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Paideia: The Language and Philosophy of Education

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EDITORIAL NOTE

We see this volume as a part of the dialogue on the most important questions in the humanities and science. Taking the Greek concept of *paideia* as a precursor of modern notions of education, this volume is devoted to educational discourse in antiquity and beyond.

The institution of education is widely recognized as one of the most conservative forces in any society. Nevertheless, educational discourse is often a discourse of change and transformation. In order to better understand this paradox and the underlying patterns of thought behind education as an ancient and modern social practice, the authors of papers in this volume examined the language and philosophy of education in various disciplines and contexts.

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PAIDEIA THROUGH POETRY IN ANCIENT ATHENS. THE CASE OF SOLON

Abstract: The paper investigates the potential of poetry as an educational instrument in Athens between the Archaic and Classical periods. The focus is on the image of Solon as legislator, wise man and poet. Observed are primarily the remaining fragments of his poetry and their language, along with later utterances (in Plato, Aristoteles, Plutarch and some others) concerning Solon and the role of poetry in the process of *paideia* in general. The initial thesis points to the performative specifics of the poetical word not only in aesthetical aspect, but also as a form of teaching. Discussed are the pieces of evidence for some popular events in Solon's political career such as his urging the Athenians not to desert from the war over Salamis, and the *post factum* explanation of his own political reforms. Thus, we see that the performative circumstances of the poetical contents could lead to effective actions too. On the other hand, the classical authors, already temporally distant from the original performance of the Archaic verses focus rather on their message, commenting on the general role, even from a critical perspective (mostly Plato), of poetry for educating the young citizens. Our conclusions lead to an affirmation of the higher potential of the poetical work to play positive educational and political role if properly understood as a specific, often festive, form of speech, more influential in its oral form.

Keywords: Archaic Greece, Solon, lyric poetry, Greek *paideia*, oral communication.

The paper aims at: 1) investigating some features of the oral *paideia* through poetry in the early Greek culture, and 2) reconstructing the original reception and the educational effectiveness of the poems of the famous Archaic wise-man, legislator and poet Solon.

We do not (and it would be incorrect for the period in question) speak of *paideia* as the Greek "predecessor" of Roman and later "culture", but neither do we refer this notion only to the process and result of a

school education or to a certain gained knowledge, but – including this – to the overall process of communicating cultural values, especially with a view to the well-being of the community. By "communicating / communication" we mean literally the sharing of opinions through the instrument of language, mainly or at least to a degree orally and directed at a certain audience. In that respect *paideia* is an active process and demands active response. Thus, *paideia* is sometimes akin to *peitho*, the rhetorical persuasion: transfiguration, especially visible in the episode of Solon's plea for Salamis. This is certainly the most educational performative act of him in metre, while the hypothetical meeting and conversation with Croesus stands out as the most eminent manifestation of Solon's linguistic potential as a wise man.[1] Both situations are discussed below, along with several other pieces of evidence of Solon's genuine poetical and more generally linguistic skills, regarded as a didactic instrument. Aiming at this, we do not discuss the authenticity and the pure literary merits of the fragments ascribed to Solon, but rather their performative situation and their impact on the original audience.[2]

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1 The meeting between Solon and Croesus, famous mostly thanks to Solon's ethical thought and verbal skills (although not poetic in that case), is actually very popular, and is mentioned for example by Herodotus and Plutarch (cf. Hdt. I, 30–3; I, 86–7; Plut. *Sol*. 27–28). Quoted here is, however, the synoptic version of Diodorus Siculus, chosen because of the addition of a substantial detail characterizing exactly Solon's way of speaking:

> Croesus, the king of the Lydians, who was possessed of great military forces and had purposely amassed a large amount of silver and gold, used to call to his court the wisest men from among the Greeks... And on one occasion he summoned Solon, and showing him his military forces and his wealth, he asked him whether he thought there was any other man more blest than he. And Solon replied, with the freedom of speech customary among lovers of wisdom (τῇ συνήθει τοῖς φιλοσόφοις χρησάμενος παρρησίᾳ), that no man while yet living was blest; for the man who waxes haughty over his prosperity and thinks that he has Fortune as his helpmeet does not know whether she will remain with him to the last. Consequently, he continued, we must look to the end of life, and only of the man who has continued until then to be fortunate may we properly say that he is blest (DS IX, 2, 1–2).

> Diodorus' comment of interest for the present survey is the mention of the *parrhesia*, the freedom of speech as typical for the language of philosophy – this concept is important also for the modern reception and history of philosophy, but in my view, it is not really peculiar to Solon, or it remained to a degree concealed behind the metaphorical style of his poetry.

2 The paper displays primary results from a broader study in progress which attempts to discuss the legacy of Solon in the terms of the ordinary language philosophy and the theory of speech acts by John L. Austin in order to investigate, following the famous title of Austin's 1962 book, *How To Do Things With Words* in the Greek Archaic.

On the other hand, the different roles and spheres in which Solon uses his verbal capacities have certainly contributed to the stronger didactic tone of his poetry as a whole. The way of speaking, characteristic of the (Seven) wise men, with its elliptic, sometimes enigmatic and highly metaphorical style, could also be investigated as belonging to the poetic language in a broader sense – that is why we do not make a clear distinction between the utterances of Solon as a wise man, politician and poet while tracing out their educational potential.

In *Protagoras* Plato directly attributes didactic significance to some poetical works:

> ... The masters take pains accordingly, and the children, when they have learnt their letters and are getting to understand the written word as before they did only the spoken, are furnished with works of good poets (ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα) to read as they sit in class, and are made to learn them off by heart: here they meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good men in times past (πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν), that the boy in envy may imitate them and yearn to become even as they (Pl. *Prot*. 325e–326a).

Here, Plato speaks of the poets from the past and their modelling role in the primary school education. This is a rather well-known fact about the presence of the poetry from the previous times as educational material during the Classical period. The description of the procedure is also of significance: the poetical examples should be learnt by heart, a method still used for learning through verses; thanks to this technical detail poetry becomes "by default" a natural part of the education – a fact, however, of greater importance for earlier oral cultures. The works of the good poets are represented almost as the first and foremost works to be read by the pupils, they actually form the primary education in literature and as in "humanities" in general. There is a high degree of certainty that the poems of Solon were also among these "works of good poets", but our first aim is to trace out the original double role of Solon – at once a poet and a teacher for his own contemporaries (who were, besides, most probably of his age or even older). Moreover, the Archaic culture was of a strongly oral type all over the Greek world, and the poetical speech was easier to share and remember; however, the case of Solon bears some Athenian mark too. It was precisely the celebrated democratic spirit of the Athenians presupposing that every appeal, pronounced aloud, is not just pronounced aloud (because this was still the common and wide-spread form of reading), but is really addressed to somebody, more often to a smaller or greater community; thus, according to the still definitive in many aspects *Paideia* of Werner Jaeger:

> ... if no fragment of his <Solon's> poems had survived, we should hardly be able to comprehend the noblest and strangest quality in the great Attic tragedies, and in fact in the whole spiritual life of Athens – the inspiration given to all her art and thought by the idea of the state. So fully did her citizens realize that the intellectual and artistic life of each individual had both its origin and its purpose in the community, that the Athenian state dominated the lives of its members to a degree unparalleled outside Sparta. But Sparta, for all the nobility and firm resolution of her communal life, left no room for the individual will to develop, and, showing more and more clearly her inability to change her ethos with changing times, gradually became a fossilized relic of the past (Jaeger 1986: 136–137).

At the beginning of the proper observations on the topic, a key passage from one of the first chapters of Plutarch's *Life of Solon* – the main primary source of the investigation – should be discussed.[3] Plutarch reconstructs the poet's own intentions and strategies for composing poetry:

> And he <Solon> seems to have composed his poetry at first with no serious end in view (εἰς οὐδὲν ἄξιον σπουδῆς), but as amusement and diversion in his hours of leisure (ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν). Then later, he put philosophic maxims into verse, and interwove many political teachings (γνώμας ἐνέτεινε φιλοσόφους καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλὰ) in his poems, not simply to record and transmit them, but because they contained justifications of his acts, and sometimes exhortations, admonitions, and rebukes for the Athenians (προτροπὰς ἐνιαχοῦ καὶ νουθεσίας καὶ ἐπιπλήξεις πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους). Some say, too, that he attempted to reduce his laws to heroic verse before he published them, and they give us this introduction to them... (Plut. *Sol.* 3, 3–4).

In the passage above we read about at least two stages of Solon's attitude towards poetry. During the first stage Solon created and performed poetry in isolation, for his own pleasure. This is a quite untypical performative situation for the Archaic lyrics and it excludes to a certain degree the possibility for the poet to play an educative role, given the presumed lack of the usual oral performance in front of a certain audience. Besides, Plutarch himself seems to be hesitant if that type of poetry, designed as a leisure activity, and not for serious occasions, could serve a didactic target at all.

3 The most important primary sources for Solon (Aelian, Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Diogenes Laertius, Herodotus, Plutarch) are dated later than Solon's lifetime, and belong to various cultural epochs, but they share the same 'confidence' in Solon's poetical fragments as truly and biographically correct reflecting his activity as a politician and his views as a philosopher, as well as having certain educational potential: as evidence both for the development of Athens during the Archaic period and for some universal ethical values. This is again an implicit confirmation that Solon's poetry fits the pattern of Plato's *Protagoras*.

According to Plutarch, however, these early years were educative for Solon himself. The Athenian wise man realized that he could use poetry as a medium and instrument for different purposes: to record his philosophical views, later also his political positions, and not only to record them, but to apply to them the proper for the poetry of that time performative influence in order to explain and in that way to justify his political acts and to stimulate and persuade the citizens of Athens to take one decision or another. At this point poetry acquires its absolute didactic potential, while at the same time leaving its generic frames and approaching the function of the rhetoric.

The mentioning of Solon's project to compose even the laws in verses is noteworthy too. Ultimately, however, Solon steps back and does not use the poetic form for the laws. His deliberation and hesitation points exactly to the instrumental function and role of the metric language in the case of Solon: he does not insist to write as a poet, but to write performatively efficiently.

A kind of an implicit (or even explicit?) apology of the acting power of poetical speech in political context is made by Solon himself in the already mentioned famous episode concerning the need for regaining the island of Salamis (in close proximity to Athens) from the Megarians.

This event and the poetical intervention of Solon not only re-educated the Athenians and positively changed the position of the leaders of the community, but also turned Solon into an influential political figure. The performative effectiveness of the poetical utterance was even twofold. Let's have a look at the details in the situation, again beginning with Plutarch:

> Once when the Athenians were tired out with a war which they were waging against the Megarians for the island of Salamis, they made a law that no one in future, on pain of death, should move, in writing or orally (μήτε γράψαι τινὰ μήτ' εἰπεῖν), that the city take up its contention for Salamis. Solon could not endure the disgrace of this, and when he saw that many of the young men wanted steps taken to bring on the war, but did not dare to take those steps themselves on account of the law, he pretended to be out of his head (ἐσκήψατο μὲν ἔκστασιν τῶν λογισμῶν), and a report was given out to the city by his family that he showed signs of madness. He then secretly composed some elegiac verses (ἐλεγεῖα δὲ κρύφα συνθεὶς), and after rehearsing them so that he could say them by rote, he sallied out into the market-place of a sudden, with a cap upon his head. After a large crowd had collected there, he got upon the herald's stone and recited the poem which begins:
>
> Behold in me a herald come from lovely Salamis,
> With a song in ordered verse instead of a harangue.

> This poem is entitled 'Salamis,' and contains a hundred very graceful verses (στίχων ἑκατόν... χαριέντως πάνυ πεποιημένον). When Solon had sung it, his friends began to praise him, and Peisistratus in particular urged and incited the citizens to obey his words. They therefore repealed the law and renewed the war, putting Solon in command of it (Plut. *Sol.* 8, 1–3).

By applying Austin's theory more liberally, one could say that the Salamis case is an exemplary performative also because of its formal characteristics – the poem starts with verbal forms in the first person singular and later, turns into a direct exhortation; it was extremely successful, and even in a twofold way: the Athenians regained Salamis, and Solon – maybe unexpectedly for him, and as an addition to the primary goal of the speech act – became the leader of this operation and thus started his political career. At this point the question arises whether the pretended madness has explicitly contributed to this success of the poet / orator / public actor. And if so, could the performative still be called successful in view of the untruth ("Solon is mad"), uttered at the preparatory stage of the performance? Actually, only this utterance could be called a "lie", since the next one – "I am coming from Salamis" – forms already a part of the poem and, although used by Solon for political purposes, is completely legitimate as a literary device.

The elaborateness of the framing false performative is even higher: if Solon was truly mad, his words, either poetry or prose, should not have been accepted as serious and trustworthy, but this was the only safe way to break the law. And exactly this performative breaking of the law became the beginning of the career of one of the most prominent Athenian lawgivers.

Otherwise, this extraordinary behavior, Solon's madness, corresponds to the extraordinarity of the situation as a whole, or even – the state of emergency for the Athenians[4].

Regarding the interconnections between the different genres in Greek literature in the oral performative in question, it is exactly this transition or even transposition and metamorphosis[5] – of the traditional elegiac

4 Diogenes Laertius' more concise account of the same episode (s. DL I.2.46) displays two details differently: a) Solon had a garland (στεφανωσάμενος), not a hat on his head, and b) the poem was presented / pronounced not by Solon himself, but read by a herald (ἀνέγνω διὰ κήρυκος). Despite these slight differences, the theatricality of the situation is similar, and the setting – festive, to a degree; Solon is again said to be "feigning madness" (μαίνεσθαι προσποιησάμενος), and even before depicting the performance, Diogenes has already qualified this intervention of him as "his greatest service", referring, moreover, to Salamis as "his birthplace" – if this circumstance was true, then the occasion really was an extraordinary one (after Podlecki 1969: 81, see below), and required unusual verbal and non-verbal strategy.

5 Described almost in these exact terms by the poet himself in v. 2 of the poem, as cited by Plutarch, see above: *κόσμον ἐπέων ᾠδὴν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος*.

distichs into public speech seems to be most interesting here. And Solon actually acts not only as a (mad) poet and as a future legislator, but as a wise man too, and this is testified also by the complex setting of the performance, dependent, on the other hand, on the oral characteristics of the Archaic culture.

Concerning the didactic layer, the passage as a whole is indicative: both with the carefully designed setting and the realization of the performative – the successful act of *paideia* should be rather well prepared and not improvised – as well as, and even more so, with the result of the performance. However, despite the success of Solon in that highly performative situation, precisely this kind of "combined" and overtly public acting and speaking, also in verses, was not the most habitual one for Solon. Or, following Podlecki, we could state that Solon fights so urgently: both metaphorically and literally – as a leader of Athenian troops, when they re-enter the battle for Salamis, only in a "state of emergency": "Solon resorted to battle only in times of national crisis, when public policy demanded involvement... The rest of the time he preferred to use the essentially peaceful procedures of law" (Podlecki 1969: 81).

During his subsequent political career, after the Salamis case, Solon continuously uses verses to explain his acts. And it could be concluded that his poetical sense has also influenced his "normal" / prosaic speech and reveals deeper insight into the language and its educational and persuasive power. This thesis could be supported by another passage by Plutarch, ascribing to Solon the "invention" of the euphemizing way of speaking:

> Now later writers observe that the ancient Athenians used to cover up the ugliness of things with auspicious and kindly terms, giving them polite and endearing names. Thus, they called harlots 'companions,' taxes 'contributions,' the garrison of a city its 'guard,' and the prison a 'chamber.' But Solon was the first, it would seem, to use this device, when he called his cancelling of debts a 'disburdenment'. (Plut. *Sol.* 15, 2–3).

This rhetorical strategy again relies on at least partial hiding of the truth, but it surely made more acceptable some legislations and other political decisions and, thus, could be called a successful performative; moreover, it prompted stronger attention to the use of language by carefully nominating the problematic and unpleasant phenomena and social roles.

But, as Podlecki remarks, we do not have almost any other evidence for such ecstatic, "mad" and vivid poetical performative as in defense of Salamis. Solon remained the charismatic leader for a certain period of time, having risen as such exactly during the Salamis episode, and he carried on to show up his (linguistic) wit and creativity. What, however, developed to become more typical for him was the rather quiet and moder-

ate reflexive tone, corresponding to the manner of speaking and acting of the wise-men[6]. In that respect the very famous retrospective "I"– elegiac fragment, dedicated to his services for the community.is remarkable:

> For to the common people I gave so much power as is sufficient,
> Neither robbing them of dignity, nor giving them too much,
> And those who had power, and were marvelously rich,
> Even for these I contrived that they suffered no harm
> I stood with a mighty shield in front of both classes,
> And suffered neither of them to prevail unjustly (Plut. *Sol.* 18, 4 = Fragm. 5 Bergk).

According again to Podlecki, the military metaphors here (vv. 5–6) are recourse to the soldiering life of Solon during his earlier years (see Podlecki 1969: 80). And even though that one cannot imagine that in his old age Solon would act similarly as in his defense of Salamis, such connections, at least at the level of poetic imagery, testify that perhaps in the time of the Salamis exploit Solon had already formed in his mind the outlines of a political project devoted to Justice.

It is as if the lyric "I" speaks of political acts and reforms, not directly bound to poetical speaking, but the general idea – to contextualize his actions, to distribute the common wealth by differentiation and according to people's personal merits – was maybe the principal idea Solon the poet was also led by: only if the poet addresses different audiences in a different way he could not only perform his poetry, but also persuade and educate through it, the final goal being – in the case of Solon – to keep the balance, both with the variety, in the state and in the community.

Thus, Solon was usually the educator, although there are some pieces of evidence about his own interest towards learning – in general, and more specifically – towards the poetry of others, very likely with the idea of getting new knowledge through it. According to Aelian (VH, Fragm. 187, 1–5), once at a dining party Solon, clearly in his old age, eagerly insisted to be taught a song of Sappho, in order not to die before having learned it. Here, most probably, the possible slightly ironic tone of the utterance is overshadowed by the interest in "life-long" learning, through poetry too, expressed directly in the very famous pentameter:

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6 The notion *sophos* as applied to these early philosophers and public figures does not mean only "philosophically learned", but more generally "wise, prudent, clever", and, this way, also "skilled in the art of speaking". Wallace, who lists the Seven Greek *sophoi* among the "charismatic leaders" from the Archaic age, stresses on their "cunning intelligence". Among the given examples, Solon is expectedly present with his contribution to the regaining of Salamis (see Wallace 2009: 422).

> But I grow old ever learning many things (Plut. Sol. 2, 2 = 31, 3 (= Fragm. 18 Bergk).[7]

Having in mind that this "confession" is poetry itself, let's conclude that the figure of Solon could be discussed as proofing some crucial aspects of the Archaic Greek culture, and especially its specific attitude to language, functioning as a rule in an oral performative context by the intense use of verses and other literary devices as an essential element of *paideia*.

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7 As we see, Plutarch cites the verse twice, using it as a framing device – approximately at the beginning and to the end of the biography. Plato also refers to this utterance of Solon in *Laches* 188b.

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ISOCRATES ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION

Abstract: Isocrates is relatively unknown nowadays, as compared to philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, but that should not mislead us as to the real "education market" in Greece in the 4th century BC. Isocrates' school of oratory comes to be recognized as the most popular educational institution of its time as it played a decisive role in shaping the cultural tradition of antiquity and set a major example for Hellenistic Greece and Rome. His ambition to offer the best higher education got him involved in a dispute with more and less prominent rivals and it is this dispute that turns out to be quite beneficial to reflection upon education. This paper gives an account of the type of training offered by the rhetorician, the argumentation he uses to defend it, and personal qualities he wants his disciples to acquire.

Keywords: Isocrates, educational philosophy, politics, culture.

The period between the middle of the fifth century BC and the death of Isocrates and Aristotle (the '30s and '20s of the fourth century BC) has often been described as the age of Greek enlightenment. It was a time of the rise of higher education and of lively debates over human nature and the ways it could be influenced and transformed. These debates had larger implications than just seeking to define the best educational system: they gave rise to reflection on broad cultural issues concerning human self-development and enhancement. While the wandering sophists in the fifth century offered instruction in various fields, claiming to teach civic virtue (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή), the fourth century saw the establishment of philosophical and rhetorical schools as two forms of higher education institutions. Both philosophers and rhetoricians called their occupation παιδεία or φιλοσοφία, the latter being still a non-specific term, standing for educational and intellectual activity in general. Reflection upon education was

stimulated by the complicated relations of mutual influence, distinction and competition between the educational systems, whose connection to social practice was yet to be affirmed and promoted. Education was discussed and perceived as a powerful instrument capable of solving the problems of both individuals and society.

Isocrates may be less known nowadays (as compared to the major philosophers and writers of the Classical period), but that should not mislead us as to the real picture of the "education market" in Greece in the fourth century BC. His school came to be recognized as the most popular of its time, so it played a decisive role in shaping a cultural tradition that lasted over the Hellenistic and the Roman age. Cicero famously compared it to a Trojan horse, from which a number of outstanding individuals came out (Cic. De orat. 294). The eminent German classicist Werner Jaeger granted Isocrates the right to be titled father of "humanistic culture" (Jaeger 1986: 46), and Moses Hadas stated that "it was the program of Isocrates which has shaped European education to this day, which has kept humanism alive, and which has given Western civilization such unity as it possesses" (Hadas 1969: 129). Others have called him "the educator of Europe", "the father of modern liberal education"[1], and what is more, "the parent of culture studies".[2] Isocrates' aspiration to offer and to promote the best higher education got him involved in an argument with more or less prominent rivals and it is this argument that turns out to be quite beneficial to reflecting upon education and civilized human life.

For the most part, Isocrates' works were meant to elucidate his views on various social and political issues. Many of his orations, though discussing ideas about the future of Athens and the entire Greek world, were never delivered in public – they were most probably composed as sample speeches for his students and then circulated as elaborate essays for the reading audience. Thus, unlike the usual deliberative speeches, they were not intended for performance in actual political debate, but rather for publication and dissemination in writing, which implies not only a wider audience but also a more distant horizon of political and cultural thinking. Isocrates regarded the beautifully arranged and convincingly designed speech as having vast potential to influence people's minds and even transform different aspects of social life and current political agenda.

1 Cf. the references and the author's own assessment in Muir 2005: 166–168; 188.

2 As stated in the title of M. McGee's paper "Isocrates: A parent of rhetoric and culture studies" which argues that the orator introduced his fellow-citizens to the ideology of a linguistically-defined culture, and through rhetoric and moral argumentation pursued "positive cultural change" (McGee 1986).

Isocrates revealed in his speeches his political views with the hope that the power of persuasion could significantly contribute to dealing with contemporary issues. He applied various combinations of epideictic and deliberative oratory to work out his ideas on the complex problems of cultural identity and political reality and, respectively, on the interdependence between the domains of cultural values and political action. Around 380 BC, he released his famous *Panegyricus* in which he communicated an appraisal of Athenian cultural achievments together with the idea that the Greeks should realize both their shared cultural tradition and their political interests, stop fighting each other and engage in a war against the barbarian Persians. The text presents Athens as the commendable leader of Greece[3] and argues that freedom, moral soundness, literacy, education and other common values separate Greeks from non-Greeks, so that the Greek states should put aside their differences and unite against the common enemy. The form of the praising speech was thus given a new social function. It brought to the fore the city's past merits and its present role in articulating and fostering the distinguishing features of the Greek civilization. It is in this context that the orator made his famous statement:

> τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ' οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασι, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.
>
> And so far has our city distanced the rest of mankind in thought and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the rest of the world; and she has brought it about that the name "Hellenes" suggests no longer a race but an intelligence (mentality), and that the title of "Hellenes" is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share our common blood.[4]

In this passage, Isocrates tends to associate Greekness with what Athens has developed as an intellectual and educational practice, presuming its universal value should be recognized all over Greece.[5] This is a step towards the notion of a universal culture that is not "anonymous" in

3 The difficulties Isocrates faced with the question of leadership and their modern explanations are briefly and clearly summarized in Papillon 2004: 26–27.

4 Paneg. 50. The English versions are taken from the Loeb edition, except for the addition here of the rendering "mentality" in the brackets. In his recent translation T. Papillon prefers "way of thinking" for διάνοια and preserves "education" (and not "culture") for παίδευσις (Isocrates 2004: 40).

5 In Y. L. Too's words "Athens' culture and education, and especially her language, synecdochically constitute Greekness" (Too 1995: 147).

its roots, but nevertheless its main feature is the possibility of transmission and appropriation as a means of self-identification. Isocrates does not expand on how exactly this process of appropriation should be conceived and how it affects the persons or the groups that are subject to it, although it is clear that the cultural exchange is channeled through language and education. It is true that the cultural ideal Isocrates proclaimed (following in the footsteps of Thucydidean Pericles) was utterly Athenocentric, and it has been justifiably argued that he would hardly extend relentlessly the notion of Greekness[6], but rather restrict it to those Greeks who had acquired the kind of knowledge and refinement nurtured in Athens. And it is also true that the cultural value inscribed into the Athenian way was meant to justify the claims for leadership, projecting "a cultural hegemony which is presented as superseding Athens' military empire" (Too 1995: 8). Still, the passage refers to a cultural practice that no doubt regards itself as a dominating and active factor, and is presented as world-open, ready to accept others and recognize them as belonging to the same set of ways to understand and organize human life.

Thinking in terms of what is now called cultural studies is essential for assessing Isocrates' political and educational ideas. In his works, the distinction of nature from culture is exemplified through a series of tangible comparisons between humans and animals, between the Greeks and the non-Greeks, between Athens and the other poleis. An indicative example is found in the following address the orator made to his fellow Athenians (Antidosis. 293–295):

> καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ προέχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων οὐ ταῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείαις, οὐδ' ὅτι κάλλιστα πολιτεύεσθε καὶ μάλιστα φυλάττετε τοὺς νόμους οὓς ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον, ἀλλὰ τούτοις οἷς περ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν βαρβάρων, τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδεῦσθαι.
>
> For you, yourselves, are pre-eminent and superior to the rest of the world, not in your application to the business of war, nor because you govern yourselves more excellently or preserve the laws handed down to you by your ancestors more faithfully than others, but in those qualities by which the nature of **man** rises above the other **animals**, and the race of the **Hellenes** above the **barbarians**, namely, in the fact that you have been educated as have been no other people in wisdom and in speech.

6 Cf. Walbank's disparagement of Jaeger's assertion that Isocrates "identifies what is specifically Greek with what is universally human" (Walbank 2010: 5). Y. L. Too also argues that Isocrates relates Greek culture to Athenian culture, and Athenian culture to his own teaching (Too 1995, esp. ch.4).

In these words, the three main dichotomies of Isocrates' cultural thinking are laid down, and at the same time they are tied to the key concept – education as a means of perfecting the special human way of expression through discourse. The context of this statement refers to the justification of the author's occupation. So there is a direct connection between thinking about the essence of human culture and about education as a path to orientation and improvement in a certain living environment. Education is presented as an alternative to other cultural identifiers: the care of security and military power, the political order, and the maintenance of the community's norms and traditions. Evidently, all these elements of cultural reflection are too closely intertwined in a somewhat speculative, not strictly analytical approach, but still, oratory is a particularly favorable ground for cultural thinking, as it is typically aimed at engaging the audience with certain ideas, which are justified by a variety of arguments. As can be seen from the above passage, the keynote of the principal difference between man and animal is mentioned by Isocrates in connection to one of his favorite topics, the apology of rhetorical education, conceived as a conscious effort to master reality by intellectual means. It is the unity of word and reason (logos) that represents the *differentia specifica*, which determines the special position of the humans in the world. Other relevant passages can be readily adduced. In the *Panegyric*, Athens is praised for having invented the φιλοσοφία and for her love of the art of speaking (Paneg. 48):

> Φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν, ἣ πάντα ταῦτα συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασε, καὶ πρός τε τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράϋνε, καὶ τῶν συμφορῶν τάς τε δι' ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένας διεῖλε, καὶ τὰς μὲν φυλάξασθαι τὰς δὲ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν ἐδίδαξεν, ἡ πόλις 48ἡμῶν κατέδειξε, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν, ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῖς δ' ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσι, **συνειδυῖα μὲν ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ζώων ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες, καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αὐτῶν διηνέγκαμεν**...
>
> Philosophy, moreover, which has helped to discover and establish all these institutions, which has educated us for public affairs and made us gentle towards each other, which has distinguished between the misfortunes that are due to ignorance and those which spring from necessity, and taught us to guard against the former and to bear the latter nobly—philosophy, I say, was given to the world by our city. And Athens it is that has honoured eloquence, which all men crave and envy in its possessors; **for she realized that this is the one endowment of our nature which singles us out from all living creatures, and that by using this advantage we have risen above them in all other respects as well**...

In a similar context, the cultural role of the *logos* is highlighted in a passage from the speech *Nicocles* (Nic. 6), repeated almost word for word also in the *Antidosis*:

> ἐγγενομένου δ' ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν ἂν βουληθῶμεν, οὐ μόνον **τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν**, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις ᾠκίσαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕρομεν, καὶ σχεδὸν **ἅπαντα τὰ δι' ἡμῶν μεμηχανημένα λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας**.
>
> ...but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only **have we escaped the life of wild beasts**, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, **there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish**.

It is within the context of these general ideas of human life and culture, that shaped Isocrates' concept of proper education. In his opinion, individual subjects such as mathematics, astronomy, eristic may be efficiently used to establish discipline of the mind, to develop thinking and memory, so they are of propaedeutic value. Yet, specializing in any one of them could not lead to useful outcomes corresponding to the real needs of both individual and society. The orator is indignant at the fact that "it is people ignoring what is necessary and loving the oddities of the old Sophists that claim to be philosophizing and not those studying and exercising what would enable them to handle efficiently their own home and public affairs. Yet, it is the home and public affairs that are worth philosophizing on and doing anything about" (Antid. 285). And again, in the *Panathenaicus* Isocrates asserts: "of those who have studied at my school, I treasure higher the ones having gained respect in life and practice, rather than the ones considered to be strong orators" (Panath. 87).

Therefore, the education offered by Isocrates was primarily focused on training in rhetoric as regards the method employed, while at the same time it was aimed at practically oriented general education as regards its objectives. It did by no means seek to be professionally specialized, nor did it seek to be abstract or isolated from life. Thus his educational goal was the production of culturally skilled, intellectually astute, ethically virtuous, and politically active individuals, capable of confronting the challenges of life. And this kind of education was considered highly relevant and effective as a resource for public achievement, since it was the power of the spoken and written word, deliberation and communication (logos) that had originally contributed to shaping human society and civilization, and that helped people in resolving different problems in any situation and on any stage of their lives.

Isocrates gives also an explicit account of his view of the scope of an individual's education and knowledge in his well-known definition of "the educated man" in the *Panathenaic oration*. This lengthy passage makes it

clear that the author had in mind general education, that is practically oriented and distinct from any specific kind of knowledge. The passage in question (Panath. 30–32) states:

> I can see that some people have specialized in individual subjects to a point that makes them teach others as well, yet renders them incapable of using those sciences properly. Those people act less sensibly than their disciples, not to say slaves, in other spheres of human activity as well. I entertain the same opinion about the ones able to speak in public and the ones having established their reputation through speech writing, to sum it up, about everyone having gained recognition in the fields of art, science and skills. As I know that most of them have neither settled their own affairs, nor are they bearable as regards their personal contacts as they ignore their fellow citizens' judgement and are profoundly wrong in numerous other respects. So I do not think even such people may have anything to do with the state of being educated.
>
> Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος· ἔπειτα τοὺς πρεπόντως καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζουσι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατὸν ἐλαφροτάτους καὶ μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας· ἔτι τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν ἀεὶ κρατοῦντας, τῶν δὲ συμφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἡττωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐταῖς διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως ἧς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν· τέταρτον, ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξισταμένους αὑτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους, ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένοις. τοὺς δὲ μὴ μόνον πρὸς ἓν τούτων ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας, τούτους φημὶ καὶ φρονίμους εἶναι καὶ τελέους ἄνδρας καὶ πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετάς.
>
> Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πεπαιδευμένω τυγχάνω ταῦτα γιγνώσκων.
>
> Whom, then, do I call educated, since I exclude the arts and sciences and specialties? First, those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a judgement which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action; next, those who are decent and honorable in their intercourse with all with whom they associate, tolerating easily and good-naturedly what is unpleasant or offensive in others and being themselves as agreeable and reasonable to their associates as it is possible to be; furthermore, those who hold their pleasures always under control and are not unduly overcome by their misfortunes, bearing up under them bravely and in a manner worthy of our common nature; finally, and most important of all, those who are

> not spoiled by successes and do not desert their true selves and become arrogant, but hold their ground steadfastly as intelligent men, not rejoicing in the good things which have come to them through chance rather than in those which through their own nature and intelligence are theirs from their birth. Those who have a character which is in accord, not with one of these things, but with all of them—these, I contend, are wise and complete men, possessed of all the virtues.
>
> These then are the views which I hold regarding educated men.

The passage provides certain clues to Isocrates' idea of the quality of being educated. Firstly, education proper should be non-specialist and universal. Secondly, it evokes a combination of various behavioral patterns, from pragmatism through civilized manners to traditional moral norms and values. Thirdly, all those characteristics are viewed as a whole, forming a complex structure built of several interrelated elements. To make a more precise differentiation between general knowledge and rhetorical training, one should turn to a curious passage from the *Fourth letter* (Epist. 4.2). Here Isocrates states that among the many individuals he has taught, some have become extremely skillful in the very art of speaking, others have proven to be efficient in thought and deed, while still others have become sensible in life and also pleasant and fine people, though they have turned out to be totally inapt to specific occupations. This is a clear indication of Isocrates' aspirations and their outcomes:

> ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν συγγεγενημένων ἀνδρῶν καὶ δόξας ἐνίων μεγάλας ἐχόντων, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οἱ μὲν τινες περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ διανοηθῆναι καὶ πρᾶξαι δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ βίου σώφρονες καὶ χαρίεντες, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας χρήσεις καὶ διαγωγὰς ἀφυεῖς παντάπασιν·
>
> For although many men of various countries have been my pupils and some of these are of great repute, and while of all the others some have proved to be distinguished for eloquence alone, and others in intellect and in practical affairs, and still others have indeed been men of sobriety of life and cultivated tastes, but for general usefulness in the practical affairs of life utterly devoid of natural ability.

The first group of outcomes involves the completion of training in rhetoric and fitness for competent civil and political action. The second group of outcomes involves non-specialist skillfulness, practical efficiency and good manners. Indeed, most of Isocrates' disciples probably attended his school to become active citizens, politicians, and public speakers (including monarchs). But Isocrates explicitly and on many occasions points out to another goal, which is less ambitious and more difficult to define. Insisting on the latter objective, he tends to imply (in the above cited definition in the *Panathenaic oration*) that the first group of outcomes stands

closer to the realm of specialist training, which does not equal to the state of being educated. The second one represents a comprehensive range of human characteristics, whose formation is believed to be a legitimate educational purpose. One could call this range of characteristics general personal culture.

Elaborating on the conditions favoring the attainment of his ideal education, Isocrates makes use of a triad known from the time of the sophists: natural ability, practical exercise and theoretical knowledge (Antid. 187; 192; Contra soph. 14). Natural abilities are the decisive factor according to him, yet, their enhancement is of great importance both to the talented and to the ones who are less gifted. Actually, everybody benefits from the training offered by the rhetorician in a way corresponding to his abilities and dispositions. That is exactly what the passage from the *Fourth letter* emphasizes. Personal advancement, however, should in any way depend upon the active involvement, purposeful exercise and effort on the part of the individual. This kind of effort is what transcends the natural disposition and this is best manifested in the comparison involving the taming of animals (Ad. Nic. 12):

> καὶ μὴ νόμιζε τὴν **ἐπιμέλειαν** ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις πράγμασι χρησίμην εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ βελτίους ἡμᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτέρους γίγνεσθαι μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν· μηδὲ καταγνῷς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν, ὡς περὶ μὲν τὰ θηρία τέχνας εὑρήκαμεν αἷς αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμεροῦμεν καὶ πλείονος ἀξίας ποιοῦμεν, ἡμᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν ἂν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὠφελήσαιμεν.
>
> And do not hold the view that while diligence is of use in all other matters it is of no avail to make us better and wiser; and do not deem us, the human kind, so unfortunate that, although in dealing with wild beasts we have discovered arts by which we tame their spirits and increase their worth, yet in our own case we are powerless to help ourselves in the pursuit of virtue.

The term παιδεία (and παίδευσις) is used by Isocrates to convey a wide variety of meanings. According to the specific context, it may stand for either an educational process, i.e. an educational mechanism with its methods and means, or the cultural and moral status of a specific community, or the cultural and moral status of an individual resulting from both his level of education and his belonging to a specific community. The notion of επιμέλεια, i. e. "care, diligence, attention", often related to the conscious attempt at human perfection, is already familiar from Plato. As its meaning is rather general and may be related to any human effort in a certain direction, it is worth emphasizing that Isocrates does usually associate it with terms such as παιδεία, παίδευσις, φιλοσοφία[7] or uses the more

7 Demon. 6; Contra soph. 8; Antid. 250; 304; Euag. 80. Just επιμέλεια in this sense: Areopag. 37; Contra soph. 17; Antid. 207; 245; επιμέλεια αὐτοῦ: Euag. 49; Antid. 290.

explicit phrase τῆς ψυχῆς επιμέλεια. Therefore, επιμέλεια is employed by Isocrates as a general notion for all those different aspects of human activity that go beyond nature and transform the very nature of the self. Indicative is also the correspondence in meaning with the Latin word *cultura*, as well as the possible impact of the phrase επιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς on Cicero's phrase *cultura animi*. As is well known, *cultura animi* was philosophy to Cicero who meant *philosophia* in the widespread sense of the word which is largely due to Plato's usage and authority. Yet, the fact that Isocrates also called his sphere "philosophy" should not be underestimated. Cicero's philosophical views are certainly strongly influenced by Plato, but as an orator and a man of letters, he was also well-versed in Isocrates's writings. The phrase επιμέλεια της ψυχης was used by both the Greek authors who were rivals and knew each other's writings.[8] Thus Isocrates was probably among the influential thinkers who helped shaping the long-lasting humanistic concept of culture.

Isocrates' educational philosophy may seem to be too modest and earthly, if compared with Plato's thought or Aristotle's oeuvre[9]; and he may be all too often overlooked by later theorists of education. It was aimed at enhancing a person's moral goodness, civilized manners and practical wisdom, regardless of whether they were a public figure or an average citizen. Yet, it is not just the pragmatism of Isocrates' ideal of the cultured individual that is relevant even for the present day, but also its universality. Isocrates' educational system, as an offspring of the sophistic (though he denies having anything to do with its objectives and methods) faces the various concerns in anybody's life. The individual trained in this school should become able to handle any situation and to have command of his life, because reason (logos) as the *differentia specifica* of the human being lays at the heart of the art of speaking. Rhetorical education cultivates a person's ability to think logically and to make the right decisions, as well as to convincingly convey his ideas to the others. It is worthwhile quot-

8 The phrase is also employed by Xenophon (e. g. Mem. 1.2.4), which leads to the suggestion that it might have been coined by Socrates himself, as all three authors are related to him. (In *Antidosis* Isocrates conspicuously models his own image after that of Socrates through allusions to the *Apology*, and some scholars assume that this might be the reason why he uses the word φιλοσοφία for his rhetoric; cf. Too 1995: 193.) No parallels are to be found in pre-Socratic thought. The "agricultural metaphor", on the other hand, is usually traced back to the sophists of the second half of the 5th century, notably to a fragment of Antiphon (DK 87 b60), and is attested in all three major fourth-century educators, i. e. Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle.

9 According to the prominent historian of classical education H. I. Marrou, Isocrates' teaching (in contrast to Plato's pursuit of inner perfection which led him to "a heroic solitude") had "an immediate and in a sense a quite prosaic objective – the formation of the intellectual elite which Greece needed *hic et nunc*" (Marrou 1982: 79).

ing in conclusion a remarkable passage from the *Sixth letter* in which the teacher explains how he instructs his students to determine the object and the parts of a speech and to seek for the proper thoughts to be expressed in each part (Epist. 6.9). That is exactly the way one has to deal with and resolve any kind of problem in his life, first to examine and analyze the situation in order to draw his strategy and then take the best course of action. Because all this is not only about speeches, Isocrates continues, it is the principle (στοιχεῖον) in all other things. Otherwise people go astray and life without direction might turn to confusion and failure.

> καὶ ταῦτα φράζω μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων καὶ κατὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων πραγμάτων. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐστὶ πραχθῆναι νοῦν ἐχόντως, ἂν μὴ τοῦτο πρῶτον μετὰ πολλῆς προνοίας λογίσησθε καὶ βουλεύσησθε, πῶς χρὴ τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον ὑμῶν αὐτῶν προστῆναι καὶ τίνα βίον προελέσθαι.
>
> And this procedure I prescribe with reference to discourse, yet it is a principle applicable not only to all other matters, but also to your own affairs. For nothing can be intelligently accomplished unless first, with full forethought, you reason and deliberate how you ought to direct your own future, what mode of life you should choose.

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WHY SHOULD WOMEN BE GIVEN THE SAME EDUCATION AS MEN?[1] Plato's Account of Gender Equality in Education in the *Laws*

Abstract: The political views of Plato on women in the *Laws* have been a subject of debate among scholars. The reintroduction of families and private property in his late dialogue can potentially impact the role of women in the state. Furthermore, it remains a matter of contention whether Plato altered some of his political views on women while writing the *Laws*. In this debate, I will analyze the inconsistencies in Plato's *Laws*, endeavoring to determine whether Plato provided women with equal opportunities in education, employment, and political involvement in his late work or not. I will explore what kinds of training Plato believes should be applied to both genders. Finally, I will draw a conclusion in regard to the social and political impacts of gender equality in education in Plato's "second best state" as it is described in his *Laws*.

Key Words: Plato, the *Laws*, education, women's issue, gender equality.

I Introduction

Some of Plato's political views were considered revolutionary in his time and continue to be regarded as such even after two millennia.[2] Plato seems to believe that both genders are equal in respect to their talents and

1 I am very grateful to the insightful comments and suggestions given to us on this paper by Nicholas D. Smith.

2 The authors G. Grote and Th. Gomperz have been identified as some of the few scholars who recognized the importance of Plato's views on encouraging women to pursue their untapped abilities. Cf. Grote 1888, Gomperz 1905, Book V.

abilities. Most probably, his account of women and their social role was influenced by the Pythagoreans. Plato visited several Pythagorean communities, where he established friendly relationships with Archytas and his intellectual circle in Tarentums (Pl. *Ep.* 326b-d, Cic. *R.* 1.10.16, D.L. 3. 46, 8/79–83), and it is possible Plato may have encountered Philolaus. While visiting Southern Italy, he may have observed Pythagorean women engaging in intellectual activities[3] (Porph. *VP* 18.19).[4]

Additionally, in the *Republic*,[5] the most intelligent women might belong to the ruling class, because some of them are naturally suited to pursue the most difficult and most responsible tasks.[6]

Plato's political views in his later work, *Laws*, are often considered more conservative than those in *Republic*. The most significant difference is Plato's reintroduction of families, which can potentially impact the role of women in the state. It is debated whether Plato changed some of his political views on women while writing *Laws*, as his text in *Laws* appears inconsistent. Consequently, scholars are sharply divided over the political and social roles of women in Plato's "second-best city" (Magnesia). In this discussion, I will analyze the inconsistencies in his Laws to determine whether Plato provided women with equal opportunities in education, employment, and political involvement in his later work.

Plato introduces the question of men's and women's relation to virtue in the following manner:

> "whatever be the way in which a man might become good, possessing the virtue of soul that befits a human, whether (one's virtue) derives from a pursuit, or a character, or a certain way of living, or a desire, or an opinion, or any intellectual study – no matter if the nature of our fellow citizen is male or female, young or old – all his efforts throughout the whole of his life shall be directed towards the attainment of virtue."[7]
>
> ὅπως ποτὲ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχων, ἔκ τινος ἐπιτηδεύματος ἤ τινος ἤθους ἢ ποιᾶς σιτήσε-

3 More about Plato and the Pythagorean women is in N. D. Smith and my paper on "Plato's Women: Expanding the Socratic Insight" (forthcoming).

4 According to edition Fideler 1987.

5 Already in the earlier dialogue *Meno*, Plato's Socrates–who argues against Meno's distinction between men's and women's virtues–posits one and same virtue for all, including men and women, young and old and the like (Cf. *Men.* 73c. See, also, Smith 1983: 467–468, Deretic 2013: 157).

6 To Glaucon's remark that Socrates beautifully described ruling men, Socrates replies: "And ruling women, too, Glaucon, for you mustn't think that what I've said applies any more to men than it does to women who are born with the appropriate natures." *Resp.* 540c-d. I use C. D. C. Reeve's translation of the *Republic*. Cf. Hutchison 1997: 1155.

7 I am very grateful to Darko Todorovic, who significantly improved my translation.

> ως ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ δόξης ἢ μαθημάτων ποτέ τινων, εἴτε ἄρρην τις τῶν συνοικούντων οὖσα ἡ φύσις εἴτε θήλεια, νέων ἢ γερόντων, ὅπως εἰς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὃ λέγομεν τεταμένη σπουδὴ πᾶσα ἔσται διὰ παντὸς οὗ βίου."[8]

The citation suggests that the Athenian Stranger posits the ultimate objective of the second-best state and its legislative reform is to develop virtues and high moral values in individuals. This requires the cultivation of good habits from an early age, the development of appropriate desires, and the honing of a critical thinking ability in persons. Plato contends that the achievement of general virtuousness depends most importantly (though not exclusively) on development of intellectual abilities.

The Athenian Stranger, in the quotation above, proposes that there is one virtue common to both men and women. He urges the lawgiver to provide laws for all citizens, regardless of gender, to pursue tasks according to their individual talents, which includes developing character traits, acquiring skills, and knowledge. Education is the means to accomplish these tasks. If women possess the same natural abilities as men to think rationally and learn, they should receive an education and participate in political life. This passage in the *Laws* agrees with the *Republic*, where women are given the same social status, duties, and responsibilities as men.

In another passage, Plato's Athenian Stranger makes the following statement:

> "A woman's natural potential for virtue is inferior to a man's."[9]
> ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων

This claim[10] appears to contradict the prior assertion of gender equality. It is unclear whether Plato intended to suggest that women are generally less capable of acquiring virtue than men or if they are less adept at acquiring specific virtues compared to men. The type of virtue that Plato refers to in this passage remains ambiguous, and it is uncertain whether it pertains to intellectual or character-based virtues. It is noteworthy that the Athenian Stranger neither specifies the inferior aspects of women's nature relative to men's nor attributes full aretê to men.

The sentence in question, when viewed in its context (770c7–d6), sheds light on Plato's intention. His portrayal of women as inferior[11] may be merely a reflection of the general character and behavior of women

8 Cf. *Leg.* 770c7–d6.

9 Cf. *Leg.* 781b2.

10 I am very grateful to Istora Tolić for helping me translate this sentence and for critically reading this paper.

11 Saunders (1995: 592), Bononich (2002: 387–8) and Samaras (2010: 189) take women's inferiority to be sociological, rather than essential.

in his time and society. If women's inferiority is a result of historical and traditional condition, then it is possible to change their position with the right approach. Plato seems to believe that current societies lack a proper legislative system that would allow women to pursue functions that align with their natural abilities. However, even the most straightforward reforms were difficult to implement due to the deeply ingrained oppression and prejudice against women and their abilities.

Plato appears to vacillate between his rational belief in the general equality of women and men while acknowledging individual differences and the prevailing views of men during his time.[12] In other words, despite the widespread biases of his time, including the one that women are inferior in terms of virtue, Plato believes that women possess sufficient intellectual abilities to receive education and hold positions corresponding with their talents and education. In the *Laws*, he argues that women should learn and participate in public life, even though there are many examples of women who would vehemently oppose the idea of changing their traditional subordinate roles.

Plato's discussion on women's education reaches a turning point[13] when he provides an example of the usefulness and value of using both hands. He discredits the assertion that the right and left hands are naturally suited for different specialized tasks by introducing an analogy between hands and feet. Plato argues that both hands can be equally efficient, just like feet and lower limbs. He further argues that human beings have made their left and right hands different "because we habitually misused them."[14] Only the right hand was developed and habituated to perform more difficult functions, while the left remained undeveloped.

Likewise, in ancient Greece, men were exclusively educated and prepared for military and public affairs, the more complex tasks, whereas women remained uneducated and unprepared to perform any activity apart from private affairs. This exclusionary approach to education for women has perpetuated the gender gap in education.[15]

Both genders should be educated to perform difficult jobs to increase efficiency in a community. This is supported by the Scythian practice, which shows how using both hands to operate bows and arrows can improve efficiency.[16] Plato uses this example to indirectly bring up the topic of training women for military activities.[17] He argues that what seems to

12 Cf. Samaras, 2010: 184.
13 Cf. *Leg*.794d4–795d5.
14 Cf. *Leg*.794e4.
15 Cf. *Leg*.794e.
16 Cf. *Leg*.795a1-3.
17 Cf. *Leg*.813e5 ff.

be a natural ability might just be a habit that limits our entailer potential. Plato believes that excluding half of humanity from performing public activities prevents a political community from realizing its full potential. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that both genders are given equal opportunities to engage in public activities to achieve maximum results.

The Athenian Stranger posits that women were left in a state of disorder due to legislative failures and collective ignorance. It can be reasonably assumed that, had their lives been ordered correctly by good laws, women would have pursued their activities differently and not been considered inferior to men regarding virtue. Plato maintains that women possess the inherent capacity to achieve virtue and that there is no logical contradiction between this and the notion of equal opportunities for women.[18] He argues that women have been hindered in developing certain dispositions and talents in the past, due to negligence, bad customs, and inappropriate laws.

II Gender Equality and Education

Plato's arguments so far suggest that both men and women should be included in public affairs. His assumption could be supported with the following reasoning: (i) If a state only develops half of its potential, it is only half a state, (ii) Humanity consists of both men and women, (iii) If only men pursue public affairs, the state can only develop half of its potential, (iv) Therefore, a political community can only reach its full potential if both men and women work together for the well-being of society as a whole.

Both genders possess inherent aptitude for learning and knowledge acquisition. Therefore, it is imperative for the welfare of the society that both men and women receive education. In order to achieve this goal, it is crucial that women are afforded equal opportunities in education. A carefully planned and methodical didactic program must be implemented to ensure that both genders receive education from an early age. The training should focus on developing various skills, including military training. It is recommended that girls be encouraged to participate in athletic activities and be provided with compulsory education in the arts.[19]

18 Samaras 210: 191. He maintains as follows: "If we further take into account that the *Laws* advances the concept of *anthrôpinê aretê*, proposes the common education of both sexes, and emphatically insists on the entrance of women into the public realm, it is safe to conclude that the feminism of the *Republic* is reiterated in the *Laws*." In my opinion, the term 'feminism' is anachronistic, when it is used to characterize Plato's views on women.

19 Cf. *Leg*.805a–b.

Boys are to be trained in all military skills like "riding, archery, javelin-throwing and slinging, and the females too, if they are agreeable, may attend at any rate the lessons, especially those in the use of weapons. In this business, you see, pretty nearly everyone misunderstands the current practice."[20] While here Plato leaves girls a chance to agree on whether they want to learn to use weapons, later on in the *Laws* he is very clear that it is the duty of every citizen – both men and women – to perform "all physical exercises of a military kind", including "heavy-armed fighting of every variety."[21]

Plato's views on girls, young women, and military skills are unconventional and challenge the traditional norms of his time. In his opinion, every member of a state should have an equal responsibility to protect it, and thus women should also be encouraged to develop their military skills. He cites Sarmatian women,[22] who were skilled in using weapons and horse-riding,[23] as an example of women who could contribute to military efforts. Plato emphasizes the importance of military service for women and repeats his argument to underscore his conviction,[24] which was not at all accepted among the Greeks of his era.

Musical education is very important in every educational curriculum. If women should be educated in military skills, then it is not surprising that Plato holds the view that they must be educated in arts. Although the Athenian Stranger explicitly claims that according to his law women should be educated and trained equally as males,[25] he also seems to suggest that each gender should listen to different kinds of music, because of their different character dispositions. He says: "an elevated manner and courageous instincts must be regarded as characteristic of the male, while a tendency to modesty and restraint must be presented—in theory and law alike—as a peculiarly feminine trait."[26]

20 Cf. *Leg.*793d7.

21 Cf. *Leg*. 813d10–e2.

22 Cf. *Leg*. 804d–805a2, 806b–c1.

23 Cf. *Leg*. 804d.

24 In *Leg*. 785b7, the Athenian Stranger says: "As for women, whatever military service it may be thought necessary to impose (after they have finished bearing children) should be performed up to the age of fifty." Then, at 805d is said, as follows: "While still girls, they must practice every kind of dancing and fighting in armor; when grown women, they must play their part in maneuvering, getting into battle formation and taking off and putting on weapons..." Furthermore, *Leg.* 814 c is asserted as follows: "So let's lay down a law to the effect that women must not neglect to cultivate the techniques of fighting, at any rate to the extent indicated."

25 Cf. *Leg*. 804d3–805b1.

26 Cf. *Leg*. 802e11–a1. This is Trevor J. Saunders' translation that appears in Cooper 1997: 1471. The Greek text runs as follows: ὸ δὴ μεγαλοπρεπὲς οὖν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν

Plato's account of musical education draws a distinction between two types of music that are appropriate for men and women, respectively. While this may appear to reinforce traditional gender roles, Plato's views are potentially unorthodox, as he seems to assign greater value to women's musical traits than men's. According to Plato, women possess feminine virtues of moderation and order that are indispensable to theoretical work and the formulation of laws, which he deems more important than the courageous songs or acts that are associated with men. This implies that women may be better suited to theoretical work and lawmaking than men. If this is the case, then the notion of women's inferiority to men concerning virtue appears inconsistent with their superiority in virtues of modesty and restraint, which Plato himself regards as more significant than men's "courageous instincts."

The issue of gender equality in Plato's *Laws* is met with equivocal responses. Plato seems to suggest that a suitable environment and proper education for women would result in the development of cooperative and theoretical virtues, rather than those associated with physical danger. Regardless of natural inclination, Plato argues that military tasks should be imposed not only on men, who are naturally endowed with courageous instincts, but also on women, who are less inclined towards such instincts.

Plato's position on gender equality in the *Laws* may be interpreted ambiguously. However, his underlying message is that women can be trained to exhibit virtues that are not limited to their perceived societal roles. By providing equal opportunities for education and military service, men and women can contribute equally to society, regardless of their natural inclinations.

The educational curriculum outlined in Plato's *Laws* includes compulsory physical activities, musical education, literature, and lyre playing for both genders. Higher education comprises arithmetic and astronomy, which is defined as knowledge about the heavenly bodies in their courses. Plato argues that a city-state should impose the highest education, which is based on arithmetic and astronomy. This education includes computation and the study of numbers, measurements of lines, surfaces, and solids, and the mutual relationship of the heavenly bodies as they revolve in their courses.[27]

These subjects are complex and difficult, and hence, not intended for a wide audience, but rather "for a chosen few".[28] Plato argues that deeper

ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον ἀρρενωπὸν φατέον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον μᾶλλον ἀποκλῖνον θηλυγενέστερον ὡς ὂν παραδοτέον ἔν τε τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ.

27 Cf. *Leg*. 818aff.

28 Cf. *Leg*. 818a2.

problems of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy cannot be understood by the general public. Towards the end of the *Laws*, the curriculum of the Guardians is outlined. It includes the dialectical knowledge of the One and is inspired by the gods.[29] Philosophical wisdom and virtues are attributed only to the excellent citizens who are members of the Nocturnal Council. This council includes distinguished Priests, ten senior Guardians of the Laws, and the Minister of Education.[30]

In conclusion, Plato advocates for a comprehensive curriculum that includes physical activities, musical education, literature, arithmetic, and astronomy.[31] He argues that the higher education should be reserved for a select group of individuals due to its complexity and difficulty. In addition, he believes that philosophical wisdom and virtues can only be attributed to the members of the Nocturnal Council.

When discussing higher education, Plato does not suggest that it is exclusively for men. In the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger talks about "highly educated men" with rare natural talent,[32] as well as "eminently virtuous women."[33] Although Plato associates higher education with a chosen few men, women seem not to be excluded.

III The Political Implication of Gender Equality in Education

In conclusion, the reintroduction of family in the *Laws* does not impede women's opportunities for education nor participation in public affairs. As shown, it is crucial to impose compulsory instruction in musical and military subjects for both genders, including girls.[34] Women must receive the same physical training in athletics and gymnastics as men, not only to foster physical strength and promote healthy childbirth, but also to prepare them for potential combat. Therefore, military education holds immense significance in Plato's educational curriculum, as articulated in the *Laws*.

29 Cf. *Leg*. 966cff.

30 Cf. *Leg*. 951d–e4.

31 "None of these subjects [arithmetic, geometrics, and astronomy] must be studied in minute detail by the general public, but only by a chosen few (and who they are, we shall say when the time comes, when our discussion is drawing to a close)." Cf. *Leg*. 818a.

32 Cf. *Leg*. 918d1–2.

33 Cf. *Leg*. 918e4–5.

34 Cf. *Leg*. 804d–e.

The implications of women's education settle on that women should have significant and equal social and political roles in the second best polis as it is described in the *Laws*.[35] Given that women will have as compulsory military service, they will be citizens[36] and members of the assembly. They should hold public offices[37] and will be in a position to participate in civic duties.[38] When they deserve them, women will receive the same awards as men.[39]Although, in the *Laws* Plato attempts to reconcile his philosophical views with tradition and reality of his time, he did not basically change his opinion of talents and public duties of female gender.

The implications of women's education suggest that they should be granted significant and equitable social and political roles in the second-best polis as outlined in the *Laws*. Given that they are mandated to serve in the military, they will be considered citizens and members of the assembly. Women who merit it will receive the same accolades as their male counterparts. Although Plato strove to reconcile his philosophical views with the norms and realities of his time, he did not fundamentally alter his stance on the abilities and public obligations of women as compared to the *Republic*.

Plato's philosophical views on women's role in society, as presented in his works *Republic*[40] and *Laws*, are considered to be the earliest developed theory of gender equality[41] in Western philosophy. According to Plato's interpretation, the only essential difference between genders is their reproductive capacity, which should not determine their social or political functions. Instead, individual differences in terms of talent and

35 Cf. *Leg*. 829b–e.

36 Cf. *Leg*.814c.

37 Cf. *Leg*.785b

38 Cf. *Leg*.805c–d.

39 Cf. *Leg*.802a.

40 Cf. Alan Bloom and Leo Strauss held the belief that Plato had a satirical intention when discussing the societal position of women in his perfect city-state. Bloom compared this to Aristophanes'comedy *Women in Assembly*. However, Nicholas D. Smith contests the interpretations of Bloom and Saxonhouse because Plato supports crucial political roles for women in both the *Republic* and the *Laws*, as argued in detail. Cf. Smith 1983: 469.

41 In my assessment, the mere fact that Plato assigned political roles to women does not qualify him as a feminist. Specifically, if we define feminism as the granting of rights to women, such as education, vocational opportunities, unimpeded sexual intercourse, and equal legal status, among other things, Plato's beliefs did not reflect this definition. Plato did not consider women's emancipation in terms of human rights, rendering him not a feminist. It is important to note that when Plato assigned women political roles, he did not consider their needs and desires. Rather, he viewed it as a project for the overall well-being of the polis, and if necessary, it should be imposed compulsorily. G. Vlastos has an opposite view to mine. Cf. Vlastos 1994: 11–23.

ability should be the defining factors for assigning specific tasks or roles. The supposed inferiority of women, as perceived by Athenian society, is more a reflection of the socio-historical context of that period rather than Plato's own beliefs. He argues that women, when provided with proper education,[42] can achieve equal success and make significant contributions to society, just as men can.

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42 Diogenes Laertius reports that, among Plato's students in his Academy were two women: Lasthenia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phlius, "who is reported by Dicaearchus to have worn men's clothes" (D. L. 3.46, 4.2).

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ARISTOTLE'S MIMESIS AS A PEDAGOGICAL MEANS (*POET*. 4, 1448B7–8): TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF THE TOY

Abstract: The isolated reference to mimesis as a principal transmitter of the earliest cognitions found in *Poetics* 4 remained without elaboration in the rest of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Given the well-known Aristotelian claim that the properties of teachability and learnability belong to conceptual ('scientific') knowledge alone, the author attempts to reconstruct a plausible notion of Aristotle's early cognitive mimesis by interpreting it – in accordance with the basic theoretical assumptions of the Aristotelian epistemology – as the primary means of *early conceptual instruction*, reasonably conformed to the learning capacities of the youngest students. In this regard, special attention is paid to toys, which are considered to be a crucial vehicle for the earliest mimetic μαθήσεις. The function of the toy as the first pedagogical tool is further envisaged on several levels, according to the several basic 'lessons' of the presumed elementary 'syllabus'.

Keywords: mimesis, conceptual instruction, toy, Ideas, anthropomorphism, agonality, substantial and accidental change, locomotion.

Preliminaries

> ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ **τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας** ... (*Poet.* 4, 1448b4–8).

A brief introductory paragraph of the ch. 4 of the *Poetics*, whose twenty lines in Bekker's edition (1448b4–24) contain a kind of theoretical prologue

to the historical typology of poetic and dramatic genres of Greek literature, brings us to several core motifs of Aristotle's theory of mimesis. The first one is highlighted in the very opening sentence of the paragraph. It concerns the identity of the 'two natural causes' that once led to the emergence of the art of poetry (ποιητικὴ τέχνη): 'It seems,' the Stagirite puts it, 'that the art of poetry was created on the whole by certain two causes, both natural.'[1] Contrary to what we would expect in the continuation of such a programmatic claim, the philosopher (no doubt convinced that the implied dichotomy is sufficiently obvious to the intended audience) does not supply any explicit specification of the given pair of causes. So it is up to today's reader to decide between several options suggested in the remainder of the text. A host of scholars tend to favour the *imitation* (τὸ μιμεῖσθαι), a notion that occupies a prominent place at the outset of the following sentence. This nominalised infinitive will, then, be repeated once again in the closing lines of the introductory section,[2] which would probably indicate that we are actually concerned with a kind of technical term. According to this interpretation, the role of the first of the two causes would be most properly assigned to imitation: 'For imitation is naturally inherent in humans since childhood.' The causal particle appears to reinforce the explanatory character of the second sentence, its logical reference to the focal term of the preceding statement, the keyword ποιητική. Let us look once again at the logical sequence of the first and the beginning of the second sentence: 'It seems that the art of poetry was created on the whole by certain two causes, both natural. For imitation is naturally inherent in humans since childhood ...' There seems to be nothing more coherent than this train of thought. The *natural propensity to imitate* would be the choice of Bywater, Rostagni, Montmollin, Halliwell, Janko and many others.[3] Some go a step further, not sticking to imitation as such. So, according to Lucas, it is really the 'pleasure in imitating' that should be understood as the first of the two natural causes that gave birth to the art of poetry.[4] However, such interpretation has its own difficulties as well.[5]

1 All translations as well as bold emphases within Greek quotations are the author's own.

2 κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι, *Poet.* 4, 1448b20. It seems that the focus on the innate character of imitation (σύμφυτον ... κατὰ φύσιν), which is actually quite consistent with the main intent of the opening statement, argues for this interpretation.

3 All these scholars markedly pursue a unique formula: Bywater 1909: 125: 'imitative instinct'; Rostagni 1945: 17: 'l'istinto dell'imitazione'; Montmollin 1951: 33: 'l'instinct d'imitation'; Halliwell 1986: 70: 'instinct to engage in mimesis'; Janko 1987: 74: 'instinct for representation'.

4 Lucas 1968: 71, 74. Similarly Lord 1982: 91: 'delight in imitation'.

5 Almost the only dissonant voice is that of Else. According to him, the first cause would be 'the inborn and universal love for learning', which is admittedly one of the best-known recurring motifs of Aristotelian philosophy (its classic expression being

In view of its extreme importance for man as 'the most imitative' of all other animals, mimesis – or more precisely: its human peculiarity expressed by the superlative form – takes on the character of almost a specific difference distinguishing the mankind from the rest of the animal world.[6] This is indicated in a conspicuous manner by the concluding statement of the second sentence: 'they [= men] are distinguished from other animals by the fact that this one[7] is the most imitative, and obtains its first instructions by imitation.'[8] Hence the superlative does not seem to be taken so much in a quantitative as in a sense of a qualitative distinction: a man is the μιμητικώτατον ζῷον because his imitation, unlike that performed by all other animals, has a distinctly *mathetic*, viz. learning and cognitive character.[9]

It is true that, according to Aristotle, even some animals would not be deprived of the 'ability to learn' (τὸ μανθάνειν); furthermore, the philosopher brings it in close relation with the animal 'intelligence' (τὸ φρόνιμον εἶναι),[10] a faculty he defines elsewhere (in the context of his ethical consid-

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the famous opening line of the *Metaphysics*, to which Else indeed does not fail to refer). In this view, Aristotle's claiming 'intellectuality of both the artist and the spectator or viewer' would in fact be the philosopher's conscious reaction 'against Plato's denial of intellectuality to art' (Else 1957: 128–30).

6 τούτῳ διαφέρουσι [sc. οἱ ἄνθρωποι] τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων. The context suggests the technical (logico-ontological) use of the verb διαφέρω: τούτῳ διαφέρουσι = **ταύτῃ τῇ (εἰδοποιῷ) διαφορᾷ** διαφέρουσι (cf., e.g., *Phys.* IV 14, 224a7–8: τρίγωνον τριγώνου διαφορᾷ διαφέρει· τοιγαροῦν ἕτερα τρίγωνα = 'specifically different triangles').

7 We refer μιμητικώτατον to ζῷον; another possibility is to read it absolutely: 'something that is most imitative' (cf. *Prob.* XXX 6, 956a11–14, with the same ambiguity: διὰ τί ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ζῴῳ; πότερον ... ὅτι ἀριθμεῖν μόνον ἐπίσταται τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων; ... ἢ ὅτι μιμητικώτατον; μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο).

8 Cf. the same rendering (μάθησιν ποιεῖσθαι) in *Pol.* VIII 6, 1341a2–3 (see also Thuc. I 68, 2). On 'modern Attic' periphrases consisting of ποιοῦμαι plus noun, see Horrocks 2010: 75.

9 τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως **τὰς πρώτας** is definitely in a relationship with τὸ ... μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον ... **ἐκ παίδων** ἐστί (τὰς πρώτας = ἐκ παίδων); this allows the following inference: the first imitations – meaning *the imitations performed by children – are inherently mathetic* in nature. Humans are distinguished from other animals not so much by simply being the most mimetic of all, as by the specific human quality of their mimesis: it is the basic form of learning and cognition (μάθησις). See above, n. 7. It is to the μιμητικώτατον formula that Halliwell attributes no less than the status of one of the three classic Aristotelian definitions of man (Halliwell 1986: 70–1).

10 *Met.* I 1, 980b22 ff. Those animals which, in addition to sense perception (αἴσθησις), common to all living beings, also possess *memory* (μνήμη), are, on Aristotle's view, 'more intelligent and more instructible (φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα)' than those not endowed with this capacity. Memory is the necessary condition for the constitution of intelligence and ability to learn. Again, the sufficient condition for animal instructability would be the presence of a sense of hearing (ἀκοή): 'only those

erations of the human φρόνησις)[11] as a practical wisdom, an inborn gift of proper reasoning and decision-making about what is good or bad for the individual.[12] Therefore, he adds, many animals are called intelligent (φρόνιμα) inasmuch as they are able to take care of their own survival.[13] Nonetheless, there is a strong likelihood that both notions, intelligence and learning ability, are used 'homonymously' (ὁμωνύμως) when applied to animal nature.[14] Several reasons would favour such an inference. First of all, intelligence is essentially conditioned by 'science' (ἐπιστήμη) and 'experience' (ἐμπειρία) – or, if not by both, then certainly by the latter.[15] Animals, on the other hand, 'have only a small share of experience'[16] and virtually none of science – their capacity for abstraction reaches at best the level of 'impressions' (φαντασίαι), the utmost degree of conceptual generalisation the animal soul is capable of. As a product of retention and

animals are able to learn which, in addition to memory, possess this sense as well' (μανθάνει δ' ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, *Met.* I 1, 980b24–25). Animals deprived of hearing ('like a bee and whatever other animal of the sort', *Met.* I 1, 980b23–24) might actually be intelligent, but not capable of learning (*Met.* I 1, 980a27–b25). Such a view may surprise us, because the philosopher (apparently following the widespread belief of his contemporaries) also imagines the supposed animal learning modelled on the human one, viz. as a process of essentially *linguistic* mediation of knowledge, whereby voices are not understood as simple acoustic signals, viz. 'noises' (ψόφοι), but as conveyors of linguistic meaning proper, viz. 'signs' (σημεῖα), that is to say, precisely as 'phonemes': 'some animals have certain share in both learning and teaching, some being taught by each other, others by humans as well, those, namely, participating in hearing – not only those which are able to perceive the distinctions among noises, but also distinctions among [acoustic] signs' (ἔνια [sc. ζῷα] δὲ κοινωνεῖ τινὸς ἅμα καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσαπερ ἀκοῆς μετέχει, μὴ μόνον ὅσα τῶν ψόφων, ἀλλ' ὅσα καὶ τῶν σημείων διαισθάνεται τὰς διαφοράς, *HA* IX 1, 608a17–21; cf. *PA* II 17, 660a35–b1; an early intimation of a 'proto-phonology' at *Cat.* 6, 4b32–37, 5a33–36?). Sense of hearing would therefore be a *sine qua non* of teaching and learning in all advanced animals – the basic physiological condition of any reception of linguistic instruction delivered by other animals or humans. The Middle Ages also adopted this (peripatetic?) conception, so we read in Boethius: 'No other path to the mind lies more open to the teachings than through the ears' (*Nulla enim magis ad animum disciplinis via quam auribus patet*, *De inst. mus.*, I 1, 181.1–2, Friedlein).

11 *EN* VI 5.

12 αὐτὴν [= φρ.] εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, *EN* VI 5, 1140b4–6.

13 διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν, *EN* VI 7, 1141a26–28.

14 'Homonymous are called things whose name alone is common, yet the definition of substance corresponding to the name is different' (ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, *Cat.* 1, 1a1–2).

15 δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην [= ἐμπ.] μᾶλλον, *EN* VI 7, 1141b21–22.

16 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα [sc. ζῷα] ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν, *Met.* I 1, 980b25–27.

stabilisation of a number of individual 'sensations' (αἰσθήσεις) of the same thing, impressions thus provide a rudimentary form of abstraction[17] – Aristotle labels it 'memory' (μνήμη).[18] However, animal memory, deprived of the support of superior and more advanced mental abilities (which are lacking even in the most developed species), inevitably fails in its attempt to create 'experience' (ἐμπειρία), a far more abstract category of cognition, extracted this time from a number of individual 'memories' of the same thing.[19] Thus, having little or no part in the experience – which is the necessary condition of intelligence, as we have seen – the animal cannot be 'intelligent' (φρόνιμον) in the true, literal sense of the word.[20] Its intelligence is therefore supposed to be taken in a 'homonymous' sense, and such is indeed its ability to learn, too. Hence the so-called animal intelligence turns out to be not up to the task of communicating 'science and art' (ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη), two superior competencies far exceeding the primitive simplicity of the animal soul, which hardly ever manages to divorce itself from the singularity of innumerable isolated 'impressions' (φαντασίαι) and form steady general notions of any higher order. The so-called learning ability of the animal, just like its intelligence, proves thus to be only a 'homonymous' rendering for some other, actually far more primitive type of synthetic capacity. It seems that both could be best equated with what we now call the animal *instinct* (which, despite the inadequacy or entire absence of animal 'experience' and 'science', still proves

17 Animal actions are largely guided by impressions – due to nonexistence in them of mind (διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν [sc. τὰς φαντασίας] καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα ... διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, *De An.* III 3, 429a4–6). At any rate, αἰσθήσεις and φαντασίαι are not interchangeable: while the former are common to all animals, this is not the case with the latter (which are 'apparently missing in ants, bees and worms', *De An.* III 3, 428a8–11; see above, n. 10).

18 ἐκ δὲ ταύτης [sc. τῆς αἰσθήσεως] τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν [sc. τῶν ζῴων] οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐγγίγνεται, *Met.* I 1, 980a29 (see above, n. 10). Cf. Plato, *Phlb.* 34a (μνήμη as σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως, 'preservation of sensation'). The noteworthy distinction between 'memory' (μνήμη) and 'recollection' (ἀνάμνησις), which Plato raises in the same passage of the *Philebus* (34b), appears to have been one of the favourite and often-discussed topics in the circles of the Academy. Aristotle will devote it a separate psychological opuscule (*On Memory and Recollection*). Whereas memory would imply a simple unreflected visualisation of an image representing something from the past, recollection would entail a conscious reproduction of a memory. If the former is found in some brutes, the latter occurs solely in man (*Mem.* 2, 453a8–9; see Bloch 2007: 131–2).

19 γίγνεται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν, *Met.* I 1, 980b28–981a1.

20 Consequently, its so-called intelligence has no ethical bearing either, hence its activity – devoid of deliberation, weighing up options and decision-making – has no character of *moral* agency (πρᾶξις): δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν, *EN* VI 1, 1139a19–20.

to be sufficiently an effective tool for orientation and survival).[21] In a more popular sense, animal learning by imitation is generally associated with the faculty of certain species to faithfully repeat the voices and gestures observed in humans, which above all makes it possible to train them in certain skills. However, it is clear that even the most complex skills animals are able to master through this kind of imitation could hardly be termed 'science' (ἐπιστήμη) or knowledge acquired via learning and experience in the proper sense of the term – that is to say, a result of a *cognitive learning*. Animal mimesis is automatic, supported only by instinctual mechanisms and the so-called conditioning.[22] In the case of man, however, imitation is the very fundamental means of learning as a planned, purposeful and consciously conducted mediation of 'science and art', two cognitive faculties that go far beyond animal nature.[23] This appears to be the true import of the Aristotelian superlative μιμητικώτατον, as the most

21 An example of an animal μάθησις might be 'learning' to fly in bird cubs, which acquire their first lessons in this skill by mimicking older individuals of their species: however, both sides act automatically, alienated and 'absent', driven only by the external compulsion of the instinct, yet indeed obtaining the usual positive effects (see below, n. 39). Although Aristotle himself provides several instances of bird mimesis, none actually shows evidence of cognition (*HA* VIII 12, 597b23–28; IX 1, 609b16–17; IX 49, 631b9–10).

22 In this regard, there is in fact no clear-cut distinction between the mimetic gift of certain bird species and the more complicated, 'humanoid' imitativity of the great apes (μιμώ = πίθηκος). What we see in animals is always just this or that form of *unreflected repetition*, devoid of any cognitive, epistemic dimension, the only one that would legitimise it as an imitation in the strict, literal sense. On the other hand, even the most absent-minded repetition of a human cub already contains – and *is* – the first germ of reflection (mimetic repetition serves no purpose other than to awaken this latent reflexivity). This again is completely lacking in even the most complex forms of animal aping.

23 '[E]xperience seems to be almost like science and art, but actually it is through experience that science and art come to men' (καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *Met.* I 1, 981a2–4). We may regret that our philosopher did not devote any of his many λέγεται πολλαχῶς's to such a pertinent pair of terms as ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη. In the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* he distinguishes indeed between 'science' and other cognitive abilities (i.e., those within the realm of the ἐπιστημονικόν, *EN* VI 1, 1139a12; see VI, 3, 2–3, 1139b18–36), but not between craft and art as well: in the good old Greek style, his masons, doctors and sculptors all indiscriminately belong to the same guild (cf. *EN* VI 4, 3, 1140a6–10; *Met.* I 1, 981a10–12; see VII 7, 1032b1 ff.). Such ambiguity, typical of the ancient Greek and, to not insignificant an extent, also responsible for the fertile polysemy of Aristotle's terminological panoply – making his technical terms suitable for so many subtle mutations, meanderings and metabases from one 'genus' to another – allows us after all to ascribe something of a 'scientific stringency' to any human cognition whatsoever, not only to that of a properly 'epistemonic' nature; and something of a higher creative vein of an artistic ποιητική to any unpretentious production of artisanal τέχνη.

distinctive trait of the human species among all other ζῷα, both 'lower' and 'higher' indiscriminately.

How, then, is human knowledge mediated? By teaching (διδασκαλία), on the teacher's part; by receiving teachings – learning (μάθησις) – on the part of the pupil. To the extent that he acquires his first lessons by imitation, a man is oriented towards mimesis as a primary and the most natural means of knowledge. The teacher was also once someone's student: so the knowledge he yields his pupil to imitate is the one he himself once took from his own teacher – by imitating the teacher's knowledge. What one gives to imitate, the other takes by imitation, only to relay it in turn as he has received it – a *lesson to imitate*. Hence the mimesis emerges as the basic means of knowledge communication.

While teaching, the teacher imparts the knowledge that is *capable of being taught* (διδακτὴ γνῶσις). After all, it should be kept in mind that not all knowledge is teachable simply due to the fact of being knowledge in a simple unqualified sense (γνῶσις). Now the knowledge capable of being object of teaching is solely the one that is *capable of being scientifically known* (ἐπιστητὴ γνῶσις), the *scientific knowledge*, or the *science* (ἐπιστήμη). At the same time, it is the only knowledge that is *capable of being learned* (μαθητὴ γνῶσις).[24] For knowledge to be a science, its object, in Aristotle's view, must be some of those 'things that are not capable of being otherwise' (τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν), the things, that is to say, which are necessary, therefore eternal, therefore ungenerated and imperishable.[25] Each teaching is based on the prior knowledge of *this* object; consequently, it is the sole possible object of learning (μάθησις) as well.[26] What we are dealing with here is thus ultimately the universals, the generic and specific concepts (τὰ καθόλου), also termed 'secondary

24 'Moreover, every science seems to be capable of being taught, and that which is scientifically knowable is capable of being learned' (ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν, *EN* VI 3, 1139b25–26). 'Because all of science is about that which takes place either always or usually. For how else will it either be learned or teach another?' (ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. πῶς γὰρ ἢ μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; *Met.* VI 2, 1027a20–22).

25 οὗ ἁπλῶς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν, *An. Post.* I 2, 71b15–16; πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ᾽ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀΐδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀΐδια, τὰ δ᾽ ἀΐδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, *EN* VI 3, 1139b19–24; ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν ... ἔτι ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, εἰ ἀποδέδεικται ἁπλῶς, *Met.* V 5, 1015a33–35, b6–8.

26 πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως, *An. Post.* I 1, 71a1–2; ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, *EN* VI 3, 1139b 25–26; πᾶσα μάθησις διὰ προγιγωσκομένων, *Met.* I 9, 992b30 ff.

substances', according to the notorious technical nomenclature of the Stagirite.[27] They are the sole objects of knowledge capable of being logically proven and defined.[28] On the other hand, all that is 'capable of being otherwise' (τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν), and hence incapable of being known as to whether it exists or not each time it had passed out of observation (θεωρία)[29] – all accidental, transient and universally replaceable features of individual things (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον), not subject to definition or proof – all this, incapable of being scientifically known (οὐκ ἐπιστητά), turns *eo ipso* incapable of being taught (οὐ διδακτά) as well as learned (οὐ μαθητά),[30] ultimately evading the imitation itself, the mimetic communication of epistemic messages between teacher and student, that continuous chain of successive handover of 'science and art' (ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη). Even though the experience (ἐμπειρία) 'seems to be almost like science and art',[31] which are generated precisely by abstraction out of plurality of individual instances of experiencing the same thing,[32] it will still remain unknowable, and hence unteachable and unlearnable, precisely due to the fact of being a *knowledge of the individual* (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον),[33] the one that does not account for the principles (ἀρχαί) and the causes (αἰτίαι) of things, about their διότι ('the wherefore'), being satisfied with the sheer

27 δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, *Cat.* 5, 2a14–16 (cf. 2b29 ff.). The term actually only appears in the *Categories*.

28 ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· [= *An. Post.* I 2, 71b17 ff.] ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται, *EN* VI 3, 1139b31–34; ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), *EN* VI 6, 1140b31–33; *Met.* III 6, 1003a14–15; VII 10, 1036a28–29; XI 1, 1059b25–26; XI 2, 1060b20; XIII 10, 1086b33, 1087a11; cf. also *Met.* I 1, 981a16 (ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου).

29 τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, *EN* VI 3, 1139b21–22; ἀπελθόντας δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὐ δῆλον πότερόν ποτέ εἰσιν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν,·*Met.* VII 10, 1036a6–7; ἄδηλά τε γὰρ τὰ φθειρόμενα τοῖς ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπέλθῃ, *Met.* VII 15, 1040a2–4.

30 οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ [= συμβεβηκός] θεωρία, *Met.* VI 2, 1026b5; ὅτι δ' ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερόν· ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ – πῶς γὰρ ἢ μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; *Met.* VI 2, 1027a20–23; διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔθ' ὁρισμὸς οὔτ' ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, *Met.* VII 15, 1039b27–29; πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων [= τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα], *Met.* XI 1, 1059b26; τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, *EN* VI 8, 1142a14–15.

31 *Met.* I 1, 981a1–2.

32 *Met.* I 1, 981a5–7.

33 *Met.* I 1, 981a15 ff.; ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ μὴ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν, *Met.* I 1, 981b7–9.

ὅτι (the simple unreflected fact of their existence).[34] The isolation of the general and necessary knowledge begins indeed already at the level of sensations (αἰσθήσεις), impressions (φαντασίαι) and memories (μνῆμαι),[35] only to culminate – through ever higher and more comprehensive degrees of abstraction, inherent to humankind alone[36] – in 'wisdom' (σοφία), as the science about principles and causes taken in themselves.[37]

If, therefore, imitation is the first and most natural means of mediating teachable and learnable knowledge; if this could solely be the knowledge of what is capable of being scientifically known – the knowledge of the general and necessary,[38] the generic and specific concepts – it follows that even the first 'lessons learned by imitation' could have had no other object than 'what could not be otherwise', the eternal, not subject to coming into existence and ceasing to exist – the universals, or the so-called secondary substances.

How does, then, a small child master the knowledge of 'what could not be otherwise', of the general and the necessary, the universals? Certainly: through imitation, which is the first and most natural means of mediating 'scientific knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη). The truth is that children's learning does not have a discursive character, being still far from a logical proof and persuasion in the usual formal sense of the term. A little child is still 'irrational', yet this irrationality is substantially different from that of animals, in which there is no trace of *potentiality (privation) of a future rational thought*. And yet child cognitions are by no means less abstract; they are furthermore *essentially abstract*, and ultimately come down to the very mental operation of abstraction. The basic function of learning, even the earliest one, that of the smallest children, consists precisely in the abstraction and generalisation, ranging from simple sensations (αἰσθήσεις) and impressions (φαντασίαι), which are inherent to certain animals as

34 οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ' οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν, *Met.* I 1, 981a28–30.

35 *Met.* I 1, 980a28–29; b26.

36 Many μνῆμαι establish one experience (ἐμπειρία, in which animals are barely involved), while many experiences establish one science (ἐπιστήμη): γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *Met.* I 1, 980b28–981a3. Cf. Plat. *Phd.* 96b.

37 σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες, *Met.* I 1, 981b28 ff. A detailed discussion of σοφία is in *EN* VI 7, 1141a9 ff. Yet in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle differentiates a still higher 'epistemonic' category – νοῦς, the speculative (= philosophical) thinking, the proper science of first principles and causes, *EN* VI 12, 1143a35 ff.: so νοῦς of *EN* and σοφία of *Met.* amount to much the same.

38 ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, *EN* VI 6, 1140b31–32.

well, up to the highest forms of conceptual synthesis, reserved for humans alone. This generalisation aims at eliminating all that is superfluous and non-functional within the realm of the soul and its operations, retaining only that which can contribute to the maintenance and effective psycho-biological adaptation of the individual, facilitating his orientation in the ever-changing, unpredictable and incalculable circumstances of outer and inner life. Whereas the animal experience seems to collapse with each repeated attempt to establish, like a disposable single-use scaffold to be removed after fulfilling its immediate task – never managing to persevere and remain in recall[39] – human experience, on the other hand, amounts to nothing but a certain and reliable inventory of persistent logical patterns, always available to adequately anticipate and obviate all the related instances of a specific problem type, ignoring individual differences as a non-substantial, accidental surplus of psychological information.

Imitating the Idea

In virtue of this early mimetic instruction, mostly run by parents and nannies, the young trainee quickly manages to master a fairly solid stock of practical skills and strategies needed to navigate the initial stage of life. All these behavioural patterns have a distinctly paradigmatic character,

39 ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν [sc. τὰ ζῷα], *Met.* I 1, 980b26–27. The animals do not remember nor recognise precedents, but solve the same problems each time as if it were the first, always starting over from the beginning, always re-gaining a complete totality of experience in addressing the given issue – only to deliver this newly-gained experience to downright amnesia as soon as the problem is solved successfully. Such a discontinuous, punctual nature of the animal experience – conditioned by the absolute forgetfulness and indocibility of the animal soul – is, though, compensated by the unequalled agility of this experience, its inexhaustible capacity for countless instantaneous regenerations to full extent. So the sporadic enclaves of a non-reflective experiencing (always occasioned by an urgent 'problem') are all regularly separated by gaps of deadly oblivion. This is how the animal mind works. It seems that this more archaic and more clumsy mechanism of occasional reconstructions and deconstructions of the full-scale totality of a non-reflective experience underlies what is called instinct. Like a precision mechanical device, instinct is always alerted and triggered in a timely manner, solving the same problem in the same regular way, although it neither does really recognise nor recollect it, nor keep it stored or archived in the form of experience proper, but always encounters it anew as a completely unprecedented case (just as the alarm device – e.g., walkthrough metal detector – does not recall nor actually recognise any of the instances that have activated it countless times before, although in all future cases of the same type it will continue to react as appropriately and promptly as ever). An animal that acts by instinct is therefore just as 'intelligent' as any 'intelligent machine', which is really empty, devoid of a self-entity and wholly delivered to the outsideness and objectivity of the outer world. Instinct is an impersonal, mechanical experience devoid of a subject – a paradoxical experience of automaton.

each potentially referring to the whole variety of individual instances of the same type. Receiving the usual ration of basic knowledge and skills through the nonviolent duress of mechanical iterations (in which the disciple engages as in a kind of interesting and entertaining play) immensely helps to avoid individual wanderings and speed up the process of maturation and socialisation. The infant will soon acquire a sufficient command of the mother tongue, whose initial rudiments are successfully grasped through the guided repetition of certain voices related to certain things and actions.

At last, there are also toys, these faithful companions of growing up, the exemplary μιμήματα of the widest range of ideal types of the animate and the inanimate world – the true Platonic Ideas materiated in vivid and fun images, perfectly suited to children's imagination. As for its fundamental purpose, the toy is indeed anything but a mere distractor or a soporific – a 'rattle' or 'dummy'. On the contrary, it serves precisely to awaken and focus the attention, to encourage the intellect and accustom it to experiencing, learning and understanding. So it always pinpoints only the most general and typical features of the thing it reproduces in its own 'childish' guise, actually omitting all that is less than absolutely germane to its definition and proper understanding. A toy always *means* (in an absolute sense), it always teaches and preaches and, like any good pedagogue, it always claims that its simple lesson be understood in a single simple sense – one that is directly aimed at the eye and common sense, immediately obvious, straightforward and unambiguous. As an ultimate residue of the most essential features, which are now reduced to the necessary minimum, the toy is a perfect pedagogical tool, the concretisation of a concept, the true image of a universal – the 'badge token' of a logical species.[40] Plato's 'equinity' (whose visibility has once

40 Yet the external appearance, even the intended exemplary functioning of certain toys, sometimes do not show any noteworthy difference compared to their 'serious' counterparts from the world of adults. The toy bucket, a notorious companion to sand games, is not only virtually indistinguishable in comparison to a real object of the same material and shape, but can fairly adequately fulfil the same function as its 'original'. So, is there finally any substantial distinction between a real plastic bucket and a toy bucket? The answer is yes without hesitation: there *is* a distinction, and the most fundamental one indeed. If the default purpose of a real bucket is to serve as a receptacle for water and sand, then that of a toy bucket would actually be *to stand for the idea of bucket* (= 'receptacle for water and sand') and teach this idea by way of the proper handling of the bucket-like toy. Regarding the real bucket, it is not so much the general concept of the bucket as the normal practical functioning of this particular piece of masonry equipment that is the matter of primary concern here – whereas the fact that each individual bucket at any rate instantiates the idea of bucket turns out to be almost a kind of accidental side effect that normally goes unnoticed. With

been challenged by some of Plato's contemporaries) becomes thus literally visible and tangible in the instance of a toy horse: it presents only the essential, definitional constituents of the concept 'horse', the immediately recognisable 'silhouette' of the species (horse head, horse mane, horse tail, horse hooves), consequently rejecting all that is just a little less than specific, all the terms that do not belong to the definition of this animal. This iconic epitome of an abstract conceptual content – a toy horse – is, then, presented to a child under the form of a teaching μίμημα – a pedagogical device that will allow the pupil not to wander too long in an uncertain and time-consuming search on its own accord, but spare his energy and focus as soon as possible on the critical, distinguishing traits (differentiae specificae): enabling him to situate this species quickly and readily on the taxonomic pyramid of beings, so as not to confuse it in the future with any similar species or relatives belonging to neighbouring classes.[41] The same holds true also for those utterly reduced and schematised drawings fashioned for children and encouraged in children:[42] all those simplified, linear and two-dimensional μιμήματα of man, house, mountain, sun – since they are all in reality emblems of concepts, selections of essential features of the respective things. Therefore 'man' is nothing but the 'Stickman', the most simplistic pictorial rendering of the notorious definition of man as an 'erect biped' (the Aristotelian ζῷον δίπουν); the 'house' is a square space for living,[43] equipped with a window, doors, a triangular roof and a chimney (the last one mainly supplemented by a swirl stroke, a plume of smoke indicating the human presence, the house's completion of its own 'second entelechy'); the 'mountain' is an elevated part of the relief (zigzag line); the 'sun' is a yellow disc that radiates light and warmth (a yellow circle

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regard to the toy bucket, on the other hand, what we are dealing with here is first and foremost the *material representation of the idea*, although the possible practical applicability and usability of this symbolic object is nevertheless implied as a kind of accidental side effect: even though it is not primarily intended to serve as a concrete receptacle for water and sand, but as a material symbol of such a tool, the toy bucket can just as readily – *per accidens* – be used for this purpose exactly the same way as a real bucket (though the toy bucket is in principle smaller than the real one – a sign of adaptation to the stature of the small users, see below, n. 50).

41 This toy horse thus functionally resembles its famous cousin represented in the Saussurean bipartite diagram of the linguistic sign: taking the place of the signified, this horse-silhouette is actually an *ideogram*, an eidetic thumbnail of the respective concept, similar to those of the road sign icons and the like public warnings – always playing the role of the *Platonic Ideas visualised*.

42 Halliwell 2002: 178 n. 5: 'children's pictorial mimesis [...] is certainly covered by Aristotle's point.'

43 Cf. ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων, *Met.* VIII 2, 1043a16–17.

with radial bars) and so forth. Many of these rudimentary notions are hardly ever substantially enriched by most adults, accompanying them throughout their lives in the sketchy form once shaped during the first weeks and months of their original schooling by imitation.

In adopting ethical principles through unconsciously mirroring the abstract patterns of 'normal' behaviour; in classifying the entire animate and inanimate world through the early manipulation of zoomorphic and other toys and toy-form drawings, the kid is entirely dependent on certain predefined templates as well as proven means for their smooth and effective acquisition. The first acts of abstraction are therefore not carried out independently, but occur under the watchful mentorial scrutiny of the first preceptors, who provide the little student with all kinds of ready-made models of easily and conveniently pre-digested universals. On the one hand, they save the learner from useless wanderings and hugely accelerate the process of abstraction, since they communicate precisely those 'knowledge and skills' which constitute the essential selection of normal, correct and exemplary notions – those grains of the substantial sorted from all that was considered accidental, fugitive and useless in the collective understanding of preceding generations.[44] On the other hand, these 'stock' notions constitute the basis of what we might call *the normal worldview* answering to a given era and culture. These chosen samples of ready-to-use abstractions offered to the child to mimic them, or to assimilate them by way of exemplary μιμήματα in the toy form, rapidly expand the youngling's field of apperception up to a normal and common level of collective experience and knowledge inherent to an era: in this indeed consists their function. To the extent that the pupil merely repeats the existing models, he implicitly espouses a historically conditioned and limited, viz. an average, standard, no-nonsense middlebrow worldview of a given time and culture. That is why the original education never escapes this overarching framework of a given 'horizon of expectation'. This also finds its expression in the morphology of the first educational tools, in the expected logical and ethical content as well as the corresponding visual styling of these childish projections of the Platonic Ideas. (The toy horse is naturally inconceivable in the toy armoury of the little pre-Columbian Indians, in a culture that was unaware of the existence of the respective zoologico-logical species; on the other hand, Indian toy warriors have a quite special cultural and ethical connotation in the context of a toy game inspired by the heroic myth

44 Toys thus play the role of materialised standards stored in the toy aisle as in a sort of a Platonic 'bureau of weights and measures'.

of the white pioneers of the West, which was publicly favoured not so long ago.)[45] The toys also change over time, become obsolete, updated, or discarded and replaced by new ones, always faithfully reflecting the normal, mediocre level of the collective ἐπιστήμη of a given culture.[46] If the toy, as is usually said, helps the child to unleash the imagination and intelligence, it is important to bear in mind that this liberation has in any case its insurmountable frontiers and strictures, predefined precisely by this common worldview of an era that finds its concentrated Platonic expression in the graphic images of the first educational patterns and tools. These are logical and ethical provisions for the life bestowed upon the child by their first teachers.

45 One of the traditional functions of the toy is also to imprint a binary gender stereotype –and this by crediting one group of little users with a passive and conservative role of a static, peaceful and caring guardian of household, goods and offspring; and the other one – with an active, penetrating and adventurous role of a rover, pioneer, warrior, conqueror, destroyer and builder, leader and winner in the field of honour, military and intellectual alike. So there are female and male, pink and blue toys. This is why the boy's playing with a doll, his gentle dressing, combing, feeding and rocking it like a little toy sister, would even today be regarded with some scepticism as a not entirely standard occurrence (if not a matter of some concern), although this type of playing might indeed be productive in reinforcing the virtues of brotherly love or philanthropy in general. On the other hand, a no less disturbing symptom would be the Amazonian aptitude of a little girl to 'kill', that is to break and tear her dollies – a general treatment of toys as 'opponents' – even when the tearing apart is an expression of intellectual curiosity to find out what is hidden inside and how does the stuff work – whether the *disjecta membra* of the torn puppet could perhaps be reassembled into a new, original, non-serial creature (not necessarily anthropomorphic), a readymade that escapes the usual assembly instructions. Thus toys also play their pioneering role in the process of individual acculturation, mostly articulated in terms of gender binary – that colossal and fascinating cultural construct (ultimately resulting from a far-reaching process of symbolical encoding of morphofunctional distinctions between two types of genitals encountered in humans) dominating not only the psychological (self-)perception and social conduct of every individual but also the general character of some of the basic cultural institutions (customs, religion, art, literature) of all times and all civilisations.

46 Certain μιμήματα also reveal traces of ancient speculations about the 'causes' of the mimicked things: this implicit theory is as well indicated by appropriate visual cues on a traditional logo. So the ancient μίμημα of the rising/setting sun – the notorious semicircle bordered by radial dashes (regular ingredient of childlike depictions of a 'smiling sun') – evinces, along with the basic character of a heavenly radiator of light and warmth, also a clear vestige of an age-old cosmological lore on the fiery disc (light deity) recurrently emerging and plunging into an underground area (mainly conceived as an aqueous chasm at the edge of the horizon). The mimetic representation of the sun as a radiating semicircle thus connotes an entire theoretical background that is completely foreign to present-day heliocentric worldview: the latter has actually put an end to the rising/setting sun concept of the ancients – yet leaving it frozen in the traditional μίμημα.

Imitating the wild

As well as being the first teachers of universal concepts, toys are also the first and most natural spreaders of the so-called pathetic fallacy, an extremely helpful logico-psychological device enabling humans to effectively meet the challenges of the non-human, natural, wild and uncontrollable – the *random accidents* (συμβεβηκότα) that have not yet been logically processed, digested and assimilated as essential and defining features of a thing. This is why the toy μιμήματα so often take the form of the wild, which now appears under a typically pacified and domesticated – anthropomorphic guise. Hence the toy animals – and they have always formed the core of the toy basket depository – provide an expectedly distorted and biased picture of the true zoological nature of the species represented: these tendentiously selected and reshaped resemblances of the wildlife have indeed little to do with the wilderness of the real fauna, against which the child's phantasy is fairly well protected by a general anthropomorphism of a systematically implanted pathetic fallacy. All this wildlife, transformed into a fabulous world of animal toys, is therefore a bit reminiscent of that mythical garden inhabited by enchanted humans, whom the sorceress Nature's rod has changed into the rough and hairy beastlike appearances, taking away their voices, without harming their human awareness and affections. The toy animals are thus always somehow conceived as half-humans trapped in clumsy, inappropriate bodies of the 'other' – and therefore essentially frustrated, hampered and ultimately *unrealised* in their full ontological potential: 'noble savages', stuck halfway to full human nature, yet otherwise harmless, cute, gentle and a little comic indeed: charmingly awkward in their attempts to imitate us, their more advanced cousins – always in nostalgic search of the lost identity of old.[47] The image of wilderness conveyed to the minds of the young users by means of toy animals is thus always an image of a nature that is substantially inferior, handicapped and disadvantaged: already subdued and placated before the onset of its full metaphysical 'colonisation' (occurring only at a later age).[48] The rocking horse is normally tamed, bridled and

47 The concept of 'the past humanity of animals' is not unknown to some indigenous cultures as well. According to the cosmological notions of the Amazonian natives, 'animals [...] are transformations of a primordial, universal humanity' (Viveiros de Castro 2004: 476, 477). 'Such a notion is often associated with the idea that the manifest bodily form of each species is an envelope (a "clothing") that conceals an internal humanoid form [...] Having been people, animals and other species continue to be people behind their everyday appearance' (ibid. 465, 466).

48 In this sense, toys play a pioneering role in the constitution of experience: they impose a default measure, a kind of transcendental anticipation of the future full-scale experience, defining its absolute limits, the expected and desirable canonical size of

mounted often well before the child faces the real equine (and perhaps come to be fascinated or dismayed by the spectacular physique of the real beast). A real bear is mollified and debilitated into a teddy bear, ending in the iron grip of the child's caressing hugs. And although most real brutes do not normally show any particular concern for humans (except sometimes as a potential prey or a simple forage supplier), the cuddly animal μιμήματα always rush into the arms of the man, reminding him that *he* is their undisputed lord and namegiver ('nicknamegiver' would frankly be a more appropriate denomination), the one to whom they readily yield their speechless mouths to receive bridles and reins of logical determinations – the blessed gift of logos and definition.[49] In their eagerness to prove themselves worthy to be admitted into the community of the accomplished and enjoy the full rights of humanity, these eternal minors even wrap themselves in human clothes, taking on joyful baby faces full of expression, even babbling meaningful voices of human language, appropriate to their age.[50] This universal anthropomorphism, a general assimi-

its entelechy. Put in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics, the toy is the bearer of the 'final cause' (τέλος) of the mature, fully accomplished apperceptive experience of the adult mind. Maturation is thus in a way the fulfilment of a program already defined by toys in the first months of life. 'Therefore, the games should mostly be imitations of what one will deal with later [= in adult life]' (διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων, *Pol.* VII 17, 1336a33–34). Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 395d and *Leg.* 643b–c. See Halliwell 1986: 70 n. 34; idem 2002: 178.

49 The present speculations on the role of children's toys in the process of 'colonisation' of the natural world by placing it under the ultimate authority of the 'pure concepts of the understanding' are mostly related to the general conceptual framework elaborated in the classic study *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Horkheimer & Adorno.

50 Toy animals are so precisely the projections of the very children who own them, manipulate them and mirror in them: the mirror lookalikes of immature, underage humans as such – 'subhumans' desperately desiring to grow up and achieve the status of full-fledged men. Yet on the other hand, it is the very scaled-down proportions of the toys as such – their basic *scale model character* – that allow the clear overviewability and manageability of the context, as well as the possibility of contextualisation itself. As small as he is, the child is after all a physical and intellectual sovereign of his teeny-weeny, handy and readily manageable menagerie. And yet it seems like *the oversized toys* could create some problem – those giant teddy bears exceeding the proportions of the child and placing him in a 'subordinate position' of someone being hugged rather than hugging. Do they undermine the validity of the present argument? It does not seem so. Although the stuffed animal now rises above the kid size, as well as the size of its own natural prototype (the real bear whose idea it represents), it still does not deviate from its basic nature and the main purpose as a toy – nor indeed from its own *default size*, which nevertheless remains 'childish' and scaled-down in an absolute, unqualified sense (i.e., whatever the relative size of a particular piece, see below, n. 92). Moreover, finding themselves among objects from the adult world and surpassing them in size, the giant puppets somehow commensurate their rival neighbours to the infantile perspective of their own, thus contributing, in their own controversial way, to the common task of every toy as such: and that is *the*

lation to human, or indeed child-scaled, proportions – an interpretation of all natural phenomena in terms of the soul and body of man, or even toddler – does not stop at the animal world, but applies to the inanimate nature as well, extending even to the areas that have long been staked out and marked by flags of definition, law and order: in the realm of toys, even lifeless things get faces, limbs and human manners – the obvious markers of an all-victorious panlogism, gradually infused into the worldview of every growing human. Toys, these vivid embodiments of basic conceptual determinations, are therefore not only elementary transmitters of the first cognitions that outline everyman's worldview, but also the earliest and most decisive disseminators of the beneficial pathetic fallacy turning the impenetrable otherness of nature into a 'forests of symbols, which observe him with familiar glances' – a magic mirror of a ubiquitous humanity.

Imitating the agon

aller Krieg ist auf diese Platte und in diese Figuren gebannt
Novalis, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*

The world in which playthings play things is *the world of game*. The rules of game governing the microscopic world of toys and their mutual relations thus correspond to the general laws of nature and human society governing the macroscopic world of real things and their real interrelationships. Being engaged in game – in which the anthropomorphic toys mimic real things, while the set of pre-agreed rules of game assumes the role of the general laws of nature and human society – the child becomes accustomed to looking at the multifarious vicissitudes of real-world affairs in terms of simple kaleidoscopic repositioning of a finite number of invariable 'pieces' within an infinite number of variable, yet theoretically predictable, constellations taking their turns on the great game board of nature.[51] The invariable 'pieces' are certainly the toys themselves: embody-

overall ludification of the reality. By conceding to the dimensions of the giant toys and conforming to their proportions, the rest of the world – a world in which humans are brought into a paradoxical situation of being smaller than puppets and surveyed by them from an overhead perspective – becomes a kind of Brobdingnagian dollhouse in which the roles of player and plaything, master and pet, big and small, adult and infantile, are giddily inverted and confounded with each other. The end result is once again – *a ludificated, scale-modelled world*.

51 The course of the game – be it a usual board game or a children's play in the proper sense, i.e., a free imaginative improvisation including a number of toys arbitrarily interrelated and animated (as in the well-known dramatic enactments with toys playing the allotted roles, while being accompanied by 'stage directions' and dialogues

ing the basic concepts, *ur*-concepts, they are distinguished mainly by a perfect stability and reliability of their axiomatically simple, perspicuous and univocal (and, indeed, heavily anthropomorphic) features allowing of no alterations and development, at least not within a single game.[52] As for the game proper – board games have in this regard a canonical status – it is actually always a mimesis of a real, material *agon* occurring within the realms of nature and human society,[53] a simulacrum of a true contest normally entailing actual warring parties, those that seriously plot against each other's lives. The real agon, unlike its artificial simulation that takes the form of game, is therefore always a sphere of real crisis and uncertainty. Mostly fickle, irregular and dirty, unfair, swindling, messy and bloody, the real-life agon is actually nothing more than continually trampling and bypassing the very 'rules' it is founded upon: these are being freely obliterated and then tinkered anew from one occasion to the next, leading to an arbitrary elimination of this or that conflicting side, or both of them, or even all the rival parties together, regardless of one's merits and initial advantages or disadvantages. The real agon often paradoxically favours the unfit, the unworthy and the base, and punishes the skilful and the virtuous, now rewarding the both sides, now scourging them without distinction and for no apparent reason. It almost always eventuates in an 'unjust' outcome, an undeserved defeat and destruction of whatever of the opposite sides, one or both at once. Not seldom that all participants turn out to be a collective collateral damage of a single match.[54] On the other hand, game – a bloodless mock agon – proves to be a veritable travesty of a real, life-or-death fight.[55] Its predictable reversals always occur un-

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uttered aloud by the small directors) – always relies on exploiting *an infinite aleatory potential of a finite set of conventional rules* that are either inherited or freely extemporised to be strictly adhered to in the context of a single game.

52 Alterations, if any, do not affect the substantial identity, but only the 'phenomenality', the accidental 'appearance' of a thing (see below, n. 92). If the prince is turned into a frog, then the true identity of a frog consists in its being the prince, who is in any event earmarked to finally – after a period of temporary enchantment – return to his original mode of existence, which has essentially never been lost. Anyway, a child himself does not allow to break the spell prematurely (as in the case of a kid seated at the front of a row of chairs, decidedly preventing the disenchantment of his enchanted train, no less than his own as its 'engine', Huizinga 1949: 8).

53 From a child's and childish perception, there is no essential difference between the laws of nature and those of human society: the laws of man are conceived by analogy with natural laws and the laws of nature by analogy with those governing social relations.

54 Among all the known games, the gladiatorial combat *sine missione* would be closest to the nature of the real agon.

55 The reader will observe that the term *agon* as applied here has a distinctly non-Huizingian flair (the Dutch scholar, as is known, 'considering the ludic function to be inherent in the agon', Huizinga 1949: 90). In our context, however, agon appears as a neutral generic term including both orderly competition of the sporting game as well

der an agreed set of clear, orderly and inviolable rules: that is why such a struggle is of necessity fake. Since the beaten side stays in life no less than the winning one, there is no real loser, the one who would be seriously wounded or driven out of existence. Instead of being expelled into real non-being, as normally comes about in a real-life agon, the fallen antagonists, 'pieces', are merely 'captured', pulled off the board and moved to the box, as to a kind of resurrection tomb whence they resume their usual turns whenever the time comes to emerge into the light and line up for a new onset. Through game, the child gets used to perceiving a dramatic aspect of the real agon – the uncontrollable clashing of the actual, concrete forces of nature and human society – in a soothing form of a fair play, a clean and honest sport, wherein all the moves, all the mutual 'blows' of the competing sides, are patiently exchanged in restrained and polite alter-

as unruly mayhem of the 'total war' ('the surprise, the ambush, the raid, the punitive expedition and wholesale extermination', ibid.). At any rate, it should be noticed that classical Greek of the fifth and fourth centuries is not unfamiliar with either of the senses, favouring neither at the expense of the other (see LSJ, s.v. III 1 and 2). The well-known quadripartite typology of games proposed by R. Caillois also includes agon, as the first (and in a sense classic) type of game, which in principle retains the essential features of a cultivated and culture-bearing competition à la Huizinga. The novelties are the remaining types of games, according to Caillois's systematisation: *alea* (games of chance), *mimicry* (games of disguise) and *ilinx* (games of ecstasy and dizziness). Caillois's astute analysis of hazard in the case of *alea* reveals the ultimately illusory nature of gambling loss and gain – a mechanism embedded in the very essence of aleatory games as such: '*Property is exchanged, but no goods are produced.* What is more, this exchange affects only the players, and only to the degree that they accept, through free decision remade at each game, the probability of such transfer' (Caillois 1961: 5, emphasis in original). The only risk is that of choosing 'a response *which is free within the limits set by the rules*' (ibid. 8, emphasis in original). '*Agôn* and *alea* imply opposite and somewhat complementary attitudes, but they both obey the same law – the creation for the players of conditions of pure equality denied them in real life. For nothing in life is clear, since everything is confused from the very beginning, luck and merit too. Play, whether *agôn* or *alea*, is thus an attempt to substitute perfect situations for the normal confusion of contemporary life. In games, the role of merit or chance is clear and indisputable. It is also implied that all must play with exactly the same possibility of proving their superiority or, on another scale, exactly the same chances of winning' (ibid. 19, emphasis in original). As for mimicry and ilinx, both are actually a kind of harmless simulations of transcending into otherness – either external, natural and social (mimicry), or internal, psychological and mental (ilinx). In both cases, the adventurous 'bathysphere' of game, challengely plunged into profundities of both the outside and the inside worlds, is in the end still umbilically attached to a 'mother ship' of rules, conventions and social considerations safely floating on the surface of normality. For in the event of a 'cable break', the game gets distorted into its own corruption – so here we are no longer concerned with the game in the proper sense (ibid. 51). (Anyway, Caillois is certainly wrong when he lumps gladiatorial combats together with boxing and wrestling, as purported games of the ilinx type; the context also does not make it clear enough whether observation or active participation is meant, ibid. 26.)

nation, 'with kid gloves', in conformity with a neatly prearranged ruleset ('the general laws of nature and society'). Given that the vanquished are no less spared than the winners, the victory in such a bloodless substitute for war – a sporting agon – turns out to be a travesty of a real victory, just as a sporting defeat amounts to a travesty of a real defeat. Both is making sport of agon. For the ultimate victory is here pledged to everyone: kings and pawns of both colours, all are essentially predestined to stay up and win the palm of ontological triumph over non-being. In the constant Manichean grapple between the black and white pieces, both are equally subject to the upmost rule commanding that there be no killing of the captured adversaries. This pseudo-agon not only teaches a child that the real things awaiting him in the future life are *essentially toys* – steady and reliable advocates of the basic conceptual features (shaped in a familiar, anthropomorphic guise); moreover, it inculcates in the mind of the little one the fundamental idea that all the diverse relationships between real things are *essentially games* – various 'matches', infinitely reproducible and variable rearrangements of a finite number of fixed 'pieces' (= things) moving along specific fields of the game board (in the only permissible corridors preventing direct contact, collisions and bloodshed), within the limited scope of individual movement types strictly specified by the set of simple rules (= the general laws of nature and society).[56] They preclude any prospect of a radical break and uncertainty, disintegration of order

56 The essence of the true agonism in nature and society consists in giving free rein to the real contingency and the real, substantial annihilation of adversaries as an unavoidable corollary thereof. The essence of the gaming, or sporting agonism – the mock agonism – would contrariwise be exactly the taming of contingency (through its redefining into *probability*, as a sort of paradoxical *precomputable contingency*, that is to say, a theoretically controllable and predictable variability within the pregiven set of rules) – and consequent outmanoeuvring the fatal outcome (through its redefining into a purely symbolic defeat, the one in which the real elimination is smoothly substituted by mutual 'capturing' of the rival 'men'). The uncomfortable fact of a real, radical and incalculable chance (such as, for instance, the unexpected outbreak of a viral pandemic, the consequences of which cannot in any way be calculated at the moment we print these lines) is neatly remedied and corrected by means of a self-confident 'calculus of probability'. The devastating reign of a *veritable* randomness and hazard in nature and society is thereby systematically diluted in a harmless whimsiness of a slot machine. We are seriously inclined to believe that the famous Wittgenstein's 'family resemblances' among the most diverse varieties of games (such as those randomised in *Phil. Invest.*, 66) are all ultimately reducible to this concrete, simple atomic function – a kind of common 'ancestral gene' present in *all* historical species without any exception whatsoever. At any rate, it is characteristic that Wittgenstein's list bypasses a game in which chance is – quite exceptionally and atypically – shown due appreciation as a full partner, completely co-equalled and freed from any ontological handicap, otherwise inherent in every ordinary Wittgensteinian game. It is of course Russian roulette, enfant terrible of the family. (Yet maybe Wittgenstein 'didn't mean that sort of game'?)

and predictability, entropy, decline into disorder, and a real, substantial, not just 'played' and accidental, loss.[57] If toys are elementary concepts in their canonical constancy and immutability, then games would be an elementary school in their effective casuistry, a propaedeutics to the art of drawing valid conclusions in accordance with a set of general rules governing nature and human society.

Imitating the substantial change

As such, the ontology of the toy and the game is in fact most naturally expressible in certain basic terms of Aristotelian ontology. If game is an imaginary world in miniature in which toys imitate real things of the great world – the primary substances; if toys are, on their turn, symbolic representations and visible signs of concepts – the secondary substances; then the basic mechanism of game would actually lie in that the secondary substances, toys, play the role of the primary substances, actual things. If again the real world is a field of real *change* defined by the general laws of nature and human society, the world of game, as its idealistic simulation, would repeat this real-word change in the fictitious imitative forms defined by the set of conventional rules of game.

As is known, Aristotle differentiates between two main types of change (μεταβολή): substantial and accidental. The substantial change would affect the individual thing as such, the primary substance, entailing its coming into existence and ceasing to exist, the instantaneous transition from one contradictory determination to another: from non-being to being, and the other way around. The birth of an individual instance of the living world, or the emergence of a particular artificial object that was not there before, would therefore mean the substantial change in terms of generation; while the death of a singular living being or the destruction of a singular and unique manufactured thing would constitute the substantial change in the sense of corruption. The substantial change is radical and thoroughgoing, it involves the whole of a substance, and concerns its generation or corruption in an absolute and irrevocable manner.[58] Unlike

57 'Children may have their real small-scale disasters, but adults have their own very large ones: war, catastrophe, accidents, hurricanes, riots, sickness, and death. The play of disorder and phantasmagoria would then seem to be a universal aspect of all free play, for both child and adult. It is noticeable that there is a very great distance between the real-life disaster and the ludic "disaster". There is not too much resemblance between a war and a circus' (Sutton-Smith 1997: 162–3).

58 'For unqualified generation and corruption do not derive from aggregation and segregation [= of atomic particles], but whenever *this one* changes into *that one* in its

the substantial change, the accidental one relates to the alteration of the accidental qualifications (πάθη) of a substance.[59] Although remaining one and the same in number, a substance changes in that it receives various contrary qualifications: man is once black, then again white, once small, then big, once here, then there.[60] While the substantial change involves a sudden transition from non-being to being, or conversely, the accidental one is marked by continuity: contraries are being replaced by successively giving way to one another (usually via several intermediate states), without internal mutations, remaining, each for itself, completely homogeneous and equal to itself.[61] Or, in the words of the philosopher, 'what appears to be most characteristic of substance is that, even if it remains the same and numerically one, it is capable of receiving contrary qualifications.'[62]

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concrete whole' (ἔστι γὰρ γένεσις ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ οὐ συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει, ἀλλ' ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε ὅλον, *GC* I 2, 317a20–22). Cf. *Phys.* V 1, 224b8–10, and esp. 225a12–20, where the 'unqualified generation' (γένεσις ἁπλῆ) is opposed to the 'qualified' one (γένεσίς τις); on which distinction see below, n. 61.

59 'For in the substrate, one component is logical [viz. definitional, κατὰ τὸν λόγον], another material [κατὰ τὴν ὕλην]. Whenever change takes place in them [= affecting their concrete unity], generation or corruption will occur; whenever again it happens in qualifications and *per accidens* – there will be alteration' (ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις ᾖ ἡ μεταβολή, γένεσις ἔσται ἢ φθορά, ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλοίωσις, *GC* I 2, 317a23–27).

60 *Met.* VIII 1, 1042a32 ff.

61 'For it is not white [= whiteness] that becomes, but it is the wood that becomes white' (οὐ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, *Met.* VIII 5, 1044b23–24); 'For the contraries do not change [sc. in itself]' (οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει, *Met.* XII 1, 1069b6–7). Cf. also Porphyry, *In Cat.* 99.30–100.2 Busse. As for the distinction between *two types of substantial change* – the so-called unqualified and qualified generations (see above, n. 58) – the abovementioned 'wood that becomes white' as a result of a *change in wood* that was not white before (change *in wood* – to point out once again – and not *in whiteness*, which itself remains unchangeable, if exchangeable) would be an example of a qualified generation (γένεσίς τις): '[F]or instance, a change of a non-white thing into a white thing is a qualified generation [lit. 'generation of *this particular thing*', γένεσις τούτου]; whereas a change of an unqualifiedly non-existent thing into an existent thing is an unqualified generation [γένεσις ἁπλῶς], according to which [= i.e., the latter type of change] we speak of a thing's becoming unqualifiedly [ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαι], and not of becoming of a particular thing [τὶ γίγνεσθαι]' (οἷον ἡ μὲν ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ εἰς λευκὸν [sc. μεταβολή] γένεσις τούτου, ἡ δ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς εἰς οὐσίαν γένεσις ἁπλῶς, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐ τὶ γίγνεσθαι λέγομεν, *Phys.* V 1, 225a14–17). The same applies *mutatis mutandis* to the unqualified and qualified corruption respectively. It is not difficult to see that only unqualified generation/corruption will be a substantial change *sensu proprio*. Cf. Ross 1936: 617.

62 μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, *Cat.* 5, 4a10–11.

With that being said, the question arises of how the microcosm of toys and games could after all imitate the macrocosm of real things, the complex dynamics of the real world, the perpetual agon of contending forces whose reversals are for the most part capriciously uncertain and incalculable? Or, to put it in more specific terms of Aristotelian metaphysics: how could toys and games mimic real change – both substantial and accidental? The main issue lies indeed in the fact that toys are symbolic renditions of concepts, that these are genera and species, universals, or secondary substances – which in turn are incapable of being subject to any change: secondary substances are eternal, incorruptible and perfectly unchangeable.[63] Being of such a nature, toys are seemingly quite unsuitable to be allotted the role of changeable objects, viz. that of the primary substances toys are supposed to mimic within the game. Yet it is precisely toys which are destined to assume the role concerned. How, then, the unchangeable secondary substances, represented in the symbolic forms of toys, could possibly play the role of the primary substances – especially in view of the notorious changeability of the latter?

Viewed from the point of Aristotelian ontology, any possibility of change depends ultimately on the composite character of the primary substance – chiefly on the presence of a material substrate (ὕλη, ὑποκείμενον) in a double composition of a concrete individual. Since neither matter nor form, if taken separately, undergoes any substantial change, this could only affect their conjunction, a concrete thing (τόδε ὅλον), one that comes into existence exactly through the association of the two, and ceases to exist through their separation.[64] Hence the substance changes primarily due to the involvement of the material component, which is the main ontological precondition and 'means' of the changeability of an individual thing.

Still, as we have seen, the toy is actually nothing more than a sensible likeness of a concept, a visual token of the Platonic Idea. No toy is essentially an individual thing. The apparent thingness and corporeity of the individual items notwithstanding, a toy remains basically immaterial, intangible, devoid of accidentality, and consequently incapable of being affected by substantial change. The idea (εἶδος) is immortal and indestructible, neither becoming nor ceasing to be:[65] that is why no toy can really come

63 Cf., e.g., *An. Post.* I 24, 85b17–18: τὰ ἄφθαρτα ἐν ἐκείνοις [= τοῖς καθόλου] ἐστί, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος φθαρτὰ μᾶλλον ('What is contained in universals are incorruptible entities, while particulars are, rather, corruptible').

64 See *Met.* VII 8; XII 3.

65 φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὁτιδήποτε χρὴ καλεῖν τὴν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μορφήν, οὐ γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ γένεσις, οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, *Met.* VII 8, 1033b5–7; φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται, *Met.* VII, 8, 1033b16–17; τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις, *Met.*

into existence or be truly deprived of it. The equinity of the toy horse neither becomes nor stops being; while the toy horse, for its part, turns out to be nothing other than the equinity itself (αὐτόϊππον)[66] – just symbolically represented by an emblematic ideogram in the form of a respective toy. The toy has no substance other than secondary,[67] which is indeed com-

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VII 15, 1039b23–24; οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, *Met.* XII 3, 1069b35; οὐδ' ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων [= τῶν εἰδῶν], *Met.* XII 3, 1070a15. Idea is not generated in the case of other categories either: οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ τὸ μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν πρώτων κοινὸς ὁ λόγος, οἷον ποσοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, *Met.* VII 9, 1034b7–10.

66 *Met.* VII 16, 1040b33.

67 If an individual toy horse stands for the concept 'horse', does it not do the same thing as does any individual horse normally standing for the concept 'horse'? Is not an individual toy horse therefore a primary substance of the horse in like manner as any individual specimen of the species 'horse' is? Well, surely not. No one will confuse a toy horse with a real one – least of all a child. An individual toy horse – an individual symbolic representation of the concept 'horse' – is only too obviously *not* an individual specimen of the species 'horse'. There is certainly no doubt that among these two individuals, an individual horse alone could be recognised as a full-blooded specimen of the horse species. (As for the individual toy horse, it would, strictly speaking, be solely a specimen of the species 'toy horse', the only concept that an individual toy horse could really 'stand for'.) The most obvious proof that the primary substance of the horse is an individual horse, and not an individual horselike toy, lies in that the real horse can (literally) be ridden, harnessed, groomed, fed, etc., while all this proves completely unfeasible in the case of a symbolically represented animal (except indeed ὁμωνύμως – by the symbolic imitation of the said actions). And yet there is no doubt that both individual horse and individual toy horse share somehow the common *form* (εἶδος) of the species horse, viz. the typical outline (σχῆμα) of the horse shape (μορφή): the toy horse is definitely a horse-shaped toy, a dummy under the form of the horse. Now if the form of the horse be common to both real horse and horselike toy, then the essential difference between the two would obviously lie in the fact that the toy – as opposed to real animal – lacks the appropriate *matter*, which, again, is exactly *the* part of the substance responsible for its generation, its coming-to-existence (*Met.* VII 7, 1032b30–1033a1). So instead of being properly combined with the ὕλη of the horse, that was naturally intended for it, and it alone (viz. horse flesh and bones), the εἶδος of the horse is now, pretty abnormally, associated with wood, plastic or plush, and thus, in a sense, 'led astray' – ontologically misplaced and miscarried. Such would be the oddly conception of this abortive crossbred of the equid family, the toy horse, a logico-ontological freak (πήρωμα), doomed to a kind of feigned, apparent existence, only vaguely similar to real life. (The ontological barrenness of the toy horse would hence be in a way comparable to that of a mule, yet another 'stray-from-the-path' equine species, mentioned in the interesting passage in *Met*. VII 8, 1033b33 ff.; cf. also VII 9, 1034b3–4) Basically heterogeneous and inappropriate to the related form, the matter of the toy horse never really coalesces with the attached shape of the horse in order to become its organic, naturally indissociable embodiment, i.e., the potentiality and privation of the horse shape (cf. *Met.* VII 7, 1032b1 ff.). Instead of generating a substance proper, the artificial marriage of a depotentialised matter and a deactualised form turns out to be a true ontological misalliance, completely futile, inert and devoid of the ability to self-locomote (otherwise typical

mon to all individual replicas of the same type: they all represent one and the selfsame toy, since each idea is unique and single-item.[68] Being essentially an idea, the toy proves indestructible, regardless the possibility that an individual instance of a material toy may be impaired or demolished.[69] Given that the substance of a toy does not lie in the haecceity of a particular piece, even the utter breakage of the latter could not eventuate in the substantial destruction of the toy in and of itself (καθ' ἑαυτό). A toy cannot be broken. A child is actually never able to break his dummy, no matter how ruthlessly hammering it. And yet it is precisely them, the toys – howbeit intrinsically insensitive to the real substantial change – that are charged with the task of imitatively reproducing that same substantial change affecting the real tangible things of the world. How do they cope

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of all ζῷα). Being left substantially untouched, unfertilised and unimbued by form, the matter of the toy continues to be a mere extraneous adjunct to the accompanying shape, coupled with it only superficially and nonadheringly – a 'vile body', always potentially abandonable without any consequences for the integrity of the form (it is typical that the parts of the toy remain always a mere σωρός, a heap of disjointed limbs assembled 'by force or concretion', incapable of being ultimately 'concocted and turned into one thing', *Met.* VII 16, 1040b9–10; 15–16: τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον πήρωσις). So, while the individual horse is, as it were, absolutely *indispensable* (its substantial change signifying a definitive and irrevocable transition from non-being to being, and the other way around), the individual toy horse – individual symbolic representation of a concept 'horse' – would be universally expendable and replaceable, i.e., serially reproducible and repeatable, which clearly testifies to the fact that its substance is *essentially a secondary one* – and that hence every toy horse is *in reality a species, and not an individual proper*. Provided that it can essentially be affected neither by the material (hylic) destruction nor by the serial replacement of the whole individual items, it is clear that the real substance of the toy proves to be the secondary, and not the primary one (the notorious and oftentimes quoted possibility of unlimitedly replacing a broken chess piece with another one of the same value, or even with an entirely heteroclite material substitute assuming the value of the destroyed piece – without least disturbing either the substantial identity of the item or the progress of the game – clearly shows that the substance of all chess kings, queens, bishops and pawns has, at its core, always been a secondary one).

68 *Met.* XII 3, 1070a18–19.

69 Just as the deletion of the triangle drawn on the board does not lead to the destruction of the triangle shown in the diagram. What here undergoes a substantial change is the primary substance of the individual drawing – a certain amount of chalk powder that 'ceases to exist' as a result of wiping. The substance of the triangle, always secondary – actually belonging to the μαθηματικά ('mathematicals'), one of the two main categories of Platonic eternal beings (cf., e.g., *Met.* I 1, 987b14–15; VII 2, 1028b19–20; XIII 9, 1086a11–13; XIV 3, 1090b35–36, etc.) – remains unchanged by this operation (just as it was by that of the 'constructing'). Now while the triangles fall into the μαθηματικά, the toys would best suit the true Platonic Ideas in their classic sense. Both alike will remain completely untouched by the substantial change affecting their symbolic representatives, individual triangle diagrams and individual toys respectively. Cf. *Met.* X 9, 1058b12–15.

with this paradox? In fact, a good half of their educational function consists precisely of mastering it successfully.

Every substantial change mimicked by game (board games, as we have seen, being particularly exemplary in this sense) is therefore essentially *docetic* in nature. Contrary to the real-life experience, in which universal contingency, arrhythmicity and decay largely relativise the authority of order, regular periodicity and conservation law, game makes us used to the salutary idea that there is no real destruction, dissipation and unplanned loss, that all antagonising parties are destined to be ultimately spared and redeemed, exempt from generation and corruption, and preserved in their ever-intact substantiality. It is for this reason that any radical and definite outcome as such turns out to be completely alien to the spirit of Olympism. As a consequence, all generation and corruption are replaced by countless disposable 'captures and releases' – effigial substitutes for real substantial change.[70]

Imitating the accidental change

The way the game normally imitates the accidental change is actually no less shrewd. It goes without saying that the mimicked change is again only apparent, its subject never being essentially affected by the real alteration.

As is known, Aristotle distinguishes the three types of accidental change: qualitative, quantitative, and local. In contrast to a change in sub-

70 The checkmating, as the game capture *par excellence*, places the royal victim in a position of extreme distress, confining him within a single square, as in a kind of isolation cell – yet sparing him from the ultimate 'deathblow' (which, according to the rules of the game and the implied value of the piece, is not taken into consideration anyway). The king could therefore theoretically remain interned for the rest of eternity, with no danger to his substance, which is in any event eternal and incorruptible (being the secondary one). In this respect, it is also worth recalling the usual duels of toys in which small animators set their champions on each other, hitting them mutually with shouts 'You're dead!': both parties are all too well aware that the clash of their lead warriors proves essentially frustrated by the ultimate impossibility of truly and definitely extruding the opponent's duellist. The substance of toys, being immaterial, comes across as perfectly insusceptible to injury and destruction (regardless of the severity of damage to a concrete item). The same soldiers, or their serial replacements (which amounts to the same), appear again and again, always available for their paradoxically reiterating 'mortal combats'. The paradox, however, disappears when we realise that toys – essentially, secondary substances – have never even moved from non-being into being, so they cannot be bereft of what they never had: a concrete existence. Hence there is no difference between the living toy and the dead toy. Essentially zombies (πηρώματα), toys are by default resilient to lethal blows.

stance, as a category in its own right, he refers to the accidental changes more specifically as *movements* (κινήσεις).[71] What they affect are certainly the individual things, the primary substances, as the only natural substrate (ὑποκείμενον) underlying accidentality. The Stagirite is after all particularly attached to linking the substantiality of the thing to its material component, seeing the matter as the most natural ontological prerequisite for any kind of change: 'That matter is also substance is clear: for in all the opposite changes there is some substrate of changes.'[72] As we have seen, the philosopher has in mind two main types of the 'opposite changes' (ἀντικείμεναι μεταβολαί): the one, based on contradictory opposition (μεταβολὴ κατ᾽ ἀντίφασιν), viz. the substantial change, the generation and corruption (γένεσις καὶ φθορά) affecting individual things alone;[73] and the other, relied on the principle of contrariety (μεταβολὴ κατ᾽ ἀντίθεσιν), viz. the accidental change – the movement – or the suc-

71 In *Cat.* 14, 15a13–14, however, he will also include substantial change among the movements. Yet see for instance *Met.* XI 12, 1068a8–11. On the four types of change see, e.g., *Phys.* III 1, 200b33–34 (μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν ἢ κατὰ τόπον), and, in greater detail, *Phys.* V 1–2.

72 ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς, *Met.* VIII 1, 1042a32–34. Strictly speaking, matter is the sole component of the substance liable to accidental changes. Substantial change, on the other hand, only affects the combination of matter and form, viz. the concrete, materiated form (σχῆμα, μορφή, the only possible mode of the form's real existence, according to the basic tenor of the Aristotelian philosophy). Taken in themselves, neither is generated (οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, *Met.* XII 3, 1069b35–36). Quite simply, but no less accurately, this can be summarised as follows: a) a substantial change concerns the *link* between matter and form – substance comes into existence precisely by the establishment of this link, and ceases to exist by its rupture ('what is called form or substance does not come into existence, whereas the union [sc. of matter and form], called after the latter, does come into existence', τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται, ἡ δὲ σύνοδος [v.l. σύνολος, Jaeger] ἡ κατὰ ταύτην λεγομένη γίγνεται, *Met.* VII 8, 1033b17–18; 'of those substances which are so called [viz. concrete things], there is both corruption as well as generation', ὅσαι [sc. οὐσίαι] μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται [viz. τὰ σύνολα], τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά· καὶ γὰρ γένεσις, *Met.* VII 15, 1039b22–23); while b) an accidental change pertains to the *material component* alone (cf., e.g., *Phys.* VII 3, 245b13–246a1) – insofar as it can serve as a suitable substrate to its form (for some accidental changes are capable of seriously menacing this inherent capacity of matter to back the concomitant form, while others have no bearing on the matter's ability to function as a substrate; the former may therefore have an indirect effect on a substantial change, the latter not). For all specific types of accidental change, see below.

73 '[W]ith regard to [the change in] substance, [there is] something which is now in coming into existence, then again in ceasing to exist, and [which is] substrate now as this individual thing [τόδε τι], now again as [the same thing] in the sense of [its own] privation' (κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὃ νῦν μὲν ἐν γενέσει, πάλιν δ᾽ ἐν φθορᾷ, καὶ νῦν μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς τόδε τι, πάλιν δ᾽ ὑποκείμενον ὡς κατὰ στέρησιν, *Met.* VIII 1, 1042b1–3).

cession of contrary qualifications inherent in individual things.[74] The latter, as is said, branches additionally into three special kinds:[75] the alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), or the succession of the contrary qualities;[76] the growth and diminution (αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις), or the sequence of the quantitative contrarieties;[77] and finally, the locomotion (φορά), or change of place according to the pairs of spatial contrarieties.[78] It is particularly important to observe that the three kinds of movements have no equal status when it comes to their relationship to the substance as the material substrate of change (τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς): for some of the movements do involve a change in substance, while others do not. In other words: certain types of movements are able to exert an essential and immediate impact on the generation or the corruption; while others affect it only partially, or not at all. So, which movements are able to change the thing in its substantiality, and which again are not? The philosopher is explicit: the quantitative movement always involves a substantial change; the qualitative does it sometimes; the local – never.[79]

Thus *every* change in quantity involves the *whole of the substance*: what grows or decreases is always an individual thing in its entirety. Furthermore, the *extreme* values of quantitative contrarieties always directly

74 'For each movement is a change from one to another, and the same holds true for generation and corruption, too; only that the latter are change into opposities in one way [viz. change into contradictory opposities], whereas the former, the movement, is change into opposities in another way [viz. change into contrary opposities]' (πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή, καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ ὡσαύτως· πλὴν αἱ μὲν εἰς ἀντικείμενα ὡδί, ἡ δ' ὡδί, ἡ κίνησις, *Met.* XI 12, 1068a23–26; the wording 'ἡ δ' ὡδὶ ἡ κίνησις' is that of A^b = cod. Laur. 87, 12). cf. *Met.* XI 11, 1067b30 ff.

75 '[T]here must be three types of movement, qualitative, quantitative and local. There is no movement with respect to substance as there is nothing contrary to substance' (ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶναι κινήσεις, ποιοῦ ποσοῦ τόπου. κατ' οὐσίαν δ' οὔ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν εἶναι οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον, *Met.* XI 12, 1068a9–11). Cf. *Cat.* 5, 3b24 ff.

76 'what is now healthy, then again diseased' (ὃ νῦν μὲν ὑγιὲς πάλιν δὲ κάμνον, *Met.* VIII 1, 1042a36–b1).

77 'what is now such-and-such a size, then again smaller or larger' (ὃ νῦν μὲν τηλικόνδε πάλιν δ' ἔλαττον ἢ μεῖζον, *Met.* VIII 1, 1042a35–36).

78 'what is now here, then again elsewhere' (τὸ νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα πάλιν δ' ἄλλοθι, *Met.* VIII 1, 1042a34–35). Plato already disambiguates two types of movement, ἀλλοίωσις and φορά (*Theaet.* 181d).

79 '[T]he moving thing departs [lit. 'steps out'] least from its substance [viz. essence] when in local movement – compared with all other kinds of movement: for this is the only movement that does not change anything of the being [τοῦ εἶναι], about as well as in the case of the altering thing, it is the quality [sc. of substance] that changes, and in the case of the thing which grows and diminishes, it is the [substance's] quantity that is subject to change' (ἥκιστα τῆς οὐσίας ἐξίσταται τὸ κινούμενον τῶν κινήσεων ἐν τῷ φέρεσθαι· κατὰ μόνην γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει τοῦ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἀλλοιουμένου μὲν τὸ ποιόν, αὐξανομένου δὲ καὶ φθίνοντος τὸ ποσόν, *Phys.* VIII 7, 261a20–23). Cf. *Top.* VI 6, 145a3–4, 9–10.

threaten the existence of a substance as such: the 'Procrustean' treatment of a body, whether animate or artificial, inevitably entails its ultimate change in substance (although not always necessarily ending in it).[80]

Alteration, or change in quality, also involves a substantial change – yet not without any exception, since a change in substance is sometimes lacking, despite the intensity of an affection.[81] One is now healthy and then diseased, whereas some diseases – those 'pushed to the extreme' – may have a fatal outcome (although not necessarily). The reason for this is that the transition from health to disease, or *vice versa*, *involves all of the substance*, the body taken in its integrity.[82] It is true, though, that the sizeable number of alterations are trivial and without essential consequences, as they do not concern the substance in its entirety, thus leaving no effect on it as a whole, not even when the changing quality reaches its extreme value. One is now dark-haired and then grey-haired (as a result of the natural greying process), yet neither any of these qualities, nor the transition from one to the other, nor their 'extreme values' (whatever that may mean in the given instance) – none of this could possibly cause a substantial change (or at least establish itself as 'the first step towards a change in substance'). The reason lies in the fact that alteration – unlike a change in quantity – does not *always and without exception* involve the whole of the substance.[83]

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80 A procedure for testing the ability of accidental qualifications to bring about a change in substance *if (theoretically) pushed to the extreme* is an original invention by German philosopher Sebastian Odzuck: 'Thus, if something keeps on growing and exceeds this natural limit, it no longer fulfils its essence and in this sense is no longer the substance it was before, in other words, it has changed in essence' (Odzuck 2014: 204).

81 See ibid. 195 ff.; 196–7. Yet see below, n. 84.

82 'My claim is that certain alterations something *x* may undergo as a whole can result in *x* undergoing a change in essence in the sense that if the alteration goes on for too long and in consequence the respective quality becomes too extreme this ultimately results in a change in substance. [...] This, of course, does not mean that every alteration leads to a change in substance, but only such as involve an affection's becoming too extreme' (ibid. 203–4).

83 Odzuck ignores this basic criterion for delineating alteration from change in quantity (which is indirectly alluded to at *Met.* VIII 1, 1042b5, a most noteworthy passage to which the German author puzzlingly makes no reference): in contrast to alteration that only *occasionally* involves the totality of the substance – *every*, howsoever partial and minuscule, change in quantity *always and without any exception* involves the substance in its wholeness – a change in substance. So while the change in hair colour only affects a part of the body – even the slightest swelling of the pinkie finger automatically matters the body in its integrity, and not the affected part alone (a barely perceptible enhancement of the finger already participates in the overall increase of the body as a whole, cf. *GC* I 5, 321a2–3; a19–20; b14–15). No matter how negligible, this tiny quantitative change turns out to be still 'the first step towards a change

The position of the locomotion is however pretty unique: '[I]t is not necessary if something has matter for local movement [ὕλη τοπική, 'local matter'], that it should also have matter for generation and corruption [γεννητὴ καί φθαρτή sc. ὕλη].'[84] What Aristotle actually has in mind is the celestial bodies he imagines as deities endued with a special kind of ungenerated and incorruptible matter, typical of the godlike beings of the supralunary region.[85] Their movement (otherwise permanent and circular, originating from the 'unmoved mover' and conveyed by a number of subordinate unmoved movers)[86] immediately relates to their own imperishable materiality, the 'local matter'[87] – though locomotion, for its part, has no retroactive impact on the enigmatic ὕλη τοπική,[88] the celestial bodies being divine, unborn and immortal, not susceptible to any substantial change.

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in substance [...] embarking on the process of departing from the essence' (Odzuck 2014: 205), although a substantial change itself, of course, be not always necessarily carried through. In the case of a change in quality, on the contrary, there is no such automatic and absolutely exceptionless entwinement between the parts and the whole: alteration in principle allows for certain autonomy of the parts, so that sometimes even the most extreme values of qualitative changes affecting individual parts remain without repercussions for the remainder of the body (as in the case of the colouristic 'extremes' of the grey hairness consequent upon the natural change of hair colour: from black to grey, from grey to greyish-white, from greyish-white to white and further on to *extreme white* – none of these intermediate steps counts as 'the first step towards a change in substance').

84 οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ὕλην ἔχει τοπικήν, τοῦτο καὶ γεννητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν ἔχειν, *Met.* VIII 1, 1042b5–6. Yet according to *Met.* IX 8, 1050b17, this reservation would also include matter for alteration: in consequence, neither ὕλη ἀλλοιωτή would entail substantial change.

85 *Met.* XII 1, 1069a31. The celestial bodies have ὕλη τοπική but not ὕλη γεννητή, *Met.* VIII 4, 1044b7–8; XII 2, 1069b25–26.

86 *Met.* XII 8, 1073a23 ff.

87 It is elsewhere (as in the spurious *On the Cosmos*) conceived more materially, as a 'fifth element', and labelled *aether*, according to a false etymology that specifically points out its locomotor capacity: οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄστρων οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθέρα καλοῦμεν ... διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ θεῖν κυκλοφορουμένην ['*ever-running* in a circle'], *De mundo* 2, 392a5–8; cf. *Cael.* I 3, 270b20–24; also *Meteor.* I 3, 339b25, Anaxagoras apparently being the first to technically use the traditional term, ibid. b20–24; see also Plato, *Epin.* 981c; 984b).

88 'Matter (ὕλη) being for Aristotle that which is presupposed by change, a thing that can change in all four ways is regarded as embedded, as it were, in four layers of matter – 'local matter' or matter for locomotion, matter for alteration, for change of size, for coming into being and passing away. These have a definite logical order; the second presupposes the first, the third the second. The fourth and third imply one another. The three last are *in fact* always found together; they belong to all sublunary bodies. 'Local matter,' however, is not only logically independent of the other three, but can exist apart from them, and does so exist in the heavenly spheres, which accordingly are 'more divine' than terrestrial things. Every individual thing in the world except minds is a union of form with at least 'local matter'" (Ross 1923: 167).

However, the fact that locomotion does not involve a change in substance can as well be understood in a more ordinary, this-worldly sense, applying to any 'normal' locomotion within the sublunary sphere of ours.[89] No locomotion has any essential bearing on the substance affected by it. Simple shift from one place to another cannot bring about any change in substance of the moving object. The horse undergoes no substantial change as a consequence of simply leaving the barn and going to the pasture. The glass remains perfectly unchanged in substance, whether it stays on the shelf or is being transferred to the table. It is true that some of the local changes may indirectly eventuate in a change in substance: the glass may indeed break due to an 'extreme' move aside, i.e., over the edge of the table; yet the real cause of a substantial change never happens to be locomotion itself, but some accidental agent, external to it (e.g., lack of support to avoid falling glass).[90] Consequently, locomotion proves to be the only kind of movement entailing no substantial change whatsoever.[91] Although it cannot subsist without things, as the only natural bearers of 'local matter', this kind of movement – despite being the most typical and the most obvious one – is actually the most abstract and most attenuated and 'idealistic', the least material in comparison with the other two, which are lot more 'somatically' involved in the solid sensible interior of the substance.

Let us now return to the game. If we pay attention to the way the game imitates accidental changes, we immediately notice that among the aforesaid three kinds of movement, it almost unequivocally chooses one alone: the locomotion, largely ignoring the other two. Locomotion stands at the base of each game as such (especially the board games). In mimicking the

89 Which still derives its momentum from the upper world, and ultimately from the *primum mobile*, cf. *Met*. XII 8, 1074a28–31.

90 'Yet, it is important to emphasize that these [= substantial] changes do not happen solely in virtue of the subject's suddenly being at some other place, but because of what is at the respective place' (Odzuck 2014: 206). The latter, by the way, may be responsible not only for the ceasing to be (as, e.g., in the case of movement in the minefield; see also Odzuck's own instance of a goldfish jumping out of a fish tank, ibid.), but also for coming into existence, as in the biblical parable of the sower: 'Some [seeds] fell upon stony places [...] and [...] withered away. [...] But other fell into good ground, and brought forth fruit' (Matthew 13:5–8 KJV; compare the analogous locomotor alternatives of a spermatozoon while 'gropingly' trying to penetrate the egg). In none of these instances did locomotion itself involve a change in substance, this change having occurred as a result of an extrinsic reason, which was in fact only *elicited* by locomotion and should not be confused with it. Locomotion always remains outside the moving substance ('local matter'). 'The fact that the place where the goldfish landed is full of air instead of water [...] is an accidental feature of the change in place' (Odzuck, loc. cit.).

91 Ibid. 201: 'Since locomotion does not affect its subject's inner attributes, one accordingly may say that it cannot be a part of a change in essence in the way alteration and change in quantity can.'

most diverse changes in the real world, the game reduces them all solely to the relations of spatial movements. The reason is clear: since the toy is by itself a pure concept, a secondary substance, it is essentially immaterial, devoid of potentiality, and accordingly out of reach of most accidental changes. How could a concept – an eternal and unchangeable entity – be now this way and again that way? Now small and again great, now black and again white? Would it not be so obliterated exactly as a concept? It is indeed true that a particular piece of a toy might at some point be shaped small and then redrawn into larger proportions, or change colour – in like manner as a particular drawing of a triangle could now be fashioned small now big, now black now white. Yet taken by themselves, neither toys nor triangles – being *per se* purely conceptual and hence unliable to any alteration or change in quantity – could have size or colour capable of being changed and superseded by its contrary.[92] This is why changes in quality

92 The toy elephant is large in an absolute and unqualified sense (it is actually the very epitome of the concept of 'the largest animal'); the toy mouse again is absolutely small ('the smallest animal') – regardless of the relative size of a particular specimen of the toy, which may vary, viz. undergo quantitative change in the ordinary sense (see above, n. 50). Hence an individual piece of toy mouse may be comparatively larger than an individual piece of toy elephant, although – taken in an absolute and unqualified sense – the toy elephant would always be larger than the toy mouse. While being characterised by the *quantitative* invariants of the absolute smallness and largeness respectively, toy mouse and toy elephant are at the same time characteristically distinguished by the common *qualitative* accident of greyness. Although individual specimens of toy mice or elephants may be of any colour, no blue mice and pink elephants will ever question this inherent and inalienable quality of a basic, absolute and unqualified greyness, normally pertaining to the concepts of mouse and elephant (though not necessarily seen). The child will always be perfectly aware that his pink elephant is *as a matter of fact* grey – grey by default – because every elephant is grey, and the toy elephant is nothing but the symbolic representation of this Everyelephant. Every blue mouse and pink elephant would therefore be principally and normally grey – grey in an unqualified, invariable and canonical sense – sharing the common *inseparable accident* of greyness, normally concomitant with the concept of mouse as well as that of elephant (though not necessarily seen). Properly speaking, if the greyness turns out to be the *inseparable* accident of the given toys, the blueness, or pinkness, or whatever colouristic quality, would be the best designated as their *separable* accident – the former normally relating to the immutable and abiding concepts symbolically represented by the respective toys; the latter again – to the concrete, changeable and volatile individual toy items as such. The same holds true also of the aforementioned quantitative accidents of smallness and largeness pertaining to the concepts of mouse and elephant respectively: being practically inalienable from the given concepts, these accidents turn out to be *inseparable quantitative accidents* of the respective toys (the toy mouse is absolutely and unqualifiedly small, 'the smallest animal'; the toy elephant again absolutely and unqualifiedly large, 'the largest animal'); whereas the relative smallness/largeness of individual toy specimens (allowing an individual piece of toy mouse to be comparatively larger than an individual piece of toy elephant) would consequently amount to the *separable quanti-*

and quantity play virtually no role in the world of toys and games (toys are typically 'unchangeable', stiff and 'puppetlike', rigid just like the rules of the game governing their movements). The dynamics of the world of toys and games, its specific agonality, rests on another type of change and movement – the locomotion.

Although locomotion is the only type of accidental change normally suited to the nature of the toy,[93] the child is by no means denied the opportunity of modifying his particular piece of toy in a whole variety of ways other than simple changing its position in space. It is well known that kid generally does not hesitate to 'imaginatively' interfere with his individual sample by supplying it with various quantitative and qualitative features that were not originally associated with the type of toy in question (by arbitrarily reducing or enlarging its original shape, or staining it with random, 'non-genuine' colours, 'drawing a moustache onto it', or even tearing it apart). However, all these interventions performed on an *individual specimen of the toy* actually have no effect on either the accidental or the substantial identity of *the toy as such*. The child is, after all, fully aware that his toy can only be properly changed in terms of locomotion, while any other attempt at accidental change would necessarily be irregular and illicit – a simple mistreatment which, like physical destruction itself (substantial change), can only affect the concrete item, leaving the toy *per se* intact and unchanged. That is why every attempt of the child to variegate his toy otherwise than *appropriately* – and the only appropriate way of changing the toy would indeed be that of locomotion, the simple

tative accidents, pertaining to the individual items alone. For inseparable accidents (ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα) see Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.26–13.3; 21.21–22.10 Busse; classic instance is the blackness of ravens and 'Ethiopians', virtually inseparable, yet capable of being thought away 'without destroying the substrate' (and *therefore* 'accidental'). According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Top.* 51.2–3 Wallies, the inseparable accident is not really inherent in the substance, being neither the matter nor the form, but a sort of inseparable concomitant of their linkage ('a by-product of what happens to the matter in its change into such and such a form', τῷ δὲ συμπτώματι τῆς ὕλης ἐπιγινόμενον ἐν τῇ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος μεταβολῇ, cf. Van Ophuijsen 2001: 54). Thus, a separable accident would belong to an individual specimen of a toy, and an inseparable again to a toy as a representation of a concept – a specific kind of 'predicable' involved in the concept represented, certainly not as a part of its formal definition, yet as a kind of its inseparable connotative retinue (part of its 'apophatic definition', cf. ibid. 48.21 ff.).

93 Accordingly, all the rules of the game apply solely to the toy's locomotor properties. Each piece of toy, especially the board game piece, is defined primarily with respect to this or that type of spatial movement. Other accidental features of the toy are normally fixed and have no part in the process of change (the baby doll does not participate in the growth process, the blush of its cheeks is frozen forever; the only change it is destined to undergo are certain 'regular' displacements, such as being laid to the 'crib', lifted from the 'crib', accepted in the arms, rocked, etc.).

moving of the toy in space – proves ultimately vain and doomed to final frustration. For the toy is relentlessly *resilient*: no matter how utterly oppressed or disfigured (in the element of individual copy), it always stubbornly resumes its original form.[94] This is so because the toy is actually nothing but this (symbolically represented) form itself, the very εἶδος, the metaphysical, imponderable, intelligible entity finding itself right in the midst of the sensible materiality of this world: surrounded by a concrete, corporeal space, it comes across as perfectly resistant to all its physical affections (which concern only the tangible stuff of the symbol, without entailing its ideal content).[95] Yet withal, one of the essential functions of the toy would – seemingly paradoxically – consist in encouraging exactly this natural proclivity of the child to manipulate the toy in a deliberately inappropriate, revolutionary and iconoclastic manner. Such 'exploratory' abuse of the individual toy, to which the toy as such is as obstinately resistant as a punching bag, serves after all a clear pedagogical purpose: it shows the child that all his repeated attempts to change his toy otherwise than aright – by a simple altering its position in space (which is, as said,

94 Perhaps there should be some higher pedagogical reason for the fact that the majority of toys are made of *rubber*, so that the rubber somehow resembles the ὕλη κατ' ἐξοχήν of the toy as such (almost a kind of πρώτη ὕλη in the world of toys). In fact, it is impossible to draw a clear line here between the trivial and non-trivial reason thereof – both can be reduced to one: pressure and wear resistance.

95 It appears to be the *ball*, the most perfect geometrical body, in which the spirit of the game would achieve its most ideal objectification. The ball is also an abstraction of the heavenly orb, which is indeed the proper form of a divine being of the supralunar realm. As a classic *medium* of game, the ball is actually devoid of its own self, all consisting of the privation of its own interior, all contained in outer shape (εἶδος), all outdoors and public, all intended to be someone else's, actually everyone's and nobody's – an epitome of pure otherness. Unseizable, unholdable, ever-elusive, it does not last long in anyone's hands, but glides quickly and continuously from one partner to another, connecting them all by a single unique interest of perpetuating one pure rhythmic – essentially orbital – locomotion (*re-sulting* from being thrown from one contrariety – one rival player *here* – to the other *there*). The ball is thus entirely made out of local matter. If again the spirit of the game – and this is the spirit of the pure locomotion – resides in the rules of the game, then the ball would be a concentrated symbolic representation of these rules themselves, of the very regularity of the game: vectors and trajectories of regular, rhythmic movements of the ball, defining the objective form of the regularity of the game as such, as pure, subjectless locomotion in and of itself. Indestructible, impenetrable, both material and immaterial, puffy and airy, imponderable, 'schematic', the ball is the pulsating rubber heart of the game, ever pressured, ever rebounding, the untiring tyre running unremittingly over the beaten orbits of the playing field (see Gadamer 2004: 105–6). (Compare the valuable literary treatment of the ball motif in Kafka's *Blumfeld, an elderly bachelor*, a classic account of the ineliminable and insuppressible, ever-squirming hither-and-thithering essence of the ball – a pure transcendental, 'celestial' being somehow inserted within concrete physical spatiality of this world of ours.)

the sole appropriate kind of toy's accidental change, the only one indicated in the user guide) – prove in the end perfectly illusory and unproductive. The toy thus serves not only to domesticate the wilderness of the outside nature, but also, indirectly, to tame the inner wilderness of the child – that restive and recalcitrant nature manifesting itself in every young person during the process of growing up. After many thwarted and ineffective assaults on accidental and substantial integrity of a toy (as a 'thing' *par excellence*), the child eventually renounces his futile persistence[96] and gets used to the victorious tenacity of a trustworthy world ruled by the universal law of locomotor change – a simple kaleidoscopic change that changes nothing of substantial consequence.

Conclusion

In doing so, the toy fulfils its complex and many-sided educational role:

- to teach the general concept (imitating the Idea);
- to anthropomorphise the nature (imitating the wild);
- to pluck out the sting of incalculability from the real agon in nature and society by transforming it into a bloodless bloodbath on a readily manageable battlefield of boardgame (imitating the agon);
- to instil the conviction that substantial change is essentially a kind of *docetic* illusion (imitating the substantial change); and finally,
- to solidify the belief that accidental change is no less illusory than substantial – except for locomotion, the only change occurring *in rerum natura* (imitating the accidental change).

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96 Mainly as a result of being convinced of the parallel existence of countless other identical (serial) specimens of toys of the same type. Even a child's own copy, no matter how 'different' (i.e., connoted by a unique affection and not seldom stamped by some peculiar physical mark thereof; or again unkindly distorted and mutilated in an equally biased, affectively involved manner), does not escape the overarching conceptual provisions of the ideal type, the only properties that matter. The toy is always victorious over the child.

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CICERO'S EDUCATIONAL *EXEMPLA*: PIECES OF CICERO'S UNWRITTEN HISTORY OF ROME OR THE EXTERNALIZATION OF HIS NOSTALGIA?*

Abstract: The ancient Romans used *exempla* as the core of their understanding of morality and as the central element of their educational system. Cicero's use of *exempla* has received some scholarly attention, but there are some questions left unanswered. This paper addresses the question whether Cicero's educational *exempla* could be viewed as pieces of his unwritten history of Rome, or rather the externalization of his notion of nostalgia.

Keywords: Cicero, *exempla*, nostalgia, history of Rome.

1. Introduction

Today it is a commonplace to say that we cannot learn from history, because, as we are told, the course of events is contingent, and history does not repeat itself. On the other hand, the ancient Greeks and Romans

* I presented my views on Cicero's nostalgia for the first time in a lecture titled 'Cicero's Nostalgia: A Journey to the Past', delivered in Bratislava (Slovakia) at the Department of Classical and Semitic Philology, Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in 2018, and I owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. Ľudmila Eliášová Buzássyová and Doc. Dr Marcela Andoková for giving me an opportunity to share my thoughts with such an engaged and motivated audience. Additionally, the first version of this paper, titled 'Framing the Past: Cicero's Educational *Exempla* or Pieces of His Unwritten History?', was presented at the International Conference 'Paideia: The Language and Philosophy of Education', held at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, March 20-22, 2019. I am very grateful to Prof. Ljiljana Radenović and Doc. Dr Il Akkad for the work we have done together, while preparing and co-organizing the conference.

thought that the study of the lives and achievements of great men from their history could be relevant to the problems of all times.

The ancient Greeks used analogical reasoning as a key cognitive tool: comparisons of new situations with past events created expectations about the potential outcome of their decisions. Aristotle describes *paradeigmata* as a strong argumentative device in his *Rhetoric* (Arist. *Rh.* 1357b 28-30). Speakers could resort to historical figures to urge or discourage a course of action, to comfort an addressee, or to emphasize the uniqueness of a given situation. Thus in the ancient Greek world exemplarity was highly resilient, but at the same time susceptible to rhetorical manipulation and moral opportunism.

The ancient Romans used *exempla* – examples of particular acts and behaviors they identified as models – as the central element of their educational system. They were exceptional in the degree to which they used examples and seemed to be highly motivated to adopt for themselves the behaviors and attitudes they approved in others.

Cicero's use of *exempla* has received some scholarly attention[1], but its connections to his historical practice and notion of nostalgia have not been thoroughly examined. There is a tendency to oversimplify the issue and to consider Cicero's *exempla* just as a collection of stories from Roman history barely relevant to his historiographical interests and practices[2], or his emotions. This paper addresses the question of whether Cicero's *exempla* could be viewed as pieces of his larger unfinished project, his unwritten history of Rome, or rather the externalization of his notion of nostalgia.

2. Cicero's Idea to Write a History of Rome

If we want to examine Cicero's *exempla* as an important element of his historical practice, there is a question of his knowledge of and relation to the historiographical tradition of his time. The accounts of Cicero's knowledge of history and his abilities as a historian range from enthusiastic admiration (Rambaud 1953) to the accusations that his dialogue *De Senectute* is a historical fantasy (Münzer 1905), and that Cicero actually invented his *exempla* (Zingler 1900). Hallward rightly pointed out that Cicero's historical knowledge might be not very extensive, nor always accurate, but certainly suitable for an orator (Hallward 1931: 22). It is hard to say whether it was enough to become a good historian[3].

1 See, for example, a recent study of Van der Blom (2010).

2 For example, we come across such views as Rawson's statement that 'the use of *exempla* is the least important aspect of Cicero's historical practice' (Rawson 1972: 33).

3 In his dialogue *De Oratore* (1.17-18), Cicero says that an orator has to know anecdotes and stories from the past as a part of his broader education and preparation for

In his philosophical work *De Legibus*, there is an indication that Cicero was seriously thinking about writing a history of Rome. In this dialogue, Cicero, his brother Quintus, and his best friend Atticus are the interlocutors. At one point the conversation turned upon history and Atticus observed that he knew no one better than Marcus Tullius to write a history of Rome, since he owed all the knowledge and gifts needed for that task:

> *Atticus*. – Postulatur a te iam diu vel flagitatur potius historia. Sic enim putant, te illam tractante effici posse, ut in hoc etiam genere Graeciae nihil cedamus. Atque ut audias quid ego ipse sentiam, non solum mihi videris eorum studiis qui [tuis] litteris delectantur, sed etiam patriae debere hoc munus, ut ea quae salva per te est, per te eundem sit ornata. Abest enim historia litteris nostris, ut et ipse intellego et ex te persaepe audio. Potes autem tu profecto satis facere in ea, quippe cum sit opus, ut tibi quidem videri solet, unum hoc oratorium maxime. (*Leg*. 1.5)
>
> '*Atticus*. – Men have long ago asked, or rather implored you, to write a history; for they conceive that if you undertook this literary enterprise, the result would be that, even in the historical department, we should be nowise inferior to Greece. And if you will listen to my opinion, it seems to me that you owe this gift, not only to the affection of those who are delighted with literature, but to your country too, in order that, since you have saved her, you should endeavour likewise to adorn her. For a good history is a desideratum in our national literature, as I know by my own experience, and as I have often heard you declare. Now, there is no man more likely than yourself to give general satisfaction in a work of this kind, since by your own avowal, it is of all the forms of composition that which most demands the eloquence of the orator.' (Trans. Yonge 1853)

Since the dating of the *De Legibus* is uncertain, the existing evidence of Cicero's most probably unfulfilled wish to write a history of Rome in his letter to Atticus from November 44 BC might be more relevant. Cicero says the following:

> Ardeo studio historiae (incredibiliter enim me commovet tua cohortatio), quae quidem nec institui nec effici potest sine tua ope. coram igitur hoc quidem conferemus (*Att*. 16.13a.2).

his chief tasks: Est enim et scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum, sine qua verborum volubilitas inanis atque inridenda est, et ipsa oratio conformanda non solum electione, sed etiam constructione verborum, et omnes animorum motus, quos hominum generi rerum natura tribuit, penitus pernoscendi...; tenenda praeterea est omnis antiquitas exemplorumque vis. ('A knowledge of very many matters must be grasped, without which oratory is but an empty and ridiculous swirl of verbiage: and the distinctive style has to be formed, not only by the choice of words, but also by the arrangement of the same; and all the mental emotions, with which nature has endowed the human race, are to be intimately understood... Further, the complete history of the past and a store of precedents must be retained in the memory.' Trans. Sutton and Rackham 1942).

> 'I am aflame with enthusiasm for a history – you cannot imagine what a rousing effect your encouragement has on me; but that can be neither begun nor achieved without your help. So we shall discuss this together.' (Trans. Shackleton Bailey 1967)

3. Cicero's Nostalgia and His Educational *Exempla*

In the last decades nostalgia studies have broadened considerably, and they have become popular across various disciplines. From the very beginning, since the 17th century when the term *nostalgia* was coined (Boym 2001; Kiser Anspach 1934), it has become clear that 'nostalgia is ambiguous in nature and difficult to conceptualize' (Lap 2019). However, according to a recent socio-psychological study, a common belief in the existence of nostalgia prevails among the wider populace even today (Hepper/Ritchie/Sedikides/Wildschut 2012).

In this section, I will try to demonstrate that Cicero experienced and expressed a complex notion of nostalgia, without naming it as such, and that this notion framed his use of educational *exempla*.

3.1. Coining the Term Nostalgia

When we say *nostalgia*, what is the first association that springs to our minds? We might think about our school days, first holidays, the first time we fell in love, or the first important book we read when we were young. Furthermore, we might think back to earlier times, times when *old values* were respected and what was agreed was fulfilled, when honesty, diligence, and modesty – almost forgotten virtues these days, were appreciated. For many of us the term *nostalgia* denotes a longing for a lost past.

As late Svetlana Boym pointed out[4], contrary to our intuition the term *nostalgia* came from medicine, not from poetry or politics (Boym 2001: 30). The word was coined by the Swiss medical student Johannes Hofer (1669-1752) in 1688 in his dissertation *Dissertatio Medica de Nostalgia, oder Heimwehe*, written in Latin. Hofer tried to explain the disease that afflicted various displaced persons (students from the Republic of Berne studying in Basel, servants working in France and Germany, Swiss soldiers fighting abroad) who, unless they had been brought back to their native land, acquired indifference toward everything, confusing past

4 Boym's book *The Future of Nostalgia* has been one of the most important publications on this topic in the last decades. However, I wanted to engage myself in a dialogue with Boym, and this paper is in part a result of that dialogue. I would like to thank Prof. Vessela Valiavitcharska-Marcum for sending me Boym's book a few years ago.

and present, real and imaginary events, etc. The newly diagnosed disease lacked a particular name in medicine, and thus Hofer coined the term[5]:

> Neque vero de nomine deliberanti convenientius occurrit, remque explicandam praecisius designans, quam Nostalgias vocabulum, origine Graecum, et quidem duabus ex vocibus compositum, quorum alterum Νόστος reditum in patriam, alterum Ἄλγος dolorem aut tristiam significat: ut adeo ex vi vocis Νοσταλγία designare possit tristem animum ex reditus in patriam ardenti desiderio oriundum.
>
> 'Nor in truth, deliberating on a name did a more suitable one occur to me, defining the thing to be explained, more concisely than the word Nostalgias, Greek in origin and indeed composed of two sounds, the one of which is Nostos, return to the native land; the other, Algos, signifies suffering or grief; so that thus far it is possible from the force of the sound Nostalgia to define the sad mood originating from the desire for return to one's native land.' (Trans. Kiser Anspach 1934).

As we have seen, at its point of origin the term *nostalgia* denoted a geographical longing for one's native land, and not a longing for the past which was usually understood by this term later.

3.2. Cicero's Longing for Home

The concept of *nostalgia* had certainly undergone some changes – it is not the same today as it was in the 17th or even in the 19th century, but, in my view, some of its core elements had already existed as early as in antiquity, or even earlier. We can begin with a statement that research on Cicero's *nostalgia* is an inquiry in the history of emotions, and it is possible only if we agree that human emotions have a history[6].

Despite the fact that the word *nostalgia* originally emerged at the end of the seventeenth century within medical discourse, at least some elements of the concept of *nostalgia* had existed long before Hofer's dissertation, first in human life and then in various fields of arts, first and foremost in literature. Thus Odysseus could be viewed as a proto-nostalgic, or rather the first nostalgic European hero[7]. His *nostos* became a *topos*[8], and most likely became an inspiration for Hofer's term nostalgia. As Claas-

5 Hofer also suggested *nosomania* and *philopatridomania*, and in the later edition in 1710 even *pothopatridalgia* (Kiser Anspach 1934: 376), but those three terms failed to become largely accepted.

6 For a fresh overview of the subject, see, for example, Radenović 2019.

7 I have made this point inspired by Malkin's view that Odysseus is a proto-colonial hero (Malkin 1998).

8 The theme of *nostos* is used two times in the first fifteen lines of the *Odyssey*. As has been pointed out by West (1988: 67), 'the proems of the Iliad and Odyssey are strik-

sen has rightly pointed out, tales of exile in myth and literature and their protagonists – Odysseus, Orpheus, Orestes, Medea, Aeneas, 'became the prototypes upon which historical outcasts fashioned themselves' (Claassen 1999: 37)[9].

Cicero is the major contributor to our view of exile and of notion of one's longing for home in antiquity. His enforced exile resulted from major differences in political views between the most powerful men in the state and himself. As it has been pointed out by Claassen, 'few displacements have been so consistently and self-revealingly documented by the exile himself as Cicero's experience of banishment in the years 58 to 57 BC. At different stages he utilized virtually all the generic forms for which he had by then become famous to document one or another aspect of his troubles' (Claassen 1999: 27).

Having in mind that 'in the Roman world, exile and death were closely related' (Claassen 1999: 10-11), it is not surprising that Cicero in his letters to his closest friend Atticus depicted his exile as the virtual equivalent or worse than death. It must be emphasized that all Cicero's letters to Atticus, and those from his exile in particular, present a unique insight into real emotions of the man in antiquity. 'Written almost as a journal at the height of his troubles', Cicero's letters to Atticus 'reflect his daily fluctuations of hope, despair, misery and grief' (Claassen 1999: 28)[10]. Thus its nature is different from all other Cicero's, and all other ancient writings[11]. Still, there are some scholars who dismiss his letters from exile as hardly reliable evidence of anything but the 'state of his mind'[12]. Yet if we want to investigate whether Cicero felt something which could be labeled as 'nostalgia', we are particularly interested in his state of mind, and for our

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ingly similar, particularly at the beginning... In both the poet refers to the sorrows to be described (πάθεν ἄλγεα / ἄλγε' ἔθηκε)'.

9 I am very grateful to Prof. Jelena Pilipović for giving me Claassen's book fifteen years ago.

10 See, for example, Cicero's words written in March 58 BC (*Att*. 3.2): ...plura scribere non possum; ita sum animo perculso et abiecto... ('I cannot write any more, I am too stricken and dejected.' Trans. Shackleton Bailey 1965); and in April 58 BC (*Att*. 3.7.1): ... odi enim celebritatem, fugio homines, lucem aspicere vix possum... ('I hate crowds and shun my fellow creatures, I can hardly bear the light of day.' Trans. Shackleton Bailey 1965).

11 For example, regarding their spontaneity, they are unlike Pliny's letters. Namely, the majority of Pliny's letters were revised for publication. On the other hand, Cicero's letters were models for Pliny's letters, and thus there are many stylistic similarities between the two collections. For a discussion on one aspect of Pliny's letters that is similar to Cicero's correspondence – the use of Greek, i. e. Pliny's bilingualism, see Dimitrijević 2006.

12 Rawson guesses that Cicero's state of his mind was 'very likely near a real nervous breakdown' (Rawson 1975: 114-118).

topic his exilic letters to Atticus present valuable evidence. Let us take a look at an example of Cicero's nostalgia in one of these letters, written in mid-January 57.

> Litterae mihi a Quinto fratre cum senatus consulto quod de me est factum adlatae sunt. mihi in animo est legum lationem exspectare; et si obtrectabitur, utar auctoritate senatus et potius vita quam patria carebo. (*Att*. 3.26)
>
> 'I have received a letter from my brother Quintus along with the decree about me passed in the Senate. I propose to wait for the laws to be put to the vote, and if there is opposition I shall avail myself of the Senate's authority and prefer loss to that of country.' (Trans. Shackleton Bailey 1965)

From Cicero's words *potius vita quam patria carebo* it is obvious that he experienced and expressed longing for his homeland during his exile. Now, we will see how he expressed his longing for the Roman past.

3.3. Cicero's Educational *Exempla* and His Longing for the Past

Most Ciceronian scholarship pertains to his role in public life, and too often overlooks some other aspects of his ideas and activities, for example, his concern for the moral development of young people and for the future of the Roman Republic. It is well known that Cicero's works circulated widely among the youth of Rome's elite and that some of them became handbooks for civic responsibility and leadership[13]. In his philosophical writings, Cicero states his preference for character development over a success in any other field and maintains that ethical behavior is the only noble thing worth striving for in this life. In my opinion, Cicero's educational *exempla* should be viewed as a part of moral framework he wanted to pass on to future generations, but also as the externalization of his notion of nostalgia. My intention here is not to give an exhaustive historical, philosophical, and/or philological explanation for Cicero's use of educational *exempla*. The aim is solely to put them into the context of Cicero's broader historical interests, his plans for historiographical pursuits, and his emotions, particularly, his notion of nostalgia.

Can we assume which mental images Cicero had when he felt and wanted to express something that could be labeled as 'nostalgia'? It certainly depends on the context, i.e. on the communicative situation[14]. If he

13 E. g. Cicero's philosophical treatise *De Officiis* (Griffin and Atkins 1991), where he expressed much of his political ideas, including the concept *cum dignitate otium*. For a fresh look at this concept, see, for example, Dimitrijević 2018.

14 Cicero adjusted his topics and style to be effective in different communicative situations. For a fresh look at some differences (and similarities) between his popular and senatorial speeches, see Dimitrijević 2019.

was talking to or exchanging letters with his best friend Atticus, the first association could refer to his childhood, to the time when he spent his days learning and playing, in his birthplace of Arpinum, far from everything constituting life in a big city. If, however, he was in a formal situation, where he was expected to present his opinion or political position, and if the year of being the consul (63 BC) was already behind him, glorious lives and acts of some important political figures from the Roman history might have been a happy solution for him.

Let us first take a look at Cicero's idealized portrait of one of major personalities of the mid-Republic, Cato the Censor, the man 'who shaped the destinies of Rome in the half-century or so during which she became the dominant power in the Mediterranean world' (Scullard 1951: v). The distinction in oratory paved the way for him to the consulship more than a century before Cicero. Cato the Censor was a particularly important historical figure for Cicero's modeling of his own political *persona*, since he too originated from the equestrian order and, despite the fact that he was a *homo novus*, held the highest state positions (Van der Blom 2010). The opening lines of Cicero's philosophical dialogue *De Re Publica* read as follows:

> M. vero Catoni, homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes, qui isdem rebus studemus, quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere. (*Rep*. 1.1)
>
> 'Marcus Cato, an unknown man of no pedigree – a man who serves as a model of industry and virtue to all of us who share his goals – could have remained at Tusuculum, a healthy spot and not far off, enjoying peace and quiet; but that madman (as some people think), under no compulsion, chose to be tossed in the waves and storms of public life to an advanced old age rather than live a happy life in peace and calm.' (Trans. Zetzel 1999)

Now, let us read the example from Cicero's oration *Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium*, given in 70 BC, where Cicero again refers to Cato the Censor. Cicero says as follows:

> Clarissimi viri nostrae civitatis temporibus optimis hoc sibi amplissimum pulcherrimumque ducebant, ab hospitibus clientibusque suis, ab exteris nationibus, quae in amicitiam populi Romani dicionemque essent, iniurias propulsare eorumque fortunas defendere. M. Catonem illum Sapientem, clarissimum virum et prudentissimum, cum multis gravis inimicitias gessisse accepimus propter Hispanorum, apud quos consul fuerat, iniurias. (*Div. in Caec*. 66)
>
> 'The most illustrious men of our state, in the best of times, used to think this most honourable and glorious for them to ward off injuries from

> their hereditary friends, and from their clients, and from foreign nations which were either friends or subjects of the Roman people, and to defend their fortunes. We learn from tradition that Marcus Cato, that wise man, that most illustrious and most prudent man, brought upon himself great enmity from many men, on account of the injuries of the Spaniards among whom he had been when consul.' (Trans. Yonge 1903)

In the example cited above, we see how the semantic content we are discussing in this essay is expressed in Latin in Cicero's days, without mentioning the word *nostalgia*. The collocation[15] *tempora optima* ('the best of times') from the first sentence gains its concretization in the second sentence, and it refers to the time when Cato the Censor lived.

The next example originates from Cicero's oration *Pro Fonteio*. As it has been pointed out, 'the chronology both of the delivery of this speech and of the circumstances is doubtful' (Watts 1972: 306). Nevertheless, it is certain that Cicero delivered it after 70 BC, maybe in 69 BC.

> Exstat oratio hominis, ut opinio mea fert, nostrorum hominum longe ingeniosissimi atque eloquentissimi, C. Gracchi; qua in oratione permulta in L. Pisonem turpia ac flagitiosa dicuntur. At in quem virum! qui tanta virtute atque integritate fuit ut etiam illis optimis temporibus, cum hominem invenire nequam neminem posses, solus tamen Frugi nominaretur. (*Font*. 39)
>
> 'There is extant a speech delivered by one who was, in my opinion, by far the ablest and most eloquent of our fellow-countrymen, Gaius Gracchus; and in this speech he insinuates many base and scandalous actions against Lucius Piso. And what a man was his victim! – one who displayed such virtue and integrity, that, even in those great days when it was impossible to find a worthless character, he alone was called the Honest.'
>
> (Trans. Watts 1972 [1931])

Here we see that the collocation *optima tempora* was again placed within a historical context, which refers to the time of the Gracchi, only a few decades after the glorious political acts of Cato the Censor. On the one hand, Cicero claims that 'in those great days .... it was impossible to find a worthless character', but on the other hand, Gaius Gracchus, a talented orator, did not hesitate to insinuate 'many base and scandalous actions' against the highly honored Lucius Piso. Does this imply that his false accusations against Lucius Piso meant that even in *those great days* there were those who were not so good, or that what was said in the heat of political struggle does not count, or, finally, does the genre of political ora-

15 While the study of co-occurrence of words dates back to the mid eighteenth century, serious linguistic research on collocation started in the 1950s. In this paper, collocations are understood as 'idiosyncratic syntagmatic combination of lexical items' (Fontenelle 1992: 222).

tory allow things to be presented slightly different to how they really are, and therefore Gaius Gracchus did not commit any offence? There are no certain answers. The given example is particularly interesting because it illustrates the frequent rhetorical maneuver of Cicero himself, as well as those of other great orators from antiquity.

Let us consider the third example of Cicero's use of the collocation *optima tempora* in his speech *Pro Cluentio* from the year 66 BC, where it is again placed in the context of a short historical narrative. In the chapter cited below, Cicero mentions Publius Popilius and Quintus Metellus, Roman politicians from the time of the Gracchi:

> Optimis hercule temporibus, tum cum homines se non iactatione populari sed dignitate atque innocentia tuebantur, tamen nec P. Popilius neque Q. Metellus, clarissimi viri atque amplissimi, vim tribuniciam sustinere potuerunt. (*Cluent*. 95)
>
> 'Even in the best of times, when men thought to shield themselves not by posing as popular champions, but by a life of honour and integrity, neither P. Popilius nor Q. Metellus, distinguished men though they were, was able to resist a tribune's violence.'
>
> (Trans. Hodge 1927)

From the examples quoted above, it is obvious that when Cicero refers to 'the good old times', he simply says *optima tempora* or *tempora optima*, and uses both variations of the collocation. First, we have seen that the order of the constructive units of the Latin collocation is reversible, in contrast to its counterpart in some modern languages where the order of the elements is fixed, for example, in English ('the good old times') and in German ('die guten alten Zeiten' or more usual 'die gute alte Zeit', in singular)[16]. Second, we see that the Latin collocation has only two elements *optima* and *tempora* ('good, i.e. the best times'), and 'old' is omitted, unlike equivalent collocations in modern languages. The main reason for the absence of that element should be sought in the universal principle of economy in languages. Namely, it is obvious from the examples which we provided that this part of semantic content was simply understood. How do we explain that in ancient Rome 'good times' were inevitably 'old' ones (thus making it unnecessary to say), while this is not case in more recent times? We do not have enough time to deal with this issue in detail now, but we will just mention two of its important elements: first, Roman

16 On the other hand, the order of the constructive units of this collocation is reversible in Serbian („стара добра времена" and „добра стара времена"), as in Latin, with a slightly different focus, depending on the primacy of the adjective – whether it is more important that the times („времена") are old („стара"), or good ones („добра").

culture was founded on respect for traditions and ancient moral norms – *mores maiorum*[17] – which certainly does not mean that it remained static or that over the centuries social and family relationships did not, sometimes even drastically, change; second, in the Greco-Roman civilization the myth of the golden age[18], the belief that every new human generation is worse than the previous one and that people in ancient times lived in prosperity and happiness, was of great significance.

4. Concluding Remarks

First, let us read Cicero's lament in his philosophical work De Officiis, written in 44 BC, not long before his death: 'So only the walls of the city remain standing, and they themselves now fear the excess of crime. The republic we have utterly lost.' (*Off*. 2.29, trans. Griffin and Atkins 1991: 74)

In this paper, I argued against the generally accepted view that *nostalgia* is a by-product of the transformations and novelties of the Modern Period which is the main thesis of Boym (2001). I tried to demonstrate that Cicero experienced and expressed *nostalgia*, without naming it as such. Furthermore, I argued that Cicero's idea to write the history of Rome was, at least, partly motivated by his notion of *nostalgia*. Finally, I believe that there is enough evidence to support the view that Cicero's *exempla* as products of his interest in history and of his *nostalgia* might have been the first important pieces of the historiographical work he wanted but did not have enough time to accomplish.

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17 For a detailed study of *mores maiorum*, see, for example, Linke, Stemmler 2000.

18 For the Golden Age, see, for example, Gatz 1967.

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SCHOLASTICI IN THE EARLY ROMAN IMPERIAL PERIOD

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to shed light on the meaning of the term *scholasticus* in the Roman literature from the early imperial period. The widespread use of the term in the Elder Seneca's *Declamations* suggests that people identified as *scholastici* played an important role in the public life of Seneca's time. In *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, the entry for *scholasticus* contains the following explanation: *of or appropriate to a school of rhetoric*, and, when it is used as a substantive – *one who attends a school of rhetoric (as student or teacher)*, *one who studies, a scholar* (*OLD*, 1702). These explanations give us only a glimpse into the context within which the word *scholasticus* was used and they do not allow us to understand who the *scholastici* were. Were they students or teachers of rhetoric? What did they exactly do and how did they do it? We will try to answer these questions by analyzing the use of the term *scholasticus* in the writings of the Elder Seneca and of his near-contemporaries – Petronius Arbiter, Tacitus, and Pliny.

Keywords: *scholastici*, oratory, rhetoric, Roman education, Seneca the Elder.

Introduction

The term *scholasticus*, which is a Latinized form of the ancient Greek substantive *ὁ σχολαστικός*, has a long tradition of usage.[1] The earliest attested use in Roman literature is in Varro's *Menippean Satires* (Var. *Men.*

1 In ancient Greek literature, the adjective *σχολαστικός* is attested as early as in the works of Aristotle (Ar. *NE* 1177b, *Pol.* 1313b, 1322b, 1341a). Its substantive form *οἱ σχολαστικοί* is most widely used in the *Aesop Romance*, an anonymous work of Greek popular literature composed around the second century AD. According to LSJ, the adjective *σχολαστικός* was used to refer to someone who was *inclined to ease, was enjoying leisure* or *devoting his leisure to learning*; the neuter substantive *τὸ σχολαστικόν* is explained as denoting *leisure* and the masculine substantive *ὁ σχολαστικός* – as denoting *a learned man, a scholar, a legal adviser, a public advocate*; according to

Fr. 144), which were written at the end of the first century BC. The term is widely used by the Elder Seneca in his *Declamations*, and there are a few occurrences in Petronius, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger and Suetonius. In *Oxford Latin Dictionary* the substantive *scholasticus* is defined as denoting *one who attends a school of rhetoric (as student or teacher)*, and, in wider use – *one who studies, a scholar.* According to the same dictionary, it can be also used as a jocular reference to someone young and inexperienced (Glare 1968: 1702). These lexicographical data give us only a glimpse into the context within which the term was used, but they do not allow us to understand precisely who the *scholastici* were. The meanings ascribed to *scholasticus* in English translations of Latin texts more or less correspond with the meanings listed in the dictionaries. Winterbottom, the translator of the Loeb edition of Seneca, is consistent in the use of *a schoolman*, and the translation solutions proposed by other translators include *a pupil, a rhetorician, a professional rhetorician, a professor, a scholar, a learned schoolmen, a teacher of rhetoric, a student, a pedant,* and in one case – *a clever friend* and *a scholasticus*. This brief overview of translation proposals shows that there are quite different perceptions of what the term *scholasticus* implied. The widespread use of the term in Seneca's *Declamations* suggests that in Seneca's time people identified as *scholastici* played an important role in the public life of first-century Rome. Were they students or teachers of rhetoric? What did they exactly do and how did they do it? How did one identify a *scholasticus* or which characteristics a person needed to possess in order to be recognized as a *scholasticus*? We will try to answer these questions by examining the passages dealing with the *scholastici* in Seneca's work and in the works of his near-contemporaries.

In PHI Latin corpus, which contains almost all Latin literary texts up to 200 A.D.,[2] we detected 58 occurrences of *scholasticus*, out of which in 37 cases the lexeme is used as a masculine substantive. In the rest of the occurrences, *scholasticus* is used as an adjective[3] and as a feminine substantive.[4] The earliest attested use is in Varro's Menippean satire *Eu-*

the same dictionary, the adjective is frequently used in a bad sense, for *a pedant, a learned simpleton* (*LSJ*, 1996: 1747).

2 PHI Latin corpus contains almost all the Latin literary texts up to 2nd century A.D. plus some late authors like Servius, Porfirius, Zeno, Justinian and the *Vulgata*. It is compiled by Packard Humanities Institute of Los Altos, California. It was initially created for a CD-ROM, but it is also available online at: http://latin.packhum.org/.

3 When it is used as an adjective, *scholasticus* modifies the nouns: *controversia* (Quint. *Inst. orat*. 4.2.92, 4.2.97; Quint. *Dec. min.* 325.5, 338.5; Tac. *Dial.* 14.4), *materia* (Quint. *Inst. orat*. 11.1.82; Quint. *Dec. min.* 338.4), *exercitatio* (Sen. *Contr*. 9 pr. 4), *declamatio* (Sen. *Contr*. 9. pr. 5; Gell. *NA*. 15.1.1), *deliciae* (Sen. *Contr.* 9 pr. 5), *lex* (Pl. *Ep*. 2.20.9) and *littera* (Pl. *Ep*. 9.2.3).

4 The feminine substantive *scholastica* is not to be found in any work earlier than the Elder Seneca's own. He uses it for a declamatory exercise, which, according to him,

menides, composed around 70-60 BC.[5] In Walsh's opinion, the use of the noun *scholastici* in Varro's satire shows that the satire was set in a school (Walsh, 1970: 21). Unlike Walsh, Astbury suggests that the *scholastici* in Varro's fragment should be understood as students of philosophy. He was led to this conclusion by the fact that the satire deals with a philosophical theme – the nature of madness (Astbury, 1977: 27). Since Varro's fragmentary satire is the only source of information about the possible meaning of the masculine substantive *scholasticus* in the Roman literature from the late Republic, it is impossible to determine which of these two suggestions is more likely to be correct. The use of the masculine substantive *scholasticus* is the most frequent in Seneca's *Declamations*, where it occurs 25 times. Few occurrences are also found in the texts of Seneca's near-contemporaries: Petronius, Tacitus, Pliny and Suetonius. The relatively widespread use of the masculine substantive *scholasticus* in the literature from the early imperial period suggests that the *scholastici* played an important role in the public life of first-century Rome.

1. *Scholastici* in the Elder Seneca's *Declamations*

Considering that Seneca's *Declamations* are our main source of knowledge about the *scholastici* in the early imperial period, we will give a brief preview of its contents. In its original state, the book that Seneca titled *Oratorum et rhetorum sententiae, divisiones, colores*, consisted of ten books of extracts from the so-called *controversiae* and of one or possibly two books of extracts from *suasoriae*. *Controversiae* and *suasoriae* were the two basic forms of declamation (*declamatio*) – the classroom speeches on assigned issues used by teachers of rhetoric to train their students for public speaking.[6] The *controversia* was a speech in character on one side of a fictional

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had been invented more recently than *controversia*. He identifies four stages in the development of declamatory exercises: *thesis*, *causa*, *controversia* and *scholastica*. The earliest stage, *thesis*, is represented by him as exclusively pre-Ciceronian, the second stage, *causa,* as Ciceronian, and the last two stages, *controversia* and *scholastica*, are represented as belonging to Seneca's own generation (Sen. *Contr*. 1. pr. 12). Bonner suggests that the feminine substantive *scholastica* represents the Greek *ἡ σχολαστική*, which developed from the adjective *σχολαστικός*, just as the feminine noun *ἡ ῥητορική* itself developed from the adjective *ῥητορικός* (Bonner 1947: 86).

5 et ceteri scholastici saturis auribus scholica dape atque ebriis sophistice aperantologia consurgimus ieiunis oculis. Varro, *Men*. fr. 144 (... *and we the other schoolmen rise together, our ears saturated from the scholastic banquet and inebriated from the interminable sophistry, but our eyes starving*... (translated by Jensson, in Jensson 2004: 57, f. 134).

6 On the Roman declamations, see Kaster 2001; Kennedy 1994; Beard 1993; Bonner 1949; Bornecque 1902.

law case: the student was supplied with applicable laws, real or imaginary, and given a specific case to defend. *Suasoria,* on the other hand, was an imaginary speech of advice: the student was asked to advise some mythological or historical figure on what to do in a given situation. For example, "Advise Agamemnon whether or not to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia" (Kennedy 1994: 84). Each of Seneca's books was originally introduced by a preface, addressed to Seneca's sons, at the request of whom he prepared his collection of declamatory extracts. In these prefaces, of which some are now lost, Seneca discusses the characteristics of the declaimers mentioned in the collection, providing anecdotes about them and criticizing certain aspects of their declamatory *practice*. In addition to its didactic purpose, declamation in first-century Rome had enjoyed popularity as a form of literate adult entertainment (Hömke 2007; Sussman 1978: 93; Kennedy 1978: 172). The rhetoricians invited the public into the schools to hear the declamations of themselves and their students and to participate in the declaiming. Almost anybody with a rhetorical education, as Kennedy has pointed out, could either show off his skills in declaiming to an audience of students and other interested people, or could enjoy the spectacle (Kennedy 1978: 1972). The rhetoricians and adult visitors, unlike the students, declaimed *ex tempore*, without prior preparation. They were free to speak for or in the person of any of the characters in the proposed theme and to take any approach they want. While they were declaiming, the audience echoed with shouts of praise (*clamores*) or with laughter (*risum*). The declamations collected by Seneca, actually, took place on such occasions (Kennedy, 1978: 172).

Seneca does not define the term *scholasticus*. What is certain is that the people he labelled *scholastici* participated in the popular practice of declaiming. In his *Declamations* more than one hundred declaimers, both Greek and Roman, are mentioned by name.[7] A large number of them are presented by Seneca as rhetoricians, some as orators, some as historians, some as poets, and some – as *scholastici*. Often while writing about a particular declaimer, Seneca just uses the term *declamator* ('a declaimer')[8] or he just mentions the name of a certain declaimer without labeling him as a member of any particular group. Given this, in many cases it is not possible to find out to which group the declaimer in question belonged. The membership in some of these groups overlapped. This is obvious in the case of the declaimer Fulvius Sparsus,[9] who is labeled both as a *rhetor*

7 For the full list of declaimers mentioned by Seneca, see Borneque 1902: 137-201.

8 See, for instance, Sen. *Cont*. 1.1.25; 1.2.23; 1.4.7; 1.4.11; 1.8.11; 1.8.16; 2.5.15; 2.6.12; 7. pr. 6; 7.2.13; 7.5.15.

9 The rhetorician Sparsus is frequently mentioned by Seneca (Sen. *Cont.* 1.7.1; 1.7.15; 7.6.23; 10 pr. 11; 10.4.14; 10.4.23; 10.5.23; 10.5.26.) and many of his *sententiae* are included in almost every extant *Controversiae* (*ibid*. 1.2.2; 1.3.3, 7; 1.4.3; 2.5.10; 7.2.3;

and as a *scholasticus*. Despite the fact that membership in these groups in some cases overlapped, it is certain that the label *scholastici* was applied to one group engaged in the practice of declaiming, which differed from the whole body of declaimers on the grounds of some observable declamatory habits. This is evident, first, from the amount of attention that Seneca has given to the declamatory style of the declaimers labelled as *scholastici*, and second, from the distinction he repeatedly makes between *scholastici* and other declaimers.

First, it should be noted that Seneca's overall attitude towards the *scholastici* is negative. Being a *scholasticus* in his work is presented as a vice (*vitium*), associated with insanity and disease. Thus, at one point, while discussing the above-mentioned declaimer, Sparsus, Seneca says that among the *scholastici* Sparsus ranked as sane, though among the sane he ranked as a *scholasticus*:

> Fr. 1. Et Sparsum hoc colore[10] declamasse memini, hominem inter scholasticos sanum, inter sanos scholasticum. Sen. *Contr*. 1.7.15[11]

7.4.1-2; 7.6.3; 9.1.7; 9.2.5; 9.3.4; 9.4.3; 9.5.4; 9.6.1; 10.1.5; 10.2.4; 10.3.3; 10.4.8-10; 10.5.8-10). As we will see later, he is criticized by Seneca for his bad declamatory habits (*ibid*. 10.4.23; 10.5.23).

10 The word *color* in its technical sense first occurs in Seneca's *Declamations*. It is used as a term for a range of strategies supporting a particular line of argumentation, especially in the rhetorical exercises known as *controversiae*. *Colores* are usually explained as 'a rhetorical spins' or 'tendentious perspectives on the circumstances of a case, roughly equivalent to what today is commonly referred to as 'spin' (Huelsenbeck 2018: 10). The meaning and function of *color* in Seneca is best illustrated in *Controversia* 9.5. The *thema*, or 'facts' of the case by which all declaimers must abide, is this: three boys, after their mother had passed away, live with their father and stepmother; two of them fall ill and die with symptoms indicating either indigestion or poison; the boys' grandfather from the maternal side is excluded from visiting the sick children; he kidnaps the remaining boy and the boys' father prosecutes him for perpetrating violence (*vis*); arguing the father's side, the declaimer Porcius Latro uses this *color*: the boy's father and his former father-in-law had always disliked one another, even when the boy's mother was alive; the boy's grandfather was violent and abusive and for that reason he wasn't permitted to visit sick children (Sen. *Cont*. 9.5.9); another declaimer's *color* is that the boy's grandfather arrived inopportunely, and became abusive because he was told 'not now'; still another *color* for the boy's father is that the father turned away his former father-in-law because he was told that he came with the intention of kidnapping; on the grandfather's side, one *color* is that he took the surviving boy to safety, since the boy's stepmother had murdered the others; another declaimer's *color* is that the boy himself, fearing for his live, asked his grandfather to take him away (*ibid*. 9.5.12). For more on rhetorical *color*, see Bonner 1949: 55-56; Sussman 1978: 41-43; Fairweather 1981: 166-178; Calboli Montefusco 2007.

11 *I recall that Sparsus also declamed with this color, among the schoolmen he ranked as sane, though among the sane he ranked as a schoolmen.* The translations of this and all other cited passages from Seneca's *Declamations* are by Winterbottom (Seneca the Elder, *Declamations, 2 vol.* Translated by Michael Winterbottom, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).

At another point in *Declamations*, one apparently widespread scholastic habit is associated with a serious disease (*gravis morbus*). The habit in question is the scholastics' use of rhetorical examples in places where their use, in Seneca's view, was inappropriate:

> Fr. 2. Gravis scholasticos morbus invasit: exempla cum didicerunt, volunt illa ad aliquod controversiae thema redigere. Hoc quomodo aliquando faciendum est, cum res patitur, ita ineptissimum est luctari cum materia et longe arcessere. (Sen. *Contr*. 7.5.12)[12]

The second point that can be drawn from the analysis of Seneca's text is that in the early imperial period it was not desirable at all to be a declaimer labelled by others as a *scholasticus*. This is evident from one passage in which Seneca tells us that the declaimer Albucius Silus[13] was afraid of being thought a *scholasticus* (*timebat ne scholasticus videretur*). While avoiding one fault (*vitium*), that is, the fault of being thought a *scholasticus*, Albucius fell into another – he started to employ vulgarisms (*sordes*), failing to see that his exceedingly brilliant style was not safeguarded but polluted by them. Later on in the same passage, Seneca repeats his opinion by saying that Albucius was not seeking to avoid being a *scholasticus*, but he merely was seeking to avoid being thought a *scholasticus* (*non quomodo non esse scholasticus quaerebat, sed quomodo non videretur*):

> Fr. 3. [*sc.* Albucius] nihil putabat esse quod dici in declamatione non posset. Erat autem illa causa: timebat ne scholasticus videretur. Dum alterum vitium devitat, incidebat in alterum, nec videbat nimium illum orationis suae splendorem his admixtis sordibus non defendi sed inquinari; [...] Albucius enim non quomodo non esset scholasticus quaerebat, sed quomodo non videretur. (Sen. *Contr*. 7. pr. 4)[14]

12 '*A serious disease has seized on the schoolmen. Having learnt up instances, they want to force them into some controversia theme. This is permissible sometimes when the subject allows of it; but it is very silly to struggle against one's material and go to great lengths for one's examples.*'

13 Gaius Albucius Silus is one of the declaimers cited most frequently in Seneca's text having been quoted fifty eight times (Bennet 2007:7). He is ranked among Seneca's first quartet, along with Aurelius Fuscus, Marcus Porcius Latro and Lucius Junius Gallio (Sen. *Contr*. 10 pr. 13). He is subject of the seventh preface of *Controversiae*. Despite including him in his first quartet, Seneca's opinion of him seems to be mixed. He is praised for his excellence in using rhetorical figures, his rich vocabulary and his effectiveness at rousing emotions, but he is also described as an uncertain man, who doubted his own talents to such a degree that he copied the last eloquent speaker he has heard (see Sen. *Contr*. 7 pr. 4-5.) Quintilian calls him 'a distinguished professor [*sc*. of rhetoric] and author' (*non obscurus professor atque auctor* (Quint. *Inst. orat*. 2.15.36)), but objects to some of his rhetorical theories (*ibid*. 2.15.36; 3.3.4; 3.6.62). The best account of Albucius' life is given in Suetonius' *De Grammaticis et rhetoribus* 30.

14 *There was nothing, he [sc. Albucius] thought, that one could not mention in a declamation. The reason was this: he was afraid of being thought a schoolman. While avoiding*

This passage does not only suggest that it was undesirable to be labelled as a *scholasticus*, but it also suggests that the evaluation of who was and who was not a *scholasticus* relied mostly on the observation of particular kinds of declamatory behaviour. The label *scholastici* was obviously not restricted to the members of a particular social group, as one might expect, but was attained on the basis of particular declamatory habits. This raises the question: what kind of habits a declaimer needed to possess in order to be identified as a *scholasticus*? From what has been said so far, we may discern two features of scholastics' declamatory style: first, the inappropriate use of rhetorical examples,[15] and, second, the adherence to a particular kind of vocabulary, from which some words, such as vulgarisms, were obviously excluded. The inappropriate use of the *exempla*, as we have already seen in fr. 3, in Seneca's text is associated with a serious disease (*morbus gravis*): the *scholastici* are blamed for their habit to use them in places where the *controversia* subject did not allow their use.[16] The second mentioned feature, the *scholastics*' adherence to a particular kind of vocabulary, can be discerned from Seneca's story about Albucius, who employed vulgarisms (*sordes*), because he was afraid of being thought a *scholasticus*.

one fault he fell into another, and failed to see that his exceedingly brilliant style was not safeguarded but polluted by the admixture of these vulgarities [...] Actually Albucius wasn't seeking to avoid being a schoolman – merely being thought one.

15 In this oldest surviving classical handbooks on rhetoric, rhetorical examples (*παραδείγματα*) are ranged under the category of so-called artistic proofs (πίστεις ἔντεχνοι), that is, proofs which the orator must construct by means of the art of invention (εὕρεσις, inventio). In pre-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* attributed to Anaximenes, rhetorical examples are defined as 'actions that have occurred previously' (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 8.14.29a) and that should be employed on occasions when the orator's statement of the case is unconvincing by itself and the orator wants to illustrate it in order to increase its probability. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, they are explained as rhetorical inductions, forming one of the two categories of artistic proof; they are classified into 'historical' and 'invented examples', which are of two sorts: comparisons (παραβολαί) and fables (λόγοι) (Arist. *Rhet*. 1393a 28). Aristotle favours using enthymemes where possible, and then adding an example as a kind of witness to the point. In his view, the examples must be used as proof only when the case does not allow the use of enthymemes. While the Greeks used the word *παράδειγμα* both for comparisons of similar things in general and specifically for comparisons involving historical facts, Romans used the Latin equivalent *exemplum* only for comparisons of the latter kind. Quintilian considered both historical parallels and comparisons involving *poeticae fabulae* as *exempla* (Quint. *Inst. orat*. 5.11.2). For more on the use of *exempla* in Roman declamation, see van der Poe 2009.

16 Van der Poel, apparently overlooking the fact that this passage refers to the *scholastici*, wrongly assumes that, in Seneca's view, the use of *exempla* in the declamations was ill-considered in general (van der Poel 2009: 336). It must be noted, first, that in the passage above Seneca refers exclusively to the *scholastici*, and second, that he explicitly claims that the use of *exempla* was permissible only when the subject allowed it (*cum res patitur*). When that was not the case, their use was inappropriate.

Albucius' urge to employ vulgarisms in order to avoid being thought a *scholasticus* suggests that the language of an ordinary *scholasticus* was devoid of such words. The language of an ordinary *scholasticus* was devoid of trite and old-fashioned words as well. This can be concluded from the passage below, in which we read that the declaimer Haterius[17] displayed the custom of the *scholastici* so far as to avoid *verba calcata et obsoleta*:

> Fr. 4. Ille (*sc*. Haterius) in hoc scholasticis morem gerebat, ne verbis calcatis et obsoletis uteretur. (Sen. *Contr*. 4. pr. 9)[18]

Valuable information about the scholastics' declamatory habits and attitudes can be obtained from Seneca's references to the previously mentioned Albucius, the declaimer who, as we have seen, was not seeking to avoid being a *scholasticus*, but was seeking to avoid being thought a *scholasticus*. The best account of him is given in the preface of the seventh book of *Controversiae* (Sen. *Contr*. 7 pr.). He is described here as a declaimer who had distinction of style unequalled by anyone else. He was effective at rousing emotions (*adfectus efficaciter movit*), excellent at figures (*figurabat egregie*), and skilled at allusiveness in his preparation (*praeparabat suspiciose*). The flow of his polished language was such that no one could complain of the poverty of Latin if he had ever heard him (*Non posses de inopia sermonis Latini queri cum illum audires: tantum orationis cultae fluebat*). He had the gift of developing a topic to the extent he desired. In order to illustrate his lack of hesitation in the choice of words, he used to say: *cum rem animus occupavit, verba ambiunt* ("When my mind has taken hold of something, the words come eagerly flocking round"). In terms of language and style he was full of polish (*Splendidissimus erat*). However, the brilliance of a one's language and style was apparently not on the list of relevant criteria for distinguishing between a good declaimer and a *scholasticus*. If we take Albucius as an example of a true *scholasticus*, as Seneca did, then we may conclude that the prioritization of style over true eloquence was a key criterion in determining whether a particular declaimer was a *scholasticus* or not. Albucius had distinction of style (*splendor orationis*) unequalled by anyone else, but he lacked a sense of proportion, he was inclined to overdevelop some sections of his declamation and under-develop others:

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17 Quintus Haterius was the suffect consul in 5 BC as well as an orator (Sen. *Contr*. 9.6.13) and a declaimer. He is described by Seneca as a very competent speaker, who alone of all the Romans brought the skills of the Greeks into the Latin language (*ibid*. 4. pr. 7). Seneca also tells us that he had trouble controlling his flow of speech and that this was his defining characteristic (*ibid.* 1.6.12; 4. Pr. 6-11). After the death of his sons, he broke down in tears while delivering a case that calls tragedy to mind (*ibid.* 4. pr. 6).

18 *Haterius bowed to the schoolmen so far as to avoid cliché and banality.*

> Fr. 5. Ilia intempestiva in declamationibus eius philosophia sine modo tunc et sine fine evagabatur; raro totam controversiam implebat: non posses dicere divisionem esse, non posses declamationem; tamquam declamationi multum deerat, tamquam divisioni multum superat. (Sen. Contr. 7. pr. 1)[19]

The key feature of Seneca's account of Albucius' declamatory style is the notion that in every declamation he wished to say not what ought to be said, but what he was capable of saying (*non quidquid debet dici sed quidquid potest*):

> Fr. 6. Cum populo diceret, omnes vires suas advocabat et ideo non desinebat. Saepe declamante illo ter bucinavit, dum cupit in omni controversia dicere non quidquid debet dici sed quidquid potest. Argumentabatur moleste magis quam subtiliter: argumenta enim argumentis colligebat, et, quasi nihil esset satis firmum, omnes probationes probationibus aliis confirmabat. (Sen. *Contr*. 7. pr. 1)[20]

Later on, Seneca gives a similar assessment of Albucius' declamatory style, claiming that he never agonized over how to say things, merely over what to say (*numquam se torsit quomodo diceret, sed quid diceret*). From the references to Albucius and to other *scholastici*, it can be concluded that the prioritization of style over content was due to the discrepancy that existed between the world of declamation, in which the *scholastici* belonged, and the world of forensic oratory, about which they knew nothing, or hardly anything. Both Seneca (Sen. *Contr*. 7. pr. 7) and Suetonius (Suet. *De gramm*. 30) testify about an event which took place in Albucius' youth, in a court-case, at the time when Albucius was holding the office of aedile in his hometown of Novara. While he was attacking his opponent, he requested him to swear an oath. The oath-figures were popular among *scholastici*,[21] but their use in real litigation was apparently uncommon. When Albucius' opponent accepted the condition of settling the case in his favour by swearing an oath, Albucius replied that he was not offering a condition, but he was only using a figure of speech (*non detuli condicionem; schema dixi*). His attempt to use an oath-figure while pleading

19 *His (sc. Albucius') celebrated philosophical observations, which were quite out of place in declamation, then wandered on without restraint and without end. He rarely completed a whole controversia, you couldn't call it a division—or a declamation: for a declamation, it lacked much, for a division it had much that was superfluous.*

20 *But whenever he spoke in public he used to summon up all his powers, and so he didn't stop. Often while he was speaking the trumpet would blow three times, for in every controversia it was his wish to say not what ought to be said but what is capable of being said. He argued laboriously rather than subtly; he used argument to prove argument, and as though there were no firm ground anywhere confirmed all his proofs with further proofs.*

21 See Sen. *Suas*. 7.14.12.

a case had proven disastrous: after the judges said they would decide for Albucius' opponent if he would swear, he did swear and won the case. Albucius, feeling insulted, decided never to appear in court again. He used to hide his actual inability to be a true orator by an alleged lack of desire to participate in oratory:

> Fr. 7. Et solebat dicere: Quid habeo quare in foro dicam, cum plures me domi audiant quam quemquam in foro? Cum volo dico, dico quamdiu volo, adsum utri volo. Et quamvis non fateretur, delectabat illum in declamationibus quod schemata sine periculo dicebantur. (Sen. *Contr*. 7. pr. 8)[22]

Albucius' case shows that the skills learned in the schools of rhetoric did not match those demanded in the court. The same conclusion can be drawn from Seneca's account on Montanus[23], the next *scholasticus* that deserves our attention. This declaimer is labelled by Seneca as *toto animo scholasticus* 'utterly a *scholasticus*'. He earned this label because on the same day he was accused by Vinicius[24] before the emperor, he said how much he enjoyed Vinicius' speech and recited several of the *sententiae* that Vinicius, his accuser, had used against him. As Surdinus[25] wittily said to him, he acted as if he thought that Vinicius was declaiming the other side. Montanus was so absorbed in the artificial world of declamation that he failed to see the reality that he was not in a lecture-room, but in a court:

> Fr. 8. At Montanus adeo toto animo scholasticus erat ut eodem die quo accusatus est a Vinicio diceret: "delectavit me Vinici actio"; et sententias eius referebat. Eleganter illi dixit Surdinus: rogo: numquid putas illum alteram partem declamasse?" (Sen. *Contr.* 10 pr. 12)[26]

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22 *In fact, he* [*sc. Albucius*] *used to say: "What reason have I to speak in court?—more listen to me at home than listen to anyone else in court. I speak when I like; I speak as long as I like; I appear for whichever party I like." And though he wouldn't admit it, he enjoyed declaiming just because he could use figures without danger.*

23 Votienus Montanus was an orator from Narbo (Sen. *Contr*. 7.5.12), exiled in 25 CE (Tac. *Ann*. 4.42). He is one of the harshest critics of declamation in Seneca's text (Sen. *Contr*. 9. pr.), which is inconsistent with the portrayal of him throughout the rest of Seneca's work (*Contr*. 7.5.12; 9.5.14-17). See Fairweather 1981: 47-49.

24 The declaimer Publius Vincius is described by Seneca as a man of extreme precision of mind (*exactissimi vir ingenii* Sen. *Contr*. 7.5.11), as a great admirer of Ovid (*summus amator Ovidi, ibid.* 10.4.25) and as a man who used to steal everyone else's witty sayings (*sumpsit ab omnibus bene dicta, ibid.* 1.4.11). See also Sen. *Contr*. 7.5. 11-12.

25 Surdinus was a student of the popular Greek declaimer and rhetor Cestius Pius. Seneca describes him as a talented declaimer, but he also claims that his *sententiae* were often 'over-sweet and effeminate' (*praedulces et infractas*, Sen. *Contr*. 7.12).

26 *But Montanus was so utterly a schoolman that the same day he was accused by Vinicius he said: "I enjoyed Vinicius' speech," and retailed some epigrams from it. Surdinus said wittily to him: "I say, do you really think he was simply declaiming the other side?".*

How detached the declamation actually was from the forensic oratory, we could see from the Montanus' definition of the purpose of declamation. In his view, the one who prepares a declamation writes *non ut vincat sed ut placeat* and his aim is to win approval for himself rather than for the case (*cupit enim se approbare, non causam*):

> Fr. 9. Qui declamationem parat, scribit non ut vincat sed ut placeat. Omnia itaque lenocinia [ita] conquirit; argumentationes, quia molestae sunt et minimum habent floris, relinquit; sententiis, explicationibus audientis delinire contentus est. Cupit enim se approbare, non causam. Sequitur autem hoc usque in forum declamatores vitium, ut necessaria deserant, dum speciosa sectantur. (Sen. *Contr.* 9 pr. 1)[27]

This Montanus' statement, as Fairweather has pointed out, is a vehement attack on the schools of declamation (Fairweather 1981: 146), in which obviously much less attention was paid to the organization of arguments than to the rhetorical embellishments. The alumni of these schools were apparently not well prepared for a successful career in the field of forensic oratory, where the careful organization of arguments was valued much more than the distinction of style. But, they could become declaimers. As declaimers, they were not so obliged to pay much attention to the 'boring' arguments, because their main objective was not to win, but to please their audience by offering them what they seemed to like most: exciting performance. In order to meet this objective, they, unlike forensic orators, were inclined to neglect the importance of argumentation and focus the most of their attention on embellishments of style. It seems that some of them were committed to this practice consciously, but some, as the *scholastici*, were committed to it because they were not capable to act in a different way. The practices of the forensic oratory, as we may conclude from Seneca's text, were unfamiliar to them. We have seen how disastrous had been Albucius' attempt to use an oath-figure while pleading a case and how detached from the reality of forensic oratory Montanus was when on the same day he was accused by Vinicius he said that he enjoyed the speech of his accuser and even recited several of the *sententiae* that he had used against him. Both Albucius and Montanus behaved in an inappropriate way, most likely because they were not skilled enough to cope with the demands of true oratory. The popular world of declamation was

27 *If you prepare a declamation beforehand, you write not to win but to please. You look out all possible allurements; you throw arguments overboard, because they are bothersome and much too sober; you rest content with cajoling the audience with epigrams and developments. Your aim is to win approval for yourself rather than for the case. Now declaimers are dogged right into the courts by this fault of leaving out what is necessary and making for the attractive.*

their safe place, place where they could completely immerse themselves in and even build a reputation of excellence in the community.[28] In this safe place, they were free to display their excellence in using figures, to develop topics to the extent they desire, to employ all available means to stir up emotions, to cajole the audience with immoderate use of *sententiae* and *exempla* etc. Some of them, as Bassus, the first mentioned *scholasticus* in the passage below, were prone to imitate the practices of the forum:

> Fr. 10. Cum Basso certamen illi fuit, quem vos quoque audistis, homine diserto, cui demptam velles quam consectbatur amaritudinem et simulationem actionis oratoriae. Nihil est indecentius quam ubi scholasticus forum quod non novit imitatur. Amabam itaque Capitonem, cuius declamatio est de Popillio, quae misero Latroni subicitur: bona fide scholasticus erat, in his declamationibus quae bene illi cesserunt nulli non post primum tetradeum praeferendus. (Sen. *Contr*. 10. pr. 14)[29]

Bassus was an eloquent man (*homo disertus*), but his eloquence was marked both by bitterness (*amaritudo*) and imitation of an orator's delivery (*simulatio orationis oratoriae*). These two features of his declamatory style provoked Seneca to remark that nothing is more indecorous than when a *scholasticus* imitates the practices of a forum, of which, as Seneca explicitly remarks, he knows nothing. The declaimer Capito, introduced next, in contrast to Bassus, was a *bona fide scholasticus*, probably because he was not attempting to amaze the audience by pretending to be someone he was not – an experienced forensic orator. This use of the label *scholasticus* in Seneca's text is the only unambiguously positive one. Seneca thought highly enough of Capito to use in reference to him such a word as *amabam* and to rate him as just below his first quartet. He probably appreciated Capito because of his unpretentiousness, a personality trait that, as it seems, has not been particularly common among the *scholastici* of his time.

The declamation, as Huelsenbeck observes, was 'a multi-participant activity', 'an interactional game', in which what was said by one partici-

28 This is the case with Albucius, who is ranked by Seneca among the four greatest declaimers of the time: primum tetradeum quod faciam, quaeritis? Latronis, Fusci, Albuci, Gallionis. (*Contr*. 10. pr. 13); despite labelling him a *scholasticus*, Seneca expresses approval for Capito as well.

29 *He [sc. Latro] was a rival of Bassus, whom you have listened to as well as I: an eloquent man, whom one could have wished to have done without the bitterness he affected and without his imitation of an orator's delivery. Nothing is more indecorous than when a schoolman imitates the practices of the forum, of which he knows nothing. That is why I liked Capito, whose declamation on Popillius gets palmed off on to the wretched Latro; he was a genuine schoolman, and in his successful declamations superior to all after the first quartet.*

pant was driven by what has been said previously by other performers (Huelsenbeck 2015: 37). The *scholastici,* along with all other declaimers, participated in this interactional game not just as speakers, but also as active listeners. Their role as an audience is well attested in *Declamations*. From all that has been said so far, it is not hard to guess that the *scholastici* were prone to give praise to the declamations similar in quality to those they themselves performed. The usual terms for the praise conferred by them and by all declaimers in general, are *summus fragor* (*Contr*. 2.3.19), *laudare* (7.pr.9) and *summus clamor* (*Contr*. 7.4.10). In the passage below, Seneca narrates an episode in which Porcius Latro rebuked the *scholastici* for giving praise to the declamation of Triarus, a declaimer who was very popular among them:[30]

> Fr. 11. Multis conpositio belle sonantis sententiae imposuit; itaque memini Latronem Porcium, ut exprobraret hanc audiendi scholasticis neglegentiam, maxime quia Triarius conpositione verborum belle cadentium multos scholasticos delectabat, omnes decipiebat, in quadam controversia, cum magna phrasi flueret et concitata, sic locum clusisse: inter sepulchra monumenta sunt; et cum scholastici maximo clamore laudarent, invectus est in eos, ut debuit, et hoc effecit ut in relicum etiam quae bene dicta erant tardius laudarent, dum insidias verentur. (Sen. *Contr*. 7. 4. 10)[31]

Latro reprimanded the *scholastici* because they were highly impressed by the rhythm of Triarius' well-sounding words and by his splendid and passionate diction. Because of their negligence, they failed to see that Triarius had sacrificed substance in favour of style. In their role of an audience, they acted similarly as they did in their role of declaimers.

The label *scholastici* in Seneca's text is not restricted to the members of a particular social group. What is certain is that the *scholastici* were not pupils, but adult participants in the practice of declaiming. They participated in this popular practice along with all other rhetorically educated men: orators, rhetoricians, poets etc. The key feature of their declamatory behaviour was the prioritization of style over true eloquence.

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30 See Sen. *Contr*. 2.3.19.

31 *Many have found themselves deceived by the rhythm of a well-sounding epigram. Thus I recall Porcius Latro—in order to reproach the schoolmen with this carelessness in listening, particularly because Triarius used to please many in the schools, and take them all in, by his arrangement of pretty word-cadences—finishing off a passage in some controversia, when he was flowing along with splendid and passionate diction, with these words: "Among the tombs there are memorials." And when the schoolmen shouted their applause, he weighed into them, as was only right, and made sure that in future they expressed their appreciation even of good sayings rather more slowly, in their fear of a trap*.

2. *Scholastici* in Petronius' *Satyricon*

Among Seneca's near-contemporaries, the best comparative use of *scholasticus* is found in Petronius' *Satyricon*, which, in Conte's view, is "a novel about *scholastici*" (Conte 1997: 59).[32] Petronius uses *scholasticus* four times. In chapter six (Petr. *Sat*. 6. 1), *ingens scholasticorum turba* pours out of the hall of declamation. They laugh at the *sententiae* and arrangement of the *suasoria* they have previously heard, which, as Kennedy noted, suggests that they imagined themselves as critical and sophisticated individuals, who were likely to be older than students (Kennedy 1978: 175).[33] Accordingly, *scholsticorum turba*, in Kennedy's opinion, should not be understood as "a crowd of students", as many translators of Petronius did.[34] In chapter ten (Petr. *Sat*. 10.6), Ascyltus, one of Petronius' heroes, is saying that he and his friend Encolpius have accepted a dinner-invitation *tamquam scholastici*. This expression can mean either 'as if we were *scholastici*' or 'in our capacity of *scholastici*' (Courtney 2001: 40). Kennedy, assuming that *tamquam scholastici* means 'as if were scholastici', suggests that Asclytus and Encolpius have visited the school in hope of meeting a victim, that is, someone who will invite them to dinner (Kennedy 1978: 174). No matter how we will understand the expression *tamquam scholastici*, it is possible, as Kennedy has suggested, that the *scholastici* lived on the basis of their rhetorical education. In chapter 39 (Petr. *Sat*. 39. 5), Trimalchio, listing people born under various zodiac signs,[35] says that the *scholastici* and *arietilli* were born under the star of Aries. We do not know what *arietillus* means, but it is clear that both *scholastici* and *arietilli* are not mentioned here as groups that have been considered to be born under a good sign:

32 This view of Conte's is based on two passages of *Satyricon* (Petr. Sat. 10.6 and 61.4); in 10.6, Asclytos says tamquam scholastici ad cenam promisimus ('*We have accepted a dinner-invitation as scholastici*'), and in 61.4, Niceros says timeo istos scholasticos ne me [de]rident ('*I fear that those scholastici may laugh at me*'). On the identity of the protagonists of *Satyricon*, see Courtney 2001: 39-43.

33 The *scholastici* in chapter six of *Satyricon* are labelled as *iuvenes*, but Kennedy considers *iuvenis* a not suitable term for a student in a rhetorical school, pointing out that in the Roman literature of that time the younger students are usually referred to as *pueri* and older ones as *adulescentuli*. See Kennedy, 1978: 175.

34 See, for instance, the translations of Heseltine (*Petronius,* with an English translation by Michael Heseltine, London: William Heinemann LTD, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1925), Firebaugh (Petronius, *Satyricon*, translation by W. C. Firebaugh, New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922), Arrowsmith (Petronius, *Satyricon*, translated by W. Arrowsmith 1959), Sullivan (Petronius, *The Satyricon*. Translated by J. P. Sullivan, Penguin Books, 1986).

35 See Keyer 2012.

> Fr. 12. Itaque quisquis nascitur illo signo, multa pecora habet, multum lanae, caput praeterea durum, frontem expudoratam, cornum acutum. Plurimi hoc signo scholastici nascuntur and arietilli. (Petr. Sat. 39.5)[36]

In chapter 61 (Petr. *Sat*. 61, 4), Niceros, an old friend of Trimalchio, before telling his werewolf story, says *timeo istos scholasticos, ne me [de]rideant* 'I fear that those scholastici may laugh at me'. This Niceros' remark may suggest that, in terms of speaking at public gatherings, the *scholastici* were perceived as a critical lot. Considering all, it seems likely that Kennedy is right when he states that the *scholastici* were neither students nor necessarily teachers of rhetoric, but "declamation buffs, the aficionados, for the most part enthusiastic amateurs" (Kennedy 1978: 175). His view is more or less similar to the one presented previously by Winterbottom, who in the Introduction of Seneca's *Declamations* defined *scholastici* as "men who spent most of their time in schools or in declamatory display" (Winterbottom 1974: viii, n. 3).

3. *Scholastici* in Tacitus' *Dialogue on orators*

In Tacitus' *Dialogue on orators*, the substantive *scholasticus* is found three times (Tac. *Dial*. 15.3; 26.8; 42.2). These three utterances are often rendered differently even within the same translations.[37] In 15.3, the orator Messalla[38] asks his interlocutors to inspect and explain why the modern orators are so inferior to those of earlier generations. Observing that

36 *So anyone who is born under that sign (sc. Aries) has plenty of flocks and wool a hard head and a brazen forehead and sharp horns. Very many pedants and young rams are born under this sign.* The translation is Heseltine's (*Petronius,* with an English translation by Michael Heseltine, London: William Heinemann LTD, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1925).

37 For instance, in Hutton and Peterson's translation (Tacitus, *Agricola. Germania. Dialogue on Oratory*. Translated by M. Hutton and W. Peterson, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914) the meaning of *scholasticus* is rendered as 'pupil' (Tac. *Dial*. 15.3), 'professional rhetorician' (26.9) and 'professor' (42.2); Benario (Tacitus, *Agricola, Germany, and Dialogue on Orators.* Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) translated *scholascticus* as 'audience' (15.2), 'professional rhetorician' (26.9) and 'schoolmaster'; in Church and Brodribb's translation (Tacitus, *Agricola, Germany, The Dialogue on Oratory*. Translated into English by A. J. Church and W. J. Brodribb, London: Macillan and Co., 1877) *scholasticus* is translated as 'rhetorician' (15.2; 26.9) and 'professor' (42.2). Reitz translates *scholastici* in 42.2 as 'schoolteachers' (Reitz 2014: 115).

38 In *Dialogus de oratoribus*, Lucius Vipstanius Messalla argues that the contemporary orators are inferior to those of earlier generations. The responsibility for this, in his view, rests with the current modes of education, within which children learn to speak prettily but to no purpose.

the situation is even worse in Greece, Messalla states that Nicetas and all the rest who cause Ephesus or Mytilene to tremble *concentu scholasticorum et clamoribus,* have fallen further from the level of Aeschines and Demosthenes than any of the Romans has fallen from the level of Cicero or Asinus:

> Fr. 12. et quod quibusdam solacio est, mihi auget quaestionem, quia video etiam Graecis accidisse ut longius absit <ab> Aeschine et Demosthene Sacerdos ille Nicetes, et si quis alius Ephesum vel Mytilenas concentu scholasticorum et clamoribus quatit, quam Afer aut Africanus aut vos ipsi a Cicerone aut Asinio recessistis. (Tac. *Dial.* 15.3)[39]

Each translator renders the meaning of *scholasticorum* differently: the expression *concentu scholasticorum et clamoribus* is translated by Hutton and Peterson as 'with rounds of applause from their approving pupils', the same expression is translated by Bennario as 'with the audience's chorus of applause' and by Church and Brodribb as 'with a chorus of rhetoricians and their noisy applause'. The first insight that we gain from the context is that Messalla here describes public speaking occasions similar to those described by Seneca in his *Declamations*. If Tacitus used the term *scholastici* in the same sense as Seneca did, which seems very likely, then these *scholastici* from Ephesus or Mytilene were similar to those who in Seneca's text Latro rebuked because they shouted their support (*maximo clamore laudarent)* to the aesthetically pleasing, but senseless declamation of Triarius (Sen. *Contr*. 7.4.10). Considering that Messalla here highlights the contrast between the true orators, such as Aeschines and Demosthenes, and the new ones, it seems very likely that even Nicetas, as Garrison has suggested, was a *scholasticus* (Garrison 2019: 54). Tacitus did not use the term *orator* in referring to him and we only assume that he was an orator, because he is contrasted with Aeschines and Demosthenes. If he is the same Nicetes mentioned by Seneca,[40] as Garisson assumes (*ibid*.), then the public speaking events about which Messalla is talking about here were of similar kind to those that Seneca describes in his *Declamations*. The *scholastici* were present at these events in the same capacity as Nicetes was

39 *And what brings comfort to some is to me only an aggravation of the difficulty, namely, the knowledge that the same thing happened also in Greece. Take your friend Sacerdos Nicetes, for instance, and all the rest that make the walls of Ephesus or Mytilene shake with rounds of applause from their approving pupils: the interval that separates them from Aeschines and Demosthenes is a wider one than that by which Afer or Africanus or you yourselves stand removed from Cicero or Asinius.*" The translation is Hutton and Peterson's (Tacitus, *Agricola. Germania. Dialogue on Oratory*. Translated by M. Hutton and W. Peterson, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914).

40 See Sen. *Contr*. 1.4.12; 1.5.9; 1.7.18; 1.8.13; 9.2.23; 9.2.29; 9.6.18; 10.2.18; 10.5.23; *Suas*. 2.14; 3.6.2; 3.6.5; 3.7.8.

– as participants of declamation. If our assumption is correct, then Messalla's main point here is that what was in the past an oratory has become a declamation. This conclusion can be supported by Messalla' claim that Aper, who in Tacitus' *Dialogue* is defending the style of oratory prevalent in his day, has not yet finished with *scholasticis controversiis* and that he preferred to use his leisure in the manner of the new rhetoricians rather than of the old orators: *quod [sc. Aper] nondum ab scholasticis controversiis recessit et otium suum mavult novorum rhetorum more quam veterum oratorum consumere* (Tac. *Dial.* 14.4). This claim by Messalla may suggest that, according to Messalla, even Aper, who considered himself as an orator, was not an orator but *scholasticus* or *rhetor novus*.

The second usage of *scholasticus* (Tac. *Dial.* 26.8) comes immediately after Messalla's remark that Aper had shrunk from praising the contemporary orators by name because those whose names he left out would have been offended. Messalla probably meant by this, as Shackleton Bailey remarked, that no modern orator could be expected to recognize a contemporary as superior to himself (Shackleton Bailey 1982: 255). Then, Messalla goes on by saying with sarcasm that the *scholastici* flatter themselves by imagining that they rank ahead of Cicero but behind their contemporary rhetor Gabinianus[41]:

> Fr. 12. Nunc detrectasse nominatim antiquos oratores contentus neminem sequentium laudare ausus est nisi in publicum et in commune, veritus credo, ne multos offenderet, si paucos excerpsisset. Quotus enim quisque scholasticorum non hac sua persuasione fruitur, ut se ante Ciceronem numeret, sed plane post Gabinianum? (Tac. *Dial.* 26.8)[42]

Assuming that it makes no sense for the overconfident rhetoricians, as *scholastici* are usually understood here, to think that they are better than Cicero but worse than Gabinianus, Shackleton Bailey tried to restore logic by replacing 'post' by 'ante'. With this emendation, the sentence should be understood as: 'almost every rhetor is better than (even) Cicero in his own conceit, but decidedly (*sed plane*) better than Gabinianus' (*ibid.* 256). We agree with Keeline that Shackleton Bailey in his quest for logic missed the sarcasm in the passage (Keene 2018: 259 n. 93). Messalla's point here is that the *scholastici* were so devoid of sense to believe that they are better

41 All we know about Gabinianus is that he taught rhetoric in Gaul and was a contemporary of Tacitus.

42 *Instead of this he has restricted himself to a criticism of certain stated orators among the 'ancients' without venturing to commend any of their successors, except in the most general terms. He was afraid, I fancy, of giving offence to many by specifying only a few. Why, almost all our professional rhetoricians plume themselves on their pet conviction that each of them is to be ranked as superior to Cicero, though distinctly inferior to Gabinianus.*

than Cicero but worse than their contemporary rhetor Gabinianus. If we understand *scholastici* as 'declamation-buffs', similar to the ones described by Seneca, then the sentence perfectly makes sense without the proposed emendation. Moreover, it is hard not to believe that someone who favoured style over true eloquence would not rejoice in his conviction that he is better than Cicero was and worse than any contemporary rhetorician is. The *scholastici* favoured aesthetic values over true eloquence exactly because their teachers of rhetoric have trained them to do so.

At the end of *Dialogus* (Tac. *Dial.* 42.2), Aper jokingly says that he will accuse his interlocutors, Maternus and Messalla, before the rhetoricians and the *scholastici* (*rhetoribus et scholasticis*). By this Aper's comment, Tacitus makes a clear distinction between the *rhetores* and the *scholastici*. All translators of *Dialogus* do agree that this occurrence is used to denote persons who teach: professors (Hutton and Peterson, Church and Brodribb), schoolmasters (Benario) or schoolteachers (Garisson, Reitz). A fact to be emphasized is that neither here nor anywhere else in Latin literature the term *scholasticus* occurs in the context of education.[43] Considering this, it seems more likely that the contrast intended here is between those who taught rhetoric (*rhetores*) and those who practiced oratory in the way they had been trained in the schools of rhetoric (*scholastici*). Aper says that he will accuse Maternus and Messalla before the *rhetores* and the *scholastici*, because they were both on the same side of the axis. By their activities, they both contributed to the decline of eloquence: the *rhetores* by means of their teaching, and the *scholastici* – by means of their declaiming practice.

4. *Scholastici* in Pliny's *Letters*

In Pliny's *Letters*, there are only two occurrences of the substantive *scholasticus* (Plin. *Ep.* 1.24; 2.3). In *Ep*. 1.24 Pliny the Younger calls Suetonius a *scholasticus*. When Suetonius was trying to buy a small estate near Rome, Pliny intervened to get him a good price, telling to Baebus Hispanus, his addressee, that the *scholastici*, like Suetonius, need no more

43 While discussing education, Tacitus uses the terms: *rhetor* 'rhetorician', 'teacher of rhetoric' (Tac. *Dial.* 14.4; 19.4; 23.2; 30.2; 31.1; 32.6; 35.1; 35.4; 42.2), *praecipiens* 'one who teaches' (*ibid.* 28.2), *praeceptor* 'a teacher', 'an instructor' (*ibid.* 29.4; 34.1; 34.6), *doctor* 'a teacher', 'an instructor' (*ibid.* 30.3). It should be stressed that In Messalla's language, the term *rhetor* refers mainly to those who taught rhetoric in the past (*ibid.* 31.1; 32.6) or to those who called themselves *rhetores* (30.2; 35.1); in the context of contemporary education, he uses *rhetor* in the adjectival phrase *rhetores novi* (*ibid.* 14.4) and in the expression *expetuntur quos rhetoras vocant* (*ibid.* 30.2). In one case (*ibid.* 35.4), the term *rhetor* is probably used by him ironically.

land than will suffice to clear their heads and refresh their eyes (Plin. *Ep*. 1.24.).[44] Does Pliny's use of a *scholasticus* imply that at one point Suetonius was an active participant in declamation? If Pliny is consistent in the use of *scholasticus*, then the answer is yes. In one letter addressed to Maecilius Nepos (Plin. *Ep*. 2.3), Pliny invites Nepos to come to his house in order to hear the *scholasticus* Isaeus. Isaeus, as Pliny writes to his addressee, had reached the age of sixty, but had preferred to remain a *scholasticus* (*ibid*. 2.3.5). Pliny invited him to entertain his adult guests with declamation. His method, as Pliny tells us, was to ask the audience for a subject, allowing them to choose which they will have and which side they would like him to take; then he used to stand up, put on his gown and began to speak. Fascinated by his eloquence and his extempore performances, Pliny writes to Nepos that he cannot decide whether Isaeus excels more at instructing, charming or moving the audience (*docet delectat adficit; quid maxime, dubites*). After the notion that there is no more honest, sincere and good class of men than *scholastici*, Pliny makes a clear distinction between 'us'– who, being occupied with active litigation, literally 'gain much malice' (*multum malitiae addiscimus*), and 'them', the *scholastici*, who are confined to the harmless and enjoyable imaginary cases in schools and lecture-halls:

> Fr. 13. Postremo docet delectat adficit; quid maxime, dubites. [...] Nos enim, qui in foro verisque litibus terimur, multum malitiae quamvis nolimus addiscimus: schola et auditorium et ficta causa res inermis innoxia est, nec minus felix, senibus praesertim. (Plinius, *Epistulae*, 2. 3)[45]

By making the distinction between those who are occupied with active litigation and those who are confined to the harmless and enjoyable imaginary cases, as the *scholasticus* Isaeus, Pliny clearly sets the *scholastici* apart from the realm of active litigation and locates them exclusively within the context of entertainment. The popularity of declamation as a form of adult entertainment is best attested in this Pliny letter. His attitude towards the *scholastici*, as it is obvious from this letter, is different from Seneca's one. In his view, there was no more honest, sincere and good class of men than *scholastici*.

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44 Scholasticis porro dominis, ut hic [*sc*. Suetonius] est, sufficit abunde tantum soli, ut relevare caput, reficere oculos, reptare per limitem unamque semitam terere omnesque viteculas suas nosse et numerare arbusculas possint (Plin. *Ep*. 1.24).

45 *It is in fact difficult to choose between his powers to instruct, to charm, or to move his hearers*. [...] *Those of us whose energies are wasted on the active litigation in the courts cannot help learning a good deal of sharp practice, but the imaginary cases in the schoolroom and lecture-hall do no harm with their blunted foils and are none the less enjoyable, especially to the old* (Pliny, *Letters*, vol. I: Books 1-7, translated by Betty Radice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).

Conclusion

To sum up, in the early imperial period, the term *scholastici* was mostly used for a subset of *declamatores*: people engaged in the popular practice of declaiming. In Seneca the Elder, the label *scholastici* is not limited to a particular social group (teachers or students), but it is applied to one group which differed from the whole body of declaimers on the grounds of some observable declamatory habits: the use of *exempla* in places where the *controversia* subject did not allow their use, the adherence to a particular kind of vocabulary, the tendency to overdevelop some declamation sections and under-develop others and the general prioritization of aesthetic values of speech over true eloquence. The *scholastici* viewed declamation exclusively as an entertainment and their main purpose was to please the audience by offering them exciting performance. How detached the declamation actually was from real oratory is evident from the fact that the *scholastici* were not skilled enough to cope with the demands of true oratory, where the careful organization of arguments was valued much more than the distinction of style. In Seneca, as Winterbottom has pointed out (1974: viii, n. 3), the term *scholasticus* is beginning to have the connotations of folly found in Epictetus and the Byzantine *Philogelos*. The term began to take on the meaning of folly probably because the people labelled as *scholastici* treated the declamation with frivolity. Given that their declamatory habits had been shaped by the educational system to which they had been exposed, the story about them is actually a story about the decline of education in first-century Rome and about its failure to produce alumni who will be well prepared to meet the challenges they will face upon entering the world of true oratory. In several cases, it is hard to tell whether the term *scholasticus* is used to refer to persons engaged in the practice of declaiming. In none of these cases the *scholastici* are mentioned in the context of education. Considering this, it seems likely that in these cases the term *scholasticus* refers neither to a teacher of rhetoric nor to a pupil, but to a man of letters, an educated man.

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EDUCATION AS A REVELATION IN THE LATE ANTIQUITY AND BEYOND

Abstract: The paper considers some less investigated patterns of transmitting knowledge that go beyond the traditional educational methods and would exist in the closed religious communities as well as among magicians, alchemists, and miracle-workers. In such communities and religious schools, knowledge could be transmitted through divine revelation, unintentional discovery of hidden truth, from father/ mother to son, or be inherited. In some cases, knowledge could be obtained without any effort. Quite a few accounts of such educational methods are preserved in the late antique biographies of philosophers, miracle-workers and other supernaturally gifted persons like Pythagoras, Apollonius of Tyana, and Zoroaster, as well as in the religious treatises and technical literature concerning occult science (magic, astrology, alchemy). These accounts were characteristic of the literary genre of *aretalogy* which belonged to the Hellenistic and late antique literature. Over time, such methods of transmitting knowledge became literary *topoi* and penetrated into the medieval literature, particularly into the genre of hagiography. After observing examples of the motifs under consideration, the author tries to explain why they appeared in Ancient Greece.

Keywords: knowledge transmission, obtaining knowledge through divine revelation, aretalogy, hagiography, Persian Magi, alchemy, occult science, literary *topoi*.

Introduction

Greek educational ideal took shape in various philosophical schools, religious systems, and branches of knowledge, including medicine and rhetoric. The basis of any educational system is a certain method of transferring knowledge from teacher to pupil(s). As far as we know, the traditional teaching methods in antiquity were lecture, diatribe, conversation,

and treatise. There were, however, some other methods – or at least accounts of them – in the ancient sources, and the question about whether they existed in reality or just in the imagination of the ancients is still under discussion (Zhmud' 1994: 94-103). These educational methods were believed to exist in the closed philosophical and religious communities and especially among the adherents of occult science. In some cases, they were part of the *paideia* of extraordinary people and were preserved in the literary works which belong to the genre of aretalogy. Since this genre is not mainstream in classical literature, nor is it well-known even to the scholars, I should make some preliminary remarks.

The term ἀρεταλογία was coined in the Hellenistic period. It is derived from ἀρετή ("virtue" in its particular meaning "miracle or marvelous deed") and may have different values. On the one hand, the word ἀρεταλογία means the glorification of gods through the stories of their miracles (Reinach 1885; Crusius 1896; Norden 1923; Tolstoj 1966), or a kind of a sacred biography where the god's attributes are listed, as, for example, the famous Isis' aretalogies (Lesko 1999: 196-199). On the other hand, "aretalogy" designates a biography of a supernaturally gifted person who can perform miracles. Richard Reitzenstein was the first who used the term "aretalogy" in this particular meaning (Reitzenstein 1906).[1] Since the biographies of such a type were extremly popular among common people but didn't deserve the respect of ancient philologists, no description or even mention of this genre has survived from antiquity. This is also the reason why we have got so few examples of aretalogical biographies. The best-known of them seem to be "The life of Apollonius of Tiana" by Flavius Philostratus and "Lives of Pythagoras" by Porphyry and Iamblichus (Cox 1983).

Having analyzed these and some other biographies, I attempted to single out motifs which have shaped the aretalogical pattern, and to examine how this pattern was applied to the fragmentary tradition about the Persian magi Zoroaster, Ostanes, and Hystaspes (Zheltova 2011). It is to be stressed that these honorable historic persons[2] were "Hellenized" in the late antique period and turned out to be magicians in the mind of the ancient people (Bidez, Cumont 1938).

In the biographies of such a type, I found a number of patterns concerning the way of obtaining knowledge by extraordinarily gifted persons.

These patterns are as follows:

1 On the history and meaning of the term "aretalogy" see Crusius 1896; Kiefer 1929; Weinreich 1931; Smith 1971; Kee 1973; Uytfanghe 1993, *inter alia.*

2 Whereas Zoroaster and Hystaspes proved to be historic persons, the historic prototype of Ostanes is unknown (Duchesne-Guillemin 1962: 246).

1) divine revelation,
2) obtaining knowledge through inheritance (from father to son and the like),
3) unintentional (incidental) discovery of hidden truth,
4) gaining knowledge without any effort.

In this paper, I shall show, firstly, how these educational patterns function in the ancient tradition and beyond, and secondly, I shall try to explain what ideas stand behind them and why they were rooted precisely in the Ancient Greek culture.

My research is based on the analysis of the following literary sources:

1) the biographies of Pythagoras, Apollonius of Tyana, and some other philosophers,
2) the fragmentary accounts of the Persian Magi Zoroaster and Ostanes,
3) and – since hagiography is considered to be a younger sister of aretalogy[3] – I will draw upon *The Life of St. Andrew the Fool*, which was written in the 10th century.

1. The divine revelation

The divine revelation can be treated as part of the literary genre of *apocalypse* whose manifestations in the Western and Eastern traditions has been deeply investigated in (Collins 1979). In this collection, the focus of the scholars' interest is mostly on the revelatory texts which describe a divine vision, an epiphany, or a revelatory journey, either to the heavens or into the underworld through which a seer or a traveller could obtain personal immortality or get the knowledge of some special doctrine or esoteric lore (compare, for example, the famous story about the journey of Er's soul in Plato's *Republic* 614B-621B, *Somnium Scipionis* preserved in Cicero's *De republica*, or the vision of Timarchus in Plutarch's *De genio Socratis* 589F-592E (Attridge 1979: 162-165).

The revelatory text I focus on below have not been considered in the Collin's volume, probably, because they were created under the influence of a quite different idea: the protagonists of these stories were eager to obtain the divine knowledge due to their passion for wisdom and justice rather than for the sake of their own salvation and immortality.

3 See a brief overview of the discussion on the aretalogical origin of hagiography in Zheltova 2011: 18-19.

Thus, according to Plutarch, knowledge of truth may be gained with the help of a divine revelation or a vision given by gods:

> ἆρα οὖν ἄξιόν ἐστι, ταῦτα συγχωροῦντας ἐπὶ τούτων, ἀπιστεῖν εἰ Ζαλεύκῳ καὶ Μίνῳ καὶ Ζωροάστρῃ καὶ Νομᾷ καὶ Λυκούργῳ βασιλείας κυβερνῶσι καὶ πολιτείας διακοσμοῦσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐφοίτα τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἢ τούτοις μὲν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ σπουδάζοντας θεοὺς **ὁμιλεῖν ἐπὶ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ παραινέσει** τῶν βελτίστων; (Plut. *Num.* 4)
>
> 'Is it worthwhile, then, if we concede these instances of divine favour, to disbelieve that Zaleucus, Minos, Zoroaster, Numa, and Lycurgus, who piloted kingdoms and formulated constitutions, had frequent audience of the Deity? Is it not likely, rather, that the gods are in earnest when they hold converse with such men as these, in order to instruct and advise them in the highest and best way?' (transl. by B. Perrin).

There is a similar testimony in Diodorus' History and in the Scholia to Plato's Alkibiades I (122 A), where the deity who transmitted wisdom to Zoroaster is called ἀγαθὸς δαίμων:

> Τὸν ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα...**τοὺς νόμους** αὐτῷ <sc. Ζωροάστρῃ> **διδόναι** (Diod. Sic. 1, 94, 2)
>
> 'The good deity gave him (i.e. Zoroaster) the laws.'[4]

It is worth noticing that the idea of transmitting the truth from a deity to the person who is thus marked with the divine mercy is echoed in Luke's Gospel: according to Luke, John the Baptist heard the voice of God in the desert. (Ev. Luc. 3, 2).

The extended version of gaining wisdom by Zoroaster occurs in the 36th oration of Dio Chrysostomus:

> τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τέλειον ἅρμα τὸ Διὸς οὐδεὶς ἄρα ὕμνησεν ἀξίως τῶν τῇδε οὔτε Ὅμηρος οὔτε Ἡσίοδος, ἀλλὰ Ζωροάστρης καὶ **μάγων παῖδες ᾄδουσι παρ' ἐκείνου μαθόντες**·ὃν Πέρσαι λέγουσιν ἔρωτι σοφίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποχωρήσαντα τῶν ἄλλων καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν ὄρει τινὶ ζῆν· ἔπειτα ἀφθῆναι τὸ ὄρος πυρὸς ἄνωθεν πολλοῦ κατασκήψαντος συνεχῶς τε κάεσθαι. τὸν οὖν βασιλέα σὺν τοῖς ἐλλογιμωτάτοις Περσῶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πλησίον, βουλόμενον εὔξασθαι τῷ θεῷ· καὶ **τὸν ἄνδρα ἐξελθεῖν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπαθῆ**, φανέντα δὲ αὐτοῖς ἵλεων θαρρεῖν **κελεῦσαι καὶ θῦσαι θυσίας τινάς**, **ὡς ἥκοντος εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦ θεοῦ** (Dio Chrys. *Or*. 36, 40).
>
> 'The mighty perfect chariot of Zeus has never been praised decently by any of the poets of our land, neither by Homer nor by Hesiod; and yet Zoroaster sings of it, as do the children of the Magi, who learned the song from him. For the Persians say that Zoroaster, because of a passion for wisdom and justice, deserted his fellows and dwelt by himself on a certain moun-

4 Unless otherwise indicated, the translations are mine.

> tain; and they say that thereupon the mountain caught fire, a mighty flame descending from the sky above which was burning unceasingly. Then the king and the most distinguished of the Persians drew near for the purpose of praying to the God; and Zoroaster came forth from the fire unscathed, and showing himself gracious toward them, bade them to be of good cheer and to offer certain sacrifices in recognition of the god's having come to that place' (transl. by J. W. Cohon and H. Lamar Crosby).

In this passage, two points attract our attention: first, the transmission of knowledge by means of the divine fire, and second, the Dio's account of the sacred chariot of Zeus, which no one could glorify properly except for Zoroaster and the children of the Magi who had learned it from him.

The last point brings us to the next motif of obtaining knowledge.

2. The transfer of secret knowledge by inheritance

This motif is closely related to the mystical character of the doctrines that were taught in some closed philosophical and religious communities. The desire to protect secret knowledge from the profane people has given rise to the practice of transferring wisdom from father to son, or in a broader sense, from generation to generation. Thus, according to Ammianus Marcellinus, Zoroastres and the Magi would hand on their wisdom from generation to generation:

> <Zoroastres> cum superioris Indiae secreta fidentius penetraret, ad nemorosam quandam venerat solitudinem, cuius tranquillis silentiis praecelsa Brachmanorum ingenia potiuntur, eorumque monitu, rationes mundani motus et siderum, purosque sacrorum ritus (quantum colligere potuit) eruditus, ex his, quae didicit, aliqua sensibus magorum infudit, quae illi cum disciplinis *praesentiendi futura,* ***per suam quisque progeniem,*** *posteris aetatibus tradunt* (Amm. Marc. 23, 6, 32-33).
>
> 'When Zoroaster had boldly made his way into the unknown regions of Upper India, he reached a wooded wilderness, whose calm silence the lofty intellects of the Brahmins control. From their teaching he learned as much as he could grasp of the laws regulating the movements of the earth and the stars, and of the pure sacrificial rites. Of what he had learned he communicated something to the understanding of the Magi, which they, along with the art of divining the future, hand on from generation to generation to later times' (transl. by J. C. Rolfe).

According to Porphyry, the Pythagoreans preserved the rule not to reveal the Pythagoras' doctrine to anyone beyond their community (μηδενὶ δοῦναι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας), and transmitted their secret writings down from generation to generation:

διευλαβούμενοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόληται τὸ φιλοσοφίας ὄνομα καὶ θεοῖς αὐτοὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπεχθάνωνται, ὑπομνήματα κεφαλαιώδη συνταξάμενοι τά τε τῶν πρεσβυτέρων συγγράμματα καὶ ὧν διεμέμνηντο συναγαγόντες κατέλιπεν ἕκαστος οὗπερ ἐτύγχανε τελευτῶν, ἐπισκήψαντες υἱοῖς ἢ θυγατράσιν ἢ γυναιξὶ **μηδενὶ δοῦναι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας**· αἳ δὲ μέχρι πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῦτο διετήρησαν ἐκ διαδοχῆς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐντολὴν διαγγέλλουσαι τοῖς ἀπογόνοις (Porph. *Pyth.* 58).

'Fearing nevertheless that among men the name of philosophy would be entirely extinguished, and that therefore the Gods would be angry with them, they made abstracts and commentaries. Each man made his own collection of written authorities and his own memories, leaving them wherever he happened to die, charging their wives, sons and daughters to preserve them within their families. This mandate of transmission within each family was obeyed for a long time' (transl. by K. S. Guthrie).

This rule seems to be of great importance among the adherents of the occult sciences such as astrology and alchemy, to which Zoroaster and the Persian Magi were mistakenly assigned. According to Cosmas of Jerusalem, Zarathrustes was the first one who studied the circle of the zodiac, after him – his sons Zames and Damoitas, then Oroiesos, who was Damoitas' son, and finally – Ostanes:

Πρῶτος μὲν οὖν Ζαραθρούστης περὶ τούτου διεσκέψατο βάρβαρος ὤν, Ζάμης δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον καὶ Δαμοίτας **οἱ τούτου παῖδες**, ἔπειτα Ὀροίησος, ὁ **Δαμοίτου παῖς**, ἐξῆς δὲ μετὰ τούτους Ὀστάνης (Cosmas Jerusalem. *Ad carm. St. Gregorii* (Migne, PG 38, 461).

Among alchemists, the law of transferring knowledge from parents to children was even stronger. No wonder, the term "hermeticism" is derived from the name of the legendary founder of alchemy Hermes Trismegistus. Not only Hermes himself but quite a lot of ancient gods and prophets turned out to be recognized as the greatest masters of alchemy in late antique and medieval times. Thus, the powerful Egyptian goddess Isis and her son Horus were treated as adherents of this occult science. The anonymous author of "Letter of Isis to Horus" highlights the importance of preserving secrets which should not be disclosed to anyone but a son or a close friend:

Τούτοις δὲ ἀφορκίσας παρήγγειλεν **μηδενὶ μεταδιδόναι εἰ μὴ μόνον τέκνῳ καὶ φίλῳ γνησίῳ** (Berthelot, Ruelle 1887-1888, I: 30).

'Having forced to swear by these oaths, he ordered not to disclose <this> to anyone but a son and a close friend'.

In this vein, Ostanes, who was a famous alchemist as much as Hermes Trismegistus, decided that after his death, the secret books would only be given to his son:

> Ἦν δὲ πρὸ τῆς τελευτῆς ἀσφαλιςάμενος **μόνον τῷ υἱῷ φανήσεσθαι τὰς βίβλους**, εἰ τὴν πρώτην ὑπερβῇ ἡλικίαν (Berthelot, Ruelle 1887-1888, II: 43).

It is obvious that Ostanes did not want to bequeath his precious books to his students including the most brilliant of them – Democritus. For this reason, Democritus had to work hard in order to discover the greatest secret – the way of combining and separating natural elements. Suddenly, another extravagant way of transferring knowledge came to the rescue.

3. Unintentional discovery of hidden truth

The most impressive examples of this motif are preserved in the ancient tradition about Ostanes. Interestingly, the story about the secret books that could be handed over to only the teacher's son was inserted into the extensive fragment of a compilation, which dated back to the Hellenistic epoch and was entitled Δημοκρίτου Φυσικὰ καὶ μυστικά. The fragment clearly shows that in the mind of the ancient people, the greatest Greek philosopher Democritus was transformed into the Master of Alchemical Arts and successor of his fictional teacher Ostanes (Preisendanz 1942: 1614). According to the later antique tradition, Ostanes obtained the greatest secret of combining and separating natural elements but had not handed it over to any one of his students before he died. His students would spend day after day in order to discover this powerful secret but they could not. One day, while having dinner in the temple, the students saw a column breaking down without any reason, and Ostanes, the Teacher's son, discovered his father's books under the broken column. Having examined these books, the students were amazed to find nothing except one mystical formula which revealed the secret of the Universe and proved to be a cornerstone of the whole alchemical art: "One element rejoices another one, one element conquers another one, one element rules another one":

> ὡς οὖν ἦμεν ἐν τῶι ναῶι ἐξ αὐτομάτου στήλη τις [ἢ κιόνιον] διαρρήγνυται, ἣν ἡμεῖς ἐωρῶμεν ἔνδον οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν. ὁ δὲ Ὀστάνης ἔφασκεν **ἐν αὐτῆι τὰς πατρώιας τεθησαυρίσθαι βίβλους** καὶ προκομίσας εἰς μέσον ἤγαγεν· ἐγκύψαντες δὲ ἐθαυμά-ζομεν, ὅτι μηδὲν ἦμεν παραλείψαντες, πλὴν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον εὕρομεν ἐκεῖ πάνυ χρήσιμον· 'ἡ φύσις τῆι φύσει τέρπεται καὶ ἡ φύσις τὴν φύσιν νικᾶι
>
> καὶ ἡ φύσις τὴν φύσιν κρατεῖ (Berthelot, Ruelle 1887-1888, II: 43)

The motif of hiding and unintentional detecting secret books repeatedly occurs in various versions in the Hellenistic and later antique literature.

Sometimes the famous historical and mythical figures are involved in the event.

Thus, according to the legend, Hermes Trismegistus after having grasped heavenly sacraments described them in the sacred books which were hidden in the ground. Hermes knew that quite a lot of people would be searching for these books but only the worthiest ones could find them (Fowden 1986: 33).

The famous Emerald Tablet whose authorship was also attributed to Hermes Trismegistus was allegedly found at his grave by Alexander the Great (Lippmann 1919-1931: 50). The same motif is found in the legendary tradition about the second Roman king Numa whose religious books were also allegedly discovered at his grave 400 years after his death (Plut. *Num.* 22).

Antonius Diogenes used a similar motif in his novel "The Wonders Beyond Thule". The Diniya's records about the amazing adventures beyond Thule – a legendary island in the far north of Europe – were hidden in a cypress box inside the underground tomb of the city of Tyrus, and eventually were found by a Macedonian soldier after the capture of Tyrus by Alexander the Great (Schmid 1894).

In a similar vein, one can interpret a Pliny's testimony about the books of the magician Dardanus which are told to be found by Democritus at the Dardanus' grave:

> *Democritus Apollobechen Coptiten et Dardanum e Phoenice inlustravit* ***voluminibus Dardani in sepulchrum eius petitis****, suis vero ex disciplina eorum editis* (Plin. *NH* 30, 9).
>
> 'Democritus glorified the Coptic Apollobech and the Phoenician Dardanus after seeking for the Dardanus' scrolls at the grave, and then issued his own scrolls based on their teaching'.

There is another version of this motif: a secret knowledge is engraved on the columns or pillars and is hidden in an unpredictable place. Along with this pattern, Euhemerus claimed in his "Sacred History" that he discovered a golden pillar in a temple of Zeus Triphylius on the invented island of Panchaea (Plut. *Is. et Os.* 23 (360A5–B2)). The golden pillar was covered with the inscriptions which described the heroic deeds of great persons of the past who then were deified by the later generations.[5]

5 As Attridge pointed out, "this travel romance...is remotely relevant to the study of revelatory genres because it uses some of the motifs common in those texts (Attridge 1979: 167).

Many centuries later, a French theological writer Petrus Comestor (XII c.) wrote in his "Scholastic History" that Zoroaster, the inventor of the magical art, described the seven liberal arts on the fourteen columns of which the seven were made of copper and another seven of brick:

> *Zoroastres, inventor magicae artis qui et septem liberales artes* ***in quattuordecim columnis scripsit, septem aeneis et septem lateritiis*** (Petr. Comestor. *Hist. Schol. Lib. Genesis* 39, 1090).

Basically, aretalogical heroes discovered the secret inscriptions in the hidden places while traveling underground, to heaven or the exotic countries. The inscriptions of such a type are called στηλογραφίαι. Some of them were found by the alchemists during their search for a hidden truth.

Thus, one of the Arabic manuscripts collected by M. Berthelot (Berthelot 1893, III: 119-123 = Bidez, Cumont II: 357-352 (A19a)), contains an incredible story about the initiation of the alchemist Ostanes. One day, when Ostanes was tired because of the endless search for truth, a certain creature came to Ostanes in a dream and ordered to follow him. They came up to the seven gates where the treasure of wisdom was hidden. Ostanes managed to get the key from a monster who had the wings of a kite, the head of an elephant, and the tail of a snake. The parts of this animal were devouring each other. Ostanes opened the gates and found behind them a glittering slab with an inscription in seven languages, which contained the whole wisdom. While Ostanes was working on deciphering this inscription, an old man approached him and gave him the possession of wisdom through a handshake. Now Ostanes could return to the earth bearing in himself all the secrets of alchemy. But before returning, he met again the monster who addressed him with these words: "The whole of science can be perfect only with my help, for it's me whom the key belongs to." Having heard these words, the old man ordered Ostanes to make a sacrifice to the animal as follows: "Sacrifice a mind in return for yours, a life spirit in return for yours, a life in return for yours, and the animal will obey you and give you everything you need. Take a body similar to yours, take away from that body everything I told you, and give all this to the animal."

Ostanes did everything the old man had ordered him, and he grasped wisdom so completely as if he had received it from Hermes himself.

In this passage, the revelatory motif of obtaining wisdom through the discovery of an inscription is tripled by means of the rare and surprising motifs of receiving wisdom through a handshake and a sacrifice.

Now I turn to the last pattern of obtaining knowledge which is characteristic of supernaturally gifted people.

4. Gaining knowledge without any effort

The idea of extraordinary people being able to obtain knowledge without any effort is attested as early as the beginning of the European literature itself since the term αὐτοδίδακτος occurs first in Homer's Odyssey: the singer of tales Phemios tells about himself in such terms: "I am self-taught, and a God has planted in my heart all sorts of songs":

> **αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί**, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἵμας
> παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν (Hom. *Od.* 22, 347).

After Homer, Hesiod announced that for him "the best man is the one who thinks of everything by himself":

> Οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτῷ πάντα νοήσει (Hes. *Op.* 293).

The author of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes came up with the same idea when saying that Apollo is allowed to know whatever he wants:

> σοὶ δ' αὐτάγρετόν ἐστι δαήμεναι ὅττι μενοινᾷς (Hom. *Herm*. 489).

Over time, the self-learning ability becomes one of the most important characteristics of a divine man (Zheltova 2001: 392-393).

Thus, according to Plutarch, Heraclitus, who accomplished many great things, declared that he did investigate himself, which was in line with the divine Delphic maxim 'Know thyself':

> ὁ δ' Ἡράκλειτος ὡς μέγα τι καὶ σεμνὸν διαπεπραγμένος 'ἐδιζησάμην' φησίν 'ἐμεωυτόν' (B 101), καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων θειότατον ἐδόκει τό 'γνῶθι σαυτόν' (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1118C6-9)

Echoing Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius said that Heraclitus had investigated himself without listening to anyone, and learned everything from himself:

> ἤκουσέ τ' οὐδενός, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ' ἑαυτοῦ (Diog. Laert. 9, 5, 1 = DK 22 B 101).

In the same vein, the followers of Heraclitus are described by Plato as self-educated people:

> οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι (Pl. *Tht*. 180c).
>
> 'There are no pupils and teachers among these people. They just spring up on their own, one here, one there, wherever they happen to catch their inspiration; and no one of them will credit another with knowing anything.' (transl. M. J. Levett, revised by M. Burnyeat).

While one can see a touch of irony in this passage, Plato's attitude to his teacher Socrates as a philosopher par excellence, who "succeeded in pursuing the truth completely independently" (Erler 2011:17) can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as serious.

Partly relevant in this regard seems to be the Plato's theory of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) which was sometimes linked with Phemius' claim to be self-educated.[6]

The word αὐτοδίδακτος acquires quite a new meaning when it comes to the Epicurus' claim to be an autodidact, which, at first glance, appears to be in conflict with his thorough knowledge of the predecessors' doctrines. As Michael Erler convinsingly argued, the Epicurus' concept of self-education is closely related to the three groups of people he singled out. First are those who find their way to the truth of their own accord and without outside assistance. Second are those who require assistance from others, and the third group consists of those who need the help of an 'enforcer'. For people in this group, pedagogical coercion is an absolute necessity (Erler 2011:15). It doesn't come as a surprise that, in Epicurus opinion, the predisposition to self-learning was an attribute of people who belonged to the first class.

According to Porphyry, Plotinus was well versed in geometry, arithmetic, mechanics, optics, and music, although he never dealt with these subjects on purpose:

> Ἔλαθε δὲ αὐτὸν οὔτε γεωμετρικόν τι λεγόμενον θεώρημα οὔτ' ἀριθμητικόν, οὐ μηχανικόν, οὐκ ὀπτικόν, οὐ μουσικόν· **αὐτὸς δὲ ταῦτα ἐξεργάζεσθαι οὐ παρεσκεύαστο** (Porph. *Plot*. 14).

Marinus in the "Life of Proclus" says, that Proclus did not grasp his science by reasoning and inference but by throwing up a direct impulse of his mental strength to the images of the divine Mind. With the help of this power, he penetrated deeply into Hellenic and barbaric theology (Marin. *Procl.* 22).

The famous hero of the Philostratus' philosophic novel Apollonius of Tyana had an excellent memory and knowledge of everything. When his companion Damides offered him to be his translator from Egyptian, Apollonius answered with a laugh that he knew all languages without learning any of them and – what is even more amazing – he knew not only what people were speaking about but even what people were silent about:

> 'ἐγὼ δέ', εἶπεν, 'ὦ ἑταῖρε, πασῶν ξυνίημι, μαθὼν μηδεμίαν.' θαυμάσαντος δὲ τοῦ Νινίου 'μὴ θαυμάσῃς,' εἶπεν 'εἰ πάσας οἶδα φωνὰς ἀνθρώπων· οἶδα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὅσα σιωπῶσιν ἄνθρωποι'(Philostr. *VA* 1, 19).

6 In more detail, see (Erler 2011:15).

> 'I know everything, my friend, – he said – although I have not learned anything. Since the Nineveh boy was surprised, he said: Do not be surprised that I know all the languages of people: I even know what people are silent about'.

Interestingly, this motif has eventually penetrated into the Byzantine literature.

In line with the late antique ideas of divine men, Michael Psellos presented Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus as self-taught persons, for their mind has brought them wisdom from a secret source:

> Ζωροάστρην δὲ ποῦ θήσεις τὸν Αἰγύπτιον ἢ Ἑρμῆν τὸν Τρισμέγιστον, οὓς καὶ φασὶν **αὐτοδιδάκτους** γενέσθαι, τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος κεκρυμμένης φλεβὸς ἀναστομωσάσης αὐτοῖς τὰ μαθήματα; (Mich. Psell. *Or.* 3, 249).
>
> 'Where will you put the Egyptian Zoroaster or Hermes Trismegistus who are said to be self-taught persons, for the soul itself, as it were, has revealed to them science from a hidden source'?

The main character of a hagiographic novel "Life of St. Andrew the Fool" (X c.) is endowed with the same supernatural powers: one day, while preaching to the servants of his young friend Epiphanius, the holy fool Andrew addressed to every servant in his native language, although he had never learned them before (*VASal* 19 (1153-1164) = Rydén 1995: 88-90). One of the servants realized that Andrew was a holy man, and entreated him with tears to ask God to let him pursue such a way of life. In order to keep this conversation in secret from the rest, Andrew began to speak with him in Syriac language, which both he and his addressee had never spoken before (*VASal* 19 (1100-1108) = Rydén 1995: 86).

Conclusions

What does the analysis of these patterns give us for understanding the phenomenon of *paideia* in antiquity?

I think, the conclusions will be as follows.

1. All patterns under consideration indicate that knowledge was of extremely high value in the ancient society, and its owner was endowed with high social and spiritual status.
2. Obtaining knowledge through divine revelation or incidental discovery of secret information in a hidden place can be treated as equivalent to a supernatural gift, and testify to the special favor of the gods towards such persons.

3. The law of transferring knowledge from parents to children and the desire to protect it from the uninitiated also equates knowledge to a valuable treasure.
4. Obtaining knowledge was very expensive and far from being accessible to everyone, therefore acquiring knowledge without any effort raised a person above the level of ordinary people and almost equated them to gods.

The next question arises why such an attitude to the acquisition of knowledge emerged in Ancient Greece.

In my opinion, it was possible because the attitude of the Greeks to knowledge was formed in a highly competitive society. As Alexander Zaitsev convincingly showed in his monograph "The Cultural Upheaval in Ancient Greece of the 8-5 Centuries BC", the agonal spirit which was inherent in the Greeks of the archaic and classical epochs brought about an extraordinary rise of culture in almost all areas, which many centuries later was called "the Greek miracle" (Zaitsev 1985: 3-25).

The agonal spirit manifested itself initially in the Greek athletics and then moved into the sphere of science and art, affecting almost all areas of the spiritual life of the Greeks: poetry, music, theater, philosophy, science (Zaitzev 1985: 117-128). The idea that a person who achieved something unusual through intellectual power deserves glory and admiration no less than the winning athlete, has spread throughout the Greek world and elevated intellectual property — truth or knowledge — to unprecedented heights and even made spiritual values much higher than material ones.

All this is reflected in the *topoi* of acquiring knowledge as divine grace or valuable treasure in the ancient tradition and was partially transferred to Byzantium.

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PREPARING FOR WAR: THE MILITARY UPBRINGING AND EDUCATION OF THE BYZANTINE ARISTOCRACY (C. 900–1204)

Abstract: Although praised and highly valued, education in Byzantium was in most cases a private matter. The same also applies to military education. Fathers, relatives, or private tutors were usually burdened with the task of providing military edification and training to young teenagers who belonged to aristocratic families. These adolescents would usually carry on with their training on their own accord during their adult life so as to adhere, as far as possible, to social expectations and military ideals. The curriculum seems to have included physical drilling, riding, practice with weapons, hunting, as well as observation of warfare. Contests, gatherings, sports, the presence of the emperor, and, ultimately, the battlefield constituted the appropriate time and place for one to showcase his dexterity, prowess in arms, and bravery. In addition to physical skills, the ideal aristocrat was expected to obtain, military, moral, rhetorical as well as encyclopaedic education by studying literary works. Military manuals, epic songs and poems, historical narratives, novels, *vitae* of saints, the Bible and other religious handbooks, as well as various treatises on rhetoric, horses, dream interpretation and occurrences were among the readings thought fit for a young military man to study.

Keywords: Byzantium, education, warfare, military, aristocracy, manuals, history, epic, leadership, training.

Entrusting the army to an experienced and famous general could well backfire, and backfire it did, since on many occasions Byzantine generals turned their campaigning forces against Constantinople to usurp the throne. Given, therefore, that military expenditures amounted to a great portion

of the state's budget and usually politics dictated that the army be led by a commander who enjoyed the absolute trust of the emperor, irrespective of his capabilities and experience, a way was required to acquire military edification in a safe and efficient manner. Failing to do so could lead to disasters to the like of 949 when Constantine VII (945–959) put an inexperienced eunuch, Constantine Gongylios, in charge of a campaign to reconquer Crete. Gongylios failed to post sentries at night and to secure his camp so that the Byzantine forces were slaughtered by an Arab night-attack. Our basic sources for the period, John Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon (f. c. 962), describe Gongylios as an incompetent and untried general who had no experience of warfare.[1] In the absence of an official military academy, however, it is utopic to speak of a uniform military education. Instead, the nature of military edification in Byzantium resembled that of general education, which, although highly recommended, was mostly private and optional.[2]

While military education was by no means official and mandatory, we aim to explore the possible ways in which a young aristocrat could acquire military edification as well as what the latter entailed by putting together evidence from various sources and genres. Military education will be divided into two categories: a) practical training which did not require literacy and b) study of literary works such as treatises, histories, poems, etc.

Aspects of this military 'curriculum' are mainly traced in sources in which the element of praise is either dominant or lurking. A good example are orations and poems, addressed or dedicated to emperors and generals, as well as historical narratives. The latter were often positively inclined to certain political and military figures and based on lost promotional sources, such as biographies and encomia of famous generals, or on military bulletins, sent from the borders to the capital to inform the public about the outcome of battles and campaigns, albeit in a propagandistic tone. Other relevant sources, such as military manuals, seem to describe a more or less ideal conduct which did not always correspond to actual experience.[3] Thus, one runs the risk of taking evidence at face value and

1 Skylitzes 1973: 245-6; Leo the Deacon 1828: 7 with Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 30. Makrypoulias 2000: 355–6 noted the sources' bias against eunuchs. For Leo the Deacon and John Skylitzes see Karpozilos 1997-2015: ii.475-528, iii.239-306; Treadgold 2013: 236-46, 329-42; Holmes 2005; Kiapidou 2010.

2 For private and public education in Byzantium see, among others, Speck 1974; Lemerle 1971; 1977; Conus-Wolska 1976; Browning 1978; 1993; Magdalino 1993: 316-412; Wilson 1996[2]; Holmes and Waring 2002; Chondridou 2002: 151-254; Ježek 2007; Konstantinidis 2011; Markopoulos 2013; 2017; Bakaloudi 2013; Bernard 2014a: 155-291; Steckel, Gaul and Grünbart 2014; Antonopoulou, Kotzabassi and Loukaki 2015; Kaldellis and Siniossoglou 2017; Shawcross and Toth 2018. See also, with reservations, Tsampis 1998.

3 For war writing in Middle-Byzantine historiography see, among others, McGrath 1995; 2018; Howard-Johnston 1983; Morris 1988; Ljubarskij 1993; Holmes 2005:

of making bolder and broader claims about the military education of the Byzantine aristocracy than our sources would permit.

Ideally, one would check the evidence of promotional or technical narratives against alternative testimonies to mitigate the problem. Where alternative evidence is lacking, however, we can still draw valuable information from promotional sources. Although the military education described in our sources could constitute a *topos*, its mere appearance as such implies that proper military edification was a source of pride for the aristocracy and a factor which justified the holding of high offices.[4] In other words, the very fact that the aristocracy boasted about its military education and that their dependants highlighted it in verse and prose demonstrates that military edification was not marginal, rather the proper way to go, at least ideally. With these thoughts in mind, we will proceed to examine the 'curriculum' of military education in Byzantium, starting from drilling and training which did not require literacy and moving to the study of literature and treatises.

Practical drilling and instruction

One of the oldest detailed evidence for the military upbringing of young aristocrats comes from Xenophon (d. c. 354 BCE) who expounds in his *Cyropaedia* the military edification of Cyrus the Great (559–530 BCE). In this idealised biography we read that Cyrus had several tutors assigned

240-98; Hoffmann 2007; Markopoulos 2009; Kiapidou 2010; Neville 2012; Krallis 2012; Sinclair 2012; 2014; Kaldellis 2013; 2014; 2016; Buckley 2014; Lilie 2014; Frankopan 2014; 2018; Shepard 2018; Németh 2018: 145-61, 185-93. For the debate on military manuals and their use in Byzantium see Hunger 1978: ii.323-4; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 139-41; McGeer 1995: 171; Kolias 1997: 153-64; Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 1-6, 445-53; Gyftopoulou 2009; Riedel 2018; Holmes 2010a: 61-80; Sullivan 2010; Whately 2015: 249-61; Rance 2017a: 292–6; Chatzelis 2019: 88-154. For orations as advice literature see Webb 2003; Giannouli 2010; Bourbouhakis 2017: 67-82; Vanderspoel 2019.

4 Menander the Rhetor stated that education was among the qualities which should be highlighted in encomia. The *basilikos logos* (imperial oration) was to cover the emperor's education referring to "his love of learning, his quickness, his enthusiasm for study, his easy grasp of what is taught him," as well as his excellence in literature, philosophy, and knowledge of letters. The rhetor was also to compare the individual's education with that of famous Romans and Greeks, see Menander 1981: 2.371-2, 2.377. In the period under consideration, education was usually highlighted as an essential trait for political and military leadership. See for example Tougher 1994; 2018: 370-7; Bourdara 1998; Odorico 2001; Triantari-Mara 2002: 23-38, 75-98; Jeffreys 2003a: 201-14; Shepard 2003; Païdas 2005; Holmes 2010b; Angelov 2012; O'Meara 2012; Magdalino 2013; Bernard 2014a: 156-333; Andriollo 2014; 2016: 371-400; Shawcross 2018; Krallis 2017; 2019; Chatzelis 2020-2021.

to him. They instructed him on the use of weapons, as well as on horsemanship, hunting and tactics. His education culminated with his father advising him on leadership and strategy in the broader sense, namely on ways in which he would secure the love, obedience and wellbeing of his men as well as master the art of logistics, bivouacking, stratagems, etc.[5] The same story is repeated in Byzantium where one finds young aristocrats being trained either by tutors, usually experienced military officers, or by their fathers. The Byzantines seem to have regarded childhood and adolescence as a mirror of adult life, whatever the underaged did in his early years would almost by default continue to do it during his adulthood. Thus, young aristocrats are usually presented in an ideal light, as *pueri senes,* namely children who behaved more or less like adults, already exhibiting the necessary skills and virtues of a successful leader.[6]

Popular and influential narratives which recounted the deeds of celebrated and archetypical Byzantine figures shed considerable light on the ideal military edification and upbringing in Byzantium. For example, in the late third century, Menander the Rhetor advised that edification should be an object of praise. Given that education was seen as contributing to temperance, one of the necessary kingly virtues, emperors were to be praised for studying literature, philosophy or military science.[7] Since many Byzantine authors considered Menander an authority, they employed his suggestions to draft their own orations and biographies. Reflecting the same values, the ninth or tenth-century Patmos *Vita* of Constantine I (324-337) recorded the ten-year-old-hero of the *vita* as having exhibited the necessary skills and abilities to be appointed by his father to the low-ranking military post of *komes*. Thirteenth and fourteenth-century versions of the *vita* expounded on the father's care for the youngster's training which included military and stamina-building exercises, boxing, wrestling, chariot-driving and horse-riding.[8] Similar motifs are also discernible in *Digenes Akrites*. In the Grottaferrata version, Digenes Akrites' father exhibits great care for his child's military edification and confesses his eagerness to instruct him in the art of war. When he is about to depart from Byzantine soil, the father holds the infant in his hands saying: *surely my son of double descent, I shall teach you to use the spear | so that all your kinsmen may boast of you,* and at his return: *when will you spread your wings, my fine hawk, and hunt*

5 Xenophon 1910: 1.1-4 with the study of Gera 1993. On the different conception of strategy and tactics in Ancient Greece and Byzantium see Theotokis 2018: 23-51.

6 Angelov 2009; Kiousopoulou 2018; Ariantzi 2018; Goetz 2018. For the concept of kinship of Byzantine aristocratic families see Leidholm 2019.

7 Menander 1981: 2.371-7, 2.385 with Heath 2004.

8 See for example, Gregoras 1994: 18 with the analysis of Angelov 2009: 102-11. For Constantine I as a model of leadership see Magdalino 1994.

partridges and lay brigands low? We next find Digenes in the age of twelve, practising riding everyday with his father and participating into hunting as a spectator. Much like Constantine I, the *puer senex* Digenes exhibits all those skills a full-grown man would ideally possess when going into battle: he shows no fear, he is eager to test himself, he is quick and athletic, he possesses super-human strength, killing two bears and a deer with nothing but his bare hands and a lion with his sword. After such feats, the father acknowledges the twelve-year old boy as ready to participate in raiding and military operations against the Arabs.[9]

Tenth to thirteen-century laudatory sources suggest that this type of drilling – practice in arms, physical and military exercises, riding, hunting and participation in warfare from an early age – constituted the proper curriculum for the military upbringing of the aristocracy. In a poem written for the birth of *sebastokrator* Andronikos' son,[10] Theodore Prodromos (d. c. 1170), the protégé of the Komnenoi, underlined all the preparations which ideally came with the birth of a young aristocrat. The poet called for the breeding of war horses, hawks and hunting dogs, as well as for the forging of new arms, armour and all the necessary equipment for battle and hunting. The boy was to be entrusted to the best tutors of archery and horsemanship, to become a new Achilles and to follow the warlike steps of Alexios I (1081-1118) and John II (1118-1143). The poet urged the boy to play vigorously with the ball, be an excellent hunter, ride and shoot with the bow well, and train for battle. Thus, the youngster would become an adolescent fighting firmly against the barbarians and dyeing his sword red with the blood of the impious.[11] In his integrated mirror for princes, the tutor of Constantine Doukas,[12] Theophylact of Ochrid, attributed qualities to his pupil which adhered to the aforementioned ideal military upbringing. Constantine is celebrated for his agile body and training, for his

9 Anonymous 1998: G3.91-5, G3.305-8, G.4.70-212 (trans. Jeffreys). For *Digenes Akrites* see Beaton 1989; Ricks 1990; Beaton and Ricks 1993. For perception of these deeds as rituals of initiations to the adult world see Galatariotou 2018. For *Digenes Akrites* as a reflection of contemporary aristocratic and imperial values see Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 117-9; Magdalino 1993: 421; 1993b; Sinclair 2012: 345-9.

10 For the sebastokrator Andronikos see *PBW* 2016: Andronikos 109.

11 Theodore Prodromos 1974: 44.68-176170-6. The mention of ball playing could be a reference to polo. C.f. Eusthatios of Thessaloniki 1999: 257 who mentions a dirk, a quiver and a bow as proper gifts for an imperial child. For Theodore Prodromos see Bazzani 2007; Nesseris 2014: i.81-90; Jeffreys 2016: 117-20. For the conception of the good sovereign in Byzantine poetry see Hörandner 2009 with Ariantzi 2018 who gives emphasis on the teenage years of the aristocracy. For a recent overview of twelfth-century poetry in Byzantium see Zagklas 2019. For epigrams which accompanied weapons offered as gifts see van Opstall 2008: 57-8; Spingou 2017. See also the funeral oration of Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1910: 2

12 Son of Michael VII Doukas (1071-1078).

excellent riding skills as well as for his dexterous handling and brandishing of his lance, not to mention his mounted archery. With such skills, young Constantine was allegedly able to hunt and slaughter wild animals which boys in his age could not even bare to see. To keep up his skills, physique and knowledge of tactics, Theophylact advised Constantine to exercise daily and to train with his men in all forms of combat.[13] Addressing John III Batatzes (1222-1254) and Theodore II Laskaris (1254-1258), Nikephoros Blemmydes proposed as the best exercises, running, jumping, wresting and the throwing of javelin, all in full armour.[14]

A more problematic form of physical drilling is that of the war dance known as πυρρίχιον or πολεμικῇ and ἔνοπλον ὄρχησιν. These terms come with two main difficulties. According to Byzantine dictionaries, these words had two meanings: one generic and one specific. The *Souda*, for example, defines the word simply as a *kind of dance* which appears among other types of dances irrelevant to warfare. The lemma, however, continues to note that general Narses (d. 573) trained his troops to: *run quickly and to leap over their horses in formation and to whirl around in a kind of armed pyrrhic dance*, and explains that the verb πυρριχίζειν means *to dance with weapons.* In the *Etymologicum Magnum* we find these terms under the lemma "ὀρχηστής" (dancer). The dictionary explains that the word "dancer" has something to do with warfare for the *Iliad* reads ὀρχηστὴς ἄρης, meaning agile in the battlefield (ὁ εὐκίνητος κατὰ πόλεμον). The lemma then makes explicit mention to the word "πυρρίχιον καὶ ἔνοπλον ὄρχησιν," explaining that the Cretans used to dance it while bearing arms, and that πυρρίχη is among the three basic rhythms, the other two being, σίκιννις, related to religious practices, and the shameful κορδακισμὸς fitting to jesters. To make matters worse, the *Etymologicum Gudianum* makes no direct reference to warfare, interpreting the word "πυῤῥίχην" as an intense dance whose name derives either from the word "fiery," or "red", or from the fact that those who dance it blush. The same dictionary and some poets, like the author(s) of the *Ptochoprodromika*, associate the πυῤῥίχην with poetic meter and correct intonation.[15] This discrepancy

13 Theophylact of Ochrid 1980: 182-4. For Theophylact and his treatise see Gautier 1980: 11-67; Mullet 1997; Triantari-Mara 2002: 75-98; Païdas 2005: 29-30; Nesseris 2014: i.57-66. For Byzantine mirror for princess in general see Blum 1981: 1-56; Prinzing 1988; Païdas 2005; 2006; Odorico 2009 with Prinzing 2016; Giannouli 2010; Reinsch 2012; Coufalová-Bohrnová 2017.

14 Blemmydes 1986: 131. For political ideology in the treatise of Nikephoros Blemmydes see Triantari-Mara 2002: 115-32 with Païdas 2006.

15 *Suda* 1928-1935: 3225; Anonymous 1848: 634-5; Anonymous 1818: 244, 488. Denoting meter and intonation: Psellos 1992: 14.14, 68.20; Ptochoprodromos 2012: 3.137. See also the detailed introduction of the latter edition, especially pp. 14-142. With the

does not always allow for undisputed translations. Should we interpret these terms strictly as armed war dance, a form of military exercise, or more generically as rhythm and movement? Modern translations of Byzantine historians are demonstrative of the problem, the English translation of Michael Attaleiates reads that some experienced soldiers *were especially well trained in the dance of war* (ἠσκημένους μᾶλλον τὴν πυρρίχιον ὄρχησιν), while the English translation of Skylitzes Continuatus for the same event has *those forces were far more accomplished in the choreography of war than the others* (ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα τὴν πυρρίχιον ἐκμεμελετηκότες ὄρχησιν).[16]

Nevertheless, even if we interpret the evidence of the sources as denoting a specific military form of training, another problem arises. Are those statements literally or a classical allusion, a form of expression to battle-ready troops? The war dance is usually mentioned in the context of everyday life and training of soldiers. For example, describing the neglect of military affairs during the reign of Constantine X Doukas (1059–1067), Skylitzes Continuatus reports that the soldiers *set aside their weapons and terms of service and became parties to legal proceedings and eager participants in these machinations, taking a long leave of battle, the din and swirl of war, and its sudden ebb and flow.*[17] In his letter to Eustathios of Thessaloniki, the bureaucrat Gregory Antiochos described his everyday experience from camp during a campaign at the Balkans (c. 1173). Gregory referred to the fact that the day was spent accompanying Ares to war dancing and learning the famous dance of war.[18] Nikephoros Basilakes (d. aft. 1182) seems to have also regarded war dancing as an integral part of military life. In his monody to his brother, Nikephoros chose to summarize soldierly life with the words serving *as men-at-arms* (ὁπλιτεύουσι) and *dancing the war-dance in arms* (πυρριχίζουσι τὰ ἐνόπλια).[19]

meaning of dancing in this specific rhythm: Psellos 1994: 8.572; Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1971-1987: ii.788, iii.357. For Byzantine dictionaries see Reitzenstein 1897; Adler 1928: viii-xxx; Cellerini 1988; Alpers 1990; Wilson 1996[2]: 145-7; Baldwin 2006; Matthaios 2006; 2010; Németh 2018: 238-55.

16 Attaleiates 2011: 122 (trans. Kaldellis-Krallis); *Skylitzes Continuatus* 1968: 147, 171 (trans. McGeer). See also *Skylitzes Continuatus* 1968: 112 and c.f. Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 38-9. See also Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1999: 212 where the term is used metaphorically. For Attaleiates and *Skylitzes Continuatus* see Treadgold 2013: 312-29; Karpozilos 1997-2015: iii.187-239; Tsolakis 2011: xix-lvi; Krallis 2012; 2019.

17 *Skylitzes Continuatus* 1968: 112: μακρὰν χαίρειν εἰπόντας ἐνυαλίῳ τε ἠχῇ καὶ πολεμικῇ ὀρχήσει καὶ περιδινήσει ἀγχιστρόφῳ (trans. McGeer).

18 Gregory Antiochos 1963: 2.9-10 with Sideras 2005 who has made corrections to the edition. For Gregoy Antiochos see Kazhdan and Franklin 1984: 196-224; Loukaki 1996: 3-45; Stone 2005.

19 Nikephoros Basilakes 1983: 1.190-2. For the latter see Jeffreys 2016: 113-4.

Despite literary conventions, I am inclined to believe that there was indeed some kind of military dance or shadowboxing. Although not necessary connected to the ancient practice, this martial dance seems to have been quite widespread and to have formed part of proper military drilling. The exercise seems to have been mainly directed to young inexperienced soldiers, probably aiming to increase their dexterity, stamina and reflexes. Michael Psellos (d. c. 1078) playfully mentioned this practice connecting the origin of his addressee (a Longobard) with the martial culture of ancient Romans *who worshiped no other thing than Ares*. Consequently, Psellos urged the Longobard to cover himself with a large oblong shield, to grasp a light training spear and to begin moving in the rhythm of the war dance (τὴν ἐνόπλιον κινήθητι ὄρχησιν), before he could join his unit in battle.[20] Much like Psellos, Theophylact of Ochrid mentioned the practice in the context of basic military training, noting that the young Constantine Doukas excelled in all essential drilling, including war dancing (πολεμικαῖς ταῖς ὀρχήσεσιν).[21] Last but not least, Niketas Choniates (d. c. 1217), provides a fairly detailed account of the value of this exercise as well as of its popularity. In one of the Byzantine campaigns against the Turks (c. 1177-1179) we read of a Turkish soldier who ambushed and killed many Byzantines with his bow. Desiring to avenge their comrades and to prove their bravery, the Byzantines tried to come at close quarters with him so as to stab him with lances. The Turk, however, *openly performed a war dance* (πυρριχίζων)*, dodging the missiles, and then, twirling about, he cut down his attackers*.[22]

From the aforementioned forms of training, the most popular and praise-worthy seems to have been hunting. Already in *Cyropaedia*, hunting emerges as the best preparation for war. Xenophon informs us that teenagers often went to hunt with the king. The latter was the leader of the expedition, while the teenagers accustomed themselves to rise *early in the morning and to endure both heat and cold.* Hunting allowed the adolescents to *practise in taking long tramps and runs, and (...) to shoot or spear a wild beast whenever it came in their way.* While chasing wild animals they *whetted their courage when* some fierce beast showed fight, for they were ex-

20 Psellos 1985: 18.100-10. For Michael Psellos see, among others, Ljubarski 1978; Karpozilos 1995-2015; 59-112; Wilson 1996[2]: 158-80; Kaldellis 1999; 2006; Barber and Jenkins 2006; Riedinger 2010; Papaioannou 2013; Lauritzen 2013; Treadgold 2013: 289-308; Barber and Papaioannou 2017; Jeffreys and Lauxtermann 2017; Jenkins 2017: 447-61.

21 Theophylact of Ochrid 1980: 182-3 c.f. Gautier's French translation: *et avec des bonds de guerrier.*

22 Choniates 1975: 196 (trans. Magoulias). For Niketas Choniates see Simpson and Efthymiadis 2009; Simpson 2013; Treadgold 2013: 422-56; Urbainczyk 2018. Karpozilos 1997-2015: iii.699-787.

pected to *strike down the animal that came to close quarters with them, and* to be on their *guard against the one that threatened to attack them.* Teenagers were also instructed how to avoid tricky and difficult terrain while mounted, perfecting their horsemanship in this manner. Each participant bared bows, arrows, quivers, swords, scabbards, shields, light spears as well as provisions so that everything would resemble a campaign.[23]

Byzantine tacticians exhibited equal favour for hunting, noting that it constituted an introduction to tactics.[24] According to emperor Maurice (582-602), *warfare is like hunting. Wild animals are taken by scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other such stratagems rather than by sheer force. In waging war we should proceed in the same way, whether the enemy be many or few.* The Byzantines gave detailed instructions on how to proceed with military hunting. Maurice noted that *since divine providence has brought into being so many quick-witted and fleetfooted wild animals who run under their own leaders, it is only fitting that attacks on them should be made with some degree of tactics and strategy.* Military hunting, thus, took the form of a mock battle: the army was drawn up in good order, scouts foreran the main battle-line, and officers as well as generals practised cohesion, discipline, manoeuvring and prowess in arms without running a serious risk of getting killed.[25] Constantine Manasses (d. 1187), historian and archbishop of Naupaktos, agreed with Byzantine tacticians on the advantages of hunting, perceiving the exercise as contributing to the preservation of Roman rule. Manasses noted that hunting accustomed men to ride, charge, hold the line and to perfect their skills for warfare without getting killed, providing, in addition, good health, clarity of mind and easiness of heart.[26]

In Byzantine poetry, hunting is also central to warrior culture. Except for Digenes himself, who constantly proves his martial virtues through hunting, his father is also described as a man who *achieved unconquerable strength* by finding *recreation in battles against wild beasts* and *testing his daring (...) he became a wonder to all who observed him.* The vital importance of this sport becomes more evident when one compares the gifts exchanged for the wedding of Digenes with the suggested preparations for the upbringing of *sebastokrator* Andronikos' son. In both inventories we

23 Xenophon 1910: 1.2.10-1, 1.4.7-8 (trans. Miller).

24 For the reception of hunting in literature and historiography see Patlagean 1992.

25 Maurice 1981: 7.1. (trans. Dennis), see also 9.5.18, 12.10. 165-9; Leo VI 2014: 9.20, 12.59-60, 12.107, 14.22, 16.5, 17.87, 19.21, 20.216; *Sylloge Tacticorum* 1938: 56. For the false attribution of *Cynegeticus* to Urbicius see Rance 2007a and c.f. Dain and Foucault 1967: 341-2, 352-3, 372.

26 Manasses 2019: paragraph 1-4. For his work see Treadgold 2013: 399-403; Nilsson 2006; 2019: 517-24, 530-4; Nilsson and Nyström 2009; Messis and Nilsson 2019.

find personnel and animals trained for hunting: dogs, leopards, falcons and falconers. *Digenes Akrites* features another interesting detail about hunting. After Digenes' father had killed a lion, he ordered to *pull out all the beast's teeth | and also the claws of its right paw* so as to be worn by *my very handsome son*.[27] It seems, therefore, that parts of the hunted animals were considered as spoils, fit to adorn the body of young males, and probably perceived as an indirect statement of bravery and martial virtue. In tune with this attitude, laudatory poems addressed to emperors and aristocrats made explicit reference to hunting. For instance, in a funerary poem by Theodore Prodromos, John II Komnenos (1118-1143) was remembered for his hunting exploits and the killing of bears and leopards. The poet praised John's riding and his excellent handling of weapons (bow, javelin, spear, and double-edged sword) which enabled all these feats. Likewise, in a poem written to commemorate the refortification of Dorylaion (1175), Manuel I was characterised as *the famous slayer of the barbarians*, and *the killer of the wild beasts that roam in the mountains*, while in another, hunting vocabulary was employed to celebrate imperial triumph over external enemies. Manuel I, thus, emerges as the hunter of barbarians. His experience in military hunting allows him to track the fleeing barbarians in their rocky hideouts and to hunt them down. Similar examples are also found for Basil I, Leo VI and Romanos II (959-963). Finally, it is worth noting that Byzantine iconography often depicts emperors and aristocrats hunting, a good example being the Troyes Casket.[28]

The idea that hunting was the best preparation for warfare and a reflexion of military skill was neither a literary *topos,* nor restricted to the Byzantine world. It was rather a widespread notion among the aristocracy of the medieval world. The Byzantines wrote treatises on birds and falconry and dedicated them to emperors.[29] Byzantine emperors, such as Manuel I, practised hunting with trained falcons resting on their hands. The emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick II (1220-1250), was the author of a treatise on falconry, and Usama Ibn Munqidh (d. 1188), a military aristocrat who served the Arab and Turkish lords, dedicated a whole chapter on hunting in his memoirs where he described falcons,

27 Anonymous 1998: G.1.39-43, G. 3.95-105, G.4.904-6 (trans. Jeffreys).

28 Theodore Prodromos 1974: 25.16-20, 30. 265-87; Anonymous 2011: 13 (trans. Spingou); Daphnopates 1978: 14. For the presentation of warfare in Byzantine epistolography see Kolia-Dermitzaki 1997. On the hunting exploits and the death of John II see Browning 1961. For Manuel I see also Spingou 2011. For hunting in Byzantine iconography, see among others Evans and Wixom 1997: 204-6 and c.f. Walker 2012: 20-79. For further examples of hunting as symbol of imperial victory over the enemies of Byzantium see Maguire 1994: 192-7. For the practice of hunting in Byzantium see Koukoules 1932; Messis and Nilsson 2019.

29 For an overview see Külzer 2018.

hunting dogs, gazelles, leopards, and the hunting exploits of various individuals, prominent or otherwise. For many medieval cultures good hunting skills were also perceived as a reflection of superb character and leadership. For instance, the vizier of the Seljuks, Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092), suggested in his *Book of Government* that ambassadors should keep an eye on things which shape the character of foreign leaders: his messmates, qualities, manners and, of course, his participation in sports and hunting. The ally of Manuel I, Baldwin III of Jerusalem (1143-1163), is recorded to have acted in the aforementioned way. According to John Kinnamos (d. 1185), *astounded at the emperor in all other respects,* Baldwin *desired to know whether he was esteemed in* hunting too. We next find Baldwin participating in hunting with Manuel I only to slip from his horse while he was trying to equal the skill of the emperor. Last but not least, Liudprand of Cremona (d. 972) recorded in the memoirs of his diplomatic mission to Constantinople that Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969) asked him whether Otto I (912-973) possessed big hunting grounds with different types of animals. Given the military experience of Nikephoros II, his question may have served to estimate the skills and character of Otto I.[30]

Apart from hunting, more specialised and collective training was provided with the initiative of emperors and generals. For instance, Leo the Deacon speaks of the fact that both Nikephoros II and John I Tzimiskes (969-976) sought to train their troops daily in military manoeuvres, shooting with the bow, brandishing and twirling spears, wielding swords and vaulting onto horses.[31] A more advanced manner of training took the form of mock battles, usually fought with blunt weapons. There is wide evidence of this type of drilling with the most relevant to our period being the cavalry duels at the hippodrome of Constantinople, organised by Nikephoros II. Leo the Deacon suggests that, at the emperor's command, the soldiers descended into the stadium, divided themselves into two groups, and, with swords at hand, opposed each other in sport as if in battle. The unexpected clash caused the citizens of Constantinople to abandon the scene in terror which probably demonstrates that such spectacles were much more common in the barracks than in the hippodrome. We are aware of at least one emperor who participated in such drilling.

30 Manasses 2019: paragraph 1-4; Frederick II 1943; Usama Ibn Munqidh 2008: 4; Nizam al-Mulk 2012: 95-6.; Kinnamos 1836: 190 (trans. Brand); Eustathios of Thessaloniki 2017: 76; Liudprand of Cremona 1998a: 37. See also Magdalino 1993: 379. For more information on espionage see Koutrakou 1995; Theotokis 2018: 128-91; Chatzelis 2019: 107-12. C.f. Squatriti 2007: 260n.71 who attributes the question aiming at assessing not the king's martial qualities, but his splendor and riches. For more on this see Maguire 1994: 193. For rare animals, hunting grounds and parks as tools of diplomacy see Ševčenko 2002.

31 Leo the Deacon 1828: 51, 128.

The historian John Kinnamos informs us that Manuel I trained his troops by *making a pretence of battle.* Manuel is recorded to have divided his men into two groups and to have ordered them to charge against each other with blunted lances. He joined his men into this mock battle by fighting with them in the front ranks. Manuel, however, did not stop there. Various sources speak of his participation in a jousting tournament in Antioch and shed light on this new form of military exercise available in the twelfth century.[32]

Aside from physical and military exercises, young aristocrats seem to had also been instructed in tactics and strategy in a manner which recalls the *Cyropaedia*. As in the latter, the role of the father in the military education and upbringing of the son appears to be central. Promotional sources usually underline the care of the emperors for the military edification of their heirs. We find emperors taking their sons to the battlefield as observers or discussing tactics and strategy with them. We read, therefore, in the *Vita Basilii*, the laudatory biography of Basil I (867–886), that the emperor, *taking along his eldest son Constantine, he set out with him against Syria, so as to give that cub of noble race a taste for slaying the enemy and to be himself his teacher in tactics and manly valour in the face of peril*. The same spirit is discernible in Michael Italikos' (d. 1157) orations to Manuel I, where the latter is described as having been instructed by his father in the art of tactics, namely, to draw up his infantry and cavalry in various formations (rhomboid, square, trapezoid) as well as to manoeuvre and wheel them around. Manuel I, of course, emerges as a *puer senex*, surpassing by far his peers and already exhibiting full-blown the virtues of a great warrior and leader. Eustathios of Thessaloniki (d. c. 1195) praised Manuel I for the fact that he fulfilled the same duty for his eleven-year old heir, Alexios II (1180 –1183), spending time with him practicing, not childish ball games, but proper military drilling.[33] Manuel I is also celebrated as being a tutor for his nephew John the *protosebastos* and *protobestiarios*.

32 For Nikephoros II Phokas see Leo the Deacon 1828: 63, 112. For Manuel I drilling with his men see Kinnamos 1836: 3.16. For Manuel participating in jousting tournaments see Choniates 1975: 109-10 with Jones and Maguire 2002: 104-48 and Kyriakidis 2011: 51-60. For all forms of mock battles and training see Rance 2000 with McGeer 1995: 217-22; Haldon 1999: 224-5, 232-3, 264-6; Alexopoulos 2016: 245-51, 286-9.

33 Constantine VII 2011: 46 (trans. I. Ševčenko); Italikos 1972: 44.282-4; Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1999: 11.190 and 16.285, 2017: 7 with Choniates 1975: 35-6 and Kinnamos 1836: 22 where the teenager Manuel is recorded as participating in warfare, valiantly charging the enemy and routing him. See also Birkenmeier 2002: 98 and Magdalino 1993: 436-7. For Eustathios of Thessaloniki and Italikos see Gautier 1972: 4-56; Kolovou 2006: 3-75; Nesseris 2014: i.91-104; Jeffreys 2016: 114-5; Pontani, Katsaros and Sarris 2017; Bourbouhakis 2017: 83-200.

A fresco which adorned the walls of John's house featured him and the emperor standing together. The mural was accompanied by a written testimony of the gratitude that John owed to Manuel I. John confessed that Manuel I acted as second father and guardian to him, for he brought him up nobly, adorned and fortified his character with the pursuit of arms and taught him the art of generalship.[34]

It is clear from all the above that practical drilling and instruction aimed at enhancing physical vigour, prowess in arms, bravery and tactical sharpness, qualities which were central to Byzantine military aristocracy.[35] Indeed, Byzantine historical narratives, mirrors for princes, military manuals, poems, orations and *vitae*, all feed into each other and promote the theme of the trained war-like aristocrat and strategist who practised warfare from his early years. Thus, Nikephoros Bryennios highlights that Basil II (976-1025) provided proper military education to the future Isaac I Komnenos (1057-1059) and his brother, assigning to them tutors of the art of war who instructed them *to bear the proper equipment, to protect themselves with the shield against the enemy's missiles, to wield the spear, to ride skilfully, and to shoot aptly with the bow.* We learn that training took place in the Monastery of Stoudios so that the pupils could easily travel to the countryside to practise hunting and training in arms. By their late teenage years, the brothers joined the *hetairiai* and then went on to command troops, provinces, the army, and, finally, the empire.[36] Evidence of teenage boys joining military regiments is also provided by a ninth-century chronicle where we read that the fifteen-year old sons of various officials were recruited into the *hikanatoi* by Nikephoros I (802-811). The same pattern is discernible in later sources as well. For example, Michael Attaleiates records in the laudatory preface of his history that Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081) achieved brave deeds in his childhood, while in the *Alexiad* we find the fourteen-year old Alexios I wishing to participate in his first battle.[37] Even John the Oxite, patriarch of Antioch, em-

34 Magdalino and Nelson 1982: 135-7.

35 For the Byzantine aristocracy and its ideals see Angold 1984; Cheynet 1990; 2006; Haldon 2009; Sinclair 2012: 398-401; Andriollo 2016: 371-400; Kolia-Dermitzaki 2018: 191-202. For the reflection of such ideals in Byzantine historiography see Païdas 2007: 181-6, 2016: 220-6.

36 Bryennios 1975: 1.1-3. For Nikephoros Bryennios see Jeffreys 2003a; Treadgold 2013: 344-5; Karpozilos 1997-2015: iii.357-98; Neville 2012; For the creation and development of the regiments of the *hetairiai* see Oikonomides 1972: 327-8; Haldon 1984: 246, 252, 267-8, 324, 328-9; Kühn 1991: 68, 104-6, 257, 259.

37 Anonymous 1987: 27. Attaleiates 2011: 3-5; Komnene 2001: 1.1. For the *Chronicle of 811* see Stephenson 2006; Karpozilos 1997-2015: ii.189-95; Treadgold 2013: 94-100. For the *Alexiad* see Buckler 1929; Mullet and Smythe 1996; Gouma-Peterson 2000;

ployed the *topos* of *puer senex* in his oration to Alexios I. Despite his quarrels with him, the patriarch acknowledged that Alexios I was hardly an adolescent when he began his great exploits, a fact which was demonstrative *of heavenly favour and successes*.[38] *Vitae* of saints appear less realistic in their accounts and drop the age threshold even more. In the *Life of Patriarch Ignatios* the hero, like another Constantine I, is appointed *domestikos of the hikanatoi* at the age of ten. The same age marks the beginning of St. Theodore's military life too. In tenth and eleventh-century versions of St. Theodore's *vita*, we read that the saint joined the Roman legions at the age of ten.[39]

These fundamental ideals were highlighted both by aristocrats themselves and their dependants. John Geometres (d. 1000), a military officer and poet, chose to present himself as an individual who possessed *courage in the heart* as well as *force in the limbs*. He talked of how his *feet went in the air with light leaps*, as well as of the fierce, terrible and bloody battles he fought in the first rank. The poet saved similar praise for other celebrated military figures too. In a poem he wrote commemorating the death of John Tzimiskes, Geometres made reference to Tzimiskes' courage and prowess in arms, describing him as *a young branch full of force* who, as an infant, hurled lightnings from his arms and surpassed his parents in courage.[40] Byzantine literature is full of such references, Leo the Deacon, Theodosius the Deacon, Michael Psellos, Constantine Manasses, Anna Komnene (d. 1153), Manganeios Prodromos (f. 12th century), Theodore Prodromos, Michael Italikos, Eustathios of Thessaloniki, John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, to mention only but a few, referred to emperors and generals acting in similar ways. Therefore, figures such as Nikephoros II Phokas, Nikephoros Pastilas, Bardas Phokas, Bardas Skleros, Basil II,

Sullivan 2010; Neville 2012; 2016a; Buckley 2014; Sinclair 2014; Frankopan 2014; 2018; Inoue 2015; Vilimonović 2015. For adolescence and military posts see Angelov 2009: 103-4. The *hikanatoi* might not had been a fighting regiment in the reign of Nikephoros I. For their creation and development see Oikonomides 1972: 329-33; Haldon 1984: 245-56, 258, 266-7, 280-2, 295-7; Kühn 1991: 39, 67-72; 116-21. C.f. Treadgold 1995. For the development of Byzantine military command see also Krsmanović 2008.

38 John the Oxite 1970: 23. For his controversy with Alexios I see Barber 2007.

39 Niketas David 2013: 3; Anonymous 1909: 185; 1925: 225. For the texts see the discussion in Smithies and Duffy 2013: xi– xxxv; Haldon 2016: 1-57. For childhood and adolescents in this gerne see Angelov 2009 and Chevallier Caseau 2009. See also Kiousopoulou 2018.

40 Geometres 2008: 65.25-6, 211 (trans. Andriollo); Geometres 1841: 267-8. For John Geometres see Lauxtermann 1998; Lauxtermann 2003-2019: i.35-41, 68-9, 116-9, 146-308, ii.58-69, 75-6, 79-81, 99-102, 129-36, 158-70, 180-87, 194-6, Kazhdan 2006: 249-72; van Opstall 2008: 3-121; Andriollo 2014: 120-38; van Opstall and Tomadaki 2019.

George Maniakes, Romanos IV Diogenes, Nikephoros Bryennios, *sebastokrator* Andronikos Komnenos, John II Komnenos, Manuel I Komnenos and *megas heteriarches* John Doukas were all recorded as preferring death in the battlefield than an unworthy and ignoble life. They were described living the course of their lives carrying a shield and mainly laying their eyes on helmets, spears and the clash of men. They bled, they received wounds, but they still endured the struggles of battle and harsh campaigning conditions. They were manly, with hands which cast lightning. They wielded huge and elaborate weapons, they cut opponents in half, they entered into single combat, they shot skilfully and routed entire regiments by themselves. They slew giant opponents with super-human strength, they were the children of Ares, fighting like Achilles and Heracles, riding swiftly, as if on Pegasus, and exhibiting their deep understanding and knowledge of tactics.[41]

Apart from warfare, displays of physical and martial skills through feats and stunts added to the glory of young aristocrats. For instance, in order to prove himself before the emperor, Digenes Akrites asked for a wild horse to be released and *begun to run behind* it so as to catch it. *He grasped its mane | and brought the great wild beast back | kicking and struggling (...). When the young noble came before the emperor | he flung the horse down so that it sprawled over the ground | and everyone was astonished at the extraordinary sight.* A similar feat with a horse plus a wrestling

41 See among others: for Nikephoros II, Theodosius the Deacon 1979: 1-39, 284, 292, 299 and Leo the Deacon 1828: 11; for Basil II, Leo the Deacon 1933; for Bardas Phokas and Bardas Skleros, Leo the Deacon 1828: 96-7, 110-1 and Skylitzes 1973: 290-1; for George Maniakes, Psellos 2014: 6.76-77; for Romanos IV Diogenes, Psellos 1994b: 20; for Nikephoros Bryennios, Komnene 2001: 3.3, 10.9; for *sebastokrator* Andronikos, Italikos 1972: 3.86, 11.130-4; for John II, Theodore Prodromos 1974: 25.54-67 and for the military identity assumed by him see Papageorgiou 2016; for Manuel I, Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1999: 200-2, 266-7; Italikos 1972: 44.284; Choniates 1975: 92, Kinnamos 1836: 60-2, 100, 190, 193 with Stone 2000 and Karla 2008. In his funeral oration, Eustathios of Thessaloniki 2017: 7 referred to the unrestrained bravery of young Manuel I and his father's attempt to harness it, see also 62. Compare Manuel with the idealized portrait of his cousin Nikephoros Komnenos in Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1910 and Manasses 1910. For John Doukas, Kinnamos 1836: 142. See also Manasses 1996: 5210-30, 5840-55, 5948 and Anonymous 1998: G.3.60-72, G.6.195-655, E.655-775. For the image of the military emperor see Magdalino 1993: 413-80; Trombley and Tougher 2019. For idealized narratives of Nikephoros II's deeds see Morris 1983; 1994: 203-5 and for a parody of those, Burke 2017. For martial virtues, display of courage and prowess in arms see McGrath 1995: 156-9; Maniati-Kokkini 1997; Holmes 2005: 240-98; Kazhdan 2006: 273-94; Markopoulos 2009: 697–714; Neville 2012: 2-27, 121-38, 194-203; Jeffreys 2011; Sinclair 2012: 319-44; Andriollo 2014: 126-38; Lilie 2014: 188–90; Kaldellis 2016: 295-6; Kyriakidis 2016; Alexopoulos 2016; Chatzelis 2019: 76-7, 102-3.

match with a Bulgarian were allegedly Basil I's tokens of reputation which got him a promotion to *protostrator* (head groom). Such skills were usually perceived as proof of one's virtue and his suitability to hold esteemed posts. Consequently, a skilful participation in hunting and riding exercises was what it took to prove Amalric I (1163 – 1174) as a worthy ally of Manuel I. Displays of physical and martial skill were also perceived in the same light by Byzantine historians. Niketas Choniates, for instance, has the citizens of Melangeia explaining themselves before Alexios Angelos III (1195 – 1203) for the fact that they partly supported the impostor of Manuel I's son. Among their excuses we find them adducing his *goodly stature* and the fact that he was *such a horseman that* he could not be *shaken (...), as though he were fixed in the saddle.* In fact, the citizens conclude their plea by stating *you too would be delighted in the man if you saw him, O Despot and Emperor.* Likewise, Leo the Deacon chose to open his narrative of the reign of John Tzimiskes with a testimony of his martial skills, possibly to enhance Tzimiskes' decorum and to underline his suitability for the throne. We first learn that John *surpassed everyone of his generation in leaping, ball-playing, and throwing the javelin, and in drawing and shooting a bow.* Leo the Deacon continues with the rumour that John could line-up four horses, jump from the first and smoothly land on the fourth, and notes that his archery surpassed that of Odysseus, since the latter could only shoot an arrow through axe-heads, whereas John through ring-holes. Leo the Deacon also celebrates John Tzimiskes' horsemanship and precision, reporting that he would put a leather ball on the base of a glass cup *and goading his horse with his spurs to quicken its speed, he would hit the ball with a stick to make it leap up and fly off; and he would leave the cup remaining in place, undisturbed and unbroken.*[42]

Another suitable occasion for the demonstration of skill were contests. The *Cyropaedia* refers to public games as an integral part of military education and reports that prizes were awarded to the best archer, javelin-man etc. It seems that the Byzantines also held similar contests, but it is unclear whether these were public and included a price. Anna Komnene mentioned them as she underlined her husband's dexterity with the bow. According to Anna, when Nikephoros Bryennios *took part in a shooting*

42 Anonymous 1998: G.4.1054-65 (trans. Jeffreys); Choniates 1975: 462 (trans. Magoulias); Leo the Deacon 1828: 98 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan); Skylitzes 1973: 124-5; Constantine VII 2011: 12-13; c.f. Symeon Logothetes 2006: 242-3 where this anti-Macedonian narrative mentions nothing of Basil exploits and stuns. For Almaric I see Eustathios of Thessaloniki 1999: 214. For Symeon Logothetes see Treadgold 2013: 203-17; Karpozilos 1997-2015: ii.391-401; Wahlgren 2012; 2017. For a discussion of this passage in *Digenes Akrites* along with a recent attempt to identify the emperor mentioned see Prinzing 2018.

contest or in a battle, he never missed his aim: at whatever part of a man's body he shot, he invariably and immediately inflicted a wound there. With such strength did he bend his bow and so swiftly did he let loose his arrows that even Teucer and the two Ajaxes were not his equal in archery. As late as 1432, a Western visitor to Constantinople, Bertrandon de la Brocquière, would record a horse-archery contest taking place in the old Hippodrome in which John VII Palaiologos' (1425-1448) brother participated along with other horsemen. Bertrandon recounts that *each had a bow, and they galloped along the enclosure, throwing their hats before them, which, when they had passed, they shot at; he who with his arrow pierced his hat, or was nearest to it, was esteemed the most expert*. In *Digenes Akrites* we get a possible glimpse of how these demonstrations of dexterity and skill were received by seasoned military men. Allegedly, the Arabs could tell that Constantine, Digenes Akrites' uncle, was experienced and brave *by his expert spurring, the parrying with the sword, the wielding of the spear*. Manuel I's enemies, on the other hand, recognized him *by the extreme unusualness of his horsemanship and of his ambidextrous manipulation of weapons* and felt no shame in their retreat.[43] *Other contests looked more like sports, like polo, the famous and dangerous tzykanion.* This very popular sport was practiced by aristocrats and emperors, and the imperial palace was furnished with a special courtyard for its practice.[44]

With regard to these martial sports, especially hunting, certain tensions emerge. It seems that Medieval historians considered such avocations suitable, beneficial and well executed only when they were undertaken by the military aristocracy. For example, Liudprand of Cremona recorded the rumours concerning the bravery of Romanos I (920-944), former commander of the fleet. The emperor's daring, we are told, was undisputed since it was known that he had killed a ferocious lion with his sword. In the same light, Byzantine historians made explicit reference to the fact that emperors and generals they favoured spent their time hunting. Therefore, the soldier emperors John II Komnenos and Manuel I are not only recorded to have loved hunting, but story has it that Manuel I killed an almost mythical beast, a mixture of lion and leopard. Anna Komnene informs us that Alexios I and his brother preferred military affairs to hunting but that they participated in the latter if there was no pressing matter at hand. Similarly, we are told that *caesar* John Doukas and Isaak Komnenos (1057-1059) loved hunting cranes, bears and hog-

43 Xenophon 1910: 1.2.12; Komnene 2001: 10.9 (trans. Sewter and Frankopan); Bertradon 1892: 158-9 (trans. Wright); Anonymous 1998: G.1.155-9; Kinnamos 1836 (trans. Brand). See also Bartusis 330-3.

44 Mango 1986[2]: 195. For Manuel I's love of polo see Kinnamos 1836: 264.

shat, mounted on their horses and accompanied by hunting falcons and dogs. Finally, when at an imperial hunt, Basil I threw a mace at a huge wolf, splitting it in two, everybody grew fearful that he would someday replace Michael III (842-847).[45] On the other hand, when hunting was conducted purely as a hobby by unwarlike men, it was regarded as a trivial and unworthy undertaking. Psellos' presentation of Constantine VIII (1025-1028) in *Historia Syntomos* is indicative of this. According to Psellos, *Constantine had the childish, trivial role: horse-racing, hunting and the other juvenile interests, while Basilius' (*Basil II*) life comprised the equipping of armies, hurrying to the eastern frontier (...), arranging this, contriving that.* The same applies to other figures such as, Romanos II (959-963) who is recorded as being *mad on sexual pleasures, infatuated with horse-racing, born for hunting-parties* and uninterested in the administration of the empire. Another example is Alexander I (912-913) who, according to Skylitzes, *was luxurious and unbridled, his passions being hunting and other licentious, habitual practices.*[46]

Although the testimony of tenth to twelve-century sources leaves little doubt that drilling, physical training, prowess in arms and tactical knowledge (gained from observation, experience or word to mouth) were central to the ideals of the aristocracy, this was not always the case. In literary sources which date from the eighth and ninth centuries martial virtues, physical training and detailed exposition of military events hold a rather marginal space. The first changes are noticeable from the tenth century onwards, when a more heroic, military and martial tone starts to emerge in the sources, a process which starts to culminate from the second half of the eleventh century onwards, although not without exceptions.[47] Two mirror of princes written by the clergy in the ninth and eleventh centuries are demonstrative of this transformation: Theophylact of Ochrid praised the military skills and training of the young Constantine Doukas, whereas

45 Liudprand of Cremona 1998b: 3.25; Kinnamos 1836: 24-5, 267; Choniates 1975: 41; Komnene 2001: 3.3; *Skylitzes Continuatus* 1968: 108; Attaleiates 2011: 55; Psellos 2014: 7.73, 7.180; Skylitzes 1973: 125-6; Constantine VII 2011: 14.

46 Psellos 1990: 96.25-6, 101, 108.53-9 with Skylitzes 1973: 194-6; Symeon Logothethes 2006: 134 and Constantine VII 1838: 378-80 where Alexander I dies playing polo. See also Choniates 1975: 223 where similar comments are made for Alexios II Komnenos. For *Historia Syntomos* see Dželebdžić 2007; Treadgold 2013: 282-9; Karpozilos 1997-2015: iii. 155-87.

47 See, for example, Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 69-70, 104-117; Kazhdan 1985: 43-57; Munitiz 1995: 50-61; Markopoulos 2009; Angelov 2009: 106-8; Andrillo 2016: 319-409; Krallis 2017; Shea 2020. Compare also the twelfth-century orations with those written for military and nonmilitary emperors in the eleventh, e.g. Psellos 1994: 1-18. See also Chamberlain 1986; Magdalino 1993: 418-20; de Vries van der Velden 1997; Schoonhoven 1993; Reinsch 2012.

Photios (d. 891), most likely the real author of the *Hortatory Chapters*, urged the future Leo VI (886-912) to honour physical strength only when accompanied by prudence and intelligence as well as to adorn his youth not with sports but with virtue.[48]

The readings of the military aristocracy

Photios certainly pointed out that there was more to leadership than bravery, prowess in arms and practical tactical experience. This idea was shared by many high-ranking military commanders and officials who regarded military, moral and intellectual edification acquired through reading as particularly beneficial.[49] Although not compulsory, education was highly valued in Byzantium. Mixing the utilitarian with the moral, it was considered a desideratum for assuming posts in the administration as well as for acquiring wisdom, prudence and virtue.[50]

The ability to read, understand and benefit from literature required literacy of various degrees, depending on gerne, the work itself as well as its version. Ideally, military officers were expected to be literate. According to the manuals, the *tourmarchai*, *merarchai* and *mandatores* were to be literate, if possible, and even required to know foreign languages.[51] The non-categorical character of such instructions, however, reveals that literacy was everything but given in Byzantium. A careful consideration of available sources demonstrates that the learning of the military aristocracy varied greatly. On the lower end we have officials who probably had no, or very limited capabilities of benefiting from any type of literature. An example includes Eustathios Skepides, *strategos* of Lucania (1042), who could barely write his name and title on paper. The next level features individuals who had acquired middle education, namely men who possessed basic knowledge of rhetoric and could read and write Greek of medium register, for instance, Katakalon Kekaumenos and the authors of the *Sylloge Tac-*

48 Basil I 2009: i.13, i.49. For this source see Markopoulos 1998; Païdas 2009: 15-100; Odorico 2009: 234-40; Tougher 2018.

49 Tensions probably existed between more and less educated military personnel. Some praised education, knowledge and tradition as key, while others only acknowledged them as useful, regarding personal experience as more significant. For example, John Geometres disapproved of Basil II's neglect of educated men. For more discussion see Andriollo 2014; Bernard 2014b; van Opstall and Tomadaki 2019: 197-9; Chatzelis 2019: 88-98.

50 See note 4 above with Chatzelis 2024; 2020–2021.

51 Maurice 1981: 1.4; Leo VI 2014: 4.45. See also Gyftopoulou 2009: 341-6 and Luttwak 2009: 236-7.

ticorum and the *De Velitatione*.[52] On the top we find men with broader literary interests. Officers such as John Geometres, Nikephoros Ouranos, and Nikephoros Bryennios authored poems and histories, among other works, corresponded with scholars and shared with the latter a deep interest in philosophy and rhetoric.[53]

In epic poetry and historiography, literacy and learning were presented as an integral part of the military upbringing of young aristocrats. Before his military training, Digenes Akrites was entrusted to a tutor for three years who provided the boy with *a mass of learning.* The same approach is discernible in the *Alexiad* as well. In an attempt to appease the separatist Theodore Gabras, Alexios I is recorded to have married his son, Gregory Gabras, to one of the imperial children. Gregory, thus, joined the imperial family and Alexios I saw to his education. We learn that he entrusted Gregory *to a tutor, one of the empress's retinue, the eunuch Michael.* His edification entailed a *good moral education and a thorough grounding in all aspects of military science.* According to Nikephoros Bryennios, Basil II included in the military education of John and Isaac Komnenos a study of *the tactical treatises so that they might know how to deploy a phalanx and draw up files, to encamp appropriately and put up a palisade, and indeed all the other things the tactical treatises teach*. Manuel I was by no means left behind. Eustathios of Thessaloniki reports that the emperor *devoted himself to the literary labours of the ancients*, that is to say to *books about geography, or works which give the precise dates of events, or those which devise military tactics*.[54]

Consequently, the first genre which clearly contributed to the military edification of the aristocracy was that of military treatises. The earliest extant work of this kind, the *Hipparchikos,* was written by Xenophon after the Peloponnesian war, around 360-355 BCE, while the latest original mil-

52 For uneducated military personnel see Cavallo 2008: 38-9. See also Karagiorgou 2008: 77-90 and Holmes 2010b: 139-40 with Chatzelis 2020-2021. for the education and misspellings of Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081). For the language of military treatises see Haldon 1990: 70-4; Kolias 1993: 39-44; Rance 2004a; 2004b; Chatzelis 2019: 11-2. For military personnel and literary production see Browning 1978: 39-44; Mazzucchi 1978: 267-316; McGeer 1995: 138, 191-4; Haldon 1999: 131-8; Holmes 2010a; Andriollo 2014: 131-8; Rance 2017b: 292-3; Rance 2018: 268-78. For the language of Kekaumenos see Bernard 2014b.

53 For the education and literary pursuits of John Geometres and Nikephoros Ouranos see Christidis 1984; Trombley 1997; Lauxterman 1998: 356-73; Andriollo 2014: 120-6; 131-8; Tomadaki 2018; van Opstall and Tomadaki 2019; Papaioannou 2019. For Katakalon Kekaumenos see Spadaro 1998; Roueché 2002; 2003; 2009; Rance 2018: 257-60. For Nikephoros Bryennios see Jeffreys 2003a; Neville 2012.

54 Anonymous 1998: G.4.66-9 (trans. Jeffreys); Komnene 2001: 8.9.6 (trans. Sewter and Frankopan); Bryennios 1975: 1.1; Eustahtios of Thessaloniki 2017: 34 (trans. Bourbouhakis).

itary treatise of the examined period, the *Taktika* was authored by Nikephoros Ouranos (c. 1000). In the course of these centuries, a great variety of military manuals were produced. Some seem to have been introductory in type, a mixture of technical and didactic literature, where one could find generic advice covering almost all aspects of warfare: traits of the ideal general, ambushes, the tactics of foreign peoples, military hunting, battle formations, sieges, division of booty, equipment, intelligence and espionage, encampment, drilling, and treatment of war prisoners, to mention but a few. Examples of such works include the *Strategikos* of Onasander (c. 49-58), the *Strategikon* of Maurice (c. 600), the *De Militari Scientia* (c. 641), the ninth-century *Peri Strategias* of Syrianos Magister, the *Taktika* of Leo VI (c. 904-912), the *Sylloge Taticorum* (c. 930), the *Praecepta Militaria* of Nikephoros II Phokas (c. 963-969) and the *Taktika* of Nikephros Ouranos.[55] Other manuals were more specialized, focusing primarily on one aspect of warfare. We thus have manuals: a) on siege warfare and engines like Aeneas Taktikos' and Apollodors' *Poliorketika* (c. 350 BCE and 101) as well as the *Poliorketika Parangelmata* of Heron of Byzantium (c. 950); b) on battle formations, such as Asclepiodotos' *Taktika Kefalaia* (1st century BCE), Aelian's *Taktike Theoria* (c. 106-113), Arrian's *Techne Taktike* and *Ektaksis Kata Alanon* (136-137), Urbicius' *Epitideuma* (c. 491-518) as well as the *Syntaxis armatorum quadrata* (c. 950); c) on guerrilla warfare, like the *Peri Paradromes* (after 969); d) on stratagems, such as the *Strategemata* of Polyaenus (c. 227-231), e) on naval warfare, such as the ninth-century *Naumachika* of Syrianos Magister, f) on camps, like the *De castrametatione*, and last but not least; g) on campaign preparation and logistics, like the three treatises of Constantine VII.[56]

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55 For a discussion about the different types of military manuals see Chatzelis 2024. For the *Hipparchikos* see Xenophon 1920; Rance 2017a: 14. For Onasander see Onasander 1935; Dain 1930; Dain and Foucault 1967: 327-9; Rance 2017a: 20-1, 24-9, 47-8; Rance 2022 and Strano 2013. For the *Strategikon* see Maurice 1981; Dain and Foucault 1967: 344-6; Kučma 1982-1986; c.f. Rance 2000: 238-44; Rance 2017c. A new translation of the *Strategikon* with extensive commentary is forthcoming by Rance. For the *De Militari Scientia* see Anonymous 2018; Dain and Foucault 1967: 346; Rance 2010; Eramo 2018a: 13-48. For the *Peri Strategias* see Syrianos Magister 1985; Cosentino 2000; Rance 2007b: 718-33; Eramo 2010; 2018b; Theotokis and Sidiropoulos 2021 c.f. Dain and Foucault 1967: 343 and Dennis 1985: 1-7. For the *Taktika* of Leo VI see Leo VI 2014; Dain and Foucault 1967: 354-7; Haldon 2014; Riedel 2018: 32-90. For the *Sylloge Tacticorum* 1938; Dain and Foucault 1967: 357-8; Sullivan 2010b: 155; Theotokis 2018: 192-235; Chatzelis 2019. For the *Praecepta Militaria* see Phokas 1995; Kolias 1993b: 13-36; McGeer 1995; Theotokis 2018: 192-235; Chatzelis 2019: 155-61. For the *Taktika* of Ouranos see Ouranos 1973; 1995; Dain 1937; McGeer 1991; 1995; Trombley 1997; Theotokis 2018: 192-235; Chatzelis 2019: 155-61.

56 For Aeneas Taktikos see Aeneas Taktikos 1967; Dain and Foucault 1967: 319-21; Rance 2017a: 15, 42-7l; Pretzler and Barley 2018. For Apollodoros see Apollodoros 1908; Dain and Foucault 1967: 332-3; Whitehead 2010; Rance 2017a: 20. For an over-

To enhance the effectiveness of such treaties, the Byzantines employed various ways to make them easily comprehensible. Discrepancies caused by high-register Greek, obsolete and difficult terms, or even complicated expositions of battle-formations, manoeuvres and siege-engines, were remedied by producing linguistically exemplified as well as abbreviated versions of some treaties. We have, for example, simpler versions of Onasander's *Strategikos*, Maurice's *Strategikon,* Polyaenus' *Strategemata*, and Aelian's *Taktike Theoria*. The latter was prepared by Michael Psellos most probably for the edification of Michael VII. Other authors preferred alternative strategies, popular in the teaching of language, astronomy, geometry and religious doctrine. We thus find various detailed illustrations and diagrams (depicting formations, manoeuvres, siege-engines and military camps) accompanying the main text of Byzantine treatises, while a version of Maurice's *Strategikon* was written in the form of questions and answers.[57]

Byzantine historians seem to have considered the study of military treatises essential for proper military conduct. In this light, they stressed both their erudition on these matters as well as that of favoured figures. For instance, the author of the *Vita Basilii* considered military manuals as an integral part of military education, stating that *military science or art* is only mastered through the study of treatises and considerable practice. Michael Psellos used this very perception to attack Romanos IV Diogenes (1068-1071), presenting him more like a soldier, a man with only practical knowledge of warfare, who lacked the necessary theoretical training. Psellos reports that *knowing that I was thoroughly*

view of ancient Greek siege treatises see Fiorucci 2014. For the *Poliorketika Parangelmata* see Heron of Byzantium 2000; Dain and Foucault 1967: 358-9; Sullivan 2000. For an overview of Byzantine siege treatises see Dain and Foucault 1967: 349, 358-9, 366; Sullivan 2010b: 154-5. For Asclepiodotos, Aelian and Arrian see Asclepiodotos 1992; Aelian 2012; Arrian 1968a; 1968b with Dain 1946; Dain and Foucault 1967: 326-7, 330-2; Rance 2017a: 17-9, 21-2. For the reception of these authors in Byzantine military manuals see Haldon 2014; Rance 2017c; Chatzelis and Harris 2017; Chatzelis 2019; Eramo 2018b; with McGeer 1995: 182-7. For the *Epitideuma* see Urbicius 2005 with Greatrex, Elton and Burgess 2005. For the *Syntaxis armatorum quadrata* see Anonymous 1992 with McGeer 1992; 1995: 220-8, 257-66; Theotokis 2018: 192-235; Chatzelis 2019: 155-61. For the *Peri Paradromes* see Phokas 1986 with Dagron and Mihăescu 1986 and Holmes 2010a: 73-5. For the *Strategemata* see Polyaenus 1887; Dain 1931; Dain and Foucault 1967: 337, 364; Schindler 1973; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xx-xiii; 1988; Brodersen 2013. For Byzantine treatises on naval warfare see Pryor and Jeffreys 2006. For the *De castrametatione* see Anonymous 1985 with Dennis 1985: 241-4; Sullivan 2010b: 158-9. For the treatises of Constantine VII see Constantine VII 1990 with Haldon 1990 and Sullivan 2010b: 155-6. See also the most recent works of Chiritoiu 2018; Chulp and Whately 2021; Whately 2022.

57 For a detailed discussion on this see Chatzelis 2024. See also Rance 2018: 260-2.

conversant with the science of military tactics, that I had made a complete study of everything pertaining to military formations, the building of war-machines, the capture of cities, and all the other things that a general has to consider, moved the emperor not only to admiration, but also to envy. Psellos, in fact, goes as far as to imply that the defeat at Manzikert (1071) occurred due to Romanos IV's lack of tactical knowledge and his inability to follow proper advice. In contrast, favoured generals are recorded as having read military treatises and especially classical ones. Basil II, therefore, is reported as having drawn knowledge of battle formations both from books and from experience, while John Doukas and Alexios I are presented as bibliophiles, having read, among others, the treatises of Aelian and Apollodorus.[58] Practical information of which books to bring on campaign and where to store them appear in the treatise of Constantine VII. The latter advised his readers to include in the imperial baggage-train *military manuals, books on mechanics including siege machinery and the production of missiles and other information relevant to enterprise, that is to say to wars and sieges*.[59]

In Constantine VII's inventory we also find reference *to historical books, especially those of Polyainos.* If we assume that Constantine VII does not refer to a lost work, he seems to be expressing his preference for synopses of historical works. Indeed, one can perceive Polyaenus' *Stratagemata* as a work comprising of excerpts of military and moral conduct deriving from historical and non-historical sources. The book supposedly fulfilled a utilitarian purpose since it was intended to accompany Marcus Aurelius (161-180) and Lucius Verus at their Parthian campaign (161-166). Constantine VII himself acknowledged the educational value of history and attempted to disseminate it by commissioning the *Excerpta Constantiniana*. This work exemplified the vast accounts of classical historians by dividing them into thematical sections (e.g. *On Defeat, on Battles, on Combat*). It functioned as a source book of ancient exempla for proper moral and practical conduct. To be sure, Constantine VII was not alone in his recommendation of history as a suitable reading, similar exhortations are also found in other manuals, such as the *Taktika* of Leo VI, *Sylloge Tacticorum* and the *De Obsidione Toleranda* (c. 950).[60]

58 Psellos 2014: 1.33; 7.137; 7.180 (trans. Sewter); Komnene 2001: 15.3.6; See also Simokattes 1887: 1.14.2 with Whitby 1988 and Chatzelis 2019: 94-8; 2020a.

59 Constantine VII 1990: C.196-9.

60 For the *Excerpta* see Flusin 2002 and c.f. Németh 2018. 185-230. For the value of history and past knowledge in matters pertaining to war see Leo VI 2014: 15.29, 20.213; *Sylloge Tacticorum* 1938: 1.10; Anonymous 2003: 67.1-6 with Sullivan 2003; Chatzelis 2019: 50n.20, 88-98; 2020a.

The fact that books of history served the general well and that they constituted part of the ideal military curriculum is corroborated from additional evidence deriving from different types of sources. To begin with, Byzantine historians themselves perceived their works as having such didactic value. For example, Michael Attaleiates reports that history is *exceedingly useful for life, as it reveals the lives of those who were virtuous and those who are not.* Attaleiates continues to note that historical narratives *lead us to imitate what was discerned well and to avoid ill-advised and shameful deeds in wars, battles, and in all other most necessary offensive adventures and challenges of defence.* Although Byzantine historians usually modelled their prefaces on that of ancient historians, it would be unwise to dismiss their statements merely as a *topos*, for there is evidence to support that Byzantine generals found historical narratives useful.[61] The most detailed exposition of how history could benefit a young and inexperienced commander comes from Julian the Apostate. In his panegyric dedicated to empress Eusebia (353-360), Julian the Apostate thanked the empress for assisting in his education and noted that he used to bring books of history in his campaigns. These books, Julian explains, provided young men experience as well as a mature judgement and understanding, constituting a *means of liberal education for the character (...), like a craftsman (...) setting before oneself as patterns the noblest men and words and deeds, one moulds his own character to match them, and make his words resemble theirs*.[62] A seventh-century Byzantine historian, Theophylaktos Simokattes, records that the brother in-law of emperor Maurice, general Philippikos, turned to historical narratives too. He is described as very fond of learning, drawing *his military knowledge from the experts of the past* and imitating Scipio.[63] Although such references may have served to enhance the profile of favoured generals, we should not too readily discard them as mere rhetoric. A document written for practical reasons, the will of Eustathios Boilas, demonstrates the interest of the aristocracy in such readings. Among the possessions of this eleventh-century provincial magnate one finds *two chronicles* and a *book containing the Persica and other things* which scholars associate with a classical history or with the sixth-century histories of Procopius and Agathias.[64]

Other influential readings which shaped the ideals of the aristocracy were promotional and glorified narratives, in prose and verse, dedicated

61 Attaleiates 2011: 6-7 with Neville 2016b.

62 Julian 1932: 15.12-38.

63 Simokattes 1887: 1.14.2. with Whitby 1988.

64 Boilas 1977: 155-6, 161-2 (trans. Vryonis) with Lemerle 1977: 15-20, 29-63 and Rapp 2017: 65-74. c.f. Vryonis 1957.

to the deeds of famous emperors, warriors and generals.[65] A characteristic example is the appearance, from the tenth century onwards, of several laudatory biographies of generals. Although such works are now lost, there is both direct and indirect evidence of their existence. In *Theophanes Continuatus* we learn that a certain *krites* and *protospatharios* Manuel covered in eight books everything about the wars, writings and prowess of John Kourkouas, the most significant military figure of the early tenth century. Likewise, Michael Psellos alluded in his *Historia Syntomos* to lost narratives which recounted the exploits of Nikephoros II Phokas, stating that *many detailed writings have been published* about him, *both by contemporaries and by authors shortly after.* Based on careful analysis of historical narratives, scholars have argued that Byzantine historians mined such texts for information. Leo the Deacon and John Skylitzes, for example, included material in their histories which originally belonged to laudatory biographies of Bardas Skleros, Bardas Phokas and Katakalon Kekaumenos.[66] As regards similar works written in verse, one would undoubtedly include epic poetry. The most popular reading should have been the *Iliad* which was among the basic textbooks of Byzantine classroom. The *Katomyomachia* (Cat-mouse battle), a lesser-known twelfth-century work, could have also fulfilled a similar role since it has recently been perceived as a mock epic, serving as an introduction to epic poetry for young students. In spite of its satirical tone, the *Katomyomachia* features the same military ideals as the historical poems of Theodore Prodromos.[67] The poems of George Pisides and Theodosios the Deacon, which recounted the deeds of Herakleios I (610-641) and Nikephoros II against the Persians and Arabs respectively, as well as other lyric works, such as the *Song of Armoures* and *Digenes Akrites,* may have also acted as exemplars for the military aristocracy. To these we may also add songs produced by local bards who, according to Arethas of Caesarea (d. 939), *having composed I do not know which songs about the adventures of famous heroes, go from door to door to sing them*.[68]

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65 To the genres discussed below, we could perhaps add dispatches and reports which informed the public about the progress of a campaign. For an example see Italikos 1972: 40 where Meles, the *logothetes tou dromou*, is mentioned as having prepared a letter, allegedly written by John II from the battlefield, to announce and describe how he prevailed over his enemies in Cilicia and Syria (1137-1138). See also Tornikes 1968: 100-2 where Demetrios Tornikes, *logothetes tou dromou*, fulfills similar functions. For relevant discussion see Sinclair 2012: 150-208; McCormick 1986: 192-6; Shepard 2005: 179-80; Kaldellis 2014.

66 Constantine VII 1838: 427-8; Psellos 1990: 98.82-5 (trans. Aerts). Regarding the sources of Leo the Deacon and John Skylitzes see Holmes 2005: 240-98; Kiapidou 2010; Shepard 1992; 2018. See also Markopoulos 2006.

67 For Homer in Byzantium see Browning 1975; Nesseris 2014: i.238-40. For the *Katomyomachia* as mock epic see Marciniak and Warcaba 2018.

68 For Arethas see Grégoire 1975: 385 (trans. Andriollo); For Pisides and Theodosius the Deacon see Sullivan 2019: 124-32; Andriollo 2011; Lauxtermann 2003-2019: i.38-40,

The will of Boilas seems to confirm the interest of the aristocracy for idealised narratives of warfare. Among the books of the magnate, we find *the Alexander* and *the Pisides*, probably denoting the *Alexander Romance,* a collection of legends revolving around the exploits of Alexander the Great, and Pisides' epic poems. Heroes of poems and romances were considered so exemplary that they adorned the halls of the *oikoi* of the military aristocracy. Legend has it that the dining-chambers of Digenes Akrites featured *the triumphs of all the illustrious men of valour from the past (...), |Achilles' legendary wars (...), |Odysseus' marvellous daring against the Cyclops, |Bellerophon killing the fire-bearing Chimaira, |the triumphs of Alexander, the defeat of Dareios.* Imperial structures and monasteries founded by military emperors depicted similar scenes. Basil I preferred Hercules and his labours, while the Komnenoi portrayed the feats of older emperors as well as the martial accomplishments of Manuel I. The latter was also depicted in various cities throughout the empire as a standard of virtue and bravery, triumphing over his enemies.[69]

Much like the illustration of brave deeds, advisory, parenetic and technical literature facilitated the mental, ethical, and technical preparation of the aristocracy for the challenges of warfare. On the technical side, one could consult various treatises related to matters which pertained to warfare. For instance, Xenophon's *Kynegetikos* expounded on the essentials of hunting, while his *Hipparchikos* and *Peri Hippikes* could be mined for ideas and insight regarding the responsibilities of cavalry officers, horses and riding. On a similar topic, veterinary treatises, such as the *Hippiatrika* of Constantine VII, could also prove useful.[70] Byzantine tacticians highlighted the benefits which came with a general able to speak and write well. Such a leader was expected to win the hearts of his subordinates and to have a detrimental effect on their morale. He could either address them in a fitting manner, or read to them fake letters supposedly sent by the

56-8, 65-8, 92-3, 130-40, 180-206, 263, ii.26-35, 41-9; 148-57, 216-23, 285. For epic poems and songs see also Grégoire 1933; Adontz and Grégoire 1933; Alexiou 1990; Thanopoulos 1990; Andriollo 2014: 131; Beck 1971: 48-63; Beaton 1993, Ghidoni 2016. For common *topoi* in romances and epics see Moennig 1993 and Hook 1993.

69 Boilas 1977: 160-1 (trans. Vryonis); Anonymous 1998: G.7.85-95. For a recent overview of Pisides' life and works see Vassis 2019. For the *Alexander Romance* see Jouanno 2002. For art depicting mythological figures as well as the hunting and martial deeds of Alexios I, Manuel I Komnenos, Alexios Axouch and Andronikos I, see Choniates 1975: 333; Magdalino and Nelson 1982: 126-30, 132-5; Mango 1986[2]: 197, 224-8, 234-5; Sinclair 2012: 407-12; c.f. Mango 1986[2]: 190-1 where Boris I's desire to paint hunting scenes is perceived in negative terms.

70 For the *Peri Hippikes* and the *Kynegetikos* see, most recently, Dillery 2017; Thomas 2018. For the *Hippiatrika* see McCabe 2007. For Xenopohon's *Peri Hippikes,* see Tomadaki 2018: 87.

emperor. To live up to the task, the general could consult generic treatises on grammar and rhetoric, such as the *progymnasmata*, but also the specialised treatise of Syrianos Magister on military harangues.[71] Treatises on natural and supernatural phenomena were also deemed useful: manuals on climate, weather, thunders, winds, rains and earthquakes were not only useful to fleet officers, but to any military leader wishing to interpret and manipulate their manifestations. Depending on the situation, phenomena were interpreted in a natural or supernatural manner. If they foretold bad omens, the natural explanation could reassure the troops. In turn, if they denoted divine support and providence, they were interpreted in a supernatural way. The same applies to sign and dream interpretation. The general could cite them as proof of divine favour or fake their occurrence with a view to boosting the army's morale.[72] For broader moral, military and intellectual edification, the general could consult advisory and admonitory treatises. Apart from mirror for princes, which were strictly addressed to emperors and heirs, generals and officers could turn to works to the like of Katakalon Kekaumenos (c.1075-1078). He was a high-ranking military officer and provincial magnate who produced a treatise including relevant advice ranging from court politics, holding of imperial, military and civilian offices, to stratagems, proper military conduct, as well as the handling of private estates and affairs.[73]

Even though these readings appear quite diverse, Byzantine aristocrats seem to have occupied themselves with them. To begin with, eloquence featured among the positive traits of soldier-emperors. For instance, Michael Psellos called Romanos IV Diogenis (1068-1071) *both a soldier and a rhetor* praising him for combining *words with weapons, bows with verses, verbs with charges* and *wisdom with armour.* Similarly, the bishop Euthymios Malakes compared Manuel I to Leo VI the Wise only to conclude that Manuel I deserved this adjective better, for he could address his subjects with elegant fine and delightful words. To cement Manuel's superiority, Malakes added that Manuel I was not only wise but

71 For Syrianos' treatise see Syrianos Magister 2010 with Zuckerman 1990; Karapli 2010; 2014: 307-8; Theotokis and Sidiropoulos 2021: 1-55. For rhetoric in Byzantium see Kustas 1973; Jeffreys 2003b. For the impact of rhetoric on military manuals see Roueché 2002; 2003.

72 For the psychological preparation of the Byzantine army see Karapli 2010. For the interference of astrology, dream interpretation and fortune telling in military and political affairs see Leo VI 20.179 20.213, 20.78-80 with Grünbart 2010. For manuals on dream interpretation in Byzantium see Oberhelman 2008: 1-58; Mavroudi 2002; Angelidi and Calofonos 2014.

73 For the Kekaumenos, mirror for princes and *florilegia* see Roueché 2002; 2003; 2009; Odorico 2003; 2009; Païdas 2005; c.f. Buckler 1940-1941.

also an *energetic fighter, great in bravery, and most experienced in military command*. Malakes culminated his praise and wondered with a rhetorical question: *O what an emperor and teacher! O what a soldier and rhetor, such that it is a matter of debate which cuts more trenchantly – his sword or his tongue?*[74] To highly cultured military men we can include John Geometres who authored a rhetorical treatise, Nikephoros Ouranos who inquired about the now lost rhetorical treatise of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the *Attikistes,* and Nikephoros Bryennios who authored a history and was also congratulated on his vibrant style by Michael Italikos. In the will of Eusthathios Boilas, among his books we find the *Oneirokritos* (dream interpretation) and another, entitled *Questions of Grammar*, which we can connect to proper writing, speaking and military haranguing. It may not be a coincidence after all that some of the specialised books discussed above were recommended by Constantine VII for inclusion in the imperial baggage train: *an oneirocritical book, a book of chances and occurrences, a book dealing with good and bad weather and storms, rain and lightning and thunder and the vehemence of the winds; and in addition to this a treatise on thunder and a treatise on earthquakes.*[75] In the reign of Manuel I, we find an educated man with military duties, Elias, who owned *a book on the subject of thunder and earthquakes*. Elias used the book and his knowledge to interpret the occurrence of a thunderclap in the sky of Constantinople during a doctrinal dispute.[76]

Indulging in diverse reading was also recommended by Katakalon Kekaumenos. The latter advised his reader to *read a lot* in order to *learn a lot*. He encouraged him not to abandon the task if the material seemed incomprehensible at first. For *when you have gone through the book frequently, knowledge will be given to you by God, and you will understand it.* Kekaumenos scorned hasty and impatient readers who were keen on reading through the material quickly. Like most Byzantines, he nurtured respect for the book as an object, and favoured a deep study of it. Quick and partial reading was a trait of gossipmongers, Kekaumenos argued. To the multitude of possible readings, Katakalon Kekaumenos adds a final source of military edification, the books of the church. Acknowledging the surprise of his audience, Kekaumenos explained that dogmas and church books can prove beneficial to soldiers. A diligent reader was to gather

74 Psellos 1994: 18.35-6; Malakes 1941-1948: 48-9 with Magdalino 1993: 466-7. See also Manasses 1906b: 1-20

75 Boilas 1977: 160-2 (trans. Vryonis). For Geometres' treatise see Geometres 1972. For Nikephoros Ouranos see Ouranos 1960: 22. For Nikephoros Bryennios see Bryennios 1975: 371-7. For Constantine VII see Constantine VII 1990: C.193-204. See also Andriollo 2014: 134-8 and Jeffreys 2003a.

76 Choniates 1975: 211 (trans. Magoulias)

from them *edifying stories, but also maxims of intelligence, of morality and of strategy; for,* Kekaumenos notes, *nearly all the Old Testament is stories of strategy*.[77] A good example of what Kekaumenos might have had in mind is the *Book of Joshua*. The story has it that God instructed Joshua to capture the city of Ai by employing a stratagem. Joshua proceeded, setting some of his men in ambush and advancing with the other part of his army against the city. When Joshua feigned retreat, the garrison pursued him, allowing his concealed men to *rise up from the ambush and seize the city for the Lord.* The message conveyed by this story could have had multiple layers. On a strictly military level, the capture of Ai highlighted the effectiveness of stratagems. Given, however, that Ai was taken with God's advice and approval, the story could also denote that victory is a reward of piety and faith. On a different level, the fact this victory was sanctioned by God, could also mean that He saw deception and trickery as acceptable means for prevailing against the unfaithful during a just war.[78]

Such stories would have been quite accessible since the Bible was the most popular, most copied and most widely read book in the Middle Ages. It comes to no surprise that Bardas Boilas possessed at least five books containing the Old and New Testament. More stories of piety and bravery could be found in the deeds of Sampson and David, which allegedly adorned the halls of Digenes Akrites' house, and in other popular readings such as *vitae*, with the most relevant being that of military saints, like the story of St. Theodore who slayed a dragon. More on the theoretical and moral side, stories of military men featured in the New Testament as well as in narratives which recorded tales of the Desert Fathers.[79]

Conclusion

Although there was no official military education in Byzantium, one would ideally acquire such an upbringing and edification with private care. This education was usually offered by aristocratic families under the guidance and supervision of the father and/or various tutors who

77 Kekaumenos 2013: 2, 3 (trans. Roueché). For books and reading in Byzantium see Cavallo 2008; Hunger 1995.

78 *Joshua*, 8.1-21 (NRSV). For such an interpretation from a twelve-century western monk see Gratian 1879: ii.894-5, 2:894-5. See also Whetham 2009: 44-5. For an overview of the Byzantine culture of war see Stouraitis 2009; 2018.

79 Anonymous 1998: G. 7.63-84; Anonymous 1909: 127. For military saints and the Byzantine army see Walter 2003; White 2013; Grotowski 2010; Karapli 2010: 128-133. For common themes between *vitae* and epic poetry see Ghidoni 2019. For the New Testament and the Desert Fathers see Iosif 2006; Wortley 1995.

would instruct the young aristocrat in the art of war physically, morally, intellectually and mentally. This military upbringing was sometimes supplemented with the study of various literary works, directly or indirectly related to warfare, which military men read through the course of their lives. Although this type of education did not apply to all members of the aristocracy, its appearance in eulogized narrative dictates that it was considered the proper way to go, while the evidence of alternative sources (e.g. documents and letters) reveals cases of military men which generally lived up to the task.

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LANGUAGES AND IDEAS OF EDUCATION OF ARISTOCRATIC WOMEN IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD AS POTENTIAL CATALYST OF CHANGE*

Abstract: Whilst the noblest of women of the European early modern period were often highly educated, a difference in status and future planned for her meant variation in education, including its language and the purpose it would serve. This paper analyses education among selected noblewomen from the late fifteenth until the mid-seventeenth century. Their education and particularly that of languages did not end in their childhood and they acquired remarkable knowledge throughout their lives. The paper follows language used in the education of several women e.g. English, Lady Margaret Beaufort, English Queen Mary I, Spanish Catherine of Aragon, or the heiress to the Swedish throne, future Queen Christina. Their education will be looked through the medium of language, as well as material that was employed in their instruction – which ranged from prescriptive literature written by clerics and humanists specifically for their female charges to their own 'school-essays'. These will offer a glimpse into language(s) of instruction of these high-born ladies and in the existing notions behind such schooling. Furthermore, investigation of their education will not stop at their youth, but intends to incorporate their efforts in spreading or employing such learning throughout their lives.

In this way, a rather comprehensive picture can be achieved of the language(s) of schooling among noble women – a mother of a king, a queen consort, a princess regent or a queen regnant – and of philosophical ideas behind it that as elements of change in societies.

Keywords: women, education, languages, humanism, Devotio Moderna, Margaret Beaufort, Mary I Tudor, Christina of Sweden.

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Introduction

It is well known that the noblest of women of the European early modern period were often highly educated. Despite this general quality, a difference in their status and the future planned for them dictated variation in education, including languages of instruction and the purpose the schooling would serve. Education that these women acquired did not end with their youth; this is particularly the case of learning languages, which signified that they acquired remarkable knowledge throughout their lives. The state of education among noblewomen of European aristocracy and royalty was the result of the social and religious norms of their time, which had been gradually altered through cultural and religious movements that spanned several centuries, and changes in family structure, marriage market, consequently leaving the imprint on the women's learning.

Humanism, Devotio Moderna, and Reformation, all affected women's education to a certain extent. The fifteenth century in England witnessed the religious movement coming from the Netherlands that would be seen as the precursor of the Reformation, as well as a form of humanism coming from Italy that was characterized by the superficial relationship between the English aristocratic patrons and the concept itself (Petrina 2004: 6). This connection characterized the schooling of noble girls. Humanist treatises on women's education written in the early sixteenth century were characterized by a gendered related need to reconcile their curriculum with the norms regulating foremost chastity. The instruction of women in what we see as humanist education had the only sense if it strengthens them in obedience towards the moral values already in place. It was with this in mind that girls' curriculum significantly diverged from boys' in terms of books used. Thus, the solution arrived in the form that favoured literally and grammatical studies without dialectic and rhetoric. In connection to it, humanistic education employed Latin in its instruction, while simultaneously facing the gendered dichotomy between vernacular and female on one side and Latin and masculine on the other (Gibson 1989: 14, 18). Particularly there has been the notion that the schooling for girls became more frequent with the Reformation until it became universal, fostering simultaneously a change in the perception of the role of women in the society and also their education accordingly (Green 1979: 101).

This paper follows language used in the education of several women: the English aristocrat Lady Margaret Beaufort (1441-1509), the English Princess and later Queen Mary I Tudor (1516-1558), whose Spanish heritage played a significant role in her studies, and the heiress to the Swed-

ish throne, future Queen Christina (1626-1689). Their education will be considered through the medium of language, as well as material that was employed in their instruction – which ranged from prescriptive literature written by clerics and humanists specifically for their female charges to their own 'school-essays'. These will offer a glimpse into language(s) of instruction of these high-born ladies and in the existing notions behind such schooling. Furthermore, investigation of their education will not stop at their youth but intends to incorporate their efforts in spreading or employing such learning throughout their lives.

Aristocratic women selected for this study belong to the countries and communities situated on the European periphery, which meant that their humanist education was characterized by the time and space in which they lived. There were differences between the education of females in fifteenth-century England, which was dominated by Devotio Moderna and the seventeenth century Sweden which was never influenced by the Italian humanism. The Italian humanism of the fifteenth century had a libertarian flavour, while the early sixteenth-century humanism of Erasmus and Thomas More was less libertarian, but was characterised by a humanitarian and pacifist footprint. Neither of the two trends prevailed in seventeenth-century humanism that reached Sweden. Around 1600 the interpretation and use of classical authors became more pragmatic and compared to the past, they were adapted more explicitly to the needs of officials involved in the formation of the first modern States. Seneca and Tacitus, who lived during the Roman Empire, became the most beloved classical authors, while Republican Cicero presented an ideal of style but certainly not a political ideal. Keeping these cultural variables in mind, a rather comprehensive picture can be achieved of the language(s) of schooling among noble women – a mother of a king, a queen consort, or a queen regnant – and of philosophical ideas behind this education that acted as elements of change in their societies.

Lady Margaret Beaufort (1441-1509)

Ever since the nineteenth century, Margaret Beaufort's biographers traditionally emphasize her education unusual in mid-fifteenth century England. Unfortunately, we don't have much information on Lady Margaret's early studies, but her educational effort in her later years is detailed enough to allow a glimpse of her learning. Lady Margaret is one of the women whose educational endeavours reached beyond her childhood, not in the least due to an early marriage at the age of twelve and the birth of her only child, the future Henry VII at the age of thirteen.

Early life and learning

We can only gather that Lady Margaret could read and write English and was fluent in French. Her knowledge of Latin was very basic, as much as that she could only read and understand titles of the Sermons, and according to John Fisher, she lamented that she had acquired a better command of the language. However, learning Latin in England of the time was reserved for men who would enter the clergy. Lady Margaret was not an exception in her education among the Beaufort women either since Margaret's great-aunts are believed to have been first ladies in England who learned to write and Lady Margaret was deemed one of the most prolific letter-writers in her own right (Routh 1924: 16). She, as a young aristocratic woman, an heiress to a fortune, was taught to be a good and devout Christian, so much so that she was known for being a patron of pious literature in later years. Her cultural and religious environment was characterised by the movement known as Devotio Moderna, where private devotion extended to the laity, and profound empathy for the passions and suffering of Jesus Christ was accentuated. Vernacular religious writings mostly in English and French served as guidance for the laity to strengthen discipline in their private lives (Armstrong 1983: 135-36). In line with this, it is not surprising that during her life she succeeded to have the pope recognize her as the patron of the feast of this cult, which enables for the mass of the cult to be held in her chapel (Jones, Underwood 1992: 176; Powell 1998: 208).

The piety of Lady Margaret Beaufort or any other young female could not be looked at separately from their familial relations and was usually exercised through the bequeathing of books and manuscripts. It is well known to the historiography that Lady Margaret owned printed books and manuscripts that had been gifted to her by her family members. The so-far most well-researched biography of Lady Margaret shows us that she inherited a psalter from her mother, which this distinguished lady had received from her father-in-law. Namely, the bequeathed part of a psalter, which had belonged to John Earl of Somerset was included in the new *books of hours illustrated by the London printer William Abell*, and only as such was passed on to Margaret, who in turn changed its function a bit, so that it suited her purpose in the history of the events surrounding her (Krug 2002: 71). Lady Margaret received several books after the death of her mother-in-law, Anne Neville, duchess of Buckingham. It is known that she was given not only the literature aimed at helping the laypeople practice devotion, such as "*Legenda Sanctorum*, a book of saints' lives, translated into English; a lectionary in French; and a primer bound in red velvet and clasped in silver-gilt" (Jones, Underwood 1992: 172), but also

books more secular in kind, such were accented by her biographers "'*a book of French called Lucun*', a French version of the works of the silver-age Latin poet Lucan. She was to leave not only mass books but classical epics and the Canterbury Tales" (Jones, Underwood 1992:173).

Collaboration with printers

Book consumption

Despite her life being filled with the personal and political drama surrounding the age, Margaret Beaufort had time for scholarly pursuits. Lady Margaret Beaufort stands as the epitome of the relation between aristocrats and early printers in the early book consumption and dissemination processes. Her most famous patronage was that of Caxton and his successor, Wynky de Worde, Richard Pynson (Powell 1998: 207). Lady Margaret's household was a perfect example of a market for the books on devotion and meditation that got out of Caxton's press (Schutte 2015: 7). Caxton printed several books of devotional literature at Lady Margaret's request, most famously John Fisher's *A Treatise Concerning the Fruitful Sayings of David, King and Prophet* and Henry Watson's translation of *The Great Ship of Fools of This World* (Powell 1998: 212). Another book that he printed at Lady Margaret's request and that deserves special mention is William Atkinson's translation from Latin of the first three books of The *Imitation of Christ*, not the least since she had a special attachment to it (Jones, Underwood 1992: 184). Interestingly, her relation with Caxton commenced with him selling her romance literature, originally from the thirteenth-century French source, called *Blanchardin and Englantine* (Powell 1998: 206, 212). It was the first book which printing she is known to had commissioned and which recounting held a striking resemblance to the contemporary political events involving her family (Jones, Underwood 1992: 182). For Caxton, who had been a staunch supporter of the House of York during the War of the Roses, this meant an expression of complete support of the opposite winning side; total acceptance by a most important member of the Tudors, Margaret Beaufort, he had received some year earlier when printed the *Life of St Winifred*, whose cult was traditionally Lancastrian (Lowry 1983: 116).

Book dissemination

Lady Margaret's interest in contemporary learning through the rather novel method of book production extended to the propagation of the works. She ordered from Caxton a printed translation of *Blanchardin and Englantine* in 1488. It has been argued that in this way Lady Margaret ac-

tively pursued a policy of shaping the education of the younger generation. It would mean that in the case of *Blanchardin and Englantine*, Lady Margaret gave her seal of approval for its employment in the education of the young ladies of her circle and beyond. The claim that the printer Caxton held traditional views regarding the education of contemporary young women of the nobility (Schutte 2015: 12) could be extended to his patron. Although being was very modern in contemplating personal devotion, Lady Margaret held the old view on the importance o steadfastness in love and promise among the youth. Thus, according to the historians of literature, the text is an example of a transitionary literature between the middle ages and the early modern era (Schutte 2015: 13). Also, Caxton and Lady Margaret had a positive reaction to the female author – the famous Christine de Pisan. Namely, Caxton printed de Pisan's military manual *Le Livre des faits d'armes et de chevalerie,* translated into English as *The Book of Fayettes of Armes and of Chyualrye*, which cope Lady Margaret owned. Another de Pisan's work, in French *Epitre d'Othea*, was bequeathed from her sister-in-law (Nall 2011: 213). Lady Margaret's leading role in the dissemination of the printed word extended towards pious literature, as well. Wynke de Worde printed for her *Hilton's Scala Perfectionis* in 1494 and she circulated the book, presenting it to her lady-in-waiting. She was quick to grasp the value of printing as a means of disseminating pious instruction, ordering large assignments of works for her household. The extent of Lady Margaret's interest in books and learning, and her position in the sequence connecting the female audience with religious houses, can be seen in many dedications that were made to her (Schutte 2015: 8). Most importantly, these dedications demonstrate that Lady Margaret commanded the reading in a couple of languages – her native tongue, English, and French.

Translations

Margaret Beaufort was the translator and the buyer of the printed copies of her translations (Jones, Underwood 1992: 182-83). Her translator's efforts render her unique among many aristocratic female contemporaries with a passion for reading and book collecting. She translated only from French since her knowledge of Latin was sufficient solely for reading headings of her service texts. Lady Margaret's old friend, John Fisher commented recalled in a text issued after her death, how she had regretted not studying the language more studiously in her youth (Fisher 1906: 16-17). Thus, Lady Margaret translated *The Mirror of Gold for the Sinful Soul* from the French edition. The tract was written for the use of perpetuate penitents – like Margaret was – consisting of seven chapters, one for each day of the week, dealt with the filthiness and misery

of man, sins in general and their effects, penance, ways to flee from the world, false riches and vanity, death and the joys of paradise countered with the pain of hell (Simon 1982: 106). Lady Margaret's most renowned work of translation is considered the *Fourth Book of The Imitation of Christ by Thomas à Kempis*. The goal of the new translation seemed to be an easier style that was more accessible to the laity. As it is mentioned above, Lady Margaret entrusted translation of the first three books of *The Imitation of Christ* from Latin into English to William Atkinson a fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. Lady Margaret took part in bringing the devotional literature closer to those who needed instruction and were without the knowledge of Latin. Margaret Beaufort, thus, translated the fourth book from the French version. Translations of all four books were published by Pynson in 1503 (Hosington 2011: 194; Jones, Underwood 1992: 184-5).

Despite a continuous interest in Lady Margaret Beaufort's life and deeds since her death until the current times, only very recently her achievement as the first woman translator of the English Renaissance was acknowledged (Hosington 2011: 188). As her confessor and protégée John Fisher stated, Lady Margaret translated for the profit of others (Fisher 1906: 16), placing it with collection of books, and dissemination of knowledge in the context of practical piety. Notwithstanding Lady Margaret's translator's activities, her patronage of humanism, her life that spanned the traditional divide between medieval and early modern era, determined her actions unjustifiably as late medieval, but still medieval. Such perceptions in historiography owe to the different character of English humanism in comparison to the French of Italian, which also peaked at a later date. Furthermore, such a reading of her life and activities likely owes to her collaboration with the monastic orders of Carthusians and Bridgettines, and their influence in translation into English and dissemination of the ecclesiastical literature – a connection that may seem to the modern historians as a pure trait of the Middle Ages (Hosington 2011: 190; Powell 2004: 211-24). However, recently literary historians of the period recognized Lady Margaret as "the *only* female translator of the works in Europe throughout the whole medieval and early modern period, commanding a place among monks, priests, and university-trained men" (Hosington 2011: 203). Indeed, Lady Margaret did not influence women's education and emancipation with a direct purpose. However, she pioneered by example in the domain reserved for men, paving the path for more Renaissance female translators to come, such was Margaret Roper, daughter of Thomas More and a friend of Renaissance philosophers such as Erasmus (Goodrich 2008: 1021-1040; McCutcheon 1988: 249-268).

University endowments

Margaret's concern for her mortality extended to patronizing Oxford and Cambridge universities, endowing divinity professors in both and taking founding Christ Church College and St. John's College in Cambridge. It is seen that her interest in education focused on extending the higher education of men. Her interest in the education of women, as we can see, stopped with patronizing devotional and sometimes secular literature for young women of her class. Given the circumstances of the time, it would have been both unusual and unachievable to extend options of higher education to women of any social strata. It is far more likely that it would never occur to the vast majority of Lady Margaret's contemporaries regardless of their sex and class.

Mary I Tudor (1516-1558)

Queen Mary I Tudor, known as the Bloody Mary, was viewed as an unusually well-educated royal woman. Even though she remained the only child of Henry VIII with his first wife Catherine of Aragon, and for some time was considered the heir apparent, her status was never definite. On one hand, Henry VIII strived to obtain more children with Catherine of Aragon, and when it was obvious that the history would not take this turn, Henry VIII sought to beget more children with other wives in hope of producing a male heir. A strong desire for a male heir on the part of kings was not only the product of his inclinations but also a demonstration of the social and political reality of the period in England. The lack of the male heir could have proved fatal for the dynasty, since the ruling female, either as a regent or a queen regnant was difficult to be accepted by the English peers, as both recent and older history proved in persons of Margaret of Anjou who tried to insert herself as the regent and Queen Mathilda. Nonetheless, Mary's ambitious mother Catherine of Aragon, strived to give the princess Mary humanist education that would render her the suitable queen regnant or queen consort. Maria Dowling notes that as humanism developed in the early sixteenth century, learning and reading for women became more acceptable. She goes so far to claim that Catherine of Aragon saw humanism as a suitable approach that would instruct and allow her only child to become the Queen regnant if possible (Dowling 1986: 223-237). The study model which was employed in Mary I Tudor's education cannot be contemplated without taking into consideration her mother's broad instruction in humanistic models of education and its specific Spanish influences. Instruction of Mary I Tudor was

strongly influenced by the Spanish humanism. It included above all learning of foreign languages and, most notably, instruction in Latin. The type of education she had received is best demonstrated by the famous manual written especially for her training by Spaniard Juan Luis Vives.

Humanist study model fit for a princess

Vives's *The Instruction of a Christian Woman* was first published in Latin, as the *De Institutione Foeminae Christianae*, and first printed in Antwerp in 1524, with a dedicatory preface to Catherine of Aragon, a countrywoman of Vives. *De Institutione Foeminae Christianae* was translated into English and first published in England in 1529 as *The Instruction of a Christian Woman* (Schutte 2015: 20). The significance of the *Instruction* as the manual used in Princess Mary's education is seen in its character of the first systematic study to address the education of women, regardless of their natural talent for studies. The manual focuses on those aspects of instruction that would make a noblewoman a worthy companion to her husband, not a worthy humanist of her own merits (Vives 2000: 1). Vives composed *Instruction* having in mind that education of a woman was noteworthy for the state in as much that it meant a worthy helpmate for the men.

Whilst The *Instruction* denied a princess studying subjects such as dialectic, history, politics, and mathematics, it encouraged reading books that would improve her moral and spiritual life, without examining profound theological questions. The list of reading that Vives drew included a variety of authors and works: the Scriptures and life of saints, but also Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch which regard morality (Vives 2000: 16). Moreover, Vives also employs Quintilian in the manual, in the discussion on the early education and draws on examples from both the Latin writers of Spanish origin: Seneca, Lucan, Martial, and Isidore, as well as from Plutarch's *Mulierum Virtutes*, Valerius Maximus, Pliny the Elder and Aulus Gelius for ancient exemplars (Vives 2000: 23).

Despite his harsh view on women, which had been commented on by Erasmus, Vives repudiated the general idea of his time that knowledge, and particularly among women leads to unchastity, asserting knowledge would protect chastity, notion that was held by his fellow humanist Thomas More (Vives 2000: 14, 17). Nonetheless, Vives, just as the humanists of the time overpraises female chastity, placing warning to the princess that other virtues are worthless if this was lacking. In order to safeguard her, Vives prescribes denying love, depicting falling in love as a dangerous business, and asserts the idea of marriage based on convenience rather than mutual sympathies. Talking married women, Vives takes on another

trope of the humanist *querelle des femmes* – obedience and referring to Aristotle and St. Paul, obsessively instructs females that husbands' commands should be obeyed as the Gods. Conservative outlook on religious education among women is broken by Vives's advice for girls to pray in the vernacular and instructs the teacher to teach the girl in vernacular instead of in Latin (Vives 1912: 22).

As it can be seen, Vives's ambivalent, almost bipolar view on females and their duties regardless of class, demonstrates, to an extent, ambivalence of the woman's question in the period. In this, Vives's, on one hand, praises virtue among women, but, on the other hand, warns women not to strive after honours, as men do, unless they became foolish in men's eyes, thus losing their respect (Vives 2000: 21). Vives's ideas provided in the *Instruction* were very successful in propagating such conduct among females, as much so that the manual had been employed throughout the Tudor era and afterward throughout the seventeenth century.

Whilst Vives dedicated the *Instruction* to Catherine of Aragon, the Queen commissioned him to write another specific tract for her daughter's education, titled *Epistolae duae de Ratione Studii Puerilis*. Also before having written the *Instruction*, Vives dedicated another book specifically to Princess Mary. The book was written in Latin and it consisted of a short saying that aimed to guard Mary's mind in the same way thy physical guard would protect her body. In dedication, Vives mentioned her mother and advised the princess to look up to Catherine of Aragon as a model for learning. The book is called *Satellitium sive Symbola*, printed in 1524, and was never printed in England (Schutte 2015: 35). In the *Epistolae duae de Ratione Studii Puerilis*, Vives offers a comprehensive study plan for learning the Latin language, including writing and conversation, as well as examples of the authors which use will be of the greatest help in studying it. Thus, Vives adds Cicero, Plutarch (in Latin translation), Plato, Justinus, Florus, a good part of Horace; some contemporary works of Erasmus and More's *Utopia*, as well as Christian authors, such as Prudentius, Sidonius, Paulinus, Aratus, Prosper, Juvencus (Vives 1912: 144).

Whilst Juan Luis Vives was preoccupied mostly with instructing Princess Mary in virtue, her curriculum was more varied. Thus, we know that princess Mary studied Latin from a textbook that had been written specifically for her by Thomas Linacre's, Mary's first tutor. Linacre composed for her studies the *Rudamenta gramatices,* which were specific Latin instructions suitable for a young royal woman. Although it was Mary's father, Henry VIII, who had commissioned it, the book carries a dedication to the princess written in Latin (Schmitt 1985: 332; Linacre 1525; Thomson 1977: 26; for more on dedications made to Mary I Tudor, see: Schutte 2015).

Tractates authored by Vives conveyed the influence of a double origin on Mary Tudor's education. On one hand, the stronger and more preserving was the one coming from Spain. Since not only Vives was a Spaniard but dedicated his work to a Spanish Princess and her daughter, the position of women in contemporary Spanish society needs to be taken into account. Teaching the Latin language was an obvious effect of this influence. Furthermore, earlier, accumulated notions and teachings on the very issue on the female question that permeated humanistic societies affected Vives' writing. This type of literature had been present in Spain since the mid-fifteenth century and produced opposing views on the education of women. The early Spanish humanistic literature containing the positive outlook on the question, particularly the belief in women's superiority compared to men's, was the one that influenced Vives's opinion (Vives 2000: 24, 26). Interestingly, the other influence arrived exactly from the North in the form of Devotio Moderna, which is regarded as a precursor to the Reformation. Having been formed in the Netherlands, the movement existed in England during the fifteenth century, and in its last decade reached Spain. It has been proven that Vives's works have elements of Devotio Moderna, in as much that he intermingled devotional quotations from various church fathers in his texts (Vives 2000: 29). Therefore, paradoxically, the influence in Mary Tudor's education indirectly arrived also from Northern Europe, despite the direct influence on the education of the aristocratic young women arriving from the Spanish cultural milieu through her mother and Juan Luis Vives.

Not unlike her great-grandmother, Margaret Beaufort, Mary Tudor engaged herself in translating works into English once she passed her girlhood and was able to employ the knowledge of languages even further. Whilst Lady Margaret lamented that she had not learned Latin sufficiently well to translate from this language, Princess Mary was fluent in Latin. Despite the religious Reformation that her father enacted during her youth, Mary took part in translating the Erasmus' paraphrase of the Gospel of St. John from Latin into English for Catherine Parr, the last wife of Henry VIII. The translation was done at the Queen's request. Although the work of translation is not completely Mary's work, and it was publicly known that the majority of it was her deed (Duffy, Loades 2006; Schutte 2015: 23; Vives 1912: 148).

Mary I's instructions as the Queen

Mary I Tudor continued her education in her adulthood, as it can be deduced from dedications written by the authors of the books in her possession. Even when she became the queen, humanist writers, who were always male, showed a need to educate her, the queen, but a woman,

in disciplines they thought she needed further instructing. The themes these books covered ranged from classical literature and philosophy to the topics on obedience and religion, the last two usually being connected. Namely, due to the Reformation that England had undergone, Queen Mary I was supposed to learn how to bring her subjects back to Catholicism through obedience. Valeria Schutte, the scholar who researched book dedications to Mary I, accentuates the lack of books regarding statecraft (Schutte 2015: 80, 50). However, keeping in mind the interconnection between contemporary politics and religion, this lack is not as present as it may seem. Although for the majority of people their libraries tend to reflect both the real person and the image they would like to project, in the case of a sixteenth-century-queen it becomes also the reflection of what others thought her interests were or should have been. Nonetheless, when she became the Queen, the English Parliament, in fear of her foreign husband, his political agenda and influence, allowed her official entry into the political world in a way reserved for men, thus conceptualizing her as "politically male", dismissing alleged inferiority of women (Jordan 1987: 428). This shows that the Parliament expected her to be able and knowledgeable enough in the matters of state to partake in the decision-making process as the head of the realm. Regrettably for the Parliament, it seems that Queen Mary I kept to the views of those who tried to educate her even in her adulthood and wished for her husband Philip II of Spain to have more real power in the matters of the internal affairs of England.

It is noticeable that Mary I Tudor was not active in promoting humanistic education among women, despite unusually broad instructions she had received. In that, she diverged from her mother, Catherine of Aragon, whose rounded education was well-known at the time.

Education of Catherine of Aragon

The study model which was employed in Mary I Tudor's education cannot be contemplated without taking into consideration her mother's broad instruction in humanistic education and its specific Spanish influences. It is highly possible that Catherine of Aragon joined her own experience with advice offered by her humanist compatriot Vives to create a perfect educational model for a young aristocratic woman who was being raised in the humanist atmosphere of the sixteenth-century English tradition. Catherine herself received enviable education on the insistence of her mother Isabella of Castille, who employed a pair of humanist brothers Antonio and Alessandro Geraldino to instruct her daughter. It seems that Catherine acquired an education more thorough than was offered to women of similar positions in England, since she could read and write

Latin in her childhood and used this knowledge to read the Scriptures (Vives 1912: 8-9). Despite being a foreign princess, Catherine of Aragon was seen as the most significant devotee of learning after Margaret Beaufort. Although Lady Margaret Beaufort propagated higher education with establishing professorships in Oxford and Cambridge and financing Cambridge colleges, she was endorsing formal education given to men. The innovative part of this striving for education was that Catherine of Aragon broadened the scope of the humanist influence on the education of young ladies, not in the least due to her only child being a female.

Keeping in mind Catherine of Aragon's education, which was organised by her mother, Queen Isabella of Castille, and its further influence on her daughter's instruction, it is necessary to mention that Catherine of Aragon's humanistic education stimulated the development of literature in England that pertained to the education of women and was part of the so-called *querelles des femmes*. It has been observed that the authors of treatises dealing favourably with the question were all in awe of Catherine of Aragon; these included – Juan Luis Vives, Richard Hyrde, Sir Thomas More and his daughters, and Sir Thomas Elyot (Vives 1912: 11). The name of Erasmus of Rotterdam needs to be added to this list of Spanish and English humanists. In 1526, Erasmus dedicated *de Matrimonio Christiano (Institution of Christian Matrimony)* to Catharine. Erasmus emphasized the continuity of sound women's education, and to it essentially connected female virtue, which originated from Queen Isabella and through her daughter, the English Queen Catherine, was transferred to Princess Mary who followed in their footsteps. (Vives 1912: 9-10; Schutte 2015: 32). Richard Hyrde's translation of Vives' work from Latin contains dedicatory preface to Catharine of Aragon in which he emphasizes the necessity for education among women: "For what is more fruitful than the good education and order of women, the one half of all mankind..." and particularly knowledge of Latin: "...I wished in my mind that either in every country women were learned in Latin" (Vives 1912: 30).

Discussing the differences in opinions on women's education among these different thinkers who surrounded Mary I's mother would go beyond the aims of this essay, constituting another theme. However, it needs to be mentioned that their thinking fostered a liberal tradition of English Renaissance thought, which encouraged autonomy in the intellectual investigation in women, despite "Hyrde's conception of the relationship between the book's morality and the reader is organic" versus "Vives's mechanical" approach. (Joseph Benson 1992: 180-81) Despite these, Princess Mary was close to the forefront of the developing ideas regarding women's education, which understood the need to incorporate knowledge of languages, particularly Latin, so that humanistic education would be achieved among women.

Despite her well-planned humanist instruction, it seems that Queen Mary I did not achieve substantial results in educational purposes, neither for general education, as was done by her great-grandmother, Margaret Beaufort, nor was she seen as the key player in advancing humanist education among women, as was done by her Spanish mother, Catherine of Aragon. She was viewed in the dramatic times of braking with the Papacy, as the stakeholder responsible to bring back the masses towards the true faith of Catholicism with its stricter view on women and their abilities.

Christina of Sweden (1626-1689)

Although Queen Mary I Tudor became the Queen of England after the death of her much younger half-brother Edward VI, she was educated to become a worthy consort of a European royal, as was the case with the princesses of the time. However, there was a noteworthy exception.

Fast-forwarding around hundred years on and navigating to the far North of Europe, and another newly Protestant country, Sweden, could be found on the map. Swedish King Gustav II Adolf was defending the country and Protestantism on the German battlefields and had designated his only child Christina to inherit him on the Swedish throne. Gustav II Adolf's wish was fulfilled and his daughter Christina (1626-1689) reigned as Queen Christina (1632-1654).

Whilst Queen Christina's boastful remarks of her education has been received with ambiguity by her contemporaries and later historians alike, it would be difficult to dispute broadness and inclusiveness of the humanist schooling she obtained. Young Christina was most likely the best-prepared princess of the period to succeed a throne. Gustav II Adolph instructed Chancellor Oxenstierna that Christina was to receive "the education of a prince", but to be trained to only two traditionally feminine practices: modesty and virtue. (Woodhead 1863: 14)

Early Education

At the time of Gustav Adolf's death, Christina became a child queen at six years of age. And for some time was moved between her mother Maria Eleonora and her paternal aunt Katharina, who her late father had designated to look after the child monarch.

Christina's humanist education, as intended by Gustav II Adolf, commenced with the passing of her aunt, when the only tutor responsible for her education became certain Matthiae – a Lutheran theologian, her father's friend, who he had designated as his daughter's teacher. The late

King imagined education for his daughter to be similar to his own in many ways, but primarily in its humanist character, unusual in an almost emancipative multitude of its masculine features, yet a heritage of Renaissance traditions reserved for princes. It was under Matthiae's tutorship that Christina's curriculum took account of languages essential for a prince.

Testimonies of Christina's aptitude for languages had been recorded and its prolific number perpetuated over the centuries among both her contemporaries and modern historians. One of Christina's most ardent devotees was surely the French Ambassador to the Swedish Court. Despite the vast difference in age and life experience, Chanut quickly became besotted with Christina's broad knowledge and her command of languages, especially French. Chanut mentioned that Christina spoke Latin, French, German, Flemish, Swedish and during his time in Sweden, she was studying Greek. (Chanut 1675: 242)

Despite being acquainted with the French language during her stay with her aunt Katharina and her family, who used the French language for everyday communication in their home, Christina was obliged to undertake a more profound study of it. It was at the age of twelve, under the auspicious Mathiae's tutelage that the child monarch commenced a rather organized tutoring in French grammar. It was at the age of twelve, under the auspicious Mathiae's tutelage that the child monarch commenced a rather organized tutoring in French grammar. "She speaks French as if she had been born at the Louvre, she has a quick and most noble mind, a soul wise and discreet, and she has a certain air about her. Her every pastime is the Senate of her study or her exercise. She speaks Latin very easily and she loves poetry. In short, even without the crown, she would be one of the most estimable people in the world." (Buckley 2002:98) Throughout her life, Christina showed her preference for French.

Regardless of her personal language preference, Latin was the language of the day. Christina's reluctance to master spoken Latin was a serious challenge to Matthiae's teaching authority. On several occasions, it seems, the young queen promised Matthiae that she would have talked to him solely in Latin and she had broken the promise. Nonetheless, she mastered it enough to impress ambassador Chanut some ten years later. Furthermore, it seems that she did not have such a negative reaction at the written word – starting from 1636 young Christina wrote letters in Latin to her cousin Charles Gustavus. (Arckenholtz 1750: 38)

German was the first language she learned to speak in her family, particularly with her German mother, Maria Elenora of Brandenburg. (Pizzagalli 2002: 39) She also communicated to her uncle, Prince Palatine in German, while the letters she addressed to his Swedish wife and her "dearest aunt" Katharina were written in Swedish. (Arckenholtz 1750: 34-36)

Use of Languages in Adulthood

It is indisputable that not only a prince, but also a Western European aristocratic woman of the age was taught foreign languages. It is necessary to be understood what a humanist based education meant for an underage female ruler and more specifically what knowledge of several foreign languages signified for Christina in practice.

Knowledge of Latin language was essential for studying history, which was in term viewed as indispensable in the education of the future ruler. Hard work in studying it offered benefits – indulging in the stories of statesmen and heroes of antiquity. The classical texts she studied acquainted her with literature, philosophy, and history, whilst the latter, with real examples of achievements and failures, served as the model for political education of the young monarch.

Thus it was not a surprise that Christina glorified Alexander the Great, Julius Ceaser, or Cyrus the Great. The result of her youthful infatuation were her essays on the life of Alexander the Great and Julius Ceaser demonstrate her inclining towards the unrestrained monarchical rule. Also, they serve as proof of changed use of classical texts in the education of a seventeenth-century prince. With Matthiae, Christina read the works of Livy, Terence, Cicero, and Sallust. (Woodhead 1863: 85)

Christina held a continuous interest in Tacitus, which was cultivated by an expert, the royal Librarian, Johan Freinsheim, who instructed Christina in most of Roman history. (Buckley 2002: 49) She was well known for reading Tacitus in her early adulthood and discussing the work with learned foreigners at her court in the early years of her independent reign. One such a foreigner was the French Ambassador Chanut whose admiration of Christina's ability to comprehend the complexity of the text was expressed in his Memoirs, stressing that where the more learned stumbled, Christina was able to express the meaning of the Latin word in French with remarkable ease. (Chanut 1675: 242) However, Christina was not attracted by Tacitus's style as much as by history.

Instruction in the ancient languages only solidified her own opinion about Lutheranism, but also about other Christian creeds. However, despite her active inquiry into the religious matters, her youth was marked by the strong idealism of neo-stoicism in her belief system. The person responsible for introducing her to this philosophy was none other but her tutor Matthiae, a Lutheran priest with uncommonly liberal views. The theologue rightly observed that initiating the child monarch with the revived ancient Stoic ideas, which were transformed so to be attuned to Christianity, would have offered a just balance of different types of bravery to Christina's impulsive temperament, trained in boyish virtues of the

antiquity. This was even more appropriate and even indispensable, since Christina was after-all a female with unconventional freedoms, who daily had contact with men's unhampered behaviour. It offered her spirit restrain without constrictions caused by a dogma.

This humanism was not the classical one of the Renaissance. The Swedes did not remember Italian humanism anymore, neither the humanism of Erasmus. It can be added that even humanism of the twelfth century escaped Sweden, an epoch in which erudite culture did not even exist. (Lindberg 1990: 35)

Having studied languages in childhood enabled her to apply them in communication, and to employ them in learning and practicing other arts necessary for the contemporary ruler. During and after her reign, Christina cultivated an image of a Sybille of the North and Pallas of the North. This she did by bringing to her court numerous scholars including linguists and philosophers.

Her linguistic training facilitated possibility to create a group of her own consisting of a cosmopolitan group of intellectuals – predominantly French, but also German and Dutch and Danes: Johann Freinsheim, the Royal Librarian who instructed the Queen in Tacitus, Roman history and even Greek in her adulthood, linguists Issac Vossius and Nicolas Heinsius, a Latinist. (Buckley 2002: 103) Regarding Christina's instructions of Greek in her adult years, she undertook them with zeal and without flippancy, almost exhausting herself with her famous five hours of sleep and early morning revision, but did not achieve quick results.

Christina's desire to study various ancient languages was sparked by her interest in the occult, which permeated the early science of the time, implying that the knowledge of biblical languages enabled deciphering the secrets of the ancient times. Queen Christina intended to found a school of theological linguistics at the new university at Dorpat, which was supposed to be taught by the philologists chosen and brought to her court. (Buckley 2002: 103)

Queen Christina's humanistic training coupled with her innate need to learn for the sake of learning and her father's emancipatory and pragmatic ideas, created an awe-inspiring person with various idiosyncrasies. As it is well-known Christina did not converse only with linguists at her court. René Descartes was the most famous of her invitees and his death during his visit to her court brought a shadow of notoriety to Christina's endeavours. It is not known what exactly the Queen and the philosopher had discussed, but it has been believed that Christina was far more interested in moral philosophy than metaphysical questions, particularly since Cartesian philosophy signified for her a clarification of complexity of moral problems. (Lindberg 1990, 43; Mackenzie 1931: 47)

She continued the practice of holding salons when she abdicated the throne of Sweden and moved to Rome, remaining patron of scholars such as Blaise Pascal.

On the list of Queen Christina's contemporary reading material that instructed her in the recent history and real politics was William Camden's biography of English Queen Elizabeth I, written in Latin. (Camden 1972) It can be easily imagined that Christina's regents saw the English Queen as a model female ruler developed Renaissance culture she had cultivated at her court and the mastery of her statesmanship. However, it seems that Christina never took to the idea.

Despite her erudition, Christina had a disdain for women and anything feminine and emphasized her manly heart and soul, which allowed her to reign just like a man. In her later years, Christina held a position against all female rulers, stating that women were weak in body and mind and if there had been strong women it was not because of their sex. (Christina of Sweden, Raymond 1994: 121-23, Woodhead 1863: 95) Christina's humanist education, coupled with her experience as a female ruler did not encourage her to promote education for women.

Conclusion

Female rulers, consorts and mothers of the kings, the noblewomen of the powerful aristocratic houses, were not only symbolic but real influencers in the late medieval and early modern period, whose impact or lack of it had genuine effects on spreading of contemporary ideas. The education they received influenced the way they related to the dissemination of humanistic teachings. While Lady Margaret Beaufort's education was shrouded in the notions of Devotio Moderna, she strived to keep contact with humanists such as Erasmus of Rotterdam, who was her guest in his early years. Nonetheless, Lady Margaret did not pay specific attention to the propagation of the education of women apart from disseminating the literature she saw proper in the gendered milieu. Her great-granddaughter, Queen Mary I Tudor, was raised in an intellectual milieu that publicized the need for the education of females; a notion that was endorsed by her Spanish mother. Despite the opportunity, she did not spread the view that would allow education more equal to that of men. Finally, Queen Christina of Sweden was given the education of the prince by her father, yet despised femininity and did not hold them equal to men in either possibility for learning or wielding power. It brings us to conclude that they did not use their erudition to bring larger positive changes to the women of their societies.

In the developing atmosphere of English fifteenth-century humanism, which differed from the Italian in many aspects, Margaret Beaufort fit with her work into its characteristic activity of translation. At that time, this was very similar to what men did, whilst imitating Italian humanists – focusing on translations without original writing. Despite the similarity of the scope of her work, which was also influenced by Devotio Moderna, Lady Margaret's activity whilst employing the education acquired did not differ from men's in it, except that she understood no Latin, which is usually considered the sign of humanist teaching, and which lack signaled gendered upbringing.

Humanism in England started developing itself at the beginning of the sixteenth century – its uniqueness visible in writings of Thomas More and Erasmus, education of aristocratic women developed a little. Whilst the knowledge of Latin language among educated females was lauded, their employment of the knowledge of languages changed little. Moreover, the meeting of English humanism with the Reformation in the course of the century did not change much. High born ladies still produced most typical kind of literally production: vernacular translations of devotional texts. This was the most plastically visible in the case of Mary I Tudor, who did not push for the more comprehensive change in women's education, despite options available to her. Interestingly, a rare example of supporting the development of education among females is seen in her mother Catherine of Aragon; this may have not been the case if her only child was not a female. Neither Mary I nor a century later Christina of Sweden, another childless monarch, albeit unmarried, used their influence in this question. Their education, which philosophy consisted largely of religious doctrine or moral fables, Christianized stoicism or Neoplatonism with emphasis on private virtues remained the same for the next centuries.

Despite the opportunity, offered by their social position, to act as a catalyst of change in the education of at least noblewomen, where female education would come closer to male's, neither a mother of a king nor a married or unmarried queens acted. The fact that they were educated in societies that through the time fostered Reformation and its promissory notion regarding female studies.

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THE APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL RHETORICAL THEORY IN MODERN LANGUAGE EDUCATION

Abstract: In this paper we will discuss the possibilities of applying traditional rhetorical theory and strategies to modern concepts of linguistic education. Bearing in mind that the communicative teaching method is highly represented in today's language teaching, we will analyse the role of possible rhetorical instruments in achieving communicative competences as well as the improvement of the quality and successfulness of the education process. Modern pedagogical theories stress motivation as one of the key tasks of contemporary education, so we should attempt to determine what the traditional rhetorical resources needed for achieving this very important didactical goal are, especially in the field of extrinsic motivation. We should approach these aforementioned issues through the didactic triad – that is, through the relationship between teacher, student, and content (language) which will be based on the correlation between classical rhetoric postulates and the principles of modern glotodidactics. Finally, we should not observe the implementation of rhetoric in the education process solely through its role to empower linguistic skills, but also in the expression of opinions, ideas, argumentation, and a lively sense of communication, which were the real values of classical *paideia*.

Keywords: rhetoric, education, language, didactic triad, glotodidactics, *paideia*.

When we talk about rhetoric in general, we can notice that a large number of contemporary studies refer to its renaissance, or to the so-called 'revival' of the classic rhetorical postulates. So, we can say that its function and content has an increasingly interdisciplinary character. In modern rhetorical theory, there have been various attempts to redefine and determine the most important functions of rhetoric today. In this paper we will be focused on its pedagogical function. According to F. Egg-

lezou, the rhetorical *paideia* is still 'the only revolutionary educational approach for the formation of skilful, integral, critical persons, who may affront effectively the challenges of life both as individuals and as collective characters in the modern world' (2018: 1). This clearly points us towards the double essence of the concept of ancient *paideia*, as rearing and education. Therefore, we understand education not only as a process of learning and the application of what is learned in practice, but at the same time as an unavoidable moment in the process of shaping our spirit, moral principles, but also critical thinking and attitudes towards others.[1] And if *we* place this pedagogical function of rhetoric into *its* historical and cultural context in ancient times[2], we should refer to Plato, who also attributed a pedagogical role to rhetoric, observing it as an indispensable part of Greek *paideia*.[3]

This 'modernization' of classical rhetoric aims to contribute to a compact and exact study of communicative patterns today. Public speaking, as well as the complex system of today's mass communication, requires professional speech education and special preparation for when the speaker appears in front of an audience. Nowadays, rhetorical means are more and more present in scientific argumentation, i.e. in scientific persuasion. Therefore, their application can be observed from several aspects, i.e. the scientific level, from the terminology, through stylistics to the different patterns of communication which were based on classical rhetorical postulates.

In this paper we will provide a brief overview of the possibilities of implementing traditional rhetorical principles and strategies in the process of language education, with the remark that each of them individually could be the subject of a separate study.

Since modern pedagogical theories stress motivation as a one of the key tasks of contemporary education, we should attempt to determine

1 Werner Jaeger (1961), for example, considers the education process to be one of shaping or forming, while the role of the learning process is that of a mould with whose help the subject is formed.

2 See Walker 2011.

3 In Plato's *Republic*, but also in his *Laws*, the idea of education is inseparable from the idea of the state. The true purpose of the state system cannot be shown clearly and completely if the question of rearing is excluded (*Nom*. 642a, *Rep*.424b). According to D. Werner (2010), in his *Phaedrus* Plato provides a new definition of rhetoric according to which 'the art of rhethoric does not include only speeches in the Assembly, but also other speeches that are not strictly rhetorical' (*Phaedr*. 258d, 261a). So, 'rhetoric' will not include only oral speeches, but also certain types of written composition, and it 'encompasses a wide ranger of discourse' (Werner 2010: 22-23). In our opinion, its essential role in the system of modern language education should be sought here, especially in the domain of oral and written production.

what the traditional rhetorical resources needed for achieving this very important didactical goal are. We usually mention the following factors which represent a significant source of motivation in the teaching process: the psychophysical characteristics of teachers and students, the characteristics of the teaching content (curriculum), the use of different teaching media, sociocultural aspects and the teaching and learning environment. Hence, bearing in mind that motivational processes represent a complex framework involving all the participants in the teaching process, (teachers, content and students), our research is based on the correlation between the classical elements of rhetoric and the principles of modern glotodidactics. In other words, we will try to point out the applicability of the rhetorical approach in the teaching of foreign languages, which clearly reflects its pedagogical nature, dating back to ancient times. We should compare the elements of the didactic triad (teachers, content/language and students) with the traditional rhetorical elements (orator, speech and auditorium). Thus, we will be able to observe rhetoric and its influence from two levels: theoretical, through its historical evolution, and practical, through the application of its classical postulates in current pedagogical practice.[4] We can therefore say that the applicability of its postulates in all forms of modern communication, including the teaching process, can be viewed in its entirety, only if we look at its essence and role today from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives.

According to Aristotle, the skill of speech is possessed by one who knows how to recognize all available means of persuasion. The use of rhetorical strategies in teaching includes, above all, the ability to provide valid arguments for the purpose of presenting and assuring the credibility of the teacher's views. Here we are primarily concerned with scientific argumentation, which is scientifically based and whose basic precondition is a fundamental knowledge of the matter and issues behind the presented thesis. A very important moment in rhetorical theory for pedagogical practice, the rhetorical triangle of *logos*, *ethos* and *patho*s, should be mentioned here. In the first book of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines these three types of technical methods of persuasion, which are based on speech:

> Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου πορι̃ζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν: αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. (Arist. *Rh.* 1356a)
>
> Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove. (Trans. by J. H. Freese)

4 See Corbett and Connors 1999.

These are the categories which today represent the fundamental elements of public speaking, so we will observe the teaching process as a type of public speech. The *logos* would represent what is being said, therefore, the logical-argumentative component of speech, the *ethos* would represent the personal values of the speaker, while the component of *pathos* would represent the very nature of the presentation (suggestive, emotional, etc.) When it comes to the teaching process, the question arises as to which of these three basic elements are the most important in educational processes? The concept of *logos* is very broad and in addition to implying the logical basis of speech, it also suggests the use of inductive and deductive methods of reasoning, appropriate argumentation, and the systematic presentation which implies harmony between the lecturer's knowledge and her/his attitude towards the material she/he teaches. This component is, in our opinion, crucial in work with students, since the outcome of the teaching process depends on the teaching approach or method. It can thus be said that the implementation of certain rhetorical strategies in language teaching largely depends on the use of various teaching methods. So, it is our view that rhetoric can sometimes help to overcome the weaknesses of a particular method, especially when we are talking about the grammar-translation method, where some rhetorical elements and strategies can contribute to the material being presented in a lively and interesting way as opposed to being monotonous and boring. We should try to explain this problem based on our own pedagogical experience and on the results of research which we have conducted on this topic, primarily in teaching Classical Greek at the Department of Modern Greek Studies at the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade.[5] The results of the aforementioned research at our department confirm our hypothesis that in addition to the teacher's personality, the intonation, the rhythm of the speech, caesurae or other elements of non-verbal communication (for example, eye contact, rhetorical posture, clothing, gestures, and mimics) can also contribute to a better understanding and acquisition of some teaching content. We also paid a particular attention to the presentation method, where we emphasized the correlation between grammatical phenomena and vocabulary in Classical and Modern Greek, and where thanks to the mentioned correlation, the students saw the benefit in studying Classical Greek. Bearing in mind that Classical Greek is one of the most difficult courses for our students and that it is not, unfortunately, one of their main interests, we need to seek all the possible mechanisms responsible for creating the motivation for this subject, especially in the field of extrinsic motivation. On the other hand, in the teaching of the Classical Greek language, but

5 Cf. Elaković-Nenadović 2016: 77-87; Elaković-Nenadović and Stojičić 2015: 823-838.

also in language education in general, the grammar-translation method is still widely practiced, where reading and writing skills are the major focus. However, despite increasing criticism of this method, it is still used today, mostly in combination with other methods (Stern 1983: 454). According to certain modern theorists, the students play a passive role in language learning and the main focus is on the teacher who is regarded as an authority (the so called teacher-centered model). Since the emphasis in this method is on reading, writing, and comprehending the text, but not on listening and speaking skills (Richards and Rodgers 1986: 6), it is not able to meet all the requirements of today's communicative competencies in the teaching process. Despite all the efforts of modern glotodidactic approaches to improve level of language competence, especially in terms of oral production, some modern theorists believe that a large part of real communication in L2 in real life is very problematic and that language lectures generally do not prepare students for the problems they will encounter in every day communication (Dörnyei 1995: 78). Here we must underline once more the value of rhetorical *paideia* or pedagogy, because the diachronic study of the teaching of rhetoric can also offer some useful solutions to overcome such problems. The choice of a particular rhetorical strategy depends on the level of language competence. At the basic level of language acquisition rhetorical techniques are focused on the phonetic characteristics of the L2 language and on problems of articulation. Quintilian emphasized the importance of the appropriate tone of voice and clear pronunciation in speech.[6]

This includes a wide range of exercises when it comes to vocal expression, in the first place articulation which comprises breathing exercises, then a system of accentuation and acoustic elements such as: intensity, intonation, sonority, tempo of speech, and modulation. In addition to phonetic competence, the applicability of rhetorical strategies is also present to a considerable extent in the higher years of study where students are faced with more complicated language requirements, either in the field of oral or written production. This level of language competence requires students to participate in discussions which deal with much more complex topics and which include, among other things, the expression of their own opinion supported by a valid argument.

Criticizing the compilers of *Arts*, who argued that a speaker's honesty (*ἐπιεικεία*) does not contribute to the persuasiveness of his speech, Aristotle believes that this persuasiveness is based on the speaker's character as the most effective means of persuasion.[7] This component of *ethos*, em-

6 Quint. *Inst*. 1. 11.4.

7 Arist. *Rh*. 1356a.

bodied in the character and qualities of the one who speaks is, according to Aristotle, how the speaker gains the trust of his listeners.[8] The same opinion is shared by Quintilian who also assumes that the orator primarily represents a 'vir bonus', since an ideal orator should be of good moral character:

> Sit ergo nobis orator, quem constituimus, is, qui a M. Catone finitur, *vir bonus* dicendi peritus; verum, id quod et ille posuit prius et ipsa natura potius ac maius est, utique vir bonus. (Quint. *Inst*. 12.1.1)
>
> The orator then, whom I am concerned to form, shall be the orator as defined by Marcus Cato, 'a good man, skilled in speaking'. But above all he must possess the quality which Cato places first and which is in the very nature of things the greatest and most important, that is, he must be a good man. (Trans. by H. E. Butler)

This coincides with the basic theoretical principles of didactics, where besides the various types of different competences (social, pedagogical, intercultural, etc.), the teacher must also possess positive and humanistic-oriented personality traits (Durbaba 2011: 108). Thus, according to didactical theory, the teacher must possess certain virtues and qualities as an orator, and his role is not only to teach the students, but also to be responsible for a creative and positive atmosphere in the classroom. Our opinion is that emphasis should be placed on the teacher's personality, on his psychophysical characteristics and his ability to motivate the students and encourage them to find his subject matter interesting.

The speaker, in this case the teacher, gains trust not only through the content and argumentation of his presentation, but also via his authority and character. So, we can say that through someone's speech, the audience consciously or unconsciously observes, i.e. 'scans' both the moral beliefs and the character of the speaker himself. If they are found to be contrary to the personality and moral beliefs of the speaker, the speech will have no effect and will not leave any particular impression on the audience. When it comes to teacher competence, we can say that this competence is closely related to the knowledge of the material being taught, and the teacher's character refers to the confidence and trust he instils in his listeners. In this regard, persuasiveness and effectiveness increase dramatically if the professor's personality is also extremely likable (Powell and Powell 2010).

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle also discusses the concept of *pathos* and its role in achieving persuasiveness, stating that it is achieved when the speaker's speech arouses emotions in the listener.[9] He also says that 'the emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opin-

8 Ibid.

9 Arist. *Rh*. 1356a.

ion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain'.[10] Here he criticizes the compilers of *Arts*, stating that their attention is mostly focused on this type of persuasion method.[11] On the other hand, Aristotle also criticizes them for failing to mention the enthymemes which are the essence of persuasion, dealing instead with issues that are outside the case. Namely, they only discuss how to bring a judge to a certain state of mind, while they say nothing about technical methods of persuasion which represent the key moment in mastering the skill of rhetorical argumentation.[12]

When it comes to *pathos* in the classroom, perhaps we could say that it can be viewed as a dominant factor in terms of motivation in the process of mastering the material. Motivation is based on the curiosity and willingness of students to master certain material in order to avoid monotony and achieve the best possible interaction between teachers and students. This contributes to the fact that today we are moving further and further away from the passive form of learning towards more interactive teaching, where rhetoric can make a significant contribution with its traditional postulates and strategies. The secret to successful teaching may be said to lie primarily in the relationship between students and teachers, i.e. in the teacher's ability to establish contact with their students and achieve the synergy required to master the material. A lack of motivation is usually linked to the fact that some teachers have a bad influence on their students, with frequent criticism and rare praise, as well inconsistencies in the clarity of their presentations, but also omissions and misunderstandings in the communication process itself. Modern understandings of rhetoric and its role in the education system asserts that rhetoric is an art which deals with presentation, either oral or written, which should inform or motivate listeners, whether the audience is made up of one person or a group (Corbett and Connors 1999: 3). This would involve improving the overall competence of teachers through knowledge of the true needs of

10 Arist. *Rh*. 1378a.

11 The statements of ancient orators were usually accompanied by certain emotions and they also had a psychological function which is contained in the Greek term *ψυχαγωγία* (Plat. *Phaedr*. 261 A). This was often the case in court cases. Considering that the trial lasted for only one day and that the members of the court body, who were otherwise badly trained in the Athenian court system, had to pass judgment on that same day, we can conclude that the final decision was often a matter of the current mood and emotions of the audience. On the other hand, in ancient litigation it was not rare for the citation of certain historical events or quotations from poetry to take on the function of a particular rhetorical argument which was used as a substitute for adequate legal norms or inartificial proofs. Cf. Pearson 1941: 209-229; Perlman 1964: 155-172.

12 Arist. *Rh*. 1354b.

education, motivational capacity and empathic orientation. According to Brophy, this would exclude the authoritative management of classes. He points out the importance of the teacher's immediacy in the form of behaviours which promote physical and psychological closeness to students (Brophy 2010).

We should also treat these aforementioned problems through the didactic triangle – that is, through the relationship between teachers, students and content (language) which will be based on the correlation between classical rhetoric postulates and the principles of modern glotodidactics. In terms of the triad of the speech, the orator and the audience, this triad can be said to be fully applicable at the level of the teaching process and it also includes the already mentioned components of *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*. This triad, which dates back to ancient times, finds its application even today and represents one of the key elements in the theory and praxis of public speaking. When it comes to orators, ancient rhetoric has left us a plethora of important factors which affect the impression the speaker makes, and which are applicable in the teaching process: his appearance, voice, intonation, the psychophysical characteristics of the speaker, knowledge, suggestiveness (coloured by the emotional component, i.e. *pathos)*, nervousness, humour (as part of motivation), etc.

In his third book of *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses the parts of speech, stating that speech consists of two necessary parts: exposition (*πρόθεσις*) and methods of persuasion (*πίστις*):

> Ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις.ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλ εῖστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος: τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεων ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων (ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο), ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ προοιμίον, οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναμιμνήσκει. (Arist. *Rh*. 1414b)
>
> So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory. (Trans. by J. H. Freese)

The structure of our speech is also something that is dominant in the teaching process. Each speech, and thus lecture, consists of a logical and aesthetic component, i.e. its content and form. Here we can follow Cicero's five canons of rhetoric: ***inventio*** (where the student can express or outline his attitudes, ideas or argumentation in oral or written speech), ***dispositio*** (which concerns the body of speech or its organic composition),

elocutio (which is directly related to the style of speech), ***memoria*** (which assumes the preservation of the invented speech) and ***actio*** as his delivery either orally or in written form.[13] We must underline that each of these components could be the separate subject for more detailed research and that their application should be one of the main rhetorical strategies which improve the quality and efficiency of foreign language teaching. All of the above require good organizational skills on the part of the teacher, not only from the practical, but also from the theoretical side. Everything a teacher presents must be clear and precise, and must have its own logical order. This includes, for example, the choice of topic or subject matter, the preparation of lectures and their concept (*inventio*), then the arrangement of the subject matter in speech (*dispositio*), the style of presentation (*elocutio*) or the delivery of speech (*actio*), which could include the use of teaching media and other elements, such as vocal expression and body language.

We must also mention the crucial element of rhetorical pedagogy in ancient times. This refers to *progymnasmata,* which represent the preliminary rhetorical exercises which 'were designed to move the student from the relatively easy, elementary exercises in composition to the *suasoriae* and *controversiae,* the more difficult and comprehensive activities of declamation' which served to move the student 'from strict imitation to a more artistic melding of the often disparate concerns of speaker, subject, and audience' (Enos 2010: 562). Kennedy says that these preliminary exercises were assigned 'by Greek grammarians to students after they had learned to read and write as preparation for declamation and were continued in rhetorical schools as written exercises even after declamation had begun' (Kennedy 2003: xi). He also claims that these handbooks of *progymnasmata* may be interesting for modern teachers of composition, because they present a sequence of assignments in reading, writing, and speaking (Kennedy 2003: xx, xi).

The third component of the didactic triad are the students (auditorium). This also reveals the pedagogical character of rhetoric. This element of the triad is closely related to the communicative approach to language teaching. This teaching method aims to make communicative competence the main goal of language teaching and encourages activities which involve real communication and a high level of interaction between the teacher and students. F. Egglezou, for example, asserts that every debate 'consists of a dynamic, demanding and agonistic process or 'intellectual *agon*' (Daqing 2010: 6806), as well as of a particular form of public dialogue' (2019: 102). And as such, debate requires the participants to develop their intellectual and communication skills:

13 Cf. Egglezou 2018: 3; Enos 2010: 348-350.

a) the active listening to opposite arguments,
b) the direct critical analysis, deconstruction and the rebuttal of the provided argumentation through critical questions and counter-arguments,
c) the efficient linguistic support of the subjective interpretation that each team ascribes to the topic through the use of the appropriate arguments, and
d) the dialogic communication skills, which are required during the exchange of arguments (Egglezou 2019: 102).

It may be concluded that these skills can be greatly enhanced by using and applying rhetorical strategies in the process of language training. This includes the enhancement of linguistic skills, both in speaking and writing, especially in the application of the communicative method where the central figure of education process is not the teacher (as in the grammar-translation method), but the student. Our intention was not only to consider the aforementioned implementation of rhetoric in the education process through its role to empower linguistic skills. We also wanted to underline that rhetorical *paideia* has a broader context which assumes the expression of opinions, argumentation and after all, a lively sense of communication, which were the real values of classical *paideia*. We can say that the form and manner of expression in rhetorical discourse is significantly supported by the principles of modern hermeneutics, whose goal is the correct understanding of discourse. Hence, we can view rhetoric in this context as the hermeneutics of human society, i.e. as the art of human coexistence.

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APPLYING THE DIRECT METHOD IN THE TEACHING OF LATIN FROM ANTIQUITY UNTIL TODAY. HOW AND WHY?*[14]

Abstract: This article examines the advantages of using natural / direct method in learning foreign languages, with special regard to teaching Latin at present-day universities. Although the direct method has become popular in teaching foreign languages especially within last five decades, its history is much older. In the time of the Roman Empire we encounter such intellectuals as Quintilian and a few centuries later mainly Saint Augustine and Saint Jerome who were critisizing uneffective methods and painful practices in teaching Latin and Greek, which is also reflected in the ideas and writings of one of the most influential school reformers in the history of European Latin education, John Amos Comenius. These authors clearly realized that grammar-translation method is definitely not sufficient in teaching Latin as a foreign language. Therefore, at our universities the students are offered a possibility to having complementary Latin conversation classes based on the direct method which help them build new vocabulary and use actively grammatical structures learned in morphology and syntax courses. Finally the aim of this article is to show to which extent this complementary Latin teaching can be useful and efficient with nowadays students.

Keywords: Direct /grammar translation method of teaching languages, Latin as a foreign language, Latin conversation classes, school reformers, Quintilianus, Iohannes Amos Comenius.

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„Knowledge of languages is the doorway to wisdom."
(Roger Bacon)

Introduction

Ever since schools[1] exist, people have strived to tune the education process so that it yielded in best possible results with the least possible means. Today, we usually refer to such efforts as the reform of the educational system. In the course of the history of European schools, such reform efforts also marked the teaching of the Latin language. A number of pedagogues and reformers working in the period of the Roman Empire, in the Middle Ages or during Renaissance Humanism and the Baroque, sought ways of making language education more efficient, so that it would not bring to the pupils more suffering than joy. In the era of the Roman emperors, great reformers of language teaching, especially the teaching of Latin, included such personalities as the Roman rhetor and teacher Quintilian, Saint Augustine of Hippo Regius and Saint Jerome, and several centuries later mainly John Amos Comenius (born Jan Amos Komenský), whose textbooks and didactic manuals[2] are, in many aspects, still valid to this day.

It is a paradox that today, many teachers of Latin look back to these reformer pedagogues of European history, since the instructors realize that the teaching methods that many of them grew up with are not very attractive for the present-day young generation; on the contrary – often enough they cause difficulties and a dislike of learning this language, the contribution of which to the European culture and scholarship is undisputed. In an effort to make the teaching of the Latin language more effective, we often go back to Comenius, whose methods of teaching Latin are in many ways identical with modern approaches to the teaching of living languages, and students arriving at universities are familiar with them from secondary, middle or primary school as well as from language schools.

In this article, therefore, I would like to point out some of the alternative options of additional teaching methods of Latin at university level

1 One of the oldest educational institutions in the world was the writing school in Edubba, which was established shortly after 3500 BC. We learn about the existence of this educational institution from texts written in cuneiform script dating from the ancient Babylonian period from around 2000 – 1600 BC. See Åke 1975: 159-160. Regarding some aspects of pre-exile education in ancient Israel see also Tiňo 2013: 40-45.

2 These are mainly the works *Didactica magna*, *Schola ludus seu encyclopedia viva* and *Orbis sensualium pictus*.

based on a natural / direct method of learning languages.[3] These in no way do not replace the classical grammar-translation method; they are more of a complementary nature with a focus on practising specific language skills. When applying this method in lessons of Latin conversation[4], we are rooted in Comenius's pedagogical principles in more ways than one. This is why we can freely state that modern methods of teaching Latin that resemble the teaching of living languages are more of a return to what was common several centuries ago rather than some didactic *novum*. Mainly due to the decreasing interest in the study of Latin, and especially in the past two centuries, we have forgotten about this.

Learning a Foreign Language in the Roman Empire

In order to get a better understanding of the reform efforts of Roman intellectuals, first we need to look at to what degree was the knowledge of a foreign language, especially of Greek (but for the population living in the eastern provinces also the knowledge of Latin), important in the Roman Empire, mainly in the first two centuries AD.

If Iuvenal complains that Rome is turning into a Greek city[5] and that soon there would be more Greek to be heard than Latin, this does not apply only for the Roman aristocracy, which had a monopoly for formal education in the Greek language[6], but also for lower social classes, which had often been, at least to a certain degree, bilingual since the end of the Republic and they used Greek for private as well as public matters.[7] Naturally, the level of Greek language proficiency was not always sufficient and a number of intellectuals pointed out this phenomenon in the period of the Principate. As Tacitus writes, for example:

3 For the definition of a natural / direct method of learning languages see for instance Marek 2017: 127-152.

4 We have several years of experience with this method at the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, where Latin conversation is taught as one of the elective subjects for students of classical languages, as well as for those interested in Latin from other study programs.

5 Cf. Iuvenalis, *Satyrae* 3,60-68, p. 24: „Non possum ferre, Quirites, Graecam urbem. Quamvis quota portio faecis Achaei?"

6 Cf. Paravati 2011; also Marrou 1956, part III: 255-264.

7 Just like many Greek-speaking migrants in Rome had to learn to speak some Latin if they wanted to find adequate jobs in crafts or trade, this applied in the opposite direction as well. Roman tradesmen, craftsmen or soldiers who had connections with the population in the Eastern provinces found it beneficial to learn elementary Greek.

> „Nowadays, on the other hand, our children are handed over at their birth to some silly little Greek serving-maid, with a male slave, who may be any one, to help her, – quite frequently the most worthless member of the whole establishment, incompetent for any serious service. It is from the foolish tittle-tattle of such persons that the children receive their earliest impressions, while their minds are still pliant and unformed; and there is not a soul in the whole house who cares a jot what he says or does in the presence of its lisping little lord."[8]

But even despite certain risks, during the Principate the Roman elite preferred domestic slaves who knew Greek.[9] On the other hand, Quintilian is aware that together with the Greek language children need to also be taught their mother tongue. In his *Institutio oratoria* he writes:

> „I prefer a boy to begin by speaking Greek, because he will imbibe Latin, which more people speak, whether we will or not and also because he will need to be taught Greek learning first, it being the source of ours too. However, I do not want a fetish to be made of this, so that he spends a long time speaking and learning nothing but Greek, as is commonly done. This gives rise to many faults both of pronunciation (owing to the distortion of the mouth produced by forming foreign sounds) and of language, because the Greek idioms stick in the mind through continual usage and persist obstinately even in speaking the other tongue."[10]

Several centuries later Jerome has similar views, writing in *Letter* 107 dedicated to the education of young Paula:

> „And let it be her task daily to bring to you the flowers which she has culled from scripture. Let her learn by heart so many verses in the Greek, but let her be instructed in the Latin also. For, if the tender lips are not from the first shaped to this, the tongue is spoiled by a foreign accent and its native speech debased by alien elements. You must yourself be her mistress, a model on which she may form her childish conduct."[11]

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8 Tacitus, *Dialogus de oratoribus* 29,1, p. 29: „At nunc natus infans delegatur Graeculae alicui ancillae, cui adiungitur unus aut alter ex omnibus servis, plerumque vilissimus nec cuiquam serio ministerio accommodatus. Horum fabulis et erroribus [et] virides [teneri] statim et rudes animi imbuuntur; nec quisquam in tota domo pensi habet, quid coram infante domino aut dicat aut faciat."; English translation, p. 91.

9 Cf. Adams 2003: 761.

10 Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria* I,1,12-13, p. 9: „A sermone Graeco puerum incipere malo, quia Latinum, qui pluribus in usu est, vel nobis nolentibus perbibet, simul quia disciplinis quoque Graecis prius instituendus est, unde et nostrae fluxerunt. Non tamen hoc adeo superstitiose fieri velim ut diu tantum Graece loquatur aut discat, sicut plerisque moris est. Hoc enim accidunt et oris plurima vitia in peregrinum sonum corrupti et sermonis, cui cum Graecae figurae adsidua consuetudine haeserunt, in diversa quoque loquendi ratione pertinacissime durant."; English translation, p. 25-27.

11 Hieronymus, *Epistula* 107,9, CSEL 55, 300: „Reddat tibi pensum cotidie scripturarum certum. Ediscat Graecorum versuum numerum. Sequatur statim et Latina eruditio;

From these words it becomes evident how important was the bilingual education of the Romans in the time of the Empire. Especially more educated people realized clearly that the natural method of learning a foreign language from an early childhood was the best way of acquiring a certain degree of proficiency in it.

However, we need to keep in mind the fact that people arriving in Rome for work from the eastern provinces also came with opposite tendencies. If, for example, they wanted to find good employment as cooks, they had to learn at least some Latin. Population living in the East also learned Latin because they saw various advantages to it, especially if they were in the army. The Roman army used the Latin language and its knowledge benefited also those who made trade with the soldiers. Although Greek was also acceptable at business talks, knowledge of Latin was a certain bonus for tradesmen. Latin was also learned by those who wanted to practise Roman law and normally speeches delivered at court were also made in Latin. None of them usually had time for a formal study of Latin, which required a lot of effort and discipline, and so they turned to practical Latin manuals based on a direct, conversational approach, using elementary vocabulary and grammar necessary for dealing with a concrete situation.[12]

Generally speaking, in the Roman Empire it was customary that two types of official documents had to be produced in Latin – birth certificates and last wills. But even despite this practice, many of the documents were eventually bilingual. Birth certificates were a very important document because they were a direct proof of Roman citizenship. They were usually written according to a contemporary customary pattern and they were certainly prepared by professional scribes.[13] Similarly, the Roman citizens' last wills and testaments had to be written in Latin, a requirement that lasted until the reign of Alexander Severus (emperor in 222 – 235 AD). This requirement was once again linked to Roman citizenship since only

quae si non ab initio os tenerum conposuerit, in peregrinum sonum lingua corrumpitur et externis vitiis sermo patrius sordidatur. Te habeat magistram, te rudis miretur infantia."; English translation, p. 301.

12 Here we refer mostly to a textbook written by Dickey (2016: 2) where the author gathers examples of various conversational topics used in the time of the Roman Empire by Greek speakers learning Latin. Among the dialogues, originally written in Greek with the Latin translation, we find such topics that regard no only school matters but also everyday life, such as borrowing money from the bank, beaing at a legal court or at the doctor's, etc. From this it becomes evident that such manuals were probably used not only by schoolgoers but also with adults who needed Latin for professional purposes or in everyday situations.

13 An example of such a bilingual document in Egypt is the birth certificate of a certain Herennia Gemella, which had the name shown in Greek on the cover despite the commonly used Latin version. Cf. Adams 2003: 563-564.

Roman citizens had the right to have a Roman testament written. In the period following the rule of Alexander Severus last wills of Greeks in the Roman Empire were written in the Greek language.[14] So we can see that the Greek language was quite widespread during the Empire inspite of the fact that with the following decades and centuries its practical knowledge was slowly but surely diminishing, which becomes evident mostly in Late Antiquity.

On the other hand, the degree to which the Greek language was widespread among the lower social classes in Rome cannot be sufficiently documented because practically no adequate literary texts were preserved and authors writing from the perspective of the elite did not pay attention to this issue either.[15] Several literary writings originating in North Africa provide an interesting insight into the matter, although the situation in that region was quite specific. Knowledge of Greek was declining since the end of the 2nd century AD. The characters in Apuleius's novel *Metamorphoses* still document Greek culture among the population in the region, but starting in the 3rd century, Latin was implemented among the Romanized population.[16] Then we read in the works of St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo, that his knowledge of Greek was quite poor and that as a pupil, he even hated this language because the teaching methods at the time intensified the students' struggles more than their knowledge in the process of learning.[17]

Thanks to this experience, as a good pedagogue, he repeatedly considered the importance of the raising and education of young people of his era. In his *Confessions* he wrote that he was similarly dissatisfied with the form and content of education provided in schools.[18] At his time, this was especially true about the teaching of Greek as a foreign language. He writes:

14 Cf. Adams 2016: 564.

15 In academic circles there is no prevailing opinion about the degree to which the lower social classes in Rome spoke Greek during the Empire; demographic statistics and epigraphic documents from the period of the Principate suggest that knowledge of Greek was a lot more common than could be expected. For this reason, Iuvenal's older contemporary, Martial, claims that Greek was supposed to serve private needs but it was not to replace Latin in public life. Cf. Martialis, *Epigrammata* X,68,1-10, p. 341.

16 Apart from Punic and Berberian dialects spoken by the locals and the lower social classes especially.

17 In contrast to Augustine, several intellectuals from the Roman Empire point out the inappropriate teaching methods and *severitas* of teachers who physically punished the lack of knowledge or lack of interest of the students. Horace mentions in this connection that „magister erat plagosus" (Horatius: *Epistula* 2,1,69, p. 294; cf. Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 9,2, p. 12). Iuvenal adds to this: „Nos manum ferulae subduximus" (Iuvenalis, *Saturae* 1,15, p. 1).

18 Cf. Augustinus, *Confessiones* I,18,28-29, CCL 27, 15-16.

> „It was so difficult; and the difficulty of thoroughly mastering a foreign language seemed to sprinkle bitterness over those fabulous narratives for all their Greek sweetness, because I knew none of the words, and the threat of savage, terrifying punishments was used to make me learn them. Time was, in my infancy, when I had known no Latin words either, but those I had learned by paying attention, without any fear or pain at all, amid the cuddles of my nurses, and teasing, and playful, happy laughter."[19]

From this text it becomes evident that Augustine as a little child did not have an opportunity to speak Greek with a Greek governess or slave since his parents probably could not afford it. They did not come from an aristocratic milieu where bilingual education of children was not merely a question of prestige but something quite common. Starting Greek together with Latin at school was burdensome for the methods used were all but not motivating and did not stimulate child's intellect and curiosity.[20]

In another place of the same book of the *Confessions*, we read:

> „Even to this day I have been unable to make up my mind why I hated the Greek that was dinned into me in early boyhood. Latin studies, on the contrary, I loved, not the elementary kind under my first teachers, but the lessons taught by masters of literature; for the early lessons in reading, writing and arithmetic had been no less burdensome and boring to me than all the elements of Greek."[21]

Augustine's words clearly reveal that the demanding memorizing of Greek vocabulary and even whole texts were not an effective method of teaching a foreign language. He was aware that natural instruction based on non-forceful and, with children, even playful forms stimulating their natural curiosity and interest is a lot more efficient than strict drilling. In this re-

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19 Augustinus, *Confessiones* I,14,23, CCL 27, 13: „Videlicet difficultas, difficultas omnino ediscendae linguae peregrinae quasi felle aspergebat omnes suavitates Graecas fabulosarum narrationum. Nulla enim verba illa noveram et saevis terroribus ac poenis, ut nossem, instabatur mihi vehementer. Nam et Latina aliquando infans utique nulla noveram et tamen advertendo didici sine ullo metu atque cruciatu inter etiam blandimenta nutricum et ioca adridentium et laetitias alludentium."; English translation, p. 54-55. Cf. Augustinus, *Contra litteras Petiliani* 2,91, CSEL 52, 75. To the topic see also e.g. Sandy 1997: 9; for coercive practices in language teaching in the Roman Empire also Andoková 2017: 23-24.

20 For more information about the different aspects of *curiositas* in Augustine's thinking see e.g. Horka 2013: 601-609.

21 Augustinus, *Confessiones* I,13,20, CCL 27, 11: „Quid autem erat causae, cur Graecas litteras oderam, quibus puerulus imbuebar, ne nunc quidem mihi satis exploratum est. Adamaveram enim Latinas, non quas primi magistri, sed quas docent qui grammatici vocantur. Nam illas primas, ubi legere et scribere et numerare discitur, non minus onerosas poenalesque habebam quam omnes Graecas."; English translation, p. 52-53.

gard he appears to follow in the footsteps of the Roman teacher Quintilian who claims that: „Study depends on the good will of the student, a quality that cannot be secured by compulsion."[22] And so it comes as no surprise that Augustine's efforts at reform resonated with Comenius[23] who can rightfully be considered one of the most influential pedagogues and reformers of the school system in European history.

Let us then take a brief look at how some of the leading figures of Humanism and Baroque periods handled the pressing issues of the teaching of foreign languages, and Latin in particular, since they were far from indifferent about these challenges just like we face these challenges today.

European Humanists on the Importance of Learning Latin as a Foreign Language

In the 17th century, with the increasing influence of the French monarchy, the position of Latin as the universal European language started its gradual decline. During the reign of Louis XIV (king in 1643 – 1715), France became the most powerful country in Europe and also during the following century, it set the tone of the lifestyle of the whole of Europe. French has been established as the language of the European elites and diplomacy.[24] And so in the 18th century, Latin lost its powerful position and is limited to the environment of schools and universities where professors of rhetoric tried to attract the attention of academic youth with stylistic exercises and declamations. But the young have long lost interest in Latin and the teachers were facing the question of how to attract students. One of the options was to give up the old humanist ideal of the perfect mastering of a language (*eloquentia*) and the related extensive and often quite demanding study of the classics. Instead, children needed to be taught Latin effectively and with emphasis on what was necessary for its acquisition.

According to Stroh, two leading didactics of the new era shifted their attention in this exact direction.[25] This was mainly the German pedagogical reformer Wolfgang Ratichius (Ratke, 1571 – 1635) who was pushing

22 Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria* I,3,8, p. 20: „...studium discendi voluntate, quae cogi non potest, constat."; cf. II,5,15, p. 86.

23 Regarding some aspects of the influence of St. Augustine on the development of Comenius's pedagogical principles cf. Andoková 2007: 57-67.

24 Cf. Vertanová – Štubňa – Andoková – Moyšová 2020: 23-24.

25 Cf. Stroh 2016: 225.

German grammatical terminology.[26] He proposed a teaching plan based on which reading and writing in German was to be taught in the first three grades. Pupils were supposed to start learning Latin only after sufficient knowledge of the fundamentals of their mother tongue and this was to happen by the reading of authors[27] rather than by the study of the rules of grammar. Similar was the thinking of the extraordinarily well-educated and multi-lingual intellectual John Amos Comenius (1592 – 1670). Many consider this native of Moravia the greatest pedagogue of all times and his principle of „may everything flow by itself and may haste be foreign to things"[28] remains valid to this day.

Comenius's pedagogical opinions related to the teaching of Latin can be summed up in the following four key principles:[29]

1. According to him, the teaching of Latin needs a different structure, while always considering the specific mother tongue.[30]
2. Comenius advocated that children should speak Latin from an early age and the mistakes and imperfections can be corrected later. This principle is also expressed in his statement: „First, we learn to chatter in Latin, then to speak, and finally we move on to Cicero so that he can teach us to speak with finesse."[31]
3. According to Comenius, Latin didactics can be refreshed by the usage of language (*usus*) during classes which would precede the-

26 Concerning the impact of Ratke's teaching methods on German education in the 17th century, see e.g. Koupil 2015: 41-42.

27 Of the Roman authors, Ratke preferred in particular Terence. His principle of learning the language by reading and interpreting the works of Roman authors is also reminiscent of the above-mentioned quote (note 21) from the *Confessions*, where Augustine admits that he much preferred to learn Latin precisely by reading the works of Roman poets.

28 „Omnia sponte fluant, absit violentia rebus!" This quote comes from the title page of the Amsterdam edition of Comenius's *Opera didactica omnia*. This statement is traditionally derived from Ovid, whom Corinna's pregnant mistress begs not to undergo an abortion. Ovidius, *Amores* II,14,25: „Sponte fluant matura sua." („May what's mature follow its own path.")

29 See Comenius's four pedagogical principles in Stroh 2016: 226-228.

30 According to Pekarovičová (2004: 21): „When acquiring language competence, often underrated is the coordination of language education, the correlation of the teaching of the mother tongue and foreign languages, insufficient is the use of Comenius's well-known didactic principle that a good knowledge of the mother language is key to the learning of foreign languages and *vice versa*, knowledge of foreign language contributes to a deeper and comprehensive knowledge of the system of one's own language and the possibilities of its use." Own translation.

31 Comenius, *Novissima linguarum methodus* 7,23; in: *Opera didactica omnia* II (1648), p. 76: „Discamus primo Latine balbutire, tum loqui; tandem Ciceronem, ut nobis dicendi quoque commonstret artificia, adibimus." Own translation.

ory (*praecepta*). In this respect, he is a follower of Quintilian, who, at the beginning of our era, emphasizes that „usage is the best language teacher."[32]

4. Perhaps Comenius's most influential principle was the request of connecting the teaching of language with other subjects of study.

In fact, the perfection of a language acquisition should in no way be the objective of its study; rather, language learning should be a means of communication and a way to obtaining a desirable knowledge in a particular field:

> „Words should not be learned apart from the objects to which they refer; since the objects do not exist separately and cannot be apprehended without words, but both exist and perform their functions together."[33]

This was the objective of Comenius's manual *Orbis sensualium pictus* (*The Visible World in Pictures*).[34] It is a trilingual, Latin – German – Czech picture book that was printed for the first time in Nuremberg in 1658 and thanks to its 250 editions, it became perhaps the most successful textbook of modern history. It included a living alphabet that the children were to learn based on various sounds (*alphabetum vivum et vocale*).[35] In the textbook, Comenius uses the induction method, that is in the process of learning, he progresses from the concrete to the abstract. In this way, he follows the tradition of Francis Bacon[36] and on the level of elementary schools, he implements the visualization of knowledge.

However, not all humanists and pedagogues of the new era shared Comenius's approach to the teaching of Latin as a foreign language. The Spanish linguist Franciscus Sanctius "el Brocense" (1523 – 1600)[37], known as Sanchez, who lived about half a century before Comenius, in an appendix to his work *Minerva: seu de causis linguae Latinae* from 1587[38] for

32 Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria* I,6,3, p. 40: „Consuetudo vero certissima est loquendi magistra."; cf. II,5,15, p. 86.

33 Comenius, *Magna didactica* XXII,4, p. 163: „Primo vocabula rerum separatim discenda non esse, cum separatim res non exstant nec intelliguntur, sed prouti conjuctae sunt, hic aut illic existunt, hoc aut illud agunt." English translation, p. 204.

34 Comenius, *Orbis sensualium pictus – Svět v obrazích* (1658). In 2006, under the title *Orbis pictus Latinus* also a modern illustrated book was published for practising Latin vocabulary, which was undoubtedly inspired by Comenius's textbook. Cf. Koller 2006.

35 Latin alphabet in Comenius's work *Orbis sensualium pictus* and its sound form is discussed in the work Fijałkowski 2007: 164-179.

36 Cf. Anderson 1948: 290 and 300.

37 For more information on Sanchez and his grammar work, see Padley 1985: 269-282, especially 269.

38 See older available edition from 1761: Franciscus Sanctius, *Minerva seu de Causis Linguae latinae commentarius, cui inserta sunt, uncis inclusa quae addidit Gasp, Scioppius* (1761).

the first time discards conversation in Latin and allows only writing in this language due to care for the purity of speech. This was because in his opinion, during talking, people easily make mistakes and take over a number of wrong habits. Also, he was the first to suggest that Latin should be taught only for the education of historians which makes him close to the more recent attitudes to the teaching of Latin.[39]

In this respect, Sanctius is more of an exception to the usual understanding of the role that grammar is to play in the process of learning a foreign language, including Latin. With scholars of Humanism, it is more common to see the view that grammar is a means for the good mastery of language, but not the objective of education itself. This opinion was shared also by the humanist German school whose representatives implemented the principle already advocated by Quintilian – that grammar is basically *ars bene loquendi*. He claims that *ars grammatica* includes correct speech (*recte loquendi scientia*) as well as interpretation of poets (*enarratio poētarum*).[40] Humanists were interested in the practical use of languages, not only Latin but also vernacular languages. The target of their study was to be the practical usage in spoken speech.[41]

At this point, we still need to ask how are Comenius's pedagogical principles, as described above, reflected in current didactics of the teaching of foreign languages. His four key principles are found not only in today's theory of education but they are also, at least partially, applied in practice as well.

As for his first principle, we can ask ourselves the question, whether students of other fields than classical languages or history, really need to base their Latin education on the reading of such authors as Caesar and Cicero whose vocabulary is often quite distant from the reality of common people and from everyday conversations.[42] This is the reason why in the world, there are textbooks published that try to offer to secondary school and university students the option of learning Latin on the basis of simpler stories given in installments, while these reflect much better the reality of everyday life.[43]

39 Cf. Stroh 2016: 227.

40 Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria* I,4,2, p. 21: „Haec igitur professio, cum breuissime in duas partis diuidatur, *recte loquendi scientiam* et poētarum enarrationem."

41 Cf. Buzássyová 2016: 83; Izzo 1982: 335.

42 Such students do usually need to learn the basics of grammar and some vocabulary in order to understand the topic of the language and get acquainted with some famous Latin *sententiae* generally known as *Latina viva*.

43 At this point we refer to such Latin textbooks as e.g. Ørberg, *Lingua Latina per se illustrata. Pars I: Familia Romana* (2011) or Serbian textbook Dimitrijević – Pakiž, *Латински језик I – Latin language I* (2019) which is especially suitable for teaching

With respect to Comenius's principle no. 2, we can state that the direct method of the teaching of languages promoted today is widespread in the teaching of small children and is also popular among adults because it focuses on the ability to understand spoken foreign languages and to also be able to express oneself, even if not without errors. This method is especially appreciated by adult learners employed with international companies who use a foreign language foremost as a means of communication.

Related to the above is the third principle, according to which practical usage of a language should precede theory. In today's schools, it is reflected by the method by which children in grades 1 to 4 learn foreign languages. Although they are not familiar with many grammatical structures or their names, and they learn by repetition and imitation, in better cases also by practical speech in the given language. Principles 2 and 3 could at least partially be applied in the teaching of Latin as a dead language, especially with students from other majors than classical languages. It is even more true about secondary schools where there is excessive emphasis placed on the difficult Latin grammar and this may discourage students' interest in this language from the very start. There is also the issue of whether testing the students' knowledge based primarily on grammatical exercises is the only means of checking the acquired knowledge of the given language.

And finally, as for Comenius's principle no. 4, today the so-called "integrated thematic teaching" is perhaps the closest to it.[44] It is aimed at bringing together knowledge of individual subjects in a way similar to the one preferred by Comenius as shown in his textbook *Orbis pictus*.

Current Approaches to Teaching Foreign Languages

From the 1970s, emphasis in the teaching of foreign languages has started to shift from grammatical competence to the ability to communicate in the given language. Practical knowledge of a foreign language is

secondary school students. The basics of the study of Latin grammar are enriched by the story of the sequel about the family of Cicero and his friend Pomponia Attica. High school students build their vocabulary in an appropriate way, practise their grammar and at the same time learn something from the realities of the life of Roman society at the time, as well as from the life of Cicero himself. At Comenius University, Bratislava, we also use at Latin morphology classes a textbook called *ITA* (Dekanová – Jirkal 2011) which reflects modern approaches to teaching foreign languages. In this book similarly a story of the sequel about a Roman family can help students practise vocabulary and grammatical structures presented in every single unit. The only disadvantage is that vocabulary used there is not ordered thematically but rather depends on grammar dealt with in the specific unit.

44 Cf. Kovalik – Olsen 1994.

more than familiarity with grammatical phenomena.[45] Moreover, professionals today generally underscore that the skill of fluent expression in a foreign language is more important than grammatical accuracy. This, in consequence, means that the grammar-translation method[46] oriented on the instruction of grammar and translation from the mother tongue to the foreign language is being increasingly replaced by the direct method[47] based on the communication between learner and teacher.[48]

And so, provided we start from the supposition that these methods of teaching living languages are applied, at least partially, on the level of our primary and secondary schools, the logical conclusion is that college and university students arriving at the course of elementary Latin may somewhat be in shock or disillusionment when confronted with grammar rules that they have to absorb during the first lessons. For them, these are often a lot more complicated than what they were used to in the initial classes of English or any other contemporary language.

This is because today, in the early phases of teaching foreign languages usually emphasis is not too much on the learning of grammar but rather on communicational situations. On the other hand, for many students of Latin (not classical philologists) it may appear demotivating that after completing one semester, they are familiar with the basics of three declinations and, in an ideal case, with all four verbal conjugations but often they are incapable to compose a complete Latin sentence on their own, let alone a correct one. And so, we ask the question of who, or what, is to blame. Do we use incorrect and unmotivating methods that discourage students from the study of foreign languages as early as in ancient times, or does the fault lie with the learners who wish to achieve maximum results while putting in minimum effort? Seeking adequate answers to this question is similar to looking for the answer to the question of what came first, the egg or the hen? But one thing is certain: We can no longer remain in the existing *status quo* because the dropping numbers of new learners of Latin[49] are just as alarming as the usually

45 Cf. e.g. Hymes 1972.

46 The grammar-translation method is a method of teaching a foreign (or second) language, which uses translation and study of grammar as the main activities in the learning process and the teaching itself. See Richards – Schmidt 2002: 231; also Klimentová – Klimentová 2005: 2.

47 The direct method originated in the 19th century as a reaction to the grammar-translation method, and today it is also referred to as the Berlitz method. It focuses primarily on developing communication skills and pronunciation training. It is carried out in the form of a question and an answer. See more to this topic in Häuslerová – Nováková 2008.

48 Cf. Bálintová 2003: 26.

49 This is particularly true in Slovakia where the number of students learning Latin at university level has decreased considerably within the last decade.

quite humble achievements of those who do venture into Latin study, be it voluntary or required.

Latin Conversation Classes as a Complementary Instruction of Latin

The discussion with the Spanish linguist Sanctius, German humanists and mainly with Comenius's didactic principles is joined by contemporary pedagogues who have been advocating the direct method of teaching foreign languages. As we have mentioned above, the objective of this method is the practical usage of language. Here the question presents itself: What for should we apply this method in the teaching Latin since we cannot have practical communication in Latin in everyday life?[50] And while this is a valid question, the problem is something else. In this respect, we must ask another question: What is actually the role of conversation in the Latin language?

We used a questionnaire to inquire about the opinions of students of different age and gender groups, who have taken the course. We asked them the two following questions:

1) Do you think it makes sense to apply the complementary teaching of Latin by the conversational method?
2) If so, how can lessons of Latin conversation help you the most in your language study?

From among the students' responses, we selected the five following ones. The first three students (A-C) gave a completely positive answer to the questions and as their replies reveal, they do not see Latin conversation as some anachronism but rather as an opportunity to practise their theoretical knowledge acquired during the lessons in Latin morphology, syntax, and during the reading of texts written by Latin authors.

Student A

1) „Yes. Latin is then no longer tied only to the written text and thanks to this method, the students have new opportunities to practise its usage actively in concrete situations."
2) „To me personally, it is very helpful. Latin, this way, got into my mind and my ears. At the same time, during conversations I real-

50 We do not mean the use of Latin among experts at international conferences, in the Vatican or in institutions such as the Latin college *Vivarium Novum* in Italy, where Latin is still cultivated as a means of communication not only during the classes but also on everyday basis.

ized that it is one thing to learn morphology and syntax and another to really know them."

Student B

1) „Yes. At the Comenius University, Faculty of Arts, the students encounter classical, medieval, and modern Latin but I lack a practical experience with this language."
2) „My expectations from conversation are that the knowledge and language skills acquired during these lessons can then help with the translation into Latin and with the creation of sentences as well as with the expressions in real, everyday life by developing vocabulary."

Student C

1) „Yes. After all, during many centuries in the Middle Ages and in modern times, Latin was used in study as a communication tool. And so, with Latin conversation, all we do is return to what was common long before us."
2) „I am not good at grammar and I consider conversation as well as writing in Latin as the best method for vocabulary acquisition and the learning of grammar and syntax rules."

Student D[51]

1) „Generally speaking, yes. Every language we want to master well should be learned on a practical basis. Its passive knowledge can in no way be sufficient. However, I myself as an archivist will hardly use in my professional life Latin otherwise than passively. So it might be questionable whether it makes sense to put too much energy in speaking Latin if one cannot use it in everyday situations."
2) „If one chooses the course of Latin conversation, he or she can expect to improve practically all aspects of the knowledge of the language, especially vocabulary and grammatical structures that are hard to be remembered if learned only on a theoretical level without practical usage."

51 The remark of this student brings us back to Comenius's view of learning such biblical languages as Greek or Hebrew, which, in his opinion, do not need to be mastered perfectly because one does not learn them in order to converse with other people, but only to read, understand or eventually translate the text from these languages into their mother tongue. Cf. Comenius, *Magna didactica* XXII,2, p. 163.

Student E

1) „No."
2) „Latin today is a dead language and its study primarily focuses on passive work with written texts. And so, I do not see the reason or need to speak this language."

Together with our students, we are aware that practising syntactical phenomena based on isolated sentences, which are often used without any context, is often not efficient. This is because students usually remember the given rule at the time when they are studying it but in an independent context, they are unable to identify it.[52] When they have to use the particular rule or form of conjugation or syntax in a sentence, they have more chance to practise it and also to retain this knowledge, which is very helpful to them especially in Latin stylistics classes where they translate quite challenging texts from their mother tongue into Latin. Conversation lessons are also a useful tool for the practice and increasing of vocabulary, which is often passive unless the students use it actively. Today's students are used to learning a foreign language by the direct method by the means of the media, social networks and other communication channels and they consider the memorizing of vocabulary originating in the reading of authors lectures too difficult. Practice has shown that instead of looking up unknown words and their paradigms, students prefer to write the translation of the whole sentence – based on an available modern translation – above the Latin wording. This only further diminishes their ability to memorize the given lexeme and to use it practically.

Our questionnaire further revealed that among our students there are still some who do not consider such an option of perfecting their knowledge of Latin as relevant (student E) since from a dead language, such as Latin or Greek, they primarily expect its passive knowledge. However, based on our experience it is clear that such attitudes are more of a unique occurrence than a rule. Here we also need to keep in mind the fact that some are extroverted and others are introverted learners, there are more

52 Such examples may be e.g. the using of conjunctive in indirect questions, or the ablative absolute. When students study this in a lesson, they can usually identify it, or even form it themselves, but in other contexts they often have trouble distinguishing whether it is a simple or temporal ablative, or an absolute ablative, and so on. Here comes into play also the interference with mother tongue or other modern languages that students master. For instance, students tend to systematically use prepositions with the temporal ablative, such as „in die Mercurii" (instead of *die Mercurii*), or „in vesperi" (instead of *vesperi*) etc., being influenced by the English usage „on Wednesday", „in the evening". The practice has shown us that these mistakes are best eliminated by repetitive practical usage of these structures in conversational exercises.

and less linguistic types of students[53], they have varying internal motivations, etc. The direct method of learning a language is more appreciated by communicative types of students who dislike spending time over books and who also do not like memorizing vocabulary or grammar structures. And so, the contents and the level of difficulty of the Latin conversation course needs to be adapted to the current skills and language competences of the particular group of students. This, naturally, requires considerable flexibility from the instructor, and his/her capability to customize the course of Latin conversation for the given set of learners. Moreover, the pedagogue has to maintain a database of exercises and conversational activities in the long term, and use it as a source of materials depending on the proficiency level and interest of the students.

Conclusion

Practice has revealed that at the beginning, many students attending Latin conversation lessons are only capable of listening to the spoken Latin word, understand it and perhaps give a simple answer to a given question. According to their language proficiency levels, as well as their talent for language learning, students gradually obtain the skill of expressing themselves with more detail. This is the onset of the real (although simple) conversation built on the direct method of question-answer, the objective of which is not linguistic perfection but rather the ability of simple expression, increasing vocabulary by retaining already passively acquired vocabulary and the practising of grammar phenomena, which students remember usually only in the short term (if there is no time left for their concentrated practising).

And so, we believe that Latin conversation can be a useful complementary subject in the second, and mainly in the third year of the Bachelor's program of Latin language majors not only when practising the use of vocabulary but also of morphological and syntactical forms and rules. However, this is not a replacement of instruction based on classical gram-

53 At this point, we refer to the eight intelligence types according to H. Gardner, the first of which was specified by the author as verbal-linguistic intelligence. These types of people usually have no problem learning foreign languages and at the same time, they manage the more strenuous grammar-translation method well. However, the individual types of intelligence are usually more or less mixed, and what type prevails in a particular individual then determines whether it is easier or more difficult to learn foreign languages. Those types that are also interpersonal, in combination with verbal-linguistic intelligence, tend to learn languages through communication with others as well as through the practical use of language. Intelligence types are discussed e.g. in Gardner 2011.

mar-translation method, which, so it seems, will remain the basis of the study of dead languages. On the contrary, it is aimed at helping today's students familiar with alternative methods of teaching and learning foreign languages to practise actively what is offered on a theoretical basis in the lessons of Latin morphology and syntax and the lectures of Latin authors. The seminar should also remain in the category of elective courses and students who do not expect of the study of a dead language more than its passive acquisition, should not be required to attend. Also, as this paper has shown, this is not about the introduction of any *res novae* in the teaching of Latin but rather about a return to what was advocated by one of the greatest teachers of our European history, John Amos Comenius, back in the 17th century.

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HOW TO RESPOND TO CHILDREN'S WORK OF ART?

Abstract: Developing educational approaches and methods, which aim to deepen children's both cognitive and emotional processes, stands out nowadays as a very important issue. Therefore, establishing appropriate approaches and strategies in fine art education, on the grounds of the theory-based understanding of possibilities and interest of children of the given age, is crucial for planning and developing preschool and school art projects. An increasingly important aspect and one of the underlying principles of contemporary art education is to understand how to respond to children's works of art. Talking with children about their art works can help them to focus, form ideas, help build understanding and make great progress with their art. Allowing children to talk about what they have produced, as well as what other children have been doing in art classes, is vital to establishing visual art as an essential way of communicating ideas and feelings. Developing critical skills in children can begin through learning to respond to their own work, discussing this in the same way as any other famous work of art might be discussed. The aim of this paper is to draw special attention to the importance of children's understanding of the visual qualities in their work and make this aspect of teaching process more widespread.

Keywords: art education, dialogues between children and teachers, descriptive praise, developing artistic vocabulary.

Introduction

Modern education is increasingly recognizing the importance of balanced development in children, implying that utilizing science-based approaches and methods both intellectual and emotional processes should be equally stimulated. It is important that teaching approaches are continually improved by relying on theoretical facts about developmental com-

petences and interests of children of different ages. These starting points are also crucial in the planning and implementation of preschool, primary and secondary school art projects. Certainly, fine arts education enables the acquisition of knowledge of fine art materials and techniques, formal-visual elements: form, line, color, volume, contrast, rhythm, composition and so on. The visual arts also contribute to general education, self-recognition, as well as better appreciation of one's own and different cultures.

Many studies have shown that learning visual arts can influence the development of verbal skills, aesthetic and critical thinking, the ability to solve problems, creative thinking, as well as the development of perception (Pavlović 2015). In order for young persons to acquire these skills and knowledge, they need to be provided with the means that can help them, "which means taking into account the student's personality, finding support and a suitable pace for introducing new elements, and accepting the student not just as a passive recipient, but as an equal creator of his / her education" (Hadži-Jovančić 2012: 14-15). Accordingly, it is essential that adequate teaching aids and approaches are used in the design and implementation of fine art activities / projects, with particular attention to the developmental characteristics of children and adolescents.

Talking to children about their artworks is one of the most important factors of artistic activity in the context of contemporary art education (Meager 2012; Clement et al. 1998; Dorn et al. 2004, etc.). There is a direct correlation between the quality of children's art and the beforehand conversation with the children about what and how they should draw, paint, etc. (Clement 1993). When children are asked to talk about what they are creating, it leads to a significant improvement in their visual work. The dialogues between children and teachers, as well as the dialogues between the children and their peers, guide and direct children in their performing process, help children come up with ideas, focus on their own work, and come to understanding of what they need to draw, paint, perform and so on (Meager 2012). At the same time, those kinds of dialogues give adults useful information about children and "eliminate the possibility of adults' arbitrary interpretations that may miss or mistakenly conceive children's intended meaning" (Chang 2007, 2012a, b; according to Chang and Cress 2014: 415).

Encouraging children to create

Considering that the role of praise – as one of the learning motivators (Trebješanin 2009) – is to encourage adequate student behavior, but also to serve as information to students about what they have done well. We will

highlight some of the characteristics of effective praise according to Brophy (Brophy 1981, according to Vizek et al. 2014): it is contingent, as opposed to accidental and unsystematic; it accurately indicates what it is that the student has done well, as opposed to general praise; it is credible so that the student knows that particular attention has been paid to it; rewards the achievement of a well-defined criterion (performance or commitment) rather than simply participating in an activity; acknowledges the extraordinarily invested effort or success of a difficult task, as opposed to giving recognition regardless of the effort or meaning of achievement; describes the student's current achievement in relation to his or her previous achievements, not in relation to the achievements of others in the class, etc.

Many teachers believe that praising children is needed and that it contributes to their confidence. Of course, it is necessary to commend children to keep them motivated. However, problems arise when children become contingent upon the praise and when they experience a lack of praise as a failure. Excessive praise may sound insincere, evoking negative reactions in the same way as an absence of praise (Barnes 1999). On the other hand, a teacher can significantly impair child's confidence in his or her creativity if they are being ignored, and even worse if the teacher responds negatively to the child's drawing, painting or/and sculpting skills. Many children, as a result of such experiences, learn in art classes that they "cannot draw", and then they stay forever "trapped" in drawing and other creative abilities which they have attained at the age of 6-7 (Anning 2002).

Althoug children enter formal schooling with an open attitude towards communicatig with others, teachers often don't spend too much time observing children while they are making art and they rarely make constructive comments about children's finished art works. It is expected that in those kinds of circumstances and the absence of one-on-one interactions the child very quickly learns that making art in school is not too important (Anning 2008). It seems that teachers remain puzzled and wondering how they should choose their words in responding to children and their art within pedagogical interactions (Iorio 2006).

Descriptive praise

Descriptive praise – commenting with no negative connotation which describes rather than criticizes (Barnes 1999) – represents a way of assessment, as well as mean of motivation. The essence is to learn how to describe events and achievements, and thus cope with students' mistakes, with negative reactions and with the preservation of children's confidence.

Descriptive praising minimizes general comments such as "it's great" and "it's nice" in favor of specifics pertaining to a particular situation. In describing rather than criticizing, the focus is on what led to an achievement and the effort that was put in. Also, if the teacher wants to encourage persistence and perseverance, it is important to understand the difference between the praise used to judge and the praise that encourages children. It has been observed that children who are praised for being intelligent, the moment they fail, cease to persist and strive. They also pursue mainly tasks in which they know they can succeed rather than challenging tasks from which they can learn (Mueller and Dweck 1998; according to Barnes 1999).

It is not easy to learn how to spontaneously apply descriptive comments in practice, and one can even say that "learning to use descriptive praise is like learning a foreign language" (Barnes 1999: 86). Consequently many experienced teachers often use in one-on-one interaction the common words "excellent", "beautiful", etc. Furthermore, a good teacher rarely uses the word "brilliant" and leaves it on that, because that word itself does not provide enough information about what exactly was brilliant about the child's work. According to Barnes (Barnes 1999) the basic features of descriptive praise would be: to avoid generic comments, not to ignore student's mistakes, or rush to point them out. Also, one of the important features is the avoidance of the use of the word "but" in this context, because it often annuls all positive comments made in response to students' work. Therefore, it is necessary to always have more positive descriptions than negative ones because by concentrating first on the positive descriptions we can build enough confidence in the student to be able to cope with the accompanying negative comments. What is even more significant is that mistakes should be addressed in a way that they serve as the basis for future improvement, rather than being thought of as complete and finalized statements (Barnes 1999). So, it can be concluded that it is not enough to praise students in a general way to motivate them, because that is a missed opportunity. They are much more assisted in learning and mastering skills when given feedback on what they have done, with the enthusiasm in the teacher's voice, which also has a powerful motivating effect.

Observation-related dialogue and positive exchange of views

The belief that teachers must possess the "talent" or apparent artistic skills in order to teach children visual arts is one of the most common excuses they use to justify themselves from trying to engage in it (Clement et al. 1998). However, the practice shows otherwise. Namely, teachers with

very little experience in the field of art are able to stimulate children's fine art work, only with their ability to focus on good dialogues with children, children's observation and children's understanding of the art making process (Clement 1993).

Using observation-related questions is one of the most important and basic teaching methods available to teachers. A good teacher can help children perceive better through good questions and conversations, and through these insights to give them new perspectives even on familiar, everyday objects (Clement 1993). It is therefore recommended that children observe and study the subject they draw (paint, sculpt, etc.) for a longer period of time, and discuss what they see.

Essential to all aspects of making art by observation are the ways in which the teacher motivates, guides, and responds to children's work. The aim is to stimulate children's thinking and development. It has been shown that adult mediation is very important and essential for the child's artistic exploration and creation, even at a very early age between 18 months and 3 years old. The nine month study conducted by Kindler (Kindler 1995) in a kindergarten showed that only when the educator or a parent stayed with the child at the art center engaging in a dialogue related to the actions carried out by the child, child's deeper involvement in the process of exploring materials and tools would emerge as an outcome.

According to Smith (Smith 1998), whose area of study was drawing by observation, the presence of an educator and his / her interest in process of making art, is often sufficient to attract and engage children aged 4-5 in visual art. However, teachers need to talk carefully with the children and ask them questions about their work to gain a better understanding of children's creativity. These strategies are no longer sufficient for children ages 6 and 7. Teachers should pay more attention to children who have difficulty getting started. By asking direct questions, such as noticing shapes, parts of a whole, etc., they can encourage children to get started and to choose specific drawing strategies. Appropriate feedback helps children gain more confidence and deepen their drawing experience (Smith 1998). Children ages 8 and 9 are increasingly social, so the teacher may encourage them to rely on each other to obtain useful information for further work. A classroom atmosphere that encourages children to gain confidence by sharing their observations, and talk freely about possible solutions should set base for "creating a setting where stimulating and instructive risks can be taken, and thoughtful, lively drawings created" (Smith 1998: 70). Children ages 10, 11 and 12 are very socially aware and it is often the case that their drawings are unfavorably compared to those of their peers. They want their drawings to look realistic and feel

ashamed or inadequate when they fail to live up to their expectations. It is then that responding to students' visual work in a way that confirms their hard work is of paramount importance, and teacher's most important role is to support. Observing children as they work and listening to what they say about their work helps the teacher understand the thought processes and intentions behind each child's drawing (Smith 1998).

A good teacher is characterized by practice of conducting a continuous individual conversation with children about their art work. This dialogue should consist of an exchange of views between teacher and a child, and would include: exploration, encouragement and mutual exchange of information. The quality of conversation between teacher and a child depends on teacher's skills to initiate reflection by asking the right questions (Clement 1993). Some of the possible starting points for conducting dialogue are: talking to children about understanding the task, exploring the idea of a given topic, feelings that emerged during the plotting process, and the use of fantasy and imagination in work. Also, an educator can have dialogue with children about formal-visual elements, such as shapes, colors, lines, patterns, as well as sizes, relationships, design, use of materials and mastering certain techniques, the effort invested, and so on (Barnes 1993). When a teacher uses different criteria when talking to children as a starting point (or multiple starting points), it allows for more flexibility in sharing opinions about what they have achieved in different aspects of their creative work. In this way, certain aspects can be praised, others criticized, however always nurturing a positive evaluation with the aim to indicate children's strengths and weaknesses.

In addition to conversations between teachers and students which encourage children to think and evaluate their artwork, the authors also recommend other useful ways to organize and lead positive exchanges (Clement et al. 1998: 149-150), such as:

- *Peer group discussion* (in small groups) which is especially useful in early stages of an art project when children can exchange their ideas about a task; talk to each other about their ideas, colors and shapes they observe in objects set before them, etc.;
- *Reviewing work in progress* is time allotted to children to discuss and compare in small groups their first sketches and drawings that should evolve further in course of art work, and compare ideas among themselves.
- *End of project review,* when teacher has a five-minute discussion at the end of art class to draw attention, that is, to highlight what has been achieved and learned during the class;

– *End of project review* takes place at the end of the art project, when teacher facilitates a group discussion regarding the presentation of a finished project.

Developing artistic vocabulary

The famous French painter Paul Cézanne (1839-1906) once said:

> ...Every morning I get up early, and I work until the natural light fades in the evening. And still I do not achieve my goals. I'm not interested in merely showing how I feel about what I see or how light changes the way things look, like your Impressionist friends. I want to show what doesn't change: the shapes of things! I want to be like an architect who puts pieces together to create a building. The rocks and trees, houses, and even the fruit in that bowl are solid shapes... (Saccardi 2007: 271-272)

How beautifully and honestly Cézanne brought to us thoughts and emotions about his work! The problem could arise when we aspire to teach young children the skill of clearly articulating a critical judgment about their own work and work of others. Children can learn to make statements about works of art but "conversations about art can be – and should be – clear, transparent, inclusive and straightforward" (Bell 2012: 2). This means that the language used in dialogues with young children about their works of art, as well as works of famous artists, should be mainly "the same as that used in any other learning interaction" (Bell 2012: 2). As they get older they should extend their vocabulary and learn to use special terms, such as formal-visual elements, names of art techniques etc.

According to teaching and learning programs for primary and secondary schools in the Republic of Serbia, even in the lower grades of primary school, by the end of a particular fine art course students are expected to be able to: describe in their own words the visual characteristics by which they distinct shapes and space; compare their impressions with impressions of others on works of art, the appearance of objects / objects and forms from nature and environment (PPNU1); compare their own and others' aesthetic experience of space, design and artwork and so on (PPNU2). Also, plans outcomes are more complex in the higher grades, and from the fifth grade (11– and 12-year-olds) by the end of the course, students should be able to: describe the rhythm they perceive in nature, environment and works of art; describe the lines they perceive in nature, environment and works of art; express their opinions on why people make art and more (PPNU56). Based on the analysis of described teaching and learning programs, it can be concluded that students are expected to de-

velop some appropriate artistic vocabulary in the field of fine arts, without which they would not be able to adequately engage in constructive discussions about their own artistic work or the works of others.

Therefore, the development of an artistic vocabulary begins by engaging in conversations about art using the age appropriate language, as adequately acquired concepts support quality dialogue about the creation and understanding of art (Clement 1993). In order to be able to discuss their work and the work of other artists and to reflect on their achievements, children gradually need to learn and use the appropriate artistic vocabulary. Art and design, like all disciplines, have their own vocabulary that is used to name and describe particular tools, methods and processes, different types of work and, most importantly, different visual qualities.

Acquiring dialogue skills and expressing opinions about their own art work should consequently help children to engage in quality conversations about the artworks of famous artists. Children should be able to relate their art to work of other artists, and to understand the reasons and purposes of creating different types of artwork in different cultural and historical contexts. Likewise, children will have much more to say about their own art if given the opportunity to study the works of renowned artists. Development of critical skills in children can be initiated by teaching them how to talk about their own creativity and visual qualities of their art work, further applying the same method when talking about the visual qualities in works of many famous artists. Their artistic vocabulary will evolve "when they are asked to talk and write about the work of different artists, and different forms of art and begin to know the difference between forms of art such as a portrait and a self-portrait, processes such as curving, screen printing and water colour paintings, and different kinds of art such as abstract, impressionist and symbolic" (Clement et all. 1998: 150).

Throughout adult-child interactive communication about visual arts created by children and famous artists "an adult needs to be a true partner in the dialogue with the child" (Chang and Cress 2014: 421). This implies that during this process teachers and children should pay attention to one another. In this sense, teacher should be a facilitator who carefully listens and observes children while they are dealing with art. Teacher should know how to guide intereseting and dynamic conversation to develop children's language and respones to the visual arts (Chang & Cress 2014; Overby 2009; Iorio 2006). Therefore, we can argue that:

> Conversational modes enhance shared understanding and learning, and embrace knowing contributions of children and teachers. Teachers can acknowledge children's responses to artworks, engaging them in conversa-

> tions, building on them, provoking them, guiding them, or informing them, but most importantly encouraging, developing and using young peoples' own powers of observation, analysis, or explanation to enrich their engagements with art. (Bell 2012: 2)

Conclusion

The nature of art education requires continuous and progressive interaction between teachers and children in order for children to acquire knowledge, skills and confidence throughout their Fine arts education. In teaching and learning programs for course of The Fine Arts (PPNU1, PPNU2, PPNU56), the learning outcomes emphasizes importance of dialogue, that is, the exchange of opinions between teachers and students, and students themselves. Good teaching practice in the visual arts involves talking and evaluating work as an integral part of the creative process. Students in the arts, crafts and design are constantly forming impressions and opinions about their work, which helps them make decisions, and thus change and perfect their work.

In addition, as we have already pointed out, it is important for children to learn to understand and verbally use formal visual elements so that they can speak about visual qualities in their own work as well as the creative process itself. Also, by studying the works of well-known artists they can build the appropriate vocabulary that enables them to engage in describing, comparing and analyzing their works and their own achievements in art and design. However, although children should be taught how to explore and talk about visual elements such as color, line, pattern, texture, form, shape and space, many teachers do not feel competent enough to implement art work methods to enable their students to prosper in this area. Thus teachers should be provided with additional help to strengthen their competence.

By the end of primary and secondary school, in addition to expressing themselves in visual art and other materials young people should apply a critical process of analysis to express feelings, ideas, and understanding in response to different works of art and artistic experiences. Furthermore, they should have acquired the knowledge of different art forms, styles and techniques, used in the past as well as nowadays (Pavlović 2015). Therefore, it is necessary for teachers to recognize the importance of children's understanding of the visual qualities of artworks, as well as to carefully listen, observe, and apply positive comments and descriptive praises through pedagogical interaction with children.

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ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING A REFLECTIVE TEACHER

Abstract: Being a reflective teacher means to be committed to persistent and careful reconsidering of your own professional actions in the light of your knowledge and believes, taking into account not only professional, but also personal and implicit theories about teaching and learning. Although future teachers attend many courses during their initial education closely related to their future practice, research shows that in their professional work they mostly relay on their own implicit theories connected to the meaning of being a good teacher and on their own experiences. The position we take in this paper is not that we should put these personal theories and experiences aside, especially taking into account that there is no such a course that can by itself create a good teacher. Having that in mind, we argue that becoming a good teacher is a process of becoming aware of your own professional and personal experience and becoming able to transform these experiences into practical knowledge that will serve as a basis of your everyday work in the classroom. However, the analysis of curricula for future teachers in Serbia (kindergarten teachers, classroom teachers and subject teachers) shows that during their initial education they are mostly not thought about the concept of reflectivity, techniques of reflection and about the importance of being reflective. Even if teachers mostly declare that it is important to be reflective, targeted reconsidering of experience on the regular basis is not the part of their professional competences and activities.

Keywords: reflexion, learning, reflective teaching, future teachers, teachers' identity.

Teaching is a very dynamic and complex process, which requires careful planning and preparation in order to manage the process that never completely unrolls according to our plans. It sounds in a way paradoxical, but every teacher knows that we can never fully predict what can happen

in the classroom. For that reason, it is natural and necessary that teachers continuously rethink their own practice, analyse it and reconsider its effects, in order to use the insights in their future work. In other words – inevitable part of each teachers' professional life should be the reflexion of practice (Schön 1987; Brookfield 1995; Pollard 2005; Radulović 2011; Simić et al. 2017). Being a reflexive teacher means that teacher explores his/her own practice, perceives and defines problems from the practice, relates them to previous knowledge and experience and puts an effort to adjust his/her own acts to the students' needs, taking into account the context of acting (Schön 1987).

Reflection of the practice is a continuous process, thus as teachers we reflect *before*, *during* and *after* acting. Of course, this does not mean that every single activity of the teacher is constantly under the microscope of reconsideration. In that case, one could not be able to act as a teacher because he/she would constantly be overwhelmed with thinking about his/her own decisions. Being reflective teacher includes targeted and planned reconsidering of ones ideas, thoughts, knowledge, decisions to the extend it supports his/her professional development and actions (Buđevac et al. 2015).

Every teacher is faced with numerous dilemmas in relation to everyday practice, which naturally leads to reconsiderations and reflection. It is, of course, important to be sensitive and question our own practice when we are faced with some problem, when we believe that we can be more efficient. However, the concept of reflection implies that we also reflect when we are satisfied with something that had happened in the classroom, when we feel that we reached with our students what we had hoped for (Buđevac et al. 2015). That is exactly what supports our professional development, allowing us to learn from our practice and be successful teachers. For example, when we feel that our lecture or a part of a lecture was very successful, we can think what made it so efficient. On the other side, if we perceived that our students had not been motivated and engaged in the activities and/or had interrupted the activity, we can ask ourselves – why that was the case, in which parts of the lecture it started or was more obvious, how it relates to our acts and so on. However, it is important to note that we cannot put an equality sign between thinking about our practice and reflexivity. It is more than thinking about teaching (Dymoke & Harisson 2008). In other words, we cannot expect that each questioning of classroom activities lead us to a reflection. For specific examples and elaborations on this, see Buđevac et al. (2015: 7).

This leads us further to one of the questions concerning the nature of the reflection – what is the relation between thinking and acting in the reflection process? There are different views on this relation (see Radulović

2011, for more details) but it seems that one cannot question the intertwining of these two. No matter of the moment of the reflexion in time in relation to acting it refers to (before, during or after), it is always related to action – that specific one or some future action we are going to take using the insights of thinking. So, our aim is always to reconsider what we are doing and why and/or to imbed the insight in our acts. This does not mean that reflection process is linked exclusively to cognitive processes (thinking). As Radulović (2011), among other authors, states – teachers' actions are inevitably related to intuition, emotions, values etc. It implies that all these are naturally included in the process of practice reconsideration. In relation to that, it is important to emphasize that the aim of reflection is not to recognize and then put aside all these implicit ideas, emotions and intuition about teaching, but to make it explicit in order to use it later intentionally and knowingly. We all have our own implicit ideas about education and teaching, gained during our experience with education and educational system. Our personal experiences shape our implicit believes about questions such as – what is good teaching, what are the characteristics of good teacher, which activities we should organize in the classroom in order to support students' learning, where is the balance between high and low control in relation with students etc. All these believes determine our acting in the classroom although we do not need to be aware of that. Reflexion is exactly a way to become aware of these implicit determinants of our acts in order to be able to use it systematically and thoughtfully, which makes us better professionals.

Putting it more concrete, being reflective teacher enables us to create classroom in accordance to students` and our own needs; make our students more satisfied; better understand different processes in the classroom; avoid routines and glut in our work; efficiently exchange professional experiences with colleagues and increase our professional self-esteem (Brookfield 1995; Buđevac et al. 2015). In addition to that, taking into account that the process of schooling and teaching is rapidly changing, putting teachers in a position to undertake new roles and responsibilities and adapt to changes at different levels of the school system, reflection of practice becomes even more important (Simić et al. 2017). As Johns (2013) puts it – being reflexive means to undertake the responsibility for your work. That is the least you can do for your students and their parents, for your colleagues and all your associates.

Reconsiderations of someone's acting is a highly personal experience that can take many different paths. Talking about specific techniques of reflection can be taken as too mechanistic, because being reflective "is about about *who I am* rather than *what I do*" (Johns 2013: 2). In other words, it

is more an ontological approach than a device or a tool. However, there is a way to categorize and describe the process of reflection. Brookfield (1995) classifies these approaches to reflection using the metaphor of lenses, talking about four critically reflective lenses: 1. our autobiographies as teachers and learners; 2. our students' eyes; 3. our colleagues' experiences; 4. theoretical literature. These lenses are key supports of reflection. They suggest what can help us to start and guide our thinking about practice – e.g. we can lighten our acts trying to remember our experiences as students and think about education from the perspective of the way we felt as students; we can ask our students to share with us their own perspective or we can share experiences and ideas with our colleagues and other experts from the field.

Having in mind all that we said about reflexivity, one could assume that it is in a way superfluous to talk about its importance and need to teach future teachers about it, as it is so natural for every teacher to be reflective. Zeichener & Liston (1996) start their book saying that the term reflective teaching can sound in a way redundant, as it seems like we cannot really teach without reconsidering what we are doing. However, findings contradict to this intuitive thought and suggest that there are problems in the implementation of this "natural" idea in the professional practice of teachers (Calderhead 1993) and that we need to put additional effort in order to raise reflective teachers (Yeh 2004; Zeichner 2005). There is a lively scientific discussion about the best ways to support (future) teachers in becoming reflective (Calderhead 1993; Zeichner 2005). It seems that it is not the matter of having a course about reflection (for pre-service or in-service teachers), but as Johns (2013) states "a journey of becoming a reflective practitioner". In other words, it is an approach to teaching that necessarily starts with learning about reflection but needs to be regularly nurtured through practice. Without the possibilities to develop reflectiveness as one of the very important characteristics of teachers, it will be just one more theoretical consideration about teaching that future teachers are learning about but are not enabled to use in their practice.

Reflection in the education of future teachers in Serbia

Talking about the education of future teachers in Serbia, we should firstly note that they are educated at different faculties – kindergarten teachers (working with children from 3 to 7) and classroom teachers (working with children from 7 to 10) are educated at the faculties specified for teachers' education. All other teachers (subject teachers in elemen-

tary schools and high schools) finish their studies at the faculties focused on the subject they are supposed to teach. Future subject teachers have several courses concerning teaching (pedagogy, psychology, methods of teaching), but the fact is that these courses are underrepresented in their overall professional development. For that reason, they finish the studies and go to schools as good experts in the area they teach, but different competences and knowledge relevant for teachers are usually insufficient. This implies that the topic of reflection is also one of the topics under the risk to be neglected or not enough present. In addition to this, the tradition of teaching in our educational system does not encourage teachers to be reflexive, which is another possible barrier in nurturing reflexive teachers. Schools in which teachers are firstly educated and then go to teach should be open for reflexion and flexible, but it is often not the case (Radulović 2011).

The goal of our investigation was to analyse the curricula for future teachers in order to get an insight into the opportunities they have to develop this important competence. As the programs of the courses from the faculties' websites are usually not detailed enough to get the complete information about all the topics of a course, we have also interviewed colleagues teaching future teachers, with the aim to clarify the place of reflexion in the education of future teachers. We have selected four faculties educating future teachers at the University of Belgrade – Teacher Education Faculty (which is the only faculty focused exclusively on teachers' education), Faculty of Mathematics (educating teachers of mathematics in elementary schools and high schools), Faculty of Philosophy (education teachers of several social sciences – sociology, history and philosophy) and Faculty of Philology (education teachers of languages). In this way, we have one faculty specified for teachers' education and three other faculties with modules for teachers, belonging to all three different categories – sciences, social sciences and humanities.

I have found that at two out of these four faculties – at the Faculty of Mathematics and the Faculty of Philology the topic of reflexivity is completely missing from the education of teachers. There are no courses specifically focused on this topic and no lessons dedicated to reflection on the courses focused on pedagogy or psychology. The situation is somewhat different at the other two faculties from the sample. At the Teacher Education Faculty students have opportunities to learn about this topic, but we can say that these opportunities are very limited. There is not specific course focused on reflexivity, but there is a lecture within the course „Educational psychology" about reflexivity. In addition, the concept of reflexivity is only mentioned within three other courses at the bachelor level of studies. Although the students of Teacher Education Faculty spend sev-

eral weeks (or even months) during the school year in the kindergartens and schools (depending on the year of the studies), they do not have the opportunities to practice reflexivity and discuss their professional experience from the perspective of being reflexive. The most occasions to learn about reflexivity and develop that approach to teaching have the students from the Faculty of Philosophy. Firstly, at the bachelor level, there is a course "Basics of pedagogy with didactics", where the reflective practice is recognized as one of the goals of the course and it is explicitly taught to students. Also, there is a master program for teachers where reflective practice is emphasized as one of the three main aims of the whole program and it is also included in two courses at this program. This shows that future teachers from the Faculty of Philosophy have the opportunity to learn about the concept of reflexivity. However, they do not have systematic possibilities to practice reflexivity during their practical work in schools, as it is not part of their tasks within these courses. Still, as one of the professors enrolled in the teaching of these courses states in the interview "*It is true that they do not have the opportunity to practice reflexion, but I responsibly claim that our students know what the reflexive practice is*".

Conclusions

As we could see from the above presented investigation, although reflexivity is considered as one of the key competences of teachers, our education system mostly does not include it in the initial training of future teachers. These who introduce reflection and reflexivity mostly teach about the concept but not about the ways to achieve deeper levels of reflexion and do not offer opportunities to practice reflexion. However, practicing reflexivity is the only way to achieve practical wisdom and become mindful of different relevant aspects of teaching practice. Having in mind that reflexivity is "a learning journey" (Johns 2013) it implies that it needs to be incorporated in the initial education of teachers. Of course, the reflexivity can (and should) be the focus of different courses for in-service teachers, but there are at least two problematical points if we assume that these courses can compensate the lack of reflexivity topic in the initial courses for pre-service teachers. 1. Reflexivity is not just one more competence among many competences relevant for teachers, but it is one of the core competences, which essentially affects teachers' identity. For that reason, it is necessary to include it in the initial education of teachers. 2. Taking into account the fact that our teachers mostly did not attend schools in which teachers were reflexive and flexible, the initial point of their reflexive learning journey is missing. In other words, their implicit

beliefs about teaching which are to big extent based on their experiences as students do not include reflexivity. That is exactly why we need to pay special attention to nurture reflexivity of our future teachers and do not leave it for insufficiently systematic and certain professional improvement of in-service teachers.

Having all this in mind, together with the statement of Radulović (2011) that the concept of reflexive educational practice and reflexive teachers are the most frequent concepts in the literature about teachers and teachers' education, one cannot resist to do not ask – how is it possible that we do not have reflexivity more represented in the education of teachers? We can speculate about reasons. Firstly, there is a kind of closed circle, difficult to open for essential change, which comes from the fact that university teachers of future teachers are not open for reflexivity themselves. They have not been developed as professionals in the system supporting reflexivity and had not been taught to be reflexive. For that reason, although they are faced with the literature about reflexivity and even with official state documents prescribing relevant competences of future teachers (e.g. Pravilnik o standardima kompetencija za profesiju nastavnika i njihovog profesionalnog razvoja 2011; Godine uzleta 2018) it is not easy for them to incorporate it in their teaching – both theoretically and practically. Another related note would be that there is a tradition in Serbia of seeing teacher as omniscient, a figure who knows everything, who is self-secure about his/her acts and knowledge, which contradicts to the basic ideas about reflexivity and need to reconsider, to rethink and get better. This is very important and relevant topic, which goes beyond the topic of this paper, but we cannot resist putting it in the context of reflection as we see it as strongly related. For that reason, we will close this conclusion looking back to an important view of Hattie (2009) that the best we can do for teachers is giving them a right to make mistakes. Without playing, exploring and thus – mistaking, we can hardly learn and develop, and support others in their own development.

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