









Conference Handbook

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1. Miscellaneous Information

Please wear your badge at all times at the Conference Venue. You will need the badge to enter the venue, get lunches and take a seat at the Conference Dinner.

Regular Sessions take place on the 1st to 4th floors. The last speaker in the session is the session chair. It is very important that you ensure the session starts and ends at the correct time. In case of a last-minute cancellation, do not fill the gap as this will facilitate session hopping. *Each speaker has 22 minutes to set up, speak including Q&A, and take down.*

Semi-plenary Sessions take place in B101, 420 and 429. The last speaker in the session is the session chair. It is very important that you ensure the session starts and ends at the correct time. *Each speaker has 45 minutes to set up, speak and take down*.

Keynote Speeches take place in B101. There will be volunteers with microphones in the audience to catch questions. *Each keynote speech lasts for 60 minutes.*

Lunch boxes/bags are offered on Floor B1. There are three lunch areas: B1 Canteen with 200 seats, B106 with 60 seats, and an open space in B1 with 90 seats. There is a large outdoor space in front of the building and feel free to take your boxed lunch there. *Your help in placing rubbish in the appropriate place is greatly appreciated.*

Information about the program and last-minute changes will be displayed on the monitors close to the Information Desk on the 1st floor, outside the classrooms, and next to the elevators.

If you need a place to keep a bag or two, contact the Information Desk.

If you would like to connect wirelessly to the internet, see instructions in "4. Service" of this handbook.

Timetable of shuttle bus between the Conference Venue and The Lakeview Hotel, which also holds the Conference Dinner on August 20th, is included in "4. Service" of this handbook. The timetable is also posted near the Information Desk.

2. Registration & Program

a) Registration

For participants arriving and/or registering on August 19th: please plan to arrive early as the opening ceremony starts at 9 am. You may first come to the opening ceremony and speeches before picking up your conference package.

For participants who reserved a room at either hotel designated in the registration system: your conference package will be kept at your hotel on August 18^{th} and 19^{th} for two days for you to pick up, and then moved to the Conference Venue from August 20^{th} .

On-site registration and payment are available in registration service hours on August 18 to 20 at the Conference Venue.

Date	National School of Development, Peking University	The Lakeview Hotel	Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center
August 18 th	12:00-18:00	12:00-22:00	12:00-22:00
August 19 th	07:30-18:00	07:30-18:00	07:30-18:00
August 20 th -22 nd	08:00-18:00	-	-
Notes	The Conference Venue at the Chengze Garden	For those who reserved a room at this hotel in registration system	For those who reserved a room at this hotel in registration system

Registration Service Timetable

GAMES20 PEKING UNIVERSITY AUGUST 19-22, BELING

B) Program Overview

	August 19 th		August 20 th	August 21 st			August 22 nd
09:00 - 09:30	Opening Ceremony and Group Photo	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 3	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 6	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 9
09:35 - 10:35	Michihiro Kandori (President's Talk)						
11:00 - 12:10	Regular Sessions 1	11:00 - 12:00	Nisarg Shah (Kalai Prize Lecture)	11:00 - 12:30	Semi-plenary Sessions	11:00 - 12:00	Gabrielle Demange (President-Elect's Talk)
12:10 - 13:30	Lunch	12:00 - 13:30	Lunch	12:30 - 13:30	Lunch	12:30 - 13:30	Lunch
13:30 - 15:00	Semi-plenary Sessions	13:30 - 14:40	Regular Sessions 4	13:30 - 14:40	Regular Sessions 7	13:30 - 15:00	Regular Sessions 10
15:30 - 16:40	Regular Sessions 2	15:10 - 16:20	Regular Sessions 5	15:10 - 16:20	Regular Sessions 8	15:30 - 17:00	Regular Sessions 11
17:10 - 18:40	Panel Discussions	16:40 - 17:40	Ariel Rubinstein (Morgenstern Lecture)	16:40 - 17:40	Françoise Forges (von Neumann Lecture)		
		18:30 - 20:30	Conference Dinner (Lakeview Hotel)				

Opening Ceremony (B101)

Aug. 19 9:00 - 9:30

Welcome remarks by

- Guohua Jiang, vice president of Peking University
- Matthew Jackson, former president, the Game Theory Society
- Michihiro Kandori, president, the Game Theory Society
- Gabrielle Demange, president-elect, the Game Theory Society
- Yiping Huang, dean of National School of Development, Peking University

Chaired by Xiaoyan Lei, chair of the Academic Board of National School of Development, Peking University

Group photo



Keynotes (B101)

Aug. 19 09:35 - 10:35	Michihiro Kandori (President's Talk) University of Tokyo	How to Use AI for Game Theoretic Research
Aug. 20	Nisarg Shah (Kalai Prize Lecture)	The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash
11:00 - 12:00	University of Toronto	Welfare
Aug. 20	Ariel Rubinstein (Morgenstern Lecture)	No Prices, No Games: The Case of Matching
16:40 - 17:40	Tel Aviv University and New York University	Problems
Aug. 21 16:40 - 17:40	Françoise Forges (von Neumann Lecture) Paris Dauphine-PSL University	On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Aug. 22	Gabrielle Demange (President-Elect's Talk)	Dual Communication in a Social Network:
11:00 - 12:00	Paris School of Economics	Contributing and Dedicating Attention

Semi-plenary Talks

Aug. 19 13:30 - 15:00

B101	Yan Chen University of Michigan	Group Identity and Belief Formation: A Decomposition of Political Polarization
	Anton Kolotilin University of New South Wales	The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
420	Takuo Sugaya Stanford University	Non-Recursive Dynamic Incentives: A Rate of Convergence Approach
	Ning Yu Nanjing Audit University	Real-Time Games

Aug. 21 11:00-12:30

0		
B101	Itai Ashlagi Stanford University	Congested Waiting Lists and Organ Allocation
	Yeneng Sun National University of Singapore	Coarser Information in Games
420	Andreas Blume University of Arizona	Language Games: Correlation through Non-Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness, and Misunderstanding
	Itai Arieli Technion-Israel Institute of Technology	Persuading while Learning
429	Ingela Alger Toulouse School of Economics	Evolutionary Foundations of Human Motivation in Strategic Interactions —Recent Advances



1 4 1	ular Sessions g. 19 11:00 – 12:10	
131	Networks I	
	Strategic Diffusion: Public Goods vs. Public Bads Interconnected Conflict	Arthur Campbell, DJ Thornton, Yves Zenou Marcin Dziubiński, Sanjeev Goyal, Junjie
	Robust Katz Centrality	Zhou* Yang Sun, Wei Zhao*, Junjie Zhou
132	Assignment I	
	Fair and Strategy-proof Probabilistic Allocation with Payment	Zheng Lin*, Tsuyoshi Adachi
	On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment	Christian Basteck*, Lars Ehlers
	Affirmative Action's Cumulative Fractional Assignments	Manshu Khanna*, Haydar Evren
245	Bargaining I	
	Bargaining with Mechanisms: Two-sided Incomplete Information	Marcin Peski*
	U-shaped settlement pattern in bargaining with arbitration	Zhixian Yu*
	Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining	Yuan Ju, Juan Vidal-Puga*
246	Contracts I	
	Designing Index Provision	Yizhou Xiao*, Yan Xiong
	Rethinking the Incentive Dilemma: Crafting Ambiguous Strategies for Indirectly Linking between Employee Behavior and Value Creation	Zhenghao Xia*, Jinghua Xiao
	Selling Training Data	Jingmin Huang, Wei Zhao, Renjie Zhong*
249	Persuasion I	
	Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules	Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan*, Yingkai Li
	Industry-optimal quality disclosure	Ming Li*, Binyan Pu
	Robust Advertisement Pricing	Tan Gan, Hongcheng Li*
344	Evolution I	
	Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching	Ziwei Wang*, Jiabin Wu
	Costly Advertising and Information Congestion: Insights from Pigou's Successors	Ryoji Jinushi*
	Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes	Hsiao-Chi Chen*, Yunshyong Chow, Shi- Miin Liu
345	Industrial Organization I	
	Popularity in location games	Gaetan Fournier, Marc Schroder*
	Data Asset Utilization and Transaction Value Allocation	Jinghua Xiao, Chenghao Zhang*, Kang Xie Zhigang Cao
	The Competitive Effects of Fixed-Price Contracts under Cost Inflation	Luke Garrod, Ruochen Li*, Chris Wilson
29	Learning I	
	Contracts that Reward Innovation: Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal	Yiman Sun*
	Optimal Incentives for Innovation Adoption	Wanyi Chen, Qiaoxi Zhang*
	Learning through Transient Matching in Congested Markets	Andrew Ferdowsian*



2. Aug. 19 15:30 - 16:40

131	Networks II	
	Influencer Networks	Xueheng Li*
	Strategic Hiding and Exploration in Networks	Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubiński*
	Sequential Network Design	Yang Sun*, Wei Zhao, Junjie Zhou
132	Experiments I	
	Goose Feather from a Thousand Miles Away: A Theory and Experiment on Reciprocity	Yunwen He, Jaimie Lien, Yang Yang*, Jie Zheng
	Credible Threats	Martin Dufwenberg, Flora Li*, Alec Smith
	Transparency and Verifiability in Communication with Endogenous Information Acquisition	Ernest Lai,* Wooyoung Lim, Yichuan Lou
245	Extensive Form	
	Extended backward induction and sequential equilibria	Evgeny Zalyubovsky*
	Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward-Induction Reasoning	Emiliano Catonini*, Pierpaolo Battigalli
	Local dominance	Emiliano Catonini, Jingyi Xue*
246	Industrial Organization II	
	Multi-dimensional Personalized Pricing and Market Competition	Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu*, Yuxuan Zhu
	Secrecy vs. Patenting in Innovation Races	Pavel Kocourek*, Eugen Kovac
	Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Entry (Global) Games	Pedro Jara-Moroni*, Rabah Amir, Rodrigo Harrison
249	Mechanism Design I	
	Robustly Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading	Wanchang Zhang*
	Optimal mechanism for selling multiple items to a unit-demand buyer	Keita Kuwahara, Reo Nonaka*
	Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions over Restricted Domains: Possibility, Impossibility and Top-inseparability	Abhinaba Lahiri*, Anup Pramanik
344	Persuasion II	
	Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response	Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang*
	Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion	Zhonghong Kuang, Jaimie W Lien*, Jie Zheng
	Revenue-Maximizing Overselling in Markets with Asymmetric Information	Fan Wu, Jie Zheng*
345	Cooperative Games I	
	Comparative Statics of Minimum-Cost-Spanning-Tree Games	Zhibin Tan*, Zhigang Cao, Zhengxing Zou
	Coalitional Manipulations and Immunity of the Shapley Value	Christian Basteck, Frank Huettner*
	Veto core consistent voting rules	Aleksei Kondratev*
429	Learning II	
	Learning from Strategic Sources	Kailin Chen*
	The Effect of State Correlation and Payoff Interdependence on R&D	Tatiana Mayskaya*, Arina Nikandrova
	Emergence of Cooperative Nash-Equilibria from Competitive Decision- Making Games	Yilong Feng*, Boyu Zhang, Wenjun Mei



3. Aug. 20 9:00 - 10:30

131	Models of Political Agency	
	Governing Local Bureaucracy in a Centralized State	Zanhui Liu, Zhaotian Luo*, Yucheng Qiu, Tianyang Xi, Hongding Zhu
	Decay of Long-established Democracies	Weijia Li, Yang Xie*
	An Organizational Theory of Political Parties	Spencer Pantoja*
	Reputational Concern and Policy Vagueness	Chen Cheng*, Liuchun Deng, Yufeng Sun
132	Networks III	
	Persuasion in Networks: Can the Sender Do Better than Using Public Signals?	Yifan Zhang*
	Information Sale on Network	Jihwan Do, Lining Han*, Xiaoxi Li
	Link complementarity and social coordination	Zhiwei Cui*
	Heterogeneous Welfare Effects of Public Information	Kota Murayama*
245	Auctions I	
	Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets	Runxi Wang*, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Anselm Eicke,, Ingmar Schlecht
	A Simple Model of Trading Artworks	Min Zhang*
	A Method to Characterize Reduced-Form Auctions	Charles Zheng*
	Auction design with ambiguity:Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions	Sosung Baik, Sung-Ha Hwang*
246	Communication I	
	Facilitating trust and trustworthiness: The impact of mediation	Saori Chiba, Michiko Ogaku*
	Bayesian communication games with information networks	Xiao Luo, Yongchuan Qiao*, Yang Sun
	Academic Publication Competition	Yifan Wu*
	Undefeated equilibrium and better response dynamics in sender receiver games	Stéphan Sémirat*, Françoise Forges
249	Contests I	
	Chasing Contests	Zhuo Chen, Yun Liu*
	Blotto Game with Testing (The Locks, Bombs and Testing Model)	Isaac Sonin*
	Optimal Biased Design of Dynamic Multi-Battle Team Contests	Xin Feng*
	Staying Afloat: On firms' sharing of their success with workers under the New Normal.	Xinyan Zhang*, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert
344	Mechanism Design II	
	Matching Maximization Mechanism	Anh Trieu*, Iwan Bos, Marc Schroder, Dries Vermeulen
	Implementing Randomized Allocation Rules with Outcome-Contingent Transfer	Fan Wu, Yi Liu*
	Robustly Optimal Voting Rule	Noriaki Kiguchi*, Shinpei Noguchi, Yuta Takahashi
	Optimal allocation with costly verification and distributional constraint	Yunan Li*



345	Implementation	
	Implementation in Undominated Strategies: Dictatorship and Compromise	Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto*
	Implementation in VNM stable sets	Michele Lombardi*, Ville Korpela, Riccardo Saulle
	Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy	Xinxi Song*
	Information Size and Full Implementation	Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun*
429	Incomplete Information	
	Bayesian Equilibrium and Generalized Nash Equilibrium	Christian W. Bach*, Andrés Perea
	Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition	Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev*
	Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games Revisited	Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi*
	Group Knowledge and Individual Introspection	Michele Crescenzi*
4. Au	g. 20 13:30 - 14:40	
131	Bargaining II —	
101	Negotiation in bankruptcy problems	Dirck Bouwhuis*, Ruud Hendrickx, Jean- Jacques Herings
	Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn meet Tullock	Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Yuxuan Zhu*
	The Cooperation Problem	Xiangliang Li*
132	Behavioral Economics I	
	Regret in Games	Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg, Senran Lin*
	Coordinated punishment? Only if reciprocators abound	Adriana Alventosa, Vicente Calabuig*, Gonzalo Olcina
	Venture Capital and Multiple Heterogeneous Beliefs	Zhuming Chen*, Xue Luo
245	Industrial Organization III	
	Merger, Stochastic R&D and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly	Di Wu, Leonard F. S. Wang, Huizhong Liu*
	Bargaining power and the incentive for innovation	Jianxin Guo*
	Teamwork Frictions in the Ricardian Team Production Framework	Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Richard Steinberg*, Oscar Volij
246	Industrial Organization IV	
	The Value of Anonymous Option	Wanzhu Zhang*, Jianpei Li
	Warm up by Revelation to Cool down in Competition: Strategic Provision of Relationship-sensitive Information	Xiaokuai Shao*, Jie Zheng
	Antitrust policy under R&D spillovers & moral hazard	Yasuhiro Shirata*
249	Evolution II	
	Algorithmic Collusion and Price Discrimination: The Over-Usage of Data	Zhang Xu*, Mingsheng Zhang, Wei Zhao
	Leadership and peer effects	Penelope Hernandez, Gonzalo Olcina*, Raul Toral
	Convergence of Fictitious Plays in Potential Games	Zibo Xu*



344	Matching I					
	Multiproduct trading of indivisible goods with many sellers and buyers	Amparo Urbano*, Iván Arribas				
	A Justified-Envy Minimal Variation of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism	Qianfeng Tang*, Jian Hong				
	College admissions with program-based scholarships	Azar Abizada*, Umut Dur				
345	Mechanism Design III					
	Undominated Mechanisms	Tilman Borgers, Jiangtao Li*, Kexin Wang				
	A Robust Optimization Approach to Mechanism Design	Kexin Wang*, Jiangtao Li				
	Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Punishment	Lining Han, Ruben Juarez*				
429	Networks IV					
	Pricing and Advertising with Network Externalities under Asymmetric Information	Litian Chen, Yaojun Nan and Fanqi Shi*				
	Financial Supernetworks and Endogenous Systemic Risk	Jing Fu*, Frank Page, Jean-Pierre Zigrand				
	The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts	Rakesh Vohra, Yiqing Xing*, Wu Zhu				
5. Au	ıg. 20 15:10 - 16:20					
131	Decision Theory					
	Decision Making Under Multidimensional Uncertainty	Mu Zhang*, Shaowei Ke				
	Failures of Contingent Thinking	Evan Piermont, Peio Zuazo-Garin*				
	Conditional Hypothesis Testing Systems	Xiao Luo*				
132	Epidemics					
	Optimal control in models of virus propagation	Xiuxiu Liu*, Elena Gubar				
	Modified SEIQHRDP and Machine Learning Prediction for the Epidemics	Yike Li*, Gubar Elena				
	The Impact of the connecting urban transportation system to the SEIR model	Ke Ma*, Elena Gubar				
245	Industrial Organization V					
	Data Trade and Consumer Privacy	Jiadong Gu*				
	Potentials in Cournot Cross-holding Games	Sixian Shen*, Feng Zhu, Guopeng Li, Zhigang Cao				
	How do Tom and Jerry Play? A Simple Application of Convex Analysis in Hide-and-Seek Games	Xinmi Li*, Jie Zheng				
246	Monotone Comparative Statics					
	How Coordination Initiates, Diffuses and Succeeds: A Dynamic Network Game Approach	Xinnian Pan*				
	The Structure of Optimisation Problems	Jose Maria Moreno de Guerra Beato*				
	Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Points	Rabah Amir*, David Rietzke				
249	Persuasion III					
	Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders	Zhuo Chen*				
	Information design in allocation with costly verification	Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang*				
	Partial commitment to disclosure rule	Ye Jin*, Zhen Zhou				



344	Matching II	
	Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism	Jiarui Xie*
	Strategic Post-exam Preference Submission in the School Choice Game	Vladimir Mazalov, Artem Sedakov*, Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng
	The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game	Chaoran Sun*, Chenghong Luo, David Perez-Castrillo
345	Search ————	
	Contracting of Search Order	Xiaoyu Chen*, Yibo Lian
	Priority Search with Outside Options	Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li*, Menghan Xu
	Search prominence with costly product returns	Daniel Z. Li, Sanxi Li, Jun Yu, Mingsheng Zhang*
429	Networks V	
	Why are there six degrees of separation in a social network?	Ivan Samoylenko*, David Aleja, Eva Primo, , Stefano Boccaletti
	Competition for Linkages with Public Goods Contribution	Guopeng Li*, Wei Zhao
	A Model of Endogenous Group Membership, Social Capital, and Economic Mobility	Matthew Jackson*, Raj Chetty
6 4 1	σ 21 9·00 - 10·30	

6. Aug. 21 9:00 - 10:30

131	Auctions II	
	Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors	Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Mengxi Zhang*
	Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World	Yiding Feng*, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins
	A Budget-Balanced Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities with Identity-Dependent Externalities	Younghwan In*, Yunkyeong Seo
	Optimal design of auction with linear contract under double moral hazard	Dazhong Wang, Ruqu Wang, Xinyi Xu*
132	Communication II	
	Multi-issue Strategic Information Transmission with Partial Attention	Yibin Li*
	The rating inflation game	Yan Long*
	Information Disclosure in Experts' Market with Uncertain Diagnostic Accuracy	Lin Zhao*
	Inference from Selectively Disclosed Data	Ying Gao*
245	Contests II	
	Entrant-Optimal Learning in A Contest Game	Shuo Xu*, Zeng Lian, Jie Zheng
	General Lotto solvable cases of the Colonel Blotto game	Marcin Dziubiński*
	Optimal Tree Contest Design and Winner-Take-All	Qian Jiao*, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu, Yang Yu
	Contesting fake news	Daniel Rehsmann, Béatrice Roussillon, Paul Schweinzer*



246	Contracts II	
	Detrimental Incentive Mechanisms in Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships	Tom Rauber*, Philipp Weinschenk
	Vertical contracting and information spillover in Cournot competition	Jihwan Do, Nicolas Riquelme*
	Enforceability v.s. Flexibility: Incomplete Contract with Litigation Cost	Jingmin Huang*, Sanxi Li, Tong Wang, Jianye Yan
	Adverse Selection and Income Inequality	Yaping Wu, Shenghao Zhu*
249	Cooperative Games II	
	Axiomatization by Individual Monotonicity: Weighted Surplus Sharing and Shifted Proportional Division	Yukihiko Funaki*, Yukio Koriyama
	Equilibrium coalition structures in symmetric three-player games	Chen Qu*, Jingyi Shen
	On Entrance of a New Agent to a Market	Martin Černý*
	The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game	Jinglei Huang*, Danxia Xie
344	Combinatorial Games and Potential Games	
	The Game of Cops and Robbers on Digraphs	Shravan Luckraz*, Gafurjan Ibragimov
	Bidding Partizan Subtrction Games	Ravi Kant Rai*, Urban Larsson, Makoto Yokoo
	Near Gradient Evolution	Omer Edhan, Ziv Hellman*
	Beyond Global Maximizers: Unveiling the Full Potential of Potential Games	Zhigang Cao*, Zhibin Tan, Jinchuan Zhou
345	Networks VI —	
	Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design	Yangbo Song*, Zhuoran Lu
	Constrained Pricing in Social Networks	Chengqing Li*, Junjie Zhou
	Comparing with neighbors: the network determinants of involution and hierarchical solidification	Shenghao Sun*, Yiqing Xing, Chen Cheng, Wenjun Mei
	Selling Network Information	Renkun Yang, Jianyu Xu*
429	Incomplete Information Industrial Organization I	
	Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities	Zi Yang Kang*
	Efficient Auction Design with Externalities	Bing Liu, Simon Loertscher*
	Optimal Hotelling Auctions	Simon Loertscher, Ellen Muir*
	Nested Bundling	Frank Yang*
7. Au	ıg. 21 13:30 - 14:40	
131	Contests III	
	Information Design in Sequential All-Pay Auction Contests	Chao Wu*, Jie Zheng
	Prize Allocation Equilibrium in Team Contests	Jingfeng Lu, Yiyao Zhu*
	Dynamic Resource Allocation in Tullock Tug-of-war	Haochen Xie*, Jie Zheng
132	Persuasion IV	
	Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders	Zhicheng Du*, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang
	Persuasion and Norm Persistence	Francesca Chiaradia*

Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Interval Revelation

Junze Sun*, Arthur Schram, Randolph Sloof



245	Computation I			
	Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients	Simon Krogmann*, Pascal Lenzner, A. Skopalik, M. Uetz, M.C. Vos		
	Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive- Form Games	Yurong Chen*, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li		
	Predefined-Time Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Aggregative Games with Event-Triggered Communication	Jianing Chen*, Chuangyin Dang, Sitian Qin		
246	Matching III			
	Continuous Time Random Matching: A General Model	Darrell Duffie, Lei Qiao*, Yeneng Sun		
	Matching and Price Competition in Large Markets	Bingchao Huangfu*, Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu		
	Hierarchic matching with single peaked preferences and the formation of pyramidal organizations	Li Nie*		
249	Mechanism Design IV			
	The Structure of Bayesian Stable Matchings	Gaoji Hu*		
	Ex Post Strategy-proof Implementation	Qinggong Wu*, Tangren Feng		
	Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities	Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline, Yingkai Li*		
344	Industrial Organization VI			
	Exclusive Contracting and Discriminatory Pricing in Two-sided Markets	Haipeng Han*, Mingzhi Li, Jie Zheng		
	Revealing Private Information in a Patent Race	Eugen Kovac*, Pavel Kocourek		
	Endogenous Exclusive Contracts and Platforms' Dilemma	Feng Zhu*, Guopeng LI, Zhigang Cao		
345	Incomplete Information Industrial Organization II			
	Ramsey Pricing Revisited	Simon Loertscher*, Ellen Muir		
	Supply Chain Frictions	Ying-Ju Chen, Zhengqing Gui*, Ernst- Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao		
	Acceptance Deadline and Job Offer Deadline	Changying Li, Xin Zhao*		
429	Experiments II			
	Selten's Horse: An experient on Sequential Rationality	Asha Sadanand*, Nikolaos Tsakas		
	Type-Projection in Private Information Games	Miguel Costa-Gomes, Jiawen Li*, Marco Serena		
	Self-serving fairness in competing allocation proposals: evidence from the laboratory	Jianing Chen*, Zeng Lian, Jie Zheng		

8. Aug. 21 15:10 - 16:20

131	Contests IV		
	All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Types and Values: Equilibria and Information Disclosure	Bo Chen,* Jingfeng Lu, Zijia Wang	
	Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests	Yanwei Sun*, Fupeng Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin	
	Monotone perfection	Wei He, Yeneng Sun, Hanping Xu*	



132	Persuasion V	
	How Marketing Strategies Shape Price Competition	Daehong Min*, Heechun Kim, Hakki Lee
	Sequential Price Discrimination in Selling Information Goods	Fynn Louis Närmann*, Manuel Förster
	Persuading the persuaded: a continuation of Blackwell	Constantine Sorokin*, Eyal Winter
245	Learning III	
	Social Learning through Action-Signals	Wenji Xu*
	Breaking Bad News	Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn*, Simon Board
	Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games	Boli Xu*, Yingkai Li
246	Matching IV	
	Matching Through Agents	Ken Ho*, Jinyong Jeong
	Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions	Yao Cheng*, Zaifu Yang, Jingsheng Yu
	Stability and strategy-proofness formatching with interval constraints	Tsuyoshi Adachi*, Yuki Ishibashi
249	Networks VII	
	Strategies of Influence in Binary Star Networks: The Role of Indifferent Agents in Opinion Dynamics	Xiangyu Li, Yin Li*
	A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks	Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa, Agnieszka Rusinowska*
	The Network Banzhaf Value in Deterministic and Variable Network Situations	Loyimee Gogoi*, Surajit Borkotokey, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Rajnish Kumar
344	Industrial Organization VII	
	Platform Dominance and Across-Market Bundling	Xiongfei Dong*, Jiajia Cong
	Self-Preferencing Across Markets	Muxin Li*
	The sleeper effect of comparative advertising in oligopolistic market	Rabah Amir, Dominika Machowska*, Andrzej Nowakowski
345	Industrial Organization VIII	
	Information Gathering on Multi-Attribute Products	Jia He, Weixuan Zhou*
	Platform Persuasion	Yao Li*, Jiang Wei, Danxia Xie
	Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Supply Chain	Lining Han, Shiping Lang, Xiaoxi Li*
429	Mechanism Design V	
	Redesign Incentives in Proof-of-Stake Ethereum: An Interdisciplinary Approach of Reinforcement Learning and Mechanism Design	Xinyu Tian*, Zesen Zhuang, Luyao Zhang
	Trustworthy Cooperation in Non-cooperative Evolutionary Game	Xinyu Tian, Gary Charness, Luyao Zhang*

9. Aug. 22 9:00 - 10:30

131	Persuasion VI	
	Private Test and Verifiable Disclosure	Yichuan Lou*
	Diversity, Disagreement, and Information Aggregation	Xienan Cheng*, Tilman Börgers
	Duplicity Games: proactive and strategic incentive design for insider threat mitigation	Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu*
	Certification Design with Outside Option	Ting Pei*, Bin Chen



132	Dynamic Games	
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	Outside Options and Information Provision in School Choice	Mengling Li, Xiaoying Mei*
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	Beauty Contests on Large Networks	M. Ali Khan, Haomiao Yu, Zhixiang Zhang*
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	New Perspective on Allocation Problem: Favor Popularity and Flow Algorithm	Xihao Song*		
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	Core-periphery and nested networks emerging from a simple model of network formation	Norma Olaizola*		
	An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks	Peter Csoka, P. Jean-Jacques Herings*		
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	Non-Bayesian Persuasion with Intransitive Indifferent Receiver	Sidong Sun, Xi Weng*, Xundong Yin		




3. Venue & Map

Scan this QR code for a map guide, where you will find the following:

- Conference Venue
- E Food streets
- Subway stations
- ⊨ Designated Hotels





a) Conference Venue

National School of Development at Peking University (北京大学国家发展研究院)

Address: No.5 Weixiuyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 北京市海淀区蔚秀园路 5 号 承泽园

The National School of Development (NSD) at Peking University is the Conference Venue for GAMES 2024. The campus of the school is at Chengze Garden (承译园), which is located in the northwest corner of Beijing City.

There will be No Parking service for the guests on all conference days. You can take taxi or public transportation to the Conference Venue.

The closest stations of Beijing Subway to the campus are Yuanmingyuan Park Station (圆明园站) of Line 4, Xiyuan Station (西苑站) of Line 4 and Line 16, and Wanquanhe Qiao Station (万泉河桥站) of Line 16. It takes you a 15-minute walk from the stations to the campus.

If you live in The Lakeview Hotel, we provide you with shuttle bus service from the hotel to the Conference Venue on every morning during the conference. See "4. Service" of this handbook for the timetable.

b) Designated Hotels

The Lakeview Hotel(北大博雅国际酒店)

Address: No.127 Zhongguancun North Avenue, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区中关村北大街 127 号

Telephone: +86-10-8268 9999

Beijing Posts and Telecommunications Conference Center (北京邮电会议中心)

Address: No. 5 Gua Jia Tun, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区挂甲屯 5 号

Telephone: +86-10- 6254 7799

c) Off-campus Restaurants

Longhu Xingyuehui - Beijing Yihe (龙湖星悦荟—北京颐和)

Address: Erlongzha Road and Zhongzhi Road Intersection, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区二龙闸路与中直路交口

This food street is about 1.1 kilometers away from the Conference Venue. It takes you a 16-minute walk to go there. You can have quite some options like coffee shops, western style foods, barbecue, Hot Pot, Yunnan cuisine, northwestern cuisine, and Hangzhou cuisine in the street. You can find a convenient store there as well.

Changchunyuan - Changxiangli (畅春园—畅饷里)

Address: No. 8 Yiheyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区海淀桥北颐和园路 8 号

This newly re-opened food street is about one kilometer away from the Conference Venue. It takes you a 15-minute walk to go there. You can find coffee shops, Beijing cuisine, Cantonese cuisine, Hunan cuisine, Hot Pot, fast foods, and barbecue there.



4. Service

a) Information Desk at Conference Venue

Hours: August 18th, 12:00-18:00; August 19th to 22nd, 8:00-18:00

b) Shuttle Bus Timetable

Date	The Lakeview Hotel to Conference Venue	Conference Venue to The Lakeview Hotel	Conference Dinner to Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center
August 19 th	8:15	19:00	-
August 20 th	8:30	18:00	20:30
August 21 st	8:30	18:00	-
August 22 nd	8:30	17:30	-

c) Meals

Lunches

Lunches are provided for all conference participants free of charge at the Conference Venue. See below lunch arrangement.

Date	Lunch Area 1 B1 Canteen (200 seats)	Lunch Area 2 B106 Room (60 seats)	Lunch Area 3 B1 Opening Space (90 seats)	Notes
August 19 th	Chinese set meal in lunch box			Halal and vegetarian meals available in B1 Canteen
August 20 th	SUBWAY sandwich			
August 21 st	Chinese set meal in lunch box			
August 22 nd	SUBWAY sandwich			

Coffee Breaks

Floor	Location	Notes	
B1	B101 Lecture Hall		
Floor 1	Outside Room 131 & 132	 Coffee breaks are offered between sessions, including coffee, tea, snacks, etc. Water and coffee are supplied outside the rooms during all conference hours. 	
Floor 2	Outside Room 245 & 246		
Floor 3	Outside Room 344 &345		
Floor 4	Outside Room 420 & 429		

Note: Besides the above-mentioned lunches, Conference Dinner and coffee breaks, food and drinks can be purchased from the B1 Canteen at your own cost.

Conference Dinner

Time: August 20th, 18:30-20:30

Location: Zhonghua Hall (中华厅), The Lakeview Hotel

Transportation: By shuttle bus

18:00: Shuttle bus departs from the Conference Venue for The Lakeview Hotel

20:30: Shuttle bus departs from The Lakeview Hotel for Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center

d) Internet

Step-by-Step Guide to Connect to the Campus Internet

(1) Connect to the PKU Wi-Fi Network

On your device, go to your Wi-Fi settings. Select the network named PKU. Your device should automatically redirect you to the login page. If it does not, please open your web browser and go to its.pku.edu.cn.

(2) Log into the Campus Network Portal

You will see a login page where you need to enter your credentials.

(3) Enter Your Credentials

The following usernames and password have been assigned to you:

Username: wdq20240806001

Password: games2024

(4) Start Browsing!

Once you have successfully logged in, you should be connected to the internet. If you encounter any issues or need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact the IT support team at the Information Desk.

e) Appointment for Visiting Peking University Main Campus

The Conference Venue is outside but close to the PKU main campus. If you'd like to visit the main campus, please scan this QR code for an appointment. Be sure to make an appointment 24 hours in advance. The appointment system stops service by 10 pm each night. The available campus visit days for you are August 20th to August 23rd. Please enter the campus from the Southwest Gate of Peking University with your passport or ID card.





f) Alipay, a Useful APP for Mobile Payment

Alipay is a very convenient payment instrument when you stay in China. You can download the APP by scanning the below QR code (or go to https://render.alipay.com/p/yuyan/180020040001212700/), and then follow the instructions shown on the picture.





5. About Us

a) About the National School of Development at Peking University

The National School of Development (NSD) at Peking University is a comprehensive college that offers a multidisciplinary environment for teaching and research in economics, management science, and public policy. Its predecessor, the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) was established in 1994 by Professor Justin Yifu Lin and five other overseas-trained economists. Following its expansion of teaching and research, CCER was renamed the National School of Development in 2008.

The NSD is China's leading institution that combines teaching, research and policy advising. It is an integral part of Peking University's drive to become a world-class university. The NSD upholds Peking University's values of inclusiveness and academic freedom; it promotes socially meaningful research in economics, management science, and public policy, and is committed to contributing to China's economic and social progress.

The NSD offers teaching programs in three areas: academia, business and public policy. Its academic programs include an economics PhD program, a bachelor program in national development, and a double-major program. Its business education is offered through BiMBA (Beijing International MBA) that hosts MBA, EMBA and EDP programs. In 2016, NSD added public policy as one of its teaching programs through a newly established institute, ISSCAD (Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development), whose mandate is to offer doctoral and master's degrees to senior officials



from developing countries.

NSD's faculty has published numerous academic papers in domestic and international journals. Many professors are China's leading scholars in their respective fields. The CCER is an internationally recognized networking center for academic exchanges.

The NSD is also one of the leading think tanks in China. It brings together research resources within Peking University and regularly participates in China's policy debates. Over the years, it has produced influential policy advice on important issues concerning industrial policy, rural reconstruction, and SOE reform, etc. Some of them have been adopted by the government. The NSD hosts three highly recognized think-tank events: China Economic Observer, NSD Policy Talk and China Development Forum. It is also the organizer of two second-track dialogues between China and the United States, US-China Economic Dialogue and US-China Health Dialogue. In 2016, it was designated by the government as one of the 25 national think tanks.

b) About Peking University

Founded in 1898, Peking University, originally known as the Imperial University of Peking, is the first comprehensive university in China. The current campus is in Haidian District, Beijing, adjacent to the Summer Palace (Yiheyuan Park) and the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan Park), and was originally the location of Yenching University, therefore, the campus of Peking University is also called "Yan Yuan".

Since its establishment more than 120 years ago, Peking University has made irreplaceable contributions to the revitalization and liberation of the nation, the construction and development of the country, and the civilization and progress of society, and has played an important vanguard role in the process of the modernization of China. The traditional spirit of patriotism, progress, democracy and science and the study style of diligence, rigor, truth-seeking and innovation are alive and well passed down from generation to generation.

As the highest-ranked university in comprehensive strength in China, Peking University currently has six departments: the Faculty of Humanities, the Faculty of Social Sciences, the Faculty of Economics and Management, the Faculty of Science, the Faculty of Information and Engineering, and the Faculty of Medicine. The university has 55 directly affiliated faculties, 133 undergraduate majors, 286 master's degree programs, and 263 doctoral degree programs. While maintaining its leading edge in traditional basic disciplines, Peking University has also made significant progress in applied disciplines and many cutting-edge interdisciplinary fields in recent years.

For more details about PKU, please visit http://www.pku.edu.cn.

c) A Short History of Beijing

Beijing is the capital of China and the political, cultural and diplomatic center of China. With a history of more than 2,900 years, it is one of the cities with the most World Heritage sites in the world (7 sites) and the first capital city in the world to have a Global Geopark. Today, the city of more than 20 million people is a modern cosmopolitan city.

As the cultural center of China, Beijing has more than 7,300 cultural relics and monuments and more than 200 tourist attractions. The Forbidden City, located in the center of Beijing's central axis, is the largest surviving ancient palace complex in the world. The Summer Palace, not far from Peking University, is the largest and best-preserved imperial garden in China. The Great Wall, which was built more than 2,000 years ago and stretches for more than 20,000 kilometers, has left the most completely protected part of Beijing territory. And the hutongs and courtyards scattered throughout the city – traditional old Beijing buildings – restore the history of the ancient capital.

Beijing's climate is divided into four distinct seasons. September and October coincide with the autumn season in Beijing, with highs around 30°C and lows around 18°C. This is the best season of the year in Beijing and the best time to travel. The beacon of the Great Wall is lit by the red maple leaves that spread over the mountains. The red walls of the Forbidden City are set against the golden ginkgo biloba. Under the clear sky, the whole city is surrounded by the distant Yanshan Mountains, which is particularly atmospheric and transparent.



主办单位: 世界博弈论学会

承办单位: 北京大学国家发展研究院

学术支持: 中国信息经济学会 中国运筹学会

Organizer: Game Theory Society

Local organizer: National School of Development at Peking University

Academic support: China Information Economics Society Operations Research Society of China