twentieth century; and the fifth stage is the “new” wave from the end of the twentieth—beginning of the twenty-first century.

The “new” wave of migration brings significant changes to migration processes caused by the transformation of the world economy and international relations and also increases the importance of China in the global space.

Thus, we can say that migration processes in China are one of the most pressing topics at the global level.

The purpose of the chapter is to study the stages of Chinese migration including the “new” wave in the modern world. Therefore, it solves such problems as considering the characteristics of migration processes in China, studying trends in the development of migration and emigration from China, and ways of regulating it.

2 Trends in the Development of Migration Processes and Their Features from Ancient Times to the End of the Nineteenth Century

The first stage of migration processes in China has been observed since the Qin Dynasty. The most common and active destination was Vietnam. The development of relations between this state and China dates back to antiquity. The basis of their relationship is hostility over territory and the acquisition and maintenance of Vietnamese sovereignty. However, the emigration of the Chinese to this country is rightly dated back to the third century BC. Most of the Chinese were located in the northern territories [3]. The ranks of the settlers included such strata of society as soldiers, officials, merchants, simple farmers, and hard workers. There was an interesting case in history when officials of the overthrown Ming dynasty asked for asylum from the Nguyen dynasty and transported 3000 soldiers and 50 ships to Vietnam. The main group of Chinese “Huai” arrived in Vietnam starting in the second half of the nineteenth century. Vietnam was colonized by the French, and after colonization was completed, the influx of Chinese migrants increased. In search of work, the Chinese entered into contracts with the French and, under the pretext of earning money, could leave for other countries. This was beneficial for France since the indigenous population was not yet ready to cooperate. And Chinese labor was a cheap tool for the development of new territories. In 1873, there were about 44 thousand Chinese people, and in 1889 the number was already 56 thousand [4].

To regulate and control newly arrived Chinese, an immigration bureau was established in 1874 in the city of Saigon.

The Chinese people had a number of privileges in Vietnam. Their growing trade was encouraged; they had the right to do business and trade in goods such as opium,

alcohol, and rice—things that were prohibited to the Vietnamese. Also, the privilege of the Chinese was the opportunity to have property in the form of land; they could calmly dispose of it and pass it on by inheritance. This was especially common in the city of Konkhinkhin. In addition, the Chinese could move freely throughout the territory of the Indochina Union.

Thus, the Chinese community, their diaspora, found themselves in the most advantageous position on the territory of Vietnam and the most promising for migration, since their work was fully rewarded, and the Chinese nation acquired a number of privileges.

The significant length of the borders with Russia explains the movement of Chinese migration flows to this state. Therefore, regarding the relationship between the two states, it is worth starting with ideas about China on the territory of Russia. In the seventeenth century, understandings about China were fragmentary and incomplete, and no conclusions were drawn about them. In the next century, China, like the entire East, is regularly opposed to the developing West. In particular, for this reason, the Russian Empress Catherine II emphasized the Europeanization of Russia and development along the lines of Europe [5]. Over time, the fashion for China is growing. Chinese motifs appear in paintings, goods from China become popular, and porcelain and lacquer furniture are valued. The Chinese Palace was built in Oranienbaum, various porcelain objects were collected in the Monplaisir Palace in Peterhof, and a “Chinese Village” project was developed in Tsarskoye Selo, which can still be admired to this day [6].

Emigration from China to Russia was a growing process. The first treaty was concluded in 1689, and according to it, the territory of the left bank of the Amur River began to belong to China. The following agreements with more complete clarification of borders were concluded only in the middle of the nineteenth century. At the time of the signing of the Beijing Treaty in 1860, there were about 2–3 thousand Chinese in the Amur region, who were given permission to conduct fisheries and animals. On the territory of Russia in the Ussuri region, the Chinese were actually engaged in hunting, gold prospecting, and collecting ginseng. The lack of a properly guarded border allowed both sides to cross it uncontrolled. Over time, the number of Chinese emigrants increased. To protect the territory from uninvited guests, the Ussuri Cavalry Hundred was created, which, however, could only control a small territory.

Russia’s policy toward migrants has been positive. “Rules for the settlement of Russians and foreigners in the Amur and Primorsky regions” of 1861 allowed them to settle in certain territories to cultivate an agricultural complex. The program also encouraged farmers to rent or own land from this region, and a person was exempt from paying taxes for 20 years.

Relations between China and Russia were good neighbors. However, in Russia, there was still a clause according to which the Chinese who committed a crime on the Russian side were sent back to their country. Taking advantage of good relations and the lack of control in the territory, the enterprising Chinese were able to develop the economy and began to freely send the grown crops to China. Russia tried to tax the exported product, but there were no funds to implement the decree. Unfortunately,

records of arriving and departing migrants were not kept, so it was impossible to speak precisely about the number of Chinese populations living or working in Russia. At the same time, one can evaluate the contribution of the Chinese to the development of the Far East. According to the 1897 census, about 57,459 Chinese lived in the Russian Far East [7].

Thus, hunger and poverty prompted the Chinese from the north to migrate to Russian territory, which turned out to be beneficial for both states at that time.

It should be noted that currently, a significant diaspora of Chinese has settled in the United States. Note that the first contacts between countries were observed in the 1780s [8]. After the opium wars and endless uprisings, the time of crisis of the Qing dynasty was experienced extremely hard by all layers of society. At the same time, the gold rush was gradually approaching in the United States. Thus, from the 1850s to 1880s, there was the most intensified flow of Chinese migrants overseas. In addition, Americans, just like Vietnamese and Russian entrepreneurs, were attracted by cheap labor. In search of better working conditions and earnings, the Chinese boldly went to another continent. According to the official census in the United States, by the end of the nineteenth century, there were about 100 thousand people, although according to unofficial data, there were about 300 thousand people [9].

A peculiarity of Chinese migrants can be considered their existence according to the principle of creating a Chinatown—"Chinatown." The difference in their world-views did not allow the Chinese to integrate into American society.

It is also worth noting that some migrants left for a while, that is, after a while they returned to their homeland. However, the large influx of Chinese led to the displacement of white workers and, therefore, caused negative sentiments among them. The Chinese began to face racist remarks and were forced to endure religious and other prejudices.

US policy was on the side of its people, and therefore in 1882 Congress voted for a law to exclude Chinese migrants and facilitated their return to their homeland. According to the law, the Chinese could no longer obtain American citizenship. This period is considered the first wave of Chinese migration to the United States. The period ended in 1923, when an entry ban was passed for all Chinese except official representatives.

According to the above, we can conclude that the experience of migration to the American continent turned out to be negative. The Chinese population was not accepted by Americans due to cultural and other differences, and their large numbers caused a number of problems.

Thus, based on the experience of the first migration flows to countries such as Vietnam, Russia, and the United States, it should be said that the migration of Chinese abroad was popularized. It is known that some of the Chinese successfully settled in the new territory and settled, while the other represented seasonal migration with the possibility of returning to China. In general, we can say that it was in the nineteenth century that migration became widespread and subsequently led to an increase in the number of Chinese diasporas in various countries.

3 Migration Processes in China in the Twentieth Century

Mass migration abroad overtook China in the twentieth century. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese representative offices began to open in other countries to protect their rights on foreign territory.

The First World War also affected the people of China: armies were assembled in Shanghai, Shantung, and Zhejiang in support of the Entente, numbering more than 100 thousand people. Due to the sudden and rapid movement of the Chinese to other countries, there is an urgent need to regulate migration flows. In particular, exit visas were adopted in China itself, which made leaving the country much more difficult. It should also be noted that in the countries of entry, the Chinese began to face the problem of discrimination among the population in the West, which, not unreasonably, influenced the decrease in migration of Chinese to these countries.

Migration to nearby countries, especially in Southeast Asia, was still relevant. In total, more than 5.1 million people arrived in this territory. The largest flow rushed there from China in the 1920s. However, due to the economic crisis in the next decade, migrants' businesses went bankrupt, and they had to return home. Thus, for example, the number of those who returned to China was recorded, which exceeded the number of those who left by 354 thousand people [10]. Thus, by 1949, the second stage of Chinese migration was completed. Since the emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, a new stage has begun that has greatly changed the situation of the Chinese. China applied the Soviet model of building socialism and introduced strict regulation regarding migration processes, which reduced the migration activity of the population, and crossing borders among the Chinese became impossible. The only opportunity to leave the country at that moment was to receive an education, only in the countries of the socialist camp, for example, in the Soviet Union and others. In the period from 1965 to 1976, traveling abroad with any personal intentions was condemned by both society and the state and was equated with betrayal of the homeland. Even entire families of emigrants came under severe repression.

As a result, it should be noted that migration processes of this period were practically absent, which followed the adoption of the new political course of the Chinese Communist Party.

4 Causes and Features of Migration Processes in China at the End of the Twentieth Century

The situation began to change dramatically in 1978, when China abandoned the Soviet model of creating socialism and adopted its own political course to build socialism with Chinese characteristics, marking the beginning of a period of reform and opening up. This led to a new wave after stagnation in migration processes both within the state and abroad. However, it should be noted that in Southeast Asia, the

Chinese increasingly began to face discrimination, violence, and xenophobia, which prompted them to return to China and change the direction of migration movements. Nevertheless, diasporas around the world continued to develop and replenish with immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, as well as Chinese born in another territory.

Thus, the Chinese population began to grow stronger and replenish in the territories of Europe and North and South America, becoming more than 6 times larger [11]. The reason for internal migration was the demographic situation expressed in an increase in population due to the highest birth rate, due to the lack of proper control over this process. In addition, it is known that by 1978 the Chinese population increased by 40%. The new policy also contributed to an increase in the birth rate. In this regard, already in 1979, China had to take a policy of one child per family. Despite this introduction, growth continued well into the 2000s [12].

In terms of population, China is at the top of the ranking, along with countries such as India and the United States. It should be noted that a significant part of the population lives in the eastern, central, and coastal regions of China, especially in the waterways of such rivers as the Yellow River, Yangtze River, and Pearl River. According to data for 1981, overpopulation occurred to a greater extent in the provinces and villages, exceeding the urban population by 4 times, and the labor force exceeded the urban population by more than 3 times.

The internal migration program began work in 1990, when at that time the number of residents who moved had increased 5.8 times by 2000 (from 21 million to 122 million people). In addition, in 2006 there were more than 530 million rural residents, provided that only 220 million could be provided with work. Thus, a surplus population of 310 million people was forced to move to the cities. This, in our opinion, is an example of forced internal migration. It is worth noting that unemployment continued to rise in cities. For example, 4% of the registered urban population (seven million people) were unemployed (this statistic does not take into account the country's situation in rural areas) [13]. Transformations in the 90 s in the economic sphere, affecting the work of enterprises, led to the release of a workforce of six million people. Thus, by the beginning of the 2000s, a new term "shahai" appeared—more qualified workers were transferred to work in foreign organizations and enterprises. The problem of unemployment also affected students and graduates who, despite having diplomas, still could not get a job, increasing the unemployment rate. According to statistics, the percentage of young people under 35 years old and unemployed in 1998 was 60%, and the total number of unemployed was 45%. It was these factors that became the main reasons for the migration of highly qualified personnel to better-paid jobs abroad.

Despite the rapid growth of the economy in the 90 s, another reason causing the mass migration of the Chinese population is the low cost of labor. In addition, the structure and procedure for departure took a new form and underwent a number of changes. There has been a kind of liberalization of society, its everyday and way of life. With these changes, the number of work and study trips has increased.

There were also historical and cultural reasons for migration. Migration has always been a chance for success in finding a better life. Thus, in some provinces,

for example, Fujian and Zhejiang, migration processes have been developing for a long time, infrastructure has been improved, exit routes for migrants have been provided, and there have already been conditions for the reception and adaptation of migrants abroad.

Thus, entire generations have been creating and shaping a migration culture abroad for quite a long time, encouraging new generations to “follow in their footsteps” and at the same time find their own path to a better life.

It is known that in the modern world, the annual migration flow is up to 1.5 million people. In the 1980s and early 1990s, approximately 200 thousand residents emigrated, one-fifth of whom left illegally. By the 2000s, the number of migrants had already more than doubled, to 513 thousand people per year. Thus, according to the Ministry of Affairs of China, since the introduction of new reforms, more than 18 million people have left China. And the Chinese diaspora over two decades of the twentieth century expanded to 2.4% [14].

5 “New” Wave of Chinese Migration in the Modern World

In the modern world, namely during the period 2010–2022, migration policy has faced various changes. We should start with the fact that internal migration and the relocation of people from villages to cities cause a number of problems, including the problem of unbalanced development of territories [15]. There are three stages of interprovincial migration: from the 80 s to 2010, then 2010–2015, and the third stage from 2015 to the present. At the first stage, the population was sent to the coastal regions (Guangdong and Zhejiang), where economic zones were specially created for their further development, and subsequently, where a sharp and rapid growth of industry began. At the second stage, migration to the central and western parts is traced due to strong competition. At the third stage, since 2015, there has been a gradual outflow of population from the overpopulated areas of the southeastern part of China in favor of the undeveloped West to create large urban agglomerations. It is assumed that the situation in the migration field will change significantly by 2030 [16]. For example, the usual influx of migrants into coastal areas will be reduced to at least one-third of the level of the first stage. In addition, enterprises began to move more often into the interior of the country and also located in free economic zones. A logical consequence of the reorganization of enterprises was the outflow of population following the relocation of the enterprise, as well as a decrease in social and demographic pressure from densely populated areas. At the same time, one can note the increasing importance of the quality of the workforce and the transformation of coastal areas into centers of high-tech development.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, China can be divided into four groups of regions, distinguished by a positive or negative trend in population influx. Thus, in the central and southern regions the influx of population will be positive, and, for example, in the northern part of the country—a negative trend.

To develop the modernization process, it was necessary to continue and develop the urbanization process. To achieve this, the Chinese government announced the creation of “urban clusters” throughout the country while highlighting certain areas. A significant event was the abolition of the “*hu-kou*” system—household registration—in 2013. According to the authorities, this relaxation was supposed to give impetus to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as for key population groups, considering university and college graduates [17]. It seems to us that the ongoing process of urbanization is attracting new flows of migrants. According to Chinese experts, there is an assumption that by 2030 more than 80% of the total population of China will be distributed among 19 urban agglomerations, with 20% concentrated in less significant areas, and 60% will occupy the territory of the seven largest agglomerations, such as the deltas of the Yangtze and Pearl. It is expected that the number of megacities with a population of more than ten million will increase to at least 10, and the population in at least 12 agglomerations will exceed 20 million people. This confirms the position regarding the growth of migration flows to large agglomerations. It should be taken into account that migration from villages to cities requires certain costs from the state, both as part of the development of programs for a better way of living and in terms of financing (promised social security for new arrivals). Labor migration entails a change in family values, the usual way of life, and the family. At the same time, urbanization is an integral part of the country’s economic development. It is envisaged that the population of 61 cities in China will grow rapidly in the next 10 years, up to 89%. It is possible that new cities will emerge and be built from scratch [15].

In addition, we can say that the PRC plans to build new megacities and high-tech centers. For example, the New Xiong’an Zone, 100 km from Beijing, is being developed. The adoption of such decisions in matters of urbanization is intended to reduce the burden on the most densely populated centers at the moment, as well as to ensure a better life for the population through relocation to cities. We can conclude that in 10 years, two out of three Chinese residents will live not in agricultural areas but in cities.

In modern times, Chinese migrants choose different destinations around the world, from nearby Asian countries to the borders of Oceania. A larger percentage of migrants come from Asian countries (46.4%). A slightly smaller percentage of Chinese choose the American direction (33.4%). Europe and Oceania account for only 11.2% and 6.9% of migrants, respectively. The smallest percentages go to Latin America (1.3%) and Africa (0.6%). Considering the favorable and partnership relations between China and Russia, migration processes are intensifying. Thus, there are 56,000 legal migrants from China in Russia [18].

Following their traditional views, the Chinese, when migrating, preferred to stay in close proximity and maintain their community. A striking example is the people from the southern coastal provinces. As a rule, they went to the same places as their ancestors, maintaining their type of activity. It is worth noting that over time, the Chinese worldview has changed in favor of independent choice of both the place of migration and the type of activity in the new territory [19].

The above influenced the ethnological composition of diasporas, which in turn became more diverse in social, cultural, and political senses [20].

The professional characteristics of Chinese migrants have changed. Among them, there are more educated and financially secure people. In addition, many specialists have appeared in such fields as science, programming, and entrepreneurship. For example, the famous Motorola company in Chicago employs at least 400 Chinese migrants [21].

Today, Chinese migrants place less importance on their national identity, preferring active integration into the society of residence, but maintaining strong ties with their country. The Chinese leadership, in turn, follows a policy of supporting overseas Chinese. For example, to instill feelings of patriotism among the younger generation, the state organizes special trips “Communication with Chinese roots” [22].

The current stage of the “new wave” of migration has contributed to the development of Chinese schools and media in other countries. For example, media founded by Chinese migrants are widely distributed in Europe and America, promoting information about the social, cultural, economic, and political development of the PRC, as well as the successes and achievements of the country.

A feature of the “new wave” of migrants should be considered the business associations they created, the purpose of which is to unite Chinese entrepreneurs on a patriotic basis as well as to introduce China to the world economy through transnational activities. Thus, close cooperation allows Beijing to control global Chinese networks.

As a result, we can conclude that the PRC is trying in every possible way to support its compatriots in foreign territories in every possible way. China also openly encourages Chinese people to lead an active social life, encourages them to open and do business, as well as join the Chinese association, dissemination of ideas and culture of China for a closer acquaintance of the world with this country.

6 Conclusion

Thus, to summarize, we can say that migration processes are closely related to the development of the state from the very beginning of its formation.

From ancient times to the end of the nineteenth century, migration processes in China developed widely, including in countries such as Vietnam, Russia, and the United States. The experience of Chinese migration to the United States turned out to be largely negative, while to Russia and Vietnam, it was beneficial to all parties.

In the twentieth century, migration necessitated its regulation, which was implemented thanks to exit visas. In addition, the situation of the Chinese in foreign territories began to worsen due to their discrimination. Thus, the number of migrants who returned to their homeland exceeded the number of those who left. It can be noted that the adopted Soviet model of building socialism significantly reduced migration activity, even to the point of bans on leaving the country.

In 1978, China took a new course toward building socialism with Chinese characteristics, which influenced changes in migration processes. Chinese migrants increasingly headed to Europe, North America, and South America. Internal migration processes were associated with the aggravation of the demographic situation in the country caused by the rapid birth rate. Population growth in villages and provinces far outpaced urban growth, which in turn prompted the state to take measures to accelerate the urbanization process.

The “New Wave” brought its own changes to migration processes: the attitude of Chinese migrants to migration, namely to professional activity and the importance of nationality, changed, diasporas around the world increased quantitatively, and China adopted a policy of active support for compatriots abroad.

Thus, it seems to us that migration processes occurring throughout all historical periods in certain countries were, are, and will be an important form of international economic relations.

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Migrants from Post-Soviet States and the Field of Legal Interpreting in Contemporary Russia



Elena Maslovskaya

1 Introduction

One of the highly contentious topics in migration studies scholarship is migrants' access to justice. Despite the large diversity of approaches to this issue, not much has been said about how migrants gain access to justice in non-Western migration regimes and the role played by legal interpreters in this process. At the same time, much of the literature is based on case studies of immigrant groups in Western-type democracies where the rule of law is strongly embedded in the national culture, while we know little about these processes in non-Western societies such as Russia that have become key "migration hotspots" worldwide in the past two decades.

Unequal access to justice for different social groups is a persistent problem in the legal sphere in today's Russia. During court hearings, parties to the proceedings use different forms of capital in order to substantiate their positions. It can be the cultural and symbolic capital of highly qualified lawyers or the social capital of connections within the legal institutions. As a result, it becomes possible to ensure adequate quality of investigation and sometimes termination of criminal proceedings or revision of a biased sentence. However, the lack of financial and social capital does not allow ordinary litigants to hire a qualified lawyer who would define the tactics of defense. Migrants from post-Soviet states mostly lack the relevant capital, and thus, they are in a particularly vulnerable position in court trials.

While it is widely believed that in Western societies legal interpreters can function as cultural mediators and they are mostly able to facilitate migrants' access to justice, a different situation can be seen in non-Western migration regimes such as today's Russia. In the Russian context, migrant workers from other post-Soviet

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states have become an object of research with special attention to the role of informal practices [1, 2]. However, there has been relatively little scholarly investigation of how migrants build their relationship with the law. Although in some works [3–5] migrants' experiences with the Russian justice system have been analyzed, such studies focused mostly on typical administrative cases, particularly in Moscow. The role of legal interpreters in cases involving foreign national defendants has been considered in Western countries [6–8] but not in Russia. Nevertheless, studying the professional activities of legal interpreters is essential for understanding the connection between migration policy, the realities of cultural diversity, and the peculiarities of law enforcement practices in contemporary Russia.

The purpose of this article is to enhance migration studies scholarship through an analysis of the interaction of interpreters with different groups of actors in criminal justice proceedings involving migrants in a weak rule of law regime. The main focus of the article is on interpreters who participate in legal proceedings involving migrants from post-Soviet states in today's Russia. It should be noted that most of such interpreters are themselves migrants from these states representing different ethnic groups and cultural backgrounds. They form a distinct segment within a broader field of legal interpreting. The article analyzes the peculiarities of that field in Russia and devotes particular attention to interpreting agencies specializing in the languages of the peoples of post-Soviet states. The author investigates the use of different types of capital by legal interpreters and discusses various forms of interaction between interpreters and legal professionals, foreign national defendants, and members of their diasporas.

2 Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Base of the Study

The complexity of the role of a legal interpreter has contributed to the emergence of opposing views on the issue of the functions of an interpreter. Within the framework of the “translation studies” approach, the viewpoint prevailed for a long time, according to which a legal interpreter should literally reproduce what was said from one language to another while maintaining neutrality and remaining “invisible” [9]. In other words, it was assumed that in the course of training and professional practice, patterns of servility and invisibility are formed, which determine the translation habitus [10].

However, the “cultural turn” in the social sciences led to an increase in interest in the cultural context of interpreting. Within this broad perspective, the inequality of participants in communication was revealed, and it was demonstrated that interpreting cannot be neutral. The legal interpreter began to be considered an active participant in communicative interaction. One of the main tasks of an interpreter was to support the detainee or defendant as a figure inferior to the prosecution, which had superior power resources. Interpreting became correlated “with the struggle for decolonization and political rights, and interpreters became involved in promoting the emancipation of marginalized and discriminated groups” [11, p. 140].

A broad understanding of the role of an interpreter in legal proceedings was presented in the works of a number of authors who defended the viewpoint that a legal interpreter can significantly influence the “construction” of a criminal case, acting as an expert in the field of linguistics, culture, and even law of the country of the accused, as well as representing to jurists a more humanistic image of the accused [7, 12]. Empirical research has shown that interpreters increasingly see themselves as cultural mediators. In the course of discussion of the possible consequences of this trend, a number of researchers drew attention to the fact that equating the activities of an interpreter with cultural mediation results in ambivalence and uncertainty in understanding the role and functions of an interpreter and may adversely affect the professionalization of community interpreting [13].

There has also been a “sociological turn” in the understanding of interpreting as a practice carried out in a specific social context. Authors of sociologically oriented studies focused on the process of training legal interpreters and the functioning of their professional associations, the self-presentation of interpreters, their working conditions, and the role of an interpreter in a legal context [14–16]. In some works, separate concepts of the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu were used but not his approach to the formation of professional groups and stratification within them. At the same time, such characteristics constituting the interaction between legal professionals and interpreters as the asymmetry of power relations and the differing goals and interests of these groups of actors have been analyzed insufficiently. It should be noted that in the Russian context, this kind of asymmetry of power relations is more conspicuous than in the Western legal orders.

The main sociological concepts developed by Bourdieu (field, habitus, capital, and symbolic dominance) bring analytical originality to the explanation of why some interpreters fully support the law enforcer and take the side of the investigation, others seek to help the accused, and still others try to a certain extent “to please” both parties, following their own career and financial interests. Rather than presuming the existence of interpreters as a professional group, Bourdieu’s relational and dynamic perspective directs our attention to the contested process of its formation, and this proves to be very relevant to the situation in today’s Russia. This approach helps reveal how the competitive struggle between holders of different types of capital often focuses on the localization and significance of the boundaries of professional groups, contributing to their formation and transformation. Finally, drawing on Bourdieu’s insight into the nature of symbolic power [17] and extending Kim’s interpretation of his ideas [18, p. 358], we can argue that law enforcement agencies play a central role in shaping positional struggles in the field of interpreting.

In addition, Bourdieu’s concept of the juridical field is relevant to the study of the interaction between legal professionals and legal interpreters [19, 20]. This concept allows us to reveal the specifics of interaction between actors with different interests and resources. The juridical field is a social space organized around the conversion of conflicts between different parties into juridically regulated debates between professionals. According to Bourdieu, the formation of a juridical field involves the establishment of a boundary between holders of legal capital and nonlawyers. Within the framework of the logic of the functioning of the juridical field, the latter

can only act as clients of specialists with the necessary competence or be used by them instrumentally. Drawing on Bourdieu's approach, we may argue that the character of interaction between law enforcers and legal interpreters reflects the structure of relationships between the juridical field and the field of interpreting, which can be regarded as a case of institutional and symbolic domination.

However, the interpreter's potential ability to influence the course of interaction and the "construction" of a case largely depends on a number of factors, including the specifics of the interpreting agency as an organizational structure. On the basis of Bourdieu's theory, we can regard the interpreting agency as a configuration of positions and dispositions of actors. To join an interpreting agency, a potential employee must have a certain composition of characteristics, that is, types of specific capital. In particular, Bourdieu demonstrates the importance of such forms of capital as cultural and symbolic ones. At the same time, ethnic capital also becomes significant in legal interpreting. It represents a set of material and symbolic resources, access to which is facilitated by belonging to a certain ethnic group [18, pp. 357–359]. The use of an approach based on Bourdieu's concept for understanding ethnic capital allows us to reveal how migrants, in response to the requirements of the host state, "invest" their ethnic capital and, ultimately, build their own strategies and effectively use their resources [21, pp. 264–265].

From the viewpoint of Bourdieu's approach, disagreements and conflicts in interpreting agencies can be explained as a consequence of the awareness of the growing discrepancy between the employee's habitus and his/her position in the organization. Since any interpreting agency is embedded in a network of relationships with other organizations within the legal field and a wider complex of different fields, the result of the struggle within the agency is determined not only by the internal organizational structure but also by the symbolic capital of actors acquired outside the organization. In turn, the results of conflicts can take the form of strategic actions, leading to a change in the dynamics of the organization.

The research approach applied in the present study is a qualitative one. The techniques combined in the study are nonparticipant observation of court proceedings and semi-structured interviews. The study is based on 29 semi-structured interviews with interpreters, heads of interpreting agencies, investigators, and advocates in three big Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod), which were conducted in 2019 and in the first 2 months of 2020. In addition, materials from the websites of interpreting agencies and nonprofit organizations providing social and legal assistance to migrant workers have been used.

Semi-structured interviews enabled me to ask follow-up questions and provide the informants with the opportunity to talk more freely and include aspects of their activity they found relevant and/or interesting, which were not covered by the interview guide. The guide was also honed during the study to include relevant themes that developed during the initial interviews. An "active interviewing" [22] approach was thus used that also included references to specific cases in order to bring the interview to life. All of the informants are anonymized and any details which may reveal their identities have also been removed or altered while retaining contextual accuracy.

The choice of participants centered on interpreters from the languages of the peoples of the post-Soviet states, such as Uzbek, Tajik, Kirghiz, Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani. The largest group of informants were interpreters from the Uzbek language. Since the use of legal interpreters in civil matters was assumed to be less common than in criminal cases, advocates whose specialties included criminal law were prioritized in participant recruitment. Among the informants who represented the legal profession including investigators and advocates, there were approximately the same number of men and women. However, women tended to be younger in both of these subgroups. Most of the women were from 25 to 30 years old, while men were mostly more than 35 years old. Men predominated among legal interpreters from the languages of the peoples of Central Asian states. Female interpreters were usually those who were born and lived in these states but were not ethnically Uzbek or Tajik. Among interpreters from the languages of the peoples of Transcaucasian states, men and women were represented approximately equally.

3 The Peculiarities of the Field of Legal Interpreting in Contemporary Russia

The field of legal interpreting in Russia is weakly structured. Entry into this field does not require any confirmation of special skills and competencies or credentials. According to Russian law, only fluency in the relevant language is necessary for legal interpreting. In other words, the boundaries of this field are blurred, and their establishment and maintenance require significant efforts on the part of individual and institutional actors. In Bourdieu's terminology, the space of legal interpreting can be characterized as an area of structural uncertainty.

At the same time, the field of legal interpreting is stratified. Interpreting agencies differ in their legal status, the range of areas in which they operate, and the specifics of network relations outside the field of interpreting. In large interpreting agencies that occupy top positions in the field, employees work with a wide range of foreign languages in oral and written formats and act in various areas from international conferences to courts and medical institutions. The main criterion for selecting employees in such agencies is the presence of an incorporated form of cultural capital. Agencies specializing in interpreting the languages of the peoples of the former Soviet republics form a separate lower segment of the field. In this social and professional space, actors are guided by the rules that have been developed informally in the daily practice of interaction with law enforcement bodies as their main customers. For these agencies, interpreting in courts and police departments is one of the main areas of activity, and the recruiting pool of employees is, first of all, diasporas.

The current situation in Russia is characterized by an almost complete lack of training for interpreters speaking the languages of the post-Soviet countries. In addition, there is no system of accreditation or certification of legal interpreters as

well as no official requirement to pass qualifying exams in order to obtain the right to interpret in court proceedings or at the pretrial stage of crime investigation. However, the international experience of the functioning of the institution of legal interpreting confirms the difference between interpreters who have received specialized training and those who possess only knowledge of the required language as a mother tongue [14, 23]. At the same time, in interviews, some informants emphasized the importance of not only linguistic training but also the need to master legal terminology and knowledge of legal procedures: “It is not enough to be a philologist, it is important to know procedures and legal terms, the vocabulary here is specialized” (legal interpreter, Nizhny Novgorod).

Another problem is the absence of a unified register of legal interpreters. As a result, the search for an interpreter is often carried out by law enforcement officers and sometimes the judiciary who use their personal or professional connections. This search is more difficult outside the big cities: “Recently an Azerbaijani offender was arrested in Chuvashia and there are no interpreters from Azerbaijani there, although there are many interpreters from German, French, English, [...] so our colleagues had to go to Moscow, but I don’t know how much it cost them to find someone who agreed to work with them” (investigator, Moscow). Since law enforcement officers are not able to assess the competence of a potential legal interpreter and Russian legislation does not specify any additional procedures for this, as a rule, legal professionals confine themselves to checking the certificate of an interpreting agency employee. However, the presence of such a certificate, according to informants, does not guarantee the necessary education and set of competencies: “until recently it was easy to deceive in court [...], court clerks looked at the certificate and did not even ask if there was any education, they did not check, they did not require to show a diploma” (legal interpreter, St. Petersburg). Overall, the competence of an interpreter and the quality of written translation are assessed by a judge or investigator in each individual case, and their assessment is valid only for that particular case.

Since the qualification of an interpreter is usually assessed purely formally, from time to time, there are situations that reveal a lack or an absence of relevant competence. In particular, according to informants, not all interpreters are equally skilled in both interpreting and (written) translation. Some of them are engaged only in interpreting. The informants emphasized that they do not trust such colleagues because “if he understands the meaning of all words, knows Russian, why can’t he translate [...] it means he doesn’t know, there is no higher education [...]” (legal interpreter, Moscow). The response to such cases is usually the use by law enforcement personnel of a kind of peer review. Investigators turn to those interpreters whose qualifications they already trust with a request to review and evaluate the translation of documents performed by other interpreters. In turn, the judges “look at who accurately and on time completes written translations, and they are asked to check texts translated by others” (legal interpreter, St. Petersburg). Legal interpreters consider such requests as proof of their professional status although they are aware that in some cases, such treatment may be caused by the desire of the judge or investigator to transfer responsibility for their mistakes to the interpreter.

In contemporary Russia, the market of interpreting services is represented by commercial organizations. Over the past 15–20 years, interpreting agencies specializing in the languages of the post-Soviet countries have appeared in big cities. The founders of such agencies are generally former migrants who have received Russian citizenship. At present, there are several dozen agencies in Moscow and St. Petersburg that compete in the market of interpreting services. The majority of migrant workers are concentrated in cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. The number of migrant workers in Nizhny Novgorod is not so considerable yet, but it is growing. In Nizhny Novgorod, the existing interpreting agencies are nonspecialized, and almost all of them have been founded by linguists or jurists with additional linguistic education.

4 Professional Characteristics and Modes of Behavior of Legal Interpreters

Legal interpreting has been classified as a profession that is not yet associated with a clearly defined professional trajectory with specific access rules, a recognized level of social prestige, and calculated chances of earning an income [24]. Due to the weakly institutionalized exchange relationship between investment and social recognition, such professions, including the profession of legal interpreter, give rise to short-term biographical strategies of a precarious nature. This is also characteristic of contemporary Russia. For most legal interpreters, this type of activity is not the only one. Usually, this work is combined with other types of employment: from petty trade to teaching at school or working in a small industry. The majority of legal interpreters are migrant workers themselves. According to interviews, relatively few interpreters who are not Russian citizens have permission to work in this capacity. The interviewed heads of interpreting agencies noted that some of the employees moved from the former Soviet republics to Russia for permanent residence and decided to use the knowledge of their mother tongue to earn an additional income. The work of a legal interpreter is also of particular interest to second-generation migrants studying at law faculties. They seek to learn “from the inside” about the peculiarities of the functioning of the law enforcement and judicial systems to acquire social capital before starting to work in their specialty.

Since there is no accreditation system as a basis for securing the professional status of legal interpreters, it seems that the role of professional filters could be performed by interpreting agencies. However, as the study demonstrates, interpreting agencies are acting in accordance with the market logic of profit maximization. First of all, the agency as a service provider focuses on the requests of customers—law enforcement and judicial authorities—and tries to meet their expectations and needs. The mode of recruiting interpreters is also largely determined by a set of requirements from the institutional actors of the legal field.

In the agencies that constantly work with the police and the bodies of inquiry, the requirements for the qualifications of employees, according to informants, are low: "It doesn't matter at all what kind of education a person has, the main thing is being a native speaker, no special skills are required" (legal interpreter, St. Petersburg). In courts, the interpreting process is public and a large volume of documents must be translated, and this implies higher requirements for legal interpreters. The heads of interpreting agencies who work mainly with the courts emphasize that they value their reputation and hire only trusted people, collecting information about them within the diasporas. Overall, when selecting employees, the head of an agency is guided by two main principles. First, the rarer the language is needed, the fewer requirements are placed on a potential legal interpreter. Second, the search for employees is carried out mostly through acquaintances, friends, and members of the diaspora, whose recommendation or patronage often plays a decisive role.

The interviews allow us to conclude that the working conditions of legal interpreters can vary significantly depending on work experience, the rarity of the languages they speak, the interest of law enforcement officials or court staff in working with a particular interpreter, and the ability to build informal relationships with the head of the interpreting agency. For example, an interpreter can make an agreement with the head of the agency that he/she receives money in cash for all kinds of work except the translation of the indictment, which is "the largest document" (legal interpreter, Moscow). However, according to the interviews, from time to time, there are conflicts between the head and employees within the interpreting agency. Although the pretexts for conflict may vary, one of the main reasons is an interpreter's assertion of his/her professional autonomy. As the professional status of the interpreter strengthens and he/she becomes more confident in the constant receipt of requests from law enforcers, the legal interpreter begins to realize the imbalance between his/her symbolic capital and position in the agency. Some interpreters try to defend their right to special working conditions, including the ability to independently determine which request to accept and which to refuse, whether "to keep remuneration for interpretation in full, giving to the agency only the money for written translation" (legal interpreter, Moscow).

The complex structure of interaction of an interpreter with the prosecution and defense parties, pursuing opposite goals, contributes to the formation of various modes of his/her behavior, which depend, among other things, on the size of the diaspora, the density of social ties, and ethnic solidarity. In relatively small and solidary diasporas, the attitude toward the work of a legal interpreter is ambivalent: "They know about my work, but they don't say anything, they don't want to do it themselves, but this work does not make me an outcast" (legal interpreter, St. Petersburg). At the same time, the interpreter who focuses on the diaspora as a reference group realizes that members of the diaspora observe his/her behavior receiving information from the relatives of the accused. Ultimately, the interpreter is forced to take into account the presence of various interest groups, both the diaspora and law enforcement bodies: "I remember that the investigator may call me in the future and if he/she calls you, he/she pays you money, so it's not good to spoil relations with her/him, and then I still have to meet with these people [the accused] and their

relatives in the community, so I have to satisfy both parties” (legal interpreter, Moscow).

Another mode of behavior is characteristic of large diasporas in which close and trusting relationships exist mainly among relatives or fellow villagers. In particular, migrants from the Central Asian states respect the work of a legal interpreter, which is considered prestigious. At the same time, there are no negative connotations connecting the interpreter with work for state bodies of the host country. In addition, interpreters who were born and lived part of their lives in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan may not be ethnic Uzbeks or Tajiks, and this allows them to follow their own career and financial interests. It is among interpreters from the Uzbek and Tajik languages that stratification is more pronounced. Some of them work only with the police; others interact with the investigating authorities and work in courts only at the request of advocates or investigators.

5 Conclusion

While Bourdieu’s sociological approach has been used in migration studies and scholarship of legal interpreters, the potential of his approach for this research has not been fully realized. The present article extends this scholarship by applying the Bourdieusian perspective to a non-Western migration regime. The study demonstrated that the field of legal interpreting in today’s Russia is weakly structured but stratified. The limits of competence and the type of behavior of the interpreter from the languages of the peoples of post-Soviet states are mostly defined by his/her position within the professional community and also legal and social characteristics such as the legal status, the level of education, the experience of professional work in the host country, and work with state bodies in the home country. The model of interpreter’s behavior partly depends on the size of a diaspora, the degree of ethnic solidarity, and the density of social ties. As the present study demonstrates, various forms of capital can be used by interpreters in their activities, including ethnic and social capital. The study reveals the importance of cultural and symbolic capital as the main drivers of dynamics within interpreting agencies.

Bourdieu’s concept of the juridical field is also highly relevant for understanding the interpreters’ interaction with representatives of the juridical profession. Legal interpreters as a professional group are subject to external structural pressure from the investigation bodies and courts. The research results allow us to make a conclusion that the peculiarities of the recruitment of interpreters largely depend on the requirements of institutional actors of the juridical field. At the same time, actors of that field influence the positional struggle within the field of interpreting. It has been found in the study that the current structure of the juridical field in Russia presupposes the reproduction of a homologous stratification of the community of legal interpreters. This results in permanent working relations of certain groups of interpreters only with the police and investigation bodies. Besides, investigators demonstrate a lack of interest in working with interpreters who possess a high level of

cultural capital, but they mostly prefer interpreters who can be easily controlled and manipulated.

The institutionalized foundations of power of law enforcers, asymmetry of power relations in the juridical field, and weak positions of the legal interpreters impose considerable structural limitations on the activities of the latter. At the same time, the existence of the diaspora as a reference group does not allow interpreters to identify themselves completely with law enforcement bodies that act as their “employers” and provide them with the possibilities to continue their professional careers. Under the structural and cultural pressure from two sides—law enforcers and the diaspora—the legal interpreter is compelled to demonstrate loyalty to both of them by maneuvering between opposing interests. However, most of the interpreters lack the relevant cultural and symbolic capital that could allow them to resist external pressures and strengthen their positions within the field of interpreting.

The peculiarities of the work of legal interpreters in contemporary Russia, which have been revealed in the study, confirm the need for a complex set of measures. First, the primary task is to improve the legislation that defines the process of choosing interpreters by the judicial and law enforcement bodies and check the level of their professional competence. It is important to work out and adopt a special law such as the Court Interpreters Act in the USA and create a system of accreditation or certification of legal interpreters. Second, although Russia follows the continental model of professionalization which is characterized by the leading role of state bodies, an important task is the creation of professional organizations, a professional standard, and an ethical code of legal interpreters. Third, it is necessary to introduce educational programs for legal interpreters, including programs of continuing education following the example of EU states, such as Sweden. Fourth, there is also a need to develop training programs for jurists who work in legal proceedings involving interpreters. However, it would not be sufficient to certify legal interpreters and to strengthen control of the quality of their work. It is necessary to change the structural conditions of interactions between jurists and legal interpreters, which reproduce the specific stratification among interpreters and the preference of law enforcement bodies for working with interpreters of varying qualifications. These measures could facilitate equal access to justice for migrants as a particularly vulnerable group.

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China–Neighboring Countries’ Humanistic Exchanges and the Building of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy: Cases of China–Myanmar and China–Nepal Buddhist Cultural Exchanges



Wan Lihong, Cai Na, and Liu Lanbo

1 Humanities Exchange and A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy

After the end of the Cold War, along with the further development of international society and the diversification of international politics, the issue of soft power raised by Joseph Nye, an American scholar, has continued to receive attention globally. Cultural diplomacy, featuring “direct contact with foreign people” [1], has become a major means of building soft power for many countries. The practice of cultural diplomacy, a recent term though, boasts a history of at least several centuries in human societies [2]. Universally, the core of a country’s culture is inseparable from its local religion, and religion-related culture has become a major force influencing the societies and people of various countries. On this basis, writers and scholars at home and abroad have proposed and discussed religious diplomacy which has two different definitions in a broad sense and in a narrow sense [3]. Most Chinese scholars believe that religious diplomacy refers to diplomatic activities initiated and guided by the government, with the participation of believers from different religious traditions. Its core content is to promote religious understanding, cultural exchange, mutual learning, and friendship. The broad interpretation holds that traditional political and economic diplomacy ignores the religious aspects of cultural beliefs, that the two can complement each other, and that religious diplomacy is part

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of public diplomacy. On the other hand, the narrow interpretation argues that, unlike secular traditional diplomacy, religious diplomacy is a kind of diplomacy with religious values at its core. Israel Rafalovich believes that religious diplomacy has a special impact and is essential in reinforcing the core values necessary for people with different cultural backgrounds to live together in some degree of harmony [4]. Since the vast majority of people in the world differ in religious beliefs, the promotion of religious and cultural exchanges has essentially played a very prominent role in the cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy of today's international community.

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government leadership, with President Xi Jinping at its helm has put forward the forward-looking and magnificent concept of building "A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind" [5]. This major concept was formally declared again at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2022. On this basis, China has made unremitting efforts to promote the building of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind together with other countries around the world, especially its neighboring countries. During this process, China strives to achieve common development with other countries and promote the communication of global nations by taking a new path of international cooperation.

2 China–Myanmar Buddhist Cultural Exchange and A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy

Myanmar lies in Southeast Asia, connecting the South-Central Peninsula (Southeast Asia) and the Indian Peninsula (South Asia), and is a neighboring country of China. Thousands of years ago, since the ancient Silk Road, exchanges between the two sides connected China and Myanmar, as well as Chinese and Burmese people known as the "pauk-phaw" (compatriots) [6], and continue till today. In the 1950s, China and Myanmar jointly advocated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In the 1960s, the two countries, under the spirit of friendly consultation and mutual understanding and accommodation, resolved the historical border issues through friendly consultation, setting a model for the border-issue resolution between countries.

Among the successive cultural and people-to-people exchanges of China–Myanmar, Buddha's Tooth Relic tours laid a solid foundation for public opinion in enhancing friendship between the two countries' people and set an example of Buddhist cultural exchange in the building of diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar as a destiny community. Myanmar is a country with a well-known and long history of Buddhist culture, with about 90% of the population believing in Buddhism, mainly practicing Theravada Buddhism. This branch of Buddhism is closest to the oldest texts in the Buddhist tradition and usually emphasizes a stricter adherence to monastic codes than other Buddhist schools. Buddhism had been the

state religion of Burma since 1044 in the Kingdom of Bagan and was restored for a time in 1961 under the leadership of Prime Minister U Nu [7]. China is also a country with a long history of Buddhism. The three schools of thought—“Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism”—are generally regarded as the core ideas of Chinese culture, with a large number of Buddhist resorts and cultural resources in China, among which the Buddha’s tooth relic enshrined in Lingguang Temple in Beijing has a prominent position. The relics are solid seed-like objects condensed from the cremation of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Lohans, and monks after their death and are rare and valuable. Thus, Buddha’s relics are the remaining relics of Buddha Shakyamuni after his death and cremation, regarded as a Holy Object by the majority of Buddhists, having a high status in the hearts of Buddhists all over the world. According to the Buddhist scriptures, there are different types of relics: the relics of the living body and the relics of the Dharma body, the relics of the whole body and the relics of the broken body, and the relics of the real body and the relics of the shadow bones. Buddha’s tooth is also called Buddha’s tooth relic, the tooth left behind after the cremation of Sakyamuni, regarded as a Holy Object by the majority of Buddhists. As mentioned in the latter part of the Mahaparinirvana Sutra, Buddha’s tooth relics symbolize the rightful authority of the law and a symbol of wisdom and peace. According to Buddhist texts, there are only two Buddha’s tooth relics in the world, one of which is kept in Lingguang Temple in Beijing and the other, which is enshrined in the Buddha’s tooth relics symbolize, Sri Lanka. Therefore, the Buddha’s tooth relic is a sacred object in the hearts of all Buddhists around the world, representing wisdom and peace, and is revered by Buddhists worldwide [8].

The precious and sacred Buddha’s tooth relic in China was worshipped by a large number of Burmese people, and in the mid-twentieth century, the head of the Burmese government came to China to venerate it and requested the Chinese to send it to Burma for a short period of time to be venerated by the people [9]. Thus, the Chinese government, at the invitation of Burma, agreed to the request in accordance with the actual situation, and since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Buddha’s Tooth Relic tours to Burma have been carried out four times successfully. As part of this, the Buddha’s tooth relic in China was escorted to Myanmar by Chinese monastic groups in 1955, 1994, 1996, and 2011, and was venerated by local people in various temples in Myanmar for 236 days, 45 days, 90 days, and 48 days, respectively. The number of people in Myanmar who directly venerated Buddha’s tooth relic increased from about one million to about 20 million, expanding friendship and far-reaching influence. In recent years, the heads of Myanmar government, diplomats, government officials, and members of different communities such as Mr. Thein Sein and Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, visited Beijing Lingguang Temple, paying homage to the Buddha’s tooth relic. Buddhist cultural exchanges play an important role in public diplomacy in the building of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy between China and Myanmar, helping to promote people-to-people contact and mutual appreciation between the two countries. Buddhist culture is the common cultural heritage for the people of China and Myanmar, as the two countries have a long history of friendship since ancient times and have been sending monks to each other for Buddhist

and other cultural exchanges for more than 1000 years. According to Xu Jinxing, the president of the Luoyang Silk Road and Grand Canal Research Association, Myanmar had sent many envoys to Luoyang during the Eastern Han, Tang, Song, and Yuan Dynasties. Myanmar and Luoyang communicate frequently in many aspects [10]. The Myanmar government donated to the work of the White Horse Temple in Luoyang, a Myanmar-style Buddhist temple, which is considered the “origin” and “ancestral temple” of Chinese Buddhism in 2010 and completed in 2014, attracting a large number of Chinese believers.

3 China–Nepal Buddhist Cultural Exchange and A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy

Nepal, located in South Asia, at the southern foot of the Himalayas, is a neighboring country of China, connecting China (East Asia) and India (South Asia). Nepal is not only an important country in the Hindu cultural sphere, but also an important country in Buddhist Culture sphere. As Buddhism was born in the South Asian subcontinent, with the Lumbini region of Nepal being the birthplace of the Buddha, Nepal is considered a destination by Buddhists. At present, the predominant religion in Nepalese society is Hinduism, and only about 10% of the Nepalese population is Buddhist. Tibetan Buddhism is the main school of Buddhism which is practiced there, with ethnic groups of The Tibeto-Burman languages in the northern region of Nepal being the main followers [11]. However, historically, Buddhism flourished in the South Asian subcontinent (including the present-day regions of India and Nepal) and served as a bridge from the heart of India through Nepal to the interior of China via the Tibetan region of China, where the culture of both sides spread and exchanged [12].

So far, Buddhist culture remains in various forms in Nepalese society and culture, with a large number of Buddhist temples, sites, and attractions left. A long history of Buddhist exchange between China and Nepal has been existed. More than 1600 years ago, the Chinese and Nepali monks, Fa Hien and Buddhahadra, visited each other’s countries and translated Buddhist scriptures into Chinese together. In China’s Tang Dynasty (618–907), Nepali Princess Bhrikuti was married to Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo, while the Chinese monk Huen Tsang visited Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, and left many precious written accounts of his pilgrimage. Then in the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368), Arniko, the renowned Nepali architect, led a group of artisans to China and presided over the construction of the White Stupa at the Miaoying Temple in Beijing among several magnificent structures over the country [13]. In 1896, the discovery of the Ashoka Stone Pillar by Kehadkar, an official of a western town of Nepal, and the famous German archaeologist, Fjord Herr, was confirmed by repeated inspections and excavations based on the information recorded in the geography and history book *The Great Tang Western Regions*

(written around 646 AD), which was dictated by Xuanzang, a renowned Buddhist scholar of the Tang Dynasty during the Ch’ing-Guan period of China, and compiled by Fanji.

At the invitation of the United Nations Development Programme, UNESCO, the Lumbini Development Committee formed by the Royal Government of Nepal, and the World Fellowship of Buddhists, the Chinese side funded the design and donation for the Nepal Chinese Temple in the Lumbini region in 1997, and the project was officially inaugurated in 2000. As Chinese President Xi Jinping said during his visit to Nepal in October 2019, the Nepal Chinese Temple in Lumbini has become a symbol of religious and cultural exchange between China and Nepal [14]. Since the establishment of the Nepal Chinese Temple in the Lumbini region of Nepal, the Chinese side has stationed Chinese Buddhist monastic groups and temple abbots to actively participate in Buddhist cultural exchanges and religious dialogues between China and Nepal, as well as to receive visits and homage from local people. After the earthquake of 2015 in Nepal, all members of the Nepal Chinese Temple also actively participated in the Chinese assistance to the disaster-affected areas and people in Nepal. The temple provided refuge to local residents and initiated a disaster relief program to resettle the victims, supporting the post-earthquake reconstruction in Nepal [15]. China has sent two Chinese Buddhist monks—Monk Huai Shan and Monk Yin Shun—to participate in long-term local demonstrations and exchanges of Chinese Buddhist culture, as well as to start exchanges and dialogues with Buddhist and Hindu religious groups in Nepal since the establishment of the temple.

In recent years, Nepal has focused on exploring Buddhist cultural resources in its territory and promoting Buddhist diplomacy, coinciding with China’s diplomatic concept of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind. China and Nepal have stepped up communication and cooperation in the field of Buddhist culture, promoting dialogue between religions and exchange and mutual appreciation of civilizations, which has become an important channel for promoting people-to-people exchanges between the two sides. With the support of China, Nepal has attracted a large number of Chinese people to visit Nepal for its rich Buddhist and other religious and cultural resources, and the exchange and interaction of Buddhist and Hindu cultural resources has become an important way for the people of the two countries to understand each other’s culture and promote people-to-people contacts.

4 Reflections on Religious and Cultural Exchanges in the Building of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy

One of the most direct goals of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy is to strengthen people-to-people Bond and expand the power of equal understanding and peace-loving in the global community. The community of

peripheral destiny is an integral part of the community of human destiny and an important part of the building of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy. The successful cases can become the pioneer version of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy, and the relevant positive exploration and experience can be subsequently promoted through exchange and cooperation with other countries.

International image is an important source of a country's soft power, and religious factors are increasingly becoming a major element of national image. In the era of globalization and information technology, the physical barriers between countries are getting weaker and weaker, and the interactions and contacts between people are getting more and more frequent. Therefore, people's evaluation and preference of a country will be directly influenced by some daily phenomena. Among these, public diplomacy in the form and content of religion cannot be ignored, and the growing demand for religion in the international community has allowed "religious perspectives to be the first to enter public discourse" [16]. With the current trend of rising religiosity among the global public, it is increasingly difficult for countries to avoid or even abandon the religious factors in their public diplomacy efforts. On the contrary, if we change from passive to active, we can find that different religions and cultures can exchange and learn from each other, including contributing to the actual realization of the diplomatic concept of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind.

Generally speaking, in the China–Myanmar Buddhist cultural exchange example, the Chinese side has been spreading Buddhist culture to the Burmese people, and the Burmese side has been actively expanding the introduction, dissemination, and influence of its own Buddhist culture in China. As for China–Nepal's Buddhist cultural exchanges, the Nepalese side disseminates its Buddhist culture to the Chinese people, and the Chinese side also strives to introduce its own Buddhist culture to Nepal, as well as to conduct mutual learning dialogues and exchanges with various local religious groups. As Andrew Leonard wrote in an article named 'Buddha Tooth Relic Diplomacy: China's "Charm Offensive"' in Southeast Asia in 2006, "it's instructive that over the last decade, China has managed to charm its neighbors and solidify diplomatic and economic relationships with its neighbors, while the United States, acting willfully, has been successful in making everyone very, very nervous" [17].

Indeed, China's vision of a Community with A Shared Future for Mankind can be seen as a solution to global governance challenges like zero-sum competition and Cold War mentality. Derived from China's "harmony and coexistence" culture, the vision is by no means a solution for its own interests like the ones advocated by some groups. Indeed, the Chinese government advocates A New Model of International Relations featuring win-win cooperation, which is the vision of A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind. For this vision, A Community with A Shared Future for Mankind Diplomacy and the Belt and Road Initiative are not only direct manifestations but also paths of realizing this concept in political and economic fields.

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Political Ecology Versus Political Geography: BRICS' Peculiarities



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1 Introduction

The aim of our research is to compare two different approaches to understanding the problem of defining Political Geography (PG) as a branch of sciences and Political Ecology (PE) as a new approach with the same aim, and in the same field of research. It is well known that Geography is one of the oldest branches of science and one of its subbranches is Political Geography which appeared much later. Its main task and aim is the study of ways geographic space is organized within and by political processes [1]. PG can include both approaches: natural (on the basis of Physical Geography) and Political (on the basis of Geopolitics). One of the specialists in this field of science, R. Muir considered PG as "... simultaneously one of the most retarded and most undervalued branches of geography and one that offers the greatest potential both for theoretical and practical advance?" [1]. But at the same time, there were many geographers who did not support this "mixture" between Geography and Politics.

Since the mid-1960s, it had become evident that the world's environmental situation was very poor, and it was time to start working on special approaches to improve it. At that time, researchers and specialists believed that two "Ecological Bells" were sounding an alarm: *Silent Spring*, written by Rachel Carson, and the first report to the Club of Rome, titled *The Limits to Growth*. More than a dozen different theoretical solutions to this global problem were proposed, and mathematical modeling of the biosphere was initiated. The UN began to play an important role in this effort, holding four environmental forums that were named "Conferences on

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Environment and Development,” demonstrating that development in a poor and polluted environment is impossible and maintaining a perfect environment without development is also impossible.

We derive the concept of Environmental Diplomacy (ED) from a new branch of science, Social Ecology, which was first mentioned in the mid-1970s. This branch of science is aimed at studying the main process that takes place on our planet—the interaction between human society and the natural environment. With the number of people now approaching 10 billion, it is important to study this process and develop new ways for global human society. Until now, there has been no concrete expression of this idea.

We believe that the ED process will include a new global rule, according to which future countries will put their national environmental interests aside in favor of the common good of all humanity. We realize that it will take time to reach such a point, and it will be necessary to develop and implement a new international environmental law as well as new national environmental regulations. It will also be necessary to promote environmental awareness and culture through social-ecological education included in school, college, and university curricula as well as through new forms of Environmental Diplomacy that will help billions of people on our planet understand that their common goal is to preserve the biosphere, the “thin green layer” on which biological life depends.

We believe that Earth’s environmental situation is a process that will involve a new international agreement, according to which, in the future, modern countries will give up their national environmental interests for the sake of the common good of all humanity. We realize that it will take time to reach such a situation. It will also be necessary to create and implement a new international environmental law, as well as new national environmental regulations. It will be essential to change people’s environmental awareness and culture by including social-ecological education in school, college, and university curricula, and more broadly speaking, through new Environmental Diplomacy to make it clear to billions of people on our planet that our common goal is to preserve the biosphere, also known as “the thin green layer on which biological life is possible.”

2 The Role of PG in Our Day

We have mentioned that on one side the PG was a branch of Geopolitics. The sense of Geopolitics (GP) was proposed in 1916 by a Swedish scientist Rudolf Chellen as a branch of science aimed at researching “a geographical organism in an expanse,” but at the same time, he underlined that he was a student of Fredrick Rachel, who was the father of Geopolitics and was the first one who published the book *Political Geography* in 1897 [2]. However, geopolitics has become discredited due to its association with Nazism and Political Geography as well as Ukrainian neo-Nazism, becoming an ossified subdiscipline of a tired subject, which is often taught but rarely researched. It is a prisoner of outdated theories and concepts. From a

disciplinary perspective, Political Geography could be defined as either a branch of geography or a subfield of political science. From a political science perspective, Political Geography can be defined as the study of political phenomena within their spatial context, as one geographer described it.

It is evident that in our days, when international architecture is rapidly changing, Political Geography starts to play another role and helps modern states to find out the best way in any complicated situation. This fact is especially important considering problem with resources and the reconstruction of old traditional borders, mainly in developing countries as they were broken and shifted during the colonial times. Thus, a political geographer is interested in the homogeneity and heterogeneity of actions within and outside the political unit. A person should attempt to analyze the centrifugal and centripetal forces acting at different speeds [2].

In the globalizing world, Political Geography will play another role and will include such aspects as the natural environment and its interconnection with human society. In our times, it has become possible to rent land with its resources, flora, and fauna in another country thus making another approach to the Political Geography's interests and estimations. Modern superpowers and intercontinental companies also influence geographical situations in our world.

A political geographer of our day has to bear in mind new natural and anthropogenic phenomena, such as climate variations, tsunamis, earthquakes, and so on, which can influence regional as well as global economic trends..

As was said earlier, the main aim of our research was to compare two different understandings: the problem of definitions of Political Geography (PG) as a branch of sciences and Political Ecology (PE) as a new approach to the same aspect, and in the same field of research.

The anthropologist Eric Wolf (1972) is widely recognized as the first scholar to have coined the term "Political Ecology," having done so in his article on the dynamics of land and resource use in the Swiss Alps. This definition is often understood as an approach that links ecological ways of researching with political-economic phenomena [3].

Robert Jason, a Professor at Columbia University, proposed the following definition of PE: "Political Ecology is a critical research field within anthropology, geography, and related disciplines that has become well known for its analyses of how and why structural forces, such as capitalist economic processes and power relations, drive environmental change in an increasingly interconnected world. In the context of the global neo-liberalization of the 1970s and '80s, political ecologists emphasized the crucial role of external forces, such as international development and economic modernization programs, in the restructuring of people's lives and the environment in the Global South. As such, the field has often been linked to interdisciplinary research on environmental change and loss of livelihoods in the context of transnational mining, forestry, agricultural conversion, and natural conservation projects in developing countries" [3].

We can say that since the 1970s, the research method of Political Ecology has evolved from its initial focus on rural lives and landscapes to include concerns with issues of environmental politics and socio-ecological relationships in urban,

industrialized settings as well. In all these contexts, a political ecologist should ask themselves when conducting research in this field—whose use of, claims to, and/or perceptions of the environment prevail, and why? So we have taken this approach in understanding Political Ecology as a branch of science.

Therefore, Political Geography, Political Ecology, and Environmental Diplomacy have recently played an increasingly significant role in international affairs. BRICS is a new international intergovernmental organization that represents different countries that are taking a new path of development. From our point of view, we can understand that these countries, together with most of the countries in the world, see and understand that their populations need to support any new movement to resolve the global socio-environmental crisis. That is why the authors of this chapter have selected this particular association for discussion.

3 BRICS from the Point of View of Political Geography

Political Geography studies the distribution of political phenomena and processes on the earth's surface. It includes the study of borders, territories, political regimes, international relations, and other aspects of political life.

From the point of view of Political Geography, BRICS is a unique entity, since the participating countries are located in different parts of the world and have different political systems, cultures, and economies. Moreover, from the point of view of geopolitics, Russia belongs to the Heartland, China, and India belong to the Rimland, and Brazil and South Africa belong to the Outer and Marginal Crescents [4].

Thus, BRICS has challenged many aspects of Political Geography, going beyond the borders of regions and covering the global space. The formation of the BRICS group was the impetus for the development of the changing geographical and political space and the transformation of the geopolitical map of the world.

According to Brazilian researcher Meena K., the BRICS group is one of the “geographical imaginations” in which the participating countries themselves were able to identify the connection between them and unite on the basis of these common characteristics [5].

Given these features, we cannot attribute a group of five (and from January 1, 2024, 11) states to one of the four levels of Political Geography: basic, auxiliary, regular, and optional levels of the political space. The BRICS group, through its trans-regional interaction, forms a separate mega-regional level.

All elements that relate to the political space are distinguished by legal personality. For example, in his work “Geography of International Relations: Structure and Elements of International Space,” I. Okunev notes the following features and stages of the sovereignty of elements of the mega-regional level:

- The discursive stage: The global geopolitical system
- Structural stage: Trans-regional international organization
- Institutional stage: Trans-regional integration association [5].

Thus, from the point of view of geography, the region represents a homogeneous space and common features. In the classical understanding of international relations and Political Geography, regions are tied to the territory and not to the concept of relations between actors. However, the BRICS group focuses on the concept of relationships and similar characteristics, forming a spatial structure that creates a mega-level of Political Geography.

The participating countries form a new space that influences the transformation of political, social, and cultural relations, which makes it possible to revise the classical understanding of Political Geography in general and the concept of the region in particular.

In terms of Political Ecology, the BRICS countries are playing an increasingly important role in world politics and economics, and their environmental priorities and approaches to solving global environmental problems are becoming increasingly important.

The Political Ecology of the BRICS encompasses many aspects, including:

- Energy policy: The BRICS countries are major energy producers and consumers, and their energy policies can have a significant impact on the global energy system and the environment.
- Environmental standards and regulations: The BRICS countries are developing their own environmental standards and regulations that can influence the activities of international companies and investors.
- International environmental policy: The BRICS countries are actively involved in international environmental agreements and initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement.
- Sustainability and development: The BRICS countries strive for sustainable development and the integration of environmental sustainability into their national development strategies.

Environmental Diplomacy plays a special role in relations between the BRICS countries. This area of cooperation includes environmental protection, sustainable development, adaptation to climate change, and solving problems related to air, water, and soil pollution.

Currently, the BRICS countries are facing various environmental problems, including air and water pollution, deforestation, and climate change (Table 1). The

Table 1 BRICS countries indicators according to the Sustainable Development Index (Environmental Efficiency Index) [6]

Country	Place in the world	Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	10-years changes
Brazil	81	43,6	5,40
Russia	112	37,5	1,6
India	180	18,9	-0,6
China	160	28,4	11,4
South Africa	116	37,2	10,1

table below shows comparative data on the position in the world ranking and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) of the BRICS countries (Table 1).

As we can see, BRICS countries have relatively low positions on the Sustainable Development Index. However, five of these states actively cooperate on using renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, as well as on energy conservation and efficiency. They also work together on biodiversity protection and the conservation of natural resources through the establishment of nature reserves and national parks, for example.

It is essential that the BRICS nations actively collaborate in the area of joint research on ecology and sustainable development as well as exchange expertise and knowledge in this field. This results in the implementation of collaborative projects and programs aimed at enhancing the ecological situation and raising the standard of living for the population.

One of the main areas of BRICS Environmental Diplomacy is cooperation to solve the problem of climate change. The BRICS nations participate in international climate negotiations and advocate for the development and implementation of shared measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prepare for the effects of climate change.

Environmental issues play a significant role in the declarations that are adopted following the BRICS summits. For the first time, the countries addressed the topic of ecology in 2010 at the summit held in Brazil. There, the countries noted the potential of new, sustainable, and environmentally friendly technologies for diversifying the energy mix and creating jobs. They emphasized the importance of utilizing biofuels and renewable energy [7].

In 2012, at a summit in India, it was noted that, given the growing needs of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries in renewable energy sources and energy-efficient and environmentally friendly technologies, the heads of these countries decided to exchange knowledge, techniques, technologies, and best practices in these fields [8].

In 2014, more and more countries paid attention to environmental issues. Following the results of the Brazilian Summit, the leaders of the BRICS countries emphasized their commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity, its protocols, and specifically to the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity for the period 2011–2020 as well as the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Climate change was identified as the most significant challenge. The BRICS countries called on all nations to seek, through decisions made in the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to complete negotiations on a protocol or another regulatory instrument by 2015—an agreement that would be legally binding on all parties, consistent with the principles and regulations of the UNFCCC. Special emphasis was placed on switching to environmentally friendly and renewable energy sources [9].

The Declaration of the 2015 BRICS Summit in Ufa expressed support for the Paris Climate Agreement and declared the intention of BRICS countries to cooperate in solving the problem of climate change and adapting to its consequences [10].

In 2016, the Goa Summit emphasized the need for a balanced approach to environmental aspects of sustainable development and also supported the use of natural gas as an economical and environmentally friendly fuel in order to promote sustainable development. The heads of state recognized the significance of the BRICS countries' involvement in implementing initiatives in the area of cooperation on environmental protection, including the establishment of a platform for the exchange of environmentally friendly technologies [11].

Following the results of the 2017 Summit in China, the BRICS countries reaffirmed their commitments to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and also stressed the importance of cooperation in the field of ecology in the interests of sustainable development of the countries and the well-being of the peoples of the five states [12].

In 2018, the heads of state of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries acknowledged that ecology is an essential component in their fight against poverty eradication by the year 2030. They also noted the progress in creating a platform for cooperation between the BRICS nations on environmentally friendly technologies, with a focus on achieving practical results and uniting partners, scientific organizations, civil society, the private sector, and financial institutions. During the 2018 BRICS summit, a meeting between the ministers of natural resources and ecology was held. During this meeting, the "BRICS Platform for Environmentally Friendly Technologies" was created along with the umbrella program, "Clean BRICS Rivers," and the initiative, "Partnership of Cities for Environmentally Sustainable Development" [13].

In 2019, there was very little attention paid to environmental issues at the summit in Brazil. The only commitment made was to balanced and comprehensive sustainable development in three areas: social, economical, and ecological [14]. This is largely due to the position of the Brazilian president, J. Bolsonaro, on environmental issues and climate change and his aspirations to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement.

In 2020, the Summit in Moscow also paid very little attention to environmental problems. Only the progress made within the framework of the BRICS Environmentally Sound Technologies Platform, including the initiative to create a "matrix" of the Platform, was noted [15].

It was surprising that at the 2021 BRICS Summit in India, a country that has traditionally paid much attention to climate change and environmental issues, commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda was noted [16]. The same was the situation at the 2022 Summit in Beijing [17].

At the BRICS Summit of South Africa in 2023, more attention was given to the ecology of BRICS countries. It was emphasized that there is a desire to create BRICS platforms to implement the Ecosystem of Productivity for Decent Work, in order to create an environmentally sustainable, inclusive economy. They also stressed the importance of implementing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), its Paris Agreement, and the principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities, which facilitate the transfer of low-cost climate technology. The BRICS countries pledged to improve the sustainability of their energy

systems, including crucial energy infrastructure, and to promote the use of clean energy alternatives [18].

Other official documents related to the BRICS, such as the Economic Partnership Strategy until 2025 [19], contain a section dedicated to sustainable development and ecology. This section discusses the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect biodiversity and ecosystems. However, it should be noted that at present, BRICS cooperation in this field is more of a declaration than a practical reality.

4 Conclusion

Thus, the BRICS statements pay attention to various environmental issues, such as air and water pollution, deforestation, and climate change. The BRICS nations recognize that these issues are common to all countries and require international cooperation to address them. The declarations also emphasize the importance of protecting biodiversity and preserving natural resources. The BRICS countries commit to taking measures to protect ecosystems and combat illegal wildlife and plant trade.

BRICS has a significant potential for the formation of Environmental Diplomacy. First, the BRICS countries have extensive experience in the field of environmental protection and sustainable development. Second, they actively cooperate with various international organizations, such as the UN and the World Bank, which allows them to influence the formation of international environmental policy. Third, the BRICS countries are major energy producers and consumers, which makes them important participants in the global energy system. All this makes BRICS an important player in the field of Environmental Diplomacy and sustainable development. To do this, the BRICS countries need to build their vector of Environmental Diplomacy and move to active action.

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9. Fortaleza Declaration (adopted following the results of the sixth BRICS Summit), 2014
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11. Goa Declaration, 2016
12. Xiamen Declaration of the Leaders of the BRICS Countries, 2017
13. Johannesburg Declaration of the Tenth BRICS Summit, 2018
14. Brasilia Declaration of the Eleventh BRICS Summit, 2019
15. Moscow Declaration of the XII BRICS Summit, 2020
16. Declaration of the XIII BRICS Summit – New Delhi, 2021
17. Declaration of the XIV BRICS Summit – Beijing, 2022
18. Johannesburg Declaration-II XV BRICS Summit, 2023
19. BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy until 2025

Part VI
Sustainable Development

The Northern Sea Route as a Driver of Russia’s Arctic “Blue Economy”



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1 Introduction

The NSR is a key component of Moscow’s Arctic strategy. Along with Moscow’s economic interests, there are some geopolitical and security factors that affect the NSR’s development and should be paid attention to by the Russian decision-makers [1]. The Russian leadership points out the significance of the NSR’s economic and environmental security aspects and the role it plays in ensuring transport and social cohesiveness of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF).

The NSR performs a number of very important functions, including ensuring the so-called “Northern supply”—supply of fuel, construction materials, food materials, and other consumer goods—to the remote local communities; shipping of the products (hydrocarbons, metals, and other natural resources) originated from Russia’s Far North to other Russian regions and abroad; providing international transit of cargo from East Asia to Northern Europe and vice versa; ensuring reliable search and rescue (SAR) operations system in its water area; securing border control over the vast territory, which became more accessible because of melting polar ice; and guaranteeing quick redeployment of the Northern Fleet forces to various parts of the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas [2].

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Given the significance of the NSR, Russia is constantly updating its policies on this maritime route by changing legal regulations, improving its management system and icebreaker and pilot services, and modernizing NSR port infrastructure, navigation and SAR systems, telecommunications, and so on.

But only quite recently Moscow started to pay serious attention not only to the economic and strategic aspects of the NSR but also to its ecological dimensions. Specifically, the Kremlin acknowledged the fact that the NSR should be further developed on the basis of the “blue economy” (BE) concept in order to protect the Arctic’s fragile marine environment and be in line with high international ecological standards.

In this study, we follow the BE definition made by the European Commission: BE is “all economic activities related to oceans, seas and coasts. It covers a wide range of interlinked established and emerging sectors” [3, p. 5]. This definition includes maritime routes and port infrastructure, which makes it applicable to the NSR situation.

This study aims to examine how Russia views the NSR’s development on the BE principles and use this maritime route as a driver for the sustainable development of the entire region. The chapter starts by examining the NSR legal framework and Russia’s conceptual discourse on the future development of this strategically important maritime route. The second section discusses the role of the Polar Code (PC) adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2014–2015 in the NSR’s integration into Russia’s emerging BE. The next section discusses the problem of reorganization of the NSR port infrastructure on the BE principles. Finally, the special section explains why establishing marine protected areas (MPAs) is conducive to the BE development in the AZRF.

2 Russia’s NSR Development Strategies: Past and Present

Initially, Russia was keen on opening up the NSR to international shipping because of economic reasons. The NSR’s sustainable development and marine environment protection were not on Moscow’s agenda at all. The USSR first suggested to open the northeast passage to international navigation in 1967, when the détente between the USA and Soviet Union began, but this offer got the cold shoulder from Western partners and was never implemented. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sounded this idea again in his famous Murmansk speech of 1987, but this initiative was not heard by the world’s largest maritime nations too. Only in mid-1991, a few months before the dissolution of the USSR, the NSR was officially opened to international exploitation. Several normative acts such as the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the NSR (1991), the Guide for Navigation through the NSR, and the Regulations for the Design, Equipment and Supply of Vessels Navigating the NSR (1995) established basic rules for using this maritime route as well as technical standards for ships exploiting this seaway.

In the 2000s, conceptual discussions on the NSR developmental strategies unfolded in Russia. One of the draft documents, which designed such a strategy until 2015, contained the idea of the NSR's integrated development and its use on a commercial basis. According to this paper, a self-supporting, cost-effective Arctic Sea Transport System under state control should be created by 2015 [4]. The discussions lasted for several years, but no real measures to develop the NSR were taken.

On 22 November 2008, the Russian Transport Strategy until 2030 was approved by the government. This strategy aimed to integrate Russia's transport system into the world one, including the full use of the country's transit potential, which is fully related to the NSR. It was planned to reconstruct old and build new terminals that could ensure the NSR's effective operation [5]. The main idea was to make the NSR more efficient and integrate it into the world's maritime transport system. The sustainable development concept was not given due attention in this document.

The situation started to gradually change in 2011–2012 when the Kremlin decided to further internationalize the NSR and simultaneously, increase the safety of the traffic by launching a number of investment projects to modernize the NSR infrastructure. In 2011, Vladimir Putin said that 38 billion rubles would be allocated to increase the icebreaker fleet by 2014, and three universal nuclear icebreakers and six diesel-electric ones would be built by 2020. He also recalled the state decision on the creation of ten integrated emergency rescue centers in the Russian Arctic [6]. All in all, in 2012–2014, more than 21 billion rubles were spent on the modernization of the NSR infrastructure [7].

In 2012, a new Russian law on the NSR [8] was signed by President Putin and the next year, the Ministry of Transport issued the new Rules of Navigation via the NSR [9]. First of all, the 2012 law established geographical parameters of the NSR and its water area (see Map 1). Both the new law and Rules of Navigation established rules of transit via the NSR and introduced new insurance requirements, which made ship owners responsible for possible environmental damage and pollution. These documents also set new tariffs for icebreaker and pilot services as well as meteorological and logistical information. Along with two state agencies, Rosatomflot (nuclear icebreakers) and Rosmorport (diesel icebreakers), several private companies, including the Murmansk Shipping Company, Far Eastern Shipping Company, Norilsk Nickel (metallurgy), Lukoil (oil), and Ice Pilots Ltd. provided icebreaker and pilot escort, radio communication, and hydrographic information. In March 2013, the NSR Administration was reestablished and made responsible for issuing permissions to transit the NSR and overseeing navigation safety.

It should be noted that the 2013 rules aimed not only to ensure the safety of navigation but also to reduce pollution from ships. Specifically, it was required:

- To make ship tanks capable of collecting oil residues—depending on the type of ship power plant and duration of the trip via the NSR
- To have on the ship storage tanks of sufficient capacity for the collection of waste generated by the vessel during its trip through the NSR
- To have on the ship a sufficient amount of fuel, freshwater, and provision for navigation via the NSR



Map 1 The Northern Sea Route water area and Arctic ports. (Sources: Center for High North Logistics; Northern Sea Route Administration. Copyright Stratfor 2019)




Fig. 1 The NSR cargo traffic (1933–2022), thousand ton. (Sources: Refs. [10–12])

To heat ballast tanks adjoining the external side above the operating waterline during the cold period from November to June [9]

Anyway, these requirements were still far from the BE principles.

The launch of Novatek’s Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in late 2017 created a principally new situation in the region by requiring the organization of all-year-round LNG shipments to East Asian and European customers. The volume of the NSR cargo traffic has grown sharply over the past decade from 0.1 million tons in 2010 to 34 million tons in 2022 [10, 11] (see Fig. 1).

In December 2018, a new version of the NSR law was approved by both the Russian Parliament and the President. This act changed the NSR management system by making the Rosatom (more specifically, its subsidiary—Rosatomflot) a key NSR operator. Rosatomflot also shared the responsibility for issuing permission to navigate this sea route with the NSR Administration (part of the Ministry of Transport). The latter remained responsible for international cooperation, including the Polar Code implementation. But what was especially important, the new law introduced the concept of sustainability to the development of both the NSR waters and port infrastructure [13]. This was one more step toward the BE principles.

Responding to the growth of the NSR cargo traffic, a special action plan on the NSR development until 2035 was approved by the Russian Cabinet of Ministers in December 2019. It foresaw renovation of the NSR ports, building of new icebreakers (nuclear and conventional), research vessels, SAR, and auxiliary fleets, improvement of hydrographic and navigational services, further expansion of a satellite group servicing navigation and communications in the NSR waters, encouraging cargo shipments and international transit via the NSR, development of local energy supply, stimulating domestic shipbuilding, and ensuring environmental safety [14].

The plan's main goal was to create by 2023 all the necessary conditions for ensuring all-year-round shipments of cargo and passengers via the NSR. The document consisted of 84 points divided into 11 categories and listed concrete measures to be implemented by federal authorities, regional governments, and the largest state corporations operating in the AZRF [14].

Along with the developmental strategies and safety requirements, the plan envisaged some measures to ensure the NSR's environmental security, including:

- Preparation of proposals for the mandatory use of the best available technologies to reduce pollution in the AZRF seas
- Preparation of proposals for the development of integrated monitoring of the AZRF lithosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere
- Creation of local monitoring systems to control pollution produced by loading and unloading operations in the NSR seaports
- Development of local observational meteorological networks in the AZRF seaports to provide hydrometeorological support for transport operations in the NSR waters
- Regular update of legal regulations aimed to prevent pollution from ships in line with the 1973 International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) and the IMO's Polar Code [14, pp. 18–19].

According to Alexey Likhachev, the head of Rosatom, this plan required 735 billion rubles (\$11.7 billion) in investments, with the state budget to provide a third and the rest to come from public and private companies, such as Rosatom itself, Rosneft, Novatek, Gazpromneft, Gazprom, Nor Nickel, and some banks [15].

Along with the above measures, the Ministry of Transport tried to chart high-altitude routes for large-capacity vessels. First, two-mile-wide main and alternative lanes should be established. Then 20-mile-wide lanes should be created (see Map



Map 2 High-a NSR lanes. (Source: <http://www.hydro-state.ru/kage.html>)

2). To chart these routes, the Federal Hydrographic Department (part of the Ministry of Transport) sent three hydrological ships to the Arctic Ocean.

In September 2020, the Russian Government issued new navigational rules for the NSR that took into account the changes in the NSR management system introduced by the 2018 law on the NSR. However, these rules did not establish any new requirements for marine environment protection or promote the BE principles [16].

In October 2020, President Putin approved a new Russian Arctic strategy until 2035. A number of the BE-related measures were planned:

- Encouraging shipping companies to use LNG and other kinds of light fuel for sea and river ships operating in the NSR waters and adjacent rivers
- Introduction of engineering and technical innovations that could ensure the NSR infrastructure's sustainability with regard to climate change
- Creation of specially protected land and marine areas in the AZRF, including the NSR water area
- Adaptation of Russia's Arctic economy and infrastructure to climate change
- Identification of objects and zones of accumulated environmental damage and taking measures to eliminate accumulated environmental damage
- Development of a state environmental monitoring system in the Russian Far North on the basis of cutting-edge information and communication technologies
- Based on the recommendations of the World Meteorological Organization, increasing the density of the observation network in the AZRF and improvement of the technical equipment of environmental monitoring systems
- Reduction of air and water emissions by the AZRF industries on the basis of the best available technologies
- Development of a unified state system to prevent and cope with emergency situations, including oil spills in the NSR water area
- Development of a network of SAR centers in the region
- Regular assessment of the anthropogenic impact on the AZRF environmental and socioeconomic systems, including the impact of transborder pollution from North America, Nordic Europe, and Asia

- Regular assessment of the impact of the AZRF nuclear energy facilities on the local environment and population
- State support for the creation of a waste management system in the AZRF, including the NSR waters and coastal zone
- Solving the problem of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste dumped in the Barents and Kara seas
- Modernization of the AZRF fishery complex on the basis of advanced technologies and high environmental standards as well as the development of aquaculture in the region [17]

With the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine in 2022, the NSR development strategy was changed. In August 2022, the Russian Government published a new, corrected NSR development plan. The BE-related priorities of this plan included:

- Establishing a state environmental monitoring system in the NSR water area
- Developing a long-term program for the removal of radioactive objects dumped in the Arctic seas
- Removal of six most dangerous sunken radioactive objects, including the nuclear submarines K-27 and B-159 with spent nuclear fuel aboard
- Organizing an environmental monitoring system to control air and water pollution caused by transshipment of dusty bulk cargo in the NSR ports
- Systemic monitoring and reducing environmental risks from cargo traffic along the NSR [18, pp. 45–47]

To sum up, in Russia, there is no integral BE concept related to the NSR or the AZRF at large. However, some elements of the BE concept are present in the legislation and conceptual documents on the NSR. This concerns, *inter alia*, environmental monitoring in the region, preparedness to fight oil spills, and cleaning of the Arctic seas from radioactive waste. At the same time, if Moscow seeks to implement the BE principles in the AZRF, it needs to develop a special conceptual document for these purposes and integrate it into Russian legislation on the NSR.

3 Polar Code Implementation

The PC (adopted in 2014–2015 and entered into force in 2017) plays an important role in increasing maritime safety and preventing marine pollution in the NSR waters. This document suggested some risk-mitigation strategies and concrete measures to deal with various challenges to Arctic shipping, including its environmental aspects.

Many environmental standards established by the PC are very close to the BE principles and in fact, the Code implementation is the right way to the creation of BE in the Arctic. Particularly, the PC prescribes:

1. Prohibition of any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures from any ship traveling in Arctic waters.
2. For ships with large oil fuel capacity, all fuel tanks should be detached from the outer shell by a distance of not less than 0.76 m.
3. For large tankers, the double bottom tanks are mandatory.
4. For most ships' categories, all oily bilge water holding tanks and oil residue tanks shall be detached from the outer shell by a distance of not less than 0.76 m.
5. Any discharge into the sea of noxious liquid substances or mixtures having such substances should not be allowed.
6. Discharges of sewage into the sea are not allowed with rare exceptions.
7. Some rules for the discharge of garbage into polar waters were established [19, pp. 38–41].


The PC also stipulated that after 1 January 2017, shipbuilders must build new vessels that should be compatible with new safety and environmental standards. According to the Code, the existing ships should be refitted by 1 January 2018 or, in some cases, by the end of 2020 to meet its requirements.

Moscow demonstrated that it can be a responsible player within the PC regime. First of all, the Code's requirements were integrated into the Russian national legislation. For example, the most important maritime regulations were changed in line with this document: Commercial Shipping Code, Rules of Navigation via the NSR, Law on Sea Ports, Rules for the Classification and Construction of Sea-Going Ships, Technical Regulations on Maritime Transportation Safety, Rules for the Technical Supervision of Ships in Service, etc.


Second, all Russian commercial ships built after 1 January 2017 correspond to the PC safety and environmental requirements. Third, by 2020, all Russian ships built before 2017 were refitted in accordance with the Code's standards. Fourth, Moscow suggested a number of training courses on navigation in icy waters for crews from non-Arctic countries in order to decrease the possibility of incidents in the NSR water area.

Moscow aims to complete the program on the construction of ten federal SAR centers in the AZRF to ensure Arctic shipping safety. Seven of these centers are already finalized while three others will be operational very soon [20]. Along with national SAR centers, two maritime SAR coordination centers (Dikson and Murmansk), four regional SAR and fire stations, three maritime SAR stations (Arkhangelsk, Tiksi, and Pevek), and four storage units for equipment for oil spill response (Dikson, Tiksi, Pevek, and Providence) were created [21, p. 29] (see Map 3).

There were plans to create an international consortium for further NSR development and its transformation to an international maritime transport corridor. Sovkomflot (cargo and tanker ships), Rosatomflot (nuclear icebreakers), Rosmorport (diesel icebreakers, port and navigation infrastructure), and some international shipping companies (most of all Chinese ones) were primary candidates for such a consortium [22, p. 9]. However, as mentioned above, the Kremlin preferred Rosatom as a chief manager of the NSR.



Map 3 The AZRF SAR centers with their zones of responsibility. (Source: http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_searchandrescue)



Map 4 The SafetyNET and Navtex stations and their coverage zones in the AZRF. (Source: <http://www.hydrostate.ru/tsibm.html>)

Russia aims to develop SafetyNET and Navtex systems in the AZRF to increase the safety of the maritime traffic in the region. For example, in addition to the existing Navtex stations in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Tiksi, a new one should be built on the Andrew Island (see Map 4).

It is safe to assume that a proper technical equipping of ice-class ships could be helpful for both safe navigating in icy waters and PC implementation. For instance, Norilsk Nickel company equipped its ice-strengthened ships with Jeppesen's dKart Ice Navigator that allows them to navigate without an icebreaking escort. The combination of high-resolution radars with the Electronic Chart Display and Information System can also provide crews with new ice detection options and ensure safer navigation in polar waters [23].

Ionospheric interference is a serious concern for many Arctic seafarers because electromagnetic fields affect radio signals on specific frequencies, positioning systems, and communications in general. According to the International Association of

Lighthouse Authorities and IMO, a more resilient positioning system is required by Arctic e-navigation. Currently, the AZRF is fully covered by the long-range radio navigation system “Seagull” that is seen as a reliable backup to GPS/GLONASS and an integral part of the IMO’s global radio navigation system [23].

Moscow plans to create several satellite groups that will be specially designed to cover the entire Arctic region and improve communications and navigation systems in the NSR waters. To monitor the Arctic hydrometeorological situation, Russia plans to launch six Arctic-M satellites into a highly elliptical orbit by 2031 [18, pp. 24–25]. The first satellite was launched in February 2021. The second satellite will be launched in 2024–2025. To provide the AZRF population and the NSR water area with high-quality broadband Internet and mobile communications, Moscow plans to create an Express-RV satellite group of four satellites, launching them into a highly elliptical orbit. In addition to this, Russia is creating a special grouping of two Condor-FKA satellites for remote sensing of the NSR water area (by 2024).

Some experts propose specific US–Russian bilateral measures for PC implementation:

- Joint efforts to improve hydrographic information and update nautical charts in the Bering and Chukchi seas
- Start US–Russia navigation safety information exchange on a regular basis
- Increase joint US–Russia emergency response capabilities, for example, by deploying rescue tugs and icebreakers near the high-risk areas
- Conduct SAR and oil spill response exercises on a regular basis to maintain the effectiveness of the 2011 and 2013 agreements on these issues
- Introduce stricter communication and reporting requirements to properly monitor Arctic shipping, reduce risk, and enforce ship compliance with the PC guidelines for safe shipping [24]

In view of increased traffic in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea, the US and Russian authorities initiated a joint proposal to create a two-way routes system in this water area to reduce emissions and increase maritime safety there. It should be noted that this region is not formally an integral part of the NSR legal regime but at the same time, belongs to the water area covered by the PC. Particularly, six two-way routes and six precautionary areas were jointly proposed to the IMO.

These routes running along the coasts of Alaska and the Chukchi Peninsula are helpful for ships to avoid the numerous islands, reefs, and shoals near the Bering Strait. They could also reduce the risk of shipwrecks and environmental disasters. These routes are of voluntary rather than mandatory character; they do not limit neither commercial fishing nor subsistence activities of local (indigenous) communities [25]. However, after the start of the Ukrainian military conflict in 2022, the discussion of these plans was postponed.

It should be noted that the Russian expert debate on the PC aims not only to discuss the Code’s implementation but also to further improve it. Particularly, the following suggestions are made:

First and foremost, an improved PC variant should substantially reduce shipping emissions, such as carbon dioxide, nitrogen, sulphur oxides, particulate matter, and

black carbon [21, 26]. These emissions heavily affect Arctic air quality, human health and eventually, the global climate. If the Arctic shipping traffic increases, the lack of a regional environmental regime can increase negative impact on local communities, flora, and fauna, and again, accelerate global climate change [27].

In contrast with Antarctica and the Baltic Sea, the current PC version does not prohibit the use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic region, although its detrimental effect on the local environment and population is obvious. Many Russian experts favor the use of lighter and cleaner fuels, such as, for example, LNG and distillates, to reduce shipping emissions in the Arctic seas [21, 26]. The IMO's recent initiative to introduce a partial HFO ban in the Arctic in the mid-2020s and a full ban by the end of the decade received a rather positive reaction from the Russian expert community [28]. Obviously, an introduction of an HFO ban could be one more serious step toward the BE principles in the NSR development.

Second, the Russian expert community favors banning ballast and greywater discharge in the polar waters. They believe that the NSR masters together with private companies should build in the Arctic ports special facilities to receive, store, and reprocess ballast and greywater [26, p. 29].

Third, the PC does not fully prevent disturbances of wildlife. The Code requires that vessels should avoid large marine mammals such as whales, walruses, narwhals, or polar bears, but it says nothing about seabird colonies. There is also criticism related to the lack of measures in the PC to prevent the migration of invasive species to the Arctic Ocean and reduce underwater noise [21, 26].

To sum up, Russia's effective Polar Code implementation and modernization of the NSR safety, pollution control, and communications infrastructures have significantly contributed to Moscow's transition to the BE principles in the AZRF, although in this case, Russia's main objectives were NSR internationalization and making it all-year-round seaway rather than building BE in the region.

4 Modernization of Port Infrastructure

There are more than 20 large, medium, and small ports along the NSR. Of these, the most important ports are Amderma, Anadyr, Baydaratskaya Bay, Dixon, Dudinka, Green Cape, Igarka, Cape Kamenny, Cape Schmidt, Novaya Zemlya, Pevek, Providence, Sabetta, Tiksi, Kharasaway, Khatanga, and Egvekinot (see Map 5). Some of them are situated on the Arctic Ocean's coast, and some are at the mouths of Siberian rivers or near them and the AZRF industrial centers. Most of these ports were built in Soviet times. Ports such as Sabetta and the "Arctic Gate" have been built over the past decade. New ports are being built—terminal "Utrennee," "Bay North," coal terminal "Chaika," etc.

The outdated AZRF port infrastructure is a serious barrier to the NSR's integration into the world's maritime transport system [30, 31]. Obviously, the old Arctic ports need reconstruction to create a world-class transport corridor in the High North. The most recent NSR development plan (2022) suggests that 14 ports will be



Map 5 The AZRF ports. (Source: Ref. [29])

either modernized or built anew. The cost of this program is about 237 billion rubles [18, pp. 9–17]. Unfortunately, the modernization plans for these ports aim more at increasing their efficiency (in particular, increasing their cargo turnover and receiving vessels of larger tonnage) than at complying with high international environmental standards. The only environmental problem that was mentioned in the 2022 NSR development strategy was pollution of atmospheric air and water areas during the transshipment of dusty bulk cargo in the NSR ports. However, some specific plans for the NSR ports' modernization have BE-related priorities.

Modernization of the NSR port infrastructure in line with the BE principles could include the following priorities:

First is to make safer and environmentally cleaner the NSR ports and terminals dealing with dangerous and hazardous cargo such as crude oil, fuel, chemicals, coal, fertilizers, explosives, etc. The new ports have already been built in line with stricter safety and environmental standards, but old ports, such as Amderma, Anadyr, Dixon, Dudinka, Igarka, Pevek, Providence, Tiksi, Khatanga, and Egvekinot, badly need modernization. This is especially important for terminals that reload coal to ships traveling via the NSR.

Second, according to the BE concept, “smart ports” should be supported by the environment-friendly coastal transport infrastructure. Currently, only four NSR ports are linked to Russia's national transportation system via railways, and 40% of Arctic ports are experiencing problems with the reception of large tonnage vessels [32, p. 55]. Many AZRF ports are hardly accessible from the land because of their remote location—there are no railways or highways connecting them with the Russian urban and industrial centers located in “mainland” Russia. To solve this problem, Moscow plans to build several railways that should connect major Arctic ports with the industrial centers of Ural and West and East Siberia. Among them are

the railways Belcomur [Arkhangelsk-Syktvykar-Solikamsk (Perm)] that should connect the White Sea ports with Ural industrial centers, the Northern Latitudinal Railway in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District (Obskaya-Salekhard-Nadym-Novy Urengoy–Korotchaev), Lavna-Vykhodnoe in the Murmansk Region, and Siberian Meridian (connecting the AZRF ports with Asian harbors via Siberia) [18, pp. 13–15].

Third, BE principles can be introduced to the port logistic system, including emission reduction schemes. The port logistics sector has a significant impact on global greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to greenhouse gases, the mobility and logistics sector also produces other emissions that are important parameters for making transportation more eco-friendly. These include noise, air pollutants, and particulate emissions. Emissions can be reduced by several methods, including reducing transport volumes, optimizing routes, increasing port transport efficiency, shifting transport to ecologically friendly modes of transport, or introducing more energy-efficient vehicles.


For example, the Hamburg Container Terminal Altenwerder (HCTA) model can be applicable to the modernization of Russian Arctic ports. HCTA uses 90 so-called automated guided vehicles (AGV) to move containers between the quayside and the yard. Until recently, AGVs were diesel-hydraulically and diesel-electrically driven. Since 2017, they have started to use lithium-ion batteries. This technology has substantially reduced CO₂ emissions, particulate matter, soot, nitrogen emissions, and noise. These vehicles are refueled during off-peak hours to withdraw excess electric energy from the power grid. They can also feed energy back into the power grid as so-called primary control power. This is done to regulate load peaks in the power grid and make the network frequency stable. To implement this project, the number of charging stations was increased on the HCTA. A special control software to determine the number of AGVs required for container handling and optimizing the charging strategies on the terminal was developed [33, p. 91].

In sum, these measures can stimulate the further improvement of the NSR port infrastructure as well as bring it closer to the BE standards.

5 Marine Protected Areas

MPAs are also an important element of BE because they help to reduce Arctic emissions from vessels, including the so-called "particularly sensitive sea areas" [27]. According to the MPA supporters, these areas could reduce shipping emissions by limiting vessel operations within the MPAs and specifying speed limits and/or fuel requirements for ships [26, p. 29].

There are seven *zapovedniks*, or strictly protected nature reserves, with MPAs in the AZRF: Kandalakshsky, Nenetsky, Bolshoi Arktichesky (Greater Arctic), Taimyrsky, Wrangel Island, Koryaksky, and Komandorsky natural reserves. The Franz Josef Land, Nenetsky, Nizhne-Obksy, and Severozemelsky *zakazniks* or special purpose reserves, also protect Arctic marine waters. There are also offshore



Map 6 Russia's federal-level coastal and marine protected areas. (Source: Ref. [34, p. 5])

buffer zones in the Nenetsky, Gydansky, Ust-Lensky, Wrangel Island, and Komandorsky *zapovedniks*. Some limited MPAs exist in the Russian Arctic and Beringia national parks [34, 35] (see Map 6).

It is unclear whether Moscow would agree to further expand MPAs in the NSR water area, especially in view of the growing traffic in the region. However, the Russian authorities do not deny a dialogue with the environmentalists and the need for further research in this field [36–38].

6 Conclusions

Currently, Russia has no clear and coherent NSR development strategy based on the BE principles, which undoubtedly hinders the transition of this sea route and the entire AZRF to the path of sustainable development and reduction of environmental

risks. At the moment, Moscow is mainly concerned with two problems: (1) how to increase the NSR's capacity and effectiveness and (2) how to ensure the further internationalization of the NSR with the aim to make it an important international transport corridor. Therefore, the measures currently being taken by Russia to modernize its commercial fleet and the NSR port infrastructure are mainly technocratic in nature, aimed at increasing the NSR's economic efficiency and not at the environmental aspects of its functioning.

At the same time, a number of Russian legislative acts, conceptual documents, and the NSR development plans contain elements of a BE strategy. This applies to measures to reduce shipping pollution and the risks of marine casualties and oil spills as well as to modernize the AZRF ports and establish MPAs to reduce the anthropogenic load on the local environment and communities. Russia still has to do a lot of "homework" to bring the NSR and the entire AZRF to the BE principles if it wants to keep up with global trends and ensure the AZRF's sustainable development. However, generally speaking, there is a rather positive dynamic in Russian strategic thinking and planning: the BE concept is gradually taking root in this domain, including further NSR development. If the BE principles are implemented in the NSR-related activities, this will become an important driver of sustainable development of the entire Russian Arctic.

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Analysis of the Environmental Policy of the Non-Arctic States in the Polar Region: The Case of Baltic States



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1 Methodology and Discussion Issues

The Arctic, includes circumpolar regions of “Arctic eights,” as enshrined in the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy [1]. For a long time, Arctic policy was the internal politics of the “Arctic five” that had northern territories. It is important to mention that in previous times, the Arctic policy was not considered a priority [2]. The situation has changed as the Arctic has transformed from a peripheral territory into an area that attracts the interest of the international community. New actors are emerging in the region, and policy mechanisms and instruments for each of them are being formed.

This study represents an attempt to rethink the participation and role of the Baltic states in the current international Arctic agenda. The authors use a systematic approach to designate the context—regional environmental policy. This approach allows to highlight the levels of evolution of political interaction and identify the instruments that determine the spheres of current environmental policy in the Arctic. Using the theory of securitization, the authors analyze the degree of involvement of the Baltic states in the Arctic agenda, in particular, and the conversion of the Arctic region as an object of securitization, in general. The authors’ research task is to try

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to answer the question—what are the possible points of contact for resuming diplomatic dialogue on key environmental issues between the Arctic states and what is the possible role of Baltic states in that process?

2 Regional Environmental Policy Shaping and Involvement of the Baltic States

The instruments of Arctic policy formation are states (through domestic political institutions), international legislation, and international actors.

The state's political institutions, which are the first level of policy formation, have a key role in regional conceptual forces.

The main strength of the state is the institutions that form the legal and regulatory framework. The strategy of the state's internal policy is expressed in the formation of government bodies, as well as basic legislation. The functional task of regional policy is assigned to special government organizations, representative offices, and industries. Specially created organizations deal with special issues regarding Arctic policy. For example, in the USA, the Arctic policy is shaped by the Ministry of Defense and the White House; Canada's regulatory framework on the Arctic issue is made up by the Ministry of Global Affairs and documents issued by the ministry. In the Scandinavian countries and Finland, there are similar government bodies that are engaged in the analysis and assessment of the Arctic agenda.

Another important mechanism for policy formation is the legislative framework. Arctic countries develop and adopt strategic documents that regulate the use of minerals, sustainable development, and stability in the northern territories. The set of accepted international legal norms makes it possible to create an established, strong mechanism of interaction between actors in the international system. The "Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period until 2035" [3] is the key Russian program paper, where it is possible to find fundamentals of the country's policy, and "The concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation – 2023" [4], is where the changing role of Arctic in Russian national interests is stated.

The Arctic strategies of Iceland [5, 6], Denmark [7], Norway [8], Sweden [9], Canada [10, 11], and the USA [12] reflect the long-term policy priorities of these states in the northern territories. Among them, there are common and different features. Their common features are:

- Sustainable development
- Preservation of flora and fauna
- Commercial exploration of the region: Improvement of roads, transport, energy supply, new types and opportunities of travel
- Cross-border and international cooperation: Transborder nature of the threats that states face and the understanding that joint efforts will help quickly and effectively solve common problems.

- Scientific research and implementation of modern technologies adapted to harsh climatic conditions.

The second level of policy formation is the work of international organizations and institutions. The first of them, the Arctic Council (AC), was created as an international forum to promote dialogue but has subsequently produced three legally binding agreements under its auspices and continues to serve as a platform for finding common solutions among states with very different national interests.

By strengthening its polar presence, NATO justifies its existence. The Arctic remains a short route for cargo transportation, and new and varied opportunities are opening up for using the region for defense purposes, even though the Arctic was not initially the central region for the deployment of NATO activities. The stated goals of NATO are security and stability issues and strengthening cooperation with European countries in this regard [13–15]. NATO views Russia's actions in the Arctic as a threat and has declared an increasing of military presence in the near future.

Another important regional actor is the European Union (EU). Its polar history began in the 1990s, and now, it continues to work on developing a common Arctic policy. The situation is complicated because the states of the European Union are characterized by varying degrees of involvement in Arctic issues. Many of them are members of the Arctic Council (e.g., Finland); many actively participated in the foundation of the Arctic Council (e.g., Great Britain); some states located far from the Arctic are interested in the logistics capabilities of the Arctic (e.g., Spain); and some states demonstrate a low degree of interest in the polar region (e.g., Slovakia).

The EU's non-defined position in the AC does not deprive the organization of its actual presence (application for observer status since 2014 [16]); the EU is present at official gatherings of the AC. The EU has several financial programs, forms a budget, forms knowledge-intensive industries, supports scientists, sponsors research [17], and expresses and actively supports measures for sustainable development.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), as an actor in Arctic politics, is not so active. Its main goal from the very beginning was to develop dialogue between the Barents and the Euro-Arctic states [18], but not all the so-called Arctic states were interested in cooperation with participants external to the Arctic. However, since five participants of BEAC are also among the AC, and the European Commission is an EU body, the prospects of this organization as an Arctic actor should be assessed as low.

Great attention in the context of this paper should be paid to the Arctic Policy of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).

The CBSS, active since 1992, includes six Arctic (and sub-Arctic) states, three Baltic countries, Germany, and Poland. Among the goals of this organization, like others, are declared policies of sustainable development, cooperation, and dialogue. The CBSS, like the EU, actively supports and funds Arctic Council programs aimed at preserving biodiversity, combating Arctic pollution, and so on.

Now CBSS has lost its position as a platform for communication between Russia and the other Arctic states and the Baltic states since Russia is not a member of the organization anymore.

Returning to the mechanisms of Arctic policy formation, we need to note the activities of non-state actors: commercial structures, non-governmental organizations, scientific institutions, individuals, etc. Such actors are becoming more influential at the present stage. For example, Chinese companies are ubiquitous in the Arctic, although Arctic actors initially had a negative attitude towards the participation of extra-regional actors. AC working groups, which are independent research bodies, make scientific papers regularly. The Arctic phenomenon of foreign policy choices, known as “Climate Change in the Arctic” [19], has forced policymakers in Arctic countries to reorient their foreign policy strategies. Moreover, international instability has influenced the Arctic, and now it has become a subject of interest for non-Arctic states.

Since the shaping of modern Arctic policy has been described above, now it is time to speak about the place of the Baltic countries in the Arctic, their involvement in the Arctic agenda, and plans for future participation in the regional environmental cooperation.

Latvia does not have a special paper on Arctic strategy. Nevertheless, the state’s interest in the Arctic was demonstrated in the speeches of political leaders [20, p. 14], and it can also be noticed in the corresponding activity of Latvia in the international arena. Latvia justifies its interest in participating in Arctic politics in terms of environmental threats, noting that the polar atmosphere processes directly affect the Baltic Sea ecosystem.

As an argument, Latvia’s presence in the region can serve the formation of a so-called Nordic identity, which has been part of the political discourse since 2020. An important fact about Latvia is that the state signed Spitzbergen Treaty, which gives Latvia access to the archipelago. Unlike Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia did not claim an opportunity to be present at the AC meetings, but this could happen in the near future.

According to Estonian political leaders, the state has three key reasons for its involvement in the Arctic policy—science, economy, and safety [21]. Some researchers point out that Estonia has the most ambitions in the Arctic [20, p. 13]. This country is working harder than others to justify its interests and would also like to take on the role of a leader among the Baltic countries in the Arctic direction.

At the same time, Estonia understands that to have a successful presence in the polar region it will need the support from the other Baltic states, so it actively supports their Arctic aspirations. Estonia is the first Baltic country to apply for observer position in the AC [22].

Of the Baltic states, Lithuania is the least interested in the Arctic part. But there is possibility of an increase in its interest with an aim to keep the policy of close neighbors.

All the Baltic states are members of NATO, EU, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Now EU is strict in its aspiration to pursue a joint Arctic policy, but the Baltic states have an opportunity to influence the shaping of EU’s policy. As

members of NATO, the Baltic states have an opportunity to participate in regular army exercises, involving troops detained in the polar region.

3 Current International Situation in the Arctic: Possible Points of Contact for Resuming Diplomatic Dialogue

The growing attention to the Arctic is a modern feature of world politics at the present stage. In an era of turbulence in world politics, it is worth mentioning the increasing possibility of a clash of interests concerning the polar region.

This northern policy dimension of the leading states is not surprising and can be explained by several arguments. These include issues of energy and environmental security. Thus, climate change is gradually making the Arctic a region quite suitable for development, hiding huge reserves of resources that will allow it to become an important geostrategic place in the world.

Moreover, the increasing of waterways in the ice of Arctic waters makes it possible to navigate more actively in terms of transport, and the Arctic offers incredible opportunities. All these suggest that this region today occupies a very important position on the global agenda; more and more states are trying to participate in the political processes of this region, which naturally affects existing Arctic actors and their interests. Undoubtedly, the situation in Ukraine has adjusted the three vectors of northern policy—the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic. The first question is if there is an opportunity to find common ground in the format of a new policy today.

Even before the breakdown in relations between Western countries and the Russian Federation, it was possible to mention the difficulties associated with the Arctic. In particular, one of the significant problems was determining “the legal status of the Arctic.” One approach was about considering its territories as open sea (then the rules of international maritime law are applied to them with all the ensuing consequences). The next point of view claims that the Arctic Ocean is largely an icy surface that can be seen as a special responsibility of Canada, Russia, the USA, Norway, and Denmark, which have divided the Arctic into their own sectors. Another issue was the institutionalization of that situation. Cooperation between the AC and the BEAC has developed with varying degrees of success. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the BEAC [23].

Norway becoming the AC chair did not improve the situation in this organization. Ambassador-at-large of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Nikolai Korchunov, emphasized that “Moscow will build its line in the council depending on the development of the situation and based on the need to respect its interests” [24].

According to his formal confirmation of the statement: “The issue of inviting Russia to events that will be organized during the Norwegian chairmanship was not discussed. At the same time, I would like to note that non-invitation of Russian representatives to the events of the Arctic Council will mean a violation of its rights

as a member country, and in this case, the continuation of our country's participation in the activities of this organization is unlikely to be possible" [24].

Norway is an important actor in the polar region—an Arctic state that is guided by the goals of its Arctic policy and, most of all, economic ones. The most important sector of its economy is the fishing industry. In addition, Norway is a NATO outpost in the Arctic [25].

Norway is the world's only country whose permanent military headquarters is located above the Arctic Circle. Norway is lobbying in every possible way for NATO to increase its attention to the northern territories. It is claimed that it was Norway that forced the North Atlantic Alliance to begin paying attention to the Arctic region in recent years.

With the growing interest in the Arctic, the Alliance's military activity in the region has also increased. NATO regularly conducts army maneuvers in Scandinavian countries and Finland. The most ambitious of these were the so-called "Cold Response" and "Loyal Arrow" [26]. The scenario included a possible interstate conflict over oil and gas [25]. "Cold Response," in 2012, was the largest NATO military exercise of its kind in years [26].

Thus, this indicated that Arctic "security" remained a priority for NATO, and its military presence was increasing. We can talk about increased militarization around the Arctic region. Norway plays an important role here. And we are talking not only about the annual Norwegian naval exercise, "Flotex," from November 28 to December 10, 2023. Several large military exercises "Flotex" [27] are being held not only simultaneously in Scandinavia, but also with the UK (Arctic Phoenix).

Both nations practiced surviving the cold weather in the Arctic. Thus, "The UK Royal Air Force and Norwegian counterparts have trained their cold weather survival skills in an environment reaching -20 degrees Celsius ($-4F$) above the Arctic Circle" [28].

The largest exercise, Nordic Response 2024, took place in March 2024. This was a kind of transformation of the Norwegian military exercise, "Cold Response," to "Nordic Respons", thanks to the expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden [29].

In The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO), the chairmanship from Sweden passed to Denmark, which clearly stated the Arctic orientation of its policy. The Danish Foreign Minister stated: "The Danish Defense Intelligence Service has recently stated that the security climate in the Arctic region is expected to become more unstable due to increased military activity, and it is possible that Russia and China will increase their cooperation in the region. Given the Kingdom of Denmark's position, it is only natural for us to focus on the developments in the Arctic and North Atlantic region" [30].

The entry of Finland into NATO and, obviously, that of Sweden will undoubtedly lead these two states into the wake of such a policy. All these suggest that gradually the "Russian threat" cultivated by our northern neighbors is now affecting the Arctic region.

The Russian Federation in this situation is represented by the following points. For Russia, the northern region is "the main strategic resource base" [25]. Active development of the region has been underway for a long time. In the Russian

program, dedicated to the exploration of the Arctic shelf until 2030, it is predicted that by this time, oil production will reach 66.2 million tons and gas production 230 billion cubic meters; in 2011 these figures were 13 million tons and 57 billion cubic meters, respectively [31].

Russia pays great attention to the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as the key transportation arteria of the ice-cold ocean. Now the NSR is also turning into an important “transport bridge,” which is mostly situated in the Russian waters. That fact allows Russia to claim the extraordinary right to control the polar transportation. We should not forget that Russia occupies almost 40% of the polar territory, and without its participation, it is impossible to talk about energy and environmental and human security in the region. The situation with Northern Europe suggests that today Russia needs to look for new forms of Arctic dialogue.

4 Conversion of the Arctic Region as an Object of Securitization

The modern system of international relations is experiencing fundamental changes. International law has been experiencing challenges to its strength since 2014. Paralysis of the regulatory framework occurs largely due to misinformation and incorrect interpretation of current events. The phenomenon of disinformation has become an integral part of research in international relations. The scientific and technological revolution, advances in technical equipment, and the Internet have created a situation in which historical truth becomes difficult to prove.

Constructivism as a classic theory of international relations, like a part of post-positivism, is a verified algorithm of actions. Thanks to this vision of the world, it is possible to develop the necessary guidelines both within the state and in the world. With the onset of globalization, the tools of constructivism are becoming increasingly popular. Management of information flows becomes on par with the military power of the state. The effect of using constructivist tools in foreign policy is not inferior to the classical method of diplomacy. A securitized object is always protected, even if it was placed under threat artificially (through the announcement of a threat by an authoritative leader) [32–34]. The Arctic is truly under threat, and the escalation of tension in the region is simply unacceptable [35].

The Arctic has always been under the close attention of Arctic leaders. The northern giant of Russia and the United States of America, as countries with powerful economic development, had a special place. Their military potential developed at an incredible pace, thanks to the historical retrospective of the times of the bipolar world. The Arctic, however, was not presented as an artificial object of securitization that needed protection. The region naturally presented itself to the international community as a place that needed to be protected from escalation.

Concern for the Arctic was not politicized; the stable state of the climate in the region was an unconditional priority for all countries that had a border with the

Arctic. The policy was based on the awareness of the harmful consequences, since any climate change there could lead to unpredictable consequences. To identify points of contact between countries regarding the stable development of the Arctic, it is necessary to identify certain patterns of the current situation in world politics. The authors highlight the following postulates:

An attempt to change the object of securitization by the countries of the European Union

Desecuritization of the object: the Arctic region is presented as a place with a huge reserve of minerals, rather than as an area in need of protection and conservation

Failure to manage the region responsibly: the escalation of tensions in the Arctic by NATO countries and regional partners

In keeping with the rules and the theory of constructivism, the provision of security of the central object is a priority and a matter of human existence [35]. The modification of the Arctic into a springboard for world politics certainly concentrates military force in the region. With the growing presence of NATO troops in the region, Russia's concern is growing, which is forcing it to be prepared for possible unfriendly measures on the part of the alliance countries. Norway, as the Chair of the Arctic Council, has repeatedly conducted military exercises in the region, despite the fact that Norway never mentions them in its speeches regarding maintaining stability in the Arctic. The country's position is limited to mentioning defense and environmental protection. Russia, as the Chair of the Arctic Council, had demonstrated its commitment to international law. It was Russia that showed its readiness to pursue an independent and farsighted policy in the Arctic; it is impossible to say so about other participants in the Arctic process.

The state showed its readiness to bear responsibility for managing the region; extensive reform was carried out to change and systematize domestic legislation and knowledge-intensive industries were introduced. The state's foreign policy strategy is focused on preserving the region as a place of peace and tranquility, subject to further scientific study of the region for the benefit and comfort of all the Arctic countries. The same cannot be said about the Arctic neighbors, whose main goal is to escalate tensions in the Arctic and search for conflict points with Russia to justify their national goals for mining and minimizing Russian presence.

However, the Arctic is part of Russia as a sovereign state, whose identity and existence depend precisely on the well-being in this region; of course, Russia is taking all measures to protect its legitimate right to free and responsible management of the Arctic. A region acquires significance after its borders are clearly defined, as well as certain symbolism and representation in regional and international organizations. The boundaries of the Arctic are still not delineated. There is the problem of the continental shelf and the issue of the Northern Sea Route. Both China and India want to become active participants in the Arctic, which, of course, increases attention in the region.

The Arctic Council was an advisory body and did not represent a lawmaking organization. The format of the meetings was aimed at solving environmental

issues. The Arctic Council does not have a lawmaking function, which was proven by the fact that countries unite for general consultations. The escalation of tensions does not fit into the framework of the Arctic approach to the issue of climate conservation. Moreover, Norway is one of the main initiators of this escalation, but the sustainable development of the Arctic is literally inscribed in the identity of the state. Not only the Nordic countries are trying to turn the Arctic into a place of disputes and confrontation, but also the Baltic countries conveniently explain their failures in foreign policy through this phenomenon. The Baltic countries' adherence to pan-European sanctions rhetoric against Russia has led countries with a low level of foreign policy independence to a food and economic crisis. The introduction of sanctions had a mirror effect on the national economies of Estonia and Latvia [36]. Systemic errors of the Baltic countries in relation to domestic legislation, as well as the inability to correctly interpret the object of securitization, lead the Baltic countries to a situation in which they become hostages of their own decisions.

The desecuritization of the Arctic as a region in need of protection has led to the Baltic countries expressing their desire to join the Arctic Union, despite the fact that there is no direct connection between the foreign policy of Estonia, Lithuania, and the Arctic. The countries are not connected to the region either economically or politically. Environmental policies in Latvia and Estonia focus on domestic consumption, reuse of raw materials, greening of territories, and a general commitment to preserving the microclimate within the state [37–42]. Environmental issues in the Baltic countries are directed internally [43–45]. Of course, events in international politics influence the environmental policy of small countries, but the way out of this situation is the willingness of the Baltic countries to accept responsibility and understand the real situation, to be ready for an equal dialogue with Russia, and not to search for those to blame for their own geopolitical mistakes [46–48].

Thus, the issue of responsible management of the Arctic is being desecuritized, and there is a process of trying to limit the Russian Federation to create conditions under which it is next to impossible to strengthen the development of the region, which, of course, has only negative consequences for the Arctic and the whole world. Concentrating on the superstructure instead of important problems could become a big international political blunder for the Northern European and Baltic states. Correct prioritization, understanding the object of securitization, and awareness of the possible consequences of a policy of refusing dialogue should become the main priorities for cooperation between Russia, the Nordic, and Baltic countries in the polar region [49].

5 Conclusions

The Arctic today is the target of foreign policy interests for not only the Nordic countries but also the leaders of the Asian market and the Baltic countries. The increased interest is not due to responsible direction for regional development but to an attempt to escalate tensions, which indicates a change in the securitized object

and desecuritization of the Arctic. The number of extra-regional players interested in the Arctic is increasing, and the Baltic states have recently joined their ranks. At first, their involvement in the Arctic agenda was low and was expressed in participation in the work of international institutions (EU and CBSS), for which the Arctic was not the main area of political interaction. Now the Baltic countries have a more serious interest in Arctic politics, as shown by the study of their domestic political discourse.

However, new participants need to understand that the key task of international cooperation in the Arctic is to make Arctic relations diversified and stable. The mechanism for forming the Arctic policy is based primarily on the correct definition of the object of the policy, after which a legislative framework is formed in accordance with the participation of the state in interregional and international organizations. Arctic governance is the shared responsibility of states that are ready for an equal dialogue, the purpose of which is to preserve biodiversity in the region and pursue a safe policy of cooperation for the benefit of all states. Timely awareness of this fact is the key to successful and good neighborly existence in the region. Russia pursues a clearly balanced policy for sustainable development in the Arctic and has the necessary resources for this, which was demonstrated while it was the Chair of the Arctic Council.

Thus, the foreign policy situation, in which there is a change in the securitized object with a parallel desecuritization of the Arctic, is dangerous, first of all, for the prosperity of the climate in the region. The leading position of the Arctic environmental issue is fading into the background. In a climate that is unpredictable, it is critical that we remain vigilant, not succumb to misinformation, and continue to support the Arctic. The loss of guidelines and understanding of the reality of the Arctic could become the biggest foreign policy mistake of the Baltic countries and Nordic countries. Any attempt to shift the Arab policy into the channel of militarization in order to counter the policies of Russia will lead to the destruction of the achievements of the recent decades in the field of sustainable development and may cause an environmental crisis.

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The Group of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the International Climate Policy: Evolution, Achievements, Prospects



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1 Introduction

The least developed countries (LDCs) are a group of the world's poorest countries with a low level of socioeconomic development. In 2023, the group included 46 countries (33 African states), located mainly in low latitudes (95% of the states are located between 15°N and 15°S), with a population of just over one billion people (according to the British researcher, P. Collier, the population of these countries forms the “bottom billion” of the world’s population—an indication of its extreme poverty) [5]. A common feature of all LDCs is low per capita income (\$1080 in 2022), low human development index (less than 60), and extremely high economic vulnerability index. In 2022, LDCs represented 14.1% of the world population, 1.4% of the world GDP, and 0.6% of the global trade [33]. In the international geographical division of labor, LDCs have the function of exporting raw materials (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, Chad, etc.), agricultural products (Senegal, Ethiopia, etc.), and light industry goods (Bangladesh, Cambodia, etc.). LDCs have not yet established their own international organization, but they act as a single actor on many political fronts, including international climate policy [14].

The LDCs’ share in the structure of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is rather small. All 46 LDCs, in total, produced 3.5% of the global emissions in 2020 (G7 produced 22.4%) [33]. The share of LDCs in carbon accumulation did not exceed 1% (G7 produced 44.4%) [18]. Per capita GHG emissions in LDCs were half the world average (3 tons/person and 6.9 tons/person, respectively). Unlike the Global North countries, more than half of the GHG emissions of these countries are

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generated in agriculture and forestry. Energy and industry accounted for only 5% of the GHG emissions (in the G7 and BRICS countries—at least 50% of GHG emissions). The structure of emissions is dominated by methane (77.6%) that is also strikingly different from the Global North countries, where at least 70% of the emissions are formed by CO₂ [33]. These features play a key role in the formation of national climate policies in LDCs.

Despite virtually no anthropogenic impact on climate, LDCs, due to geographical circumstances, are suffering the greatest economic and social damage from climate change among all world nations [15]. Rising temperatures are exacerbating the already pressing problems of employment, poverty, education, gender, and the provision of basic resources (water and food). Droughts, hurricanes, catastrophic floods, rising ocean levels, destruction of coastlines, and other natural hazards (NH) are becoming the main destabilizing factors for the social, economic, and political systems of these states, making it difficult to implement national sustainable development goals [1].

The high vulnerability to NH, together with the low capacity of LDC states to counter climate change, has determined their special status in the structure of international climate diplomacy. For more than 30 years, this group of countries has been speaking at international climate protection forums as a single organization with common requirements, programs, and structures. The diplomatic efforts of LDCs are aimed at creating an equitable international climate regime, in which the primary responsibility and financial burden for the ongoing changes should be borne by the Global North countries. The second vector of the LDCs' climate policy is aimed at creating international institutional structures, mechanisms, and principles to enable LDCs, on the one hand, to increase their national adaptive capacity to the effects of global climate change, and on the other hand, to stimulate their further socioeconomic development [10]. These efforts of the group, despite numerous assurances and promises from the global community, face tremendous resistance from the Global North countries, which are apparently disinterested in the economic development of these states [19]. The LDCs' struggle for an equitable global climate regime is reflected in the documents adopted at the UN and the institutional structures established under it. Along with the international activity of the LDCs group, the national climate policy of these states is also increasing, which is reflected in the growth of independent lawmaking processes in this area.

The purpose of this paper is to show the features of the LDCs' climate policy evolution, their role in forming the UN climate agenda, institutional structures, and international mechanisms, as well as to assess the current national climate policy according to the regulatory documents adopted in the group to characterize the features and main directions of the domestic climate policy of these countries. This study focuses on examining the LDCs' climate policy trajectory in the development of both global climate regime and national climate agenda.

2 Material and Methods

The theoretical foundation of the study is based on the world-systems theory of I. Wallerstein [31]. Relations between the global Core and Periphery create the global development dynamics. Climate policy is a synthesis of systemic and “anti-systemic” (according to I. Wallerstein) processes and can contribute to smoothing the asymmetry between the Core and the Periphery. The struggle of the LDCs group for the creation of an equitable global climate regime is reflected in the established “climate” funds, carbon regulation mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol, and transfers of “clean” technologies. In our opinion, international climate policy stimulates the processes of socioeconomic modernization in the LDC countries, which is reflected, for example, in the growth of renewable energy capacity in these countries (from 1990 to 2021, the installed capacity of wind and solar energy in the LDCs group increased by 5900%), and contributes to the achievement of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals [34].

The methodological framework is based on structural-analytical and comparative approaches. The analysis of countries’ climate initiatives and activities reflected in the international agreements, state regulatory documents, and Nationally Determined Contribution of States to the Achievement of the Paris Agreement Goals (NDC), as well as in the international statistics, makes it possible to determine the nature, direction, and achievements of the climate policy of these countries to assess the impact of certain factors (external and internal) on the processes of adaptation, decarbonization, and climate transformation of national structures.

The main sources, on which the highlights and conclusions of this publication were based, are international treaties and agreements in climate diplomacy (UN Framework Convention, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement, resolutions of the Conferences of the Parties), data from the The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (primarily NDC), the World Bank [33], and scientific papers of researchers and experts on climate policy of the Least Developed countries.

The study of the international climate policy has been launched relatively recently. At the moment, the evolution of the international climate policy has been extensively studied [7, 9, 22]. Researches on the role of individual groups of countries and organizations in the international climate policy formation tend to be less represented. Here the studies of V.M. Jornist et al. [35] and A.G. Sakharov [23] are worth highlighting. Studies devoted to the impact of climate change on the economy and society of the LDCs group, its climate policy, peculiarities of economic decarbonization, adaptation, and climate neutrality are presented only in foreign authors’ researches. For example, the American researcher, G. McDonald, points out the complexity of the Global North-South relations in climate policy and the developed countries’ responsibility toward climate change [15]. The least developed countries’ positions in international negotiations are reflected in the thesis of Jahrmarkt L. [12] and the study of N. Reimer [20]. Features of the LDCs’ national climate policy are represented in the works of several authors [1–4, 10, 13]. This paper aims to create

a holistic picture of LDCs' climate policy using both analytical studies of the above-mentioned experts and official UN documents reflecting the stages of climate diplomacy evolution.

3 Results

3.1 *The Impact of LDCs on Earth/Global Climate Change*

The least developed countries have a minimal anthropogenic impact on the Earth's atmosphere change in the gas composition. The LDCs' economic development degree and the population level of well-being are extremely low. Poverty and a high proportion of the population employed in low-productivity agriculture determine the meager environmental footprint and GHG emissions of these countries. In 2018, the level of greenhouse gas emissions of the LDCs amounted to 1772 million tons CO₂-eq. The share of 48 countries of the group in global GHG emissions did not exceed 3.8%, which was significantly lower than their share in the world population (13.6%) but higher than their share in the world GDP (2.8%). LDCs occupy the last positions in terms of GHG emissions among the groups of countries in the world. The volume of their emissions is almost ten times lower than those of the East Asian countries (38.4%) and eight times lower than all industrialized countries of the world (32.3%). They are many times inferior to the scale of emissions from the countries of North and Latin America (14.7% and 7%, respectively), the EU (7.7%), and the Arab States (6.9%). With a population comparable to that of China and India, the economies of the 48 LDC countries produce seven times less GHG emissions than the national economy of China (12.3 billion tons) and two times less than the Indian economy (3.3 billion tons CO₂-eq).

GHG emissions analysis of individual LDCs shows their high concentration in highly populated countries. Five countries of the LDC (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Sudan, and Tanzania) produced about 40% of all greenhouse gases in the group. These countries' emission volumes are comparable to those of Western countries such as the Netherlands (178 million tons), the Czech Republic (122 million tons), or Belgium (108 million tons). The first ten LDC countries account for over 60% of emissions. The other 38 states produced about 37–38% of all GHGs in the group (see Table 1).

The vast majority of countries of the LDCs group have low emissions. About seven countries of the group produced from 50 to 100 million tons, 11 states—from 20 to 50 million tons, and 22 countries—below 20 million tons of CO₂ equivalent. The lowest levels of anthropogenic emissions were observed both in the group of small island LDCs (Kiribati, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, and Comoros) and in small African and Asian countries (Eritrea, Rwanda, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Bhutan, etc.). The GHG emissions of island countries do not exceed one million tons. This is the lowest rate among the countries on our planet. Far from technological

Table 1 Top greenhouse gas (GHG) producing countries in the world's least developed countries (LDCs) group [33]

State	GHG emissions in 2018 (million tons of CO ₂ equivalent)	Emission trends 1990–2018	GHG emissions per capita (tCO ₂ eq/pers)
Bangladesh	198.9	+44	1.1
Ethiopia	172.2	+170	1.5
Myanmar	119.6	−40	2.4
Sudan	109.6	+431	2.3
Tanzania	105.3	+148	1.4
Afghanistan	98.9	+44	0.9
Chad	80.6	+499	1.4
Angola	79.7	−18	2.9
DRC	58.7	−42	0.5
CAR	55.6	+242	2.2
Uganda	54.8	+119	1.1
Total LDCs	1772.6	+37	1.3
WORLD	45,873.8	+40	6.6

civilization, these states have assumed the function of maintaining planetary stability during the current period of global climate change.

More than half of these countries' greenhouse gas emissions come from the "Land use, land use change and forestry" sector, which is related to the economic structure of these countries.

The analysis of the GHG emissions dynamics in the period of 1990–2018 shows that greenhouse gas emissions from this group of countries more than doubled (from 811 to 1772 million tons). The largest growth was observed in Equatorial Guinea (2519%), Mozambique (829%), Cambodia (553%), and Chad (499%). As a rule, increases in GHG emissions reflect national demographic and economic dynamics. In these states, the growth in emissions was directly related to the rapid development of certain economic sectors (for example, the oil industry in Equatorial Guinea or coal mining in Mozambique). In the vast majority of LDCs, however, GHG emissions doubled during this period. The exceptions were Angola, Benin, DRC, and Solomon Islands, which reduced their GHG emissions during this period. The main reason was socioeconomic and political instability, combined with a progressive crisis.

The indicator of per capita greenhouse gas emissions is more demonstrative in assessing the impact of the LDCs group on anthropogenic climate change. The largest GHG emitters listed in Table 1 have large populations. Bangladesh, for example, ranks eighth in terms of population in the world (more than 180 million people), and Ethiopia is in the twelfth place (110 million people). Nevertheless, even large LDCs have very low per capita GHG emissions. The average level of per capita emissions in this group is five times lower than the world indicator (1.3 and 6.6 tons/person). A huge gap is clearly visible in the LDCs group states' per capita values compared with the industrialized Western countries or the oil-exporting Middle East countries.

In the first case (industrialized countries), the climate footprint was ten times higher than that of the Least Developed Countries (12.6 tons/person). The oil-exporting Middle East states had a 26-fold gap compared to the LDCs (34.6 tons/person). The differences are especially clear when comparing the diametrical indicators of per capita GHG emissions. In the poorest countries of the world (Afghanistan, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti), as well as small island states, GHG emissions per capita do not exceed 1 t/person. The minimum level of emissions was produced by Burundi (0.4 tons), Solomon Islands (0.5 tons), Rwanda (0.5 tons), DRC (0.5 tons), and Lesotho (0.7 tons). At the same time, Kuwait accounts for 32 tons of GHG per inhabitant, Bahrain for 30 tons, Australia for 27.6 tons, and Qatar exceeds 66 tons. These states should take steps to radically decarbonize their economies in the first place.

The LDCs group's minimum impact on the planet's climate system is accompanied by the maximum global climate change impact on the natural and social complexes of these countries. First, this is expressed in the frequency and intensity increase in extreme weather events, such as disruption of seasonal cycles, rising sea levels, and flooding of coastal areas. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) experts note an increase in extreme weather events frequency in all LDCs. According to their calculations, the number of recorded severe weather cataclysms, such as droughts, floods, and extreme temperatures, has increased five times over the past 50 years (1970–2019) [32]. Myanmar, Puerto Rico, Haiti, Mozambique, and Bangladesh suffered the maximum material and human damage from extreme weather conditions in the period 2000–2019. The annual average number of NH victims in the period 2010–2019 in Myanmar was more than 7000 people, in Bangladesh it was 572 people, and in Haiti it was 274 people [6]. These states are among the top ten countries in the world with the greatest risks from the global climate change effects. According to the VI report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [11], an increase in extreme weather events is predicted in the LDCs group. In Africa, the number of droughts will increase, which will lead to crop losses and cause food shortages in many states of the continent [11]. Heavy rainfall and associated catastrophic floods are predicted in many regions of Africa and Asia as well. Extreme weather events associated with climate change have other direct and indirect impacts. For example, they discourage population mobility, impede business productivity, and restrict access to social infrastructure.

In the world ranking of countries in terms of road quality, the least developed countries occupy the last positions [24]. The LDCs' governments face a serious task of adapting the population to the climate change effects, increasing the entire national system stability and resilience to the coming climate shocks. According to the African Development Bank, African countries must invest about \$40 billion annually in national infrastructure to adapt to changing climate conditions. As climate impacts become more catastrophic, the adaptive capacity limits of LDCs' national systems to climate change (disappearance of islands and loss of coastlines due to sea level rise) are apparent. The need to create a whole global assistance system for these states in the long term, covering not only financial, technological, information, and other transfers from developed countries to developing countries

but also aspects of humanitarian assistance—the resettlement of the population from climate disaster zones (island states and the states of the Sahel) to climatically more stable areas on the territory of other states. However, as recent practice has shown, the creation of such institutions within the international climate diplomacy framework is the most complex and time-consuming process.

3.2 The Role of LDCs in the Evolution of the Climate Narrative

The least developed countries group is one of the most vulnerable world groupings to climate change. Bearing the brunt of the global warming consequences, the LDCs act as a single actor in international negotiations within the climate diplomacy framework. Within the UN, they demand the Global North countries to take more stringent obligations to reduce GHG emissions and provide them with financial assistance to adapt to climate change and compensate them for damage from natural disasters caused by global climate change. These requirements of the LDCs are reflected in the main international climate documents' provisions and in the established instances.

Once the first international documents on the global climate regime, named the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was enacted, it indicated the historical guilt of developed countries in global warming. Convention Article 4 emphasized that “industrialized states have agreed to support climate action in developing countries and to provide them with appropriate financial assistance in addition to the material support they already provide to these states.” In accordance with the Convention’s provisions, a system of grants and loans is being established and administered by the Global Environment Facility. Industrialized countries have also agreed to transfer technology to less developed states [29]. With the ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, each member has committed itself to submit regular reports on its national climate policy programs (National Communications), including adaptation activities. However, all developing countries have been exempted from GHG emission reduction obligations.

In the Kyoto Protocol, this principle remains in force. Adaptation to climate change and the development of its mechanisms and tools have become the second most important international climate policy section regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol details adaptation measures and Article 12(8) states that a portion of the Clean Development Mechanism funds should be used for adaptation activities in developing countries. It was assumed that 2% of the investments from the implemented projects under the Clean Development Mechanism should go to the Adaptation Fund (AF) for developing countries. At the Conference of the Parties in Marrakesh in 2001, it was decided to establish such a fund (COP 7, 2001) [21]. However, about 10 years had passed before the Adaptation Fund received the

first financial transfers from industrialized countries. In addition, until 2010, endless discussions continued about the organizational structure of the fund and its location. Developed countries were interested in controlling the fund and insisted on its placement in one of the industrialized countries. Developing countries were against it. Moreover, there were debates on the new climate fund creation [Green Climate Fund (GCF)], which would include not only targeted transfers for the developing countries' adaptation to changing climatic conditions but also in a range of other areas.

Finally, at the 2010 Conference of the Parties in Cancun (COP 16), the countries reached a compromise that the climate change Adaptation Fund for developing countries should be located in Bonn, and the Green Climate Fund should be located in the South Korean city of Songdo. Despite some success, the cash registers of both funds were practically empty. In November 2011, the Adaptation Fund had \$200 million in capital, which was used during 2012 to finance 31 projects in developing countries. According to the World Bank estimates, the states of the Global South need about 75–100 billion dollars annually to adapt to climate change [21].

During the same period, the LDCs group demanded concrete steps from the world community in terms of their adaptation to changing climatic conditions. At the conferences of the parties held between 2001 and 2010, three major decisions were made:

1. Creation of a special Least Developed Country Fund
2. Formation of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group
3. Establishment of the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA)

Based on the decisions taken at Conferences of the Parties No. 7, No. 10, and No. 11, it was proposed that developing countries work out their own national adaptation programs. The established Least Developed Countries Expert Group should provide scientific and technical assistance in the development and implementation of NAPAs [30]. Since 2011, the least developed countries have received financial and technical support to develop and implement their programs. National adaptation programs should promote existing adaptation strategies, identify priority areas for action, and identify the specific vulnerabilities of the states concerned. They are intended to demonstrate the relevant LDCs' adaptation needs and project proposals that can be supported by the Least Developed Country Fund.

In May 2013, the LDCs' national adaptation programs included 522 projects, with a total funding of about \$2.1 billion. The projects' sectoral features reflect the paramount importance of the countries' statistical indicators and were aimed at exploiting the individual ecosystem, as well as developing the significance and increasing the importance of sustainability. In Bangladesh, for example, 30% of all adaptation costs were directed toward protecting the coastal zones. In African countries, especially in the states of the Sahel (Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and Chad), more than 50% of implemented projects were in the field of food security and water supply. However, financial resources are clearly not enough to implement all adaptation programs and projects [26].

In December 2017, 51 developing countries (including LDCs) submitted their new national adaptation programs to the UNFCCC secretariat [17]. In addition to adaptation programs, most LDCs have initiated the development of national adaptation plans (NAPS). This adaptation tool is based on the results of the analysis of the vulnerability to climate change in various sectors of countries' economies. Emphasis is placed on supporting adaptation efforts in priority areas (agriculture, animal husbandry, water management, forestry, natural ecosystems, energy, infrastructure and housing, health, etc.). The focus is on supporting adaptation efforts in priority areas (agriculture, animal breeding, water management, forestry, natural ecosystems, energy, infrastructure and accommodation, healthcare, etc.). National adaptation plans developed and submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat receive special funding from many funds and financial institutions. In March 2021, 90% of the countries in the LDCs group developed national adaptation plans, and six countries in this group submitted them to the UNFCCC secretariat and started implementing them (see Table 2).

The next stage in the climate policy development in relation to LDCs was the creation of an international mechanism for "loss and damage." At the Conference of the Parties in Warsaw in 2013 (COP 19), on the initiative of developing countries, it was decided to form another assistance instrument to countries affected by climate change. Here, as in previous instruments, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility" remains dominant. This means that the elimination of natural hazards' consequences in developing countries should be carried out at the expense of industrially developed countries. This instrument, named the "Warsaw Mechanism," originally associated with national adaptation programs, has become an independent, additional instrument of climate policy today [25].

The Paris Agreement, concluded by the world community in 2015 and entered into force in 2016, marked the beginning of a new climate policy for the LDCs. According to its provisions, all countries of the world, regardless of their socioeconomic development level, must pursue a national climate policy. Nationally Determined Contributions to Achieve the Objectives of the Paris Agreement (NDC) have become policy documents reflecting specific countries' efforts to reduce national emissions and adapt to the climate change impacts. In accordance with the Paris Agreement provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4, each party prepares and sends to the UN Climate secretariat its NDCs that it intends to achieve and also adheres to them. In order to achieve the objectives of such contributions, the parties take national climate change mitigation measures. For the first time, all countries, including the LDCs group, have set legally documented targets for climate change mitigation through voluntary reductions in GHG emissions. In the period 2015–2021 in the LDCs, there has been a surge in institutional and legislative activity in the climate policy area. A number of them adopt comprehensive and specific programs and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the consequences of climate change (Myanmar, Cambodia, Bhutan, Liberia, Somalia, etc.).

On 1 April 2022, 46 least developed countries of the world (out of 48 states) submitted their national contributions to the secretariat of the Framework Convention

Table 2 Appendix

Country	The goal of reducing GHG emissions from the projected level of emissions without climate measures [BAU (business as usual)] by 2030 (%)	National Adaptation Plan (+ under development, ++ under implementation, – no information)	The number of adopted national legal documents in the climate policy sector [28]
Afghanistan	–13.6% (with international support)	+	8
Angola	–35% (without international support) and 50% (with international support)	+	11
Bangladesh	–5% (without international assistance) –15% (with international assistance)	+	10
Benin	–9% and –12.8%	+	0
Bhutan	Carbon neutrality achieved	++	5
Burkina Faso	–7% and –11.6%	++	8
Burundi	–3% and 20%	+	4
Vanuatu	Carbon neutrality	+	
The Gambia	50%	–	6
Guinea	13%	+	2
Guinea-Bissau	10% and 30%	+	2
Haiti	5% and 26%	–	1
Djibouti	40% and 60%	+	5
Zambia	25% and 47%	+	15
Yemen	–	+	6
Cambodia	42%	+	6
Comoros	23% Carbon neutral by 2050	+	0
DR Congo	21% and 28%	+	5
Kiribati	13% and 49% Carbon neutral by 2050	++	5
Laos	60%	+	5
Lesotho	10% and 35%	+	5
Liberia	15%	+	5
Madagascar	14% and 32%	++	3
Malawi	6% and 45%	+	7
Mali	40%	+	16
Mauritania	11% and 92%	++	4
Mozambique	–40 million tons	+	11
Myanmar	25% and 50%	+	7

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Country	The goal of reducing GHG emissions from the projected level of emissions without climate measures [BAU (business as usual)] by 2030 (%)	National Adaptation Plan (+ under development, ++ under implementation, – no information)	The number of adopted national legal documents in the climate policy sector [28]
Nepal	Carbon neutrality by 2050	++	3
Niger	12.5% and 45%	+	4
Rwanda	16% and 22%	+	7
Sao Tome and Principe	27% (with international support)	+	2
Senegal	7% and 29%	++	11
Sierra Leone	10% and 25%	+	8
Solomon Islands	30% and 45% carbon neutrality	+	6
Somalia	30% (with international support)	+	0
Sudan	–	++	0
Tanzania	–	+	10
East Timor	Carbon neutrality	++	6
Togolese Republic	20.5% and 50.5%	++	13
Tuvalu	Carbon neutrality	+	7
Uganda	22%	+	4
Chad	18.2% and 71%	++	1
CAR	5% and 25%	+	2
Equatorial Guinea	20% and 50%	++	0
Eritrea	12% and 38.8%	+	2
Ethiopia	14% and 69%	++	9
South Sudan	–	+	2

on Climate Change to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. Only two states—Tanzania and Yemen—were not represented in this list.

An LDCs' analysis of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) shows that 90% of countries in the group that submitted their programs have carefully developed quantitative climate policy goals and ways to achieve them (the absence of specific targets for GHG reduction can be traced only in two states—South Sudan and East Timor). If GHG emissions increase according to the plan by 2030, all LDCs commit themselves, through various measures, to reduce GHG emissions from 3% to more than 90% compared to their production without carbon restrictions [BAU (business as usual)] [27]. Individual states of the group plan to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 (Nepal, Bhutan, Tuvalu, Liberia, and Mauritania). LDC submissions (NDCs) point to two climate change mitigation policy development

directions—first, a policy of self-reliance (unconditional), and second, a policy of all-volume financial support from the global community. According to the second development direction, the degree of GHG reduction is several times higher than the options for climate measures relying on one's own forces. For example, in Mauritania, the reduction of emissions based on its own forces is planned at the level of 11% by 2030 from the BAU scenario, and in the case of foreign support it is 92%; in Ethiopia it is 14% and 69%; in Lesotho it is 10% and 35%; in Malawi it is 6% and 45%; etc. Foreign assistance in reducing emissions is an integral part of the climate policy of the vast majority of the group's states. For example, in order to achieve the goals of climate neutrality by 2050, Mauritania will need international assistance in the amount of \$46.5 billion.

4 Discussion

The signing of the Paris Agreement has become a catalyst for the development of national climate policies in the least developed countries of the world. The institutionalization of NDC has entailed the need to improve the legislative framework in this area. In most LDCs group states, a chain reaction of the climate institutions' growth and legislation followed. Thus, the principle of global governance according to the "Up-down" model—from global institutions to the national level—has demonstrated its positive effect in this sector of world politics.

However, national actions on global climate change began in LDCs long before the Paris Agreement. As it has been noted above, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the results of the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) in the framework of international climate policy were reflected in the legal framework and LDCs' institutions. For example, in Lesotho, a law on national forest policy was adopted in 2008 and on renewable energy sources in 2013; in Cambodia, a green growth policy has been implemented since 2009; and in Ethiopia and Rwanda, green growth strategies have been implemented since 2011 (NDC's Lesotho – 4, Cambodia – 2, Rwanda – 1, Ethiopia – 4). In many LDCs, strategies for the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change were ratified at the beginning of the twenty-first century. According to M. Nachmany, there were about 265 regulatory legal acts related to climate change mitigation, adaptation, transition to a low-carbon economy, and disaster risk reduction [16]. According to the authors' calculations, the LDCs group accounts for about 20% of all existing regulations in the field of climate policy in the world.

National regulatory legal acts (NLA) differ in their legal force. In some countries of the group, laws dominate and in others, subordinate legislation. For example, Bangladesh has a law on financial funds for the effects of climate change; the Gambia has adopted a law on renewable energy sources.

In other countries, subordinate legislation adopted by the country's authorities (political programs, strategies, edicts, and decrees) dominates. The level of their legal force is lower than laws. National climate change strategies have been adopted,

in particular, in Madagascar, Malawi, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, etc. This reflects the different legislative and regulatory cultures in the LDCs group. Nevertheless, for countries with a functioning legislature, the presence of subordinate legislation may indicate that the national response is interim, inconclusive and that it has not received sufficient support to be enshrined in law [16].

The laws and regulations analysis in the LDCs' climate policy field makes it possible to determine the development level of national climate policy and the specialization features. The countries with the largest regulatory legal acts number in the climate policy field were located in Africa (184 laws and subordinate legislation). The states of Asia and Oceania lag behind the African states in this regard. The number of normative legal acts in them is about 75. In Haiti, as the only representative of the Western Hemisphere countries, only one legal act in the field of climate policy was in force.

Among African states, Mali ((National legal acts (NLA)), Zambia (15 NLA), and Togo (13 NLA) occupied the leading places in terms of the regulatory legal acts number. Angola, Mozambique, Senegal (11 NLA each) and Tanzania (ten NLA) have a significant number of acts. The advanced Asian countries are Bangladesh (ten NLA), Myanmar (seven NLA), and Cambodia and Vanuatu (six NLA). The legislative base of Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan and Haiti is extremely insignificant. In these countries, the number of adopted laws and regulations does not exceed two. Until 2017, there was no legislative framework for climate policy in Sudan and Somalia. However, in 2020, Somalia approved the first legal document on the country's climate policy (The Somalia National Climate Change Policy 2020) [8].

A study of current trends shows that policies and legislative activities in LDCs are few and tend to be sporadic and fragmented. The vast majority of laws and subordinate legislation relate to the energy sector (28%) (Fig. 1). Here we should mention that the development of this sector is a priority for most countries in this group. Almost half of the total population of this group of states still does not have access to electricity (47.2%) [1]. For the rural population of the LDCs, this figure reaches 97%.

Many countries of the group find the solution through renewable energy development due to the lack of fossil energy resources. Combining the strategies of the "clean" technologies energy sector for sustainable development with NDC decarbonization strategies is becoming an essential tool for the LDCs' modernization policy. Today, in the 20 least developed countries, there are regulatory legal acts regarding the promotion of the development of renewable energy sources (RES). The Gambia and Lesotho passed renewable energy laws in 2013. In a number of African countries, renewable energy sources are becoming the most important sources of energy. In Mauritania, solar and wind installations in 2019 generated more than 18% of national electricity; in Burkina Faso it was 8%; and in Somalia, it was 4.6% [16]. Not all EU states have such indicators. The island nations of Vanuatu and Tuvalu plan to achieve 100% electricity generation by 2030 from solar and wind installations.




Fig. 1 Legislative activities of LDCs in climate policy [14]

The second sector of the LDCs' climate policy in terms of the laws and subordinate legislation number is related to the protection of nature. About 21% of all legal documents related to climate policy regulate the protection of ecological systems, biodiversity, and natural resources. The largest number of normative acts are characterized by such states as Togo (five), Zambia (three), Angola (three), East Timor and Myanmar (three each), and Tanzania (two) [16].

Climate-related forestry laws are in force in one-third of the LDCs. African states with a large area of forests (DR Congo, Zambia, and Togo) are characterized by the largest number of regulatory documents in this area.

The smallest regulatory legal acts number of the LDCs is related to the issues of reducing the risks of natural hazards, agriculture, and food security. Only 15 out of 48 countries have laws regulating the avoidance of NH risks and 12 in the agriculture and food security fields. However, this does not mean that other LDCs group states do not deal with these issues; rather, this is due to the fact that the development problem of these countries are not yet a priority.

5 Conclusions

The least developed countries are the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of global warming. Having a minimal anthropogenic impact on the atmosphere, these countries are highly likely to feel all the negative consequences of climate change. Five of the ten countries in the world most affected by climate change belong to the LDCs group. The existing LDCs' economic, social, and political problems complicate the processes of adaptation and formation of territorial resistance to global warming.

Over the last 30 years, LDCs group has been an active actor in international climate policy. The group's efforts have led to the creation of key UN structures that support the developing and least developed countries of the world in their fight against global climate change. Moreover, some basic documents have been adopted that determine relations between countries in the modern climate regime. The policy initiatives of the LDCs played a direct role in the formation of climate funds (AF, GCF, LDCF, etc.), the LDC expert group, and the development of national climate change adaptation programs and plans. The Paris Agreement gave an impetus to the development of the LDCs' climate policy. Almost all countries in the LDCs group have communicated Nationally Determined Contributions to the UN secretariat to achieve the goals set out in the Paris Agreement (NDC). The period 2015–2021 is also characterized by a high degree of regulatory and institutional activity in all countries of the LDCs group.

African countries have the largest number of adopted regulatory legal acts in the climate policy field. "Green" energy, nature conservation, and water and food security have become the main climate policy sectors in these countries. In the countries of Asia and Oceania, climate policy focuses on reducing risks of natural hazards (NH), protecting coastal areas, and ensuring food security. Thus, there is a close link between the sustainable development strategies of the LDCs and the climate policies of these countries.

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Behavioral Practices of the Realization of Environmental Policy



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1 Introduction

The modern consumer is placed in a new condition of super-dynamic changes in the environment, which, with its uncertainty and speed of innovation, challenges not only decision-making skills but also encourages a revision of lifestyle and consumer practices and a change in their own concept of consumption [1]. This leads to the actualization of research on responsible consumer behavior, its rational foundations, and understanding of responsibility. Among the research, it is worth highlighting the trend focusing on responsible research, aiming at a deeper subjective and normative understanding of innovation-oriented activity. Another important area is the sociological study of pro-environmental attitudes and behavior concepts supported by consumers [2, 3].

The report of the Center for Sustainable Business Development at the Institute for Emerging Markets Research at the Skolkovo Business School formulated the main trends affecting the spread of ideas of responsible consumption, among them such parameters as generational change, digital transformation, the development of state regulation, effects of tourism, and the formation of an international certification system of goods take the leading place [4, 5]. The environmental policy of the state is also an important part of state regulation in this sphere.

The methodological basis for the study of responsible behavior is the direction of personality ecology, which, in an interdisciplinary manner, examines the behavior

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of an individual in interaction with a changing environment, which is based on rationality, and focuses on positive transformative performance and synergy of human and environmental development. The “ecological man,” as a new type, is distinguished by the structure of the relationship between basic needs and values, where the core element is the optimality of the intended actions and responsibility for the results that have prolonged effects. The “ecological man” himself acts at the same time both as a goal and as a means of positive social transformations; he/she acts as a collective image of interdisciplinary human models, focused on strengthening the rational principle. Within the framework of ecological psychology [6] and social ecology, the ecological behavior of a person is distinguished and understood as a consequence of the implementation of the constructive content of the ecological consciousness of a person [7]. The invariance of ecological consciousness is the characteristic of ecological behavior as a form of human interaction with the external environment, in which the very inclusion of a person into the ecological system, regardless of their goal and tasks, leads to a change in the system. Thus it is necessary to make clear the system of orientation and readiness of the subject for ecological behavior.

W.A. Ajibike and other authors, studying environmental behavior throughout a person’s life, emphasize that the relationship between age and environmental behavior is determined not by growing up as such but by learning: the more people master and process environmental information, the more pronounced their environmental participation and the orientation of behavior toward environmental values [8].

The generational cut of the problem allows us to note that the change of generations is characterized by a certain increase in environmental awareness. This is due to the fact that the growing up of persons born from 1985 to 2002 took place during a wide coverage of environmental problems and natural disasters; at this time, general educational programs began to include disciplines that study environmental problems in more depth. Cultural and educational institutions started to play a more important role in forming relevant environmental practices of individuals when using new technologies, including information and communication technologies [9] or gamification technologies [10]. Therefore, young people today are more inclined to support environmental legislative initiatives. The second important characteristic is the attitude toward maintaining a healthy lifestyle, since the psychological and physical health of the population has become associated with the principles of sustainable development [11] as well as with the ability to form future prospects using tools of budgeting when forming the environmental agenda on a local level [12].

The second half of the twentieth century completed the formation of a new type of person—“consuming person.” J. Mylan notes that in a consumer society, the process of acquiring more and more new goods acquires a special intrinsic value, closes in on itself and turns into a central aspect of human activity, which entails the phenomenon of consumerism associated with a one-sided dependence on things and the desire to acquire them. At the same time, the person himself experiences this dependence as “true freedom” [3].

2 Literature Review

From the standpoint of sociology, the study of environmental behavior is carried out not only to clarify the subjective concept but also to identify the types and factors of influence. The design of types of ecological behavior is based on the fact that the optimal types are characterized by a high level of ecological values development and components of an ecologically oriented way of life, while the alternative will be types of behavior characterized by a low level of ecological knowledge, poor understanding of the importance of environmental problems, and nonparticipation in their practical solution, characterized by the dominance of consumer values and orientations. Thus, behavior is analyzed within the framework of a continuum, where on one side, there is a type of behavior that corresponds to the eco-centric approach and demonstrates the priority of environmental values over consumer values, and on the other side, an anthropocentric approach and consumer values [13].

To better understand how environmental behavior is formed, let us consider what environmental policy is. Environmental policy is understood as “a purposeful policy of the state, providing for a broad involvement of the main groups of urban stakeholders—civil society, business, expert community, and environmental organizations—as well as the formation of environmental culture and environmental consciousness of the population” [14].

It is important to consider the formation of environmental policy in light of the UN-approved program of Sustainable Development Goals for the period until 2030. Sustainable development implies, among other things, the formation of environmental sustainability, for the measurement of which, in 2016, the Environmental Performance Index was developed on the basis of indicators. These indicators include the degree of protection of human health from external impacts and the degree of protection of ecosystem resilience and allow identifying the countries and regions that are most successful in this area. For example, the comparative analysis shows that small industrialized countries in Europe (Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark) and North America are more successful than, for example, densely populated countries in Asia (China, India, and Pakistan) or Africa [15].

Conducted by the authors Jaciow and Wolny, a study made it possible to get to know the behavior of consumers from Generation Z (378 responses were obtained). The study included two parts: dealing with self-evaluation of the ecological behavior of respondents and measuring its frequency. According to the results of the study, self-esteem and self-perception as an ecological individual is translated into the level of engagement in ecological behaviors. Disengaged respondents identified themselves as unecological. Poorly ecologically engaged consumers identified themselves as rather ecological, whereas ecologically engaged and highly ecologically engaged types of consumers identified themselves as highly ecological. At the same time, it has been noticed that the level of engagement in ecological behaviors increases when the respondents function in an ecological society (household, friends, etc.) The research has proven that Generation Z willingly and frequently undertakes ecological behaviors [13].

Determining the value of the influence of the responsible behavior ecological component is associated with its positioning within the framework of the entire system of factors that determine the behavior of a responsible consumer [16]. This system consists of the following elements:

1. Environmental component: The desire to reduce the consumption of goods, the production of which is harmful to the environment and the health of people and animals
2. Social component: Orientation to the observance of the principles of fair trade, minimization of damage to public welfare, and support for the principles of responsible production
3. Ethical component: A person's personal choice, adopted on the basis of norms, principles, and their own opinions and beliefs
4. Rational basis: Changes in consumer practices in order to reduce the level of personal consumption of goods and services

The conceptual framework for the analysis of rational consumption is the classical approaches of M. Weber, T. Veblen, and G. Simmel and postclassical concepts by J. Galbraith, revealing the specifics of the "consumer society" of J. Baudrillard. Already in the second half of the twentieth century, the significant influence of the media industry on the mass consciousness significantly changed behavioral practices. The goods themselves began to be endowed with personal qualities, and the significance of a person began to be determined by the presence of certain things that form the sign system of the symbolic capital of the personality [17, 18]. These tendencies are reflected by the introduced term "insatiable consumer"—this is an individual for whom the consumption process acts as the semantic content of life, interpersonal interaction acquires a market character, and sincere feelings and genuine emotions are replaced by symbols of social success [19]. The image of an insatiable consumer is contrasted with the concept of responsible consumption, and the problem of analyzing a model of behavior in which economic and political values will not prevail over human nature is posed.

F. Webster proposes to consider socially responsible behavior in which the consumer takes into account the social consequences of their choice or uses their consumer spending in such a way as to achieve social change. A socially responsible consumer, according to Webster, must be aware of social problems, believe in their right to change the situation, and also be an active member of society [20].

M. Toussaint and others define a socially responsible consumer as a person who buys goods and services that cause the least harm to the environment and gives preference to companies that contribute to positive social change [21].

R.O. Kaaronen and N. Strelkovskii understand socially responsible consumption as the acquisition, use, and disposal of products, proceeding from the consumer's desire to minimize or eliminate any harmful consequences of their choice and have the most beneficial effect on society [22].

Allocation of the ethical side as the main basis of responsible behavior follows from the concept of "moral economy," which determines ethical norms as the main regulators of the economic system. Another important aspect of socially responsible

consumer behavior is patriotism in consumption, which involves the support of local producers due to the preferences for purchasing goods and services from local producers [23].

The term “responsible consumption” does not have clear boundaries of use, as it is often interpreted identically to concepts such as “green consumption” [24], environmentally conscious consumption [25], and environmentally responsible consumption [7]. Modern approaches are based on the idea of consumption aimed at minimizing environmental consequences and the formation of responsible behavior practices, which determines the sustainable development of the economy and society.

The sociological side of responsible consumer behavior is also associated with the identification of a responsible consumer, which actualizes a large set of roles that a consumer can perform. The consumer can act as:

- User and re-user (for example, reusing a product or buying a used product)
- A person who processes goods
- A person who disposes of the goods (e.g., when he/she takes the goods for temporary use)
- Co-owner or shareholder (e.g., when a product is purchased by several people for joint use)
- A person who chooses the product
- Repairer (e.g., when a person prefers to repair the product on their own, rather than replace it with a new one)
- Collaborating employee (e.g., in the framework of crowdfunding)
- Coauthor (e.g., when creating value)
- A person who refuses to purchase a product
- A person protesting against a product

Thus, the formation of responsible behavior presupposes social maturity, clarity of identification, and the ability to flexibly use the role-playing set and develops their consumer practices, taking into account all socially significant consequences.

Responsible consumption is influenced by environmental values that regulate behavioral patterns based on beliefs and norms [26]. These elements of environmental culture can also be seen through the lens of ecological tourism development [27–29]. At the same time, environmental information and eco-education do not have much motivational power if consumers do not consider environmental protection as a prevailing value for themselves [30].

3 Methods and Results

In order to identify the components of responsible consumption of youth, a sociological survey among students and postgraduate students of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University was conducted (2023, the sample was 328 people, covering the representation of students and postgraduate students from 16 to

35 years old, males (27%) and females (73%). The questionnaire was posted on Internet resources. To confirm some of the provisions and conclusions of the survey, two focus groups were also conducted with selected participants, which also included representatives of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University (SPbPU) students. The study was conducted on the basis of a sample from the Northwestern region of Russia.

The purpose of the survey was to identify the environmental practices of young people reflecting their commitment to environmental values as well as the ways to develop a sustainable system of responsible consumption.

One of the hypotheses to be tested was the assumption that “ecological culture revealed in everyday practices of behavior is one of the defining criteria of responsible consumption.”

Among the purposes of focus group discussions was to study:

1. The structure of environmental practices
2. The determining factors for the sustainability of environmental behavior

The first part of the questionnaire focused on the understanding of responsible consumption by youth. Awareness of the essence of responsible consumption is demonstrated by the answers to the question (see Fig. 1).

The survey demonstrated a positive attitude toward responsible consumption (see Fig. 2).

When answering the question about responsible consumption practices—whether they know about them and use them—the respondents identified the following: separate waste collection—know and use 38%, and know but do not use 58%; sharing—know and use 50%, and know but do not use 46%; ecological way to travel—know and use 71%, and know but do not use 28%; saving resources—know and use 69%, and know but do not use 30%; purchasing only necessary things—know and use 41%, and know but do not use 56%; waste disposal during picnics—know and use 99%, and know but do not use 1%; hazardous waste disposal—know and use 51%, and know but do not use 45%; reuse of goods—know





Fig. 1 Concept of responsible consumption includes saving of natural resources in order to satisfy only the necessary needs to reduce environmental burdens and not to cause additional harm to people, animals, and nature. Do you support this position?

Fig. 2 What is your attitude toward responsible consumption?



and use 74%, and know but do not use 23%; and secondhand use—know and use 74%, and know but do not use 24%. This confirms the orientation of the behavior of a responsible consumer toward environmental activity and the relationship between environmental and responsible positions.

According to the results of answers to this question, we can identify the most widespread eco-practices among students: waste disposal during picnics, reuse of goods, and choosing an environmentally friendly way of transportation. Practices that are the least popular, i.e., they are known about but neglected include separate waste collection and purchasing only the most necessary things. Based on the data obtained, we can identify the main areas where it is necessary to take measures to overcome barriers to the use of environmental practices (Fig. 3).

Among the main difficulties of using responsible consumption practices shared by the respondents, the following should be highlighted. The majority of students (38%) indicated difficulty in changing their lifestyle to adopt environmental practices. “I don’t trust people; I’m afraid of meeting scammers” (29%): students are not sure about the attitude of other people, especially when sharing resources or buying used goods, which may limit their willingness to apply environmental practices that require interaction with other people. Students also noted a lack of information about different environmental practices (28%). This may be due to the lack of information about existing practices and their benefits for the environment. “I don’t like the idea of someone using something before me (sharing)” (19%): some students expressed aversion to the idea of sharing resources, preferring personal ownership (Fig. 4).

The results of the focus group studies show that, first, the development of the city’s infrastructure has a significant impact on the environmental attitudes of its residents. Improved accessibility of public transportation, creation of bicycle lanes, and development of pedestrian zones and green parks encourage student youth to adopt a more environmentally conscious lifestyle (“make bicycle lanes in areas of the city where there are a lot of students”). Favorable conditions for environmental practices, such as using public transportation instead of cars, active use of bicycles, and walking, can contribute to the formation of environmental practices among students and their participation in environmental initiatives.




Fig. 3 Which of the listed environmental practices do you know, and which ones do you use or have you ever used?

Second, the environmental practices of students have a direct impact on the development of the city infrastructure. Active participation of students in environmental movements and initiatives stimulates city authorities and organizations to implement environmental technologies and improve infrastructure. Authorities should support such an initiative, because some focus group respondents mentioned that “not all districts have well-developed infrastructure for separate waste collection and bicycle lanes—in some districts it is ‘3.5’ on a five-point scale”, and “in the city center infrastructure may be less developed.”

Third, it should be noted that the interaction between infrastructure development and the environmental practices of students is mutually beneficial and ensures the long-term sustainability of the urban environment. The improvement of students’ environmental practices contributes to the reduction of negative environmental impact and creates conditions for a more comfortable and healthy life in the city (“you can offer a loyalty program where people can get bonuses for separate waste collection or using public transport,” “organizing environmental campaigns, informing citizens, and providing bonuses and fines depending on compliance with environmental rules”). In turn, improving the infrastructure that provides opportunities




Fig. 4 What difficulties do you face while using environmental practices?

for students' environmental activities leads to further development of environmental practices and increases the level of environmental responsibility in the urban community.

4 Discussion

Summarizing all of the above, it can be noted that the sociological research conducted by the authors revealed the environmental components of responsible consumption as using of different environmental practices. In the course of the survey, most of the respondents indicated such environmental practices as waste disposal during picnics (99%), reuse of goods and secondhand use (both 74%), ecological way to travel (71%), and saving resources (69%). The subject's environmentally

targeted behavior has been determined to be a form of responsible consumer behavior. Awareness of behavior also follows from the consumer's choice of information sources, giving preference to Internet resources, including social networks, forums, and blocks, where environmentally oriented behavior, types of responsible practices, consequences, and new problems are actively discussed. According to the respondents, a responsible consumer is ready to implement their responsible consumption practices, despite the fact that he/she may face various kinds of difficulties. So, for example, a consumer is ready to take into account the social consequences of their choice (in this case, a responsible choice) [20]. Determining environmental practices of the socially conscious consumer, despite difficulties of adopting environmental practices (38%), reveals a lack of trust toward people in situations of renting (29%), a lack of information about environmental practices (28%), and students being wary of someone's use of something before them (sharing) (19%).

This makes it possible to form a range of problem-oriented research areas for future research: the problem of the state's or ecological organization's role in maintaining and developing the practices of responsible consumer behavior (especially dealing with the problem of lack of information about environmental practices) and the development of ideas of "moral economy," which determines ethical norms as the main regulators of the economic system, rather than economic parameters of benefit, profit and so on [16], as well as the problem of the meaning of the quality of education [31] in developing responsible behavior.

The problems of human ecological practices arise as human shortcomings since ecology as science deals not only with the environment but with human beings as well. Responsible human behavior is formed through thinking and the development of cognitive activity. The cognitive activity of a person determines how much an individual is interested in ecological problems and is ready to study the ecological agenda. It is the cognitive activity that predetermines the awareness of human and environmental problems and the importance of the environment [32]. The thinking of an individual is influenced by education as a special system of scientific knowledge, aimed at the development of human abilities. Therefore, any professional and social activity of a person should develop their abilities, thinking, and consciousness. Environmental policy and environmental education as its main aspect influence the formation of environmental consciousness.

One of the emerging areas is the impact of digital technologies on consumption, as "digital technologies contribute to sustainable consumption and production through dematerialization. Hence, digital text is seen as a way to reduce the environmental implications of printing" [33]. This indicates the need to introduce similar and other innovations "in existing processes of production and consumption through sustainable innovation" [34, 35].

5 Conclusion

The results of the study, focused on identifying the ecological practices of individuals as an environmental component of responsible consumption, make it possible to deepen the understanding of the relationship between responsible consumption and the environmental practices of an individual, as well as to reveal values on which the model of behavior of a responsible consumer is built. As a result of the survey conducted by the methods of questionnaires and focus groups, the hypothesis that “the youth’s ecological culture, indicated in daily environmental practices, is one of the defining criteria for youth responsible consumption development” was confirmed. As a promising direction for the development of this research problem, it should be noted the formulation of the question of what is characteristic of environmental practices, what responsible behavior is expected, and how exactly to motivate its emergence as well as the question of what criteria indicate the rising awareness of environmental agenda and its implementation into everyday behavioral practices, what can contribute to such factors of sustainable development as information support, infrastructure development, etc. Promoting responsible consumption can contribute to the solution of the problem of reducing the burden on the environment by creating incentives for responsible behavior and environmental culture. Responsible consumption creates an environment for the implementation of sustainable development policy. The solution to this problem is a promising direction for the building of a sustainable system of responsible consumption.

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