


# Handbook of Japan-Russia Relations

Edited by Kazuhiko Togo and Dmitri V. Streltsov



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**Dedicated to**

**Professor Akaha Tsuneo**

**(1949–2021)**

**The founder of this book project**





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Kazuhiko Togo  
Dmitri Streltsov

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# Chapter 15

## Russian Perceptions of Japan

*Leonid Smorgunov and Olga Ignatjeva*

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*This chapter, based on the difference in the perception of others in the concepts of polemos and agon, describes the images of the Japanese in the Russian public consciousness. The study begins with Captain Vasily Golovnin's memories of Japan in the early 19th century and ends with the reception of Japanese Zen by today's youth. The conflicting history of relations between the two countries over the past two centuries has nonetheless been expressed in a competitive but generally favorable and tolerant perception of Japan in Russia. The authors conclude that the image of Japan in the minds and mentality of Russian citizens is formed according to the agonistic type, which implies the acceptance of the other, and not rejection, as is the case of the "perception of the other" according to the polemos type.*

### Introduction

Cross-cultural analysis is one of the essential elements of the changed paradigm of thinking of modern man. It introduces a new dimension into the study of the problem of international communications, connected with the interaction of cultures, when any new state in any field of human activity can be read as a text, the semantic content of which loses its certainty, is blurred and appears for the person in an unexpected form. The multitude of possible interpretations turns any appeal to the emerging phenomenon into a problem, and often into an event. The manipulative technique of modern mass media, although it tries to impose certain stereotypes of perception, encounters a situation of resistance and is forced to take into account the moment of interpretation by the recipient of the received message. In this regard, television and the Internet have their own methods of forming a space for communication of intercultural interaction. These communication flows are embedded in the international politics of relations, sometimes obeying the political conjuncture of the moment, sometimes stimulating a favorable vector of emerging political relations. For all the importance of modern means of communications, they must still pay tribute to the steady trend of peoples' perception of each other, which is in one way or another connected with the tradition of relations, with historical memory and the mutual politics of memory. In recent decades, politics of memory has become an active factor of substantiation and evidence



in international affairs, sometimes obscuring the significance of practical issues. Peoples communicate, putting forward, along with political or economic demands, cognitive-psychological interpretations.

The relationship between Japan and Russia developed in ambiguous historical conditions. In the political and economic sense, there have been and remain problems, but as for culture, it seems that both sides recognize the great importance of cultural exchanges and mutual knowledge. Scholarly English-language literature on Russian-Japanese relations reveals the main features of the historical war events between these two countries. Rosamund Bartlett and Aaron Cohen describes the complex conflict in Russian cultural consciousness including Japanism and Japanophobia, war monuments during and after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.<sup>1</sup> Betsy Perabo analyzes the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Russo-Japanese War of the early 20th century, emphasizing the difference between the Orthodox attitude to the war compared to the Western version of “just war” and the complex role of Orthodoxy in Japan itself at this time.<sup>2</sup> Alexander Bukh explores the processes of identifying the Japanese against the backdrop of the events of the Second World War, the Cold War and the new Russia, emphasizing the ambivalence of the attitude towards Russians neither as to the West nor as to the East and territorial disputes.<sup>3</sup> Travel notes of Russians who visited Japan in the 18th and early 20th centuries have been published and interpreted. David Wells published rare stories of Russians who visited Japan from 1792 to 1913. The book demonstrates how these stories combine ethnographic interests with the assertion of Russian and European values, and also describes the relationship of authorities and cultural differences.<sup>4</sup> Describing the notes of Vasily Golovnin, a naval officer who was captured by the Japanese in 1811, Barbara Maggs testifies that in them Golovnin not only describes Japan with sympathy, but at the same time proudly evaluates his country as the bearer of European values.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, the problem of the perception of Japanese by Russians remains an insufficiently studied issue. This is especially significant in the context of the growing importance of new means of communication, which create previously unknown opportunities for the political identification of social communities, including historical memory in this process in a different way. It should be noted that “perception of the other” is one of the main themes of modern philosophical and sociological literature, which can be effectively used as a methodology for analyzing a particular case of Russian-Japanese perception of each other. This methodology has already found expression in the study of the history of relations between Japan and Russia. In the work of L.V. Smorgunov Japanese politicians are presented in the aspect of a “significant other,” when one’s own assessment undergoes a change depending on the significance of the relations with other.<sup>6</sup> A different character of the other is presented in the paper of R.S. Pereslavl'tseva. Here is an analysis of the image of the “other” in the works of Russian writers of the first quarter of the 20th century, dedicated to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905. It is important that in the literature devoted to the war, the tradition of Russian culture continues, when the “other,” who does not carry a mortal threat, is perceived tolerantly as “God’s creation,” although he may be a representative of a different nationality and faith.<sup>7</sup> N.S. Lyubimova analyzes the relations between Russia and Japan using the concept of the other in the aspect of exoticism. Exoticity stems, according to the author, from the notions of both “traditionality” and “futurism” of the Land of the Rising Sun.<sup>8</sup>

It should be said that in the presence of a large list of modern literature in Russia on the history and current state of Russian-Japanese relations, the results of the study of Russian ideas about Japan are relatively few. Among the available literature, fundamental and

generalizing works on the history and current state of Russian-Japanese relations stand out, including interpretations of cognitive-psychological mutual attitudes.<sup>9</sup> There are works on Russian and Japanese identity in various periods of Russian-Japanese relations, starting from the 19th century, which contain material on mutual perceptions.<sup>10</sup> The works on the linguistic analysis of the perception of the culture and society of Japan by Russians are interesting. So, in the study of E.A. Popova and V.A. Kazantseva three groups of linguistic markers are analyzed that define Japan as an exotic culture, a country with a high level of technological development and a subject of international relations that poses some danger to Russia.<sup>11</sup> A number of works written on the basis of sociological data analyze the image of Japan with a significant component of its perception as an exotic country, when even its industrial progress in the post-war period is assessed as “futuristic.”<sup>12</sup> In other works describing the opinion of the inhabitants of the Russian Far East, a contradictory combination of judgments is emphasized, highlighting the need to intensify interactions with this country.<sup>13</sup> A sociological analysis of the opinions of students from the two countries on mutual perception has shown that Russian students are less ideologized in relation to the perception of the Japanese; among them at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century neutral views on Japan dominated.<sup>14</sup>

In this chapter, the images and perceptions of the Japanese are considered from the point of view of different strategies of the Russian interpretation of Japan: on the one hand, it is important to find out how these images are embedded in what can be called a “response to an event,” and on the other hand, the communicative nature of any images, including political, involves their study from the position of interaction, or the relationship of “I” and “Other.” The metaphysics of a person’s presence in the world and his life in it suggests an answer to the question of how the construction of an image is connected with the historical tradition of interpretation and mutual positioning of two countries. In this regard, our understanding of identification practices today cannot be limited to one strategy for interpreting interactions and, accordingly, perceptions of political images. In our opinion, there is a whole range of strategies here, chosen by the actors participating in the interaction, depending on the political ontology of historical relations, which find radical expression in situations of confrontation. In this regard, it seems that the dominant strategy for the perception of Japan in the Russian mind is the historical memory of building relationships according to the type of rivalry and resolved conflict with mutual claims, i.e., relations by *agon*, not military interaction aimed at destroying the enemy, *polemos*. Of course, these strategies are present in history in a mixed composition, but nevertheless, ontologically, the Russian attitude towards Japanese society, culture and people is characterized by an understanding of their specifics, respect for special features and a mood for constructive mutual arrangement. This is evidenced by the history and the current state of relations. To describe the latter, the paper uses some historical evidence and the data from sociological surveys conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation over the past two decades.

## ***Agon vs polemos in the Russian perception of Japan***

The Russian perception of Japan, despite the historical collisions of real political relations, has always tended to ensure that this country always remains in the positive spectrum of basic assessments and feelings. Even the “bad” historical periods of coexistence could not

interrupt the overall constructive picture that the Russian consciousness painted for itself regarding the nature, culture, life, and people of the Land of the Rising Sun. The Russian understanding of Japan took into account mutual policy, territorial issues, and coalition agreements between Japan and other countries, but never considered this country in terms of *polemos*,<sup>15</sup> i.e., the struggle to destroy or enslave the enemy. Rather, in the Russian attitude there was a heightened sense of rivalry, competition and dispute, relations between two countries (in the Far East, in the Asia-Pacific region, in the global context), the interaction between which constitutes an existential need for coexistence. In this regard, *agon*,<sup>16</sup> i.e., peer-to-peer competition, describes a characteristic feature of the Russian perception of Japan. It can be assumed that many stereotypes in the perception of the Japanese were the result of the first visits to Japan by Russians who, on the one hand, sought to establish mutually beneficial ties, and, on the other, expand their claims to participate in the politics of the corresponding region.

Vasily Golovnin, who spent two years in captivity in Japan at the beginning of the 19th century (1811–1813), found himself under the spell of this country. If at the beginning he noted suspicion and obvious hostility of relations, then later he noticed that the Japanese are smart and insightful, honest and compassionate, literate, and have a peaceful government and wise laws.<sup>17</sup> Although the capture of Russian officers and sailors by the Japanese at that time was associated with a reasonable suspicion on their part, in the Russians' descriptions of the country there is an attempt to understand all its originality and possible development trends that would favor open relations. Important in this regard, the concluding remarks of V.M. Golovnin to his memoirs are: "The book will reach them ... Finding that we openly announce with all sincerity the deeds and methods used for reconciliation, the Japanese will be completely convinced of the sincerity of our proposed friendship and the desire to have contact with them; and this can be of great benefit to [our] state."<sup>18</sup> In a secret note, he proposed to punish Japan for his capture, but this measure was in the spirit of an understanding of equal justice in relations.<sup>19</sup>

Special in this regard are the events related to the design of Russian-Japanese relations during the visit to Japan by a delegation of Admiral Evfimiy Putyatin in 1852. First impressions, as is commonly believed, are the most faithful and stable, and influence the subsequent process of formation and interpretation of perception. Similar impressions can be found in many historical testimonies left by members of the Putyatin delegation. Alexander Mozhaisky, a naval officer and painter, left, for example, a number of sketches of the Japanese representatives at the talks and made a detailed commentary on one of them. Mozhaisky was a direct witness to the negotiations led by E. Putyatin and which eventually led to the signing of the Shimodsky Treaty, the first official treaty between Russia and Japan. During the negotiations, he sketched a group portrait of the Japanese delegation, and then, returning from Japan to the place of further service in Helsingfors, he completed this drawing, signed the names of Japanese diplomats and provided his commentary.<sup>20</sup> This small sketch seems to contain the main strategies for the perception and interpretation of the Japanese people that were and remain characteristic of the Russians.

First, it is clear that Japanese officials are viewed from the perspective of a different culture and history. They have their own customs, their own way of dressing, their own way of negotiating and their own delegation structure. All these "robes," "harem pants," and "scarves" emphasize "foreignness" and "strangeness." The difference allows Russians to understand that they are "different" in relation to Japanese culture. Second, in the description there is

something that, according to the narrator, brings the members of the delegation closer to the Russians, moreover, makes them representatives of a universal culture. We see the members of the delegation as “smart,” “amiable,” “well-bred,” and their activity is “businesslike;” they are “kind” and “respectable.” These characteristics emphasize the possibility of contact and discussion of difficult issues on the negotiating agenda. Of particular note is the desire for spatial symmetry in the negotiations (“not having time in their intention to convince the admiral to obey their custom, the commissioners arranged for themselves benches of equal height with the chairs that were brought for us from the frigate”). The relation of symmetry makes us understand those present as equal and dependent, there is no removal to some “inaccessibility” and “independence.” Third, there are many definitions in the description that make us consider what is happening as a performance. Here everyone performs certain roles (“dignitary,” “spy,” “translator,” “grammarian”) and are hidden under various masks that speak only about the function, but do not characterize the actors themselves. The very same “robes,” “harem pants,” “scarves,” and here also “sabers,” are separated from culture and represent attributes of the scene, elements of decoration. All masks are subject to an emerging event called “negotiations.”

The warlike moods of the Russians and their sorrowful experiences during and after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 are known. It can be said that in the Russian cultural consciousness during this period, for the first time, a stereotypical attitude towards Japan as an “enemy country” appeared.<sup>21</sup> But here, too, the perception of Japan as a whole is interrupted by well-known conflicting opinions and equal assessments. Interest in Japanese culture in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Russian society was combined with a critical military-political attitude. As Rosamund Bartlett wrote, “no other country in the world had ever found itself in the position of being simultaneously at war with, and culturally in thrall to, Japan: this was a unique situation. It is hardly surprising, then, that responses to the war were diverse and contradictory.”<sup>22</sup> Further, the attitude towards Japan is manifested in the words of Emperor Nicholas II when he received the new Japanese envoy in 1906: “I learned from the report of Nelidov (Deputy Foreign Minister) that Your Excellency deeply sympathizes with our country, and I am very glad that you are assigned to us. During the war, we fought with each other as honest and noble opponents (*komei seidai*), and I would like us to become honest and true comrades for each other now. This would be a great happiness for both Japan and Russia.”<sup>23</sup> It is a significant fact, but after the war, it was the Japanese government that began an active program of building memorials in Manchuria to show its goodwill to the former enemy, declare its role as a guardian in the region and demonstrate its value as a great power. Monuments to the victors were erected near Port Arthur, but the Japanese built the first major monument to the fallen Russians, a temple-mausoleum, which became the final resting place for the defenders of the fort. This fact manifests not only the Japanese great power, but also the recognition of Russia as a partner, and not an implacable enemy. “At the dedication ceremony in June 1908 military officials from both countries celebrated together in an atmosphere of mutual respect and admiration. General Gerngroß led a ‘hurrah’ from Russian troops in honor of the Japanese emperor and his ‘excellent’ army, while General Nogi and Japanese soldiers cried ‘banzai’ for the Russian emperor and his ‘brave’ soldiers.”<sup>24</sup> Of course, the Japanese nationalism of this period and the Russian national self-consciousness were in dissonance, but after ten years the moods were changing for the public as a whole. During the First World War, Japan built an alliance

with Russia in the Far East, helping her financially, which also caused the creation of positive and approving impressions.

The participation of Japan on the side of the white army in the civil war, the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1935, its militarization in the 1930s and 1940s and the well-known events of the Second World War, accompanied by its defeat in August-September 1945 with the participation of the USSR, formed the official negative propaganda directed against Japan, which could not but affect the public mood of that period. Japan was generally perceived as an adversary of the Soviet Union, making a deal with domestic and international imperialism. The situation began to change in the 1960s. Linda Galvane, citing the work of Japanese researcher Mizobuchi Sonoko, writes that “the attitude towards Japan, viewed as an enemy, during the Soviet era was not unambiguous, either—the hostility towards Japan was combined with the ‘compassion and friendliness’ to the Asian nations in general.”<sup>25</sup> The understanding of the dependence of Japanese foreign policy, coupled with the general victimization of estimates of the heavy casualties incurred in the Second World War, made the perception of Japan understandable and accepted.<sup>26</sup> As D.V. Streltsov rightly noted, “as for the Soviet Union, then, for obvious reasons, post-war Soviet historiography paid much more attention to issues related to the Great Patriotic War. The entry of the USSR into the war with Japan, in addition to the fact that it was already an episode not of the Great Patriotic War, but of the Second World War, was presented to a greater extent not as retribution for the crimes committed by the Japanese military, but as the fulfillment of the obligations of the USSR to the allies.”<sup>27</sup> International journalist V.V. Ovchinnikov’s book “Sakura branch: A story about what kind of people the Japanese are,” published in 1971 in the Soviet Union with a circulation of 65 thousand copies, was an expression of sincere sympathy for the Japanese people. Prior to this, individual chapters from the book were published in the highly influential literary journal *Novy Mir* and aroused the admiration of the reading public. Ovchinnikov wrote, “Since the beginning of this century, our country has known more bad than good about this neighboring people. There were reasons for this. And even the bad things that we are used to hearing about the Japanese are generally true and need more explanation than refutation. However, if the negative features of Japanese nature are known to us by ninety percent, then the positive ones are only ten percent.”<sup>28</sup>

The 1990s brought something new to the distribution of Russian citizens’ reactions to Japan. The collapse of the Soviet ideology led to a weakening of the critical political wave and to more intensive multilateral interaction with Japan. There was a restructuring of political relations, the range of cultural interactions expanded, and a large number of Russian and Japanese cities established sister city ties (sister city ties originated in 1961; currently 41 cities or regions in Russia have sister city ties with Japan). An intensive process of interaction between the leadership of the two countries was established. The general policy of this period did not change in the first decades of the new century, demonstrating new emerging complexities and elements of perception of Japan in the public mind.


## **Dynamics of public opinion about Japan in the first two decades of the 21st century**

The perception of another country in the foreseeable historical perspective is formed mainly under the influence of ongoing fluctuations in the system of international relations covering

those two countries. Of course, it is necessary to distinguish between some basic stereotypes that remain more or less stable due to the fixation in people’s minds of assessments and interpretations of deeper grounds for understanding the history and culture of countries, and more mobile public opinion, which is subject to change under the influence of statements by politicians and the media. The latter arises as a response to current policy, fluctuating depending on specific political steps in intercountry relations.

In the first decades of the 21st century, relations between Russia and Japan were unstable, as evidenced by the results of public opinion polls. First, despite the change in the ideological basis of Russian policy towards Japan, the territorial problem and the conclusion of a peace treaty remained unresolved for Japanese society, which periodically created tensions and conflicts. Secondly, Japan, as before, was drawn into the policy pursued by the Western states towards Russia. It is clear that this could not but influence the Russians’ perception of Japan. On November 24–25, 2018, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) conducted a sociological survey to measure the attitude of Russians towards our Far Eastern neighbor, Japan.<sup>29</sup> 1,500 respondents from 53 regions of the Russian Federation took part in the survey. In the context of the question “At present, are relations between Russia and Japan generally good or bad?” Periodic surveys have been conducted for 18 years, fixing changes in relations between the neighboring countries.

**Figure 15.1** Dynamics of Russian-Japanese relations from 2000 to 2018



**Source:** FOM, Russia

Figure 15.1 indicates a deteriorating in relations between Japan and Russia from 2000 to 2011. However, from 2011 to 2018, relations began to improve. The tension in relations and their deterioration can be characterized by the existence of territorial disputes between the two countries and the tough policy of the eastern neighbor in an effort to resolve this issue. With Prime Minister Abe Shinzō coming to power a second time in 2012, the situation began to change. The new prime minister went for rapprochement with Russia by strengthening economic relations and establishing warm and trusting relations with Russian President V.V. Putin to finally resolve the old territorial dispute in favor of Japan. Abe even took an oath


on his father's grave that during his reign he would return the Kuriles to Japan. Speaking in April 2013 before the Japanese Parliament, he stated that "Relations with Russia ... are one of the most promising bilateral areas for Japan. I intend to use the visit planned for this year"<sup>30</sup> to give a new impetus to the development of Japanese-Russian relations. During Abe's tenure (2012–2020), as can be seen in Figure 15.1, the attitudes of Russian citizens towards Japan indeed noticeably improved (from 31 to 59 percent of respondents who assessed relations between Russia and Japan as positive). It should be noted that in May 2016, Abe announced a new eight-point economic policy towards Russia, which differed from the previous policy focused on using the potential of Russia as a supplier of raw materials and energy to a more diversified and industrially oriented strategy.<sup>31</sup> In addition, it assumed the development of economic relations as a basis for concluding a peace treaty and resolving disputed territorial issues. In 2018 Prime Minister Abe and President V.V. Putin decided to declare a cross year between Japan and Russia in order to stimulate exchanges between the two countries in the fields of culture, art, business, science, education, etc. More than 400 events were planned to be held during the year. All this could not but affect public opinion in Russia. Japan joined the anti-Russian sanctions after 2014 and after February 24, 2022. This, of course, has influenced and will continue to influence the attitude of Russians towards Japan. However, we can agree with Yu.V. Latov that "although absolutely all developed countries implement anti-Russian sanctions, public consciousness definitely does not include Japan among the "bad" countries. Perhaps this is due to the fact that anti-Russian sanctions are considered an initiative of the West ("Euro-Atlantic" countries), and Japan cannot be attributed to the West in any way (although this country is a political ally of the United States and took part in the sanctions against Russia)."<sup>32</sup>

Calculating structural shifts in the period 2000–2005, they amounted to 5.7 percent, in the period 2005–2009, 12.3 percent, in the period 2009–2011, 8.0 percent, and in the period 2011–2018, 19.3 percent. Thus, we can conclude that there is a certain cyclicality in the dynamics of Russian-Japanese relations: periods of calm are replaced by periods of sharp shifts. In this case, sharp structural shifts occurred in the period 2005–2009 and again for the period 2011–2018, the first of these being negative, followed by a period of improvement. If the last positive structural shift can be explained by the implementation of targeted efforts by the government and Prime Minister Abe of Japan to form good neighborly relations with Russia, then the period from 2005 to 2009 may correlate to a frequent change of power in Japan: Koizumi Jun'ichirō (2001–2005), Abe Shinzō (2006–2007), Fukuda Yasuo (2007–2008), Asō Tarō (2008–2009), as well as a more uneven policy in relations with Russia. As emphasized by O.G. Paramonov, "the period between the first and second cabinets of Abe Shinzō, Japanese foreign policy had a situational, reactive character not only in the Russian direction, but in general."<sup>33</sup> Therefore, we can conclude that the issue of normalizing Russian-Japanese relations in this period did not attract much attention of politicians and was carried out according to a long-established stereotype. And after Abe's resignation in 2020, the Japanese government continued his course. It can be expressed in the words of Abe's successor, Suga Yoshihida "The course aimed at solving the territorial problem without passing it on to the next generations and concluding a peace treaty remains unchanged. The position of the Japanese side remains unchanged, which consists in the fact that the northern territories are islands to which the sovereignty of our country extends, and that the subject of negotiations on a peace treaty is the solution of the question of ownership of the four islands."<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the trend line regarding good relations with Japan will continue to fall. Reassessment,

in particular, of the results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and its contemporary interpretation as a war to unify the nation against crisis fuels the presence of confrontational relations.<sup>35</sup>

The distribution of public opinion about Russian-Japanese relations in the Russian regional context is interesting. It is clear that this regional distribution depends on the proximity of the region to the Far East and Japan, the level of economic and cultural interaction with this country and historical ties recorded in public memory.

**Figure 15.2** Responses to the question “Do you think Japan is a friendly or unfriendly state towards Russia?”




**Source:** FOM, Russia

Figure 15.2 shows the responses to the question “Do you think Japan is a friendly or unfriendly state towards Russia?” On average, 51 percent of the population of the six regions consider Japan a friendly country. A slightly larger percentage (58 percent) of respondents answered positively to this question in the Southern Federal District. The largest share of respondents (65 percent) came from the Far Eastern Federal District. The high value indicated in the Far East is associated with the active policy of Japan in this region to promote the culture of its country, both at the level of financial support from the Japan Foundation and the active participation of consulates in various events, as well as Japan’s proximity to this region, which makes it possible to travel to Japan for both business and tourism.

The positive attitude of the inhabitants of the region towards Japan was also facilitated by economic relations between the two countries. In this region, Japan ranks third among countries in terms of exports and second in terms of imports.




**Figure 15.3** Responses to the question: “If we compare Russia and Japan, then, in your opinion, which country today has more influence in the world—Russia or Japan?”



**Source:** FOM, Russia

When asked which of the two countries is the most influential today, representatives of the Siberian and North Caucasian Federal Districts in the largest number of cases put Russia in first place—82 and 83 percent of respondents, respectively (see Figure 15.3). Representatives of the Far Eastern District in 78 percent of cases also rated Russia as a more influential state in the international arena compared to Japan. The rest of the regions also put Russia in first place in terms of the degree of political influence. Their responses ranged from 70 to 73 percent. No more than 15 percent put Japan in first place as the most influential country compared to Russia. The largest percentage of Japan’s influence assessment fell on the Southern Federal District (21 percent of respondents). The smallest in the Siberian, Ural and North Caucasian federal districts—9, 8 and 6 percent of respondents, respectively. Residents of the Far Eastern Federal District, which borders Japan, consider Japan to be more influential than Russia in 15 percent of cases.


**Figure 15.4** Responses to the question: “Which of the two countries is developing more successfully today—Russia or Japan?”



**Source:** FOM, Russia

Russians have diametrically opposed views on the results of the economic and technological development of the two countries (Figure 15.4). To the question “Which of the two countries is developing more successfully today—Russia or Japan?” most of the respondents believe that this is Japan. This is the opinion of 74 percent of respondents in the Far East, 73 percent in Siberia, 71 percent in the Northwestern Federal District, and from 63 to 69 percent in the Urals, Central, Volga and Southern Federal Districts. Only residents of the North Caucasus region believe that in 35 percent of cases Russia is developing more successfully than Japan. Fifty-four percent of the representatives of the North Caucasus also believe that Japan has succeeded in economic and technological issues better than its northern neighbor.


**Figure 15.5** Responses to the question: “On the whole, do you think partnership relations with Japan are important or not important for Russia?”



**Source:** FOM, Russia

Figure 15.5 gives the results of the answers to the question “On the whole, do you think partnership relations with Japan are important or not important for Russia?” Obviously, the vast majority of Russians believe that partner relations with Japan are important for Russia. The highest percentage of affirmative answers was given by residents of the Central and Northwestern Federal Districts (85 percent), followed by residents of the Far Eastern Federal District (84 percent), and then the Siberian Federal District (83 percent). A slightly smaller percentage was shown by residents of the North Caucasus and Ural federal districts—79 percent of respondents answered positively. Thus, we can conclude that the people of Russia are not only ready for, but will also welcome cooperation with their Pacific neighbor.


**Figure 15.6** Response to the question: “Is partnership with Russia important or not important for Japan?”



**Source:** FOM, Russia

Figure 15.6 reflects the Russian impression about Japan’s readiness to cooperate with Russia, which is important in building good neighborly relations and indicates a positive image of Japan in the minds of most Russians. So, the inhabitants of the Far East in 86 percent of the cases believe that the Japanese are ready to cooperate with Russia and are striving for this. Residents of the Southern Federal District believe that Japan needs cooperation with Russia in 81 percent of the cases. Representatives of the Siberian and North Caucasian regions think so in 79 percent of the cases. The smallest percentage who believe in Japan’s willingness to cooperate was shown by residents of the North-Western and Central regions—74 and 77 percent, respectively. Slightly lower figures for the northwest and the center of Russia are associated with the remoteness of these regions from Japan and the orientation of economic ties until recently towards the countries of Western Europe and the USA.

**Figure 15.7** Response to the question: “Do you think the culture, way of life, and values of the Japanese and Russians differ strongly or not very much?”



**Source:** FOM, Russia

Figure 15.7 shows the results of answers to the question: “Do you think the culture, life-style, values of the Japanese and Russians differ strongly or not very much?” These answers also reflect the possibility of finding mutual understanding between our countries, as well as the readiness for cooperation and building good neighborly relations. Japan is a country far from the decision-making center in Russia, and many regions of our country know it only thanks to information from the media, the Internet and books.<sup>36</sup> Thus, a relatively small percentage of Russian regions perceive Japan as a country that does not differ much in terms of cultural values and way of life, while the vast majority of Russians believe the opposite. The largest share of respondents who believe that the Japanese are very different from Russians (80 percent) are respondents from the Urals Federal District. A slightly smaller percentage is shown by residents of the North-Western, Central and Far Eastern districts—75, 73 and 71 percent, respectively. The share of respondents from the remaining regions, who adhere to this point of view, was distributed in the range from 56 to 76 percent, respectively. At the same time, when considering these results, it is worth paying special attention to the answers of the residents of the Far East region, since their relations with Japan are built not only virtually, but also built on real ties.


## Youth subculture of Japan in Russia

Japan remains a magnet for both Western countries and Russia. Its exotic image of a flourishing, technologically and economically developed country that keeps its traditions and skillfully transmits them from generation to generation with the help of fascinating manga and anime plots does not leave many people on the planet indifferent. The digital generation, the homelander entering adulthood and independent life, are no exception in this sense. Like their parents, they too fall under the humble charm of Japanese culture. For a long time since the end of World War II, relations between Japan and Russia have been mostly built on the basis of literary images and stereotypes. At the same time, cultural issues were positive in these relations, and political issues were negative. During this time, “Russia and Japan have gained a truly unique experience in building mutual images in the almost complete absence of political reality.”<sup>37</sup>

The millennials, or digital generation, are often referred to as digital natives,<sup>38</sup> as born in the 2000s, they gained experience using electronic gadgets before they could speak. This generation is a product of the fourth industrial revolution, when information and communication technologies became an integral part of everyday life, which in a certain way affected the worldview of the new generation. In a study conducted by a group of researchers from St. Petersburg State University and ITMO, on a sample of 300 people among students of St. Petersburg, it was revealed that representatives of the millennial generation do not actually distinguish between digital and physical reality, living in both at the same time.<sup>39</sup> It was also revealed that an important condition for freedom in the digital environment is the anonymity of the millennials, which allows them to more openly express their opinions. Anonymity, and consequently, freedom of expression, into the network is also facilitated by the features of the anime subculture, which make it possible to communicate in chats and groups under the fictitious names of manga and anime characters. And it is no coincidence that Japan has become a role model for this generation, because in it the new digital base of human relations developed most intensively.

According to a survey by the Public Opinion Foundation<sup>40</sup> conducted in 43 constituent entities of the Russian Federation on a sample of 1,500 respondents, in general, the proportion of anime fans among viewers of other cartoon genres is small and mostly young people under 30 years old (6 percent of regular viewers at this age, see Figure 15.8).

**Figure 15.8** The attractiveness of cartoon genres in Russia



**Source:** FOM, Russia.

This trend is also well traced in the study of Siberian scientists M.D. Kudryavtsev, I.E. Kramida, and A.Yu. Osipov, “The prevalence of the habit of watching anime, manga, etc., is significantly lower than that of other monitor habits. However, it grows both among boys and girls with an increase in the duration of study at the university (for groups of students of the 1st and 3rd courses, the difference is significant).”<sup>41</sup> And yet, despite the significantly small proportion of anime fans in Russia, there are quite a lot of representatives of this subculture among young people, called “otaku.” These are close-knit ranks of enthusiastic youth who communicate both on the Internet in specially created groups of social networks VKontakte and Facebook (in the Russian segment), and meet live at cosplay festivals and anime events.

**Table 15.1** Russian anime otaku groups on VKontakte and Facebook

VKontakte	Number of participants	Facebook	Number of participants
Anime	1,642,866	Anime	24,000
Anime Channel	527,918	^^Anime^^	16,000
Anime WebM	348,985	Drama   Anime   Turkish TV Shows	6,500
AlexandriA	234,365	Anime. Russian-speaking community	3,800
Anime pictures	144,068	Anime artie	2,800
Anime wallpaper Antiterror	104,073	Anime is our life	1,200

**Source:** <https://fom.ru/Mir/14158> (a study of relations between Russia and Japan), page 1.

The anime subculture arose in Japan after the Japanese film industry began to mass-produce Japanese animated materials in the middle of the 20th century. The ideological core of this genre is the “trauma of modernization,” which is expressed in some kind of significant event (ecological catastrophe, World War II, growing up). Overcoming this event through self-discovery and self-liberation is the essence of every anime series, which of course attracts many fans. The creative imagination of the inhabitants of Japan gives a special charm to this culture, since you can not only be a passive spectator, but also compose the continuation of your favorite anime for yourself, share it with other fans, and also turn into your favorite hero and play that role at anime events. Cosplay became popular in Japan in the 1990s. Girls painted their faces white, dressed in special clothes and pretended to be Europeans of the 19th century (“Gothic Lolitas”).<sup>42</sup> Other Japanese youth groups painted their faces dark and their hair bright red to impersonate African-American rappers (“Gangoros”). It’s no surprise that these cosplay practices have come to accompany the anime fandom movement around the world. Russia was no exception.

In the 1990s, Japanese anime series began to be broadcast in Russia as well. Fandom movements formed very quickly in different regions of the country, which developed independently and often singly of each other.<sup>43</sup> In general, this culture is harmless and belongs to a broader youth movement—geeks—which is generally different from the brutal subcultures of football fans, gopniks, and skinheads. This hobby involves the formation of communities, spending time together both online and in reality with communication on topics from the stories of favorite anime and cosplay. In general, the commitment of Russian teenagers to this subculture does not cause much concern for their parents. “Adults sometimes watch anime themselves, but not so often—12 percent; some approve of a teenager’s hobby, but consider it strange—0.2 percent; the majority of parents do not care—32 percent. Anime is a world where adults don’t go much or don’t go at all.”<sup>44</sup> However, there are alarming signs in this hobby—departure into virtual reality and detachment from everyday problems and real-life goals. “The situation is much more complicated and problematic with another less numerous category of anime fans, or rather, otaku—extreme fans of this subculture, for whom anime, manga, and computer games are the goal, and the main goal in life, its whole essence. They live in their parallel worlds outside of time, space and connection with the surrounding reality, and in this obsession they are in many ways reminiscent of their Japanese associates.”<sup>45</sup> In general, the anime subculture covers all regions of Russia, but the closer the region is to Japan, the greater the number of fans. For example, in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, this movement is supported by the consulates of Japan, and in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk by the representation of Hokkaido prefecture. “The anime movement is well developed in big cities. Large-scale cosplay festivals are held there, for example, Animatrix in Moscow, Animatsuri, Manifesto, Anyfest, Otaku Festival in St. Petersburg, All-Russian Festival of Japanese Animation in Voronezh, Dai-Fest in Omsk, Otakun and Jiyuu in Ryazan, Mikan no Yuki in Kovrov.”<sup>46</sup> and the largest cosplay festival in the Far East—Animateit! (Vladivostok).

Another cultural influence experienced by the inhabitants of the Russian Federation, and especially its most active part—young people—is the spread of the practices of Zen Buddhism, which came to Russia from Japan, but through the countries of the Anglo-Saxon world. That is why this religious trend, having gone through many transformations and interpretations, came to Russia in the form of *exo-zen*. The term “*exo-zen*” includes two shades of meaning: exoteric and exotic. Modern *exo-zen* is a psychotechnical or general theoretical

instruction for various types of activities—doing business, manufacturing, artistic creativity, sports, entertainment, etc.<sup>47</sup>.

Zen Buddhism arose as a direction of religious and bodily practices in the 8th century in China, at a time of severe trials, when two-thirds of the population died as a result of pestilence. It was the practice of pacifying the flesh and surviving in extreme conditions. Gradually, with the strengthening of the influence of this religious school, the Chinese authorities banned it, and the teaching of “Chan” moved to neighboring Japan, where it was not in demand for a long time. And only in the Middle Ages, during the era of cataclysms, it became popular in Japan, especially for the military class—samurai—because Zen (Chan) “taught how not to be afraid of death, how to always be ready, how to survive in a life poorly adapted to life.”<sup>48</sup> The essence of this teaching lies in bodily practices that involve special physical training (sitting in the lotus position), renunciation of worldly worries through all sorts of affirmations (for example, “I am a clear sky, my thoughts are clouds”) in order to achieve complete equanimity and tranquility, as well as reading short philosophical sayings of this teaching.

Zen Buddhism first penetrated the West, becoming especially popular after World War II, due to the deployment of American occupation troops in Japan and the loss of orientation among Western youth as a result of the post-war shock. In the 1960s this doctrine also came to the Soviet Union,<sup>49</sup> infecting the decadent Soviet intelligentsia, who wanted to be “away from the Soviet Union, in their own space, virtual, aestheticized.”<sup>50</sup> A new surge of interest in the teachings and practices of Zen began in the 1990s, when it actually became an influential trend in mass culture, as a way of avoiding the difficult economic and political realities caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike anime, this teaching and practice penetrated into Russia through representatives of the Western world with its translations of Zen philosophical sayings. Very often student exchanges and contacts with European and American peers became the sources of Zen penetration into Russia. “Zen sutras in Russia came from an English translation.”<sup>51</sup> and therefore the teaching itself was perceived in a somewhat distorted form. In St. Petersburg there is a community of young people who practice Zen Buddhism on the territory of the Buddhist temple Datsan Gunzenchoinei and attract other followers of this teaching among the youth.

Thus, although many residents of Russia, including young people, have never been to Japan, they perceive this country through a system of images, semiotic signs broadcast by mass culture using the Internet, the media, television, as well as through personal contacts with those who once visited this country and communicated with its inhabitants. The perception of Japan in Russia is shrouded in an aura of exoticism and has an attractive force due to its otherness, unrecognizability and remoteness. According to the FOM 2018, 64 percent of young people aged 18–30 positively assess Russian-Japanese relations.

## Conclusion

An essential feature of the perception of images of another country in terms of the problem of mutual relations is, as a rule, opposition. Under the opposition of the image, one can understand the competition of possible descriptions of the image of another. In extreme terms, opposition is presented as a victory in a struggle similar to a zero-sum game or war (*polemos*). In this case, it does not matter whether we talk about the external or internal

image. It should be emphasized that in this case the image is formed by reflection from the source, from the basis on which the image should lie and which it should represent. The image becomes nothing more than a carrier of opposites, rupture, relations “between” broken ties. There must be an attitude of hostility. Such relations are built in the contradictions of “civilization-barbarism,” “we-strangers,” “friends-enemies.” The second type of emerging relationship is based on the acceptance of another, understanding of its culture and the ability to build long-term relationships, albeit a competitive plan. These can be conditionally called relations of competitive reciprocity. Here, perhaps, it will be successful to describe the relationship as agonistic. As the history of Russian-Japanese relations shows, starting from the first steps of acquaintance in the 17th–19th centuries, the second type of relationship was the dominant strategy of mutual perception here. Perceptions of Japan after the 1904–1905 war and World War II in the Russian public consciousness “slid” from the line of opposition and hostility to understanding and building competitive reciprocity. Realpolitik, of course, influenced the dynamics of mutual perception, as evidenced by the data of recent decades. Public opinion adequately responded to problematic conflicts, but there was always room for understanding. Even young people, experiencing the attractive power of Japanese exoticism, understand it as an additional step towards constructive interaction.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Rosamund Bartlett, “Japonisme and Japanophobia: The Russo-Japanese War in Russian Cultural Consciousness,” *The Russian Review*, 67, no. 1 (January 2008): 8–33; Aaron Cohen, “Long Ago and Far Away: War Monuments, Public Relations, and the Memory of the Russo-Japanese War in Russia, 1907–14,” *The Russian Review*, 69, no. 3 (2010): 388–411.

<sup>2</sup> Betsy Perabo, *Russian Orthodoxy and the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> Alexander Bukh, *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's "Other"* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).

<sup>4</sup> David Wells, ed. and transl., *Russian Views of Japan, 1792–1913: An Anthology of Travel Writing* (London: Routledge, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> Barbara Maggs, “Imprisoned! Two Russian Narratives of Travel and Captivity in Asia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: Filipp Efremov in Central Asia and Vasilii Golovnin in Japan,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, 52, no. 3/4 (September–December 2010): 331–49.

<sup>6</sup> Leonid Smorgunov, “Strategies of Representation: Japanese Politicians on Russian Internet and Television,” in *Japan and Russia. Three Centuries of Mutual Images*, ed. Yulia Mikhailova and M. William Steele (Kent: Global Oriental, 2008), 192–207.

<sup>7</sup> R. S. Pereslavceva, “Obraz ‘drugogo’ v proizvedeniyah o russko-yaponskoj vojne 1904–1905 godov” [The image of the “other” in the works on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905], *Vestnik Novgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, no. 94 (2016): 59–62.

<sup>8</sup> Nataliya Lyubimova, “Obraz Yaponii v Rossii—starye elementy v novom oformlenii” [The image of Japan in Russia—old elements in a new design], *Vestnik antropologii*, 51, no. 3 (2020): 153–67.

<sup>9</sup> V. E. Molodyakov, *Obraz Yaponii v Evrope i Rossii vtoroj poloviny XIX—nachala XX veka* [The image of Japan in Europe and Russia in the second half of the 19th–Early 20th Centuries] (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, 1996); Evgeniy Shtejner, *Bez Fudziyamy: yaponskie obrazy i vooobrazeniya* [Without Fujiyama: Japanese imagery and imagination] (Moscow: Natalis, 2006); Konstantin Sarkisov, *Rossiya i Yaponiya. Sto let otnoshenij (1817–1917)* [Russia and Japan. One hundred years of relations (1817–1917)] (Moscow: Olma Media Grupp, 2015); Vladimir Alpatov, *Yaponistika. Teoriya yazyka. Sociolingvistika. Istoriya yazykoznaniiya*. [Japanese studies. Theory of language. Sociolinguistics. History of linguistics] (Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskoj kul'tury, 2017); Dmitriy Streltsov, ed., *Problemy istoricheskogo proshlogo v otnosheniyah Yaponii*



so stranami-sosedjyami: Monografiya [Problems of the historical past in Japan's relations with neighboring countries] (Moscow: Izd. Aspekt Press, 2022).

<sup>10</sup> Konstantin Sarkisov, "Srvnitelny analiz identichnostey Rossii i Yaponii (1905–1917 gg.)" [Comparative analysis of the identities of Russia and Japan (1905–1917)], in *Yaponiya Ezhegodnik*, ed. Dmitriy Streltsov (Moscow: AIRO–HKHI, 2016), 298–309; Dmitriy Streltsov, "Identichnosti Rossii i Yaponii v poslevoennyj period (1945–1991 gg.)" [Russian and Japanese Identities in the Postwar Period (1945–1991)], in *Yaponiya Ezhegodnik*, ed. Dmitriy Streltsov (Moscow: AIRO–HKHI, 2016), 337–52; Sergey Chugrov, "Identichnosti Rossii i Yaponii v postbipolyarnyj period (1991–2015 gg.)" [Russian and Japanese Identities in the Post-Bipolar Period (1991–2015)], in *Yaponiya Ezhegodnik*, ed. Dmitriy Streltsov (Moscow: AIRO–HKHI, 2016), 353–75.

<sup>11</sup> Elena Popova and Veronika Kazanceva, "Yaponiya i yaponcy v zerkale russkoj frazeologii" [Japan and the Japanese in the mirror of Russian phraseology], *Vestnik Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Filologiya. Zhurnalistika*, no. 4 (2017): 58–60; Elena Popova and Veronika Kazanceva, "Rol' stereotipov v formirovanii obraza Yaponii v russkojazykovoj kartine mira" [The role of stereotypes in shaping the image of Japan in the Russian language picture of the world], *Vestnik Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Filologiya. Zhurnalistika*, no. 2 (2020): 42–45.

<sup>12</sup> Lyubimova, "Obraz Yaponii v Rossii."

<sup>13</sup> Viktor Larin and Liliya Larina, "Menyayushchiesya obrazy Vostochnoj Azii v soznanii zhitelej ti-hookeanskoj Rossii: srezy poslednih let" [Changing images of East Asia in the minds of the inhabitants of Pacific Russia: Slices of recent years], *Rossiya i ATR*, 110, no. 4 (2020): 15–45; Viktor Larin and Liliya Larina, "Sovremennyy vzglyad na Yaponiyu iz Vladivostoka (po rezul'tatam oprosa 2021 goda)" [A modern view of Japan from Vladivostok (Based on a 2021 survey)], *Yaponskie issledovaniya*, no. 1 (2022): 95–114.

<sup>14</sup> Larisa Zhilina, "Yaponiya i Rossiya: puti formirovaniya obshchestvennogo mneniya o stranah-sosedyah" [Japan and Russia: ways of shaping public opinion about neighboring countries], in *Yaponiya Ezhegodnik*, ed. Dmitriy Streltsov (Moscow: AIRO–HKHI, 2013), 135–53.

<sup>15</sup> In Greek mythology, *Polemos* is the god of war. Heraclitus spoke of him in a metaphorical sense as the source of everything. Subsequently, this term played a big role in the justification of the political as a war of friends against enemies by Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger.

<sup>16</sup> *Agon*: in ancient Greece, a wrestling or competition, in particular at the Olympic Games. In political philosophy, the term is often used as the opposite of war, or *polemos*.

<sup>17</sup> Vasilij Golovnin, *Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o priklyucheniyah ego v plenu u yaponcev* [Notes of the fleet of Captain Golovnin about his adventures in captivity with the Japanese] (Moscow: Zaharov, 2004).

<sup>18</sup> Sergey Kozlov, *Russkie otkryvajut Japoniju: iz rukopisnogo nasledija moreplavatelej V. M. Golovnina i A. I. Hlebnikova 1810–1820-e gg.* [Russians discover Japan: from the handwritten heritage of navigators V. M. Golovnin and A. I. Khlebnikov 1810–1820s] (St Petersburg: Istoricheskaja illjustracija, 2016), 15.

<sup>19</sup> Sergey Kozlov, "Zapiski russkih moreplavatelej V.M.Golovnina i A.I.Hlebnikova 1810–1820-h godov: na puti k otkrytiju Japonii" [Notes of Russian navigators V.M. Golovnin and A.I. Khlebnikov in the 1810–1820s: On the way to the discovery of Japan], *Vestnik Rossijskogo gumanitarnogo nauchnogo fonda*, 84–85, no. 3–4 (2016): 11–28.

<sup>20</sup> A[lexandr] M[ozhaisky], 'Yaponiya i yaponsy', [Japan and the Japanese], *Russkii khudozhestvennyi listok*, no. 14 (1857): 1–2.

<sup>21</sup> Elena Popova and Veronika Kazanceva, "Rol' stereotipov v formirovanii obraza Yaponii v russkojazykovoj kartine mira" [The role of stereotypes in shaping the image of Japan in the Russian language picture of the world] *Vestnik Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Filologiya. Zhurnalistika*, no. 2 (2020): 42–45.

<sup>22</sup> Bartlett, "Japonisme and Japanophobia," 9.

<sup>23</sup> Cit. on: Sarkisov, "Srvnitelny analiz identichnostey," 307.

<sup>24</sup> Cohen, "Long Ago and Far Away," 394.

<sup>25</sup> Linda Galvane, "In the Middle, Somewhat... Japanese-Russian Mixed Blood Characters in Contemporary Russian Literature," *New Zealand Slavonic Journal*, 44 (2010): 69.

<sup>26</sup> Streltsov, "Identichnosti Rossii i Yaponii."

<sup>27</sup> Streltsov, "Identichnosti Rossii i Yaponii." 340.

<sup>28</sup> Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, *Vetka sakury: Rasskaz o tom, chto za ljudi japoncy* [Sakura branch: A story about what kind of people the Japanese are] (Moscow: Molodaja gvardija, 1971), 216.

- <sup>29</sup> Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), <https://fom.ru/Mir/14158>. Data for Figures 15.1 to 15.7 taken from this survey.
- <sup>30</sup> Vladimir Nelidov, “Novaya neopredelennost’ v rossijsko-yaponskih otnosheniyah” [New uncertainty in Russian-Japanese relations], *Yaponskie issledovaniya*, no. 4 (2020): 121.
- <sup>31</sup> A.N. Panov, “Vneshnepoliticheskie priority premer-ministra Yaponii Abe Sindzo” [Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s foreign policy priorities], in *Yaponiya Ezhegodnik*, ed. Dmitriy Streltsov (Moscow: AIRO–HKHI, 2016), 37–38.
- <sup>32</sup> Yriy Latov, “Antizapadnichestvo vo vneshnepoliticheskom mentalitete sovremennyh rossiyan (po dannym sociologicheskikh oprosov)” [Anti-Westernism in the foreign policy mentality of modern Russians (according to opinion polls)], *Sociologicheskaya nauka i social’naya praktika*, 5, no. 4(20) (2017): 117.
- <sup>33</sup> Oleg Paramonov, “Rossijsko-yaponskie otnosheniya na rubezhe vekov: zakonmernosti, marshruty, lidery” [Russian-Japanese relations at the turn of the century: Patterns, routes, leaders], *Mezhdunarodnaya analitika*, 12, no. 2 (2021): 122.
- <sup>34</sup> In Nelidov, “Novaya neopredelennost’,” 125.
- <sup>35</sup> Ji-won Yun, “The Origin of Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia and Japanese Perceptions of the Russo-Japanese War: A Literature Review,” *Inha Journal of International Studies: Pacific Focus*, XXXV, no. 1 (April 2020): 59–75.
- <sup>36</sup> Larisa Zhilina, “Yaponiya i Rossiya: puti formirovaniya obshchestvennogo mneniya o stranah-sosedyah” [Japan and Russia: Ways of shaping public opinion about neighboring countries], in *Yaponiya Ezhegodnik*, ed. Dmitriy Streltsov (Moscow: AIRO–HKHI, 2016), 138.
- <sup>37</sup> Aleksander Kulanov and Yulia Stonogina, *Obraz i real’nost’: Yaponiya i Rossiya glazami drug druga* [Image and reality: Japan and Russia through each other’s eyes]. <https://polit.ru/article/2003/07/15/621297/>.
- <sup>38</sup> M. Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants,” *On the Horizon* 5, no. 9, 2001, MCB University Press, Bingley. <http://www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Natives,%20Digital%20Immigrants%20-%20PartI.pdf>.
- <sup>39</sup> Irina Tolstikova, Olga Ignatjeva, Konstantin Kondratenko, and Alexander Pletnev, “Generation Z and Its Value Transformations: Digital Reality vs. Phygital Interaction,” in *Digital Transformation and Global Society*, (Cham: Springer Nature, 2020), 47–61.
- <sup>40</sup> Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), February 8–9, 2014, <https://fom.ru/Rabota-i-dom/11368>.
- <sup>41</sup> Mikhail Kudryavceva, Irina Kramida, and Aleksander Osipov, “Vliyanie monitornyh vrednyh privyчек na zdorovyj obraz zhizni studentov” [The influence of monitoring bad habits on a healthy lifestyle of students], *Teoriya i praktika fizicheskoy kul’ury*, no. 6 (2016): 26.
- <sup>42</sup> Shtejner, *Bez Fudziyamy*.
- <sup>43</sup> E.S. Vorobeva “Subkul’tura anime v sovremennom rossijskom sociokul’turnom prostranstve” [Anime subculture in modern Russian sociocultural space. Avtoreferat na soiskanie uch. stepeni kandidata nauk]. PhD diss., Far Eastern Federal University, 2021.
- <sup>44</sup> Vorobeva “Subkul’tura anime,” 15.
- <sup>45</sup> Elena Katasonova, “Otaku: za i protiv. Novaya generaciya lyudej komp’yuternoj ephi” [Otaku: for and against. A new generation of people of the computer age], *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, no. 12 (2010): 52.
- <sup>46</sup> Molodezhnye subkul’tury. Animeshniki. 2012. [Youth subcultures. Anime people]. <http://www.detmobib.ru/pda/young/subcultures/553/>.
- <sup>47</sup> Viktoria Kravchenko, “Ekza-dzen kak surrogat yaponskogo dzen-buddizma v sovremennom rossijskom masskul’te” [Exa-Zen as a surrogate for Japanese Zen Buddhism in modern Russian mass culture], *Filosofskij polilog*, 1 (2017): 126–40.
- <sup>48</sup> Shtejner, *Bez Fudziyamy*.
- <sup>49</sup> Oksana Aleksandrova, “Proniknovenie dzen-buddizma v prostranstvo otechestvennoj kul’tury i filosofii” [The penetration of Zen Buddhism into the space of Russian culture and philosophy], *Obraznye resursy i tekhnologii*, 37, no. 4 (2021): 97–101.
- <sup>50</sup> Shtejner, *Bez Fudziyamy*.
- <sup>51</sup> Shtejner, *Bez Fudziyamy*.

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