GAME THEORY SOCIETY

GAMES 2024
PEKING UNIVERSITY
AUGUST 19-22, BEIJING

北京大学国家发展研究院
National School of Development

30th Anniversary 1994-2024

2024 第七届世界博弈论大会
The 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
August 19-22, Beijing

Conference Handbook

北京大学国家发展研究院
National School of Development

30th Anniversary 1994-2024

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1. Miscellaneous Information

Please wear your badge at all times at the Conference Venue. You will need the badge to enter the venue, get lunches and take a seat at the Conference Dinner.

Regular Sessions take place on the 1st to 4th floors. The last speaker in the session is the session chair. It is very important that you ensure the session starts and ends at the correct time. In case of a last-minute cancellation, do not fill the gap as this will facilitate session hopping. *Each speaker has 22 minutes to set up, speak including Q&A, and take down.*

Semi-plenary Sessions take place in B101, 420 and 429. The last speaker in the session is the session chair. It is very important that you ensure the session starts and ends at the correct time. *Each speaker has 45 minutes to set up, speak and take down.*

Keynote Speeches take place in B101. There will be volunteers with microphones in the audience to catch questions. *Each keynote speech lasts for 60 minutes.*

Lunch boxes/bags are offered on Floor B1. There are three lunch areas: B1 Canteen with 200 seats, B106 with 60 seats, and an open space in B1 with 90 seats. There is a large outdoor space in front of the building and feel free to take your boxed lunch there. *Your help in placing rubbish in the appropriate place is greatly appreciated.*

Information about the program and last-minute changes will be displayed on the monitors close to the Information Desk on the 1st floor, outside the classrooms, and next to the elevators.

If you need a place to keep a bag or two, contact the Information Desk.

If you would like to connect wirelessly to the internet, see instructions in "4. Service" of this handbook.

Timetable of shuttle bus between the Conference Venue and The Lakeview Hotel, which also holds the Conference Dinner on August 20th, is included in "4. Service" of this handbook. The timetable is also posted near the Information Desk.

2. Registration & Program

a) Registration

For participants arriving and/or registering on August 19th: please plan to arrive early as the opening ceremony starts at 9 am. You may first come to the opening ceremony and speeches before picking up your conference package.

For participants who reserved a room at either hotel designated in the registration system: your conference package will be kept at your hotel on August 18th and 19th for two days for you to pick up, and then moved to the Conference Venue from August 20th.

On-site registration and payment are available in registration service hours on August 18 to 20 at the Conference Venue.

Registration Service Timetable

Date	National School of Development, Peking University	The Lakeview Hotel	Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center
August 18th	12:00-18:00	12:00-22:00	12:00-22:00
August 19th	07:30-18:00	07:30-18:00	07:30-18:00
August 20th-22nd	08:00-18:00	-	-
Notes	*The Conference Venue at the Chengze Garden*	*For those who reserved a room at this hotel in registration system*	*For those who reserved a room at this hotel in registration system*

B) Program Overview

August 19th		August 20th		August 21st		August 22nd	
09:00 - 09:30	Opening Ceremony and Group Photo	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 3	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 6	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 9
09:35 - 10:35	Michihiro Kandori (President's Talk)						
11:00 - 12:10	Regular Sessions 1	11:00 - 12:00	Nisarg Shah (Kalai Prize Lecture)	11:00 - 12:30	Semi-plenary Sessions	11:00 - 12:00	Gabrielle Demange (President-Elect's Talk)
12:10 - 13:30	Lunch	12:00 - 13:30	Lunch	12:30 - 13:30	Lunch	12:30 - 13:30	Lunch
13:30 - 15:00	Semi-plenary Sessions	13:30 - 14:40	Regular Sessions 4	13:30 - 14:40	Regular Sessions 7	13:30 - 15:00	Regular Sessions 10
15:30 - 16:40	Regular Sessions 2	15:10 - 16:20	Regular Sessions 5	15:10 - 16:20	Regular Sessions 8	15:30 - 17:00	Regular Sessions 11
17:10 - 18:40	Panel Discussions	16:40 - 17:40	Ariel Rubinstein (Morgenstern Lecture)	16:40 - 17:40	Françoise Forges (von Neumann Lecture)		
		18:30 - 20:30	Conference Dinner (Lakeview Hotel)				

Opening Ceremony (B101)

Aug. 19 9:00 – 9:30

Welcome remarks by

- Guohua Jiang, vice president of Peking University
- Matthew Jackson, former president, the Game Theory Society
- Michihiro Kandori, president, the Game Theory Society
- Gabrielle Demange, president-elect, the Game Theory Society
- Yiping Huang, dean of National School of Development, Peking University

Chaired by Xiaoyan Lei, chair of the Academic Board of National School of Development, Peking University

Group photo

Keynotes (B101)

Aug. 19 **09:35 - 10:35**	Michihiro Kandori (President's Talk) University of Tokyo	How to Use AI for Game Theoretic Research
Aug. 20 **11:00 - 12:00**	Nisarg Shah (Kalai Prize Lecture) University of Toronto	The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Aug. 20 **16:40 - 17:40**	Ariel Rubinstein (Morgenstern Lecture) Tel Aviv University and New York University	No Prices, No Games: The Case of Matching Problems
Aug. 21 **16:40 - 17:40**	Françoise Forges (von Neumann Lecture) Paris Dauphine-PSL University	On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Aug. 22 **11:00 - 12:00**	Gabrielle Demange (President-Elect's Talk) Paris School of Economics	Dual Communication in a Social Network: Contributing and Dedicating Attention

Semi-plenary Talks

Aug. 19 13:30 - 15:00

B101	Yan Chen University of Michigan	Group Identity and Belief Formation: A Decomposition of Political Polarization
	Anton Kolotilin University of New South Wales	The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
420	Takuo Sugaya Stanford University	Non-Recursive Dynamic Incentives: A Rate of Convergence Approach
	Ning Yu Nanjing Audit University	Real-Time Games

Aug. 21 11:00-12:30

B101	Itai Ashlagi Stanford University	Congested Waiting Lists and Organ Allocation
	Yeneng Sun National University of Singapore	Coarser Information in Games
420	Andreas Blume University of Arizona	Language Games: Correlation through Non-Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness, and Misunderstanding
	Itai Arieli Technion-lsrael Institute of Technology	Persuading while Learning
429	Ingela Alger Toulouse School of Economics	Evolutionary Foundations of Human Motivation in Strategic Interactions —Recent Advances

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Regular Sessions
1. Aug. 19 11:00 – 12:10

131	Networks I	
	Strategic Diffusion: Public Goods vs. Public Bads	Arthur Campbell, DJ Thornton, Yves Zenou*
	Interconnected Conflict	Marcin Dziubiński, Sanjeev Goyal, Junjie Zhou*
	Robust Katz Centrality	Yang Sun, Wei Zhao*, Junjie Zhou

132	Assignment I	
	Fair and Strategy-proof Probabilistic Allocation with Payment	Zheng Lin*, Tsuyoshi Adachi
	On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment	Christian Basteck*, Lars Ehlers
	Affirmative Action's Cumulative Fractional Assignments	Manshu Khanna*, Haydar Evren

245	Bargaining I	
	Bargaining with Mechanisms: Two-sided Incomplete Information	Marcin Peski*
	U-shaped settlement pattern in bargaining with arbitration	Zhixian Yu*
	Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining	Yuan Ju, Juan Vidal-Puga*

246	Contracts I	
	Designing Index Provision	Yizhou Xiao*, Yan Xiong
	Rethinking the Incentive Dilemma: Crafting Ambiguous Strategies for Indirectly Linking between Employee Behavior and Value Creation	Zhenghao Xia*, Jinghua Xiao
	Selling Training Data	Jingmin Huang, Wei Zhao, Renjie Zhong*

249	Persuasion I	
	Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules	Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan*, Yingkai Li
	Industry-optimal quality disclosure	Ming Li*, Binyan Pu
	Robust Advertisement Pricing	Tan Gan, Hongcheng Li*

344	Evolution I	
	Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching	Ziwei Wang*, Jiabin Wu
	Costly Advertising and Information Congestion: Insights from Pigou's Successors	Ryoji Jinushi*
	Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes	Hsiao-Chi Chen*, Yunshyong Chow, Shi-Miin Liu

345	Industrial Organization I	
	Popularity in location games	Gaetan Fournier, Marc Schroder*
	Data Asset Utilization and Transaction Value Allocation	Jinghua Xiao, Chenghao Zhang*, Kang Xie, Zhigang Cao
	The Competitive Effects of Fixed-Price Contracts under Cost Inflation	Luke Garrod, Ruochen Li*, Chris Wilson

429	Learning I	
	Contracts that Reward Innovation: Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal	Yiman Sun*
	Optimal Incentives for Innovation Adoption	Wanyi Chen, Qiaoxi Zhang*
	Learning through Transient Matching in Congested Markets	Andrew Ferdowsian*

2. Aug. 19 15:30 - 16:40

131 Networks II

Influencer Networks — Xueheng Li*

Strategic Hiding and Exploration in Networks — Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubiński*

Sequential Network Design — Yang Sun*, Wei Zhao, Junjie Zhou

132 Experiments I

Goose Feather from a Thousand Miles Away: A Theory and Experiment on Reciprocity — Yunwen He, Jaimie Lien, Yang Yang*, Jie Zheng

Credible Threats — Martin Dufwenberg, Flora Li*, Alec Smith

Transparency and Verifiability in Communication with Endogenous Information Acquisition — Ernest Lai,* Wooyoung Lim, Yichuan Lou

245 Extensive Form

Extended backward induction and sequential equilibria — Evgeny Zalyubovsky*

Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward-Induction Reasoning — Emiliano Catonini*, Pierpaolo Battigalli

Local dominance — Emiliano Catonini, Jingyi Xue*

246 Industrial Organization II

Multi-dimensional Personalized Pricing and Market Competition — Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu*, Yuxuan Zhu

Secrecy vs. Patenting in Innovation Races — Pavel Kocourek*, Eugen Kovac

Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Entry (Global) Games — Pedro Jara-Moroni*, Rabah Amir, Rodrigo Harrison

249 Mechanism Design I

Robustly Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading — Wanchang Zhang*

Optimal mechanism for selling multiple items to a unit-demand buyer — Keita Kuwahara, Reo Nonaka*

Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions over Restricted Domains: Possibility, Impossibility and Top-inseparability — Abhinaba Lahiri*, Anup Pramanik

344 Persuasion II

Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response — Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang*

Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion — Zhonghong Kuang, Jaimie W Lien*, Jie Zheng

Revenue-Maximizing Overselling in Markets with Asymmetric Information — Fan Wu, Jie Zheng*

345 Cooperative Games I

Comparative Statics of Minimum-Cost-Spanning-Tree Games — Zhibin Tan*, Zhigang Cao, Zhengxing Zou

Coalitional Manipulations and Immunity of the Shapley Value — Christian Basteck, Frank Huettner*

Veto core consistent voting rules — Aleksei Kondratev*

429 Learning II

Learning from Strategic Sources — Kailin Chen*

The Effect of State Correlation and Payoff Interdependence on R&D — Tatiana Mayskaya*, Arina Nikandrova

Emergence of Cooperative Nash-Equilibria from Competitive Decision-Making Games — Yilong Feng*, Boyu Zhang, Wenjun Mei

3. Aug. 20 9:00 - 10:30

131   Models of Political Agency

Governing Local Bureaucracy in a Centralized State — Zanhui Liu, Zhaotian Luo*, Yucheng Qiu, Tianyang Xi, Hongding Zhu

Decay of Long-established Democracies — Weijia Li, Yang Xie*

An Organizational Theory of Political Parties — Spencer Pantoja*

Reputational Concern and Policy Vagueness — Chen Cheng*, Liuchun Deng, Yufeng Sun

132   Networks III

Persuasion in Networks: Can the Sender Do Better than Using Public Signals? — Yifan Zhang*

Information Sale on Network — Jihwan Do, Lining Han*, Xiaoxi Li

Link complementarity and social coordination — Zhiwei Cui*

Heterogeneous Welfare Effects of Public Information — Kota Murayama*

245   Auctions I

Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets — Runxi Wang*, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Anselm Eicke, ..., Ingmar Schlecht

A Simple Model of Trading Artworks — Min Zhang*

A Method to Characterize Reduced-Form Auctions — Charles Zheng*

Auction design with ambiguity:Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions — Sosung Baik, Sung-Ha Hwang*

246   Communication I

Facilitating trust and trustworthiness: The impact of mediation — Saori Chiba, Michiko Ogaku*

Bayesian communication games with information networks — Xiao Luo, Yongchuan Qiao*, Yang Sun

Academic Publication Competition — Yifan Wu*

Undefeated equilibrium and better response dynamics in sender receiver games — Stéphan Sémirat*, Françoise Forges

249   Contests I

Chasing Contests — Zhuo Chen, Yun Liu*

Blotto Game with Testing (The Locks, Bombs and Testing Model) — Isaac Sonin*

Optimal Biased Design of Dynamic Multi-Battle Team Contests — Xin Feng*

Staying Afloat: On firms' sharing of their success with workers under the New Normal. — Xinyan Zhang*, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert

344   Mechanism Design II

Matching Maximization Mechanism — Anh Trieu*, Iwan Bos, Marc Schroder, Dries Vermeulen

Implementing Randomized Allocation Rules with Outcome-Contingent Transfer — Fan Wu, Yi Liu*

Robustly Optimal Voting Rule — Noriaki Kiguchi*, Shinpei Noguchi, Yuta Takahashi

Optimal allocation with costly verification and distributional constraint — Yunan Li*

345	Implementation	
	Implementation in Undominated Strategies: Dictatorship and Compromise	Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto*
	Implementation in VNM stable sets	Michele Lombardi*, Ville Korpela, Riccardo Saulle
	Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy	Xinxi Song*
	Information Size and Full Implementation	Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun*

429	Incomplete Information	
	Bayesian Equilibrium and Generalized Nash Equilibrium	Christian W. Bach*, Andrés Perea
	Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition	Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev*
	Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games Revisited	Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi*
	Group Knowledge and Individual Introspection	Michele Crescenzi*

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	Negotiation in bankruptcy problems	Dirck Bouwhuis*, Ruud Hendrickx, Jean-Jacques Herings
	Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn meet Tullock	Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Yuxuan Zhu*
	The Cooperation Problem	Xiangliang Li*

132	Behavioral Economics I	
	Regret in Games	Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg, Senran Lin*
	Coordinated punishment? Only if reciprocators abound	Adriana Alventosa, Vicente Calabuig*, Gonzalo Olcina
	Venture Capital and Multiple Heterogeneous Beliefs	Zhuming Chen*, Xue Luo

245	Industrial Organization III	
	Merger, Stochastic R&D and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly	Di Wu, Leonard F. S. Wang, Huizhong Liu*
	Bargaining power and the incentive for innovation	Jianxin Guo*
	Teamwork Frictions in the Ricardian Team Production Framework	Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Richard Steinberg*, Oscar Volij

246	Industrial Organization IV	
	The Value of Anonymous Option	Wanzhu Zhang*, Jianpei Li
	Warm up by Revelation to Cool down in Competition: Strategic Provision of Relationship-sensitive Information	Xiaokuai Shao*, Jie Zheng
	Antitrust policy under R&D spillovers & moral hazard	Yasuhiro Shirata*

249	Evolution II	
	Algorithmic Collusion and Price Discrimination: The Over-Usage of Data	Zhang Xu*, Mingsheng Zhang, Wei Zhao
	Leadership and peer effects	Penelope Hernandez, Gonzalo Olcina*, Raul Toral
	Convergence of Fictitious Plays in Potential Games	Zibo Xu*

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Multiproduct trading of indivisible goods with many sellers and buyers	Amparo Urbano*, Iván Arribas
A Justified-Envy Minimal Variation of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism	Qianfeng Tang*, Jian Hong
College admissions with program-based scholarships	Azar Abizada*, Umut Dur

345 Mechanism Design III

Undominated Mechanisms	Tilman Borgers, Jiangtao Li*, Kexin Wang
A Robust Optimization Approach to Mechanism Design	Kexin Wang*, Jiangtao Li
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Punishment	Lining Han, Ruben Juarez*

429 Networks IV

Pricing and Advertising with Network Externalities under Asymmetric Information	Litian Chen, Yaojun Nan and Fanqi Shi*
Financial Supernetworks and Endogenous Systemic Risk	Jing Fu*, Frank Page, Jean-Pierre Zigrand
The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts	Rakesh Vohra, Yiqing Xing*, Wu Zhu

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131 Decision Theory

Decision Making Under Multidimensional Uncertainty	Mu Zhang*, Shaowei Ke
Failures of Contingent Thinking	Evan Piermont, Peio Zuazo-Garin*
Conditional Hypothesis Testing Systems	Xiao Luo*

132 Epidemics

Optimal control in models of virus propagation	Xiuxiu Liu*, Elena Gubar
Modified SEIQHRDP and Machine Learning Prediction for the Epidemics	Yike Li*, Gubar Elena
The Impact of the connecting urban transportation systemto the SEIR model	Ke Ma*, Elena Gubar

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Data Trade and Consumer Privacy	Jiadong Gu*
Potentials in Cournot Cross-holding Games	Sixian Shen*, Feng Zhu, Guopeng Li, Zhigang Cao
How do Tom and Jerry Play? A Simple Application of Convex Analysis in Hide-and-Seek Games	Xinmi Li*, Jie Zheng

246 Monotone Comparative Statics

How Coordination Initiates, Diffuses and Succeeds: A Dynamic Network Game Approach	Xinnian Pan*
The Structure of Optimisation Problems	Jose Maria Moreno de Guerra Beato*
Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Points	Rabah Amir*, David Rietzke

249 Persuasion III

Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders	Zhuo Chen*
Information design in allocation with costly verification	Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang*
Partial commitment to disclosure rule	Ye Jin*, Zhen Zhou

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Strategic Post-exam Preference Submission in the School Choice Game

Vladimir Mazalov, Artem Sedakov*, Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng

The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game

Chaoran Sun*, Chenghong Luo, David Perez-Castrillo

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Priority Search with Outside Options

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Search prominence with costly product returns

Daniel Z. Li, Sanxi Li, Jun Yu, Mingsheng Zhang*

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Why are there six degrees of separation in a social network?

Ivan Samoylenko*, David Aleja, Eva Primo, ..., Stefano Boccaletti

Competition for Linkages with Public Goods Contribution

Guopeng Li*, Wei Zhao

A Model of Endogenous Group Membership, Social Capital, and Economic Mobility

Matthew Jackson*, Raj Chetty

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Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors

Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Mengxi Zhang*

Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World

Yiding Feng*, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins

A Budget-Balanced Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities with Identity-Dependent Externalities

Younghwan In*, Yunkyeong Seo

Optimal design of auction with linear contract under double moral hazard

Dazhong Wang, Ruqu Wang, Xinyi Xu*

132　　**Communication II** ────────────────────────────

Multi-issue Strategic Information Transmission with Partial Attention

Yibin Li*

The rating inflation game

Yan Long*

Information Disclosure in Experts' Market with Uncertain Diagnostic Accuracy

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Ying Gao*

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Entrant-Optimal Learning in A Contest Game

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General Lotto solvable cases of the Colonel Blotto game

Marcin Dziubiński*

Optimal Tree Contest Design and Winner-Take-All

Qian Jiao*, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu, Yang Yu

Contesting fake news

Daniel Rehsmann, Béatrice Roussillon, Paul Schweinzer*

246 Contracts II

Detrimental Incentive Mechanisms in Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships — Tom Rauber*, Philipp Weinschenk

Vertical contracting and information spillover in Cournot competition — Jihwan Do, Nicolas Riquelme*

Enforceability v.s. Flexibility: Incomplete Contract with Litigation Cost — Jingmin Huang*, Sanxi Li, Tong Wang, Jianye Yan

Adverse Selection and Income Inequality — Yaping Wu, Shenghao Zhu*

249 Cooperative Games II

Axiomatization by Individual Monotonicity: Weighted Surplus Sharing and Shifted Proportional Division — Yukihiko Funaki*, Yukio Koriyama

Equilibrium coalition structures in symmetric three-player games — Chen Qu*, Jingyi Shen

On Entrance of a New Agent to a Market — Martin Černý*

The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game — Jinglei Huang*, Danxia Xie

344 Combinatorial Games and Potential Games

The Game of Cops and Robbers on Digraphs — Shravan Luckraz*, Gafurjan Ibragimov

Bidding Partizan Subtrction Games — Ravi Kant Rai*, Urban Larsson, Makoto Yokoo

Near Gradient Evolution — Omer Edhan, Ziv Hellman*

Beyond Global Maximizers: Unveiling the Full Potential of Potential Games — Zhigang Cao*, Zhibin Tan, Jinchuan Zhou

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Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design — Yangbo Song*, Zhuoran Lu

Constrained Pricing in Social Networks — Chengqing Li*, Junjie Zhou

Comparing with neighbors: the network determinants of involution and hierarchical solidification — Shenghao Sun*, Yiqing Xing, Chen Cheng, Wenjun Mei

Selling Network Information — Renkun Yang, Jianyu Xu*

429 Incomplete Information Industrial Organization I

Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities — Zi Yang Kang*

Efficient Auction Design with Externalities — Bing Liu, Simon Loertscher*

Optimal Hotelling Auctions — Simon Loertscher, Ellen Muir*

Nested Bundling — Frank Yang*

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131 Contests III

Information Design in Sequential All-Pay Auction Contests — Chao Wu*, Jie Zheng

Prize Allocation Equilibrium in Team Contests — Jingfeng Lu, Yiyao Zhu*

Dynamic Resource Allocation in Tullock Tug-of-war — Haochen Xie*, Jie Zheng

132 Persuasion IV

Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders — Zhicheng Du*, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang

Persuasion and Norm Persistence — Francesca Chiaradia*

Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Interval Revelation — Junze Sun*, Arthur Schram, Randolph Sloof

245 Computation I

Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients	Simon Krogmann*, Pascal Lenzner, A. Skopalik, M. Uetz, M.C. Vos
Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-Form Games	Yurong Chen*, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
Predefined-Time Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Aggregative Games with Event-Triggered Communication	Jianing Chen*, Chuangyin Dang, Sitian Qin

246 Matching III

Continuous Time Random Matching: A General Model	Darrell Duffie, Lei Qiao*, Yeneng Sun
Matching and Price Competition in Large Markets	Bingchao Huangfu*, Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu
Hierarchic matching with single peaked preferences and the formation of pyramidal organizations	Li Nie*

249 Mechanism Design IV

The Structure of Bayesian Stable Matchings	Gaoji Hu*
Ex Post Strategy-proof Implementation	Qinggong Wu*, Tangren Feng
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities	Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline, Yingkai Li*

344 Industrial Organization VI

Exclusive Contracting and Discriminatory Pricing in Two-sided Markets	Haipeng Han*, Mingzhi Li, Jie Zheng
Revealing Private Information in a Patent Race	Eugen Kovac*, Pavel Kocourek
Endogenous Exclusive Contracts and Platforms' Dilemma	Feng Zhu*, Guopeng LI, Zhigang Cao

345 Incomplete Information Industrial Organization II

Ramsey Pricing Revisited	Simon Loertscher*, Ellen Muir
Supply Chain Frictions	Ying-Ju Chen, Zhengqing Gui*, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao
Acceptance Deadline and Job Offer Deadline	Changying Li, Xin Zhao*

429 Experiments II

Selten's Horse: An experient on Sequential Rationality	Asha Sadanand*, Nikolaos Tsakas
Type-Projection in Private Information Games	Miguel Costa-Gomes, Jiawen Li*, Marco Serena
Self-serving fairness in competing allocation proposals: evidence from the laboratory	Jianing Chen*, Zeng Lian, Jie Zheng

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131 Contests IV

All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Types and Values: Equilibria and Information Disclosure	Bo Chen,* Jingfeng Lu, Zijia Wang
Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests	Yanwei Sun*, Fupeng Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin
Monotone perfection	Wei He, Yeneng Sun, Hanping Xu*

132   Persuasion V

How Marketing Strategies Shape Price Competition — Daehong Min*, Heechun Kim, Hakki Lee

Sequential Price Discrimination in Selling Information Goods — Fynn Louis Närmann*, Manuel Förster

Persuading the persuaded: a continuation of Blackwell — Constantine Sorokin*, Eyal Winter

245   Learning III

Social Learning through Action-Signals — Wenji Xu*

Breaking Bad News — Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn*, Simon Board

Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games — Boli Xu*, Yingkai Li

246   Matching IV

Matching Through Agents — Ken Ho*, Jinyong Jeong

Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions — Yao Cheng*, Zaifu Yang, Jingsheng Yu

Stability and strategy-proofness formatching with interval constraints — Tsuyoshi Adachi*, Yuki Ishibashi

249   Networks VII

Strategies of Influence in Binary Star Networks: The Role of Indifferent Agents in Opinion Dynamics — Xiangyu Li, Yin Li*

A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks — Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa, Agnieszka Rusinowska*

The Network Banzhaf Value in Deterministic and Variable Network Situations — Loyimee Gogoi*, Surajit Borkotokey, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Rajnish Kumar

344   Industrial Organization VII

Platform Dominance and Across-Market Bundling — Xiongfei Dong*, Jiajia Cong

Self-Preferencing Across Markets — Muxin Li*

The sleeper effect of comparative advertising in oligopolistic market — Rabah Amir, Dominika Machowska*, Andrzej Nowakowski

345   Industrial Organization VIII

Information Gathering on Multi-Attribute Products — Jia He, Weixuan Zhou*

Platform Persuasion — Yao Li*, Jiang Wei, Danxia Xie

Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Supply Chain — Lining Han, Shiping Lang, Xiaoxi Li*

429   Mechanism Design V

Redesign Incentives in Proof-of-Stake Ethereum: An Interdisciplinary Approach of Reinforcement Learning and Mechanism Design — Xinyu Tian*, Zesen Zhuang, Luyao Zhang

Trustworthy Cooperation in Non-cooperative Evolutionary Game — Xinyu Tian, Gary Charness, Luyao Zhang*

9. Aug. 22 9:00 - 10:30

131   Persuasion VI

Private Test and Verifiable Disclosure — Yichuan Lou*

Diversity, Disagreement, and Information Aggregation — Xienan Cheng*, Tilman Börgers

Duplicity Games: proactive and strategic incentive design for insider threat mitigation — Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu*

Certification Design with Outside Option — Ting Pei*, Bin Chen

10. Aug. 22 13:30 - 15:00

131	Assignment II	
	A computational approach to the comparison of fair division algorithms involving money transfers	Dhivya Anand Kumar*, Hervé Moulin
	Utility distortion in claims problems	Bas Dietzenbacher*, William Thomson
	A new axiomatization of the broadcasting problem	Marcus Franz Konrad Pisch*
	Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for market design environments	JIngsheng Yu, Jun Zhang*

132	Communication III	
	Counterintelligence and Its Effects in Strategic Interactions with Conflict of Interest	Tao Wang*
	Competitive Disclosure of Multiple Product Attributes	James Dearden, David Goldbaum, Ernest Lai, Qichao Shi*
	Unacknowledged Heterogeneity in Communication	Kyle Chauvin*
	A Role for Cheap Talk in Disclosure	Wenhao Wu*

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	Correlation and rationalizability in nonatomic games	Francesco Giordano*

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	Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets	Di Feng*
	Egalitarianism in International Greenhouse Gas Permits Distribution	Josep M. Izqierdo, Pedro Calleja Cortes, Xiuxia Yin*
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	Effects of External Compensation Disparities on Corporate Innovation: A Signaling Game Analysis of Manufacturing Enterprises	Chuyi Fang*, Yuting Wang

| 245	Cooperative Games III	
	Semivalue and Sobolev-Type Reduced Game	Chenghong Luo*, Chaoran Sun, Chunyang Fu
	The Shapley Value for Multichoice Games with Restricted Choices	Josune Albizuri, Satoshi Masuya*, Jose Zarzuelo
	Solutions of stochastic cooperative games with excess-based preferences through optimization method	Panfei Sun*
	A union self-evaluation approach to associated consistency for cooperative games	Wenzhong Li*, Genjiu Xu, René van den Brink

3. Venue & Map

Scan this QR code for a map guide, where you will find the following:

- 🎓 Conference Venue
- 💼 Food streets
- 🚆 Subway stations
- 🛏 Designated Hotels

Conference Venue
Apple Maps

a) Conference Venue

National School of Development at Peking University (北京大学国家发展研究院)

Address: No.5 Weixiuyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 北京市海淀区蔚秀园路 5 号 承泽园

The National School of Development (NSD) at Peking University is the Conference Venue for GAMES 2024. The campus of the school is at Chengze Garden (承泽园), which is located in the northwest corner of Beijing City.

There will be No Parking service for the guests on all conference days. You can take taxi or public transportation to the Conference Venue.

The closest stations of Beijing Subway to the campus are Yuanmingyuan Park Station (圆明园站) of Line 4, Xiyuan Station (西苑站) of Line 4 and Line 16, and Wanquanhe Qiao Station (万泉河桥站) of Line 16. It takes you a 15-minute walk from the stations to the campus.

If you live in The Lakeview Hotel, we provide you with shuttle bus service from the hotel to the Conference Venue on every morning during the conference. See "4. Service" of this handbook for the timetable.

b) Designated Hotels

The Lakeview Hotel (北大博雅国际酒店)

Address: No.127 Zhongguancun North Avenue, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区中关村北大街 127 号

Telephone: +86-10-8268 9999

Beijing Posts and Telecommunications Conference Center (北京邮电会议中心)

Address: No. 5 Gua Jia Tun, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区挂甲屯 5 号

Telephone: +86-10- 6254 7799

c) Off-campus Restaurants

Longhu Xingyuehui – Beijing Yihe (龙湖星悦荟—北京颐和)

Address: Erlongzha Road and Zhongzhi Road Intersection, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区二龙闸路与中直路交口

This food street is about 1.1 kilometers away from the Conference Venue. It takes you a 16-minute walk to go there. You can have quite some options like coffee shops, western style foods, barbecue, Hot Pot, Yunnan cuisine, northwestern cuisine, and Hangzhou cuisine in the street. You can find a convenient store there as well.

Changchunyuan -Changxiangli (畅春园—畅饷里)

Address: No. 8 Yiheyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 海淀区海淀桥北颐和园路 8 号

This newly re-opened food street is about one kilometer away from the Conference Venue. It takes you a 15-minute walk to go there. You can find coffee shops, Beijing cuisine, Cantonese cuisine, Hunan cuisine, Hot Pot, fast foods, and barbecue there.

4. Service

a) Information Desk at Conference Venue

Hours: August 18th, 12:00-18:00;   August 19th to 22nd, 8:00-18:00

b) Shuttle Bus Timetable

Date	The Lakeview Hotel to Conference Venue	Conference Venue to The Lakeview Hotel	Conference Dinner to Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center
August 19th	8:15	19:00	-
August 20th	8:30	18:00	20:30
August 21st	8:30	18:00	-
August 22nd	8:30	17:30	-

c) Meals

Lunches

Lunches are provided for all conference participants free of charge at the Conference Venue. See below lunch arrangement.

Date	Lunch Area 1 B1 Canteen (200 seats)	Lunch Area 2 B106 Room (60 seats)	Lunch Area 3 B1 Opening Space (90 seats)	Notes
August 19th	Chinese set meal in lunch box			Halal and vegetarian meals available in B1 Canteen
August 20th	SUBWAY sandwich			
August 21st	Chinese set meal in lunch box			
August 22nd	SUBWAY sandwich			

Coffee Breaks

Floor	Location	Notes
B1	B101 Lecture Hall	1.Coffee breaks are offered between sessions, including coffee, tea, snacks, etc.
Floor 1	Outside Room 131 & 132	
Floor 2	Outside Room 245 & 246	2.Water and coffee are supplied outside the rooms during all conference hours.
Floor 3	Outside Room 344 &345	
Floor 4	Outside Room 420 & 429	

Note: Besides the above-mentioned lunches, Conference Dinner and coffee breaks, food and drinks can be purchased from the B1 Canteen at your own cost.

Conference Dinner

Time: August 20th, 18:30-20:30

Location: Zhonghua Hall (中华厅), The Lakeview Hotel

Transportation: By shuttle bus

    18:00: Shuttle bus departs from the Conference Venue for The Lakeview Hotel

    20:30: Shuttle bus departs from The Lakeview Hotel for Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center

d) Internet

Step-by-Step Guide to Connect to the Campus Internet

(1) Connect to the PKU Wi-Fi Network

On your device, go to your Wi-Fi settings. Select the network named PKU. Your device should automatically redirect you to the login page. If it does not, please open your web browser and go to its.pku.edu.cn.

(2) Log into the Campus Network Portal

You will see a login page where you need to enter your credentials.

(3) Enter Your Credentials

The following usernames and password have been assigned to you:

Username: wdq20240806001

Password: games2024

(4) Start Browsing!

Once you have successfully logged in, you should be connected to the internet. If you encounter any issues or need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact the IT support team at the Information Desk.

e) Appointment for Visiting Peking University Main Campus

The Conference Venue is outside but close to the PKU main campus. If you'd like to visit the main campus, please scan this QR code for an appointment. Be sure to make an appointment 24 hours in advance. The appointment system stops service by 10 pm each night. The available campus visit days for you are August 20th to August 23rd. Please enter the campus from the Southwest Gate of Peking University with your passport or ID card.

f) Alipay, a Useful APP for Mobile Payment

Alipay is a very convenient payment instrument when you stay in China. You can download the APP by scanning the below QR code (or go to https://render.alipay.com/p/yuyan/180020040001212700/), and then follow the instructions shown on the picture.

三步开启便捷支付
Get started with Alipay in 3 steps

1.注册账户
Registration
打开手机支付宝，点击【注册账号】
Open Alipay, tap "sign up"to register

2.实名及绑卡
Verification and Adding Bank Card
右下角点击【我的】-【银行卡】-【立即绑定】进入绑卡页面，按照页面提示进行操作 - 点击【立即认证】，根据页面提示进行认证
In the lower right corner, tap "Me", "Bank Card", "Add card", and then follow the on-page prompts to add your card. Tap "Verify now", and follow the page prompts to fill in your identity information.

3.支付
Make Payment
商家有二维码：点击【扫一扫】-扫描商家二维码
商家有扫码机器：点击【收付款】-出示您的二维码
Tap Scan, and then scan the merchant
-presented QR code
Tap Pay/Collect and then present your QR code to the merchant.

5. About Us

a) About the National School of Development at Peking University

The National School of Development (NSD) at Peking University is a comprehensive college that offers a multidisciplinary environment for teaching and research in economics, management science, and public policy. Its predecessor, the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) was established in 1994 by Professor Justin Yifu Lin and five other overseas-trained economists. Following its expansion of teaching and research, CCER was renamed the National School of Development in 2008.

The NSD is China's leading institution that combines teaching, research and policy advising. It is an integral part of Peking University's drive to become a world-class university. The NSD upholds Peking University's values of inclusiveness and academic freedom; it promotes socially meaningful research in economics, management science, and public policy, and is committed to contributing to China's economic and social progress.

The NSD offers teaching programs in three areas: academia, business and public policy. Its academic programs include an economics PhD program, a bachelor program in national development, and a double-major program. Its business education is offered through BiMBA (Beijing International MBA) that hosts MBA, EMBA and EDP programs. In 2016, NSD added public policy as one of its teaching programs through a newly established institute, ISSCAD (Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development), whose mandate is to offer doctoral and master's degrees to senior officials

from developing countries.

NSD's faculty has published numerous academic papers in domestic and international journals. Many professors are China's leading scholars in their respective fields. The CCER is an internationally recognized networking center for academic exchanges.

The NSD is also one of the leading think tanks in China. It brings together research resources within Peking University and regularly participates in China's policy debates. Over the years, it has produced influential policy advice on important issues concerning industrial policy, rural reconstruction, and SOE reform, etc. Some of them have been adopted by the government. The NSD hosts three highly recognized think-tank events: China Economic Observer, NSD Policy Talk and China Development Forum. It is also the organizer of two second-track dialogues between China and the United States, US-China Economic Dialogue and US-China Health Dialogue. In 2016, it was designated by the government as one of the 25 national think tanks.

b) About Peking University

Founded in 1898, Peking University, originally known as the Imperial University of Peking, is the first comprehensive university in China. The current campus is in Haidian District, Beijing, adjacent to the Summer Palace (Yiheyuan Park) and the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan Park), and was originally the location of Yenching University, therefore, the campus of Peking University is also called "Yan Yuan".

Since its establishment more than 120 years ago, Peking University has made irreplaceable contributions to the revitalization and liberation of the nation, the construction and development of the country, and the civilization and progress of society, and has played an important vanguard role in the process of the modernization of China. The traditional spirit of patriotism, progress, democracy and science and the study style of diligence, rigor, truth-seeking and innovation are alive and well passed down from generation to generation.

As the highest-ranked university in comprehensive strength in China, Peking University currently has six departments: the Faculty of Humanities, the Faculty of Social Sciences, the Faculty of Economics and Management, the Faculty of Science, the Faculty of Information and Engineering, and the Faculty of Medicine. The university has 55 directly affiliated faculties, 133 undergraduate majors, 286 master's degree programs, and 263 doctoral degree programs. While maintaining its leading edge in traditional basic disciplines, Peking University has also made significant progress in applied disciplines and many cutting-edge interdisciplinary fields in recent years.

For more details about PKU, please visit http://www.pku.edu.cn.

c) A Short History of Beijing

Beijing is the capital of China and the political, cultural and diplomatic center of China. With a history of more than 2,900 years, it is one of the cities with the most World Heritage sites in the world (7 sites) and the first capital city in the world to have a Global Geopark. Today, the city of more than 20 million people is a modern cosmopolitan city.

As the cultural center of China, Beijing has more than 7,300 cultural relics and monuments and more than 200 tourist attractions. The Forbidden City, located in the center of Beijing's central axis, is the largest surviving ancient palace complex in the world. The Summer Palace, not far from Peking University, is the largest and best-preserved imperial garden in China. The Great Wall, which was built more than 2,000 years ago and stretches for more than 20,000 kilometers, has left the most completely protected part of Beijing territory. And the hutongs and courtyards scattered throughout the city – traditional old Beijing buildings – restore the history of the ancient capital.

Beijing's climate is divided into four distinct seasons. September and October coincide with the autumn season in Beijing, with highs around 30°C and lows around 18°C. This is the best season of the year in Beijing and the best time to travel. The beacon of the Great Wall is lit by the red maple leaves that spread over the mountains. The red walls of the Forbidden City are set against the golden ginkgo biloba. Under the clear sky, the whole city is surrounded by the distant Yanshan Mountains, which is particularly atmospheric and transparent.