

Springer Geography

Radomir Bolgov · Vadim Atnashev ·  
Yury Gladkiy · Art Leete · Alexey Tsyb ·  
Sergey Pogodin · Andrei Znamenski *Editors*

# Proceedings of Topical Issues in International Political Geography

 Springer

# Springer Geography

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Editors

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# Preface

This volume contains the papers submitted (and accepted for publication) to the International Conference “Topical Issues of International Political Geography” (TIPG-2021). This proceedings book addresses the main issues of contemporary political geography and international relations, providing a platform for discussion and collaboration of experts in the fields of Political Geography, Geopolitics, International Relations, etc. Participants from all over the world consider the controversies and challenges posed by globalization, focusing, in particular, on the ideologies of globalization and regionalism, migration crises, prevention of ethnic conflicts, and measures to promote sustainable development. The content of the book may be interesting to expert community, academics, and popular audience.

The Program Committee comprising of the recognized researchers from 15 countries had conducted a rigorous peer review. One of the unique characteristics of this book is that it gathers under conceptual umbrella Western and Eastern experts.

The volume consists of five parts. The titles of Parts I–II and V were represented previously in the last TIPG conferences of 2019 and 2020. Discussion on the pages of previous volumes has generated new works collected in the proceedings under this umbrella. At the same time, the volume discovered new directions for the studies. The titles of Part IV (Geography of Culture, Sport and Tourism) and Part III (Administrative Culture, Political Institutions and National Policies) are new topics of TIPG. These parts consist of the papers presented on new sections of TIPG.

The chapters of Part I “International Relations” cover such issues of international relations as anti-pandemic policies, digital and climate strategies, transport cooperation, oil & gas politics, etc. The main idea of the section is to discuss the effects of global issues on international relations and the effects of international relations on global issues. The geographic space is a background for this discussion. Some studies represent the international platforms as a context of politico-geographical processes (for instance, the European Union, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization as platforms for countries’ cooperation). The chapters of the section discuss the international security issues related to the power distribution depending on the geographic location. The contemporary background is the COVID-19 pandemic.



The chapters of Part II “Ideologies of Regionalism and Globalization in Historical Context: Philosophy of Politics” focus on the spatial aspects of two parallel processes—globalization and regionalism. The authors discuss the effects of globalization on the ideology, identity, and symbolic of nations and communities. The authors discuss such trends as Asianization and shift of the power from West to East. The context of the section is designed by the historical framework of geographical issues with the use of a historical geographical approach to studying politics. Following Élisée Reclus, “geography is history in space whilst history is geography in time.”

Part III “Administrative Culture, Political Institutions and National Policies” moves from cases at the national level to the local one. The chapters cover such issues of domestic politics as anticorruption policies & governance quality, digital and sustainable development strategies, elections, etc. The section contains a set of cases for comparative analysis focused on national cases (for instance, a comparative study of public service in China and Russia).

The chapters of Part IV “Geography of Culture, Sport and Tourism” represent the culture as a factor of geography (for instance, international cultural exchanges, cultural policy, etc.). Why wasn’t Russian Soft Power in Ukraine effective? What is the role of sport in Russian diplomacy? What are the prospects of the global tourism industry after the COVID-19 pandemic? The section is intended to answer these and other questions.

Finally, the chapters of Part V “Migration and Socio-demographic Processes” deal with migration and socio-demographic issues. They focus on cases of European countries, China and Russia. The chapters discuss the gender aspects of migration. The authors make conclusions about the challenges of migration to the multiculturalism issues. The studies focus on national, regional, and local cases in the EU, Eastern, and Post-Soviet countries.

We would like to thank those who made this event possible and successful. We especially express our gratitude to the Program Committee members for their contribution to the event. We thank the authors for submitting their papers. We are proud to attract a great team of scholars from different countries and disciplines. We will work further to sustain and expand the TIPG community through joint research and collaboration.

St. Petersburg, Russia  
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 St. Petersburg, Russia  
 Tartu, Estonia  
 St. Petersburg, Russia  
 St. Petersburg, Russia  
 Memphis, USA

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# **International Relations**



# Eurasia in the Post-pandemic Political and Socioeconomic Prospects

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**Abstract.** There have been debates about how the pandemics will set off unprecedented events that possibly lead to a new world order. Therefore, Eurasian countries need to implement efficient policies and strategies not only to overcome the effect of the pandemics but also to find a good place in post-pandemic geopolitics. This presentation analyzes similarities and differences in domestic factors that have led Eurasian countries like Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states to give various responses to the pandemics. The paper assesses possible outcomes of these various policies and strategies on geopolitical future of these countries. In this framework, a special emphasis will be placed on digital transformation, health care and migration in order to see whether Eurasian countries take measures to adapt to changes in post-pandemic geopolitical order.

**Keywords:** Eurasia · Pandemic · Central Asia · Russia · Azerbaijan · Geopolitics · World Order

## 1 Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has confirmed that all parts of the world are vulnerable to global crises than ever before. Eurasia has accordingly received its share of challenges brought by the pandemic. However, since the Eurasian countries have different political and socioeconomic dynamics, they have implemented various policies and strategies in order to cope with the catastrophic influences of the pandemic. Meanwhile, there have been rising concerns about how the pandemic will set off unprecedented events that possibly lead to a new world order. It has been argued that in the post-pandemic world era, China will expand its power at the expense of the western world. At this point, the countries of the Eurasian space need to implement effective policies and strategies not only to overcome the pandemic but also to find a good place in the post-pandemic world order. This paper aims to analyze how the Eurasian countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey, the Caucasian and Central Asian republics have responded to the ravaging pandemic while they have to deal with overwhelming issues of their domestic and foreign agenda. This paper also investigates possible outcomes of domestic and foreign policies of the countries on their geopolitical future.

## 2 Russia

At the outset of the pandemic in March 2020, the Eurasian countries seemed to be burdened with their usual domestic and international agenda. Moscow prepared for the referendum which was scheduled for April 2020 to decide on constitutional reforms that proposed to make changes in Russia's administrative system and further President Vladimir Putin's term in office. In foreign affairs, the Kremlin sought to protect Russia's geopolitical interests in Syria and Libya and fought with Saudi Arabia over oil prices. At the beginning of the pandemic, Moscow seemed to perform well as the health care facilities of the country were officially able to handle the low number of the COVID-19 cases. As Judy Twigg points out, benefitting from the Soviet experience, Russia apparently has an advanced health care system as it fares better than many of the OECD countries concerning the number of medical staff and hospital beds. The centralized administrative system also enables a swift reallocation and mobilization of resources as proven by the rapid construction of the pandemic hospital in Moscow [1]. In addition, a number of Soviet-era institutions of contagious diseases and quarantine measures help not only Russia but also other former Soviet states in their fight with the COVID-19 pandemic [2]. The media reports on Moscow's medical assistance to other countries have also helped Moscow to have the confidence of the Russian public opinion showing how Serbia, Italy and even the USA have been desperate to welcome Russian medical specialists in their fight with the pandemic [3]. An operational headquarters was formed on 27 January 2020 with the purpose of coordinating policies against the coronavirus [4].

Russia has also effectively developed Sputnik V vaccine and agreed to distribute it to many African, Asian and Latin American countries which have difficulty in having access to the vaccines developed in western countries. While wealthy countries have manifested me-first approach to get jabs as many as possible and vaccine companies have refused to release patents and agree for joint production, Russia has signed agreements with many countries for joint production of its vaccine. Moscow has accordingly improved its global image thanks to its vaccine policies [5]. As Birol Akgün and Metin Çelik point out, Russia's swiftness to send medical aid to Italy and Spain has showed how non-western countries could be more successful than western countries in times of need. The western international institutions such as EU and NATO failed to provide support to two member countries such as Italy and Spain as they were severely hit by the pandemic. Other EU and NATO members also adopting me-first approach not only hesitated to mobilize their sources for Italy and Spain but also closed their borders with these countries. Therefore, the inefficiency of the western world during the pandemic has casted doubts on pro-European and pro-Atlantic ideals [6]. It is also argued that the pandemic has proven Russia and China right about their objection to the US-led liberal world order and their assertion for a multipolar world [7].

Besides, although the Trump administration accused China of making the world face such a perilous disease and even labeled it as the Chinese virus, Putin has preferred to be supportive of China and warned the United States to refrain from stigmatizing China and spreading provocative arguments on the origin of the virus [8]. At the meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 2020, Moscow countered the attempts of the American administration to raise concerns about the responsibility of the Chinese government for spreading the virus. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov implicitly blamed the United States



for searching a scapegoat for its domestic problems [9]. As the Kremlin has maintained its diplomatic support to China, speculations have arisen concerning how Russia needs to cooperate with China in order to lead the post-pandemic world order. In this context, Talmiz Ahmad assesses that as the decrease in the US willingness and capabilities to lead the world is now more evident, Russia should seize the opportunity provided by the pandemic and fashion a tripartite partnership with China and India in order to shape the post-pandemic world. According to him, such partnership will play a constructive role in solving global problems. In the framework of China's Silk Road Initiative, Moscow together with Beijing and New Delhi can propose projects for the economic and social development of the poor regions of the world. The United States does not also have much credibility to assume an impartial peace-maker role because of its destructive military occupations. In alliance with India and China, Russia can allegedly mediate peace in the Middle East. Ahmad also believes that although the recent border clashes between India and China seem to pose a challenge to tripartite cooperation, Russia managed to turn the crisis to its advantage by organizing a video conference among the foreign ministers of three countries [10].

In similar vein, Stergios Skaperdas draws attention to Chinese and Russian role in checking the US power in Eurasia. From his point of view, Russian military and diplomacy have barred the United States from increasing its influence in Eurasia while China has been rapidly closing the gap with the United States in economy, military and technology. The pandemic led the US economy to enter into a severe recession and thus accelerated the US decline whereas China has healed its wounds and begun to recover from the coronavirus crisis [11]. Qingming Huang defines China, Russia and Iran as revisionist powers which threaten the US-led liberal world order. All of these states reject the liberal-democratic model of the western world and propose their own economic and political model. Huang anticipates that like China and Iran, Russia will take advantage of the coronavirus crisis to strengthen control over its people. Moscow intends to follow China's example to set up a system of control with technology and plans to acquire surveillance capabilities such as facial recognition and location tracking networks. Since several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America see Chinese and Russian models of political and economic development more appealing than western capitalism and democracy, they are willing to receive Chinese and Russian military and technological help [12]. The pandemic accordingly presents an opportunity to revisionist capitals such as Moscow and Beijing to provide an alternative to the US-led liberal world order.

In addition, the perception that Asian countries such as China, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan have more successfully handled the coronavirus crisis than the western world led Russian public opinion to be increasingly in favour of Asian model of political and economic development which prioritizes obedience over individualism [13]. It is therefore expected that the pandemic will strengthen Eurasianist stance in Russia at the expense of pro-western tendencies.

According to Gunter Deuber, while national paid-leaves and other measures have restricted social and economic life and therefore reduced economic outcome, economic downturn in Russia is expected to be relatively less than in the advanced economies.

Russia is not highly integrated into global economy while tourism and small and middle-size enterprises do not play a significant role in economy. As a major customer of Russian oil and gas, China's announcement concerning the containment of the pandemic in its territories and the normalization of its economic activities has pleased Moscow. Russia should benefit from China's economic recovery and energy consumption and lessen the adverse influences of dwindling oil and gas demand [14]. It can be stated that Moscow should reap the fruits of its relations with Beijing since China's bouncing back from the pandemic is anticipated to help Russian economy to recover sooner than the western economies. In addition, maintaining budget surplus and accumulating large financial reserves for difficult times, Moscow seems to have financial resources not only to cope up with the economic burden of the pandemic but also to improve its economic and technological infrastructure [15].

The pandemic has not posed much serious challenge to the public approval of the Kremlin's policies as Putin emerged victorious from the 2020 referendum allowing him to make constitutional changes to Russian political system. The 2021 legislative elections also ended in the victory of the pro-Putin United Russia having an overwhelming majority of the seats in the parliament.

The pandemic has also brought challenges to the Russian state and society. Pandemic cases and deaths continue to ravage Russia like other countries. At a meeting with the entrepreneurs in March 2021, Putin pointed out to the pandemic and the collapsing oil prices as the two problems of the country [16]. While Russia's oil and gas-led economy which has started to show some signs of recovery after a period of recession due to the western sanctions and weak oil prices, the demand for Russian oil and gas has fallen because of the contraction of the world economies during the pandemic [17]. The Kremlin has resorted to national paid-leaves to lessen the spread of the virus and introduced other means of support such as deferrals on taxes and payments for the businesses. The Russian government also plans to move funds from military to social spending to support its citizens and maintain budget surplus and large financial reserves as well [18]. Moscow's commitment to fiscal discipline is expected to lessen the burden of the pandemic on Russian economy.

### **3 The Central Asia**

The Central Asian republics has encountered the pandemic-led economic problems since they are geographically between China and its commercial partners in Europe and the Middle East [19]. All governments in the region, except for Turkmenistan, have accepted the existence of the coronavirus cases and deaths and introduced similar measures executed in the other parts of the world [20]. While Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan rely on oil and gas revenues, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan do not have viable economic resources and are heavily dependent on remittances. Therefore, when the pandemic compelled the countries to seal off their borders, remittance flows between Central Asia and the other parts of the world have been slowed down. This situation adversely affected the economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan [21]. The pandemic aggravated the burden of the declining oil and gas prices on Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as their hydrocarbon exports dropped because of the slowdown in China's economy [22].

Under these circumstances, the Central Asian governments will plausibly be eager to participate in the Eurasian Economic Union to cooperate with Russia and other regional countries to address economic and social challenges caused by the coronavirus [23]. The increasing concerns over regional security due to the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan will make the Central Asian governments be willing to expand military cooperation with Russia in the post-pandemic period. Parallel to the recovery of Chinese economy, Beijing has also resumed its Silk Road Initiative to expand its influence in the region [24]. It also aims to increase its share in the Central Asian technology market by giving loans to promote the purchase of digital surveillance devices produced by the Chinese firms such as Huawei and Hikvision [25]. In this respect, Russia and China will maintain their dominant role in the post-pandemic Central Asia.

Although the pandemic-led digitalization has sparked controversies and conspiracies about the intention of the authorities to expand their control of life, it has also provided opportunities for Central Asian economies. As Daulet Zhailybayev explains, the lockdown measures in Kazakhstan has revealed the shortcomings of the internet infrastructure and propelled the government to invest in software projects such as e-government and Digital Kazakhstan. In the meantime, digitalization has begun thanks to the initiative of the local authorities. For example, the museums in the southern city of Turkestan have digitalized and opened their collections to online users, organized online seminars and virtual museum tours. The museum's online activities have then become a source of relief during the strict measures of isolation [26]. This example of pandemic-led digitalization shows how internet could be used to reach out to people from different destinations, advertise and attract more visitors to one of the most important historical sites of the world.

## 4 The South Caucasus

The three South Caucasian states have struggled with similar social and economic problems during the pandemic. Armenia and Georgia have suffered much from border closures since their economies rely on remittances and tourists from Russia [27]. Compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia seemed to achieve a relative success in the struggle against the coronavirus [28]. However, the euphoria of victory has faded away with the second wave of the pandemic as the restrictions introduced by the Georgian authorities led to demonstrations [29]. Like other hydrocarbon-dependent countries, Azerbaijan has suffered from shrinking oil and gas demand. Meanwhile, the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict escalated into war in autumn 2020. Armenia was defeated by Azerbaijan and forced to agree to the Russian-mediated ceasefire agreement. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the conflict has taken precedence over the pandemic. The defeat sparked popular demonstrations and led to a legitimacy crisis for the Armenian government under Nikol Pashinyan. By the same token, the successes of the Azerbaijani military provided Baku the opportunity to appease public concerns about the management of the coronavirus crisis. As the broker of the current ceasefire and provider of peacekeeping troops in Nagorno-Karabagh, Russia has strengthened its position in the region. Armenia and Azerbaijan also rely on Russia in their struggle against the pandemic and carried out negotiations with Moscow to receive sufficient doses of Sputnik V vaccine [30].

## 5 Belarus and Ukraine

In western part of post-Soviet space, Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko has refrained from introducing lockdown measures against the pandemic so that economy would not suffer from prolonged closures [31]. Lukashenko's government has also been overwhelmed by the protests of the opposition which has objected to the results of the 2020 presidential elections. In response to the western criticism of the handling of the elections and the treatment of the opposition, Lukashenko blamed the US and the European countries for provoking demonstrations as a part of their strategy to transform Belarus into an anti-Russian country [32]. Concerning the US-Chinese brawls over the origin of the coronavirus, Minsk blamed the US for casting unfounded claims against China [33]. In the framework of the events during the pandemic, it is possible to argue that Lukashenko intends to maintain pro-Russian position in the post-pandemic world order. The pandemic has worsened political and socioeconomic problems in Ukraine such as the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk and the failure of the state to provide services to its citizens [34]. Anders Aslund underlines that Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky considering limited economic means of the country asked leading fifteen businesspeople to take care of health services in the regions. The Ukrainian businesspeople agreed to take an active role in the struggle against the coronavirus and used their wealth to provide medical supplies [35]. Zelensky's strategy seems to be a successful example of anti-crisis management but leaving health care to the businesspeople may damage the credibility of the Ukrainian state in the eyes of the people regarding its ability to provide basic public services. In addition, the disagreements between Kyiv and the local authorities on introducing curfew and other measures have reportedly damaged Zelensky's public approval [36].

## 6 Turkey

The pandemic-induced global recession has exacerbated Turkey's struggling economy as well. The curfew measures and border closures seemed to fail Turkish authorities' expectation to extract more revenue from tourism as the declining currency has made Turkey a cheaper destination [37]. However, parallel to the acceleration of the vaccination programme, the government has loosened pandemic measures to facilitate economic recovery. Accordingly, Turkish economy has begun seeing itself on a path of restoration as it has achieved highest growth rate in last two decades [38]. The weakened Turkish lira also contributed to the record rise in exports in 2020. It is believed that Turkish digital games have benefitted from the plunging currency and is expected to extract nearly one billion USD revenue by the end of 2021 [39]. Along with growing prospects of economic recovery, Turkish experts have expressed their concerns about Turkey's readiness for the post-pandemic world order. In this regard, long before the outbreak of the pandemic, Turkey as a growing regional power had started to seek for autonomy from NATO and EU and cultivated relations with China and Russia [40]. Seeing that the pandemic will accelerate the collapse of the US-led liberal world order, Turkey should be prepared for future geopolitical uncertainties [41]. To be competitive in the post-pandemic era, Turkey needs to maintain investments in national security and accelerate

digital transformation and use of artificial intelligence in education, health, industry and other areas. The Turkish authorities should also address social problems led by the coronavirus crisis, since the studies have revealed that the pandemic led elderly and young people to lose their social ties with their environment and therefore increased the feeling of loneliness among these groups of Turkish society [42].

## 7 Conclusion

To sum up, it is possible to state that the Eurasian countries have been adversely affected by the ongoing pandemic crisis and tried to prevent the spread of the coronavirus by implementing a variety of policies in accordance with their economic capabilities. Having better financial means than other post-Soviet countries, Russia has resorted to measures such as paid leaves, curfew and border closures. However, like the economies of hydrocarbon producers including Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Russian economy has been shaken by the decrease in oil and gas demand because of the pandemic. The governments of the resource scarce countries like Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have seen how their economies are dependent on remittances from Russia as their citizens have been deprived of access to Russia's labour market due to border shutdowns. Along with political crises such as the recent Nagorno-Karabagh war and Taliban's seizure of Afghanistan, the coronavirus has made the regional countries understand the importance of the cooperation with Russia. In the post-pandemic world, the resource scarce countries of the region are anticipated to be more willing to take part in regional integration projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union for a better management crisis in future. The post-Soviet countries also welcome China's intention to resume Silk Road Initiative to receive investment and therefore start economic recovery as soon as possible. In the light of all these circumstances, Russia will strengthen its leading position and also expand cooperation with China in the post-pandemic Eurasia. Ankara also intends to increase cooperation with Moscow and Beijing due not only to its growing economic ties with Russia and China but also to its tense relations with the US and the EU.

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# EU Concerns About Security, 5G and Huawei

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**Abstract.** The economic revolution that world is experiencing now promises to change the traditional service sector in economics to a different one with computer machineries that will take unmanned decisions. New technologies that appeared in the era of technical and economic revolutions have become of crucial importance in the innovative global economy. The nearest years promise that 5G network will be widely incorporated into technologies and economics. Unmanned data exchange is a basic ideology of 5G technology, which is supposed to substitute 4G. 5G may be used to develop different innovations such as self-driving cars, smart cities and drones for postal delivery. IoT technology is highly discussed in this respect.

**Keywords:** 5G · EU · Huawei · Security · NATO

## 1 Introduction

The economic revolution the world is experiencing now is changing traditional approach to service. It promises to be very different with computer machineries and decisions, with no human interventions. In the era of technical and economic revolutions, new technologies have become of an extraordinary significance to innovative global economy. In the nearest future 5G technology is bound to be wildly incorporated into economics and industries. Basic ideology of 5G is mechanical data exchange that is supposed to substitute 4G technology. It may be used to develop different innovations such as self-driving cars, smart cities and drones for postal delivery. IoT technology is highly discussed in this respect.

5G is the basis for IoT and thus for a smart city technology. This huge potential of 5G will bring economic growth, efficiency and social progress. Achieve that, European Union has to provide a more clear vision about the dates and algorithms for 5G practical implementation.

Chinese Huawei is providing the best quality-to-price ratio of 5G. Other companies are having a technological gap with 5G. In this context, Huawei is considered the only option in a short-term horizon [1].

However, adoption of 5G may meet a great number of challenges connected with security issues. 5G gives to its provider an opportunity to influence communicated data, save and use it for different purposes. This is a very risky business from the point of



security issues and for market competition. If EU makes a stake at a Chinese technology, three options come into detailed consideration: the first is about total abundance of Chinese 5G, second is the possible partial implementation and third is if to make it free of charge.

## 2 Methodology and Data Analysis

In this research news from social networks was used to clarify the latest developments with 5G. We may conclude that the current EU policies do not have clear outlines and it gives a vague impression about the situation with 5G. The joint statements and initial reports about EU-China summits were used to clarify agreements reached between the countries. Most of the referred documents come from European External Action Service website. The research examines various blogs and websites for more detailed vision on EU policy concerns with 5G. They are effective in giving a general background information about 5G technology, Internet of Things and related security issues. The examples of such websites are The Strategist and EU-Logos Athena ASBL. Scientific articles were also used for analysis of cases trailing 5G technology. Position of NATO were under scrupulous consideration in security issues risks associated with 5G and Huawei. Some prompts were found about US and EU positions towards potential ban of Huawei. Official documents of NATO Cyber Defense Center of Excellence were very useful to serve this goal [1].

To meet the goals of the research several interviews were conducted. The first respondent (Interviewee A) is from Oracle Company. Being a leading analyst and publisher on company sales strategy and for Oracle sales community, IA updates cover high-level competitive strategies such as in-memory applications, cloud applications, future products, services, technologies, and partner strategies. The expert gives regular trainings to Oracle sales and pre-sales teams around the world and participates in strategic sessions, market demand workshops. The second respondent (Interviewee B) is a doctoral student at Charles University in Prague. Being an expert for cybersecurity analytical group along with other graduate students, he also specializes in international political economy. The concerned subject covers a wide spectrum of studies, thus we limit our research to potential perspectives of 5G technology only for science and business. Business has different vision on the problem than the science. It allows us to identify and incorporate factors relevant to the private sector in our policy memorandum. General questions were asked in semi-structured interviews. Further, in this article we enlighten the issues met in the interviews.

Interviewee A points out that the power of Huawei should not be overestimated. Huawei is the company with the cheapest 5G, but we are to remember that any market is a competitive environment. Chinese company ZTE also has a 5G network, but remains out of sight for a while. According to Interviewee A, in several years it is quite probable that ZTE will compete with Huawei on 5G span and coverage. European providers Erickson and Nokia can equally provide 5G but the price is unrelatedly high. The second expert says that Samsung as Korea-based company is also capable to deliver a low-cost network option within 2 years. It will take a while, but Interviewee A predicts that the competition will be tough. He points out that “Countries will have a choice”. The problem is that

European Union does not have a unanimous position on this issue. Southern Europe and Italy, in particular, will not benefit much from fast 5G implementation and thus there will not be quick collaboration with Northern Europe. Besides there is no consensus in Western Europe as well. IA states that 5G also may be considered as a status marker. Some countries want it only because it may be very prestigious from a political and economic point of view. This network is currently a very attractive resource, especially for business, while the public sector will benefit less from 5G.

In conclusion, Interviewee A says that adoption of 5G may be rather problematic. For its distribution, Chinese Huawei is planning to use a newly updated satellite system. But, for example, the Netherlands will not have a chance to get this system until 2022. IA gives a conclusion about the number of substantial issues. At first, Europe will have big difficulties in terms of cooperation between states. Countries may have different interests and 5G value varies at different degrees. Due to economic reasons, the situation will be more or less the same for a period of time. In addition, rhetoric of the US appears to be not very influential, and it does not look like Europe hopes for their help. The question is how strong is a need of 5G in Europe. IA believes that it is better to wait for a while for more clear vision of the situation. Despite the fact that GDP may decrease, but definitely not in big numbers, security issues are of a greater importance now.

You may follow the interview questions as they may give more clear vision about the issues considered in the research. “With China being the only country able to export 5G network, there are some safety and security dilemmas. Can you state your thoughts about the perspectives for both public and private sector? What may be the potential dilemmas for implementation of 5G?” “A lot at stake from the economic perspective. Quite possible that economic growth may be hindered if not to adopt 5G now. What would you advise to European government? Should they implement 5G or not? What are the potential risks?” “The US government has already decided not to have business with Chinese companies. What are your thoughts about it and how trade wars may influence the situation with Europe?” “Can you try to foresee the future of the 5G network?”.

### 3 Research Design and Details

The above stated problems are closely correlated with our research goals. The essence of the problem is that it does not contain any policy at all, which is particularly characterized by the wait-and-see policy of EU countries. One substantial issue is that this policy may bring to a great division. EU countries need to achieve some unanimity if they want to implement Huawei 5G. Secondly, it is important that this political decision will minimize the risks of the Huawei network. Undoubtedly, it applies not only to political decisions. While considering the problem, it is also necessary to discuss the inquiry and need for 5G. In this respect, some temporal problems come into light: if the need of this technology is strong in Europe, what are the benefits versus costs ratio. There is a problem of the “now” issue as for a while the technology is not widely spread. It is of great significance to take into account this temporal aspect. Perhaps the lack of unanimity in the EU can be attributed to the huge difference in demand between countries. Therefore, it is also important that for each EU country there will be sufficient benefits and profits. To summarize the goals we can state that: first, 5G and Huawei

will bring economic growth, secondly is the need in unanimity within EU, third is the reduction of economic dependence on other continents and forth is minimization of risks 5G adoption can create. The solution can be found while taking clear vision on the priorities of each goal.

If to take into account the crucial importance of a technology for economics and politics and lack of time for finding alternatives to the technology, it seems that priority lies in the partial implementation of Chinese 5G. It gives an opportunity for the market to be competitive and for governmental institutions not to be involved in using 5G due to security reasons.

Obviously, 5G is the future of our society. With high data capacity and minimal differences, 5G may serve as the basis for Internet of Things. IoT is the technology with independent and direct computer control of 'things' connected with the Internet which share data with other things. Society and individuals become very dependable on the technology. The research of Mattern and Floerkemeier 'From Internet of Computers to Internet of Things'(2010) argues that IoT products use built-in sensors to collect data. The products interact with each other and with people via the Internet. The system is functioning more effective if IoT controls and manages the processes. It may highly improve security systems connected with traffic control, etc. The cases mentioned by Mattern and Floerkemeier may be considered as examples of giving a soft and non-intrusive support for aged adults in their daily routines and automobiles that communicate with each other [1].

IoT may improve the efficiency, reduce costs, retain clients, produce a more target-oriented marketing, create new business models, provide more clear represented data, and supply with better service and high security. Obviously, IoT is a very perspective technology from business, economic and social aspects.

EU is very keen on implementation of the technology in Eurozone. They want to be progressive and to keep up with the rest of the world. IoT and 5G are crucial technologies for EU. In fact, there are some IoT applications in 4G. Nonetheless, the prospects mentioned above is in need of more powerful and modern networks. 5G is the technology that satisfy all these needs.

5G seems the only option for now that makes IoT possible as it is the basis for all IoT applications. Thus, the safety of the technology must be of a crucial importance. From this perspective the traffic security, business confidentiality, consumer assistance depend on security issues of 5G. Mattern and Floerkemeier claim that "Infrastructure of Internet of Things must be not only effective, scalable, safe and secure but also to answer the social and political expectations, be commonly employed and take into account economic considerations" (Mattern and Floerkemeier [12], p. 245) [2].

The span of IoT usage is increasing dramatically and the safety of the net becomes much more important than it was before. It concerns both widely known aspects of security and new ones that appear. For instance, we can provide some objects an access to different services and ban their contact with other objects in a particular time with no human to control the process. Moreover, business operations with 'smart objects' must be protected. Thus, the net security is of significant importance as its usage becomes more intensive, overwhelming and dependent. Not only private households at risk but businesses and society, which depend on it. If the Internet is broken or under attack it

may become a catastrophe for economics and society. Not very friendly partners of EU may use this weak spot. The service and equipment ought to be chosen carefully as it gets a privileged position in controlling Internet [3].

The risks of using 5G are obvious. Most challenges are connected with the potential influence on data communication from outside and this is not the news. However, IoT and future application products with 5G become more all-encompassing and interconnected. It concerns all consumer goods and networks in state social institutions and business. This huge interdependency makes the access to big data too easy. More companies, social institutions, individuals are becoming related to automatization processes. Society depends on energy and electricity and it will appear in 5G very soon. The risks are not connected by hackers only. Huawei that provides budget-friendly 5G seems to be affiliated with Chinese government. It is rather dodgy business as there is a probability that Huawei may provide state bodies with private data. To do this there is no need for Huawei to communicate with the government directly [4]. According to Chinese legislative system, it is necessary for private business and individuals to cooperate with state authorities. In fact, this law allows state bodies to get data legally. Security risks analysis and arguments about 5G queries dictate that in a short run it will be very problematic for EU to work out the detailed policy about 5G implementation. With no adopted policy, business community remains in the dark about the future of 5G in EU. If EU wants to compete in the globe, they are in a very need of the technology. Chinese Huawei is likely to continue to be the cheapest high quality 5G provider with huge investments. However, business is not sure if EU will take up Chinese 5G due to security risks. Nevertheless, if they decide to adopt 5G what may be the terms. There are alternative technologies that are less developed and more expensive but business are not ready to invest because European Union may choose a different way. EU must be very quick with decision about 5G otherwise, they may lose a very effective economic product and market. EU ought to come to unanimous conclusion about 5G and its service provider. With 'general freedom' movement in EU, there is no common policy regarding external relations. EU has many doubts, as they are to make their decision in the times of so-called trade war between US and China. It means that the trade relations of EU and other countries are in jeopardy and unanimity principle may help to keep EU as a trustworthy partner. Quite possible that in the future policy will appear to integrate 5G on all EU countries [6]. 5G will provide more effective communication technologies in transport, data, etc. If just one member state is using not very secure Internet protocols the rest of the members are under threat. Taking into account these risks, some member states will not wish to participate even if the perspectives are very promising. Overall, it shows that EU cannot afford long indecisive policy and ought to take a very clear position in this respect.

The significance of the choice is very articulated. If EU chooses 5G and China it may indirectly mean that, they do a step back from their staunch ally that is the US. Moreover, the situation is very different if to choose US but not China. It will be clear that EU accepts claims to dominate in the world and will show EU loyalty to the US in this very important struggle [7]. If there is a chance for EU to choose the European player, it will allow EU to keep the neutral position and thus status quo.

At the moment when the agreements were being discussed, most influential players in 5G were Huawei, Ericsson and Nokia. Chinese Huawei is the most comprehensive provider amongst three of them. Ericsson and Nokia are North European companies but not so progressive. NOS op 3 claims that Huawei spends 15 billion dollars for research and development annually and in 2019, this sum is two times bigger than of Ericsson and Nokia together. They say that it gives a unique opportunity to Huawei to provide with cheaper 5G. However, the world doubts a lot about safety of this technology as the company is the Chinese one. Researchers of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) Kaska et al. [8], state that the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Czech Republic have already imposed restrictions on using Huawei 5G [8].

They sum up that “the states concerns are rooted in interconnections between Chinese communications companies and intelligence agencies, reinforced by Chinese political and legal spheres, which requires cooperation with intelligence agencies” (Kaska et al. [8], p. 5) [11]. Raud from CCDCOE claims that China has already had a notorious spy reputation. He points out to “academia, industry and government agencies gather technology secrets” (Raud [11], p. 5). Moreover, China has a very strong legislative system to give a powerful support to a national intelligence office. In the Strategist (2018), Hoffman and Kania mention that Article 7 of the China National Intelligence Law states that every organization and citizen must, with high law considerations, support and cooperate in national intelligence activities, keep confidentiality about all national intelligence activities they are aware of. The state protects people and organizations that support, collaborate and cooperate in national intelligence activities (Hoffmann and Kania [6], p. 5) [12].

Hoffmann and Kania say that in legislature, there is no clear definition of intelligence activities and therefore this subject matter may have different interpretations. The conclusion may be as follows, that for such companies like Huawei there are no other options but to cooperate with Chinese intelligence office. Chinese legislation stipulates them to cooperate in their intelligence activities. Kaska et al. [8] research also reveals that Huawei has been accused not but once of spying and violating international economic sanctions against Iran and North Korea. The above-mentioned situations dictate for EU to pursue policy that is more cautious. Megna from EU-Logos Athena ASBL says that the European Commission (EC) requested from member countries in March a security risk assessment report on 5G, without explicit mention of Huawei (2019). Twenty-four member states out of twenty-eight have submitted a report, which generally states that Huawei is a threat. Megna also says that existing European Security Commissioner has not yet informed about any possible bans [9].

The European Commissioner for the Security Alliance, after EC has provided recommendations on how to ensure good security of 5G networks and the need to develop a cybersecurity certificate (2019). Now the position of EU has been eliminated. On April 10, 2019, at the EU-China Summit it was stated that countries would support an “open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful environment for information and communication technologies (ICT)”. This joint statement claims the importance to follow International legislature for peace and security reasons (European External Action Service, 2019, p. 3).

In addition, they indicate that they are contributing to “the development and implementation of internationally recognized standards of responsible state behavior in cyberspace” (European External Action Service, 2019, p. 3). Gadi (2014) claims that so-called EU-China Cyber Task Force was elaborated in 2012 [10]. He also says that the only benefit of this was mutual distrust reduction. Regarding 5G, the joint statement only mention is that they would like to stay connected and support cooperation in the field of business technology (European External Action Service, 2019, p. 3). It shows that there is no novelty in here. According to the report of December 4 ANP, EU ministers on communications agreed that EU countries should pay attention to the “technical risk profiles of telecommunications companies” plus “legal and policy framework with external 5G providers (Europa Nu (now), 2019, p. 1)” [11].

The conclusion is that these are the minimal steps that have to be taken. In EU, there is still no specific plan or approach for 5G implementation. Megna [9] argues that this is likely due to the situation when European market is fragmented with over 100 telecommunication operators. This makes it difficult to take into account interests of all EU countries. He also points out that only 12 member states are actually preparing to introduce 5G in EU (2019). It shows that in a short-term the whole situation is not probable for the most member states. In addition, according to Megna, Poland is still the only country that seeks to work with the United States to implement 5G, and Belgium and Hungary have already concluded that Huawei does not pose any risk. In other countries, the solution is under the provider (2019) [11].

There is a lot of disagreement about Huawei among member states. This is a central issue in relations with US, which indicates that EU countries should ban Huawei. Interviewee A demonstrates that Huawei should not be overestimated. In a few years, other providers will appear that can provide a network with the same scope. However, European providers will ask for a higher price. Therefore, we can expect competition: “Countries will have a choice,” says Interviewee A. He also points out that Europe is not showing unity on this problem. In particular, Eastern Europe and Italy seem that not benefit much from 5G rapid adoption and therefore will not work quickly with Northern Europe. There is also no consensus in Western Europe. Interviewee A comments that some countries only want it because it is very prestigious from a political and economic perspective. 5G may be a very attractive tool. There may be many benefits for public sector but for businesses it will be more profitable. He adds that Chinese 5G is planned to be distributed via newly updated satellite system. However, for a while, not every EU country have an opportunity to gain access to this system. The Netherlands, for instance, will not have this satellite network until 2022. It means that such countries should not rush to make a decision [13].

Interviewee B has a different vision on the problem. He says that “Companies like Oracle and SAP are pretty pragmatic when it comes to business, so if there is a chance to earn in partnerships with Huawei, they will not miss the opportunity.” There are no any strict restrictions except that all 5G contracts must be formulated and approved by a responsible ministerial department. Interviewee B noted that American Oracle and Chinese Huawei are indeed partners, but it is not very progressive for American and European markets. The documents about the relationships between Oracle and Huawei

we can browse only in the Chinese language. A little can be found about their collaboration in other languages. “SAP is not so secure; there is quite a lot data in English, so it seems that the German company is not trying to hide information. After all, there is no trade embargo about Huawei in Europe. You often see that European companies are not always worried about the US trade embargo.... For example, the deal between Telefonica (a Spanish company) and Huawei,” states Interviewee B. Another aspect that IB points out is the usage of network: once you can penetrate into a part of a network, you can enter the entire system. He refers to an article by Duquette and Poynter (2020) on zdnet.com where experts say that “end-to-end encryption means that bans of Huawei concern the access, not interception”. This means that when you enter one part of 5G, you also may enter the other more secure networks. The idea is applicable to single country conditions as well: once you can hack 5G network in one country, it will be easier for you to access all other networks in that country. Therefore, it is very important to secure the most accessible parts of network such as mobile systems. Finally, Interviewee B says that 5G is a so-called ‘dual-use’ technology. He claims that it can be used for both military and civilian purposes. It means that companies like Oracle need to deal with more than just business sector. An embargo, based on security restrictions, generally is much stringent. It becomes rather obvious from the interviews that companies are more inclined to work with Huawei than with other vendors because the company provides high quality technology with less expense. It also appears that the protection of the weakest network parts is the key issue if the institutions want to prevent the more important and secure parts from being discredited.

## 4 Concluding Remarks

Taking into account all the aspects mentioned above, not overall 5G adoption seems more attractive for EU. European Union cannot afford complete abundance of Chinese 5G. They are to compromise; otherwise, EU will trail along at the back of international market. Security issues are crucial issues and they may prevent full adoption of 5G. Concerns of European Union about state companies, their safety and security are obvious. The alternatives should be found to reach European players with acceptance of all risks connected with 5G. Nokia seems to be the best company to fill this gap. Nokia may give a significant boost to the development of EU high-tech industries, which now lags far behind Chinese.

The need in 5G technology was initially evident. A new technological revolution is happening at a frenetic pace. 5G is a significant part of this technical revolution. If companies want to compete, they are to take up this technology but very carefully. Chinese Huawei, which provides 5G with the best price, is the main player. In this respect, safety and security are primarily issues to consider about. 5G depends on a network provider, in our case it is Huawei. The possibility of data collection and usage for different purposes is obvious. This situation brings a huge risk to privacy issues for both government agencies and individuals. In particular, a data breach could be destructive and devastating. European companies are to find ways to compete the sooner the better. For a while, there is a strong need in decisions how to adopt 5G with minimal risks. The right decision seems to apply 5G but partially. The interests lay at using 5G technology

but now, as there is no any possibility to wait for alternatives. The implementation of technology is a crucial issue for states being competitive at the global marketplace. Full 5G implementation in EU seems less feasible due to security risks. Defense Department and some government agencies will have to wait for alternatives to appear. Such EU decision limits the number of risks and gives a chance for Europe to be at a competitive mode with such leading powers as China.

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# Key Aspects of Climate Strategies in Europe

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**Abstract.** Climate change is one of the main challenges and threats of the 21st century. Accordingly, the analysis in this study is based on the conceptual economic strategy of the United Nations Green Economy. Attention is paid to topical issues on the problem of climate change, since the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected human economic activities. For this study, three European Union member states have been selected for their economic performance and economic development: Germany, France and Italy. According to the statistics of the International Monetary Fund for 2020, the data on the GDP of these countries is the highest. Compared to other member states, the selected countries have the largest population. Moreover, the leaders of the three states have repeatedly expressed their concern about the problem of climate change. The paper provides a brief analysis of the most important international conferences devoted to the climate problem, as well as a comparison of the main approaches in relation to anthropological factors causing climate change. Unfortunately, the climate agenda is still viewed by some industrialists, government elites and energy sector businessmen as less significant than economic benefits. Academic circles are also divided and many believe that the transition to “green rails” is not feasible at the moment and the climate issue can be postponed. Thus, economic reforms, compliance with environmental recommendations, the introduction of legal and institutional mechanisms and methods remain under the responsibility of each state separately. The avoidance and reluctance of transformations allows us to speak about the initial stage of the formation of awareness of the climate threat.

**Keywords:** Climate change · The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change · The Paris Agreement · The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change · Climate policy

## 1 Introduction

Scientists from different countries are calling for an urgent solution to the problem of climate change, given the possible negative consequences for the environment and human health. However, the debate about the causes and consequences of climate change has been going on for decades among scientists. The harm documented in the reports of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is serious and (in many cases) irreversible [1]. For example, the growth of deserts, the projected loss of life due to unusual weather events, and the continuing extinction of many plant and animal species. Climate change and the lack of modernization of economies and industrial production

are becoming more pronounced. This requires discussion, advice and commitment from the global community.

The leaders of European countries are concerned about this problem. Thus, A. Merkel said the following: “Unrelenting climate change will lead to a reduction in welfare from 5% to 25%. Strict climate protection will only cost 1% of this wealth and make economic sense” [2]. E. Macron expressed concern about the current situation: “Now we must accelerate the pace of emission reductions, because we are living with the first consequences of climate disruptions” [3]. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said at the April 2021 Climate Summit: “The climate commitments we make in 2021 may determine our chances of effectively fighting climate change in the next decades and in the future” [4].

The relevance of this work lies in the growing impact of climate change on national policy programs. The novelty of this study lies in considering public opinion in three states, as well as in analyzing the ways of exchanging experience developed over the past couple of years, and the relevance of innovations in existing national climate programs and methods in the context of the coronavirus pandemic.

The aim of the study is to test the hypothesis about the growing efficiency of legal and institutional mechanisms and methods in Germany, France and Italy.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: (1) trace the dynamics of increasing the significance and importance of discussing the climate problem in the world discourse; (2) analyze the main theoretical aspects of the climate problem; (3) study the opinions of supporters and critics of the climate trend in three states; (4) on the basis of legal documents, opinion polls and statistical indicators, form a picture of the effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for the implementation of climate policy.

## 2 Materials and Methods

The following social, humanitarian and general scientific methods are used to conduct the research: comparative method, analysis of documents and statistics, generalization, derivation, content analysis and event analysis.

The study of the problem of climate change as an international phenomenon is of concern to foreign and Russian scientists. The main sources of this study are the regulatory legal acts of the Federal Republic of Germany, the French and Italian republics, as well as the statistical bases of the European Climate Agency (EEA), Green Growth Index, IMF, StatInfo Fr.

Climate issues intrigued mankind long before the emergence of the science “Meteorology” and methods of modeling and forecasting. The impressive development of computer technology and the introduction of innovations in the field of space observation can warn humanity about the formation of a new global climate picture. Researchers with particular interest analyze its stages and upcoming trends in the atmosphere and/or on the Earth’s surface. In recent decades, the world community has faced the threat of excessive global warming, which causes lively discussions about the causes and consequences of its occurrence [5]. However, it is difficult to determine what processes are involved. To begin with, the authors consider it necessary to reveal the concept of “climate” and analyze the relationship between two definitions: “climatic variability” (variability) and “climate change” (change).

“Climate” is often a collective unit in colloquial speech, meaning or replacing the words “weather”, “weather conditions”, “Wednesday”. This position is taken by Oliver Bothe in the monograph [6] “What even is” Climate “?”, Saying that “we use the term” climate “in different contexts that refer” to different temporal and/or spatial scales. “Climate” has a colloquial, scientific, philosophical and political meaning”.

Researcher Todorov A.V. gives a radical view in his work “Reply” from 1986 [7]. The author believes that among climate scientists there is no consensus and agreement on the definition of the term “climate”, therefore, talking about climate change, climate trends or fluctuations is meaningless.

However, the conceptualization process does not stand still. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change at the United Nations (IPCC), founded in 1988 and representing a forum of many thousands of world scientists, interprets the climate in a broad and narrow sense [8]. In a narrow sense, climate is a statistical description of the average value and variability of the corresponding values for a certain period of time, starting from several months. For example, the standard period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined in the mandate of the World Meteorological Organization [9]. The quantities are most often temperature, precipitation and wind. And climate in a broader sense is the general state of the climate system.

The American Meteorological Society (AMS), a nongovernmental organization, gives a similar definition: climate is a slowly changing aspect of the atmosphere - hydrosphere - land surface [10]. It is also characterized by the average values of the climate system over periods of a month or more, considering the variability in values.

AV Todorov believes that “the issue of climate change is perhaps the most complex and controversial in the whole science of meteorology. There are no strict criteria for how many dry years there must be to justify the use of the phrase “climate change”. Kathleen A. Miller in the study “Climate Variability, Climate Change, and Western Water” believes that “variability” to some extent is a random result of complex nonlinear interactions between independently changing components of the climate system [11].

The American Climate Change Center issued a guideline in 2016 in which climate variability refers to natural climate change [12]. For example, the warming phenomenon of the Pacific El Niño Current, which changes temperature, rain and wind patterns in many regions over several years, is an example of natural climate variability. At the same time, according to the guidance, climate change is a systematic change in the long-term state of the climate over several decades or longer. Nigerian researchers Olufemi Adedeji, Okocha Reuben, Olufemi Olatoye in the work “Global Climate Change” believe that variability can be variations of natural or anthropogenic external impact [13].

Article 1, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) clarifies this concept. The Convention states that climate change “is directly or indirectly caused by human activities causing changes in the composition of the global atmosphere, and superimposed on natural climate fluctuations observed over comparable periods of time.” Thus, the UN convention distinguishes between climate change caused by human activities that change the composition of the atmosphere and climate variability due to natural causes [14].

The position exists that the problem of climate change is closely related to overpopulation. American researcher Doris Baus gives this point of view in her work “Overpopulation and the Impact on the Environment”. She says that “the ecological system is overloaded, and the human footprint is destroying it” [15]. Indian scientists Rajeev Pratap Singh, Anita Singh and Vaibhav Srivastava, in their monograph *Environmental Issues Surrounding Human Overpopulation*, also associate rapid population growth with a deteriorating climate balance: gases” [16]. Another American researcher David Rosnick in the study ““The Consequences of Increased Population Growth for Climate Change” expresses the opinion that “any reduction in population growth will have a much greater impact on reducing climate change” [17]. The authors of the study “Reproduction and the carbon legacies of individuals” Paul A. Murtaugh and Michael G. Schlax concluded that “the potential savings from reduced reproduction are enormous” compared to the savings that can be obtained by resorting to other methods of control [18].

A report prepared by experts from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) was released in 2020 entitled “Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study”. The report says that the global birth rate will decline over time, the population is predominantly aging to this day, and by the end of the century the number of people will decline in almost all countries on Earth. The conclusions allow us to speak about the overestimation of the problem of overpopulation, therefore there is a group of researchers whose scientific interest lies in the study of the interdependence of excess consumption with climate change [19].

The authors of the report “Lifestyle Choices and Societal Behavior Changes as Local Climate Strategy” Brahmanand Mohanty, Martin Scherfler and Vikram Devatha believe that the responsibility for climate change lies not only with national governments and industry. Each person needs to reconsider their lifestyle and change their consumption patterns. Of course, changing individual habits requires effort and support at different institutional levels. Accordingly, the authorities need to create an enabling environment that will facilitate lifestyle changes. For example, the use of strong incentives and, in extreme cases, coercive measures can be a suitable tool for changing human behavior [20].

Joyashree Roy and Shamik Pal, in their article *Lifestyles and climate change: link awaiting activation*, state that the polluter pays principle has not provided significant compensation to those suffering from the effects of pollution or reduced global emissions over the past several decades. The authors believe that lifestyle change is also about disseminating information about sustainable and rational consumption, discussing energy issues at government levels, regulating technology development and managing market forces [21].

There is a third group of researchers. They believe that economic inequality is the main driver of climate change. For example, Branko Milanovic wrote in his study “Global Inequality A New Approach for the Age of Globalization”: is done today, to calculate the distribution of emissions by country” [22].

Tim Gore from the international association Oxfam published a report “Confronting Carbon Inequality: Putting climate justice at the heart of the COVID-19 recovery”, in which he cited the following statistics:

- The richest 10% of the world's population (about 630 million people) are responsible for 52% of total carbon emissions.
- The poorest 50% (about 3.1 billion people) accounted for only 7% of total emissions [23].

Éloi Laurent of the Stanford Center for Poverty and Inequality lists five “macroecological links” between inequality and environmental degradation in Inequality as pollution, pollution as inequality. The most important linkages in the context of climate change are:

- Inequality increases the ecological irresponsibility of the richest within each country and between states.
- Inequality reduces the need for environmental policy action and also reduces the likelihood of government compensation for the potential socially regressive consequences of environmental policy [24].

Thus, representatives of the third group combine the economic inequality of the population both within states and between states with climate change into a common system. However, differences in approaches to understanding anthropogenic factors do not negate the importance of combating both overpopulations, where necessary, and harmful lifestyles, and especially economic inequality. All three factors exacerbate the climate problem, placing it among the new global challenges and threats of the 21st century.

### 3 Results

Global averaged land and ocean surface temperatures for 1990 and 1991 were similar to those of the warmest years of the 1980s and were still warmer than the rest of the observation period, according to the 1992 IPCC report [25]. These indicators seriously worried the scientific community, therefore, in the same 1992, the “Warning of world scientists to humanity” was published, in which about 1700 leading scientists of the world, including most of the Nobel Prize winners in the field of natural sciences, recognized the threat of climate change as the most serious global problem. Associated with the survival of modern civilization [26]. Of course, the appeal did not go unnoticed, therefore, the first steps to resolve this problem, the states began to take with the adoption of the UNFCCC at the Summit “Planet Earth” in 1992. However, according to the IPCC report, the mechanisms and methods of implementation used by states are insufficient and ineffective, and in 2018, an increase in the average global temperature of 1.5 °C was recorded [27].

This is due to the fact that the leaders of world economies, as well as the governments of a number of developing countries, ignore the recommendations of scientists, or even refuse interstate mechanisms altogether. Thus, the restrictions imposed on industry are criticized due to the slowdown in economic development. For example, former US

President Donald Trump, being the head of the world's first economy, withdrew from the Paris Agreement and declared that it was "unfair to the United States" [28]. Thus, he decided to help his country's oil and coal industry as part of America's first policy. This rather controversial move sparked a heated discussion, and many, for example, former President Barack Obama accused Trump of "denying the future" [29]. However, Joe Biden re-signed the agreement on the first day of his presidential term, January 20, 2021, thereby returning the United States to the Paris Agreement. UN Secretary General António Guterres gave a short comment to the media: "We hope that they [the US] will lead to significant emission reductions and become an example for other countries" [30].

The actions of former US President D. Trump and heads of other states, promoting extensive economic growth at the expense of polluting natural resources, are explained by a lack of understanding of the essence of the problem. The above-mentioned Nigerian researchers explain this by the distorted meaning of "global warming", which is often broadcast in the media. Global warming is often incorrectly associated with uniform warming of the entire world. In fact, an increase in global average temperature is causing a change in atmospheric circulation, resulting in more warming in some areas of the world and less or no warming in others. Some regions may even get cold. Accordingly, climate change is about more than just warming.

Based on this, some states are significantly affected by climate change, while others, on the contrary, live in stable climatic conditions. Robert Mendelsohn spoke out in *Climate Change and Economic Growth*, stating that "the magnitude or severity of mitigation programs [climate change] depends on the magnitude and severity of climate impacts." In other words, if the problem does not directly concern the state, the quality of implementation of climate programs and the work of mechanisms in it are extremely conditional.

Politicians postpone the modernization of production and industry on the back burner, since the transition of industry and economy to "green rails" is often accompanied by large financial costs. However, researchers Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth A. Stanton in *The Cost of Climate Change* believe that "the cost of inaction will be much higher" [31]. Thus, there is a struggle between the two approaches. Government economists, weighing costs and damages, advocate a balanced long-term climate program, while environmentalists, by contrast, advocate more radical, high-budget short-term strategies.

Politicians start from the idea that only a limited part of the state's economy is vulnerable to climate change. These are mainly industries such as: agriculture, coastal tourist areas, forestry. Therefore, even if climate change turns out to be significant, there is a limit to how much climate damage can cause to the economy.

However, this does not negate the fact that low-income developing countries, especially in the south, have a large share of their economies in agriculture and forestry. They are located in low latitudes, where any climatic fluctuations affect these sectors most seriously, therefore, climate change is a very difficult problem for them. The productivity of natural resources is declining, which is manifested in low crop yields, a decrease in timber harvesting and a shortage of water resources. This situation is also typical for Europe. A European Environment Agency report states that "at the regional and

national levels, the impacts [of climate change] can be significant, especially in southern and central Europe, where agriculture is the most important sector for employment” [32]. The conclusions of a study entitled “Exploring climate change vulnerability across sectors and scenarios using indicators of impacts and coping capacity” state that the north and west of Europe are better adapted to combined climatic and socio-economic impacts than the south and east [33]. The authors of the study “Economic Development under Climate Change” state that “the sensitivity of a country’s socio-economic system reflects the potential damage (or benefits) associated with various consequences of climate change.” And, as it turned out, the sensitivity of the developing countries of the South is extremely high [34].

Counting the cost 2019: a year of climate breakdown, UK authors report that climate change contributed to extreme weather events in 2019, resulting in at least \$ 100 billion in damage [35]. The authors of the study “Climate Change Policy” cite a number of negative changes due to the climate problem:

- Damage to the built environment, such as coastal areas, due to floods from rising sea levels;
- Risk to life and health;
- Damage to natural conditions contributing to the formation of habitats for rare species, and in general, the risk of reducing biodiversity [36].

Accordingly, the world community is puzzled by the problem of continuing to develop reliable and fair mechanisms for implementing climate policy, well-functioning communication channels for the exchange of experience and technologies, as well as finalizing interstate communication formats for top officials and representatives of business and industry to adjust the general course.

The development and transfer of technologies to support national climate change mechanisms has been an important element since countries became aware of the threat of global warming. The 1992 UN Convention states that all parties involved will cooperate in the development and transfer of technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It also urges developed country parties to take all feasible steps to encourage, facilitate and finance the transfer of, or access to, climate technologies to other States, especially developing ones. Moreover, over the years, more attention has been paid to the development and transfer of technologies related to adaptation to climate change. The Paris Agreement also addresses the development and transfer of technologies both to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Paris Agreement, in contrast to the 1992 Convention, establishes a framework for ensuring the exchange of experience and technology.

Thus, within the UN, the Climate Technology Center (CTCN) has been established, which promotes the creation of a network of national, regional, sectoral and international technology centers, networks, organizations and private sector enterprises. The UNFCCC website indicates that more than 150 countries are participating in the Center by creating The National Designated Entity (NDE), which is also part of the network. Thus, developing countries can send requests for technical assistance to the CTCN through their NDEs (see Table 1) [37].

**Table 1.** Comparative characteristics of national mechanisms for the exchange of experience and technologies

Criteria for comparison	Germany	France	Italy
National Institutions of the Climate Technology Center (CTCN)	National Designated Body under the UNFCCC [38]	French Agency for the Environment and Energy (ADEME) [39]	National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development (ENEA)
Applied technologies	Autarsys technology - containerized energy storage systems for networked and autonomous installations for small rural communities [40]	Cogen' Air technology - the first thermoelectric solar panel to produce electricity and heat [41]	Project "MED-DESIRE", aimed at the dissemination of solar energy [42]
Practical use	Communities remote from the city infrastructure are guaranteed electricity. Batteries, at the same time, are recharged from renewable energy sources, forming an independent closed cycle	The Cogen' Air solar panel generates 1000 watts of energy, which helps reduce energy costs in the residential sector	Development of technical documentation for the harmonization of certification schemes and standards. Participates in the design and construction of two 100 kW and 50 kW photovoltaic systems feeding irrigation systems using water from rivers
States that have received climate technology	Philippines, Australia, Cameroon, Cyprus	Morocco and Brazil	Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Senegal

Thus, among the three EU countries under consideration, Germany has achieved the best results so far, but the overall picture shows that France and Italy do not intend to lag behind in the fight against climate change. All three parties are concerned about the economic recovery after the pandemic, and a positive development is the commitment of governments to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the international level, countries participate in a single UN network, creating specialized bodies whose portfolios include the development of mechanisms for investment, technological and scientific cooperation with other partner countries. Of course, there is also a benefit from the entry of national enterprises into new markets, but joint projects and legal agreements also bring about the exchange of innovations, cultures and experiences.



## 4 Discussion

International conferences within the framework of the UN have been held annually since 1995. Denmark became the host country in 2009 and Copenhagen is the host country. The main theme of the conference was to agree on a framework for post-2012 climate change mitigation. The official data of the UNFCCC website states that at the time of the meeting, there were 120 heads of state and government in Denmark, as well as 10,500 delegates, 13,500 observers and about 3,000 media representatives [43]. Radoslav Dimitrov cites an interesting fact in his article “Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference”. He writes that “it took 1200 limousines and 400 helicopters” only for the transportation of high-ranking officials [44].

Despite such a high level of political attention to the problem, the conference turned out to be a failure, as the participants could not come to a consensus and present a new global project to the world. For example, the author Averchenkova A. reported in the report “The Outcomes of Copenhagen: The Negotiations and the Accord” that “even before the conference, it became clear that reaching a comprehensive agreement in Copenhagen was impossible,” since the idea of a binding document had been abandoned a month before this, at the Barcelona Round in November 2009 [45].

Experts from the International Institute for Sustainable Development have published their analytical paper “A Brief Analysis of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”. The authors attributed the failure to disagreement and reluctance to accept alternatives, so the negotiations and the resulting Copenhagen Agreement turned out to be extremely disappointing [46].

The seventeenth UN conference was held in Durban, South Africa 2 years later. The participants discussed plans for a legally binding agreement. The 21st conference was held in Paris in 2015. This event marked the signing of the Paris Agreement. The document states that the main goal is to limit the rise in global temperature to an acceptable level of 1.5 degrees Celsius. In addition, the agreement considers the issues of adaptation to climate change, financial and other support for developing countries, technology transfer, as well as analysis of damage from climate change [47].

Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which stipulates that only developed countries fulfill specific emission reduction targets, the Paris Agreement assumes that all signatory countries must act to achieve their national goals, determined by their own climate strategies, and report on progress in national reports. Thus, the only obligations are the preparation, support and reporting of national climate strategies. Unfortunately, the specific content of the obligations is not regulated by the Paris Agreement. The author of the study “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Background, Analysis, and Implications” suggested that “the US Congress, which is dominated by the Republican Party, would certainly veto any agreement that implied legally binding provisions for their country” [48].

The initial reaction to the Paris Agreement was largely positive. For example, former British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that “By making this deal, the peoples of the world have shown what unity, ambition and perseverance are capable of” [49]. However, experts noted that a huge effort will be required to bridge the gap between the ambition of the agreement and the promises [50].

The need to strengthen the fight against climate change arose when considering the analysis of global temperature indicators, informing about a negative trend and an

aggravation of global warming. The next most important meeting of the heads of state took place in the fall of 2019 in New York at the summit with the self-explanatory title: “A Race We Can Win. A Race We Must Win”. UN Secretary General António Guterres was the direct initiator. He actively encouraged countries to participate in the event. He stated: “The Climate Change Summit will serve as a stepping stone to set us on the right track.” [51] According to the official report on the last summit, the countries have taken on a number of additional obligations:

- 77 countries have pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050;
- Small Island Developing States have pledged to reform the energy sector so that by 2030 they are self-sufficient in 100% renewable electricity;
- France has pledged not to enter into trade deals with countries whose policies are contrary to the Paris Agreement [52].

The summit also presented initiatives to insure the most vulnerable people, help small farmers adapt to climate change, and support in disaster prevention. Governments and private sector representatives, as well as investors who own industrial assets, have pledged to take environmental impacts into account when making investment decisions. 130 banks, representing a third of the global banking sector, have announced that they will work to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement [53]. However, some experts and politicians were not encouraged by the results of the meeting. Thus, Andrew Steer, president and CEO of the World Resources Institute, said that “most major economies are terribly short of reaching their goals and further constraints and commitments are needed [54]. German Environment Minister Svenja Schulze admitted that her government “does not know exactly how to achieve carbon neutrality” [55].

The 26th UN Climate Conference will be held in Glasgow in November 2021. The signature on the official website reads: “in partnership with Italy” [56]. Most likely, this is due to the critical deterioration of the economy and demography of Italy during the coronavirus pandemic. The agenda for the conference predicts a discussion on supporting green and sustainable recovery that will foster sustainable growth and job creation in new industries. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said that he “intends to urge states to gradually move away from fossil fuels in favor of low-carbon energy sources, including in favor of nuclear energy” [57]. The success of the future conference depends on the willingness of the participating states to promote initiatives for a rational way out of the crisis caused by COVID-19 and making the corresponding commitments.

Thus, the analysis of the results of the most important conferences presents an ambiguous picture. Branko Milanovic wrote extremely critically: “Those who call for slower growth for environmental reasons are often the biggest contributors to environmental degradation and global warming. Imagine the hypocrisy of carbon reduction conferences that try to convince attendees to get rid of the guilt of fifteen-hour flights by paying carbon taxes—a practice reminiscent of buying indulgences—absolution from the Catholic Church”.

Indeed, state leaders set extremely ambitious goals and call for solidarity in political statements. Agreements are accepted and, it seems, the process of mitigating the effects of climate change is being established, but at the same time, the degree of threat remains at the same level. On the one hand, there is a general commitment and understanding,

on the other, there are extremely depressing real results. The pandemic has somewhat suspended human economic activity, and the new main goal of conferences, scientists and politicians is to establish it in a reasonable amount, without further aggravating the climate problem.

The UN has released a document entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, which contains 17 global economic, social and environmental goals in 2015. Based on its provisions, 13 the goal is to take urgent action to combat climate change and its consequences [58].

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reviewed the Sustainable Development Goals at the Third Forum in 2019. Goal thirteen includes the following objectives:

- Finding a balance between actions to mitigate the effects of global climate change and adaptation of the economy to mitigation mechanisms;
- Intensification of partnerships between public sectors and business representatives;
- Adopting an integrated approach that considers climatic implications and the desire for economic development;
- An attempt to consider economic inequalities in the formation of national climate strategies, due to the synergy between the fight against poverty and the fight against climate change [59].

Climate change has a detrimental effect on human health, which is why WHO has published a policy review, which contains the main intersections of the two aspects - climate and health [60]. This document reflects the organization’s vision for further steps in relation to the development of the world community and medicine in the context of global warming. Questions are raised about timely responses to health risks associated with environmental degradation. Thus, in the context of sustainable development, WHO focuses on:

- Adapting public health to climate change as an independent policy or as part of broader national policies;
- Strengthening risk mitigation policies and early warning systems and surveillance systems. Priority on preparedness for extreme weather events and outbreaks of climate-sensitive diseases;
- Development of information, tools and mechanisms to support the authorities and the public in awareness;
- Integration of health-related aspects of climate change into curricula, non-formal education and continuing professional education of staff.

Thus, the authors state the fact that climate change is understood as a change in average temperatures due to the systematic influence of human economic activity. These changes do not always affect only in favor of an increase in temperature, but vice versa, cold snaps are possible, and in some regions, climate change may have no effect at all. Various sociological approaches offer a multifaceted view of the problem of anthropogenic factors, but in most cases, these are their combinations. In this regard, there is a need for limiting specific emission indicators, as well as for high-quality information

work with the population. The mechanisms of interstate cooperation, within the framework of the annual UN climate conferences, should modify the existing system, make it as transparent and fair as possible, so that the restrictions are based on the characteristics of the economic system of each state. Monitoring and formation of national climate strategies must have supranational principles, otherwise loud words and ambitious goals will remain on paper. Financial aid should flow to developing countries along with technology, and modernization should involve an integrated approach involving education and medicine. The thirteenth goal of sustainable development, like the rest of the goals, can be achievable only with the sum of individual contributions to the common cause, therefore, it is unacceptable to remain on the sidelines.

## 5 Conclusion

Climate change remains an acute debatable problem due to different approaches to the study of the causes of this phenomenon, as well as approaches to combating it. Many people are not fully aware of the scale and severity of climate change. Climate change is referred to as global challenges and threats of the 21st century, along with international terrorism, cybersecurity, nuclear proliferation, etc. Developing countries ignore the warnings of scientists and experts, wanting to catch up with the developed ones in terms of economic indicators, forgetting about any rationality and measure. Moreover, the coronavirus pandemic turned out to be a serious test of the ambitions and statements of politicians, thanks to which states not only slowed down the economic pace, but also suffered serious demographic losses. Therefore, fears that the progress achieved will be leveled and the average annual temperature will not be stabilized are not unfounded.

More research is needed in terms of policy making. The main focus is on adaptation to climate change, but the difficulty lies in the interdisciplinary nature of the study: work on climate covers complex scientific and policy areas such as agriculture, energy supply (with a large regulatory framework in Europe and other developed countries), etc. Social aspect climatic impacts exist. Scientists know little about the impact of climate change on the most vulnerable social groups. In this context, the policy in the field of adaptation to climate change will be based not only on the economic efficiency of the analyzed measures, but also on the consideration of aspects of social justice and consideration of possible risks. The researchers expect that better integration of mechanisms at the European level will contribute to the overall achievement of climate performance. Few aspects can unite countries such as Germany, France and Italy to act as a united front due to history, competition. Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement contributed to the fact that Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly called on their allies under the agreement to accelerate efforts to combat climate change.

Reorienting the economy and part of the state apparatus towards sustainable and safe human life will require colossal funds, as well as a readiness for restrictions and alternatives. At the current stage, Germany, France and Italy have developed a rich legal climate system. Each state has a national strategy, a climate plan is constantly updated, containing a framework for practical mechanisms, as well as a set of measures for reporting, allowing researchers to assess the progress of the climate agenda. Another

issue is the ability of governments to fully translate the ideas outlined on paper, and statistics show that the pace varies considerably. The interest of Germans, French and Italians in cooperation, exchange of experience and knowledge, promotion of their own climate patents and green technologies speaks for the involvement of an increasing percentage of civil society in the fight against climate change. Thus, institutional shifts and initiatives go not only from the top down, but also from the bottom up.

The most important event - the climate conference will be held in Glasgow in 2021, at which the participating countries will define a new framework for cooperation and, possibly, adopt a new package of climate agreements. The outcome of the conference will provide an opportunity to trace the commitment of states to a common cause. Demonstrating the same urgency in the fight against climate change will be compelling, like the one that all countries are demonstrating in the fight against the coronavirus.

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# Russia's Chairmanship of the Arctic Council: Problems and Prospects

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**Abstract.** In May 2021, the chairmanship of the international forum Arctic Council has passed to the Russian Federation. This is Russia's third chairmanship since the Forum was established. Russia has successful experience of cross-boundary cooperation with other members of the AC. In 2020, the "Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035" (hereinafter S.) and "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035" (hereinafter F.) were adopted, which nowadays are the pillars of current Russia's chairmanship. With a purpose to forecast Russia's chairmanship, it is necessary to examine the features of the Its policy-making. The paper includes a timeline and key issues of the main stages of Russia's work in the AC, an evaluation of the strategic documents of the Russian Federation's policy in the North region for the next 15 years and also contains prognosis of the Russian Arctic program of the chairmanship.

**Keywords:** Arctic Council · Russia · International organizations · International relations

## 1 Introduction

The Arctic Council was managed to be a discussion forum in aim to provide collaboration in the Arctic among the member states and permanent participants. The main document of the forum - the Ottawa Declaration - determined the basis for the work and management points of the Arctic Council. Russia, Canada, USA, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Norway became members of the Arctic Council. In addition, in this international institution there is such a category as permanent participants - associations of indigenous peoples of the North, who have the right to produce their interests at meetings of the Arctic Council. Observers in the AC are non-Arctic states and international organizations [see 1]. Every two years, it is planned to rotate the presidency states, whose tasks include defining the accents in the policy of the Arctic Council and the areas in which interaction will be intensified in the next period/term.

In the speech of M.S. Gorbachev, visited Murmansk in 1987, called for widening and strengthens of the international efforts in ensuring appropriate living conditions for the habitancy of the High North. The Soviet leader's proposals were highly regarded by Canada, Norway and Finland. Preparations for a conference began in Rovaniemi,

Finnish city, the purpose of which was to bring the interests of Arctic players closer together and search for common ground for the start of Arctic cooperation.

In the short term the USSR ceased to exist, and its successor, the Russian Federation, was undergoing a financial and technological crisis. Russia did not have a well-formed policy towards the Arctic. For a long time, Russia's priorities in the Arctic were the development of shipping and the development of rich Arctic deposits. In spite of the economic situation in Russia, which could not make the protection of the Arctic environment to be a major direction of Arctic policy, large Arctic areas made Russia to obtain its place and position in the emerging Arctic Council.

The "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy", signed in 1992 and added to juridical base of the membership of Arctic states, became the starting point for the formation of the Arctic Council "as a high-level forum to provide a means of promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among Arctic states, with the involvement of Arctic indigenous peoples and other inhabitants of the Arctic on general issues of the Arctic, in particular, sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic" [2].

The subject of the research is Russia's policy in the Arctic Council since the creation of the forum on current chairmanship of Russia in the AC.

The aim of the work is to periodize Russia's policy in the AC, to identify the relationship between the content of conceptual Arctic documents of Russia and the major directions of strategy of Russia in the AC. That's why the attention in the article is paid to the analysis of following important documents: the program documents of Russian policy in the Arctic and documents of the Arctic Council. The theoretical basis of the study is the neorealist paradigm of international relations, according to which the state, based on its national interests, pursues an independent policy, and international institutions are an auxiliary tool for achieving goals. The methodology of the study is based on case study and cross-methods studies and the institutional approach in which different periods of interaction between Russia and the Arctic Council are explored.

When the bipolar system of international relations collapsed, a wide range of domestic and foreign literature is focused on the study of cross-boundary partnership in the High North and the AC, the interaction of its state members, observers and indigenous people within this forum. The importance the resource capacity for the Arctic security in the 1980s was investigated by K. Archer [3], H. Bergesen, A. Moe and V. Estreng [4]. Modern foreign studies of the Arctic by O. Young [5], E. Hurell [6], M. Tennberg [7], T. Koivurova [8], R. Hubert [9] are concentrated on the efforts of Working Groups, the role environmental agenda in international arena.

The key outcome of Russian scientific research in the field of sustainable development and environmental issues in the North region, the features of state politics in this area are the research of A.V. Zagorsky [10], D.A. Shirina [11], N.K. Kharlampieva [12], the structure of Russian policy-making the Arctic, national concerns and their strategic orientation are included in the research of V.N. Konyshov and A.A. Sergunin [13]. The chairmanships in the Arctic Council and RF-strategy in the AC are presented in the articles of V.P. Zhuravel [14], V. D. Kamanin [15], D. N. Voronchikhina [16], B. Kh. Krasnopolskiy [17], V.V. Gogoleva [18], V.N. Snetkov [19], D.A. Mokhorov [19], A.V. Sboychakova [20], E. Dolzhenkova [21].

## **2 Russia in the Arctic Council and the First Chairmanship of Russia (2004–2006)**

Until 2004, Russia did not pursue an active policy in the AC: it took little part in the AC projects, practically did not finance the activities of the forum, the delegations sent to the AC meetings were comparatively small in number. However, at that time Russia did not have a special Arctic strategy, and the AC itself was in its infancy. The first significant activity of Russia was during its first chairmanship in the AC.

The first chairmanship of Russia in the AC was on the least active period of the forum. Despite this fact, the overall improvement in relations with Western partners in the AC, caused by overcoming the legacy of the Cold War, was reflected in the Arctic. New projects appear, more and more points of interests emerge. Together with the chairmanship of Russia in the AC, it also took over the chairmanship of the “Sustainable Development Working Group”, therefore the main program document of the chairmanship 2004–2006 was the realization of the plan of sustainable development of the Arctic. Russian chairmanship includes other work items, such as the development of sea and air navigation in the Arctic. Among the social projects were measures aimed at protecting the well-being of the indigenous peoples and other citizens of the North, the development of social infrastructure, scientific and educational cooperation [22].

The projects that Russia initiated in the Arctic Council at the time were focused on solving internal problems - economic support, elimination of pollution in Russia's Arctic area. Also, the focus was concentrated on the emerging cooperation on search and rescue in the Arctic [23].

During the years of Russia's first chairmanship, the amount of the Russian delegation at the Arctic Council increases and becomes comparable to the most represented - the Canadian and American delegations [16, p. 309]. Chairmanship in the AC influenced the development of a common Russian strategy in the High North, and the implementation of the “F” in 2008.

“Arctic Climate Impact Assessment” (ACIA) was published in 2005, It had been prepared for 4 years. It was remembered as a shift in Arctic environmental science and enlightenment of the first decade of 2000-s. When the ACIA saw the light, in general, and the Arctic Council mainly, interest from the international community has increased, more states have applied to become observers at the AC. This report meant a significant stage in the intensification of cooperation with the AC.

In 2006, the final meeting of ministers took place in Salekhard which was important for the Russian chairmanship and where the most discussed topic, naturally, was adaptation to climate change. They also discussed issues of preserving marine flora and fauna, preventing land pollution and reducing airborne anthropogenic pollution. The topic of increasing the institutional efficiency of the Arctic Council was as well raised at this meeting. The Salekhard Declaration pointed out the problems with sufficient funding for the Arctic Council. In Salekhard it was emphasized that it is essential to comply with the earlier decision to launch the The Arctic Council Project Support Tool [24].

### 3 Russia and the Arctic Council (2006–2021)

Despite the rapid increase of Russia's work in the AC in 2004–2006, it was after the end of its presidency that ministerial meetings in the Arctic Council were suspended for a time. In a political sense, the reasons for the inactivity of AC's work can be called two important international events that took place in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, a Russian expedition to the North Pole was undertaken. The main purpose of this action was to prove that Russia owns two strategically important territories. The Russian expedition was unenthusiastically assessed even by the other littoral countries of the Arctic [25]. Perhaps the main reason for a meeting in Illulisat in 2008 of the so-called "Arctic Five" was smoothing of possible sharp contradictions. The other countries of the AC were not invited to this meeting, and the declaration adopted at the end of the meeting contained justification for the exclusive rights of the Arctic Five to the Arctic water area – "a unique opportunity... to use the capabilities of the Arctic Ocean" [26]. This could not but cause a negative reaction from Finland, Sweden, and Iceland, which do not have access to Arctic waters, but are members of the Arctic Council. On the other hand, this step of the five Arctic states can also be viewed as a preventive measure against the growing pressure from non-Arctic participants [27].

However, the AC events were resumed only in 2009 in Tromsø, where "Arctic Ocean Review" (AOR) was formed. It was a step to change the status of international database of the Arctic Ocean.

The "Agreement on Cooperation in Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic" between Arctic States was adopted with the mediation of the AC in 2011, but Russia actively worked and encouraged this document. Russia also launched two High-level meetings - gathering of states of AC in Salekhard (2013) and the Forum "Arctic - the territory of dialogue" [28].

Another tension between Russia and the rest AC states could have been caused by the action of Greenpeace on the Prirazlomnaya platform [29] and the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, although it was largely thanks to the AC that the tension was overcome [30].

In April 2014, due to Canadian-Russian dispute concerning the North Pole, [27] Canada boycotted a meeting of one of the AC target groups which was held in Moscow.

The crisis in Syria, EU sanctions against Russia (which were supported by Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and the United States), disagreements between Russia and countries, fears of a loss of stability in the High North were not confirmed. Moreover, during the Canadian chairmanship, preparation of the third legally binding agreement of the AC started successfully - on strengthening scientific cooperation (signed during the US chairmanship, moreover, Russia together with the United States led the corresponding target group). It happened even despite the absence of the Russian Foreign Minister at the meeting in Iqaluit. Russia has funded the Project Support Tool, has taken several environmental initiatives, in particular, the national report on soot and methane emissions.

During the US chairmanship, despite the deterioration of bilateral relations, Russian policy in the AC continued, it focused on environmental issues.

Russia was one of the main creators of the International Polar Code (2014), which was adopted with help of NPP marine environment protection program. The Russian Federation continued to participate in projects to reject impurities of the Arctic, led a

project on risk assessment and development of emergency actions in Arctic conditions (“Rescue operations in the Arctic”).

Under the term of Finland chairmanship, Russia hosted the conference in St. Petersburg, “The reality of the ethnic group: the role of education in the preservation and development of languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation”, run on 23 November 2017 [14, p. 312]. This event was fully consistent with the spirit of the Finnish chairmanship of the AC, the main focus of which was scientific cooperation. 2017 became The Year of Environment in Russia, therefore, some of the AC initiatives in the Russian Arctic were intensified. However, Russia did not succeed in the issue of “resuming meetings of the chiefs of general staff of the Armed Forces of the states of the “Arctic Eight” [15, p. 139]. This precedent is an indicator of tension in relations between Russia and its partners in the AC, and, possibly, an indicator of unwillingness to solve security problems in the Arctic together.

In 2019, the chairmanship of the AC was passed to Iceland, which declared one of its priorities the cleaning of the Arctic Sea coast from plastic materials. The interests of Russia and Iceland in the Arctic overlap in many respects on issues of fishing and cleaning up Arctic coastal areas. Russia currently leads and takes an active part in the projects of the “Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks”, a long-term program to establish a common Arctic observing system for social purposes, the Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative, the project, aimed at preserving populations of migratory birds in the Arctic.

#### **4 Russian Chairmanship Program 2021–2023: Features of Formation and Possible Points**

In 2020 Russian President signed a decree about the key initiatives, goals and methods for establishing of the “State policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone” [31] which may become the basis for the preparation of the program of the Russian AC chairmanship in 2021–2023.

The “F.” does not indicate the limits of the periods of finishing with decisions of specific problems. The complicated and unfinished research of Arctic environment and the effects of global warming should give impetus to the Russian authorities in their search for the environmental-saving technologies needed when launching major economic projects to develop the Arctic region.

The “F.” does not mention the development zones proposed earlier by the State Commission for Arctic Development. According to Zhuravel V.P., Head of the Centre for Arctic Studies of the European Academy of Sciences: “...there is a danger that the status of the ASRF Arctic territories will be determined in the near future in terms of the significance of the projects to be implemented there, as well as the point development of the Arctic. Only Kola and Yamal-Nenets support zones are being developed” [32; P.6].

Another feature of the “F.” is the lack of direct mention of the need to develop and increase transit traffic in the Arctic Ocean. This was one of the key points in Russian Arctic policy.

The “F.” does not mentioned allies of the Russian Federation on the Eurasian Economic Council as a wished part of transboundary partnership. There is no allusion of contemporary threats to the Arctic security.

The “S.”, adopted in October 2020, is the second important document for understanding Russia’s policy in the High North.

The “S.” maintains a global vector for the continued development of the Arctic. However, such issues like the direction of shipbuilding or the list of threats have increased significantly compared to the earlier editions of the paper [33].

Point out that for Russia the Arctic remains a large hydrocarbon reservoir: “The Arctic Zone provides production of more than 80% of natural gas and 17% of oil (including gas condensate) in the Russian Federation”, “The continental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic is estimated by experts to contain more than 85.1 trillion cubes. Meters of fuel natural gas, 17,3 billion tons of oil (including gas condensate) and is a strategic reserve for development of mineral-raw base of the Russian Federation” [34].

The “S.” (unlike the “F”) mentions the moment of “the Northern Sea Route”, the functional importance of which will only increase in the future as a result of global climate shift and human-induced impacts [35].

Among the main dangers, challenges and threats that pose risks to the progression of the Arctic as whole and Russian national security as the part, stated: intensive climate warming in the Arctic; population decline; and lagging indicators, comparing the level of life in the AZRF and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation; the low level of access to quality social services and decent housing in settlements located in remote areas; high level of occupational risk; lack of state support system for the delivery of fuel, food and other essential goods to remote settlements; low level of transport infrastructure.

In this regard, the emphasis is made on human wellness and prospects of the High North: the modernization of primary health care, the provision of vehicles and aircraft to primary health-care organizations, the development of high-tech medical care, etc. [34].

Special mention is made of the need for state financing for the building of Arctic ice-class cruise ships in Russia and for the rising of touristic attraction as well as importance of science for the modernization of the Nigh North.

In these circumstances, the forthcoming Russian chairmanship of the Arctic Council, which will begin in 2021 (in May) and last for two years, assumes particular importance. During Russian chairmanship, particular attention will be paid to the balanced promotion of sustainable development, with an emphasis on the socio-economic dimension, taking into account the proposals of the regions. According to the statement of the Russian Ambassador for Special Assignments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs N. Korchunov in April 2019: “Regional support and initiatives by regional organizations are particularly important to us, especially to promote those projects that would be competitive and useful to partners of other Arctic States” [36].

Agreement on preparations for the Russian Federation chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021–2023 was also initiated at a high state level. Thus, in November 2020, according to President Decree, a committee was organized to prepare and ensure the Russian chairmanship. In February 2021, the concept of the Russian chairmanship was included in the agenda of its first meeting, held under the control of Mr. Trutnev.

The future chairmanship was suggested as focused on the AC mainstreaming, and the protection of Russian national interests according to the “F.” and the “S.” [37].

It is also worth mentioning the outcome of the joint press conference at the conclusion of the talks between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Lavrov, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, A. Linde, Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, where the issue of the AC Russian chairmanship was also raised. According to S. Lavrov: “One of the key themes will be the climate agenda. The second priority, which will be developed under the Russian chairmanship, is related to Arctic shipping. Also, there are plans of the council to strengthen the social and economic agenda. In addition, there are plans to propose a number of new mechanisms for mutually beneficial economic cooperation in the Arctic” [38].

It is fair to say that the active momentum for studying current issues of transregional partnership in the development and exploitation of the Arctic goes to 2019. The direction of Russia's Arctic politics was highly discussed at the relevant Russian events.

The international scientific and political talking of Arctic agenda took place in Moscow, at the IV International Conference “Arctic: Offshore Projects and Sustainable Development of Regions” (February). On April 9 and 10 in Saint Petersburg the next V high-level meeting “Arctic - the territory of dialogue?” was held. On April 17–18, 2019, in Saint Petersburg Polytechnic University of Peter the Great the IV International Scientific Conference “Arctic: History and Modernity” took place. In the spring of 2021, NArFU hosted an international week of Arctic science, whose participants represented 29 states. The Northern Forum on Sustainable Development was also international and held in Yakutsk in September, 2020 [40, pp. 115–117].

This busy schedule of international scientific events in Russia demonstrates the high level of interest of the State in developing and mastering policymaking for the High North.

## 5 Conclusion

The challenges of the Arctic development are being studied in more detail, considering the specific features of the law of the AC members. The focus of attention is still on the problems of shelf development, environmental issues, security and cross regional partnership.

Nevertheless, it should be noticed: the scientific events on Arctic topics and the analysis of their activities made input into the development of the “F.”. The issues discussed at international conferences on the Arctic can serve as a basis for developing a program for the Russian Federation's AC chairmanship of 2021–2023.

The study of Russian policy in the AC, interaction with other Arctic states makes it possible to assume that during its chairmanship in the AC Russia will concentrate on issues of cleaning the geographically Russian parts of the Arctic from products of anthropogenic pollution, will pay attention to international scientific cooperation in the Arctic, however, it will not abandon its main national interests - the development of the new patterns of shipping. Consequently, projects that will attract Russia to the nuclear power plant will be centered around maritime search and rescue, the exchange of experience in emergency situations in the Arctic waters.

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# Political-Geographical Determinants of International Cooperation in the Development of International Transport Corridors (NSR)

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**Abstract.** This paper is dedicated to the study of the political-geographical determinants of international cooperation in the evolution of international transport corridors, specifically the Northern Sea Route (NSR). To achieve this goal, the paper analyzes the measures taken earlier for the growth of the NSR, the current geopolitical situation in the Arctic region of Russia, and the projections for the growth of the NSR in connection with recent events.

**Keywords:** Northern Sea Route · International transport corridor · Arctic · International cooperation · Geography

## 1 International Transport Corridors

Maritime transport communications throughout the world's history and to this day are significant geopolitical and geo-economic resources. International transport corridors are an essential element of the economic and political efficiency of any State. Their development consists not only of physical expansion but also in the qualitative growth of the means of transportation used in the system. This condition is necessary for complete satisfaction with the requirements in the field of transportation. The degree of advancement of international transport corridors depends upon the cost of transportation, speed and reliability.

The authors of publications about the Arctic, V. Y. Gumelev, V. V. Elistratov and A. N. Ragozin refer to geopolitics as the means to achieve world domination by use of power to support global hegemony [7]. A more objective interpretation is offered in his work by I. Y. Okunev, along with other authors, who consider it as a spatial paradigm of international relations, which within its framework are “analysed through the prism of the structure of the global world space” [15]. A well-known example of such a division is the geopolitical concept of Mackinder, dividing the world's spaces into civilizations of the sea and land [11]. In such a system, Russia is defined as a land power that opposes maritime states such as the United States and Great Britain [11]. Mackinder also predicted that the Soviet Union would become the world's greatest land power if it defeated Germany in WWII [12]. In 1944, U.S. Ambassador John Winant

praised Mackinder for his prescience as “the first who fully enlisted geography as an aid to statecraft” [22]. However, Russia cannot be said to be an exclusively land power.

I.M. Mogilevkin writes that “the Arctic deserves attention in the general context of the development of world communications...” and there are authors who call it “the region of the XXI century”, which, in turn, actualizes the global role of the NSR, whose geopolitical significance increases as a result of the globalization (political, economic, environmental) transformations of the modern world [14]. A similar sceptical opinion about the NSR is expressed by the author of the journal “Expert” A. Gorokhova, who claims that this sea route is not more profitable than the Suez Canal and cannot serve as its northern alternative [4]. The increased technical requirements for ships and other factors, such as icebreaker requirements, could lead to an appreciation in the cost of cargo transportation due to the complex natural conditions of the Arctic. The author also considers the position on the national status of the NSR to be ambiguous, which is currently being disputed by the United States through its Freedom of Navigation program and China, whose iron ore supplies made up the bulk of international cargo transit through the NSR [4]. Despite all the opposing opinions of various researchers, global warming indicates that the Northern Sea Route is an important element of geopolitics not only within the framework of countries with littoral rights to use the Arctic but also for other states interested in global development. The modernisation of Russia’s infrastructure network, enhancement of cohesiveness and integration of the vast country and its opening to global markets are the main goals set for the development of the NSR as an internationally viable transport passage.

## **2 The History of the NSR’S Evolution into a Global Transport Corridor**

Russia’s activities in the transformation of the NSR as an international transport corridor have been primarily related to the internal situation in Russia, both political and socio-economic. The stipulations for the development of navigation in Arctic waters were started in 1991. Accordingly, regulations were approved for controlling navigation along the NSR. In the 1990s, the first foreign vessel sailed along the NSR, which opened the way for large-scale transportation by international shipping in the 21st century [8].

The continuing interest in the NSR international transport corridor is explained by the large number of minerals hidden in the Arctic. Thus, the Russian Arctic territories have immense gas and oil deposits, which constitute a significant part of the world’s energy resources. The geographical location of these resources greatly simplifies the subsequent sale of energy resources. However, this is interlinked with the qualitative development of the NSR as an international shipping route. Analogous to the growth of international transport corridors, augmentation of the NSR could result in positive outcomes, namely economic growth, generation of jobs, reduction of poverty, equity in economic development along the regions associated with the NSR [16] and economic resilience of Russia notwithstanding sanctions. However, because of the impact of political geography, this is likely to have positive spin-offs not only for Russia but also for the countries of North-East Asia, Japan, South Korea and China who are greatly interested

in the growth of the NSR [17]. This is also likely to positively affect Nordic countries if they take part in the expansion of the NSR.

The operation of the NSR as a national transport route is a vital instrument that will assist the development of sea routes and the Arctic fleet. Progress in this area is likely to be governed on the principles of international political and economic cooperation since success is possible only after global recognition of the economic viability and safety of the NSR.

The Russian Central Marine Research and Design Institute (CNIIMF), the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen Institute and the Japanese Ship and Ocean Foundation cooperated from 1993–1998 in the execution of the International Northern Sea Route program (INSROP), which was aimed at implementing the following goals:

- calculation of the economic efficiency of exploitation of the NSR;
- comparative analysis of this international transport corridor and other options;
- studies of possible environmental consequences of the use of Arctic waters for transport and shipping purposes [8].

This research remains one of the most comprehensive research works related to the NSR to this day. Thus, specialists from more than 15 countries took part in it. As a result of the work, the possibility of using the Arctic transport corridor without causing significant damage to the Arctic environment was established. Consequently, the feasibility of using the Northern Sea Route as a corridor between the European and Asian-Pacific centres was validated [8].

Based upon the evaluation by researchers, it was predicted that the volume of cargo transported along the NSR could grow significantly. The savings accrued in distance along the NSR and the technical limitations of alternative routes, such as the Suez Canal, aided this prognosis. It is worth noting that in support of the existing viewpoints of experts in 1995, a research scientific and commercial expedition was implemented, during which the temporary efficiency of the Arctic route was revealed (a reduction of 15 days) and economic benefits (\$500 thousand per transit) [8].

The next important step in the evolution of the NSR as a wide-reaching shipping route was made in 1997–1998, and it was called the ARCDEV international project. The essence of this project was to launch an experimental deployment of two tankers - a Russian and a Finnish one, to export gas condensate from the Gulf of Ob and the Yamal Peninsula to the European market. Many organizations, both state and commercial, were involved in project execution. 19,950 tons of gas condensate was exported from the Arctic to Rotterdam during project realisation. In addition, throughout the entire route of the tankers, information was collected and processed about the ice cover during navigation in the Gulf of Ob and along the NSR [3].

The implementation of the international ARCDEV project revealed some important results:

the level of technical equipment of the Russian Federation allows for high-quality and efficient transportation all along the Northern Sea Route;  
only category LU7 tankers of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping could be exploited for shipping along the NSR;

The Azipod rotary steering system needs additional research, as well as some adjustments, considering the need to work in heavy Arctic ice [3].

However, the most important result of the ARCDEV international project was to confirm the hypothesis that the NSR is the most economically beneficial and environmentally attractive way to extract the natural resources available in the Arctic. In general, the successful implementation of the ARCDEV project showed that the NSR today is the only cheap and most environmentally safe way to transport the energy resources of the Russian Arctic [3].

The later phase in the evolution of the NSR as an international transport corridor was the international project ARCOP, implemented in 2005. This project was part of the EU program “Competitive and sustainable development” and consisted of the development of a reliable system for the transportation of natural resources from the Russian Arctic [13].

The project established the following conclusions:

- improvement of the system for collecting data on climatic conditions in the Arctic and their subsequent assessment in order to select the most suitable route in specific conditions;
- analysis of the regulatory and statutory structure of transportation via the NSR, both within the state and internationally;
- development of the existing system of influence exerted on the environment when utilising the NSR;
- development of an integrated environmental risk management system;
- practical testing of existing theories in the field of implementation of international transport corridors in the Arctic;
- building a system of cooperation between various representatives in the field of advancement of the NSR (scientists, engineers, authorities);
- developing a reliable transport system for Arctic oil and gas transportation [26].

The results were of great practical importance and have been since used in the export of gas and oil from the Russian Arctic.

In 1998, the first International Eurasian Conference was held in St. Petersburg, during which Russia declared the need to assign the status of an independent Eurasian transport corridor to the Northern Sea Route. The partakers of the conference supported this proposal. The Government of the Russian Federation No. 2188-R dated 09.12.2001 approved the federal program “Modernization of the transport system of Russia”, in which the Northern Sea Route was defined as an international transport corridor [20]. The state was assigned the responsibility of being the initiator in the growth of the Arctic international transport corridor.

However, for a better understanding, it is essential to analyze the characteristics of the growth of the NSR.

Russia released an updated strategy for the Russian Arctic and National Security in October 2020, which included a renewed focus on social and economic development, science, technology, the establishment of infrastructure, the environment and security [18]. The growth of the NSR is also part of the state policy of a number of countries, some of which do not even have direct access to it.

- (1) The fragile Arctic ecosystem, which may have a possible influence on worldwide climatic trends should be protected by special laws during the process of expansion of the NSR. However, there are international laws, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Polar Code which are already in force. In this regard, it is important to achieve consistency in the status of individual Arctic areas, for example, the Bering Strait.
- (2) Currently, Arctic waters are not affected by piracy. However, its likelihood in the future cannot be ruled out. This could be exacerbated by the climatic features of the region. In this regard, the following areas of improving the safety of the Northern Sea Route were identified:

development of a forecast of various types of cargo transportation both in the short and long term;

comprehensive high-frequency communications coverage;

development of the icebreaker fleet;

expansion of powers available to the Federal Security Bureau (FSB);

possibility of having a special rescue team on merchant shipping transiting the route due to the inadequacy of rescue assets and the time taken to render assistance.

- (3) The assimilation of the NSR into the world shipping routes is an important task to be achieved. The lessons learnt from the evolution of other major international shipping routes could be factored into the policy and planning process. The future role of Russia in the global economic system depends on how effectively this task will be implemented.
- (4) It is necessary to make material and technical improvements to the vessels in order to ensure continuous delivery of goods. In this regard, it is important to work on improving the ice-breaking technology and building the optimal route in each specific time period, which will reduce the time of cargo transportation by 40% and thereby increase economic efficiency.

### **3 The Current Status of the NSR and the Influence of Geopolitics**

A number of Russian scientists and those involved in government, maritime and other related organisations believe that it is in Russia's strategic interest to develop the NSR. The goal is the rapid progress of the Russian Arctic to achieve economic development and social stability. The position of Russia in the Arctic is beneficial both from geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, and this buttresses the proponents of this viewpoint. In addition, the Russian history of the development of the Arctic and the use of the Northern Sea Route dates back to 1915, which allowed Russia to create the most impressive icebreaking fleet, which includes 49 ships. For comparison, the second country in terms of the number of ships, Finland, has only 12. The technical development of Russia is also manifested in a more advanced transport and logistics system and emergency rescue technologies. The growth of the Northern Sea Route in Russia over a prolonged period of time has allowed the formation of a high-quality political and managerial apparatus,

while other Arctic countries have just begun to implement the same. These are the reasons for the preeminent status image of Russia as the leading Arctic power and pioneer the progress of the NSR.

Therefore, it could be stated that the evolution of the NSR has many possible scenarios that could have different consequences for Russia in the region. For the best result, it is important to reflect on the adequacy of provisions of the Polar Code promulgated by the International Maritime Organisation to improve safety in the use of sea routes in the polar regions. Secondly, Russia needs to take the initiative for international collaboration in the Arctic through its current chairmanship of the Arctic Council. The last comprehensive Arctic shipping assessment of the Arctic Council was carried out in 2009, and a progress report was made in 2015 [1]. In light of the rapid development of the NSR and progressive increase in shipping, it is essential that a fresh assessment be carried out. In addition, with the support of the Arctic Council, it may be beneficial to create a Murmansk-based International Committee of experts to advise on the evolution of the NSR. This step may allow the laying of the foundation for Murmansk to be the hub of the NSR in Russia's endeavour to make it an international transport corridor.

Another important initiative could be the creation of an organisation of Arctic countries interested in the NSR. This could be akin to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China and its Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The purpose could be to create a joint framework for the progress of the NSR by harnessing common resources. In our opinion, a program such as a 21st century INSROP could leverage the intellectual resources of like minded countries and result in optimal development of the NSR in a quicker timeframe. All these proposed measures may cement Russia's status as an Arctic leader and make international cooperation in the expansion of this transport corridor more effective.

The updated "Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation" was promulgated in 2015 [19]. The goals enunciated included a transport management system, provision of ice-breakers and authorization for all shipping, including foreign vessels [19].


The main challenge in the progress of the NSR is presently the tense geopolitical situation in the Arctic due to the desire of various states to control resources and transport routes in the region. The events in the Arctic are influenced by frequent military exercises of both NATO and Russia. There have been forward deployments 100 nautical miles from the Russian coast and basing by NATO forces such as the B2 stealth bombers in Iceland, despite the defensive military strategy adopted by Russia [21]. Due to Western sanctions post-2014, Russia's growth has slowed, and it needs financial assistance and technologies to implement its Arctic strategy since many experts consider the current budgetary allocation insufficient [9, 21].

The main players in the Arctic are Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, who came together in 1996 to form the Arctic Council. Five of them (the Russian Federation, the USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway) have their own coastal and island territories in the Arctic, among which Russia has the longest coastline. Most of these states have put forth legal claims regarding the extended continental shelf, and there is no indication that any of them will not accept the rulings of the United Nations Commission on the limitations of the extended continental shelf [2, 23]. As far as the control of the NSR is concerned, both Russia and Canada have similar rules, and except for the USA, itself not a signatory to UNCLOS, no government has



openly objected to the same [10, 24]. The remaining three (Finland, Iceland, Sweden) are sub-Arctic states without access to the Arctic Ocean. They seek to increase their status in the region. In addition, as many authors write, such non-regional entities as China, India, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, a number of EU member states and others are currently also showing interest in the Arctic through various activities [6]. For instance, other than the Yamal energy projects, Russia and China have signed MoUs for the development of the NSR, but these have not fructified because of differences in opinion regarding China's role in the governance of the Arctic [25], acceptance of its legal regime for the NSR and control of infrastructure assets built as a result of joint ventures [9, 21, 26, 27].

Following the spatial logic, the general hierarchy of international actors operating in the Arctic and, interested in controlling the NSR can be represented as in Fig. 1.



**Fig. 1.** Hierarchy of government actors in the Arctic and their geo-political influence on the potential of the NSR

## 4 Conclusion

The development of the NSR is considered a technological measure to support Russia's Eurasian character and enhance its influence on world geopolitical developments. The involvement and cooperation of various countries in the growth of the NSR so far is a result of the implementation of government and organisational policies. Russia could further harness this and initiate specific measures in international cooperation with interested countries to give an impetus to the evolution of the NSR.

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# Making of a New Petro-State in the Middle East? Fossil Fueled Kurdistan Regional Government

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**Abstract.** The emergence of a Kurdish political entity in the north of Iraq can be dated back to the aftermath of First Gulf War. When the coalition forces stopped short of destroying Saddam’s War machine in 1991, the Iraqi Army advanced north to crush the Kurdish rebels. A coalition force led by US declared a “no-fly zone” on the north of 36th parallel in order to create a safe haven for the Kurds. Second Gulf War further consolidated Kurdish autonomy in the region following the melt down of central Iraqi government while the peshmerga forces advanced south to control the abundant oil resources of Kirkuk province that has been contested by Baghdad and the Kurds for decades. Control of those underground resources enabled the Kurdish entity to pursue a more independent policy as well as providing financial resources for centralization of political power. The disputes with Baghdad government still are not over but a petro-state seems to be taking shape despite those political uncertainties. This new political entity shares many similar traits with other states in the region that rely on rents from fossil fuels. Underlying economic conditions are an important determinant of the political system of Erbil government.

**Keywords:** Petro-state · Rentier State · Resource Wars · Kurdistan Regional Government · Resource Nationalism

## 1 Introduction

The political map of the modern Middle East was drawn by the victorious powers of World War I, Britain and partially France with Sykes-Picot Treaty and San Remo Conference. Discovery of oil resources in the Mesopotamia as well as political and commercial significance of Levant region motivated both powers to be persistent in their quest to dominate the Middle East after the Great War. Resistance from local players was overcome by force and co-optation, particularly in Iraq and Syria, while great power rivalry intensified in this colonial period.

The Iraqi Petroleum Company, that had the concession of oil resources in Mesopotamia accepted that American giants would also hold stakes in the Company after intense negotiations [1]. Yet, not until the end of the Second World War, the underground resources of the Middle East start to shape the political economy of regional

players. The oil resources in Saudi Arabia were not discovered until 1930s and Middle Eastern resources were not at the epicenter of global oil supply until the second half of 20th century. The expansion of consumer capitalism in this period caused a surge in energy demand that could only be satisfied with the inclusion of vast supply capabilities of the region. Increasing demand for oil and other industrial inputs coincided with the wave of decolonization in all over the globe, triggering resource nationalism that would eventually push international companies to the sidelines and bring local control over underground resources [2]. As oil prices boomed after 1970s and nation-states increased their share of total income at the expense of multinational companies a new form of a rentier state started to take shape in the region, that is the petro-states. Relying on a few insignificant commodities and foreign help for decades, Middle Eastern states now enjoyed a splurge of oil rents to finance their somehow extravagant expenditures.

After the World War I, Mesopotamia was among the primary targets of Western powers thanks to its proven oil reserves [3]. The state of Iraq was established by merging the oil rich Basra, Baghdad and Mosul vilayets, yet indirect foreign control on the country continued well into the second half of the 20th century. The nationalist backlash against domination by the British did not bring any tangible results until 1958 Revolution [4] while utilization of oil resources was the main source of discontent against Western control. The resource nationalism of the period finally bore fruit in 1972 when Iraqi government nationalized the assets of Iraqi Petroleum Company. Almost simultaneously, the oil embargo started by OPEC resulted in an unprecedented hike in prices and consequentially brought enormous flows of cash into Baghdad's treasury. While, within a decade, Iraq became one of the exemplary cases of rentier states only to be stopped by continuous warfare and political instability.

In this time frame, Kurds in the north looked for opportunities to establish their independence or an autonomous region at worst. The oil resources of the region could be sufficient to finance a Kurdish entity, yet hostility from almost all regional players, Iraq, Iran, Syrian and Turkey to an independent Kurdistan hampered such a prospect. A Cold War balance of power that favored the status quo was not conducive to remaking of the maps in the Middle East. Only after two US interventions in Iraq in 1991 and in 2003 Baghdad lost control over the north of their country, a region largely inhabited by Kurdish minority. As the disintegration of Iraq and Syria continues, it would not only be how the local and global players' demands that will determine the fate of the region but also whether underground resource rents will make it feasible the establishment of a Kurdish political entity.

## 2 Petro-States in the Middle East

Rentier states are those states that derive their income from the surplus obtained by exploitation of resources rather taxation of national economic activity. The state revenues do not rely on the value added created by citizens but on a steady and sustainable source of income is generated from ownership of specific assets [5]. These rents may also be tributes paid by foreign individuals, fees collected on trans-passage of vehicles, royalties paid in exchange for exhaustible sources. In rentier states, the administration does not need the contribution of citizens to fill the state coffers meaning that a general "taxes for representation" mentality is lacking [6].

Petro-states are forms of rentier states on which the income accumulated in the coffers of the state depend upon underground oil resources [7]. Therefore petro-states can, most of the time exhibit characteristics of authoritarian regimes. It is not only the fact that the regime does not need taxing its citizens to raise revenues that eventually lead to a dependence relationship between the state and the society. The state can also buy the loyalty of its citizens by subsidizing goods or by way of making transfer to loyalist groups in order to establish a clientalist relationship. Buying the consent of the population is a strategy that rentier states can afford provided that the stream of income is substantial and sustainable in the long run. Finally, the oil income may also be used to finance a police state that will oversee suppressing opposition and dissenting voices. This police state can be financed thanks to the cash flow made possible by the extraction and sale of underground resources.

Although those mechanisms may bolster adverse effects of corrupt and authoritarian system, it is also a fact that there are also resource rich nations with well-functioning democracies. In the case of states that have previously established democratic institutions and have a strong and stable culture of tolerance, oil income may not be an obstacle to political development [8] yet for the rest oil may be a curse rather than a blessing in terms of political development.

Nevertheless, even for the developed states the distribution of oil income may be a continuous struggle. For the modern autocratic regimes, oil-led spending sprees may be used to cover troubles and freeze democratic development. Petro-states are strong, in terms of redistributive functions and funding a security apparatus and especially in times of booms in oil prices. On the other hand, they are weak in terms of representation function, a modern welfare state and especially in times of low oil prices [9]. These diverging effects may on the one side bring stability although in an authoritarian fashion or may escalate competition for rents inducing rival groups to undermine the political consensus [10]. However, even though low prices may lead to political turmoil, the durability and persistence of the regime seems to be positively linked with the presence of resource income [11]. So, even if oil income is not necessarily very reliable and price fluctuations may also cause political turbulence, eventually it creates a solid economic base for regime survival.

While the importance of oil was already evident for military and economic purposes since the beginning of 20th century, North America continued to be the epicenter of world supply until the end of World War II [12]. In the second half of the century Middle East rapidly climbed to the top position as the supplier of fossil fuels and the many countries of the region started to display characteristics of a petro-state. Prior to the oil glut's effects, Middle Eastern states were mostly pre-modern politics entities with almost no basic framework for the functioning of a proper capitalist economy. Oil was already becoming an important commodity for countries like Iran, but the sector was mostly isolated from other segments of the economy failing to provide a positive take-off effect. Similarly, countries like Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia failed to transform their underground riches to a mechanism to finance their development until the end of World War II. One of the major reasons behind this problem was international oil companies' dominance in the energy markets [13] and their greed that kept most of the surplus away from hosting nations that needed it heavily. The dominance of cartel companies in the oil

business was the main motive behind increasing resource nationalism of those countries reaching new heights in the second half of 20th century [14]. Not only in the Middle East but also in Latin America oil producing countries started to renegotiate their concession terms in order to increase their revenues.

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, OPEC embargo successfully boosted oil prices to record high levels while at the same time the control over markets were handed over to oil producer states rather than international companies [15]. Oil producing countries one by one nationalized the foreign companies in the energy sector pushing them to the marketing and sales end of the sector. After decades long bitter conflict, post-colonial states of the Middle East finally found the income to be able to defy poverty as well as the domination by the West.

Yet, being a form of a rentier state, most of those political entities failed to avoid the shortcomings of petro-populist authoritarian states. The presence of oil was a resource curse [16] for those relatively underdeveloped states, rather than a blessing in terms of their political and social development. The relation between the civil society and the state was weak for the latter depended on the rents of underground resources for its finances rather than the thrift of its citizens. The state could extract enough funds from sale of oil resources with only participation of a small fraction of its population to the political processes. The rest of the citizens had no role to play in this relationship that the rulers established with the markets, so the only problem was to keep the population content and quiet in this process.

The people were also subdued under repressive mechanisms or succumbed to cheap populist policies [17] and rhetoric. For those petro-states, Western style democracies seemed to be a far away. One can also claim that the political culture of the Middle Eastern states was not conducive for a liberal democracy yet at the same time the economic structure was not providing much of an incentive to a pluralist system. While economically oil producing states mostly managed to make quantum leaps, we cannot claim the same in the social and political spheres.

Iraq is among those petro-states that wished to use the oil income as a leverage to finance its economic development and political goals. Despite consecutive coups and attempts all incoming governments tried at varying degrees to control the country's oil wealth. By the 1970s, Iraqi economy was finally thriving thanks to tripling oil prices and increased output [18]. In the same decade the attempts to find common ground with the Kurds in the north failed largely because of encouragement from Iran.

While the Iraqi state was able to use the oil income to invest heavily in the infrastructure and the economy, this bonanza brought increased demands of autonomy as a side effect. Nevertheless, the Baath regime managed to centralize political power and finances for decades only to lose the grip after Gulf Wars. This role is now assumed by KRG in the north of the country.

For the Kurdish leaders, the oil reserves of especially Kirkuk region offers a valuable opportunity for power and autonomy. The oilfields in Kirkuk region is among the giant reserves along with the Rumalia field that is located in the south of the country [19]. In 2017 a referendum was held in the contested Kirkuk city to bring it into KRG control, and which brought an overwhelming majority voting for the action. Yet neither Baghdad

government, nor regional powers like Turkey and Iran recognized the results [20]. KRG had to succumb to this pressure, but the city is still key in economic and political terms.

### 3 Gulf Wars and the Disintegration of Iraq

Before the start of Iran-Iraq war, the regime in Baghdad could pride itself with its economic and social achievements having lifted the whole Iraqi society to being the most prosperous and best educated among Middle Eastern states. This does not imply that the Iraqis had achieved the development level of Western states, but the country had achieved a satisfactory development pace both economically and socially [21]. All this would change with over ambitious policies of Baghdad in terms of regional hegemony while resources were shifted from much needed domestic expenditures to military adventures. The war that Saddam Hussein initiated in 1979 by attacking Revolutionary Iran was the first one among decades of armed conflict that the ordinary citizens had to endure. It was a long war draining huge resources and manpower, yet Baghdad managed to control the situation throughout the conflict. As the war ended, Iraqi Army crushed once again the rebellious Kurds in the north [22] and there was no reason to doubt that the regime in Baghdad was coming to the end of its lifetime.

Eventually, Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in 1990 with its war veteran Army triggering a US led intervention to undo the invasion. American occupation stopped short of destroying Saddam Hussein's military machine and delayed the disintegration of the state for another decade. However, the US and its allies decided to protect the Kurds in the north by providing air cover for the Kurdish populated areas. Operation Provide Comfort forbade Iraqi air forces to fly to the north of 36th parallel in order to prevent Saddam's army from crushing the Kurdish zone. This semi-autonomous region would form the core of the future Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) but before the power of Saddam's Army was completely decimated Kurds could not dream of reaching out to Kirkuk oil fields. This region, rich in underground resources were inevitable for a Kurdish entity to have some form of autonomy [23] without which it would be economically dependent on other actors.

The second Gulf War started a dynamic that led to the break-down of the Iraqi state in a decade full of political violence. In 1991 American Army stopped before destroying Saddam's armed forces but in 2003, the US was determined to destroy the military and civil machine that was controlled by the Baath regime. Disregarding the warnings that this policy would lead to destruction of Iraqi regime and start a civil war, Americans pursued a of de-Baathification that eventually led to the collapse of state functions [24]. Within six months after the collapse of Saddam regime, an insurgency started against American occupiers led primarily by Sunni Arabs. The Shiite population was also insisting on the departure of US forces, but they also benefited from the collapse of the regime. Nevertheless, it was the Kurds that benefited the most from the American intervention in 2003. As Iraq fell apart among sectarian lines and the Army that kept the Kurds in line collapsed, an unprecedented opportunity lay in front of Erbil. Kirkuk oilfields were finally within the reach of peshmerga meaning that finally an economically self-sufficient entity could be created in the Kurdish controlled zones. The presence of underground resources of Kirkuk province made it so central to the question of Kurdish



region's economic and political autonomy [25]. After decades of internal struggle with Baghdad regime the Kurds finally laid their hands on a very valuable trophy, but this also had implications for other regional players as well.

KRG's emergence after the American intervention was naturally perceived as a threat by its neighbors like Turkey [26] and Iran who had sizable Kurdish minorities. Fearing the possibility that this would spark a flame that would set ablaze their own territories as well, Turkish and Iranian authorities were alarmed with the new developments. However, in the last decade Turkey pragmatically reconciled with facts of the fields accepting the formation of Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) after which Ankara established strong economic and political ties with Erbil. If only the Syrian Civil War had not started, Turkey could seemingly accommodate the emergence of Kurds as a political actor. As long as the status quo could be maintained elsewhere Turkey could control Kurdish nationalism's ambitions because KRG was a landlocked entity and yearned for the cooperation of Turks for access to markets [27]. Economic cooperation between Ankara and Erbil urged both parties to realign their policies for further cooperation. This improvement also opened the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey that cost tens of thousands of lives in three decades. This bright prospect, however, was broken into pieces when Ankara's expectations for a regime change in Syria backfired.

The opening of the Syrian Civil War and Assad's strategy of dealing with a massive insurgency against its rule changed the prospects for peace. When popular demonstrations against Assad regime started in 2011, Ankara foresaw a regime change within six months at most. When Assad refused to step down Turkey took a bold move by supporting the rebels against the Syrian regime that were mostly Sunni Arabs [28]. Syrian regime's forces were initially outnumbered against the opposition counting on the support of Alawites, Christians and relatively well-off Sunni Arabs making an all-out struggle unsustainable. Thus, Assad concentrated his forces on the west of the country and aimed to secure the main routes and cities from Aleppo to Damascus. The rest of the country became a contested area among opposition groups. In this void, the Kurdish armed forces gradually secured Haseke region and started advancing to the west with the help of American air cover. It is actually this development that terminated the understanding between Turkey and Kurdish political movement [29] and led to the restart of armed clashes. Ankara eventually started military operations in 2016 to limit and control the advances of groups that it considers linked to terrorism.

Turkey is seemingly the closest aide to KRG in its pursuit to be able to function independently but the scramble in the Middle East is changing payoffs continuously. Erbil administration actively participated to the assault on Mosul in coordination with American forces to take the city back from ISIS. Although Iraqi forces claim control of the city, KRG will secure a sizable territory in the north of Iraq as well as controlling some of the transit routes of its oil resources to international markets.

Yet, there are still many complexities with regards to the formation of a Kurdish controlled zone in the ruins of Iraq and Syria. First, both Iraq and Syria are still sovereign states according to the international law so for now, we cannot claim that a new state has already being born even if KRG has substantial autonomy [30]. We have already established that KRG is unable to market the oil extracted from the zones it controls

because Iraqi constitution still designates the central government as the final authority in charge of underground resources of the country. For now, US is also backing Baghdad's position with regards to the marketing of oil resources in the region, so Erbil seems stuck and in dire need for cooperation of Washington. KRG needs to play a delicate play in between regional actors like Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara as well as global powers in order to be able to survive in this fragile political environment.

#### 4 Formation of a New Petro-State

As of now, it is hard to argue that KRG has fulfilled the conditions to become an independent entity both in economic and political terms. The region has ample energy reserves to finance its expenditures and Erbil is trying to steer its way among conflicting interests of Baghdad and Ankara to optimize the returns of this important opportunity [31]. As a result of the disagreement between Erbil and Baghdad on sharing the oil income, Kurdish authorities had a hard time marketing their resource wealth from time to time. The administration in Baghdad successfully blocked KRG's attempts to make unilateral arrangements with other parties circumventing central Iraqi government. According to current Iraqi Constitution the state energy company SOMO oversees all exports of fossil fuels and Erbil's initiatives to make deals with oil companies and other sovereign nations have been successfully challenged by Baghdad government. The oil and gas income of the north should also be accrued to the central Treasury after which the federal state will receive 17% of the total income. KRG, apparently unsatisfied with the setting tried to pocket the entire revenue from its sales in the region controlled by the peshmerga but Baghdad managed to block all the deals on the grounds that they were not valid according to Iraqi Constitution. As a result of the stalemate with Baghdad, KRG had difficulties in arranging its finances and even failing to pay for government employees occasionally [32]. Multinational companies suspended their operations in KRG controlled zones until a political settlement with Baghdad can be achieved and security situation will be improved. We can also add the fact that the volume in the north is not as large as previously anticipated explaining major players reluctance to hang on to their operations in KRG controlled zones. Moreover, close to 1.5 million refugees are placing an additional burden on the finances of the government in an economic environment where the low plateau in international oil prices is not helping either.

In the absence of formal statistics, reports on the facts and figures rely on sectorial studies and interviews with business groups. Yet it would not be misleading to claim that except for a smaller non-tradable sector the entire economy relies on income from oil [33]. Capital city of KRG Erbil thrived on the flow of oil income for a decade until the payments from Baghdad treasury were halted in 2014. The government used the oil funds to pay salaries of a significant number of employees and support peshmerga forces. The fragile political situation required that KRG invest heavily in its defenses [34], but this would not be possible without oil income. Erbil centralized not only economic rents that could be redistributed for political purposes but also consolidated its jurisdiction on the territories it controlled.

Although we cannot claim that a new state has already been born, we can make a projection for the future on how a political entity will look like on the ruins of the

old order. According to International Energy Agency's (IEA) estimates 45% of the incremental output to global supply will come from Iraq until the year 2035 [35]. That means IEA projects that Iraq will increase its daily production from 4.1 million barrels per day to 8 million barrels per day within almost two decades. The realization of this optimistic projection depends upon the maintenance of order in the country as well as assuring international companies on rule of law and security situation so that they will keep investing. Even though, Iraq had serious security issues especially because of ISIS presence, some sort of stability was reestablished by the government forces, So, even if oil sector will fall short of optimistic scenarios, we can expect the output to increase in the coming years.

According to IEA figures, north of Iraq has more than 20% of total reserves of the country if Kirkuk is also included. Since the region is not properly explored total reserves may be as high as 45 billion barrels putting the region in the top ten countries. Although north of Iraq hosts around 20% of total reserves of Iraq, according to recent forecasts that KRG's output will be 1.2 million barrels per day within two decades [36] (IEA, 2014, s. 49), slightly lower than its share in terms of reserves. With current prices of around 75 \$/barrel gross income from oil sales will reach around 30 billion dollars per year. This does not imply that the real income for KRG will reach this amount because production costs and the share of partner companies also need to be deducted. However, it is also another fact that the costs are among the lowest in the globe in the region [37]. This means that KRG can expect substantial amounts of income only from oil.

In terms of bringing the oil to the market there are still issues. The pipeline from Kurmala to Turkish border in Fishabur has 700.000 barrel/day capacity. Another pipeline from Tawke to the same destination has 200.000-barrel capacity. Both pipelines are connected to Fishabur-Yumurtalık that has 1.5 million barrel/day capacity so currently Turkish corridor has the capacity to bring Kurdish oil to markets only if the issues with Baghdad regime can be resolved [38]. There are other pipelines from Kirkuk to Tripoli and Basra that are not functioning for now. These may be alternative outlets once a comprehensive settlement in the region can be achieved.

Natural gas is another source of income that has not yet been exploited by Iraqi governments. Especially the associated gas found in the north is an important opportunity in terms of its extraction costs and proximity to markets. Almost 70% of the gas coming out of the wells is being flared for now as there has not been sufficient infrastructure investment to convert heat to electricity. For that reason, power outage in Iraqi cities is a common event. It should be expected that in the future as necessary facilities are being established some of the gas will be used for electricity generation while the rest will be exported.

The population of KRG controlled areas in Iraq exceeds 9 million if Kirkuk is also included. Comparing the population with the underground resources we can easily conclude that political normalization can bring significant prosperity to the Kurds in the region. Yet, like in other petro-states in a land-locked geography and non-sophisticated economy the population will have to rely on the funds to be distributed by the central government. Not only in northern Iraq but also PYD controlled zones in Syria, it is hard to observe neither presence of productive enterprises not in the short term any hope of changing the situation. The population is young, and the infrastructure is insufficient to

support a growing economy. Furthermore, like in many other energy exporters, Dutch disease will be a major obstacle in front of manufacturing industries. So, it would not be an overstatement to expect that Kurdish controlled zones, will increasingly display characteristics of a petro-state. This trajectory has already been followed by other Middle Eastern states that had a primitive economy prior to development of their oil sector [39]. They also developed single commodity economies and failed in their quest to diversify economic activity. Nevertheless, especially Gulf countries are enjoying a very high level of income thanks to oil and gas income so in the presence of political stability one should not rule out the possibility that KRG in the future can have higher standards of living.

In the Kurdish controlled areas in Iraq, popular mobilization and the surge in nationalist feelings [40] have already brought large masses into politics. It is hard to expect a passive civil society in this geography unlike some other Middle Eastern states with largely apolitical populations. Young and energetic populations will have demands from the state that the rulers will have to meet to certain extents. The ruling elites will be inclined to use populist policies to secure the support of the population and those measures will have to be funded by income from the sale of underground resources. Furthermore, in a fragile geography, massive investments will also be needed for military purposes. So even if Erbil can grasp more autonomy in the future from the ruins of those crumbling states, there will also be major undertakings in the decades to come.

The prospect of the wealth being centrally distributed, and the absence of other productive businesses bring out the possibility of a clientalist relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Politicians and bureaucrats may be inclined to buy the consent of a young population with increased transfer payments in return for political allegiance. The centrifugal forces in the society need to be compensated by economic means otherwise.

## 5 Conclusion

Contemporary Middle East has been largely shaped by treaties signed after World War I, by and large by Great Britain who designed the region in order to have control over the oil resources of the region. A century ago, the prospect of establishment of a Kurdish state was rejected as a result of an agreement between Great Britain and France on the one hand and other regional players on the other hand. Today, the demise of Sykes-Picot system has brought important changes in the region with KRG emerging as an actor [41], though not an independent state. Already in the north of Iraq, Kurdistan Regional Government is enjoying substantial autonomy and may be on the road to establishing itself as an independent entity. Although there are still serious obstacles to the formation of a Kurdish nation-state such as opposition of local actors and problems that may arise from international law, it is an undisputable fact that a new political actor is in the making.

The political entity that is being born is relying on oil and partially natural gas sales to be able to stand alone economically and politically. We have already stated that especially Kirkuk province has ample fossil fuel reserves, large enough to support Erbil administration. The region is land-locked meaning that transferring and marketing of this underground resource is problematic yet alternative routes may be found as long as they are economically feasible. The southern route to Basra, the western route to Haifa and pipelines through Turkey are all alternative outlets.

KRG, relying on the sale of underground resources is in the process of becoming a rentier petro-state like many other Middle Eastern countries. The income from oil and gas will constitute a larger chunk of its revenues and as a result the wealth will be distributed not by the market conditions but by the central government. Considering the level of mobilization of the population within the boundaries of KRG, we can claim that the future administrations will be using populist tools to buy the consent of the ordinary people. We may observe a typical petro-state both in terms of the weight of public sector in the economy and because of the transfers from the treasury to the citizens.

Already fluctuations in oil income are causing a significant volatility on the material conditions of the region. Control of underground resources has become the main motivation of all contenders to power after which oil and gas rent may be used to consolidate the grasp on the society. As in typical rentier states, this is a winner takes all game, a setting not conducive to democratic politics. It could be expected to see continued struggle to control oil rents by competing political actors. Geopolitical competition in the region by local and global actors means that the fight for economic rents among different groups will bring result in the interference of foreign players.

A new petro-state is being born in the Middle East but since it is not an independent state under international law complicates the picture. Nevertheless, the characteristic traits of those rentier states are already there and will continue to consolidate as Erbil government continues its reliance on income from sale of fossil fuels.

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# UN Charter Interpretation in Settlement of Regional Conflicts: Guatemala Crisis of 1954

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**Abstract.** The objective of this paper is to study the UN Charter interpretation issues in settlement of regional conflicts. The Charter was approved unanimously at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945. However, there were quite a lot of ambiguities and legal gaps in the definition of powers of the entire UN, its individual bodies and the Secretary-General, which had to be filled in during the practical activities of the UN. The UN has a fairly wide range of legally defined tools, but not all of them can be used or have been used in the history of the Organization. On the other hand, there are many tools and patterns that have entered into the practice of the UN, which are not reflected in any way in the main documents. This opens the possibility for certain UN members for manipulating the legal norms of the UN. This also allows the UN to work in a more efficient way in the situation of disagreements between its members. One of the most ambiguous issues is the one of the roles of regional international bodies, especially in the settlement of international conflicts. Here the powers of the UN have come into conflict with ambitions of regional organizations and their leading nations. The research based on the case-study of the Guatemala crisis shows the specific features of the UN Chapter interpretation in settlement the modern regional conflicts from foreign policy directions and national interests of the external actors.

**Keywords:** UN Charter · Regional conflict · Guatemala crisis

## 1 Introduction

UN Charter is the core element of the modern international system. This fundamental document sets the basic principles of states interactions in different fields, most importantly – in preventing and resolving international conflicts. As any fundamental documents, the Charter is generalized in nature and needs to be interpreted in application to the specific situation. However, this interpretation opens the possibility for manipulation that may alter the core idea of the Charter and the UN System and are inherently dangerous, undermining the principles of collective security, impartial international settlement of conflicts, the right of every state to be heard and be treated fairly, regardless of its size and status, sovereign equality of UN members and others.

The example of such situations can be the numerous cases of expansive interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions. Cases of Iraq, Libya and other may pose a question of what is more important: the adherence to the language of the SC resolutions, often restricted by the positions of the SC permanent members, or its spirit, calling for protection of civilians, cessation of violence and such?

However, this is not the only issue. History has seen examples of loose interpretation of the very text of the Charter, not inspired by the urge to protect someone, but, most likely, to secure the interests of one or several Great Powers. Below the authors study the case of Guatemala, but it was not the only one by far. The goal is not, however, to accuse some states, as nearly all SC permanent members have manipulated the Charter to gain advantage. We can recall USSR's attempts to render SC resolutions on Korea unfulfilled by boycotting the SC and then claiming that the resolutions adopted in its absence are not legal, also UK and France endeavor in Suez (hidden by Israel's activity on first step) [1, p. 1310] were taken under the guise of peacekeeping but involved clear violation of the Charter.

History has seen examples of loose interpretation of the very text of the Charter, not inspired by the urge to protect someone, but, most likely, to secure the interests of one or several Great Powers. Below the authors study the case of Guatemala, but it was not the only one by far. The goal is not, however, to accuse some states, as nearly all SC permanent members have manipulated the Charter to gain advantage. We can recall USSR's attempts to render SC resolutions on Korea unfulfilled by boycotting the SC and then claiming that the resolutions adopted in its absence are not legal, also UK and France endeavor in Suez (hidden by Israel's activity on first step) were taken under the guise of peacekeeping but involved clear violation of the Charter.

## 2 Materials and Methods

The research based on the case-study of the Guatemala crisis shows the specific features of the UN Charter interpretation in settlement the modern regional conflicts from foreign policy directions and national interests of the external actors. This case is very illustrative as the crisis occurred within a very well-established regional system relatively soon after the creation of the UN. The authors also try to demonstrate the distinction between the political will of member-states of international organization and the ideas and principles such an organization tries to pursue.

When implementing the study, the authors turned to a number of primary research and historical methods:

- the method of induction, which allows to draw a conclusion about general patterns based on particular facts; the method was used to identify patterns and motives of behavior of individual participants in political processes within the UN in the context of the crisis in Guatemala on the basis of their individual actions and statements;
- historical-genetic method made it possible to identify and trace changes in the consideration and interpretation of the UN Charter within the case – Guatemala crisis of 1954;



- source analysis, which involves a comprehensive study of various historical sources, establishing their information potential and reliability and evaluating the information contained in them; the method was used for complex analysis of the UN Charter and the prime resources of the UN Security Council.

The research based on the complex analysis of the the UN Charter and the prime resources of the UN Security Council, most importantly – its official meeting records which allow for a deeper study of SC members positions in each case and on every step of discussion and the manipulation methods used, as well as the resolutions adopted.

### 3 Discussion

The Guatemalan case is studied as one of the clearest examples of the following notion. The international organization, including the UN, can be a very elaborate and seemingly efficient and effective mechanism (in different domains). However, despite all political powers this organization has at its disposal, it is still a secondary actor of international relations. Nation-states are still the primary actors and their will (supported by military power, political weight and economical significance) can still outweigh any ideas any international organization may present – by the fact that the organization does not have its own resources, everything it has comes from the member-states, including political will.

In 1951, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a military retiree who participated in the 1944 coup against the dictator Jorge Ubico y Castaneda, was elected President of Guatemala. The election of Arbenz, according to various researchers, was in line with democratic norms [2, pp 44–45] [3], the new president enjoyed broad popular support. Arbenz began a series of reforms in the country aimed at improving the situation of wide sections of the population. One of the most important of these was the agrarian reform, which, among other things, provided for the removal of large unused plots of fertile land from large big owners in exchange for compensation. These lands were then distributed among the peasants.

The United Fruit Company (UFCO), an a large well-known American company active in Latin America, suffered the most from the reform, losing more than 200,000 acres [2, pp. 44–52].

Also, a number of Arbenz's actions were aimed at demonopolizing the transport sector, which was also controlled by UFCO. These actions have caused discontent in the State Department and US political circles. It is noted that many of the most important political figures in the United States of that period were directly or indirectly associated with the UFCO and its interests [2, pp. 44–52] [4, p. 47].

Another serious problem was the State Department and CIA's suspicions of Arbenz's links to the international communist movement. They were indirectly confirmed Arbenz by the actions of Arbenz aimed at improving the situation of workers in Guatemala, restricting the rights of large companies, and also by the fact that, as a first approximation, he was somewhat seen as his close ties with to the Labor Party of Guatemala. At the same time However, it is noted that researchers mostly concur that in fact Arbenz was not close to the communists in ideology, considered communist

ideas in their pure form harmful to Guatemala and even banned the Communist Party of Guatemala itself, which had to unite with other political forces. The support of the Labor Party was necessary for Arbenz to ensure popular approval of his actions [2, pp. 44–52].

One of the decisive factors was the decision of the Arbenz government to purchase weapons for the army in Czechoslovakia, a country of the communist camp. That has assured The the United States has confirmed its opinion that the Guatemalan government is made up of communists who penetrated Latin America, the main zone area of influence of the United States, and thus Guatemala might, in US Department of State's opinion, pose a threat to the national interests and national security of the United States, as it caused a threat of the spread of communist influence spread in the region. Meanwhile, it is noted that the purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia was, on the whole, an act of despair of the Guatemalan government, after all the other states to which Guatemala turned, refused it under pressure from the same USA.

At a conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) in March 1954, the United States passed an OAS resolution stating that communism was a threat to the entire region. Guatemala turned out to be the only member of the OAS to vote against the resolution. The country's concern was that this resolution due to fears of the possibility of using might be used it to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. This step finally confirmed the United States that the communist government is in power in Guatemala, which and it must be overthrown. By that time, the CIA had already developed a plan of operation.

On June 18, 1954, about two hundred soldiers under the command of Colonel Castillo Armas, who had previously tried before to overthrow the government of Guatemala, invaded the country from the territory of neighboring Honduras. Also, the territory of the country was bombed from planes provided to the rebels by the CIA. The planes took off from the territory of Nicaragua. The ports of Guatemala were blocked by the US Navy "in order to prevent the supply of weapons." On June 27, Arbenz was finally forced to resign, shortly thereafter, Castillo Armas seized power.

However, the most interesting here is the course of United Nations proceedings of this issue.

On June 19, 1954, the Guatemalan government appealed to the UN with a demand to convene an emergency meeting of the Security Council. The meeting of the Security Council (675th) was convened on 20 June. At the meeting, the representative of Guatemala described in detail the situation in his country and accused the United States of directly leading the invasion, and Honduras and Nicaragua of pandering to the rebels. Representatives from of the United States, Nicaragua and Honduras dismissed these suspicions. The United States, in particular, argued that the fighting in Guatemala was caused by an internal struggle for power in the country and had no connection with foreign states. The representative of Guatemala pointed out that the rebel forces clearly have the support of the United States and other states, in particular, they have combat aircraft, the pilots of which (at least one of the aircraft had made an emergency landing) are not Hispanics. Brazil and Colombia submitted a draft resolution to the Council, providing for the transmission of Guatemala's request to the Organization of American States.

The approval of this project was expressed by all members of the Council, except for the USSR. France and Great Britain made minor amendments to it. Discussion erupted in the Council, as the representatives of the United States, Colombia and Brazil believed that the issue must be submitted to the OAS on the basis of Article 52 of the UN Charter, paragraph 2 of which reads: “The Members of the United Nations entering into Members of the Organization that have concluded [regional] arrangements agreements or constituting [regional] agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council bodies should make every effort to achieve a peaceful resolution of local disputes through such regional agreements or such regional bodies before referring these disputes to the Security Council” [5].

The members of the Council, with the exception of the USSR, agreed that this way the UN Charter obliges member states to apply to a regional body, if there is one, and only then, if the efforts of such a body do not help resolve the situation, they have the right to apply appeal to the Security Council. The representative of the USSR fundamentally disagreed with this interpretation of the Charter, pointing out that the Security Council bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in order to ensure prompt and effective UN action, and also that since Guatemala objects to the transfer of the issue to OAS, the provisions of Article 52 are inapplicable on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 2 of which provides that “The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties the Security Council shall take into account any procedure for the resolution of this dispute that has already been accepted by the parties” [5]. The USSR also pointed out that, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 52 (“This Article in no way impairs the application This article does not in any way affect the application of Articles 34 and 35”) [5], the Security Council has the right and, more importantly, is obliged to consider any disputable situation or situation that threatens to entail an armed conflict, without waiting for the actions of the relevant regional bodies, if one of the parties to the conflict, or all participants apply to the Council with such a request.

The representative of Guatemala also pointed out to the Council that Article 52 is not applicable in this situation, including because Guatemala is not in a state of dispute or conflict with any State, but was subjected to an unprovoked attack by an unidentified group of unidentified persons, and Article 52 provides confines for the consideration of regional structures are precisely to disputes only. The representative of Guatemala also indicated that, according to Article 103, “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail In the event that the obligations of the Members of the Organization under this Charter are in conflict with their obligations under any other international agreement, the obligations under this Charter shall prevail,” [5] that is, since Guatemala appealed to the UN, other members of the OAS should also consider the current situation within the UN, in particular, its Security Council.

In the subsequent vote, 10 of the 11 members of the Security Council voted for the draft resolution proposed by Brazil and Colombia, as amended by France and Great

Britain, but the only vote belonged to the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, so the draft resolution was rejected. It should be noted that during the meeting, the members of the Security Council, in particular the representatives of the United States and France, actively and sometimes emotionally criticized the position of the USSR, in particular, its intention to use the veto right in relation to the Brazilian-Colombian draft resolution. A much less specific draft resolution proposed by France was then put to the vote. This project did not provide for the transfer of the Guatemalan problem anywhere, but only required all participants to stop aggressive actions.

This resolution was adopted unanimously [6]. Its text reads: “The Security Council, having considered on an urgent basis the communication of the Government of Guatemala to the President of the Security Council, calls for the immediate termination of any action likely to cause bloodshed and requests all Members of the United Nations to abstain, in the spirit of the Charter, from rendering assistance to any such action. The Security Council, having considered as a matter of urgency a communication from the Government of Guatemala addressed to the President of the Security Council, call for an immediate end to all actions that could lead to bloodshed, and invite all members of the United Nations to refrain, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, from facilitating such actions” [7].

However, hostilities did not stop, and on 22nd of June, the Government of Guatemala requested the President of the Security Council to reconsider the situation at a Council meeting. Unlike the previous meeting, convened the day after the request was received, the new Security Council meeting was convened only on 25th of June on a new request from Guatemala. This delay, albeit a relatively minor one, seriously slowed down UN decision-making in the context of the rapidly evolving crisis in Guatemala. It should be noted worth mentioning that it was in June 1954 that the President of the Security Council was presided by the representative of the United States of America. Whether the outbreak of hostilities in Guatemala during the month of the US presidency of the Council is an accidental coincidence, or whether the actions were adjusted to the chairmanship of the US Council (and the events in Guatemala were carefully prepared by the CIA, this as clearly follows from the declassified documents) [8] is unknown, but it should be noted that, thanks to the his role of the Chairman, the representative of the United States G.K. Lodge was able to delay the resolution of the issue and tilt the situation in a favorable direction for the United States interests.

During the new (676th) meeting, a tough debate broke out on the procedural issue of approving the agenda. This often is a purely formal issue, but on June 25th, 1954 it caused such serious controversy that the entire session SC meeting was devoted only to it.

The representative of Brazil during the discussion of the draft agenda (its text is as follows: “1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Cablegram dated June 19, 1954 of from the Minister of Foreign Affairs for External Relations of Guatemala dated June 19, 1954 addressed to the President of the Security Council and a letter dated June 22, 1954 from the representative of Guatemala dated June 22, 1954 addressed to the Secretary-General” [9] has pointed out that the issue of the situation in Guatemala is being dealt with by the Organization of American States, which is an extremely influential and important international organization in which all American states have long been resolving all their controversial issues,. in In this connection with which the Security Council discussion

of this issue is inappropriate, since it will undermine the credibility of the OAS, as well as prevent an effective solution to the current situation, confusing it.

Also, the representative of Brazil gave his analysis of the situation in Guatemala. Chairman of the Security Council G.K. Lodge was then going to turn give the floor over to the representative of Colombia, but he was interrupted by the representative of the USSR, who demanded that the representative of Guatemala be allowed to take a seat at the table, since the discussion went beyond procedural issues and touched the essence of the problem, and in accordance with Article 32 of the UN Charter, "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations. Any A Member of the Organization that is not a member of the Security Council, or any State not a Member of the Organization, if they are parties to a dispute before the Security Council, are invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that dispute.

The Security Council shall impose such conditions for the participation of a non-Member State as it finds fair" [5]. Representative of the USSR S.K. Tsarapkin pointed out that since the decision to approve or reject the agenda will actually determine whether the complaint of Guatemala, a UN member state that has been the victim of aggression, will be considered. Thus, the representative of Guatemala should take a seat at the table and have the opportunity to speak. Refusal of this requirement would be a de facto violation of the Charter and, in fact, would give the green light to aggression. It would also allow the aggressors to resolve issues within the framework of a regional organization whose decisions were predetermined. The President (as well as the representative of France) rejected this demand of the USSR, pointing out that, according to established practice, representatives of states that are not members of the Security Council are invited to take a seat at the table only after the approval of the agenda and not earlier. The representative of the USSR protested this decision of the chairman, but his protest was rejected by 10 votes to 1 (such decisions are considered procedural and the veto of a permanent member of the Council does not apply to them).

The representatives of the remaining members of the Security Council expressed differing views. The representatives of Great Britain (Pearson Dixon) and France (Oppeno) pointed out the ambiguity of the problem, since on the one hand, the problem situation was already being solved by the competent regional body, acting, in their opinion, in accordance with the UN Charter, and on the other hand, there was a direct appeal by a member state to the Security Council., ignoring which it could undermine the authority of the Council and the Organization as a whole, as well as negatively affect the resolution of a specific problem situation. In this regard, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France announced their intention to abstain from voting on the adoption of the agenda. The representative of Lebanon said that he would vote for the approval of the agenda, since the Security Council is obliged to consider appeals from member states within the framework of the UN mission to maintain international peace and security. In

the future, during the discussion of the meeting, one or another decision can be made, but it is necessary to consider the issue.

A similar view was expressed by the representative of Denmark. The representatives of Turkey, China, New Zealand spoke in favor of rejecting the agenda and postponing consideration of the issue until any results of the consideration of the issue by the Organization of American States are achieved ready. The USSR representative repeated his arguments for the approval of the agenda, and also actually accused the US representative of the Security Council presiding over SC of actively obstructing the consideration of the problematic issue, pursuing the national interests of his country. The US spokesman denied these allegations and indicated that this kind of issue should be addressed by the Organization of American States. He also made it clear that the United States attaches special importance to the OAS and protests against any attempts to belittle its status and deprive it of influence. He said that one of the conditions for the United States to join the UN was the preservation of the leading role of the OAS in the region. The deprivation of the Organization of American States of such a place in the system of international relations, according to the representative of the United States G.K. Lodge will negatively affect not only the state of affairs on the American continent, but also the participation of the United States and other American countries in the UN.

The USSR representative again accused the United States of trying to divert the issue from the field of vision of the United Nations in its own interests, and also warned that the decision to refuse to consider the complaint of Guatemala would create a dangerous precedent for all American states, since all conflicts on their territory would be outside the field of activity. The UN and, thus, decisions on them will be taken in an unfair way, and the UN itself will lose its global reach and, therefore, its significance and meaning.

In a subsequent vote, the agenda was rejected by 5 votes to 4, with 2 abstentions. This ended the 676th meeting of the UN Security Council [9].

## 4 Results

The reports of the 675 and 676 Security Council meetings clearly show how the United States of America manipulated the interpretation of the Charter to ensure that the desired decision was taken, as well as the fact that almost all members of the Security Council in 1954 agreed with their controversial interpretation, despite the fact that representatives of the USSR, as well as Guatemala, clearly pointed to the provisions of the Charter, not only giving the Council the right to consider such a situation, but actually obliging it to do so.

However, the USSR and Guatemala were not alone in their interpretation of the Charter and their desire to solve the problem of hostilities in Guatemala within the framework of the UN Security Council. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, shared the same view as the USSR and Guatemala. He objected to the removal of the issue of the events in Guatemala from the jurisdiction of the UN, and was also annoyed by the behavior of the President of the Security Council of Lodge, which was expressed in the free formation of the agenda and the delay in convening a meeting of the Council. But the main point on which Hammarskjöld strongly disagreed with Lodge was the same free interpretation of the Charter. From

the point of view of Hammarskjöld, who has always sought to strengthen the role of the UN in the international arena, there was no reason to refer the issue to the Organization of American States. Hammarskjöld shared the Soviet point of view that paragraph 4 of Article 52 of the UN Charter unambiguously gives any state the right to appeal directly to the Security Council, and the Council is obliged to consider such an appeal, regardless of the presence and involvement of a regional organization in resolving the issue. Also, Article 103 clearly indicated that the obligations of any UN member to the Organization prevail over its obligations to any other international structures, and the spirit and letter of the Charter imply that the United Nations has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and is obliged to do everything. The actions necessary for this, and not to shift responsibility to regional bodies, unless all parties to the dispute or conflict situation wish it. Regional international agreements also had to recognize and recognize the supremacy of the UN Charter. From the point of view of Hammarskjöld, the situation with Guatemala created a precedent that could negatively affect the development of the UN, which was extremely dangerous for the entire system of international relations [4, p. 71]. It worth mentioning that after being appointed as Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld has consistently promoted the UN independence from external actors and the paramount role of the Organization in international relations (this can be confirmed by e.g. his efforts to banish US FBI agents conducting investigations against UN officials – US citizens in the very UN buildings) [10].

In fact, any controversial situation in this way could be removed from the area of responsibility of the Security Council, the only international body, according to the Charter, which has the right to apply coercive measures to restore and maintain peace (except as provided by General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for peace” that gives the General Assembly the right to take over any threatening situation if the SC is disabled by the permanent member’s veto [11]), that is, in fact, there was a danger of the collapse of the unified peacekeeping system, and states from different regions could lose the opportunity to formally express their position and react to events in regions to which they do not belong. Hammarskjöld, as the chief UN official, cannot come to terms with such a situation. However, the United States rejected his arguments and reiterated the right and obligation of all American states in the event of conflict situations to contact the OAS before contacting the United Nations.

Be that as it may, while there was a debate in the Security Council and between the Secretary General, the legally elected President of Guatemala was forced to resign, and soon the coup ended in a victory for pro-American forces [4]. Neither the USSR nor Dag Hammarskjöld managed to prevent the dangerous development of the situation according to the American scenario. According to P. Heller, this was one of the events that set the limits of the Secretary General’s power [4].

## 5 Conclusion

The coup in Guatemala showed that with the right preparation and the presence of political support, nothing can stop the superpower, which has decided to change the government it does not like in its zone of influence. In addition to the obvious strengthening of the US position in Latin America, this episode made it clear that such behavior

is possible. It can be considered that the USSR, suppressing the Hungarian uprising of 1956, followed the example of the United States. In addition, the discussion of the events in the Security Council showed that if there is support, even an obvious norm of the UN Charter can be circumvented or turned to your advantage, you just need to convince the majority of the Council members that they are right. The clear violation of the Charter did not benefit the UN, weakening its international authority, since the government of Guatemala turned to it for protection, and the Organization was unable to help this country in any way. The fall in the authority of the UN among the countries of the socialist bloc, which treated it with distrust since the time of the Korean War, was especially noticeable [12]. One more consequence of the Guatemala crisis can be traced in subsequent events, such as Hungarian Revolution of 1956 crushed by Soviet forces. Many similarities can be traced in adoption of SC meeting agenda [13], disputes over the nature of conflict (whether it is internal or international) and inability of the SC to resolve the issue [13, 14].

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# Development of Cooperation Between Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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**Abstract.** The paper is devoted to the interaction of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China within the SCO. It analyzes the main activities of all participating countries, as well as the role of Russia and China in the organization. This paper highlights the main projects that were carried out during the existence of the SCO. It also outlines Sino-Russian relations within the organization. In this paper, an attempt is made to give an understanding of China’s activities in relation to the Central Asian countries. The paper focuses on the results and prospects of this project.

**Keywords:** Shanghai Cooperation Organization · People’s Republic of China · Russian Federation · International security · Economic direction · Energy resources

## 1 Introduction

The modern world is characterized by instability. Every day there are changes in all spheres of life, which can lead to both positive and very negative consequences for all mankind. At the same time, people cannot control climate and natural changes, but certain political, economic and social issues will be. Therefore, in order to effectively solve various emerging problems, countries need to unite and work in conditions of mutual cooperation. There are already a significant number of international organizations, among which the Shanghai Cooperation Organization plays an important role. The People’s Republic of China, developing a policy of multilateral cooperation, initiated a proposal for cooperation between the countries within the framework of the “Shanghai five”. Initially, this mechanism was supposed to solve issues related only to the military spheres, but later the PRC proposed to develop cooperation in the economic and energy fields, which contributed to the rivalry between China and Russia for the Central Asian region.

In the study of the chosen topic, such methods were used as: empirical, which implied the study and analysis of materials and synthesis of the studied information to create a holistic picture, as well as general logical, which allowed to identify the main theses and summarize the information.

The main objective of the study was to demonstrate the interaction of two influential countries within the same organization. In the global community, China and Russia act as the main partners and close friends, however, when their interests collide in the same region, they become the main competitors. China's active activity in the Central Asian region may possibly affect relations with Russia in the future, as Beijing may consider other countries more attractive for partnerships.

## 2 Main Activities of the SCO

Today, the priority areas are considered to be: the sphere of international security; the economic aspect, as well as energy, cultural and humanitarian areas.

### 2.1 The Sphere of International Security

This area includes the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism, illegal arms trafficking, cybercrime, and trafficking in drug and psychotropic substances. Terrorism, extremism and separatism are considered the “three evils” of the organization that receive the most attention. The Member States committed themselves to develop effective measures for joint response to emergency situations, to ensure that security secretaries meet on a regular basis, to plan anti-terrorist activities, to use technical equipment to combat threats, as well as to identify and suppress the terrorist threat in their territories, not to grant political asylum to those who have been accused of terrorist, extremist or separatist activities. As a result of the actions taken, the SCO member states have achieved certain results. For example, in 2008–2010, the SCO stopped more than 100 terrorist attacks, removed 2.2 tons of explosives from illegal circulation, as well as 2.3 tons of toxic substances. In addition, it seized 429 improvised explosive devices, eliminated more than 180 terrorists and detained more than 500 militants [1]. Between 2011 and 2015, 20 terrorist attacks were prevented, 440 terrorists and 1,700 members of international terrorist organizations were eliminated. More than 180 people were put on the wanted list, 3,250 improvised explosive devices, more than 10,000 weapons, and more than 52 tons of explosives were seized. In addition, the Convention on Combating Extremism for 2016–2018 was adopted, which was aimed at strengthening security [2]. Another significant problem that the SCO is facing is the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic substances. A three-level mechanism of anti-drug agencies was established (2009), which includes: meetings of the heads of the competent authorities of the SCO member states, working groups and meetings of senior officials (SDL). The main tasks of these groups are: preparation and implementation of projects to combat drug trafficking, development of interstate programs and plans to counteract illicit drug trafficking, and organization of joint activities and research in the field of implementation of anti-drug legal policy. Initially, this three-level mechanism was created to implement the Agreement between the SCO member states on combating illicit drug trafficking, adopted in 2004, when the drug trafficking in Afghanistan was being destroyed [3]. Afghanistan was considered a global monopoly on the production of heroin. In many provinces, there were centers where opium was processed and heroin was obtained. According to the Federal Service of Russia, more than 800 tons of heroin were produced annually,

which passed through both Russia and Central Asia. Speaking about the results, we can note the developed anti-terrorist strategies that allow us to fight drug crime. The fact that these strategies are effective is shown by the fact that over the past 5 years, more than 69 tons of heroin were seized, which is about 14% of the global figure, and more than 75 tons of precursors were seized. In addition, joint drug control activities were held in 2016 in New York and in 2017 in Vienna [2].

## **2.2 The Direction of Economic Development and Cooperation**

This area is currently one of the most significant. Since 2001, many documents have been signed concerning the creation of a single trade and economic space. In 2005, the Interbank Association was established, which helped to establish banking relations between the states and became the basis for the creation of the SCO Bank. In 2006, the Business Council of this organization was established, which is aimed at attracting investment and further development of economic cooperation within the organization [4]. Speaking about the development of trade, it should be noted a significant increase in the foreign trade turnover of the countries from 2001 to 2011. By 2001, the average annual growth in trade between the countries was 30%, that is, 12 billion US dollars, and by 2007 there was a significant increase, where the trade turnover amounted to 67 billion US dollars. 500 million dollars [5]. By 2011, the trade turnover of the SCO member states also increased. For example, the trade turnover of China with the participating countries reached \$113.41 billion; Russia- \$109.5 billion; Kazakhstan - \$48.22 billion; Kyrgyzstan - \$3.59 billion; Uzbekistan – \$13.68 billion. US \$ [6]. It should be noted that by 2020, the trade turnover between the countries began to decline due to the pandemic, so the main task of the organization is to “revive” trade and economic cooperation. In our opinion, despite all the positive aspects of this cooperation and attempts to restore it, there is a discord among the States of this organization, which leads to the question of the possibility of the continued existence of this organization. For example, the People’s Republic of China provided the Silk Road Economic Belt plan in 2013, which did not receive adequate support from the other member States, since each participating country primarily pursues its own goals. For example, from the very beginning, the Russian Federation saw more military potential in the SCO than economic potential, and the People’s Republic of China saw more economic cooperation in the SCO. China is an important object that is of interest to many countries. Most states, choosing a partner between the United States and China, tend to lean more towards the People’s Republic of China. This suggests that the PRC has a significant status on the world stage and the possible discord in the SCO may not affect China as much as other countries of this organization. Thus, we cannot say that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a model of economic cooperation. It should turn from an organization that pursues only Russian-Chinese goals in Central Asia into a more integrated and cohesive project.

## **2.3 The Sphere of Energy Resources**

This area can be considered not only the most important component of economic cooperation, but also the most controversial and complex area of the organization. The first

program that touched upon cooperation in the field of energy resources was the program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation, which indicated the need for the development of hydrocarbon raw materials. In 2006, the Russian Federation proposed the creation of an Energy Club, which caused controversy among the participating countries [7]. Firstly, Uzbekistan did not support this project, stating that it was not feasible; secondly, Kazakhstan put forward its own project – the Asian Energy Strategy, and thirdly, Chinese experts criticized the Russian idea. Perhaps this criticism was caused by the competition between the countries for influence in Central Asia, including for the market of energy resources. Despite this, the participating countries, with the exception of Uzbekistan, signed an agreement on cooperation within the framework of the Energy Club. In addition, there are many projects and programs aimed at the development of energy infrastructure. Among them are: the Kenkiyak-Kumkol oil pipeline, where oil is supplied from Kazakhstan to the Chinese market (construction was completed in 2009); the Moinak hydroelectric power station, which is located in Kazakhstan (commissioned in 2012); the gas pipeline from Uzbekistan to the People’s Republic of China for the transit of Turkmen gas; the supply of Uzbek and Russian natural gas to China; cooperation between the countries on nuclear energy issues and many other projects. In our opinion, cooperation in this direction allows us to identify both advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages, it is necessary to highlight the possibility of access to foreign markets of countries that have energy potential and for “barter transactions”, as well as the profit of transit countries from energy transfer services. The disadvantages include the existence of contradictions between states (rejection of projects, the prevalence of their own interests, etc.), which affect all areas of cooperation, as well as the uneven economic and energy development of the SCO member states. In our opinion, despite all the above, cooperation in the energy sector is an undoubted plus, since further cooperation will open up new opportunities in the development, production, transportation and processing of energy resources, as well as turn the SCO into a self-sufficient energy system.

### **3 China’s Role in the SCO**

The People’s Republic of China, which initiated the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, undoubtedly occupies a leading place in the development of this organization. According to some Chinese researchers, the main tasks that prompted the Chinese government to initiate the creation of the SCO were to ensure stability in the region, covering the “rear” with the help of Central Asian countries; to develop economic cooperation, including trade and import of energy resources; to contain the separatist forces of “East Turkestan»; increasing their influence in the Central Asian region, as well as improving relations with the Russian Federation and recognizing each other’s interests in Central Asia.

#### **3.1 China’s Role in Economic Sphere**

In September 2001, at a time of destabilization in the region and the intervention of the US military, Beijing declared the importance of institutionalizing the organization. After

securing the main documents, China proposes to expand the organization's activities, and, gradually, the SCO begins to cooperate in the economic sphere. In 2003, the PRC made a proposal to create a free trade zone, which would further affect the energy sector. This proposal is reflected in the program of long-term trade and economic cooperation. In addition, the PRC begins accelerated construction of the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline and buys American shares in the Kazakh oil sector, thereby intensifying cooperation in the field of energy resources with the countries of Central Asia, and also offers to take soft loans to partners up to 900 million US dollars to increase the volume of Chinese trade [8]. In addition, China has actively offered economic assistance for the development of some SCO institutions (to speed up the process of economic cooperation, as well as to make the remaining member states dependent on the PRC). Since 2004, the People's Republic of China has begun to develop a transport network with the countries of Central Asia, investing more than 50 million US dollars [9]. Since 2005, China has been importing energy resources from Central Asian countries, and subsequently opening oil pipelines (2009–2011), which lead to economic development, as well as cooperation in the field of energy resources. The Chinese government bought the assets of the Canadian company PetroKazakhstan, and in December of the same year, the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline was opened, which in fact meant the dominant role of China in the organization. The global economic crisis, which has affected the Russian economy, has become a new stage for the People's Republic of China to strengthen its position in the organization. In 2008, China imported more than 113 thousand barrels of oil from Central Asian countries, which accounted for more than 3% of its annual imports. In addition, the trade turnover by the same year increased 4 times compared to 2004 and reached 30 billion US dollars [8]. By 2009, the China-Central Asia gas pipeline was opened, and by 2010, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was opened, which transports oil from Western Kazakhstan.

### **3.2 Humanitarian Sphere**

Beijing also began to actively promote the idea of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. In 2005, Hu Jintao offered to train more than 1,500 specialists in China. This policy could only mean consolidating its leading role in the organization, as well as spreading Chinese culture outside. By 2007, the Chinese government had awarded scholarships to students from SCO member states.

### **3.3 Security**

In addition to the economic component, China also pays great attention to maintaining security in the region. This is reflected in the joint exercises in which the PRC actively participated, providing a large number of military personnel and participating in operations to destroy drug trafficking in Afghanistan. China also supports the Russian initiative to combat cybercrime. Thus, it should be noted that the "Chinese approach" to the activities of the SCO really exists and China's policy changes depending on changes in the international arena. The Chinese government initially saw the organization as a solution to its problems in the field of security, and then economic cooperation, as well as in the field of energy resources. For Beijing, the Central Asian region has become

a guarantor of the supply of energy resources and transport routes for communication with other regions. The lack of consensus on many issues led to the fact that China began to conclude bilateral agreements with the countries of Central Asia, thereby consolidating its dominance and driving the countries of this region into economic dependence. The proposal to create a free trade zone only proves the Chinese government's zeal for leadership in the region and control of Central Asian resources.

## **4 Russia in the SCO**

### **4.1 Security**

After the signing of the agreement on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia very clearly outlined its goals: to speed up the meetings of defense ministers and meetings of heads of law enforcement agencies. The main goal of the Russian side was to ensure security in the region. This was due to the unstable situation in Afghanistan and the Taliban's focus on Central Asian countries. After the approval of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), the first terrorist exercises were held in Tashkent, in which the Russian side actively participated. At the summit in Tashkent, Vladimir Putin put forward the initiative to create a SCO Contact Group to ensure security in the Central Asian region [1]. Moreover, Russia actively participated in anti-terrorist exercises in 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The Russian side also put forward the Information Security Doctrine to develop a common strategy to combat cyberterrorism.

### **4.2 Economy**

Speaking about the economic cooperation of the Russian Federation with the SCO member states, it should be noted that Russia supported the project of the Interbank Association and the Business Council for the establishment of banking and investment relations. In addition, Russia is actively developing trade in agricultural products with the member States of the organization. For example, the export of the Russian Federation to the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017 amounted to 665.3 million US dollars [10].

### **4.3 Energy Resources**

Touching upon the issue of cooperation in the field of energy resources, it should be noted that in 2006, the Russian Federation proposed the creation of another structure – the SCO Energy Club. This project was supposed to lead to the identification of the main interests of the participating countries, to the expansion of issues related to energy security, as well as to the consideration of the possibility of joint implementation of projects related to energy resources. From 2011 to 2013, a Memorandum on the full approval of this project was signed. In addition, the Skovorodino-Daqing oil pipeline was opened and Rosneft' began exporting oil to China via the ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean) pipeline by 2011. However, despite the attempt to engage in various areas of the organization, the Russian Federation sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

as a platform for implementing projects related to ensuring security in the region. In our opinion, the Russian Federation is primarily aimed at creating projects that allow protecting borders from external threats, rather than at internal integration of countries. In this regard, Russia is losing its economic importance in Central Asia.

## 5 China-Russia Relations Within the SCO

At the moment, the interaction between Russia and China within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is significant for its activities, but at the same time, the relations between the two countries can be considered changeable: from joint projects to competition. Initially, the SCO was supposed to become a kind of platform that took into account the interests of the PRC, the Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries, but later it became a “guide” to the development of competition between China and Russia for the Central Asian region. Russian-Chinese relations were initially quite optimistic. For example, it should be noted “bilateral cooperation in a multilateral format” in the field of security, namely, the conduct of military exercises in 2005–2007 [11]. The People’s Republic of China also supported the Russian initiative to develop a strategy to combat cybercrime. In addition, by 2010, cooperation in the field of energy resources improved – the Skovorodino-Daqing oil pipeline was opened and Rosneft’ began to supply oil to China through the ESPO pipeline. Nevertheless, it is impossible to talk about a strong Sino-Russian friendship within the SCO, since the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are the main competitors for a dominant role in the Central Asian region. Despite the fact that at the initial stage of the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the two powers found common solutions on topical issues, interacted on the basis of consensus and mutual respect, later they had a different vision of the organization’s activities. The People’s Republic of China sees the future of the SCO in trade, economic and energy cooperation, and explicitly declares this. Russia pays more attention to military-political cooperation. However, Russia’s attempts to strengthen trade and economic relations and cooperation in the field of energy resources with the Central Asian countries do not cause China to be optimistic, and therefore, there is a “discord” between the powers. For example, when the Chinese government proposed to create a free trade zone and develop transport infrastructure between Central Asia and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the Russian government rejected this idea, fearing China’s leading position in the Central Asian region. Despite this, the People’s Republic of China begins active cooperation with the Central Asian countries and signs many agreements related to the economy and energy resources, consolidating its position in this region. By 2006, Vladimir Putin put forward the initiative to create an Energy Club within the SCO. However, this proposal was criticized by Chinese experts and the Chinese government did not support this initiative, but proposed to make the body exclusively advisory. Despite the active cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Central Asian countries, Beijing in the 2005’s, 2010’s, and 2012’s offers the countries of the region to take concessional lending (trying to make them more dependent on the Chinese economy), which involves the purchase of only Chinese goods for this amount. The government of the Russian Federation refused such conditions, considering them unprofitable, however, some Central Asian countries accepted this

offer. This economic influence of China causes Moscow to fear losing its equality and becoming dependent on Beijing, so Russia develops other regional organizations (CSTO, EEU (former EurAsEC)), ensuring its protection in Central Asia. Summing up, it should be noted that the Sino-Russian relations, initially built on the basis of mutual trust and mutual respect, led to the dominant role of China in the region and the fear of the Russian Federation to become a “junior partner” of the PRC. At the moment, the SCO is an instrument of the People’s Republic of China for the realization of its goals, while the interests of the Russian Federation have been relegated to the background. Naturally, this is a well-founded fear of Chinese influence in the region from the Russian Federation. If China’s dominance in Central Asia remains the same, then the fears will become a reality and Moscow will indeed become a junior partner of Beijing. Summing up all of the above, the conclusion is that Russia needs China more than Russia needs China.

## 6 Results and Prospects of Cooperation

According to the results of our research, the following problems of interaction between Russia and China can be identified: the rivalry between the two main members – China and Russia (pursuing only their own goals, it is difficult to talk about mutual respect, declared as the SCO motto); the lack of a certain mechanism that would monitor the implementation of approved projects; insufficient activity in the field of trade and economic cooperation.

However, despite the above-mentioned problems, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has become a guarantor of security in Central Asia. Paying attention to the statistics, we can only notice the positive dynamics of this cooperation in the military sphere. For example, conducting joint exercises, strengthening border controls, combating terrorism, countering the recruitment of individuals and legal entities, and combating drug trafficking are only half of what Member States are doing in the field of security. It is also necessary to note certain projects in the field of economy that have led to an increase in trade turnover. In addition, the participating countries hold annual meetings where cooperation in various areas is discussed, as well as events to strengthen friendship between the states are held. For example, in August 2019, the issue of creating a system of legal services in the SCO space and cooperation between the legal services of the participating countries was actively discussed. And in 2020, within the framework of the SCO, an exhibition of children’s paintings was opened to promote the culture of different states.

Summing up, we can safely say that, despite the fact that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has recently been experiencing a “crisis” caused by the above-mentioned problems and the coronavirus pandemic, it has a right to exist, since certain results have been made over so many years. This is evidenced by the statements of the ministers at the video conference of May 13, 2020, which called for the unity of the member states in this difficult period of the SCO.



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# A New Centennial Dream: China's Second Centennial Plan and Sino-US Relations

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**Abstract.** In this paper, I tried to explore what China is aiming for by analyzing the content that was brought to public at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China in July 2021 and the essence of a long-term plan presented for the 2035 future vision. The Chinese government defined it as ‘getting up’ in the Mao era, ‘getting rich’ in the Deng Xiaoping era, and ‘getting stronger’ in the Xi Jinping era. Xi Jinping also declared that China would stand proudly against anyone in the world that would challenge the country and achieve a victory by using strong military power accumulated through socialist modernization. He also stressed that China would contribute as maintaining an order in the international community by forming new global power relationships.

In response to China's challenge, the United States is essentially adopting a policy of containment of China. Although US China policies slightly very depending on a American regime in power, the policy will to maintain the US-centered world order has not changed. Under these circumstances, it is expected that China's responsible international role could influence China's status in the future.

**Keywords:** Chinese Communist Party (CCP) · Future vision for 2035 · US regime · China's Challenge · Xi Jinping · Biden

## 1 Preface

After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China began asserting China's interests by stating that it was an independent activist. At the U.S.-China summit in June 2013, Xi Jinping proposed a “new great-power relationship” to Obama and expressed his intention to reorganize it into an international order in which China's interests are guaranteed. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping, who revealed China's status both internally and externally, presented a vision of realizing the dream of China and a strong military by 2050, thereby completing a powerful socialist country with Chinese characteristics.

In the midst of such a macro blueprint, on July 1, 2021, Xi Jinping raised his voice to the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. In his congratulations, he looked back on the splendid history of the 100-year struggle of the Chinese Communist Party, looking forward to the bright future of the great revival of the Chinese nation. For 100 years after the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921, the goal was to establish a moderately prosperous society in all parts of China, stating that he

had already solved the problem of absolute poverty. Accordingly, he vowed to accelerate the construction of a powerful modern socialist state as the goal of the nation's second century.

After the Opium War in 1840, China experienced unprecedented difficulties of being a semi-colonial country, and realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation became the great dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. A roadmap for building a powerful modern socialist state and economic and social implementation was also presented. Among them, the modernization of the national defense and military stands out. As a steppingstone for realizing China's dream, the goal is to achieve mechanization and informatization by 2020, modernize the military by 2035, and create a strong, world-class military by 2050. However, China's military dreams can bring about changes not only in East Asia but also in the global security order. The pursuit of military prowess can inevitably be seen as a new challenge that requires reorganization of the existing US-centered security order. What is the US policy on this?

As China's socialist modernization encompasses defense and military modernization issues and affects the US-led world order, previous studies have been interested in historical changes in Sino-US relations. Jungnam Lee analyzed changes in China's perception of Sino-US relations by focusing on 'stake holders', 'G2' and 'new type of great power relationship' [1]. Recently, Hüseyin Korkmaz et al. used the hybrid cold war concept by comparing the US-China relations with those of the Cold War [2].

This paper intends to analyze the direction and goal of China after Xi Jinping took office in 2012. In particular, through the content emphasized at the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China in July 2021, I would like to analyze what China values and how it relates to the long-term plan for 2035. The reason for analyzing the declaration of the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China is that it contains a statement addressed to the world, away from the Chinese-centered celebration. Therefore, it is possible to clearly see what China is aiming for. This paper will also analyze what kind of policy the US, which stands in opposition to China's new challenges, is pursuing toward China.

## **2 China's Aim to be a Powerful Socialist Modern State**

### **2.1 China that 'Has Stood Up'**

After the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921, the People's Republic of China was established in 1949 after the anti-Japanese war and civil war. When Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China at the fortress of Tiananmen, the Chinese people shouted that this is the era of "rising". The Deng Xiaoping era was an era of "getting wealthy" [3] through reform and opening up, while the Xi Jinping era was an era of "getting strong". With the rapid development of the Chinese nation from the era of 'rising' and 'wealth' to the era of 'strengthening', the realization of the revival of China has become an unstoppable in the flow of history [4].

The Chinese leadership advocated the "new type of strong country relations" in 2012, hoping that China's presence could be revealed in the reorganization of the world order. The reason why the Chinese leadership expresses confidence to pursue the future

is because they understand that the revolutionary spirit has developed dramatically in the self-revolution of the Communist Party and the social revolution of the new era [5].

This confidence is also confirmed by Xi Jinping's remarks at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, held on July 1, 2021, when more than 70,000 delegates gathered at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. "After the Opium War in 1840, China became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and the country was humiliated... After that, realizing the great revival of the Chinese people became the biggest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation" [6]. Xi Jinping emphasized that going through the Northern Expedition War, the Land Revolutionary War, the Anti-Japanese War, and the War of Liberation, "established the People's Republic of China as the master of the people... and completely abolished all privileges of unequal treaties and imperialism imposed by the great powers on China, and restored the Chinese people's lives. It has created the fundamental social conditions for a great revival" [6].

What should be emphasized in Xi Jinping's remarks is the expression that "China has risen" in the declaration that "the era of the Chinese people has arisen, the time when the Chinese people were slaughtered and abused by others is over" [6]. The specific meaning of Xi Jinping's expression that it stands up, and what it intends to do when it stands up will be of utmost things of interest. "China has risen" means that the problem of absolute poverty has been solved, as confirmed by the particular emphasis that it has "built a prosperous society suitable for China and historically solved the problem of absolute poverty" [6].

The goal of China to escape from absolute poverty, which had been the goal for 100 years since the founding of the Communist Party of China, is to completely build a powerful socialist modern state for the next 100 years. Building a powerful socialist modern state and striving for the goal of fighting for the second hundred years is the great revival of the Chinese nation and the realization of China's dream [7].

The meaning of socialist modernization has also changed with the times. At the 1st National People's Congress in September 1954, the concept of four modernizations in industry, agriculture, transportation business and national defense was presented for the first time. At the 3rd National People's Congress in December 1964, Zhou Enlai (周恩来) envisioned the realization of a socialist modern state in agriculture, industry, national defense and modern science, and technology as four modernization goals. In December 1979, Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) called the "Chinese style of four Modernizations" is moderately prosperous society. Then at the 13th National People's Congress in October 1987, the "Three steps" development strategy was presented. The first step was to solve the problem of poverty, the second step was to reach the moderately prosperous stage at the end of the 20th century, and the third step is to reach the wealthy stage in the middle of the 21st century, basically realizing modernization [8]. From 1953 to the present, the concept of socialist modernization contained in the 13 five-year plans has gradually changed. What is the modernization of socialism emphasized on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party?

Xi Jinping said that the Chinese Communist Party has greatly changed the direction and process of the development of the Chinese people, the future and destiny of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, and the trends and patterns of global development. Xi said, "I solemnly declared to the world that the courageous and persistent struggle

of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people has made the Chinese people stand up and made a great leap forward to becoming wealthy and strong, and that the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical process” [6].

This declaration can also be seen as a declaration to change the trends and patterns of global development, not just emphasizing the future and fate of China. So, what will be done to change China's future and further the pattern of global development? The first is to adhere to the strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party: “The history of more than 180 years since modern times, 100 years since the founding of the Communist Party of China, and more than 70 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China sufficiently prove that without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new country and no great revival of the Chinese nation. History and the people have chosen the Communist Party of China. The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the greatest strength of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and it is the foundation and lifeline of the party and the state” [6]. Therefore, he continues, “to fully implement the Communist Party's strong military ideology in the new era, adhere to the Party's absolute leadership over the People's Army, build the People's Army into a world-class military force, and defend national sovereignty, security and development interests, we have to mobilize stronger capabilities and more reliable means” [6].

One of the things that the Chinese Communist Party emphasizes in order to maintain the leadership of the Party is the theory of party ideology. At the February 20, 2021 Party Learning and Education Mobilization Conference (党史学习教育动员大会), Xi Jinping emphasized that “the history of the Party is the history of continuous Marxist Sinicization and the history of constantly creating theories” [9], These words were highlighted in nine items at the centennial celebration.

Analyzing the nine essential items, [10] there are two major directions: one is that the Chinese Communist Party should lead, and the other is to spur national defense and military modernization, calling for great national unity, so that the Chinese people can bravely face any dangerous challenge and win.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, China are adhering to and improving the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and promoting the modernization of the state governance system and governance capacity. Under the strong leadership of the Communist Party, the nation will build a modernized strong army, defend the international order as a builder of world peace, bravely face any danger and challenge, and win to promote the revival of the nation. In other words, China's forward-looking direction externally is clear in that it seeks to revive the nation by building a world order based on a strong military and fighting and winning against anything that challenges it.

Xi also reaffirmed that he would maintain ‘one country, two systems’ by defending national sovereignty, security, and development interests as a world-class people's army. This emphasizes reunification with Taiwan, along with a ‘promise’ to ensure long-term prosperity and stable governance of Hong Kong and Macao. “Resolving the Taiwan problem and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland is the steadfast historical task of the CCP and the common aspiration of all Chinese people” [6]. By internationally

declaring its resolve to “resolutely crush all plans for Taiwan independence and create a better future for national revitalization,” [6] it clearly showed the direction of what China is going to ‘get up’ and do. Although the ‘umbrella revolution’ occurred in Hong Kong because China’s promises to Hong Kong were not kept properly, China is still shouting only ‘promise’ as a slogan.

The road to a strong army with Chinese characteristics is to adhere to the omnidirectional promotion of political construction, reform, science and technology, human resources, and military rule based on the law. In order to create a future by taking history as a lesson, we need to accelerate the modernization of our national defense and military, and we will create such a strong military to “protect regional and global peace” [6].

In addition, by emphasizing that China does not oppress and dominate other countries and people, it also tried to dispel the “worrying worldview” of China’s rise. In addition, the Communist Party of China is focused on the future and destiny of humankind, and while advancing together with all progressive forces in the world, it intends to convey the message that it is always a builder of world peace, a contributor to world development, and a protector of the international order. “The Communist Party of China, together with all peace-loving countries and peoples, inherits the common values of all mankind in promoting peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom, cooperates, does not oppose, is not closed, is open to each other. We will not play a zero-sum game for profit and win-win, and we will lead the wheel of history to a bright future by opposing hegemonic and power politics” [6]. As a result, based on the communist-centered militarization, the goal is to be able to win against any challenge in the global order.

On the one hand, he not only showed off his power internationally, but also showed the image of a benevolent father domestically. Xi’s expression of “having the people in our hearts and working for the people” [11] emphasized the ‘people’s idea’. He emphasized that the party fundamentally guarantees that the party can triumph over all difficulties and dangers by boarding a boat with the people in a storm, sharing life and death, and maintaining blood and blood relations from beginning to end. He said that if the party gains the people’s trust and the people’s support, they can overcome any difficulties and there is nothing it cannot overcome. “The people are the creators of history, and the people are true heroes. Let us believe in and follow the people,” [11] he said.

China is practically ruled under the strong leadership of the Communist Party, but at the bottom of it, it emphasized the need to support the leadership by appealing to the people for their will to usher in a new era while believing in and following the people, the creators and heroes of history. “Realizing China’s dream of a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by uniting all peoples under the strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve the goal of building a powerful modernized socialist country” [11] is the core content of China’s declaration to the world. Of course, this is just a rosy explanation of what China wants. Whether this can be achieved as desired will have to take into account external relations as well as internal circumstances in China.

## 2.2 Future Vision for 2035

The future direction pursued by the Chinese leadership can also be confirmed in the content presented in the [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has

enacted the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and a proposal for the future vision for 2035 (abbreviated as vision for 2035) [12] promulgated on November 3, 2020. The 5th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in-depth analysis of the international and domestic situation and proposed the 14th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development and 15 visions for 2035. The key point is that after showing off the achievements of socialist modernization and market economy development, it can be said that they requested unity for the safe construction of China through national defense and military modernization.

In vision for 2035 emphasized that “55.75 million rural poor have been lifted out of poverty, and food production of more than 130 billion yuan has been stabilized for five consecutive years. The anti-pollution control has been increased and the ecological environment has been greatly improved. Openness to the outside world continues to expand, and the achievements of the ‘One Belt and One Road’ Initiative are abundant. People’s living standards have improved significantly, higher education has entered the popularization stage, and more than 60 million new jobs have been created in urban areas” [12]. He praised himself for achieving important strategic achievements in economic development, social stability, and improvement of the standard of living, as well as in the prevention and control of the global coronavirus. Therefore, the efforts of the past 100 years have been evaluated as “laying a solid foundation on which to start a new journey for the construction of a socialist modernization country”, [12] thus he wanted to complete the goals of the 13th Five-Year Plan and focus on the 14th Five-Year Plan.

The implementation goals for 2035 are presented, which is to build a “five unity (五位一体)” of economic construction, political construction, cultural construction, social construction, and ecological civilization construction, as well as building a ‘four all over strategy (四个全面)’ of comprehensively modernized socialist state, deepening reform, governing by law, and strictly following the Communist Party strategy.

It is noteworthy, with the change of the times, that part of the 2035 plan is to strengthen the national strategic science and technology capabilities. Specifically, artificial intelligence, quantum information, integrated circuits, life health, brain science, biological breeding, aerospace science and technology, deep-sea and other high-tech fields, aiming for the future-oriented and strategic national major science and technology to implement the project.

What is needed to deepen the development of advanced science is to firmly establish a manufacturing powerful country, a quality powerful country, a network powerful country and a digital China. It is also necessary to upgrade the industrial base and modernize the industrial belt, and improve the quality efficiency and core competitiveness of the economy. The plan is to establish a new system for broader reform and opening up, improve the free trade trial area, and continue to promote autonomous reform and construction of the Hainan Free Trade Port to manage the systematic and stable Chinese market and play a meaningful role in international cooperation.

While emphasizing the expansion of external opening and international cooperation, strengthen propaganda, and education for national security, it is necessary to “firmly safeguard the security, institutional security and ideological security of state power, and comprehensively strengthen network security systems and capacity building to penetrate

the hostile forces” to strictly prevent and crack down on destruction, overthrow, and division” [12].

For the sake of national security, China wants to implement a military strategic policy appropriate to the circumstances of the times, and it is considered important to adhere to the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party over the People’s Army. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, “Accelerate the intelligent convergence development of mechanization and informatization, strengthen military training preparations in all directions, and strengthen strategic capabilities to defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests, the goal of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the military in 2027” [12].

Defense and military modernization are indispensable here. Therefore, it was declared that it would strengthen combat capabilities suitable for the times, establish a joint operation system, modernize weapons and equipment, and accelerate the development of intelligent weapons and equipment. All of this is being done under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. “Adhering to and improving the multi-party cooperation and political consultation system, and exerting the unique advantages of socialist consultation democracy. Adhering to and perfecting the regional national autonomy system, strengthening the consciousness of the Chinese national community, uniting and fighting together for all nationalities, and promoting common prosperity and development. Complete the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics, promote judicial justice, and develop the cause of human rights in all directions” [12].

In addition, China intends to solve the problem of ‘peaceful development and reunification of the country between the two sides’ by strengthening the consciousness of the Chinese nation. Therefore, improving systems and policies to ensure equal treatment with mainland China for Taiwan, supporting Taiwanese companies to participate in the ‘One Belt and One Road’ development, and supporting qualified Taiwanese companies to list on the mainland, we will be wary of separatist activities for Taiwan’s independence and will resolutely suppress it,” [12] he stressed.

Aiming for Taiwan’s unification, foreign exchanges are also promoted in all fields to promote new types of international relations and the construction of a community with a shared future for humankind. Specifically, it intends to promote coordination and cooperation between great powers, deepen relations with neighboring countries, strengthen solidarity and cooperation with developing countries, and actively develop global partnerships. Therefore, in the future, China will actively participate in the reform and construction of the global governance system, strengthen the construction of foreign-related legal systems, strengthen the use of international law, and maintain an international system with the United Nations as its core and an international order based on international law. And jointly resolved global challenges. It aims to strengthen China’s status internationally by actively participating in international cooperation on the prevention and control of the current epidemic and promoting the construction of a human health and health community.

From 1953 to the present, China has made rapid progress from poverty to prosperity and wealth. The Communist Party pledged to do everything in its power to build a new 100-year plan and build a modernized socialist country. He made it clear that development is the basis and key to solving all China’s problems. This is in line with



socialism with Chinese characteristics reaching a more advanced stage in a new era. It can be said that China's goal of building a fully modernized socialist country and striving for the second hundred years as a goal is a significant milestone in China's development process.

As emphasized in future vision for 2035, realizing a new development structure with a new development theory at a new stage of development [13] can make China's dream come true. In the end, it can be seen that based on the development theory that matches the current stage, it aims to create a new development structure while leading the future-oriented action to create a superior position internationally.

Is this direction an unavoidable choice due to its international structure or is it a natural policy choice that comes from China's expansion of its opening policy?

### 3 China's Challenge and U.S.'s Policy Toward China

#### 3.1 China's Challenge

When the US financial crisis of 2007–2008 caused a global economic crisis, the role theory of China emerged. By raising the question of the hegemonic position of the United States in the international order, attention was paid to the transformation of the power structure and the position of China in that order [14–17]. In March 2007, when Ferguson used the concept of Chimerica in the British Sunday Telegraph, the G2 theory was used in Sino-US relations, and China and the United States were asked to play a joint leadership role in the global economic situation [18]. On January 12, 2009, on the 30th anniversary of Sino-US relations, Kissinger and Brzezinski publicly argued that the G2 should be elevated from an economic perspective to a strategic one [19, 20].

In London on April 1, 2009, President Obama mentioned the role of China, stating that China-US relations are the most important bilateral relations in the world [21]. On the other hand, Hu Jintao said that the two countries should build active, cooperative and comprehensive Sino-US relations in the 21st century through joint efforts. In a meeting with President Obama on November 19, 2009, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said, "China is still a developing country that is developing economically, and while pursuing independent diplomacy, it does not form alliances with any country or group of countries, all countries should decide jointly, not two countries at will," [22] and opposed the G2 expression.

However, on the other hand, since China, a developing country, should focus on solving the problems it is facing, it should focus on solving domestic problems [23]. It was also recognized that the theory of responsibility for China claimed by the US is only a variant of the theory of the Chinese threat, and that the US policy toward China has not fundamentally changed [24]. In any case, the task of the times is how China will establish its identity in a situation where the United States, a superpower, leads the international order. In the report of the 18th Party Congress held in November 2012, China emphasized that China should strive for world peace while developing its position in the international community [25]. Xi Jinping, while visiting the United States in February 2012, said that although China is a developing country, and there are differences in national power and international order between China and the United States, it is the most important bilateral relationship between the United States and the world, and without cooperation

between the two countries, peace in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the world cannot be guaranteed. So he mentioned the new superpower relationship.

The new superpower relationship means that China and the United States must cooperate to pursue world peace and stability while trusting and respecting each other. As a way to materialize this, on June 20, 2012, Hu Jintao proposed continuous communication between China and the United States, mutual exchanges, stability of Sino-US relations, and shared responsibility between China and the United States [26].

China presented the C2 strategy differentiated from G2. The C2, which can be interpreted as ‘mutual regulation’, coordination, cooperation, supplementation, and ‘community of destiny’, was viewed as a principle leading a new Sino-US relationship, and it was urged to actively revise the G2 concept. As China and the United States develop great-power relations based on equality, trust can have a strong vitality [27].

The reason China is trying to exert its international influence in line with the new era is because it believes that it has developed faithfully to the point of “getting up” and “getting rich” and “strong” domestically. Xi Jinping said, “Since reform and opening up, China has experienced various external storms and shocks, but has been able to safely create risks because it handles its own affairs well and sets the direction of development in China” [13]. Concentrating competence on doing one’s job well and emphasizing good domestic circulation is not about locking the door and promoting development. However, in order to respond holistically to the changing international environment, domestic circulation is smoothly formed, attracting global resource factors and forming a new advantage in international competition and cooperation [13].

China has aspirations to have a significant impact on human history by building socialist modernization and creating common wealth. It has “grand goals and grand blueprints” to not only create wealth for 1.4 billion Chinese, but also to have a meaningful impact on the world. It was seen as a historic mission given to the Communist Party of China in the new era to achieve a comprehensively prosperous society and a socialist modernization country, and then to strive towards the dream as a powerful socialist modern state.

Xi Jinping said that the current international order is not perfect and reform is needed. First, it has a multivariate international structure with related international organizations centered on the United Nations, including world trade organizations and the World Bank. However, this reflects the values and interests of Western countries, led by Western countries from the design stage.

The establishment of related system rules was also based on the situation of international political and economic development in the early postwar period, but it was found that it was difficult to effectively respond to various problems due to the diversification of international actions following the global economic change, making it difficult to maintain a balance while developing safely [28]. It was difficult to properly reflect the post-war international order in the development of each country, so they could not adapt to national changes. Therefore, he emphasized that even for proper development, changes must be made in accordance with the circumstances of each country and the demands of the times [28]. Xi Jinping emphasized that reforming and perfecting the current international system should develop a fairer and rational direction, rather than creating another organization [29].

It can be seen that military confidence was the basis for China's attempt to play an international role. China's military expenditure in 2021 was announced at \$20.916 billion, an increase of 6.8% from 2020. Up until 2014, the increase in military spending declined from double-digit to single-digit, but it is still on a steep upward trend [30]. Recently, during a tour of an air force unit, Xi Jinping showed off China's aggressive military capabilities, emphasizing that it should be "equipped with combat capabilities to win wars". China's military capabilities and military strategy are being converted into more aggressive operational concepts by strengthening various advanced weapons and aircraft carrier capabilities [31].

China's attempt to create an advantage by reorganizing the international order while emphasizing new development can be seen as challenging the US-centered international order. This can be said to be China's determination to actively implement a strategy in which China has an edge while emphasizing cooperation and competition in international relations. What policy is the US taking against China's move?

### 3.2 U.S. Policy Toward China

After Clinton cited China's role as a responsible superpower in 1997, in 2005 Robert Zoellick urged China to become a "responsible stakeholder" [1, 32]. The Obama administration, launched in 2009, defined China as a responsible stakeholder and demanded its greater role in international affairs.

The Obama administration has adopted a "pivot to Asia" policy, emphasizing solving problems in accordance with ideology and values, and international norms and procedures. In early 2010, tensions between China and the United States increased due to the US arms sale to Taiwan, President Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama, Sino-US trade frictions, the Cheonan Fleet incident and the Nansha Islands incident. In this situation, there were also questions about whether China and the United States could properly play their role as G2 [33].

The Trump administration, which emerged advocating America first and making America great again, also recognized the importance of the alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region. Through the US-China summit, the 'China responsibility theory' was imprinted on the North Korean nuclear issue, and the cooperation relationship could be maintained.

China has also pursued its own role and identity to keep the international order stable in line with its status as a responsible power [34]. Hu Jintao, at meeting with President Bush in 2006, said, "Sino-US relations go beyond the scope of bilateral relations and are growing in global influence and strategic importance. China and the United States have broad and important common strategic interests and share a common responsibility for maintaining world peace and promoting common development. China and the United States are not only stakeholders, but also constructive partners. Both sides should work together to fully develop a constructive and cooperative relationship between China and the United States" [35]. This can be seen as China's multifaceted efforts to secure its status not only in Sino-US relations but also internationally.

In June 2013, Xi Jinping said to the United States, "The Pacific Ocean is large enough to contain both the United States and China," [36] and emphasized China's role in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to avoid conflict and confrontation, to respect each other,

and to seek win-win common prosperity, it was proposed to establish a ‘new type of superpower relationship’. At the 5th China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in Washington, USA on July 10–11, 2013, State Councilor Yang Jietsu suggested the following: The new superpower relationship aims to lead to win-win through cooperation based on mutual respect between China and the United States, such as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other, respect for each development path choice, and respect for their own interests and differences. He tried to get the US side to agree with China’s proposal for a new superpower relationship. The US side mentioned that it recognizes restraint in state actions and observance of international norms as basic premises for establishing a new superpower relationship. However, the US side said that the basic implications of self-restraint and compliance with the norms are respect for the universality of human rights, respect for intellectual property rights, and protection of free navigation in the Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, as China is not complying with these aspects, it is argued that the establishment of a new superpower relationship proposed by China is premature [37].

The core of the Trump administration’s foreign policy was ‘America First’ and ‘Peace through Strength’. To this end, the Trump administration increased defense spending and declared “Making our Military Strong Again”. In the 2017 National Security Strategy report, it was stated that China influences other countries’ free trade, sovereignty, and regional stability in the South China Sea [38]. In the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, the United States should continue to play an important role in stabilizing the Indo-Pacific region [39]. In 2020, “The United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” challenges the U.S. government to keep its promises to China as it continues to safeguard U.S. interests and strengthen U.S. influence [40].

The emphasis on Asia was noted as a change in the Obama administration’s policy strategy of ‘pivot to Asia’. In the fall of 2011, the Obama administration tried to play an important role by expanding and strengthening its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, he believed that the US should play a role of “rebalancing,” as China is exerting unprecedented influence in the region [41]. However, the Trump administration, later viewed the Obama administration’s ‘rebalancing strategy’ as an overly exaggerated concept of a central point in Asia, and sought a new strategy [42].

Biden, who called for the rescue of US foreign policy after Trump and advocated that the US should lead the international community again, stating, “the cruel and meaningless policy of the Trump administration will be reversed” [43]. Thus, it was predicted Biden to take foreign policy in a completely different direction in the future. Biden wanted to work with China on issues that also involved American interests, such as climate change, non-proliferation, and global health security. However, in terms of China’s policy to check the Chinese government on issues such as human rights violations, it has similar aspects to the Trump era. Although different causes are being used in each era, such as the ‘rebalance policy’ or the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’, the Biden government is also moving in the direction of strengthening pressure on China through human rights and democracy by stationing a strong military force in Asia.

In terms of security policy toward China, the Biden government thus far seems to be maintaining the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and strengthening the “Quad system”. This

is because the Quad Summit was held as a concrete visualization of the establishment of a security cooperation system that can contain China's expansion.

On March 12, 2021, the first Quad Summit was held, led by the United States, and was attended by Australia, India and Japan. The leaders of the four countries announced "The Spirit of the Quad," promising that, pursuing a free and open Indo-Pacific order, and working together on the decisive challenges of this era to do their best to become a prosperous Indo-Pacific [44].

Based on its rapidly increased national power, China is mobilizing militarily and gaining the economic means to threaten the hegemony of the United States and national interests. In such a situation, the US government, which must maintain its hegemony, is adopting a strategy to lock down China, a "potential hegemonic challenger," regardless of the regime [31].

In addition to the institutional arrangements to lock down China, the Biden government selected China as its top priority and launched the "Pacific Deterrence Initiative" [45], with the purpose of checking China's military and economic power. In 2022, USD. 4.68 billion, and from 2023 to 2027, USD 22.69 billion was allocated for defense. It will concentrate on force design and posture; exercises, experimentation, and innovation; joint force lethality; logistics and Security Enablers; and Strengthen Allies and Partners [46]. The Biden government aims to deter Chinese provocations and lock down China's expansion through these military capabilities.

The Biden administration sees the rise of China as challenging the moderate democratic consolidation agenda. At the end of 2021, the Summit for Democracy will be held, with the aim to "bring the world's democracies together to strengthen democratic institutions," "face the challenges of retreating nations honestly," and "build a common agenda to address threats to our common values" [47].

The United States' slogans of "Rebuilding the Great America" and China's slogans of "Reviving the Great Chinese Nation" seem to have similarities. As a world leader, the United States advocated for the construction of a strong military force, while China emphasized the construction of a powerful socialist modern state, placing significance on national defense and military modernization. China emphasized that "to become a powerful country, there must be a strong army, and only when the army is strong, the country is safe" [48].

Who will manage the international order in the two-way structure of the US and China emphasizing each other's greatness? While advocating the path of national security with Chinese characteristics, [49] China wants to position itself as a maintainer, builder, and contributor of the international order. The United States is calling for international cooperation to keep China in check, while calling for the defense of democracy. There are a host of factors that could clash between China and the United States, which claim to be the world's leaders, but nevertheless, how they cooperate will affect global peace.

## 4 Conclusion

This paper analyzed China's future direction and US policy toward China by examining the content announced at the 100th anniversary celebration of the Communist Party of China in July 2021 and the proclamations presented in the '2035 future vision' announced in November 2020.

Although the policies of the Clinton, Obama, Trump, and Biden governments in the United States are slightly different, their policy to maintain a US-centered order has not changed. This is because we know that the United States cannot maintain its hegemony without checking or containment of China, which is rapidly expanding its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and the rest of the world, threatening the existing international order.

Specifically, by forming a ‘Quad’ as an entity that actually implements the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’, the U.S. not only secured the execution power of the strategy, but also secured the effect of ‘layered’ blockade by engaging its allies such as the UK, France, and Canada. If the Obama administration’s ‘Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy’ was a concept of concentrating US military capabilities in Asia and checking China with the US military and bilateral alliances through cooperation with major existing allies, the Trump administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and ‘Quad’ multilateral security body was formed, and a more ‘multilateral and layered’ China blockade strategy was adopted through military cooperation with regional nations [31].

The U.S. policy strategy toward China has been designed as an American security matter regardless of changes in US regimes. The US government’s China security policy is explained by the international structural factor of competition for hegemony with China. In particular, China’s aggressive internal and external declaration of its role in the international order, while China is narrowing the economic and power gap with the United States, directly affects the US security policy.

The Xi Jinping administration is advocating a powerful modern socialist state and mobilizing the military as well as economic means to expand its influence, threatening the hegemony of the United States and its national interests. China is now becoming richer and stronger, exercising both internally and externally more international influence since the coming of the Xi Jinping regime to power. In particular, China clearly declares that it will create a strong army through socialist modernization and secure a victory facing anyone in the world. Specifically, the China’s constant declarations unification with Taiwan as a top priority is a fundamental difference from the US policy historically and realistically.

China challenged the United States, which is adopting a policy of containment of China due to the rising competition for hegemony, by stating that it would maintain an order in the international community by advocating for the formation of new superpower relations in a new era. How China, as well as the United States, will have to accept that China’s future plans may change depends on whether China will make a concrete contribution to world economy and politics while taking concretely responsible actions in the international community. To act as a peacekeeper, China will have to play an actual role in the international community. The world is watching China’s declaration.

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# BRICS and the Contemporary Body Politic: Examining a Decade of Normativities in the BRICS Summit Declarations

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**Abstract.** This paper argues that the body politic metaphor requires rethinking and updating in order to represent the evolving realities of global governance. It situates the BRICS within political discourses by offering an alternative analysis on how this international forum recasts the notion of body politic in global politics. Through analysing the materials from the first decade of BRICS Joint Statements (2009–2020), this article offers a critical analysis of how The BRICS challenges the traditional body politic by the shift of sovereignty from the nation-state toward global governance. Particular attention is given to how BRICS norm-making acts serve as symbiotic energy that maintains the political health within the global political ecosystem. This re-imagination takes place in four ways: co-governance, interdependence, balanced gatekeeping, and pragmatic agenda. The BRICS' vision of interdependence involves acknowledging that cooperation takes place because of diversity, not despite it, reflecting a re-imagined symbiotic body politic. Re-imagining the body politic that does not necessarily weaken the nation-state but rather make nation-states evolve through a symbiotic process coming from a rather small emerging power in the international arena rather than the dominant Global North. The discussions raised in this work speak more broadly to the field of international relations and political sciences to put into dialogue abstract frameworks and contemporary political events.

**Keywords:** BRICS · Body politic · International relations · Political theory

## 1 Introduction

The body politic metaphor has served as a classical approach in analysing society. Plato and Aristotle used the body politic to characterise the unity within diversity in the Greek polis. Hobbes' *Leviathan* [46] also popularised the equivalence of the state's issues to the taxonomy of human sickness. Interpretations are rich from the fields of physics, biology, religion, the arts and the social sciences about how the body serves as a mirror of human societies [3, 47, 65]. However, the body politic metaphor has faced criticisms, especially in the age of globalization. The level of academic attention to the weakening metaphor of the body politic is comprehensive, in which interdisciplinary approaches have attempted to either criticise or defend the largely Eurocentric underpinnings of the

body politic. One of the main contentions is that the body politic metaphor reflects a hierarchical understanding of the body that is characterised as a neural body [37] or head-to-toe conception [62], controlled by a central organ, the brain, with the nervous system being the main unit [37]. Moreover, the old body politic represents a Darwinian framework, that is, centering on competition and individual selection [19]. This analogy grew unappealing and biologists contended that competition is only part of cooperation [45]. Hence, those who observe both animal and human socialities have called for a reinterpretation of the Darwinian model from competition to cooperation [60].

Building on an analytical framework that reimagines the idea of the body politic, this article offers a critical analysis of how contemporary political arrangements contest the idea of the body politic in the present realities of international communities. This is an important task because any metaphor we employ to understand our political realities “has the ability to transform the accepted meaning” [57] and can frame policy-making and power relations [4, 53]. Criticisms against the classical notion of body politic argue that the body politic no longer appeals as an instructive metaphor for politics or simply has gone outdated since the mid-17th century [40, 42, 79]. The idea of the body politic became weak because of its “theoretical insufficiency and political perniciousness” [74]. For instance, feminist scholars have pointed out on the patriarchal assumptions of a well-functioning body as masculine—rational, unitary, strong bodies—which engenders a very narrow political framework in international relations [1, 18]. Such understandings of the global system run the risk of diversity in thinking of global governance outside a unitary body politic.

The criticisms of the body politic metaphor are especially relevant to contemporary world politics, at times when multipolarity and decentering of global powers take place. Furthermore, Eastern political thought has highlighted the importance of seeing the body as a metaphor for holism rather than a simple combination of parts [84]. As Wilcox emphasises, we need “a rethinking of the terms of the state and sovereignty that are implied by the metaphor of the body politic” [81]. Some important inquiries include theoretical questions on the nature of contemporary world politics as response to the call to revisit the relevance of body politic in the current international order. In light of the changes in global politics, several developments in body politic gain traction, which shifts from nation-state towards international community as the sovereign that can penetrate through the nation-state. For instance, international groups can use *soft power* to influence individual states through popular appeal rather than coercion [64, 77]. In other words, there comes an influence of a larger sovereign body that replaces the form of sovereignty embodied in the nation-state. And while “one can find bodies in the very words of IR: organs of the United Nations, the family of nations, and head of state” [34, 33], this relationship among nations and international groups is not as stable as how the body politic is imagined in its classical sense. The international community of states has grown into a stronger global system that shares certain sentiments and common interests, as well as culture and values such as negotiating sets of international norms on global governance. These discussions are especially relevant to the concept of emerging powers, or those states that transitioned from low to the middle position in terms of economic and political influence in the international arena [35, 75, 76]. These states have collaborated together to create international bodies to set their common

agenda [49, 63]. These international bodies engage in norm-making as a practice of international diplomacy [46].

Given such dialogues, this work examines how international groups' practices of diplomatic dialogue are situated within the wider discussions on the concept of body politic. It aims to analyze diplomatic norm-making practices in times of the rise of the emerging powers and multipolarity. This work takes BRICS, being an emerging power [35], as a useful case study of how norms created within international groups can be used to deconstruct the body politic and at the same time to formulate a new understanding of the body politic in contemporary global governance. Specifically, this is an attempt to unpack how BRICS' public engagements with each other reflect their re-imagination of the international community. In doing so, a content analysis is applied as a means to explore subjectivities based on secondary texts. Tracing and revealing the patterns of correspondence in decade-long BRICS summit engagements, this paper explores BRICS navigating its complex relationship with global politics [59, 68]. This work uses secondary sources selected from representative materials from the first decade (2009–2020) of BRICS Joint Statements. This paper is intended to make a new contribution to the field of BRICS research by discursively analyzing the principles and norms that BRICS member countries themselves have crafted in the joint statements of their annual BRICS Summit and how these norms can sharpen the reimagination of the body politic metaphor.

## 2 BRICS and the Challenge to the Body Politic

A long-standing criticism against BRICS collaboration is their lack of shared and collectivity for a strong cooperation. Given that BRICS members largely vary in interests, history, values, and policy preferences, a challenge is to establish a source of common energy to which its symbiosis works. Some political observers stress that BRICS may be in the process of establishing a more solid collectivity and are still “in search of cement” [38]. It is therefore not surprising to hear doubts about BRICS taking the lead toward a new global order [76]. For instance, compared to Russia's sense of leadership, China can be a “reluctant global power” and not willing to “abandon [its] low profile policy” [83]. Meanwhile the BRICS agenda sits well with India's inherent international appeal of its democracy and age-old civilization in the new world order [61]. With the lack of a natural source of commonality, the process of norm-making among the BRICS nations reveals the extent to which BRICS manages to have a sort of artificial symbiosis to serve as an energy to keep their symbiotic relationship and political health. As such, the set of norms in the BRICS joint declarations are especially important to seal their limited shared values. Through solidifying norms among themselves, each BRICS nation grows and evolves with one another for the survival of BRICS. These norms serve as a way of achieving self-sustainability and growth of BRICS as a symbiotic forum. These shared norms are sustained through their declared unity over time [48].

The BRICS re-imagines the body politic metaphor not only by turning sovereignty away from the nation-state toward global governance (GG) but also by keeping power decentralised. The presence of BRICS decentralises and diversifies the type of power played in the international arena, thus complicating the body politic. This veers away

from the classical notion of the body politic based on a monarchical absolutism yet BRICS as a bloc does not altogether invalidate the body politic metaphor. There is no “disincorporation of individuals” [54] but rather, BRICS is a conscious effort to expand the idea of body politic as an “act of association creat[ing] a corporate and collective body” yet not only “the union of all other persons” [73] but rather of the international community. This denotes a kind of counter institutionalization effort [87] because of its conscious fighting back against the state of affairs of the loaning system with high interest rates from leading international institutions [67]. The BRICS creates “a moment of transition in the construction of a multipolar system” [69], thus expanding the scope of the body politic.

## 2.1 BRICS as an Organism to a Wider Political Ecosystem

In re-imagining body politic, BRICS presents a case on how the members of contemporary world politics evolve together or “co-metabolise” [37] within the wider political ecosystem of the international community. Using a symbiotic framework to understand global order and international politics is not entirely new [50]. For instance, the metaphorical framings of metagenomics, which deserves the body as “highly adaptive and robust against environmental perturbation” and “dynamic, self-sustaining and self-repairing processes” applies to describing how political life is like a microbial ecosystem [29]. This is not to argue that global order would be better served by symbiotic metaphors rather than others [33]. The point is that by looking at the symbiotic model as a lens for political phenomena, we can rethink outside the “old, tired social Darwinist metaphors” [58] and ultimately enrich our understanding of coexistence in a political environment. For instance, one of the most salient characteristics of BRICS declarations is its global humanitarian agenda led by the Global South. As part of co-metabolizing into the global political ecosystem, the BRICS joint statements express compliance to aspects of global affairs. In the most recent virtual summit, the BRICS declaration in Moscow stated their “solidarity with all people and countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic” [17]. While BRICS established its own symbiosis of interests, it does not make any extremely outlying statements that may cut it out from global interests. In such statements, not only is the changing political nature of the international community recognised but through references to Global South, a collective body comes into being and is made knowable and intelligible and publicly acknowledged by BRICS. This indicates the shared commitment of BRICS to multilateralism. Examples of statements indicative of the humanitarian normative positions of BRICS are those that express condemnation of situations that threaten peace and economic stability. Moreover, while BRICS joint declarations directly express strong opinions and judgments about BRICS collaboration and global politics, they also continue to echo their past consensus to mark BRICS compound unity [2].

## 2.2 BRICS and Norm-Making Toward a Symbiotic Framework

The BRICS as an international forum provides a case to reimagine the body politic as a symbiotic group of co-metabolizing nation-states [5], which interrogates the very framework of politics [21]. Why are the norms in BRICS declarations uniquely important?

BRICS as an inter-governmental discussion forum thrives to carve out space within a West-dominated version of globalisation with a “desire to create an alternative to the Western-dominated financial institutions” [51]. Yet BRICS has a heterogeneous character with more risks to collapse compared to other heterogeneous international organizations. The BRICS nations are “either too big for or too uncomfortable in [their] immediate neighbourhood[s]” [23]. Aside from being “unusually large” [32] as individual nations, BRICS as a group also has an “unusual degree of institutionalisation” [56]. Hence, the public declarations of BRICS help accomplish that has not or could not be achieved through bilateral relations between its member states: offering alternative world power as BRICS bloc “sits uneasily between the attitudes and interests of the North and the South” world regions [44]. The BRICS declarations reflect each country’s link to each other as a whole given their risky heterogeneity. Note that BRICS heterogeneity is not the same as other heterogeneity among international forums. BRICS countries have a riskier heterogeneity by virtue of being too geographically distant, culturally variegated, and can be politically clashing [55, 85]. Norm-making usually needs a certain regularity of interaction over time, which the BRICS ensures by having annual summits to function as image-making for the wider internal community to behold. These norms serve as nutrients that maintain BRICS’ “political health” or the “political, economic and social well-being of the political community” wherein peace and peaceful constitutional change, security, liberty, democratic governance, political and social justice, economic prosperity and ecological balance [72]. As Plato [70] puts it, “the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body”. The undertones found in BRICS joint declarations are relevant to analyzing how BRICS participates to maintain the political health of the global political ecosystem. Indeed, these joint statements are examples to see some re-contextualizations of what we know about the nature of international politics.

While the BRICS summit declarations appear to be ordinary rhetorics of international diplomacy at face value, these statements are an integral part of the BRICS package for public affairs, given the pressure from international politics spectators for BRICS to be the spokespersons for the Global South [26]. This is an important aspect of their emerging role in causing a shift to global governance because there is presumably a gap to fill in international politics. The statements are less about mere advocacy content and more about showing that BRICS compromise. The Johannesburg Declaration, for instance, states that BRICS is committed to the Paris Agreement and in pursuing sustainable development for developing countries, emphasizing their representation of the Global South. Declarations can gain legitimacy in political life if they marshal sufficient performance [40]. The act of declaring itself is just as important as the content of BRICS declarations because public declarations play an important role to be visible in global politics. While individual country actions in relation to BRICS declarations are important, the joint declarations carry public consequences for BRICS as a group. Whatever claim BRICS raises in speech can be a source of criticism or praise for BRICS as a group. The BRICS bloc is judged by how true it is to what the declarations say – rather than by the truth of what they say, with which the consequences of their transparent agenda stay on the surface.

The established norms in BRICS declarations function to diversify the institutions that the international community seek for support. By expressing their normative expectations and urges, the BRICS targets the international community as its specific audience such that it distinguishes and addresses a specific recipient from others [39]. Consequently, BRICS expands its source of political power in building a parallel political power such as the New Development Bank (NDB) to balance the western-centric institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). The declared intentions of BRICS can influence the international framework just “by acting in unison and arriving at real outcome... [which] would probably achieve a more accountable soft power and a more definite power in shaping GG itself” [69].

Although it is inevitable to have a mismatch between local goals and BRICS agenda, the BRICS declarations assure that differences do not supersede their unity. The BRICS declarations are more than a set of guidelines and agenda. These declarations function as a yardstick to measure BRICS’ legitimacy and solidarity from an international perspective. In other words, BRICS sets its own checklists, on top of some existing formal or informal international standards, by which political observers can evaluate its merits as a group. Regardless of BRICS members’ local priorities, the summit declarations present an official solidarity for political observers to judge. Rather than the national goal’s task of matching local priorities with BRICS agenda, the declarations were about acknowledging vested interests in the solidarity, even to the extent of letting go of some national goals, to create altogether a public performance of unity.

### 3 Recasting Body Politic in Global Politics

Receiving international attention raises an opportunity for BRICS to present an alternative or perhaps updated interpretation of the body politic other than that of the classic neural epistemology, but instead evolutionary and symbiotic in approach. The BRICS agenda draws attention to the multifaceted outcomes of cosmopolitanization that on one hand can weaken the nation-state but on the other hand forge connections among nations and create a reimagined version of the body politic with long-term political solidarities. This offers an alternative view of the body politic and of political participation away from a Westphalian view of the body politic as a structure of preordained leadership. This observation comes in view of the classical version of the sovereign as territorial, usually comprising only the democracy of the powerful. The narrative of a symbiotic relationship among international community members serves as an alternative pathway for a healthier global politics through “seek[ing] a balance between the goal of challenging the western neoliberal order while not dismissing it” [36] and evolving with it. In this sense, BRICS’ support for a new global agenda is more significant than its potential to lead international politics. BRICS nations do not zealously fly the banner of a world government but rather support international groups to intensify a “commitment to international law and to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its centre and foundation” [11]. The BRICS Summit Declarations all constantly speak about its demands to review the UN’s accountability to push equity above and beyond national boundaries. This applies a similar logic to arguing for a less powerful global parliamentary assembly.

In light of the discussions on body politic re-imagination, the BRICS’ case resonates Lakoff’s [52] claim that metaphors can fail to materialise. Instead, the BRICS serves as

an example of an evolving politics in the international community. Stretching Wendt's [80] argument that "states are at most superorganisms rather than organisms, with conceptual rather than physical boundaries", the BRICS nations demonstrate the plurality of political realities possible for the international community's progress. The BRICS takes the approach that does not directly talk about restructuring world history per se nor does it claim to be a new paragon to measure political hierarchy in contemporary global rhetoric. Rather, BRICS represents an opportunity to grow together as it foregrounds partnership and stability in its summit themes. In doing so, the BRICS disrupts the dominant body politic and reframes it in a global eye. This reimagines a global body politic that does not necessarily weaken the nation-state but rather make nation-states evolve through a symbiotic process. This re-imagination takes place in four ways: control to co-governance, aid culture to interdependence, observation to gatekeeping, and ideal to pragmatic agenda.

### 3.1 From Control to Co-governance

The body politic that BRICS co-construct with the international community is a complex co-governance rather than "hard-shelled nation-states competing in anarchical conditions ruled by fear and exclusion" [34]. Promoting the evolution of the international community toward a more balanced and symbiotic politics comes with consensus decision-making, as reflected in BRICS summits since 2009. Examples include the Master Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in Local Currency under BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and the Multilateral Letter of Credit Confirmation Facility Agreement between our EXIM/Development Banks [9] and Agreement on New Development Bank signed during the VI BRICS Summit in Fortaleza. A cooperative spirit is also accentuated by the desire to have a good-natured relationship for a "harmonious world of lasting peace" [10]. As such, there is a strong imperative for international non-state to secure amity among nations. Long-term cooperation is also encouraged, such as the potential "in cooperation and collaboration in advancing the Oceans Economy amongst BRICS countries" [15] and agreements on future ministerial gatherings [14, 16].

Note that the inclusivity touted by the BRICS declaration is less about embracing a diversity of expressing independent individuality than it is about ensuring that states can secure and preserve their standing and opportunities in a global politics that would otherwise marginalise them. This shows a re-imagined body politic that leaves the discourse of individuality and rather sees a body politic as a complicated network of mini-ecosystems, maintaining political health [37]. The collective language used to form in norm-making has a symbiotic nature that connects BRICS as a mini-ecosystem to its to a larger global ecosystem with the aim of "establishing and transmitting the shared systems of value and knowledge" [43]. Consequently, collaboration yields to an evolution from an effort to co-metabolise with the rest of the world, not only among BRICS co-members. Finally, these norms are ways to smoothen any existing and potential friction among BRICS members. The BRICS summits mark the mutual and symbiotic priorities. Establishing shared principles foster trust-building and encourage members to deliver under constructive pressure.



### 3.2 From the “AID Culture” to Interdependence

The BRICS moves away from the aid culture toward promoting an interdependent and mutualistic relationship among countries. This interdependence enhances the political health of the international community through having an international model inspired by human’s innate drive to cooperate [60]. This is evident in BRICS’ remarks on welcoming the African Union’s (AU) vision, aspirations, goals and priorities for Africa’s development [13], showing explicit respect to Africa’s autonomy as opposed to the paternalistic aid/donorship principle [66]. However, while the BRICS challenges the aid discourse, “it is important for BRICS not to be seen as a grouping that opposes the West as this could lead to a fragmented global order rather than furthering the multilateral agenda” [6]. Rather, what surfaces is a call to refashion the outdated centralising practices and instead empower global institutions in order to have more representation and “to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries” [10]. This encourages arrangements wherein a diverse set of players are in concert with an “appearance of an inclusive, collective, even consensual approach to international action” [82].

In challenging the donorship paradigm of the West, the BRICS members recognise the capabilities of the Global South to be independent yet integrated, highlighting “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” [9]. The emphasis on inclusivity also shows a disinterest in ranking and instead promotes a social homeostasis that resembles both animal and human population where “division of labor in more inclusive systems” [30]. This view recognises the capacities of each nation for an international system that is able to set fair terms of opportunities, wherein countries know their obligations to contribute to development, to support fair trade and investment rules, to address climate change, among others. These collaborative norms allow for a more integrative role of BRICS in the international arena [20]. Unlike the EU Declarations, which established measurable indicators and benchmarks [28, 31], the BRICS nations pay little attention to torigid measurements to discuss contributions of each country in the international community. Freire stresses that “BRICS summit declarations do not pay special attention to the EU, just as the EU Global Strategy does not mention the BRICS” [36].

### 3.3 From Observing to Gatekeeping

BRICS also serves as an overseer of balance or homeostasis of accountability in the global arena. Specifically, the balance of political power is achieved by voicing out an appeal to the developed world to extend to their non-member countries a fair share of opportunities to develop. As BRICS pressures the Global North to be accountable for the Millennium Development Goals, it pushes for accountability, “reminding the Global North of their responsibilities for building a global development partnership and suggesting that they are to blame largely for the failure of this to materiali[s]e” [86]. Aiming to hold the Global North accountable, BRICS nations also question the consequences of industrialization, and instead push for the stabilization of international relations by fostering a non-extractive international environment. This projects values with well-defined directions and focus on impact felt by the developing world as reflected in

the 2013 eThekweni Declaration when South Africa initiated the BRICS-Africa Leaders Dialogue Forum Retreat, attended by 12 African leaders representing the African Union, the New African Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the eight AU Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The action plans of the BRICS declarations also come with specific recovery plans for developing countries to "ensur[e] steady, adequate and predictable access to long-term finance for developing countries from a variety of sources" [10] and "economic recovery and secure financial stability" [9].

### 3.4 From Ideal to Pragmatic Agenda

Recasting a new sense of body politic into the global political ecosystem exemplifies the pragmatic goals of BRICS concerning the immediate and achievable goals in global politics. As much as it has great symbiotic goals such as a peaceful and multi-power world politics, the BRICS as a group is aware of the challenges that come ahead. For instance, the BRICS prioritises addressing immediate issues of hunger, education and health [9] rather than solving world poverty, unhappiness or reconciling countries in conflict. None of BRICS' immediate aims was downright easy, but also none was particularly radical. Rather, the BRICS set action plans according to what seems to emerge in global affairs and its immediate implications "at a time which requires that we consider issues of mutual interest and systemic importance" [10] or in a "faltering global recovery made more complex by the situation in the eurozone" [9]. The 2016 Goa Declaration states the phrase "[w]e meet at a time when the global economic recovery is progressing, with improved resilience and emergence of new sources of growth. The growth, though, is weaker than expected with downside risks to the global economy continuing to persist" [13].

The BRICS declarations are upfront in expressing urgency. For instance, the Sanya Declaration stated a "call for a quick achievement of the targets for the reform of the International Monetary Fund" [8]. This direct approach allows an output-driven implementation as the BRICS leaders spell out its demands in their summit declarations. BRICS as a bloc is also direct in its position that inclusivity, equity and sustainable global growth should motivate international politics, showing that the BRICS agenda operates under urgent interests in the current political climate. Moreover, the declarations tried to achieve directness and accuracy of expression and avoid the possibility of misinterpretations in the BRICS agenda. BRICS members also call for more economic opportunities and the means to pursue them through deep institutional development such as the establishment of BRICS financial institutions: the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement (CRA) [12]. While these agendas appear to be occasional cliches, the nature and context of the scope of such discussions focus on the pragmatic issues faced by developing countries, with an agenda that highlights the importance of "improved resilience and emergence of new sources of growth" [13, 16]. The primary concerns of BRICS center on its presumption that addressing such practical issues specifically in developing countries will indeed facilitate multilateralism and equity towards the longer-term goals of peace and democracy.

## 4 Rejoinder: BRICS and an Evolving Body Politic

Citizens organise their perception of the international community is dependent upon the frameworks they use in forming their knowledge about the world. Some are deeply formed through traditions, cultures or epistemic communities. Also, just as this paper's promotion of intellectual humility, there can be no end in theorising and understanding as the very idea of body is unfixed. The point is that, ultimately, reality evolves and so must the structures that govern the production of knowledge. The body politic metaphors, once useful to reveal our realities, is not a static concept but rather growing, to render some guidance to the unintelligible world. It is through the metaphor of body politic that we initially understood the abstract field of politics and governance but to be stuck in such a metaphor renders disservice to the changes we see in the international community. Gilles Deleuze's [27] message is instructive: "People say to them: things are not like that. But, in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not".

The BRICS has re-imagined the body politic as a symbiotic body, pursuing an evolutionary global agenda that is "less constraining, less patronizing, less subordinating than what developing countries have become accustomed to" [86]. This symbiotic body is prompted by the need to share principles and goals given how different countries are with diverse histories, political contexts and economic systems [5]. This branding of the body politic enables the BRICS nations to "'insert' themselves more fully into global decision making" [32]. Though the principles forwarded by BRICS joint declaration are not necessarily unique to BRICS (e.g., cooperation and inclusivity), the BRICS is still different because it expressed demands as a small emerging power in the international arena with uncertain unity [71]. The BRICS therefore becomes a unique branding of the body politic because it aims for unity amidst its instability and heterogeneity. The BRICS declarations insinuate a message that there is an effort in each BRICS member country to negotiate both their global and intra-BRICS ties, as well as submitting to both traditional economics and offering alternatives to international politics [25]. These principles are combined with an unassuming role in global governance, yet very pragmatic positions and demands on global issues.

Re-imagining the body politic helps to foster an understanding of global politics that does not consider the concept of bodies in situ, but rather thinks of the body as constantly in motion and in relation with an evolving environment. The evolutionary character of BRICS involves acknowledging that cooperation takes place because of diversity, not despite of it, reflecting a re-imagined symbiotic body politic, showing that BRICS have played in the international arena to somehow "found a way to disagree on some key issues... without torpedoing the entire enterprise" [41]. International political and economic groups are constantly evolving and adapting to the challenges and shifts in international politics. Let it be clear, however, that the BRICS have shared principles that may only reveal fragments of ideological character rather than representing individual national ideologies of its member countries. To assess BRICS based on ideology alone may not provide the whole picture if ideology means individual national interest. Rather, their formed ideology as a group, as seen in the New Development Bank, speaks of how the BRICS nations have created a new bloc ideology rather than patchworks of their individual ideology.

## 5 Conclusion

This article's aim has been to invite a thinking space that reconsiders how the BRICS is useful to re-imagine the body politic metaphor. The discussions raised in this work speak more broadly to the field of international relations and political sciences to put into dialogue abstract frameworks and contemporary political events. Through examining the collection of BRICS joint declarations for a decade, this work has shown how the BRICS manifest Emerson's [30] principle of seeing "the unity of group systems as entities in evolution" [60]. The way the BRICS members define BRICS collaboration is based on a context-dependent negotiation of their mutualistic interests and actions, which are discursively co-constructed in their interactions. International political and economic groups are routinely evolving through being subjected to criticisms within the bounds of the norms reflected in their policies and agenda. This approach enables thinking about the world through an organismic perspective, with connections, linkages, and plurality. Thus, this enables us to think of politics as a shared form of life. Crucially, the aim for political theory is not to resolve how to think about the global order but rather to re-create and pluralise ways of thinking that take interest in emergent realities in the international arena [22]. A plurality of ways to imagine the global order needs a "more respectful of multiple ways of understanding our complex world" [78].

The conversation between political theory and BRICS allows for diversifying our thinking on "on how we might have been, or could be different than we are" [7]. The engagement between BRICS and body politic in this paper is less about defining a "better" metaphor or theoretical approach than about opening other ways to challenge our basic assumptions about international politics and the global order. Moreover, rethinking these relationships allows for problematising, albeit indirectly, normativities in knowledge production in international politics. This, in turn, sheds light on the complexity of global politics in alternative approaches. What this analysis has shown is that the BRICS serves as a case for cautiously using metaphors to abstractly reflect our political realities. This paper is intended to urge alternative ways into thinking about political theories, especially in the context of international relations. In light of Robert Cox's message that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" [18, 24], it is important to question and problematise what drives our frameworks and theory-making of the global order. The body politic as understood in the past no longer catches up with the perpetually contested political groups in the international arena upon which global politics plays out. Indeed, the international community adapts to current issues altogether with its member's active participation in forming, repairing, maintaining, strengthening, or revising the overall political health of global politics. The relevance of understanding the role of BRICS cooperation in the body politic metaphor is to recast sovereignty in view of interdependence as opposed to centralised powers. It also implies the non-fixity of the BRICS as part of an evolving global politics, being a continuum built through events with contradictions and competing discourses. Finally, this article calls for deeper examination of other international blocs and they communicate their agenda as part of the symbiotic body of the international arena. This work hopes to spark conversations that unpack the abstract concepts used in political science and international relations to lead productive dialogues.

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**Ideologies of Regionalism  
and Globalization in Historical Context:  
Philosophy of Politics**



# On Border Energy and Cross-Border Communication in Geoeconomics and Geopolitics

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**Abstract.** A number of axioms related to the ontological status of the so-called “social energy”, which remains a controversial area of scientific knowledge, are postulated. Such energy cannot be measured either in amperes or kilocalories, but the energy costs that manifest themselves in social communities in the form of enthusiasm, aggression, bitterness and other forms are not only special, but sometimes colossal. According to the authors, the energy of “red-hot” political and administrative borders, as well as the energy of cross-border contacts in the modern world, is associated with social energy. Attention is focused on the fact that the concept of “state border” is not limited to the legal meaning. It is also a social and political structure, which is associated with the emotions of people living on both sides of it, especially in cases of contradictions between neighboring ethnic groups. Geoeconomics and geopolitics were chosen as the “polygons” of the study. The marginal stratification of society is also considered as a generator of social energy, when large social groups find themselves “on the borders”, “on the fields” or between strata. It is noted that the centers of marginality have their own boundaries, possess with their own boundaries, have a boundary energy, which is reflected in the specifics of frontier communication. The contradictory connection of geopolitics and geo-economics is fixed, which generates social energy with a “minus” sign. An increase in the “degree” of social tension often occurs with the so-called “border trade” practiced by the population of neighboring states. The development of this type of trade in Russia was strongly influenced by the worst financial and economic situation of the neighboring countries, the depressive nature of their economies. The stated problem is directly related to military conflicts between states and other armed conflicts (“energy of war”); tribal separatism and intertribal clashes (tribalism in Africa); territories not controlled by former metropolises, etc.

**Keywords:** Frontier energy · Cross-border communication · Globalization · Geoeconomics · Geopolitics · Marginal stratification

## 1 Introduction

The terms “*frontier energy*” and “*frontier communication*” appearing in the title of the article do not pretend to be original. Their content (sometimes controversial) under various “pseudonyms” has long been described in geoeconomic dictionaries and textbooks for students. In any case, they are “genetically” related to the problem of borderline states, the philosophical foundations of which were substantiated by I. Kant. Considering the spiritual and earthly horizons, he formulated ideas about the immanent and transcendental world, in which philosophical concepts organically merge with spatial ones. The valuable ideas of one of the central thinkers of the Enlightenment about a multidimensional communication space were taken up by other authors, primarily by representatives of sociology. And although today the philosophical heritage of the scientist on the essence of frontier is often subjected to rethinking (they say, the bottomless, fractal structure of the border is so complex that it devalues the most rational arguments of Kant [1]), it still feeds the ideas of our contemporaries.

Frontier communicativeness is most often interpreted as “the tension of the energetic rudiments of the multidimensional communication space in nature” [2]. Therefore, the question of the energetic nature of the boundary interaction can be attributed to the number of priorities in many sciences (this, as it were, confirms the thought of Nikola Tesla, the author of many myths and unconfirmed hypotheses: “*If you want to discover the secrets of the universe, think in the language of energy...*”).

Meanwhile, the very concept of “social energy” in science has not really been studied. Traditionally, the concept of “energy” is associated with such branches of scientific knowledge as physics, psychology, economics. Much less often - with some areas of knowledge acting in a pseudo-scientific guise and appealing to science, proclaiming the principle of the unity of science, religion and philosophy (parapsychology, astrology, esotericism, etc.). Of course, the existential meanings of borderline situations are only marginally suitable for explaining the effects of borderline energetics.

Thanks to econometric properties, the most reliable are our ideas about the electric field as a special type of matter that has its own energy and is an integral component of the vector electromagnetic field. And although even the electric field does not have clear boundaries, the tendency of the force effect to zero with distance from the energy source makes it a significant object of both theoretical and practical research.

Along with physics, the term “energy” (under the pseudonym proposed by Z. Freud - “*mental energy*”) has long been rooted in psychology. Here it means a high tone, the presence of vital energy, a willingness to act, a vision of life prospects, etc. The *metapsychology* formulated by Freud was based on the concept of psychic energy for its further use, in particular, in applied economics. By the way, authoritative psychologists B. Moore and B. Fine proceeded from the fact that psychic energy is a quantitatively measurable energy underlying all psychic manifestations of a person [3].

In psychology, the concept of “*borderline situation*” (german. “*Grenzsituation*”), which was widely used by the German philosopher and psychiatrist K. Jaspers, is often associated with difficult life experiences of a person, guilt, severe stress, death. The scientist believed that the human body in this case usually uses all its hidden reserves and is mobilized as much as possible [4]. However, such an “extra-spatial” interpretation is unlikely to help us in considering the problem associated with boundaries as spatial

taxa. By the way, it cannot be argued that the Freudian interpretation of the term - as the concentration of the internal forces (attention, interest, attachment) of an individual from one object to another and the consideration of psychic energy as an analogue of a physical quantity - received universal support from psychologists. A number of well-known psychologists and analysts even demanded a complete rejection of the idea of the existence of “psychic energy” [5], but it turned out to be quite viable.

The “term” energy is well recognized in economics as well, however, being associated mainly with specific branches of material production (mining of coal, oil, gas, etc.) it is able to take us away from the stated context. It is more appropriate to use the term “energy” in the meaning we need in geoeconomics, especially when characterizing economic crises and wars, sanctions policy, etc. This aspect is given increased attention in the article.

Taking into account V. Dergachev’s ideas about the boundary energy of a multidimensional communication space (including nature), attempts are made to link social and ethnic processes even with the geological structure, magmatism and fault tectonics of the Earth’s lithosphere. As if the passionate energy of many ethnic groups is clearly recorded by geophysical and geochemical anomalies, which is due to bursts of biochemical energy in the anthroposphere. As an argument, the East African Rift Valley is cited, where, they say, “*fluid flows*” emanate from deep faults, affecting the psychophysical state of the peoples living here [6, 7].

On a purely theoretical level, there is nothing implausible in the formulation of such a hypothesis. If, for example, the connection between power plants, high-voltage transmission lines and transformer substations with psychophysical fluctuations of people has been reliably established, then why not allow the connection of ethnogenesis of some peoples with rifts, marginal parts of continents, interblock faults, large tectonic faults, ring structures, lineaments, nuclears, etc., characterized by an increased density of energy flows? However, the use of this explanation by the supporters of this explanation as a scientific proof of L. Gumilyov’s theory of passionarity [8], which is still difficult to prove and “exotic”, leaves this hypothesis out of the subject of our interest.

## 2 Discourses in the Scientific Literature

A kind of theoretical temptation for geographers could be to attract the ideas of *energetism* – a philosophical doctrine based on the idea of energy as a substantial and dynamic primary basis of the world. Moreover, the most odious representative of this trend is V. Ostwald (Germany) he was a big supporter of space: he replaced the concept of matter with the concept of “a complex of various energies subordinate to space”, while space itself was considered by him as a potential energy [9]. Regarding the latter statement, Ostwald was far from alone. Many thinkers of the past (from G. Lebon to A. Einstein) held the opinion that the mass of a body is a synonym for its energy: “Matter and radiation, according to the special theory of relativity, are only special forms of energy distributed in space; thus, a weighty mass loses its special position and is only a special form of matter” [10, p. 685].

However, despite the law of the relationship between mass and energy discovered by modern physics, we leave aside philosophical disputes about movement without

matter and the transformation of energy into “substances of the world”, since they do not contribute much to attempts to comprehend the concept of “social energy”, frontier energy and cross-border communication in geo-economics and geopolitics.

Although the hypothesis of the existence of “social energy” is still poorly argued, representatives of the natural sciences are mistaken if they think that the nature of energy is thoroughly known to physicists. It is not enough to know many forms, formulas and principles of energy conservation (gravity, kinetic, thermal, electrical, chemical, nuclear, radiation energy, mass, etc.), it is necessary to understand that “energy is omnipresent, it is in matter, in bonds, in the world of fields. It also exists where there is no substance (vacuum energy). It exists in society - at the individual, group and societal levels” [11, p. 18].

It is the latter thesis that is most often criticized, mainly due to the lack of econometric tools for assessing social energy as a special, unique and non-repetitive form of energy. For the same reason, the position of the author of the well-known passionary theory, L. Gumilev, is also questioned: “Passionarity as energy is an excess of the biochemical energy of a living substance, the reverse of the vector of instinct and determining the ability to overstrain” [8, p. 479].

As for interdisciplinary research in the field of frontier and cross-border communications, they originate from the analysis of mediated forms of communication, reflecting, first of all, various media systems. At the same time, attention was paid not only to the topic of communications, but also to the sources of funding, as well as the ideology professed by media systems during the two world wars, the cold war period and the era of globalization after the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe. In this regard, the special literature provides a distinctive thematic periodization of the history of such studies [12–15]:

1930–1950: as psychological war (“propaganda paradigm”);  
 1950–1970: as a means of development (the “paradigm of modernization”);  
 1970–1990: as media imperialism (the “paradigm of dependence”);  
 1990 - the beginning of the 21st century: as the transnationalization and hybridization of national social spheres (the “paradigm of globalization”).

This problem has been reflected in numerous publications, including the following [16–19].

There are a considerable number of specialized scientific journals (primarily in Europe) that study the issues of mediated cross-border communication (“International Communication Gazette”, “Global Media and Communication”, “European Journal of Communication”, “Journal of International Communication”, etc.). In addition, such studies are also conducted by several academic associations and their working groups (International Communication Association: Division for “Global Communication and Social Change”; International Communication Association: Division for “Intercultural Communication”; European Communication Research and Education Association: Section on “International and Intercultural Communication”; German Communication Association: Section on “International and Intercultural Communication”; International Association for Media and Communication Research: Section on “International Communication”, etc.

Naturally, real interdisciplinary studies of frontier communication in the field of geopolitics, political geography and geoeconomics are distinguished by a great practical weight in the scientific literature [20–23].

### 3 Problem Statement and Research Goal

The concept of “energy” in the social sense is usually associated with an individual, but individuals are united in social groups, classes, strata, which causes them to have some common features due to the exchange of individual energies, mass communication, etc. In our case, the means of consolidating individual energies is the *borderline residence* of the population, which contributes to the correction of mass consciousness. We are talking about the spatial interpretation of the concept of “social energy”, which characterizes the social essence of not only peoples (“people’s spirit”, “people’s character”, etc.), but also other collectives, including residents of microdistricts and even marginal groups of the population. The latter occupy a position “on the borders”, “on the margins” or between strata. Therefore, marginality often serves as a generator of social energy.

By the way, since the implementation of the term “marginality” into science by the American sociologist R. Park [24], the meaning of the latter has repeatedly “maneuvered”, mainly in the works of sociologists, psychologists and cultural scientists, which prevented the formulation of a stable concept of marginality. Moreover, its active metaphorization by representatives of the humanities, especially in journalistic and fiction literature, has repeatedly threatened to take it out of the scope of scientific analysis altogether.

Today, there are many versions that explain the phenomenon of marginality. But we are only interested in those that shed additional light on the topic we have stated. For example, the problem of marginality is often considered within the framework of social or ethno-cultural conflicts [25] or from the angle of social psychology as a result of cultural and racial “hybrids”, especially among mulattoes, mestizos, etc. [26]. Among French researchers, there is a widespread interpretation of marginality as a kind of public protest of a certain group of society against social realities. An association is made with the stratification part of the population that finds itself on the border of social classes and is burdened with status and orientation uncertainty. In the eyes of French authors, a marginal person is “a product of the collapse of a society affected by the crisis” [27, p. 146]. Similar positions are held by German and English authors who consider marginals as representatives of the “social bottom” and declared social outsiders.

But it is hardly correct to identify the marginal strata of society with lumpen and declassified persons - these may be migrants who are in the process of social adaptation, unemployed, religious marginals, etc. A special cohort of marginals is the population of ethnically isolated regions, with a rigid hierarchy and clan structure of society, characteristic of some underdeveloped countries. However, there is still no generally accepted socio-philosophical justification of marginality in the literature, and, moreover, its concept [28]. It is clear that the “energy of marginality” can be concentrated both on the border of the state and inside it. In any case, the centers of marginality have their own boundaries, they have a boundary energy, which is reflected in the specifics of the boundary communication. We are talking, first of all, about the borders of conflicting states and the lines of demarcation of ethnic groups that have inherited disputed problems, etc.

## 4 Purpose and Methods of Research

The idea of the authors was to expand the ideas about the role of “frontier energy” and “frontier communication” in the historically formed multidimensional space of the modern world. The position is defended, according to which the boundary energy-information exchange (interpersonal, class, ethnic, civilizational) is a special scientific problem. The methodological basis was the works of authoritative philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, geographers (I. Kant, K. Jaspers, O. Spengler, B. Rodoman, etc.) on the essence of borders, border situations, marginality.

There are numerous attempts in the literature to create special methods for calculating indices of social, economic and political tension in countries and regions [29–33], but they, for a number of reasons, may not always be useful for our research. First, they deal with the monitoring assessment of domestic political and socio-economic tensions, based on the calculation of peculiar indices, including such indicators as the institutional structure, administrative stability, the state of the public sector, the situation of households, etc. [34]. While the assessment of “frontier energy” and “frontier communication” requires careful consideration, first of all, of the role of borders and frontiers, as well as neighboring regions and countries in the dynamics of public life. In this case, such factors as the state of the psychological atmosphere, the security of the population, the dynamics of production and investment, conflicts, etc. become of paramount importance.

Of course, in some cases, it is difficult to determine the nature of the tension that arises. For example, the conflicts can be situational (between the authorities and business structures, opposition parties and movements) or permanent in regions with a complex ethnic composition. In the latter case, they can be provoked from abroad - including from neighboring border territories.

Among the goals of the article is to identify the specifics of “cross-border energy” in geo-economic and geopolitical studies. The research methods used in the work are traditional: the collection and systematization of empirical and statistical material, the unity of historical and logical approaches, the analysis and synthesis of real processes.

## 5 Result of Research

### 5.1 Geoeconomics - Geopolitics: The “Energy” of a Contradictory Connection

If we recall V. Lenin’s sacramental expression “Politics is a concentrated expression of the economy”, then taking into account modern realities in the functional mechanism of the world economy, the rigid correlation between geopolitical and geo-economic processes becomes even more obvious. Of course, these connections are changeable and are not reduced to the “economic determinism” characteristic of Marxist thought. The preponderance of economic or political factors is explained by a set of reasons, the study of which requires a systematic approach. In this case, it is important that the permanent contradiction of the geo-economic and geopolitical interests of states can generate bursts of tension between them and, above all, in the border areas.

As a vivid example, we will cite the problem of the so-called “*northern territories*” - that is, the islands of the Kuril Ridge, the return of which is unequivocally demanded by the Japanese side. The basic position of Japan is that the islands are its historical

territories that are under the illegal occupation of Russia. It prohibits the economic activity of third parties on the islands, since it will indicate the subordination of Russia's jurisdiction over the northern territories. Accordingly, Russia's basic position is that the Kuril Islands are its integral territory on legal grounds following the results of the Second World War, enshrined in the UN Charter.

As a result of geopolitical "discord", the islands remained practically neutral in economic terms for many decades, which had an extremely negative impact on both the socio-economic situation and the mental and physiological state of the small population of the border islands. Such a mode of life activity has specific energy characteristics.

Theoretically, the indissoluble connection between geoeconomics and geopolitics is manifested in the fact that any political structure (a state or a union of states) constantly feels the existence of the economic interests of other structures. Let's assume that the field of geoeconomic interests at each of its points is characterized by a certain power - the ability to influence the political situation to a greater or lesser extent. In this case, it can be assumed that this power depends on the power of the field source and the resistance of the political medium. Such resistance is a complex phenomenon characterized by economic, geographical, military-technical, psychological and other features. It is associated with the ability of a state to influence geoeconomic processes in the modern world. It is the resistance of the political environment that sometimes not only makes the power of the geo-economic fields of small states insignificant, but also artificially underestimates the power of the geo-economic fields of large states.

## 5.2 Geopolitics, Politic Geography and "Cross-Border Energy"

The appeal to geopolitics as an indicative means and method of manifestation of cross-border social energy is due to the fact that geopolitics itself (from the Greek. *Geos* – earth, *politike* – politics) in its original interpretation is the theory and practice of state foreign policy based on maximum consideration, first of all, of borders. This, of course, is also an analytical assessment of "balances and counterbalances", a kind of "mutual checks" that ensure a certain stability between states. But we are interested in the energy of the trans-border region.

After all, the concept of "state border" is not limited to legal meaning. It is also a social and political structure, which is associated with the emotions of people living on both sides of it, especially in cases of existing contradictions between neighboring ethnic groups. Sometimes it is a constant fear of the possibility of violating the border, the anger of the population against the unacceptable demarcation, the fear of meeting with spies and refugees, etc. Like "mushrooms after the rain", new "gray zones" (*Terrae incognitae*) are multiplying in the world today, which are managed by armed groups, drug lords or other rebel forces. The "Golden Triangle" at the junction of Myanmar, Thailand and China, as well as the territories of Colombia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lebanon, is mentioned most often in this regard.

The huge social potential of the border as a geopolitical phenomenon was noted in the introduction to the work of geopolitician J. Ancel (1879–1959) "Geography of Borders" a prominent specialist in political geography A. Siegfried (1875–1959): "The plot, we admit it, is dangerous for a scientist, since it is all permeated with political passions, full



of underlying reasons. When people talk about borders, they show considerable interest, and therefore they cannot speak in cold blood: the quarrel is permanent” [35, p. VII].

In a certain sense, the concept of “energy of war” can be associated with frontier interaction as a conflict between states (ethnic groups) on the basis of various claims, in the form of confrontation, fighting with the use of weapons. War drains the forces of the defeated subject and strengthens the power of the victor. At the same time, it “draws” energy from some and adds it to others, but the border population of the conflict, as a rule, bears heavier physical, material and mental costs. The nature of the communication environment changes as the conflicting parties become embittered.

This aspect of the analysis does not require special evidence, given the fact that wars are as old as humanity itself. The documented evidence of wars has a history of many thousands, and they are all connected with the lines of demarcation of peoples and the borders of states. At the same time, the situation with local conflicts in the world does not change much. Only at the beginning of the 21st century, hotbeds of tension in Africa arose in the DRC, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Chad, Niger, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Sudan (including Darfur and South Sudan), Somalia, and Western Sahara.

The so-called “Arab spring” (the beginning of 2011) was marked by mass protests of the local population. And although the protests were not strictly connected with the borders of states, the most acute criminal situation was at the borders. Massive illegal arms and drug trafficking, as well as smuggling, were carried out through them.

Tribal separatism and intertribal clashes in Africa, as a consequence of ethnic thinking based on *tribalism*, are often associated not with state borders, but with intertribal ones. On the one hand, in this case, the manifestation of cross-border energy is recorded, on the other hand, these processes (with the participation of adolescent children) may not have a direct relationship to geopolitics [36].

The existing de facto political borders between a number of sovereign states and territories beyond their control are directly related to the phenomenon of “*trans-border social energy*”. Among the many states that do not fully control their territory are Afghanistan, Somalia, Myanmar, Sudan, Cyprus, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.

A recent example of excessive accumulation of “cross-border energy” can be the border hotbed of tension that arose in 2021 on the “red-hot” Belarusian-Lithuanian border. Due to the massive influx of migrants from Iraq, DRC, Cameroon, Guinea, Iran, Syria and Afghanistan (for which the EU blames the President of Belarus A. Lukashenko), a powerful protest of the local population was manifested in the Lithuanian regions adjacent to the border. The situation was complicated by the fact that after seeing the brutal methods of Lithuanian border guards to push refugees back to Belarus (especially children and pregnant women) radical muslims from these countries expressed their readiness to immediately come to their aid with weapons. Residents (including the authorities) of border municipalities advocated much more cruel measures of treatment of migrants and demanded their expulsion. Such an explosion of social energy is well illustrated by the stated subject of the study.

Similar processes of accumulation of “cross-border social energy” are observed when creating and drawing political and administrative borders within states, but they already belong to the sphere of political geography, not geopolitics. The source of such energy

is most often associated with the search and assertion of regional identity. In Russia, in some cases, such identity is determined by territorial affiliation (for Russians), in others - by ethnicity. It is not surprising that border disputes sometimes arise between regions with a complex ethnic composition, reaching the threat of secession. In the recent past, they took place in the North Caucasus, where ethnic consciousness traditionally acts as the main consolidating factor.

### 5.3 Social Energy of Geoeconomic Processes

The very formulation of the question of identifying cross-border “energy of geoeconomic processes” may seem far-fetched. But if the phenomenon of geoeconomics is a global cycle of key resources (raw materials, technological, financial, human) and “global management”, then it is hardly possible to avoid an emotional component when evaluating a huge set of economic relations in any territory, expressed, moreover, through management relations. Moreover, such relations are traditionally characterized by a plurality of managers, a plurality of different reference points that are either in agreement or in contradiction (even antagonistic) with each other.

When analyzing geoeconomic processes, it is necessary to take into account such a consequence of globalization as the weakening of the national sovereignty of many countries due to the increase in international relations of non-state actors - large TNCs with huge financial capabilities, as well as various non-governmental organizations. However, the social energy of geoeconomic processes in most cases poorly reflects the direction of the protest moods of the population against transnational financial and economic forces. Thus, the policy of sanctions deterrence of Russia, which has long become almost an ordinary tool of external influence, is, in fact, a coalition strategy of many countries and TNCs. Its goal is to destabilize the economic and political situation in the country, increase social discontent, intensify protests, and aggravate interregional federal contradictions. And then - forcing concessions and putting into effect the orange perestroika scenario and changing the political course.

The social energy of geoeconomic processes is largely associated with the so-called international “cross-border trade”, practiced by the population of neighboring states exclusively to meet local needs for goods and services. The development of this type of trade in Russia was strongly influenced by the worst financial and economic situation of the neighboring countries, the depressive nature of their economies. The scale of this activity is evidenced by the fact that 10 years ago the share of “border trade” accounted for almost 1/2 of total exports and 2/3 of imports. In the crisis conditions of difficult times, “border trade” acquired the properties of poorly controlled territories by the state, which automatically increased the “degree” of social tension on them.

Within the framework of the European Union, where issues of cross-border economic cooperation have long been given considerable importance, the effect of “social energy” at the borders is relatively poorly expressed. At the beginning of the noughties, a number of documents were published here, which set out the philosophy of relations taking into account cross-border economic cooperation: “Wider Europe - Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors”, “European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper”, etc. But even here, from time to time, individual

outbreaks of social discontent arising on the basis of cross-border economic relations are recorded.

They are especially often manifested on the periphery of the European Union as challenges and threats increase for it. For example, they have intensified and multiplied as a result of the deepening differences between Brussels and Ankara, Greece and Turkey (due to the survey work carried out by Ankara on the disputed shelf with Greece), the UK's exit from the EU, etc. In the latter case, the border between Ireland and the United Kingdom became the only external land border of the EU between the United Kingdom and the European Union. Brexit has had a huge impact on cross-border trade, customs, immigration checks, the local economy, etc. The changes that have taken place have stirred up the population of Ireland. A wave of public discontent swept across Europe in connection with quarantine restrictions and border closures. It was about a sharp reduction in both passenger and cargo flows.

The intensity of social energy in the Kaliningrad region is largely due to the role of its borders separating the region from the territory of the EU. The economic development of the subject of the Russian Federation cannot be called ideal, and this is one of the levers that the so-called European partners can and will put pressure on. Moreover, Europe is located "around". Some of the protest moods within the region are heated from the outside, counting on unemployed Kaliningrad residents who can help in establishing geo-economic relations with the enclave that are more beneficial for the EU.

There are many other examples that illustrate the social energy of geo-economic processes. They are related to cross-border relations, in particular, between Russia and the Baltic States and Ukraine; the United States and Mexico; Israel and neighboring countries, etc.

## 6 Discussion

Studies on frontier energy and cross-border communication in geoeconomics and geopolitics are not yet abundant. The most famous author in this field in the post-soviet space is V. A. Dergachev (Ukraine), who proposed to the scientific community a geopolitical theory of "large multidimensional spaces" or "frontier communication" [2, 23, etc.]. The creative contribution of this author to the development of ideas of frontier energy and frontier communication is really significant. At the same time, Dergachev, who organized a private institute of Geopolitics named after himself, in some cases somewhat overestimates his contribution to science.

For example, it is difficult to agree with the statements that for the first time he created the theory of economic development and zoning of the World Ocean on the basis of the formation of port-industrial complexes; for the first time the geopolitical foundations of geo-economics (new geopolitics) were developed; for the first time the foundations of offshore geopolitics were developed, etc. There are many names of Western authors (E. Luttwak, U. Chohan, E. Fagley, C. Ebinger, S. Solberg, M. Herberg, P. Venier, etc., who also fruitfully investigated these issues.

In addition, he clearly exaggerates the role of some theories (A.I. Uemov's parametric theory of systems, M. K. Mamardashvili's Kantian variations of "border stylistics" by Yu. M. Lotman, etc.) in the development of theoretical ideas in the field of geopolitics and geo-economics.

## 7 Conclusion

The poorly researched problem of “social energy” considered in the article (mainly due to the lack of “consensus” with the laws of physics) to some extent echoes the ideas of geophilosophy. The latter is a spatial model of philosophy that operates with the relation of territory and land (naturally, with the participation of a person), and is based on the ideas of a multidimensional communication space with high boundary energy. V. Dergachev, mentioned above, believes that geophilosophy is an interdisciplinary science of civilizational relations and the transformation of the world immanent order based on the ideas of the multiplicity of worlds [37].

Taking into account the specifics of geophilosophy, where it is allowed to defend even very dubious opinions, the authors also could not avoid some controversial theses, arguing about “social energy”. Moreover, geoeconomics, geopolitics and political economic geography are chosen as the “polygons” of the study, dealing with borders that are sometimes very “hot”.

The main conclusions can be formulated as follows:

- social energy cannot be measured in physical units, but the energy expenditures that manifest themselves in social communities in the form of enthusiasm, inspiration, anger, aggression and other forms are not only specific, sometimes colossal. Bursts of such energy are very often recorded within the boundaries of regional and cross-border territories, which it is logical to consider in the context of geo-economics, geopolitics and political geography;
- “clusters” of social energy are confined to pockets of marginality in developing countries, which can be concentrated both inside them and on the periphery (in ethnically isolated regions);
- often, hotbeds of accumulation of “cross-border” social energy are observed in the process of political and administrative structuring of states and the construction of regional identity, especially in cases when the formation of such an identity occurs on a mixed basis-territorial and ethnic. This process is practically unavoidable, since regional identity is the “key” to the construction of the region as a political, social and institutional space.
- the problem is directly related to military conflicts between states, as well as other armed conflicts (“energy of war”); tribal separatism and intertribal clashes (tribalism in Africa); territories not controlled by former metropolises, etc.
- attempts to link the social energy of ethnic groups with geological boundaries, magmatism and fault tectonics of the Earth’s lithosphere suffer from too weak arguments, which does not allow them to be taken into account, in particular, in geo-economic studies.

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# Biopolitics in the Era of Coronavirus and Artificial Intelligence

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**Abstract.** The problem of the survival of humankind has acquired a new relevance. If recently the whole world was horrified by the prospects of a nuclear war, now the value priorities have shifted from the technogenic forms of struggle of some states and peoples against others to bio-political constants. Although the issues of viral infection, as well as the social consequences of the use of AI technologies concern all 8 billion earthlings, however, the biopolitics in the era of coronavirus and AI reflects all the same patterns: not solidarity in research and solving problems, but rivalry and absolutization of national interest.

**Keywords:** Biopolitics · COVID-19 · Artificial Intelligence Technologies · Social Problems · Global Community

## 1 Introduction

In the middle of the last century, the English historian Arnold J. Toynbee, analyzed the patterns of development of civilizations and derived the formula for survival: “challenge – response”, which means the need for an adequate response of the creative minority of civilization to the challenges of the environment, which are understood quite broadly. In the first half of the 21st century, modern global civilization found itself, on the one hand, facing the challenge of the natural environment, and namely a viral pandemic, and on the other hand, facing the challenge of the artificial environment, i.e., the social costs of introducing artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. And it requires an adequate response, but for this, it is necessary to understand the nature and the degree of danger of these challenges, as well as to determine the ways to effectively counter their negative consequences. If the 20<sup>th</sup> century passed under the sign of the scientific and technological revolution, where disciplines from the sphere of exact sciences were the basis, then the 21<sup>st</sup> century was marked by the accelerated development of a complex of sciences about “living matter” (V.I. Vernadsky). The study of the functioning mechanisms of “living matter” is in high demand for understanding natural and artificial habitat of humankind at the present stage of development.

## 2 Methodology of Research

Nowadays, in political science, the category “life” is meaningfully “determined by two main approaches. The first one is bio-anthropological, which emphasizes the importance of human life as “homo sapiens”. Therefore, the complex problem of preserving the environment and human as a part of nature comes to the fore. Another approach is politico-anthropological, which focuses on the social constants of a person’s life, where a complex of issues of exercising freedom and all-round development of a person as a citizen and an individual in society acquires the most important meaning” [1]. The crisis in the interaction of the natural and artificial environment of human gave rise to the concept of sustainable development, which entailed changes in the modern alignment of the power functions of the state and society and, as M. Foucault noted, “for millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” [2].

In this context, the problem of the survival of humankind has acquired a completely new meaning. If recently the whole world was horrified by the prospects of a nuclear war, now the value priorities have shifted from the technogenic forms of struggle of some states and peoples against others to bio-political constants. And although the issues of viral infection, as well as the social consequences of the use of AI technologies concern all 8 billion earthlings, the biopolitics in the era of coronavirus and AI technologies reflects all the same patterns: not solidarity in research and solving problems, but rivalry and absolutization of national interest.

Analyzing the situation with COVID-19 in the world, UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that “because while we are all floating on the same sea, it’s clear that some are in superyachts while others are clinging to drifting debris” [3]. Over the past century, humanity has been actively and repeatedly exposed to viruses (starting with the Spanish flu and ending at the present stage with COVID-19), which may be a manifestation of a natural change from one biosphere type to some other.

According to the academician V.I. Vernadsky, the biosphere is a special shell of the Earth, captured by life, and “life has the most important characteristic of expansion into all areas accessible to it” [4]. It was found out, based on the data of complex scientific research (geology, biology, paleontology, etc.) [5], that the Earth’s biosphere has been radically changing over 3.5 billion years with a frequency of about 62 million years. At the same time, there was an almost complete (Permian extinction, when about 96% of all marine and 70% of terrestrial vertebrates disappeared) or partial disappearance of some living species and the emergence of others that occupied the vacant living niches. It is important to note that the modern type of biosphere has existed for 65 million years, and scientists have noted clear signs of extinction. The best indicator for this phenomenon is the area of forests, which decreased by two times even before the beginning of active human impact on it. Extinction processes are actively ongoing, especially under the influence of humans, and those species which will best adapt to new conditions will survive [6].

There exist discussions among scientists about the role of human beings in the change of the modern biosphere. According to some researchers, over the past ten thousand years, man has changed nature so actively that he has obtained a leading role among



vertebrates, accelerating at the same time the disappearance of the rest. Another point of view is that “the short history of humanity in comparison with the whole life on Earth just emphasizes that with the advent of humans, life passed to a completely new stage of self-organization, when its ability to lower the entropy of the environment in a natural way” [7] was transformed into processes of human influence at it. In particular, it turned out that a person is able to live and work in an artificial environment (in space, under water, underground). Therefore, humanity is capable of terraforming lifeless planets.

But if we assume that the vacated living niches (living spaces) will be gradually occupied by such a universal biological substance as a virus, which in one form or another destroys both human beings and other types of the modern biosphere, then the question arises of a person’s ability to fight this biological conqueror and subjugate an evolutionary process, turning it into co-evolution in the form of a noosphere civilization.

### 3 Results of Research

The year 2020 will go down in history as the year of a pandemic, when the issues of life and death largely overshadowed previously such significant military conflicts, political differences between states and environmental problems. If during the Cold War, according to Raymond Aron, the main actors of world politics were the soldier and the diplomat, and in the 90s James N. Rosenau brought to the fore the figures of the tourist and the terrorist, then at the present moment the pharmacist and an IT specialist have come to the fore in world politics, because these are the sectors of the world economy that have become the most important in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In fact, there has come the finest hour of genetic, pharmacological research and AI engineering in the era of coronavirus.

At this point, the “virus war” has led to significant human casualties (for example, by January 2021, the virus had already killed 2 million people), as well as to an economic and financial crisis. However, the biggest losses relate to the widespread social isolation, which acts as the only way to fight infection until effective vaccines become available. It is important to emphasize the problem of social isolation, because human natural communications are minimized, and secondary IT virtual connections have developed rapidly, as the German sociologist Barbara Mettler-Meibom wrote with alarm back in the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, emphasizing the fact that “obtaining information and impressions with the help of information technology, i.e. from the “second hand”, violates the biologically determined way of assimilating information and interaction. A dematerialized world is being formed in the human psyche, replacing the real, material world with material interactions to which the human body and psyche are adapted” [8]. Since the end of the last century, the term “glass man” has come into scientific use. The term means the complete absence of privacy in the context of the total introduction of digital technologies. This happens both at the will of the citizens through social networks and with the help of AI technologies based on Big Data analysis. For example, “the bank’s AI will analyze all the data about the person (data purchased from different platforms), and the bank will refuse them a loan, and since this is a “black box”, it will not even explain to them (and its owner) why it did not give a loan. The same can happen with the admission to a university and so on” [9].

If we consider the situation with the COVID-19 pandemic in this context, then the problem of the “glass man” has begun to acquire an increasingly political character.

Technologies have emerged to stop the spread of the virus, which are in essence technologies for effective government surveillance of citizens. In particular, the essence of the Chinese “Social Credit System (2014–2020)” is that “those who have justified trust enjoy all the benefits, and those who have lost trust will not be able to take a step”. Information about citizens’ life and work is sent to one information center, where it is processed using big data technology, and according to the results of information processing, the citizens’ rating increases or decreases” [10]. Nowadays, there are already more than 170 million CCTV cameras in China, and this figure is constantly growing. So, “a system of “public reliability rating” has been deployed from 2020 throughout the country with the help of the facial recognition system, which is now operating in several regions of China. A citizen has the opportunity to maintain and even increase the rating, carefully following the rules of the road, acting as a donor, or conducting active public work” [11]. All these things will be considered at citizen’s work and in social life.

In particular, a citizen who scored 599 points and below is blacklisted with the postscript “person D”. Virtually, such people are already outcasts of society who are not hired for almost any job, not given loans, and not sold tickets for high-speed trains and planes. The one who communicates with such a person will be immediately reported, and his rating will also rapidly go down [12].

It is obvious that new technologies and the speed of their spread have a great influence on modern political processes, but this influence, however, is not unambiguous. According to the political scientist N.A. Baranov, these technologies, on the one hand, expand the opportunities of socially active citizens, but on the other hand, they increase the threat of interference in private life. The researcher argues that “new forms of social control called “The Digital Panopticon” contribute to the political mobilization of young people”, because “people respond to these forms of control with online mobilization and other technologies” [13]. His conclusion about “the introduction of digital technologies and artificial intelligence programs in order to control human behavior and actions, which are called digital totalitarianism, seems to be quite logical and reasonable and contributes to a change in the perception of the political agenda” [13].

Thus, the viral pandemic has become a factor, at one end, aggravating the social isolation of citizens, taking people away from natural ties and spiritual communication (what is expressed in such forms as closing of museums, theaters, and other places of cultural interaction) into the world of “loneliness on the Web”, and, by contrast, accelerating widespread introduction of AI technologies for total control of public services over citizens. All these measures are justified by the fact that it is necessary to fight to save lives, and therefore, the theme of health has become the leitmotif of modern political life.

The bio-political approach to the essence analysis of the problem of human survival as homo sapiens methodologically covers several directions in modern social science. Firstly, this is the problem of risk society, which was developed by W. Beck [14], who wrote that increasing labor productivity, increasing welfare, expanding knowledge, new technology and practically effective science in a terrible and paradoxical way turn against man and humanity, leading to “collective self-harm”. Secondly, the civilization of risk gives rise to an increased need for security, which, according to M. Foucault [15], forms certain dominants in the management of society, and namely discipline and biopolitics.

Thirdly, place in the forefront in modern conditions of biopolitics in the context of security is directly related to the increased role of medicine in the era of coronavirus when somatic human rights are increasingly falling under the state control. Its expressions are biometric passport, vaccination certificate and sanitary standards of communication, especially for individuals over 65 [16]. This topic is very relevant today, since the axiological aspects of freedom and equality of people in the fight against a deadly infection acquire alarming resonance.

Total management methods in these emergency conditions proved to be the most effective. Politics is a fight for power. But is it a fight for power over the virus? It sounds possible if the government or a pharmaceutical company has the vaccine. According to Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization, “inequality in the supply of coronavirus vaccines among high- and low-income countries undermines efforts to combat the pandemic. Some countries are bypassing COVAX (WHO’s program to deliver coronavirus vaccines to poor countries) by raising prices and trying to “jump ahead of the line”. As a result, several billion people will not be able to get the vaccine before 2024” [17].

In the new post-pandemic world, according to the political scientist Mardan, humanity will be divided into “clean” and “unclean”, since it will be much more profitable for an employer to take a person with a “passport of immunity” than one who was not yet sick but can get sick. After all, the employer will have to pay for medical insurance, bear the cost of finding a new employee in the event of the probable illness, and so on [18]. Chilean Deputy Minister of Health Dasa pointed out that more than 4,600 people are already eligible to receive digital or physical cards, that is, documents that guarantee advantages in recruitment [19].

Consequently, biological research in modern political and economic realities can become a tool for introducing new forms of social inequality, and therefore, it becomes a question, what will humanity receive because of the development of modern medical technologies, science, and technology in general? In fact, the understanding and interpretation of the meaning of human life, its value and significance are changing.

And there arises a new form of biopolitics, when the fear of death can subdue not only the citizens of one state, but also humanity. A new form of military-political struggle is emerging, and namely “vaccine” form. There exists the development of a special form of terrorism, where horror is spread by an invisible enemy that can be found everywhere. The best way to fight is isolation. Restriction of citizens’ rights to movement acts as a life sentence. This requires tight control, which can be implemented with the help of artificial intelligence.

An important problem occurs about how we use AI technology, since it becomes one of the most significant factors in the survival of a person as a biological being. But in this regard, it is significant to pay attention to the value characteristics of scientific research in the fight against diseases in the context of modern socio-political realities. As Giorgio Agamben noted, “with the establishment of biopolitics, we are witnessing an incessant shift in the boundaries of the state of emergency <... > in every modern state there is a certain limit of distinction, a point where a decision about life turns into a decision about death, and biopolitics can thus turn into thanatopolitics” [20, 21]. According to Bruno Latour, the so-called bio-power is being formed. “It is the state of what is rightly

called statistics: population management on a territorial grid seen from above and led by the power of experts. This is exactly what we see resurrected today, with the only difference that it is replicated from one nation to the next, to the point of having become worldwide. The originality of the present situation, it seems to me, is that, by remaining trapped at home while outside there is only the extension of police powers and the din of ambulances, we are collectively playing a caricatured form of the figure of biopolitics that seems to have come straight out of a Michel Foucault lecture” [21].

Another important topic incorporates the question of freedom of cognition and knowledge. According to S.G. Kara-Murza, “the demythologization of the concept of freedom inevitably brings to the fore the concept of responsibility with the requirement of an open statement of all visible limitations and areas of uncertainty when making significant decisions”, and “the concept of “knowledge is power” takes on the meaning of the infinite power of man above natural and an artificial habitat, where a person is considered as an object of cognitive influence along with all other objects of technological transformation” [22].

This is how the concept of inner freedom; the semantic and value foundations of his historical choice disappear. According to K. Lorentz, “values cannot be expressed in the terminology of quantity inherent in the natural sciences, and therefore, they seem not to exist, which means that everything that is connected with value is denied and humanity itself denies it; humanity, which knows the price and does not know values” [22]. And the most dangerous thing in this regard is the disappearance of the understanding of the life value, its sacraments, the living has turned into one of the “raw materials” for constructing the technological framework of the future, and thus, the freedom of creation has turned into the terrible freedom of man “to respect or destroy the world, and moreover, to pursue or give up for ruin” [23]. In this sense, there appears the problem of natural human rights, in particular, the problem of the realization of the human right to “negative” or personal freedom from society and the state, which does not come either from God or from society but is in the person himself.

According to I. Ashmanov, “we need a certain digital code that protects a person who has fallen into this digital whirlwind. It is necessary to protect digital identity, privacy and so on, notably, it is necessary to secure at the legislative level that digital technologies cannot be used to worsen the lives of citizens. Artificial intelligence systems operating in automatic mode should not make vital decisions about people” [24]. It seems that one should not rely on “business self-regulation”, since “the owners of new technologies have a lot of temptations to use artificial intelligence where it will discriminate against a person” [24].

Machines significantly exceed our cognitive abilities in most areas, resulting in ethical risks, which, according to Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, can be divided into three groups: “a shortage of work that will be performed by machines instead of people; the consequences for the independence of the individual and, particularly, for their freedom and security; and concerns that smarter machines will dominate humans and cause the loss of human life. However, on closer examination, it becomes obvious that work for people is not disappearing, but is being transformed, requiring new skills” [25]. Reports regularly make it clear that due to artificial intelligence technologies, from 20 to 70% of jobs will disappear, and this percentage includes not only blue collars (truck drivers, industrial

workers, etc.), but also white collars (lawyers, doctors, accountants). Experts argue that the number of jobs that will appear in connection with AI will exceed the number of disappeared ones. But will everyone be able to qualitatively retrain to perform a new job?

Also, even Francis Bacon considered science and technology as means by which humankind can compensate for the harmful consequences of its “expulsion from Paradise”. Machines acted as a symbol of achieving personal and social well-being, what was a characteristic tradition of Western civilization. The absolutization of the significance of technology, starting from the industrial society, has brought to life the psychological reaction of the worker to the machine, as an equal to an equal, where mental and emotional guidelines for distinguishing a person as a goal and a machine as a means have already been lost. An example of this is the Luddite movement in England in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the neo-Luddite movement in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the International Society for the Prohibition of Computers emerged, and union leaders began to observe workers’ concerns about being unnecessary in the face of structural unemployment in the digital age. Thus, “Luddism or neo-Luddism represents a certain type of social worldview when relationships between people have acquired a machine character. Hence, criticism of machines means criticism of the very type of social development, which primarily destroys the human in man” [26]. An illustration of this phenomenon is the production policy of the Amazon campaign, which partially switched its warehouses to service using AI technologies. So, large flat devices quickly move goods, but Mexican workers are engaged in loading them. Cameras are installed everywhere, so these cameras can monitor smoke breaks and other actions of workers not related to the performance of direct official duties. In fact, “people are continuously chased with an electronic whip, fined, punished, fired for the smallest violations and robots are made out of them” [24].

The pandemic pushed digitalization and the development of AI technologies, which, according to I. Alksnis, leads to a paradoxical situation when “millions of people are not needed either for industry, or for agriculture, or for armies. And when the socio-economic weight is lost, the political one also disappears” [27].

Hence, a social problem occurs, which scientists wrote about at the dawn of the information society, and namely this problem stems from the formation of a social group of “involuntarily idle”, when society can provide a decent standard of living overall but cannot occupy these people and give jobs corresponding to their abilities and education. And as A. Kuleshov notes, structural unemployment, and lack of purpose in life have already affected the lives of Europeans and citizens of other developed countries through the radicalization of protest movements, as well as through the formation of an appropriate social environment for extremist groups. The way out, according to the academician A. Kuleshov, is “in conscious archaization of life, in creating a situation in which I will feel needed. Hell with it that I live worse, but I do not live like everyone else. The feeling that you are constantly being sent fast food for free and given sneakers every six months, but at the same time you are not needed for anything, is terrible. And this feeling will only grow with the development of AI and robotics” [28].

Probably, the salvation in this situation can be the accelerated development of the education sector, which has undergone significant changes in the context of the pandemic, based on a sharp decline in offline learning and an increased demand for online

education. The authors of the article “International On-Line Collaboration in the Context of Contemporary Higher Education” note that in joint international projects in the field of online learning, it is necessary to consider the emergence of cultural behavioral patterns [29].

Online education has become almost the norm, which experts say will further transform the relationship between learners and those who teach them. According to F. Ibragimov, virtual tutoring and chat bots will develop. The researcher suggests that “by 2024 AI will be better at handling translations, by 2026 it will be able to write essays on given topics better than high school students, by 2049 it will easily write bestsellers, and after 45 years AI will be better than humans to cope with all types of work, including diplomatic work, not only at the level of consulates and paperwork, but also at the level of international negotiations and public diplomacy” [30]. Indisputably, these technological forecasts from a social standpoint are colored in both light and dark tones. For example, neural machine translation provides translation of the entire sentence, and the potential for fast and accurate translation is enormous, since it will solve many problems of international communication. For example, Google Neural Machine Translation, which translates from English into 103 other languages around the world, already supports translation into 13 African languages, including Igbo, Swahili, and Zulu, the three most spoken languages on the continent [31]. Thus, AI technologies can contribute to the development of the communication environment of the world community and reduce the risks of interethnic conflicts. But there is also a space for negative assessments of the introduction of AI into international relations. For example, the authors of the report “Artificial Intelligence and International Affairs: Disruption Anticipated” express concern that in the medium and long term the development of AI can be effectively used only by a small group of developed countries or segments of society. According to Yaroslav Lisovolik, Program Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club, a member of the RIAC, it is necessary to highlight the key risks in the development of artificial intelligence from two points of view, global and ethical. In the first case, “one of the key risks in the development of AI can be considered as the possibility of increasing the technological lag of the least developed countries from the most advanced economies in the world” [32]. And in the second case, “there is always the issue of the developed countries’ willingness to share their knowledge and innovations with other members of the international community within the framework of technology development at the national level” [32].

It is important to comprehend how actively biopolitics uses the capabilities of AI to control society in modern conditions, even in such a highly risky segment as armed conflicts. According to the military expert V.B. Kozyulin, artificial intelligence technologies will be able to significantly change the entire course of hostilities with far-reaching consequences and that they will affect the security of civilians and other aspects of an armed conflict, since it will technologically be possible to wage a war bloodlessly, not conquering, but taking territories and population under AI control. The changes will also affect humanitarian law, since “humane” weapons will only temporarily disable manpower or immobilize terrorists using non-blinding lasers, stun guns, directed impulses, and the robot can set the level of compliance with international humanitarian law, which will ultimately be reflected in AI platform within the allowed parameters [33].

Thus, a person turns into a creature controlled by an artificial intelligence and that does not have the power to handle his own actions, and therefore, the danger of submission of a person to his own instruments is formed. The American General P. Houston believes that to avoid this, especially in the military field, “commanders should always exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force. In other words, the key decisions must be made by a person; one cannot use autonomous weapon systems over which effective human control has been lost” [33]. Stephen Hawking wrote also about this a lot, noting that “useful artificial intelligence could co-exist with people and increase our capabilities, but when machines reach a critical stage at which they can evolve on their own, it will be impossible to predict how their goals will coincide with ours. When developing artificial intelligence, it is necessary to ensure compliance with ethical and security requirements” [34].

## 4 Discussion Questions

The rapid development of digital technologies, the filling of the human environment with intellectual artifacts raise questions about the possibilities of species changes in a person up to the direct merging of a person with a machine and the emergence of a co-evolutionary process, in a view that this type of biosphere may already be in decline. Therefore, a fundamentally new understanding of the “natural” has recently begun to form.

In this regard, another block of axiological problems of biopolitics arises, where the issues of “qualitative demography” come to the fore, i.e., the improvement of the human breed with the help of modern genetic methods. There exist already substitutes for skin, blood, and organs. We are already becoming cyborgs, in other words, creatures whose vital functions depend on technology. However, “eugenic intervention” aimed at the development and improvement of human nature, according to Yu.V. Hen, “threatens humanity with complete stagnation. The ideal, created by each epoch, captures the situation characteristic of that epoch. Any attempt to build a person in accordance with a certain model will simultaneously turn out to be an attempt to stop history” [35].

There arises an objective need for a symbiosis of rational and value principles in comprehending the world, because the absolutization of the rational method of comprehending reality has led to irrational results, i.e., to the destruction of the natural preconditions of human existence. And therefore, a one-sided orientation towards a rational organization of life appears now as a dead end [36]. An acute question appeared around the commensurability of the rational and the sensual, the logic and the value, the rational and the mythological in the thinking and behavior of a person. Romano Guardini, speaking about a “new type of man”, noted that “the field of knowledge, will and human activity has lost any correlation with the organic proportions of the person himself. Man’s relationship to nature is losing its immediacy, becoming indirect, mediated through calculations and equipment” [23].

Russian researchers Vladimir Belous, Vitaly Volkov and Leonid Baltovsky declare the need to form new common political values for humankind, the combination of which is called geo-eco-ideology, noting that its focus should be on “the problems of the natural environment, taking into account the natural and anthropogenic processes”, and the result

of the interaction of modern political knowledge and public consciousness should be systemic values, such as “ecological state, ecological political sovereignty, justice and responsibility” [37].

In the opinion of E.V. Kosilova and A.V. Frolov, modern humanity already exists in three environments, and namely the natural environment, the urbanized artificial environment, and the digital environment. The living digital world is determined by the Internet, which often leads to a mixing of the virtual and real worlds [9], and, consequently, to the already mentioned problems of the “ecology of communication”, when natural biological ties between people are broken, and a world of simulacrum is formed in return.

A manifestation of the “ecological turn” in the study of the digital environment can relate to the formation of digital ecology, which becomes part of the general concept of sustainable development, which can be considered as the philosophical basis for a comprehensive response of humankind to the challenges of natural (COVID-19 pandemic) and artificial (AI technology) *homo sapiens* habitats.

Returning to the original thesis about the survival of humankind, it is necessary to understand what resources we have in order to make evolution “manageable”, in other words, to achieve noospheric civilization. According to V.I. Vernadsky, the energy of thought, being embodied in human life activity, becomes “cultural biochemical energy”, which becomes the driving force of evolution, the basis for the transformation of the biosphere into the noosphere [38].

Items of material culture, created by man, due to his ability to think, can lead to his loss of life. But at the same time, thinking gives us hope for salvation, because it allows us to learn, comprehend and understand. This means that we can realize the process of evolution and direct our scientific and technical energy of creation toward regulation of our evolutionary process, and hence, to survival. The modern historical and civilizational moment, in the opinion of P. Kuusi, “gives us the privilege of living at a turning point in cosmic history when evolution for the first time becomes conscious of itself via human. We are passing through a critical starting point and entering into conscious evolution” [39].

However, in the current state of human noospheric activity, an objective element of instability and destruction is observed: the cultural biochemical energy of a person is aimed at a narrowly defined goal of satisfying the national interests of individual states and communities, and that is why, on the scale of all humankind, we do not find appropriate biopolitical responses to the challenges of a viral pandemic, and as a result, we find ourselves in captivity of social isolation and total AI control.

During the speaking at an event timed to the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the first meeting of the UN General Assembly, A. Guterres noted the importance of expanding international cooperation, as “we must turn our global system into a global partnership” [40].

## 5 Conclusions

Thus, summing up some of the results of considering the multifactorial problem of the development of biopolitics in the era of a viral pandemic and AI technologies, the following conclusions can be made. Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic objectively showed



that the term global community is applied to peoples belonging to different states and communities, because the virus made it clear in a cruel way that only the solidarity of all earthlings and mutual assistance can be an effective response to its deadly challenge, without which (exchange of vaccines, joint research, public and private investments in virology and related research areas) it is impossible to defeat the virus. Secondly, the development and implementation of AI technologies is the main direction of scientific and applied research, which opens great opportunities for humans in managing the natural, artificial, and digital environments of their habitat, in fact, creating real prerequisites for the development of noospheric civilization. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that when developing technologies of co-evolution, it is necessary to proceed from the most important axiological prerequisites for the preservation and building on of living matter, for which AI technologies are though the most important, but only tools in the hands of homo sapiens. Thirdly, biopolitics should be filled with that objectively required content (regulation of the interaction processes between the natural and artificial environment of humankind), which will make it possible to implement the principles of global governance.

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# Digital Geography and Digital Borders in the Era of Information Globalization

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**Abstract.** Internet fragmentation is a popular topic of the scientific research; specialized terms, such as “Internet Balkanization” and “Splinternet” appear, which describe the new state of the de-globalized information space. This de-globalization is associated with the emergence of digital borders and territorialization of the global Internet. At the same time, according to UNCTAD statistics, the volume of data crossing the borders of states continues to grow. Thus, globalization at the level of data coexists with the fragmentation and digital borders at the policy level.

Methodologically the paper is based on the critical geography approach. Critical geography allows to study digital borders as social constructs, discursive practices that reflect the nature of power relations in the international arena and are a source of power for those who create and control them. Digital borders, due to their social nature, are not impenetrable and the construction of digital borders, therefore, does not mean the end of information globalization.

The article identifies two levels of digital geography and digital borders—discursive and ontological. At the discursive level, they reflect the securitization of the information space and at the ontological level, they are designed primarily to protect against cybersecurity threats.

However, the erection of borders on the discursive level does not imply the end of information globalization on the ontological level of the digital geography. States are interested in the economic benefits that the global connected Internet provides. Global connectivity is the result of business activities, which creates new global digital spaces, contributing to the globalization of the market in order to increase profits.

**Keywords:** Internet · Globalization · Critical geography · International information security · Digital sovereignty · Digital borders · Digital geography

## 1 Introduction

At the initial stage of the Internet development, at the early 1990s it was considered a “terra nullis” (lat.)—a space in which social relations and norms are not based on historical experience and must be developed anew. According to this approach, the norms of international politics do not apply to cyberspace, there are no state borders and the states cannot exert sovereignty there. Internet was considered as one of the driving

forces of globalization (globalization was the dominant topic in the academic literature on international affairs at that time), and the term “information globalization” was widely used to emphasize the growing volume of cross-border information flows on the Internet.

At present, this approach is challenged by various fields of knowledge—political science, international studies, etc. The growing amount of the scientific literature deals with the topics of Internet fragmentation and increasing role of states in the information sphere [1], as well as its information wars and conflicts [2]. At the same time, scientific materials on the globalization Internet are quite rare.

Internet fragmentation is reflected not only in a significant number of scientific publications, but also in the reports of international organizations (for example, in the WEF report “Internet Fragmentation: An Overview”), it conflicts with statistical data, according to which over the past years the volume cross-border data transmission is increasing.

This article aims to answer the research question: why, along with the strengthening of the discourse about digital borders and the fragmentation of the Internet, there is no reduction in the volume of cross-border data transmitted and is it legitimate in these conditions to talk about the end of information globalization?

Critical geography approach, which considers digital boundaries as social constructs reflecting power relations in the international arena is chosen as the theoretical basis of the study.

Critical geography implies that digital boundaries are social constructs in which one can distinguish two levels: discursive one (which is a reflection of power relations and political and diplomatic discourse in the international arena) and ontological one (the ontological level of digital geography includes infrastructure, software and digital content, and digital borders on the ontological level reflect states jurisdiction over these layers of cyberspace).

Ontological and discursive levels of digital geography and digital borders are in complex interdependence. At the discursive level, the subjects of the formation of digital borders are states that are interested in strengthening their sovereignty and protecting against information security threats. Due to the securitization of the information space, the discourse on digital borders is primarily focused on ensuring security, therefore it is dominated by states, but this does not mean the end of information globalization.

At the ontological level of the digital geography states are not the only players, and security is not always the major driving force. Governments, along with global Internet companies, have a stake in economic growth and economic benefits from a connected global Internet. Large Internet companies strive to globalize sales markets and increase profits, as a result of their activities, there is an increase in the volume of data that crosses state borders.

At the same time, the discursive and ontological levels are closely related, it is at the political level that decisions are made and institutions are formed that control the subsequent development of technologies. Thus, according to critical geopolitics, borders are primarily social objects, and the territorialization of the Internet does not mean the formation of “unpenetrated” borders and, thus, does not destroy it as a coherent global system. Strengthening digital borders does not mean de-globalization, but speaks of the

growing influence of international politics, characterized by increasing conflicts, on the information space.

## 2 Literature Review

In the 1990s and early 2000s quite a vast amount of scientific papers was devoted to the influence of the Internet on world politics [3], and the Internet was considered as the main engine of globalization [4] and contributed to the growing role of non-governmental actors, increased interdependence and erosion of state sovereignty [5]. Most researchers contrasted the networked nature of the Internet with the territorial nature of political geography, and stated that geographical analogies are not applicable to the cyberspace [3].

This approach was called the “digital exclusivity”—the Internet space was seen as an independent area that was not subject to the laws of “Real politick”, but which, in turn, had a significant impact on international politics, strengthening globalization [6].

Since the mid-2000s the emphasis began to shift. Today, this point of view is considered as a utopian interpretation of not only the very nature of the Internet, but also the nature of its relationship with world politics [7]. Researchers believe that international politics, including the “rollback of globalization,” has a significant impact on the nature of the information space [2], its growing conflict, strengthening state borders and digital sovereignty in the face of an increasing number of digital security threats. The authors note the growing fragmentation trend of the Internet [8].

The American researcher M. Mueller proves that states strive to define the boundaries of their jurisdiction in the information space, which is the engine of the information fragmentation of the world [8]. As the Swiss scientist M. Dunn-Cavelty notes, such a policy is due to the securitization of this area, since as the number of digital threats increases, governments perceive ICT through the prism of security [9, 10].

Most researchers in the field of Internet fragmentation identify states as subjects of fragmentation that seek to ensure their sovereignty by strengthening “digital borders” [11], which can be designated as the territorialization of the Internet, by analogy with the colonization and territorialization of other new spaces by states, for example, the Arctic or the New World [12].

## 3 Critical Geography on Digital Borders

According to critical geography, borders and territories are products of power relations, formed discursively. Borders and territories acquire form and meaning only as a result of the social activity of groups or individuals. Thus, “territories are always manifestations of power relations and they need public action to create and maintain them” [13].

Spatial analysis of the Internet has gained popularity in Western scientific works for a long time, but critical geography has not been used in it until recently. One of the most authoritative centers in this field, the Oxford Internet Research Institute compiles “Internet maps” reflecting the popularity of social networks in the world, the routes of cross-border and transcontinental data transmitted, the total number of domains or the number of users by country. However, the very scheme for constructing such “maps of

the Internet” was intended to emphasize the differences between physical and cyberspace and the inapplicability of simple geographic analogies to it.

One of the first approaches to critical geography was used by the German researcher Lambach, who noted that the subjects of territorialization in their actions not only designate the boundaries and limits of their jurisdiction, but also create new territories in global cyberspace. At the same time, Lambach singles out states, large Internet companies and communities of Internet users in the role of subjects of Internet territorialization. Following Lambach, in this article, state communities, large Internet companies and communities of Internet users are distinguished as subjects of the formation of Internet borders [11].

According to critical geography, discourse has a very important role in shaping territory and boundaries, and political discourse is always a reflection of power relationship.

Two main discursive practices in the formation and maintenance of digital boundaries can be distinguished:

- (1) Public marking of borders (for example, statements of state officials about state borders on the Internet);
- (2) Regular public demonstration of power and border control (adoption of legislative initiatives aimed at marking digital borders at the national level, fixing the corresponding formulations in the final documents of international organizations, restricting access for foreign IT companies).

A feature of cyberspace is its man-made nature, which distinguishes it from previous spaces that were subject to territorialization, such as land and air space. Therefore, cyber territories need to be “reified”, created at the ontological level, and only then delimitation of boundaries and determination of power relations in the digital space takes place. At the same time, the ontological and discursive levels of digital boundaries are closely related to each other, but do not coincide.

At the ontological level, the global information space of the Internet consists of infrastructure, software and content, information and data [14]. Based on this approach, the ontological component of digital boundaries can be formulated as follows:

- (1) (1) access control (control over the infrastructure through which the Internet is accessed);
- (2) (2) control of functionality (control over the software, with the help of which the main functionality of the information resources of the network is realized);
- (3) (3) data control (which also implies control of the behavior of Internet users creating data and information, including in the context of information security, prevention of illegal activities at the level of an individual state and the international community) [14].

Due to the interdependence of discourse and the ontology of digital borders, many political decisions simultaneously affect both levels. So, for example, legislative initiatives in the field of localization of personal data of citizens, on the one hand, have a

discursive meaning, since they are a demonstration of state control over their digital borders, change the network ontology, since they involve the creation of infrastructure and the development of software solutions that allow storing personal data within a specific jurisdiction.

## 4 Current Trends in Digital Geography

National segments of the information space are analogies of territorial jurisdictions in cyberspace, which are convenient and understandable for decision-makers in the field of public policy in all states. The main reason for the construction of digital borders is the securitization of the information space, when, as threats to information security grow, security issues become relevant, in making decisions about which states play a major role. At the same time, it must be said that states are interested in the economic benefits that the global connected Internet provides.

Critical geography allows us to consider borders as reflections of power relations in the international arena, therefore, the formation of a discourse about digital borders, which replaced the discourse about information globalization and about the Internet as a global public good, is a restructuring of the spatial organization of the information sphere based on digital sovereignty by creating new discursive and ontological practices in the context of changed power relations—a decrease in the influence of the United States in international politics and the information sphere, the formation of multipolarity, a growing number of threats to international information security.

The global information space is a vivid example of a space that is new from the point of view of territoriality, within which state borders and the boundaries of state power go through the stages of emergence, change and struggle. Unlike other spaces, the territorialization of the Internet initially presupposes “reification”, the creation of a territory, since cyber territory is not a given. In this process, the leading role is played by non-state actors—representatives of business and the Internet community. As M. Finnemore notes, 95% of the entire Internet infrastructure is privately owned [14]. It is as a result of business activities that new formats for using the Internet are being formed, new platforms for user interaction, and it should be noted that the high dynamism of business activity in this area should be noted.

In turn, large companies that own digital platforms, at the level of network ontology, have the ability to create digital boundaries of information ecosystems at all levels—control of infrastructure, software and content, as well as the ability to manage the preferences and behavior of users of information services, but in the political field they do not have influence comparable to states, and therefore hardly participate in the discourse about borders on the Internet. This is due to the growing number of threats to information security, while only states have a monopoly on legitimate violence and thus can guarantee the security of digital borders, which explains their dominant position in discourse.

Business pursues the goal of obtaining benefits, therefore it is interested in expanding sales markets, that is, in information globalization. It is business activity that plays a significant role in increasing the volume of cross-border data transferred—first of all, we are talking about the activities of global digital platforms (such as the companies of the GAFAM group—Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and BATX—Baidu, Alibaba,



Tascent, Xiaomi). As the authors of the UNCTAD Digital Economy Report 2021 note, large IT companies have the ability to manage huge digital ecosystems, often calling into question the ability of individual states to sovereign control over the data flows that cross their borders.

Moreover, the largest companies are based in the United States and China. According to UNCTAD statistics, companies headquartered in these two countries accounted for 90% of the market capitalization of all digital platforms in 2019. As D. Farrell notes, states use large IT companies as “points of control” over the behavior of users or other non-state actors [15], thus indirectly strengthening their influence within digital boundaries. Companies, in turn, agree to this, fearing the commercial costs associated with confrontation with national governments. However, the interests of states and business still lie on a different plane, which largely explains the divergence of the discursive and ontological levels of digital boundaries. The most important element in the formation of digital borders is the legitimization of the state’s power over a certain “digital territory”, while an important legitimizing factor at the discursive level is the securitization of the global information space and the growth of threats to information security. At the level of data and infrastructure, as well as software, the main subject of globalization is business.

## 5 Conclusion

Territories and borders in cyberspace have the characteristics of a geographic spaces: they define what is “inside” and “outside”. However, a feature of digital territories and digital borders are highly dynamic—they are constantly changing and restructuring, and the creation of new territories and new dimensions of cyberspace occurs as a result of the activities of states and non-state actors.

At the discourse level, the strengthening of digital borders is associated with the need to protect against information security threats, which are predominantly transnational in nature. However, the trends in the development of the information space are multi-level and nonlinear in nature and are characterized by the participation of many actors, whose motives lie not only in the political, but also in the economic, value and other planes. Thus, the erection of digital borders does not mean the end of information globalization.

The development of the Internet at the present stage, therefore, is characterized by the simultaneous flow of two multidirectional processes: globalization and de-globalization. American author Rosenau called such phenomenon “glocalization” [5]. Moreover, if at the discursive level we observe an increase in fragmentation, then the ontological level of “digital borders” on the Internet and “digital geography” tends more towards globalization.

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# Globalization and the Principles of Tolerance

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**Abstract.** The article examines the sociological and political-legal issues of the implementation of the principles of tolerance in modern Russian society. The forms and causes of intolerant behavior, problems of migration processes, interethnic extremism are analyzed. The issues of the spread of political radicalism and extremism in the modern world are considered. The statistical data reflecting the indicators of the number of terrorist acts carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation and the number of terrorist acts prevented are given. The conclusion is made: in the total number of crimes committed on the territory of the Russian Federation, the quantitative indicator of extremist crimes is small. However, each such crime can cause an increased public response and destabilize the internal political and social situation both in a particular region and in the country. Interethnic relations and the causes of xenophobia are analyzed. It is indicated that a significant number of radicalist and extremist manifestations are associated with the peculiarities of interethnic relations. Thus, the study of this problem requires close attention to the norms of international law that ensure sustainable development, global peace and security. From the point of view of the psychopathology and political psychology of extremism, its socio-cultural prerequisites, the influence of extreme social and psychological attitudes on the growth of violence in society, the influence of extreme ideological attitudes that find their expression in ideological disputes and have a wide public resonance is considered. It is concluded that extreme social and psychological attitudes, extreme ideological attitudes in themselves do not cause violence in society. The grounds, principles and boundaries of tolerance are revealed. It is pointed out that the state security system and the life support structures of society are ineffective without special adaptation to the conditions of the fight against political extremism and terrorism. This explains the success of the extremists and the wide range of their actions. Therefore, conducting special research on the problems of extremism is important for ensuring state security and preserving socio-political stability. It is concluded that the boundaries of tolerance are determined by the boundaries of conscious freedom. The issue of defining the boundaries of the freedom of society in countering extremism is considered. It is concluded that the use of emergency means in such situations may pose a threat to the realization of the purpose for which they are intended—the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens. Thus, the only arguments against extreme methods of combating extremist activity are arguments that appeal to values. This means that one of the most important criteria for assessing the development of civil society is the level of legal awareness and legal culture of society. Legal attitudes should be based on a positive image of law and on the idea of legal behavior as the only way to realize freedom in modern society.

**Keywords:** Radicalism · Extremism · Tolerance · Xenophobia · Freedom

## 1 Introduction

The dispute between irreconcilable ideological enemies representing adherents of tolerance and anti-tolerance has essentially nothing to do with the problem of tolerance in its practical aspect. This dispute can last forever, and neither side will win a final victory in it: “both the boundaries and the content of tolerance depend to a very high degree on the way it is theoretically justified” [1, p. 33]. Meanwhile, society lives according to its own principles and norms, developed not so much by irreconcilable ideologists, but by life itself.

An example is the events in Europe in the fall of 2020. On October 16, an 18-year-old Chechen born in Moscow, Abdulakh Anzorov, attacked a college teacher and beheaded him in a Paris suburb. The motive was that the teacher during one of the classes showed students cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. On October 28, in Nice, an unknown person shouting “Allahu Akbar” attacked passers-by with a knife near the Basilica of Notre-Dame. He killed three people and wounded several others. Two of the victims were beheaded. The media also reported that a man tried to attack police officers with a knife in Avignon, but in the end, he was shot. On the same day, a similar attack was launched near the walls of the French consulate in the Saudi city of Jeddah. The criminal also managed to neutralize. On November 2, near the central synagogue of Vienna, shooting was opened at passers-by. 4 people were killed, 22 were injured, including one policeman. The alleged terrorist Feyzulai Kuytim is a citizen of Austria and Northern Macedonia, who was previously convicted in Austria for participating in the activities of a terrorist organization.

From the positions of law enforcement agencies, the prevention of extremism should be preventive in nature. An example of this is the liquidation of two cells of supporters of the international extremist religious association “At-Takfir Wal-Hijra”, banned in Russia, on 23.10.2020. In Makhachkala, Kaspiysk and Izberbash, which, according to the comments of the FSB of Russia, actively promoted radical ideology, recruited new supporters to a religious extremist sect, called on believers to reject secular laws and civil society institutions, and also advocated the creation of a theocratic Islamic state on the territory of the North Caucasus. Total according to open sources (<https://ria.ru/20200322/1568976434.html>) in 2020, 5 terrorist acts were prevented in Russia. Their geography is wide: March 27 in Krasnodar; March 23 in Kabardino-Balkaria; March 21 in the suburbs of Ufa; February 18 in the city of Kerch; January 24 in Simferopol.

In the modern world, a significant number of radicalist and extremist manifestations are associated with the peculiarities of interethnic relations. During the study, it turns out that often radicalism and extremism have no grounds in inter-ethnic conflicts, but on the contrary, provoke conflicts. Interethnic conflicts become “artificial”, having no interethnic contradictions at their core.

## 2 Results

The dispute between irreconcilable ideological enemies representing adherents of tolerance and anti-tolerance [1] has essentially nothing to do with the problem of tolerance in its practical aspect. This dispute can last forever, and neither side will win a final victory

in it: “both the boundaries and the content of tolerance depend to a very high degree on the way it is theoretically justified” [2, p. 33, 3].

The “Declaration of Principles of Tolerance”, adopted by resolution 5.61 of the UNESCO General Conference of November 16, 1995 [4] states: tolerance means respect, acceptance and understanding of the diversity of cultures of our world, forms of self-expression and ways of expressing human individuality. Tolerance is promoted by knowledge, openness, communication, freedom of thought, conscience and beliefs. Tolerance is not a tolerant attitude to injustice, not a rejection of one’s own or a concession to someone else’s beliefs, not condescension or indulgence, but an active attitude, recognition and respect for human rights and freedoms. The views of one person cannot be imposed on others: freedom to adhere to their beliefs and granting this right to others, rejection of dogmas and absolute truths, recognition of people’s differences in appearance, social status, speech, behavior, values and the right to live in peace, preserving their individuality. As a result, the opportunities for reaching agreement between people are expanding due to the enrichment of their own experience and the variability of communication with others other than us. Tolerance is a harmony of diversity, a criterion for the development and culture of a person. Tolerance promotes the education of individual responsibility, responsibility for one’s destiny and responsibility for the fate of the world community.

Meanwhile, society lives according to its own principles and norms, developed not so much by irreconcilable ideologists, but by life itself. An example is the events in Europe in the fall of 2020. On October 16, an 18-year-old Chechen born in Moscow, Abdulakh Anzorov, attacked a college teacher and beheaded him in a Paris suburb. The motive was that the teacher during one of the classes showed students cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. On October 28, in Nice, an unknown person shouting “Allahu Akbar” attacked passers-by with a knife near the Basilica of Notre-Dame. He killed three people and wounded several others. Two of the victims were beheaded. The media also reported that a man tried to attack police officers with a knife in Avignon, but in the end, he was shot. On the same day, a similar attack was launched near the walls of the French consulate in the Saudi city of Jeddah. The criminal also managed to neutralize. On November 2, near the central synagogue of Vienna, shooting was opened at passers-by. 4 people were killed, 22 were injured, including one policeman. The alleged terrorist Feyzulai Kuytim is a citizen of Austria and Northern Macedonia, who was previously convicted in Austria for participating in the activities of a terrorist organization.

From the positions of law enforcement agencies, the prevention of extremism should be preventive in nature [5]. An example of this is the liquidation of two cells of supporters of the international extremist religious association “At-Takfir Wal-Hijra”, banned in Russia, on 23.10.2020. In Makhachkala, Kaspiysk and Izberbash, which, according to the comments of the FSB of Russia, actively promoted radical ideology, recruited new supporters to a religious extremist sect, called on believers to reject secular laws and civil society institutions, and also advocated the creation of a theocratic Islamic state on the territory of the North Caucasus. Total according to open sources (<https://ria.ru/20200322/1568976434.html>) in 2020, 5 terrorist acts were prevented in Russia. Their geography is wide: March 27 in Krasnodar; March 23 in Kabardino-Balkaria; March 21 in the suburbs of Ufa; February 18 in the city of Kerch; January 24 in Simferopol.

At the same time: in January–December 2018, 1,265 extremist crimes were registered; during 2019, 585 extremist crimes were registered; in January–December 2020, 833 extremist crimes were registered [1]. In comparison with the total number of crimes committed on the territory of the Russian Federation, the quantitative indicator of extremist crimes is not great, but each such crime can cause an increased public response and destabilize the internal political and social situation both in a particular region and in the country.

The state security system and the life support structures of society are ineffective without specialized adaptation to the conditions of the fight against political extremism and terrorism. This explains the success of the extremists and the wide range of their actions. Therefore, conducting special research on the problems of extremism is important for ensuring state security and preserving socio-political stability.

In the modern world, a significant number of radicalist and extremist manifestations are associated with the peculiarities of interethnic relations. The study of this problem requires close attention to the norms of international law that ensure sustainable development, global peace and security [6]. During the study, it turns out that often radicalism and extremism have no grounds in inter-ethnic conflicts, but on the contrary, provoke conflicts. Interethnic conflicts become “artificial”, having no interethnic contradictions at their core.

There are peoples and ethnic groups living in the world whose relationships are historically conditioned by conflict. This may be due to the historical features of their military-political relations, the specifics of their confessional affiliation, cultural, linguistic and even socio-psychological factors. At the same time, representatives of these ethnic groups are in the closest social interaction. How to avoid conflicts in such a situation?

People are affected by extreme social and psychological attitudes. Exploring the issues of psychopathology and political psychology of extremism, its socio-cultural prerequisites, as well as relying on available statistics [7], it can be noted that extreme social and psychological attitudes do not cause violence and are more often expressed in personal hostility.

Extreme ideological attitudes are imposed on society, which have their expression in ideological disputes that have a wide public resonance. For our country, it is very important to study the issue of nationalist extremism, which under the influence of the natural course of history undergoes constant ideological changes [8]. However, extreme ideological attitudes also do not cause violence. What, then, is the reason for interethnic violence in modern society?

"The drama of the acculturation period is associated with the psychological discomfort of experiencing a “cultural shock” and a violation of the usual algorithm of interactions, leading to the breakdown of “background expectations”, the everyday structure of elements of natural events. Consequently, the processes accompanying the entry of an individual into a new cultural space for him are characterized by stresses, depending on the experience of which the individual either adapts more actively or prefers to linger in the narrow environment of “his own”, the familiar atmosphere of the diaspora with a familiar culture and learned patterns of behavior" [9, p. 25].

The phenomenon of xenophobia has many aspects: psychology, history, culture, traditions, economic and political aspects. Prevention of xenophobia should be aimed at the activities of specific social groups. However, xenophobia as an ideological attitude of social groups can also pursue various goals: political PR in order to fight for power; the economic component in order to fight for spheres of influence in business, for cheap labor; the nationalist, racist component, expressed in the assertion of the exclusivity of the nation, race, whose representatives and fighters for the rights of the members of these groups consider themselves. All these factors are unpredictably mixed together [10, pp. 171–175, 11].

The principles of tolerance in today's society express the only acceptable way of coexistence of a multinational, multi-religious population. Globalization as a process of rapprochement of peoples, races, languages, cultures, is an objective and irreversible process. Nevertheless, it should not lead to universal unification based on one "ideal" model, and should not be expressed in complete cosmopolitanism [12]. This search for compromises does not have universal recipes. This is a process of search and development. This search should reveal the general, and not separate the particular, but it should not violate the rights of the special to define private life.

Private life should be built on the principles of respect for one's special features as a representative of an ethnic group, nation, denomination, cultural and family tradition, on knowledge and respect for the history of one's people and one's kind [13, p. 27]. Without respect for oneself as a self-sufficient, free, developing person, there will be no respectful attitude towards the surrounding members of society. However, self-respect largely depends on how tolerant society will be to me, how much it will allow me to develop this respect in myself, how much I will be able to remain as I am, due to the characteristics inherent in me from birth.

This is expressed in such necessary things for me as the opportunity to communicate in my native language, the opportunity to develop my culture, the opportunity to perform religious rituals and celebrate traditional holidays for my people. If I see that I am respected, this will be the first step towards making me respect others.

Professor Bystrov V. Yu., refers to the work of the Slovenian social philosopher Slavoj Žižek "On violence" [14]: "the emergence of a society paralyzed by the principle of tolerance cannot be prevented by understanding this principle as a balance between respect for the other and the need for one's own freedom. Such a balance will always be formed not in favor of a tolerant individual, if the category of recognition in its content will be reduced to the passive recognition of the rights and beliefs of another" [9, p. 28, 1, pp. 42–44].

The social begins to proceed directly from the moral—"treat the other as a goal, not as a means to achieve the goal," Kant taught. If I am confident in myself, I will be confident in the other, seeing myself in him. Tolerance seems to be a form of relationship that only free people can afford: the boundaries of tolerance are determined by the boundaries of the freedom I realize [15].

### 3 Discussion and Conclusion

Thus, the study leads us to the need to consider the principles of tolerance in the context of assessing the development of civil society. This assessment can be carried out

according to various criteria: the development of democratic institutions and political pluralism; civil activity of the population, its electoral behavior; the degree of influence of public opinion on the institutions of state power; the criterion for the development of private entrepreneurship and business institutions, etc. One of the important criteria characterizing the degree of development of the civil consciousness of the population is the criterion of the development of the principles of tolerance in it.

Currently, the meaning of this term is significantly devalued in our society. In the public consciousness, the samples of “tolerance” cause a negative assessment. Common sense suggests that the opposite of tolerance is often given out as “tolerant”. However, we will focus on its positive meaning.

The formation and development of civil society is a complex process, the formation of a specific form of public consciousness. The degree of development of civil society directly depends on how much understanding has developed in society to what extent the “patience” of the state, society, and law enforcement agencies should be extended in relation to various social groups. The question arises about understanding the boundaries of tolerance.

The boundaries of tolerance are clear: when “tolerant” social relations and processes begin to aggressively invade the life of the whole society, when “tolerant” begins to claim and impose itself as “unconditionally positive”, the border of tolerance is considered passed. Society, the state and law enforcement agencies should begin to counteract. It is extremely important that these actions do not go beyond the legal framework, do not become more radical than the radicalists themselves, do not turn into an emotional reaction of the crowd.

There is a new problem—the definition of the boundaries of the freedom of society in countering extremism. It is obvious that the use of emergency means in such situations can pose a threat to the realization of the purpose for which they are conditioned—the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

Civil society and its political superstructure—a legal democratic state—are forced to defend themselves. The authorities adopt laws on countering extremism, prohibit the propaganda of extremist ideas, and persecute members of radical organizations. For example, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 29, 2020 No. 344 “On approval of the Strategy for countering Extremism in the Russian Federation until 2025”. The implementation of the Strategy involves: the adoption of regulatory legal acts on countering extremism, monitoring and forecasting the emergence and development of situations related to threats of an extremist nature; conducting explanatory work on the involvement of civil society in activities to counter extremism; ensuring the protection of information and telecommunications networks from the penetration of the ideology of extremism [16].

The necessity and justification of such measures is obvious. However, the fight against extremism by any means is extremely dangerous for democracy, but without it, the existence of civil society is impossible. “In our opinion, the only “working” arguments against extreme methods of controlling extremist activity are those arguments that appeal to values” [17, p. 81].

We are talking about moral values, the violation of which is immoral. On the other hand, we are talking about the values of democratic politics, among which the most



important place is occupied by the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. They form the core of democracy.

So, one of the essential criteria for assessing the development of civil society is the level of legal consciousness and legal culture of society. Legal attitudes should be based on a positive image of law and on the idea of legal behavior as the only way to realize freedom in modern society.

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# Professional Ethics in Higher Education

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**Abstract.** In higher educational institutions, the concept of professional ethics is regarded to be of utmost significance in achieving the desired goals and objectives. The paper discusses the significance, relevance, and usefulness of professional ethics in the context of higher education. It highlights the pivotal role of professional ethics in offering teachers a better understanding of their responsibilities, duties, rights, and institutional obligations as they work to provide quality education. As the individuals grow, they are provided with information in terms of professional ethics. When the individuals are able to understand the meaning and significance of professional ethics and implement them, they are able to bring about improvements in their lives and achieve personal and professional goals. Within the course of pursuance of higher education, it is necessary for the students to take into account professional ethics. This concept is vital not only for students, but also for other members of the educational institutions as well, including directors, heads, professors, and staff members. In the effective implementation of professional ethics, it is vital for the individuals to ensure that they communicate effectively, form good terms and relationships with others, depict honesty and righteousness and carry out their job duties in a well-organized manner. The paper discusses meaning and significance of professional ethics, objectives of professional ethics, types of professional ethics, and measures to improve professional ethics.

**Keywords:** Educational Institutions · Higher Education · Measures · Objectives · Professional Ethics

## 1 Introduction

Professional ethics are referred to the principles, which the individuals need to take into account on a regular basis. The purpose of the paper is to reveal the significance of ethical principals in higher education. The authors set themselves the following tasks:—of discussing the significance of professional ethics;—of focusing on the objectives and types of professional ethics;—of highlighting the main elements in a skills based ethics course;—of revealing measures to improve professional ethics. In higher educational institutions, the members include heads, professors, research scholars, administrative, technical and clerical staff members and students. They are different from each other in terms of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, age, personality traits, educational qualifications and socio-economic background. Within the educational institutions, they have their own job duties to perform. It is apparent that they need to possess essential educational qualifications and

competencies in terms of their job duties, but apart from job knowledge, they need to be professional in their conduct. Usually, in higher educational institutions, the individuals are well-aware in terms of all aspects and traits that are needed to depict professionalism. But within the course of implementation of job duties as well as within the course of pursuance of educational programs, they understand the meaning and significance of professional ethics [1].

It is vital for all the members of the educational institutions to generate information in terms of professional ethics on a regular basis, so they are able to benefit in a number of ways. As it has been comprehensively understood that it is not only essential for the members to generate awareness and augment their understanding in terms performance of job duties, but it is vital for them to generate awareness in terms of professional ethics as well. Professional ethics needs to be depicted in performance of one's job duties and responsibilities, and in dealing with others and various situations. Particularly, when the individuals need to cope with problems and challenges, they need to be professional in their conduct. Therefore, it is vital for the individuals to generate information in terms of professional ethics on a regular basis throughout their jobs or in pursuance of educational programs.

## 2 Methods of Research

This work uses scientific research methods such as analysis, synthesis and generalization.

## 3 Background Review

Professional ethics of higher education workers forms a complex system of interconnected moral relations. It reveals the influence of morality on the work of the university, gives an ethical assessment of the specialists' and teachers' behavior, and provides the direction of successful business communication. The relevance of this topic is due to the versatility of the pedagogical process, which is in constant dynamics. Modern studies of professional ethics reflect the development of this phenomenon, and the peculiarities aimed at the professional formation of moral requirements and principles. Murgatroyd S. Simpson D. in their publications underline the special features of professional ethics describing ethical leadership as the cornerstone of moral collaboration and commitment [1]. Hedborg C. describes the importance of ethical behavior and examines the aspects of professional ethics [2]. Wolff and Borzikowsky in their works emphasizes the implication and meaning of the professional code of ethics. The authors emphasize the fact that increased awareness of the ethical dimensions and responsibilities of teaching is essential for professionalism [3]. Ross and Bruce discuss the importance of intercultural competence that helps to interact with people from other cultures adequately and effectively [4]. Bebeau and Bielby view the personal traits of character that are supposed to gear to the types of professional ethics [5, 6].

## 4 Meaning and Significance of Professional Ethics

It is stated that an aimless life is a meaningless life. Therefore, it is vital for the individuals to formulate aims and objectives. Professional ethics are referred to as the principles, which need to be focused upon throughout one's lives. It is of utmost significance for the individuals to implement professional ethics within as well as outside the home. When they are dealing with family members or community members or they are in jobs or pursuing educational programs, it is of utmost significance for all the individuals to implement professional ethics. Professional ethics render a significant contribution in enabling the individuals to become good human beings as well as in achieving personal and professional goals.

When the individuals get enrolled in educational institutions from nursery schools to universities, they also generate information from their educators. But it is up to the individuals to acquire an efficient understanding and implement them in their daily lives. From the stage of early childhood, the individuals need to understand that they need to implement professional ethics in their lives. As they get enrolled in elementary schools, secondary schools, higher educational institutions and then get engaged in employment opportunities, the inculcation of professional ethics enables them to achieve their professional goals in a satisfactory manner [7]. Apart from acquisition of education and employment opportunities, it is vital for the individuals to maintain good terms and relationships with their family members and emerge into productive citizens of the country.

### 4.1 Objectives of Professional Ethics

The objectives of professional ethics have been stated as follows:

1. Ensuring that all individuals are treated with respect and courtesy and there should not be any kind of discrimination on the basis of any factors, i.e. caste, creed, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, age, and socio-economic background.
2. Ensuring fair treatment to all the individuals. The individuals, particularly the ones who are in leadership positions ensure that all subordinates are treated fairly.
3. The teachers need to ensure that when they are dealing with students, teaching them and making effective use of teaching-learning methods, instructional strategies and teaching-learning materials, they need to be knowledgeable and competent.
4. The individuals are able to acquire an efficient understanding in terms of their job duties and responsibilities. When one understands the meaning and significance of professional ethics, they understand their duties and responsibilities within as well as outside the home.
5. Professional ethics renders a significant contribution in preparing the individuals for different opportunities. Within the course of acquisition of education and employment, the individuals need to be well-prepared for opportunities and that is facilitated through professional ethics.
6. The individuals also get prepared to cope with various types of challenges. Challenges are regarded as an integral part of one's lives. Therefore, it is vital for the individuals to become well-prepared to cope with various challenges.

7. Professional ethics renders an important contribution in facilitating human behaviour. It is indispensable for all the individuals, irrespective of their categories and backgrounds to depict good and decent behaviour and this is facilitated through inculcation of professional ethics.
8. Professional ethics renders a significant contribution in building moral judgement. It is necessary for the individuals to exercise moral judgement; in case they need to make selection between two or more alternatives. Moral judgement helps in making wise and productive decisions.
9. One cannot carry out their tasks and functions in seclusion, particularly within the course of acquisition of education and employment opportunities, through professional ethics, they are able to recognize the meaning and significance of effective communication.
10. Professional ethics contributes in the establishment of principles and moral standards of behaviour. As in order to emerge into good human beings and achieve personal and professional goals, it is vital for the individuals to inculcate principles and moral standards of behaviour [8].

## 4.2 Types of Professional Ethics

The various types of professional ethics that the individuals need to be aware of can be stated as follows.

*Honesty.* Honesty is regarded as the crucial ground for ethical behavior in not only the field of education, but in other fields as well. Honesty is regarded as the greatest of all human values. It makes provision of great personal benefits and even a large social circle and one is able to receive rewards and appreciation. It is not regarded as the truth but truthfulness, which includes the intent of that truth. It is regarded as more than truth; it deals with motives and intents. In higher educational institutions, it is vital for the students to generate awareness in terms of academic honesty. Academic honesty is, when they put in their own ideas and viewpoints in their assignments and projects. On the other hand, when they are using someone else's ideas and viewpoints, they are supposed to cite the sources. It is of utmost significance to put into operation academic honesty in order to achieve academic goals. Violation of academic honesty may enable the students to experience dire consequences, which may even include expulsion from the educational institutions. Therefore, it can be stated that it is vital to implement honesty for all the members of the educational institutions in order to perform well and achieve desired goals [5].

*Diligence, Resourcefulness and Conscientiousness.* The traits of diligence, resourcefulness and conscientiousness are considered indispensable for the individuals to put into operation, irrespective of their tasks and activities. In higher educational institutions, all the members aim to carry out their job duties in a well-organized manner and achieve personal and professional goals. Hence, in order to generate the desired outcomes, it is vital for the individuals to inculcate the traits of diligence, resourcefulness and conscientiousness. The adult individuals are usually aware of these traits, when they realize their responsibilities. The individuals are required to carry out not only one, but numbers of job duties. Apart from job duties, they need to manage household responsibilities and personal lives. Therefore, in order to ensure personal as well as professional

duties get carried out in an appropriate manner, the individuals need to implement time management skills. Diligence facilitates in putting into practice, meticulousness, and persistence, resourcefulness enables the individuals to exercise creativity and ingenuity and conscientiousness enables the individuals to depict industriousness, assiduousness and regularity [9]. Therefore, it can be stated, when the members of the educational institutions depict these traits, they are able to carry out their job duties satisfactorily as well as achieve personal and professional goals.

*Approachability and Amiability.* Approachability and amiability are regarded as the types of professional ethics, which enable the individuals to deal with other individuals in an appropriate manner and maintain good terms and relationships with them. In higher educational institutions, it is apparent that individuals cannot work in seclusion; it is indispensable to inculcate the traits of approachability and amiability. The heads of the departments and associate professors are required to organize meetings in order to discuss various matters. The staff members need to collaborate with each other and work in order to carry out the administrative functions. The research scholars and students need to socialize with each other to acquire an understanding of academic concepts and provide solutions to academic problems and challenges. Verbal as well as written forms of communication take place between all the members of the educational institutions [2]. Apart from discussing work-related matters, the members also get engaged in informal conversations. Formal and informal conversations, both are considered equally important. Through the implementation of these traits, they are able to form effective terms and relationships with others, carry out their job duties in a well-organized manner, achieve professional and personal goals and objectives and retain their jobs.

*Morality and Ethics.* Morality and ethics are regarded as significant aspects, in terms of which individuals need to generate awareness from the stage of early childhood. When from the initial stage, the individuals generate awareness in terms of these traits and put into practice in their daily lives, they are able to achieve personal and professional goals as well as enhance their overall quality of lives. Morality and ethics impart knowledge and understanding among the individuals in terms of norms, values, principles and standards. In higher educational institutions, when the individuals are in leadership positions of directors and heads, or employed as professors or staff members or are research scholars or students, they need to ensure that they implement morality and ethics in the performance of their job duties as well as in dealing with others. In the implementation of morality and ethics, these individuals realize that they need to be principled and ethical in their conduct [10]. When the members are performing their job duties, they need to ensure, they not just make use of their knowledge and competencies, but also put into operation, morality and ethics. These traits enable the individuals to be professional in their conduct, achieve desired outcomes and enhance the overall system of education.

*Truthfulness.* The meaning of truthfulness can be understood in terms of various ways. It is referred to representing the truth, telling the facts, corresponding with what is genuine or real and speaking the truth with sincerity [11]. The job duties and responsibilities of the members of not only in the higher educational institutions, but in all fields, organizations and educational institutions can be carried out in an appropriate manner, when they depict truthfulness. For example, when the professors assign research projects

to the students and they need to conduct field research, then it is vital for them to make field visits, take notes, or collect information through surveys or interviews, which they would put in their projects. In order to achieve good grades and achieve academic goals, it is vital for the researchers and students to ensure that the information is factual. On the other hand, when the directors, heads, professors or other staff members are to carry out their job duties or when they need to convey any information to their superiors or subordinates or colleagues, they need to ensure that the information is truthful. Therefore, it can be stated that when individuals depict truthfulness, they are able to augment professionalism, achieve desired goals, acquire rewards and appreciation and enhance the overall system of education [6].

*Justice and Autonomy.* Justice and autonomy are referred to as professional ethics, which render a significant contribution in generating the feeling of contentment among the individuals. In higher educational institutions, the individuals are different from each other on the basis of factors, such as, caste, creed, race, religion, ethnicity, age, gender, educational qualifications, competencies and socio-economic background. It is vital to make provision of equal rights and opportunities to all and not any form of discrimination. The directors and heads are vested with the authority to make decisions in terms of various aspects of the departments. When they are making decisions, in some cases, they may take ideas and suggestions from others, whereas, in other cases, they may use their own discretion. Similarly, within the classroom settings, the professors may make decisions on their own or obtain suggestions from students. But when the individuals are given the opportunities to express their ideas and suggestions, they feel, they are provided with justice and autonomy. In most cases, when research scholars, pursuing doctoral programs are required to submit their assignments, they are provided with autonomy to set-up their own targets date. Therefore, it can be stated, justice and autonomy need to be focused upon in the right manner and right direction.

*Communication.* Communication is regarded as the key aspect in generating information in terms of professional ethics and depicting them. When the individuals communicate with their colleagues, superiors and subordinates in a polite and respectful manner, they are regarded as professional and good-natured. Communication takes place in a verbal as well as in a written manner. Verbal communication takes place either face to face or over the phone, whereas, written communication takes place through notices, letters, emails and messages. When the department heads need to impart information to the students or professors or other staff members and are not able to meet them personally, they may either send emails or put up notices. In order to depict professional ethics, it is vital for the individuals to take into consideration various aspects in verbal as well as written communication. In verbal communication, it needs to be ensured, proper language and decent words are made use of, eye contact should be maintained, should speak softly and respond appropriately. Whereas, in written communication, proper and decent words should be used, addressing should be done appropriately, and information should be easily understandable to the individuals [12]. Therefore, it can be stated, effective communication is the life blood in leading to proper functioning of the educational institutions.

*Calmness.* Calmness is a professional ethic, which needs to be put into operation by the members throughout their jobs. Job duties and academic learning in higher educational institutions is not easy. There are number of problems and challenges that take place, which need to be dealt with. The problems may take place within the course of implementation of job duties as well as in dealing with others. In some cases, the individuals are demanding and difficult to deal with, whereas, in other cases, when the individuals have other job duties as well and are required to complete an assignment within the limited time, they may feel stressed. Therefore, in order to perform their job duties well and deal with stressful situations, it is essential for the individuals to depict calmness. When the individuals possess a calm and composed nature, they are able to develop logical thinking in terms of how to cope with stressful and difficult situations. One of the important ways is putting into operation time management skills and forming a schedule [13]. This enables the individuals to assign priorities and take out sufficient time for all tasks and activities. Therefore, through calmness, the individuals are able to cope with problems and stressful situations in an effective manner.

*Abilities to Cope with Psychological Problems.* In one's personal as well as professional lives, the individuals are required to undergo various psychological problems of anger, stress, anxiety and depression. In higher educational institutions, the individuals do experience these problems. It is of utmost significance for all the members to develop their abilities to cope with various types of psychological problems. But the development of abilities to cope with psychological problems is regarded as professionalism [4]. When the individuals are well-aware of the professional ethics that need to be put into operation to cope with psychological problems, they are able to provide solutions to barriers that may arise within the course of implementation of job duties and achievement of personal as well as professional goals. There are situations that enable the individuals to experience psychological problems. For example, when students need to work on their assignments as well as go to their jobs, they may feel stressed. But when they are determined, diligent and conscientious, they are able to develop the abilities to cope with psychological problems. Therefore, it can be stated, when the members are able to develop the abilities, they are able to carry out their tasks and achieve desired goals and objectives in a well-organized manner.

*Maintaining Confidentiality in Professional Relationships.* Maintaining confidentiality in professional relationships is regarded as a professional ethic. This professional ethic enables the individuals to carry out their job duties in a systematic and methodical manner. Maintenance of confidentiality is in terms of job duties. In higher educational institutions, students are different from each other in terms of learning abilities. When the students experience problems and setbacks in their academic performance, they consult their professors and supervisors and receive ideas and suggestions. When the professors are giving suggestions or are engaged in a conversation with them regarding their academic performance, they usually keep the discussion confidential. Another aspect is, when heads and professors are in a discussion meeting, they usually keep the doors closed and keep it confidential. Professors usually focus on teaching their own subjects and grading their assignments. They do not impart any information to their colleagues in terms of their work duties. In some cases, the students also keep their grades and other information regarding their assignments confidential and do not disclose it to their



fellow students. Therefore, it can be stated that maintaining confidentiality in professional relationships is regarded as one of the important professional ethics that enables the individuals to carry out their job duties in a systematic and well-organized manner.

## 5 Measures to Improve Professional Ethics

It is indispensable for the individuals to formulate measures and bring about improvements in professional ethics on a continuous basis. The various measures that are focused upon bringing about improvements in professional ethics have been stated as follows.

*Making Ethical Performance a Strategic Priority.* It is vital for the individuals to form the determination that ethical performance should be their priority. They need to develop the code, which would enable them to put into operation ethical performance. In making ethical performance a strategic priority, a relevant code of ethics needs to be established. In addition, clear objectives, standards, and expectations are regarded as the key requirements for ethical performance. The relevant code of conduct that is established needs to be supported by the focus on ethical performance in comprehensive decision making. The reason being, decision making is regarded as an integral part of the functioning of higher educational institutions and require inculcation of professional ethics. Therefore, when ethical performance is made as a strategic priority, it leads to making of wise and productive decisions.

*Illustrating Leadership Skills.* It is vital for the heads and professors to illustrate leadership skills. Illustrating of leadership skills will not only enable the individuals to improve professional ethics, but they are able to carry out other tasks and activities as well, in an appropriate manner. It is the job of the leaders to guide and lead others in the right direction, provide solutions to their problems, make provision of ideas and suggestions, which would be productive and useful, implement conflict resolution methods in an appropriate manner, and create amiable and pleasant working environmental conditions. Furthermore, the leaders need to be aware of various types of modern and innovative methods and strategies, which would contribute in not only bringing about improvements in professional ethics, but also overall system of education.

*Encouraging Participation of Students.* The primary objective of the educational institutions is to lead to effective growth and development of the students. They aim that students not only acquire an efficient understanding of the lesson plans, but also inculcate professional traits, morals, ethics and values among themselves. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to encourage the participation of students in various activities. One of the common ways in which participation of students is encouraged is, when there are organization of seminars and workshops, they volunteer to carry out number of tasks. Participation in various activities enables them to bring about improvements in presentation and communication skills. Furthermore, they are able to gain more confidence in themselves and improve professional ethics. Therefore, in higher educational institutions, various opportunities need to be created for encouraging participation of students [14].

*Providing Support Systems for Staff Members.* The staff members and educators also need to be aware of various methods and strategies that are needed to improve professional ethics. Not only students, but other members of the educational institutions

also need to generate awareness in terms of methods and approaches, which are focused upon bringing about improvements in professional ethics. In making provision of support systems for the staff members to bring about improvements in professional ethics, it is necessary to create a working environment in such a manner, in which they develop motivation towards the implementation of job duties. The working environment needs to include, infrastructure, materials, tools, technologies, equipment, amenities and other facilities. When all these aspects will be made available within the working environment, the individuals will not only perform their job duties satisfactorily, but bring about improvements in professional ethics as well [3, 13].

*Implementation of Rules.* It is vital to implement rules in educational institutions, which need to be followed by all the members. When the members follow the rules, they will be able to carry out their job duties in a well-organized manner, maintain discipline and improve professional ethics. One of the important rules that need to be implemented is, the individuals need to treat each other with respect and courtesy. Furthermore, they need to depict honesty and truthfulness in the implementation of their job duties as well as in dealing with others. Within the course of time, there are changes taking place in the rules as well. But when changes are made, it needs to be ensured that they prove to be favorable to the members as well as educational institutions on the whole.

*Measuring Effectiveness of Ethics Program.* It is vital to formulate the measures to identify how the ethics program has been effective in generating the desired outcomes. In some higher educational institutions, not only in India, but in other countries of the world as well, an ethics program is initiated, which focuses upon generating information among the members in terms of professional ethics. As when individuals get recruited in employment opportunities or students get enrolled in higher educational programs, it is vital for them to generate awareness in terms of professional ethics. In the ethics program, there is recruitment of well-qualified and competent trainers, who need to impart knowledge and understanding to the individuals in terms of meaning and significance of professional ethics. Therefore, when the individuals implement methods and approaches to measure the effectiveness of ethics program, they are able to bring about improvements in professional ethics.

*Illustrating Dedication and Punctuality.* Professional ethics are clearly depicted, when the individuals are dedicated and punctual towards their job duties. Within the working environment, it is necessary for the individuals to be committed towards their job duties and professional goals. These traits enable the individuals to take responsibility and assume ownership of their performance [1]. In case, they experience any problems or concerns, they are required to seek help from others. In order to illustrate dedication and commitment, it is necessary for the individuals to illustrate regularity and punctuality. Research has indicated that within the classroom settings, when the students have maintained regular attendance, the professors form the viewpoint that they have acquired an efficient understanding of professional ethics and even reward them. Therefore, it can be stated that illustrating dedication and punctuality highlight that one has understood as well as contribute towards bringing about improvements in professional ethics.

*Aiming at High Productivity and Quality of Work.* When the members are carrying out their job duties, it is vital for them to aim at high productivity and quality of work. In

order to carry out their job duties in an appropriate manner, it is necessary for them to take into account various factors. These include, generating awareness in terms of strategies and approaches, using modern, technical, and pioneering methods, maintaining good terms and relationships with others, conducting research on regular basis, identifying the limitations and putting into operation the measures for bringing about improvements and depicting professionalism. When the members are aware of these factors and work effectively to bring about improvements in them, they would render a significant contribution in improving professional ethics as well as augmenting productivity and quality of work.

*Demonstrating a Strong Character.* Strong character and professional ethics are required to proceed simultaneously. It is vital for heads, professors, staff members, researchers and students to ensure that they demonstrate a strong character in order to bring about improvements in their tasks and functions as well as professional ethics. Important ways of demonstrating a strong character is, when the individuals are able to cope up with difficult situations in a manageable way. When they possess a calm and composed nature and are well-aware of ways to exercise control on the feelings of anger and frustration, they demonstrate a strong character. When the individuals are adults, they are well-aware of ways of how to conduct themselves particularly within the workplace and when they are pursuing higher education. Therefore, it can be stated that demonstrating a strong character is regarded as one of the indispensable measures of bringing about improvements in professional ethics as well as in achieving personal and professional goals.

*Possessing Constructive Viewpoints.* In some cases, individuals find it difficult to work on a task or deal with individuals, who are demanding in nature. When this kind of challenges takes place, it is vital for the individuals to exercise professionalism. Professional ethics can be improved by possessing constructive viewpoints. It is vital to possess constructive viewpoints for the individuals, job duties and the working environmental conditions. When individuals find certain tasks and functions difficult, it is vital for them to obtain assistance. Seeking help and support from others would enable the individuals to carry out their tasks satisfactorily. On the other hand, when dealing has to take place with individuals, who are demanding in nature, then also it is vital for the individuals to form constructive viewpoints and work diligently to meet their expectations [15]. Therefore, it can be stated that possessions of constructive viewpoints render a significant contribution in development of interest and enthusiasm and in improving professional ethics.

## 6 Conclusion

Professional ethics are regarded as the principles, which are of utmost significance. It is vital for the individuals to focus upon professional ethics not only within the workplace or when they are pursuing educational programs, but it is vital for them to focus upon them in their personal lives as well. In order to achieve personal as well as professional goals, it is vital for the individuals to focus upon improvements of professional ethics. The various types of professional ethics are honesty, diligence, resourcefulness and conscientiousness, approachability and amiability, morality and ethics, truthfulness, justice

and autonomy, communication, calmness, abilities to cope with psychological problems and maintaining confidentiality in professional relationships. When the individuals are well-aware of these professional ethics and put them into operation in their professional lives, they are able to benefit in number of ways. These include, performing one's job duties well, maintaining good terms and relationships with others, incurring the feelings of pleasure and contentment and achieving personal and professional goals.

Apart from understanding the meaning and significance of professional ethics, it is vital to generate awareness in terms of measures that are necessary to bring about improvements in them. These are, making ethical performance a strategic priority, illustrating leadership skills, encouraging participation of students, providing support systems for staff members, implementation of rules, measuring effectiveness of ethics program, illustrating dedication and punctuality, aiming at high productivity and quality of work, demonstrating a strong character and possessing constructive viewpoints. The heads and educators within the university departments usually discuss these measures. When the instructors are providing information to the students in terms of lesson plans and academic concepts, then too it is vital for them to impart information in terms of these factors. Finally, it can be stated that when all the members are able to generate information and augment their understanding in terms of these measures, they are able to improve professional ethics as well as achieve educational goals in a well-organized manner.

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# Thomas Hobbes and the Linguistic Construction of the International Political Space

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**Abstract.** I argue that Thomas Hobbes presaged the current concerns with language in International Relations (IR) and Political Geography, and that he and these concerns present, perhaps unexpectedly, similar promises and problems. In spite of the views limiting Hobbes to materialism, naturalism, individualism, or separating his science and rhetoric, language was key for him. The humans construct their reason and society (notably, the state) in language, it also influences their extra-social interactions; and the humans are themselves constrained and, in a sense, created by language. Intellectuals are tied to the construction of social reality. These basic ideas are widely shared by the current views of language in IR. Both Hobbes and they can be seen as stressing collective freedom, pluralism and responsibility. But the analysis of Hobbes also draws attention to ontological, epistemological and ethical problems that he and the current theories share due to relativist conceptions of language and rationality.

**Keywords:** Thomas Hobbes · International Relations · Linguistic Turn

Canst thou draw out Leviathan with an hook? or his tongue with a cord...? (Job 41:1)

## 1 Introduction

I aim to show that Thomas Hobbes foreshadowed the current concerns with language in International Relations (IR) theory and Political Geography, and that he and these concerns stress collective freedom, pluralism and responsibility, but also suffer from relativist views of language and rationality. This aim is relevant to several trending theoretical issues. A ‘linguistic turn’ has featured discussions of key entities and spheres for IR and Political Geography—e.g., the state as consisting of ‘narratives’ [1] or securitisation via speech acts [2]. The turn is tied with the last ‘great debate’, constructivism and poststructuralism [3, pp. 316–317] (all these approaches are not monolithic; I will just focus on some common themes). And the turn is still important, as the issues of language have hardly been ‘settled’ and seem almost perennial. Thus, John Gunnell has recently upbraided political theorists (including some in IR) for still failing to fully appreciate that all politics is about linguistic conventions (practices). For him, the material reality is only accessible to us in language; also, there is no purely ‘private thought’, as thinking is coextensive with language [4; see also 5].

Yet, the linguistic turn often lacks a historical retrospective [6], perhaps because its proponents try to present their work as more novel than it is (often by just using new, contrived vocabularies). Mostly, a linguistic turn seems to start with Richard Rorty or, at best, the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (and his more or less positivist view of language), sometimes with cursory references to earlier classics [3, p. 235; 7, 12; 17].

Meanwhile, philosophers and historians of philosophy have been increasingly interested in Hobbes' views of language [8–17, pp. 214–256]. Hobbes may even be the first to have taken a 'linguistic turn' in political theory [18]. This interpretation of Hobbes, however, has not been sufficiently followed through in IR. Here, he has been, of course, mostly either built on or dismissed as a straightforward realist, opposed to any serious engagement with language. A recent book-length analysis of Hobbes, e.g., pays almost no attention to his linguistic and, indeed, proto-constructivist ideas [19]. Pictures of Hobbes as an advocate of fixed ideas of God, law and justice continue to circulate in IR [20, p. 76]. Rob Walker saw in him a prototype of a structuralist theory [21]. For Robert Cox, he was a proto-positivist; positivism follows pre-Einsteinian physics, separates subject and object, is individualist and looks for fixed, universal human nature and causal, universal laws. Cox was perceptive in noting that positivism considers 'data'—i.e., etymologically, 'givens', while a more historical approach considers 'facts'—etymologically, 'mades'. The latter approach shows that humans collectively make and remake their different institutions in history [22, p. 45, 51, 59–60; 23, pp. 49–59]. Cox and a few others in IR praised Giambattista Vico [24] for his focus on language [7, p. 235] and for the idea that humans make their history and that, as its makers, they can know it—that *verum* (truth) is *factum* (made) [25]. Noting Vico is welcome, for he is underexplored in IR. This would correct those scholars who, like Rorty, create 'the impression that until Hegel and Nietzsche showed that truth was a human creation, most theorists believed that truth was found rather than made' [26, p. 16]. However, and for all of Vico's subjective criticisms of Hobbes, it was Hobbes who, as I show below, was probably the first who offered a modern formulation of the *verum-factum* principle.

In IR, there has certainly been a growing interest in rereading the great realists of the past to find some non-positivist elements in them [27]. There were accounts mentioning language in Hobbes [28], of which the boldest remains that of Michael Williams [29]. Still, these have been insufficient. Williams could not have used the advances in the studies of language made after his book was published, and, as shown below, was perhaps too sanguine regarding both Hobbes and constructivism. Hopefully, my work would be novel in firmly tying Hobbes and IR's linguistic concerns, and showing their (perhaps unexpectedly) similar strengths and problems.

Methodologically, this study will draw on two literatures. The one on language in Hobbes helps interpret him so that, even if we acknowledge a degree of materialism and individualism in him, language will still be crucial, at least for his *scientia civilis* (and geometry). Comparing Hobbes with the current literature on language in IR shows their similarities. Of course, my interpretation is not 'definitive' or 'exhaustive'. I just argue that it is backed by Hobbes' texts (which may certainly contain other ideas) and several of his commentators, and that it is worth attention in IR. Also, though Hobbes wrote little on IR, he *is* very important—due to what he did write and, crucially, to the

importance of language for all human activities (which helps us avoid too rigid divisions between the studies of the international and other realms).

Two more formal comments are in order. First, connecting a distant thinker to present concerns may provoke a charge of anachronism. Certainly, we need to read past thinkers in their historical contexts. Yet, there exist key enduring themes, and it would be ‘simply implausible’ to *limit* Hobbes’ interests, and importance, to his time only [30, p. 26]. Besides, contextualism and attempts to identify enduring topics in a past thinker need not contradict each other: the former just answers to more historical interests, the latter, to more theoretical. It is with the latter that IR theory, and this paper, are mostly concerned. At the same time, I try to follow Hobbes’ texts as faithfully as possible. Second, I focus on four key texts: *On the Citizen* [31] (the culmination of Hobbes’ early work, which, besides, was an expanded version of the political ideas of *The Elements of Law* [14, p. 243]); *Leviathan* [32]; *A Dialogue...* [33] (probably his last extended analysis of politics); *Behemoth* [34] (another late text, perhaps more important for political reflections than historical details). These texts are chosen due to the paper’s limited scope and, crucially, because, as detailed below, they are representative of Hobbes’ relevant basic ideas, which changed little.

I will consider, in turn, the general importance of language for Hobbes; its role in the state of nature and the commonwealth; and implications for IR.

## 2 What Humans and Words Do with Each Other

Several features of Hobbes’ early modern historical context (as a rupture from the Middle Ages) are important for us. In geopolitical terms, these were the Reformation, the Thirty Years’ war and the English Civil War. More generally, it was the displacement of universal projects—those both of the Pope and Empire—by sovereign states with their different ‘reasons’ of state. In intellectual terms, it was a peculiar combination of scepticism and the scientific revolution. Scepticism manifested itself, notably, in the revival of Pyrrhonism and in Michel Montaigne’s ideas. For the sceptics, no view was absolutely true, so a prudent person would not insist on any. Also, Hobbes grew up in the Renaissance humanist culture, with its stress on rhetoric (Quentin Skinner focuses on this, and not on Pyrrhonism, but these are not mutually exclusive, as rhetoric, I believe, was never able to avoid relativism) [31, pp. viii–xxxiii; 39]. This scepticism did not always contradict the scientific revolution. They could hang together: if what had seemed certain was scientifically proven wrong (e.g., the geocentric astronomy), it made sense to be sceptical of any appearances [12, p. 10; 29, p. 21]. As Hobbes wrote, only ‘reason’ and ‘instruction’ could correct the naïve people who took things as they appear to be [cited in 31, p. xxi]. Unlike many medieval scholastics, Hobbes rejected the traditional realism about universals (his nominalism allowed for similarities between things, but they could be seen only after the humans gained access to language) [12, pp. 9–11, 30–36]. Nancy Struever stresses the importance of rhetoric, as opposed to traditional philosophical quest for certainties, in modernity. In particular, she stresses the notion of modality in rhetoric: it shows possibilities and contingency, not determinacy [16]. This was a theme in ‘the Machiavelli-Hobbes-Vico succession’ [16, p. 126]. The early modernity thus showed that both ‘powers’ and ‘knowledges’ were inescapably plural; there was no return to old



certainties. For Francis Bacon (whose secretary Hobbes was for some time), knowledge was of course power, but what was one to do with clashing knowledges and powers? Modernity opened up novel possibilities, but also challenges. Hobbes embraced these possibilities, but also tried to contain them. This containment could no more be totally ‘natural’, for humans came to the self-awareness of being the makers of their history. It became largely artificial—and linguistic.

Three objections at least against a view that Hobbes saw language as crucial must be forestalled. First, it is his apparent materialism and naturalism, mentions of human nature, natural law and state of nature. Yet, his naturalism must not be overstated. This is clear from his *verum-factum* doctrine [18, 35, p. 219; 12, 13, 16, p. 59]. It went back to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and referred to God’s certain knowledge of his creation. Hobbes shifted the focus to human creations. If nature was not made by humans, physics could be only conjectural (here, Hobbes could hold a correspondence theory of truth [8]). Conversely, mathematics is a human artifact and, hence, certain; politics should follow its model [31, pp. 4–5]. Mathematics and (right) politics are thus superior to physics because infallible. In both mathematics and politics, to construct, define and know are the same. In both, to know the truth is just to recall what ‘has been determined by the common consent of speakers of the same language (as by a kind of agreement necessary for human society)’—e.g., to know whether two and free are five is to recall what is called by those numbers, and whether theft is wrong, to recall what is called by the names ‘theft’ and ‘wrong’ [31, p. 237]. ‘[T]ruth consisteth in the right ordering of names’<sup>1</sup>; using the settled definitions becomes key, as in geometry, the only true science [32, p. 28]. Likewise, future things can be foreseen only by the one ‘by whose will they are to come’ [32, p. 22]. But forecasts themselves can influence people’s behaviour and become a self-fulfilling prophecy [34, pp. 365–366; 29, p. 26, 30]. ‘Reason’ is acquired in ‘apt imposing of names’ and then in methodically connecting them into ‘assertions’, and assertions between each other. This is ‘science’—‘a knowledge of all the consequences of names’ [32, p. 35]. Truth is purely analytic, a logical entailment or implication. Certainly, there exist ‘bare discrete sense-particulars’ [10, p. 8]. They are discrete due to Hobbes’ nominalism: ‘there being nothing in the world universall but names; for the things named, are every one ... individual and singular’ [32, p. 26]. But above the mere sense-particulars, nothing is ‘given’; ‘all order, all significance, all intelligibility’ are introduced by humans in arbitrary linguistic conventions [10, p. 6, 8]. So, ‘Hobbes gives us a strikingly modern conception of philosophy as concerned with linguistic “truth”’ [17, p. 224].

Hobbes explicitly wrote that *scientia civilis* ‘rests upon its own principles known by reason’ and is autonomous from theories of human body or an individual’s ‘faculties and passions’ [31, p. 13]. Reason is neither inborn nor a mere experience, but, as noted, linguistic. Not only nature and experience, but also consensual definitions are key for politics [32, p. 35, 255]. The laws of nature are not so unambiguously *laws* as the civil ones [31, p. 56]. Human nature certainly provides the ‘matter’ for commonwealths; but humans are also, perhaps even more importantly, ‘the makers, and orderers of them’ [32, p. 221]. Language gives us ‘possibilities’, but also ‘*non-natural* woes’ [28, p. 342, italics added]. As we will see, the state of nature itself is largely linguistic. The natural thus

<sup>1</sup> In citing Hobbes’ works, I removed italics and (according to modern syntax) capitalisations.

does not fully determine the social. Moreover, sometimes the social encroaches on the natural. Even sensations are not just caused by the external world—there is a subjective, active dimension in how humans process them. Sensing is *making* sense (even more than in Vico) [36]. Perhaps therefore Hobbes wrote that ‘what we owe to physics, physics owes to geometry’ [31, p. 5]. Some passions are shaped by unavoidably social *beliefs about* power and honour; thus, ‘joy’ derives ‘from imagination of a mans own power and ability’ and ‘griefe, from opinion of want of power’ [32, p. 42; see also 31, pp. xx–xxi]. As S. A. Lloyd suggests, even though Hobbes saw the world (except, possibly, God) as consisting of just matter in motion, he stressed ‘the power of mind over matter’. People may have religious interests that override even the concern for self-preservation; political order is based on education more than on might; grasping existing human interests is more important than a ‘physical-scientific account of human beings’ [37, pp. 2–3]. Strikingly, Hobbes thought that Christ entrusted the *states* to settle disputes not just in politics and law, but also in the natural sciences [31, p. 215]. Even physics would then be viewed ‘*sub specie linguae*’ [10, p. 19]. Possibly, Hobbes embraced materialism not as his epistemological stance, but as a political strategy. I.e., if people’s ‘enthusiastic’ beliefs in *immaterial* powers could lead them to conflicts and disobedience, and as they cared for such beliefs more than for their own physical survival, no amount of physical threats from their sovereign could make them obedient. But the focus on the *material* world in politics would divert people’s attention from such ‘enthusiastic’ beliefs and thus teach them obedience to the sovereign [29]. The rest of transcendental beliefs Hobbes could reformulate so as to bring them under the sovereign’s control [37].

The second, related objection is that Hobbes is often associated with individualism [38, 39]. But it is already clear from what we noted, e.g., regarding passions, that sociality largely shapes individuals. Hobbes’ very notion of interest included concerns for morality (and respect for others), religion and salvation that might override the concern for individual physical survival [12, 37, p. 3]. An individual was not a ready-made building block for politics. The minds of at least the common people, when cleared from false authorities, were *tabula rasa*—‘like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them’ [32, p. 233]. The social construction of an individual could even go ‘all the way down’: if ‘a woman gives birth to a deformed figure’, it is the state that will decide whether the new-born satisfies the definition of a human being [31, p. 215]. Hobbes’ view foreshadowed Vico’s in being ‘public’; politics might be just motion, ‘but there is no attempt to define motion or emotion as subjective, private states of mind, internal scenes’ [16, p. 48].

The third objection might be that, as Skinner argued, Hobbes did not *always* value rhetoric: though he grew up in the humanist culture, he then switched to ‘scientific’ arguments, only to return to rhetoric later [14]. However, firstly, it must be clarified that Hobbes never denied that rhetoric was important for political practice, and mostly negatively so, above all as it fomented disagreements: see the early *On the citizen* [31, pp. 139–141], *Leviathan* (where he calls eloquence ‘seeming Wisdome’) [32, p. 72, 181], and the two later works [33, p. 11; 34, p. 196]. What Skinner really showed is that, while Hobbes was somewhat reluctant in his more ‘scientific’ period to use rhetoric for advancing *his own views*, as he thought his ‘truth’ was self-evident, he later came himself to use rhetoric more (but to a degree, Hobbes always wanted to be both scientific

and persuasive [15]). Secondly, I would not even strictly *oppose* rhetoric and science in Hobbes. He consistently thought that science and reason, as noted, were themselves linguistic constructs. His ideal state was deeply linguistic. And Hobbes' science and practical ideal were also rhetorically subjective, mirroring *his* subjective views. There is little surprise when he eventually recognises that 'Reason, and Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall) may stand very well together' [32, pp. 483–484]. In the domains constructed by humans themselves via language, *ratio* is based on *oratio*. They are both *logos* [see also 32, p. 29]—and this was fine for Hobbes, provided this *logos* was his, and of his ideal sovereign. His basic ideas on language and politics remained quite stable [12, p. 6].

So, Hobbes wrote: 'the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility or conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither common-wealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves' [32, p. 24]. Philip Pettit argues that, for Hobbes, language presented to the humans *three possibilities*—to reason, be natural persons and create corporate persons—but also challenges. Consider these ideas of Hobbes in turn [see 12, pp. 1–97]. First, even if he is materialist about mind, language, for him, gives the humans reason, and thus raises their mind above the animals' mind. It enables not just a passive contemplation of ideas but an active, intentional thought, which emerges in the use of words as signs to communicate with others ('intersubjectively' [8, p. 3]); communication becomes key. Language also allows to classify things, to see their similarities and differences. For many earlier authors, language was just a *sign* of thought, but Hobbes' largely innovative idea is that language is much more—the *source* of human thought without which it is barely possible. Reason becomes ratiocination, counting with words: 'words are wise mens counters' [32, pp. 28–29]. Second and third, language enables the humans to be persons, both natural and artificial. All persons are thus 'spokespersons'; the natural speak for themselves, the artificial (sovereigns or private corporations), for others. Persons are those who authorise (are the authors of) their words or actions; they act not just due to a reflex, but try (if sincere) to voluntarily manifest their thoughts in speech, and are bound by their words. Even a natural person is deeply social, as s/he must, even if erroneously, think oneself to address an audience. Language therefore raises humans above a merely mechanical interaction, makes them 'contract—and covenant-making creatures' [40, p. 257]. They become able to perform actions with words (Hobbes was discussed in terms of John Austin's performative utterances in [9, 11, 13, 18]). Yet, language also leads to abuses of reason. These are the lack of method; metaphors; rhetoric (especially the *paradiastole*—re-describing, e.g., the same moral qualities positively or negatively); and clashing subjective evaluations of good and evil. Language warps passions as well. People differ in what they call good and bad. They acquire passions inaccessible to animals. Science dramatically increases the possibility of planning, and language enables comparisons. But this leads to fears about the future, and to comparing oneself and competing with others. In fine, '[b]y speech man is not made better, but only given greater possibilities' [Hobbes cited in 12, p. 97]. Again, *pace* Hobbes' 'physicalism', sometimes 'the unreal controls the real': '[e]quipped with imagination and language,

human beings respond to the possible as well as the actual, to the ... future as well as to the ... present' [Stephen Holmes cited in 29, p. 26].

Note finally how much language itself is, for Hobbes, a human construction. Speech is an 'invention', as cited above. Names do not correspond to the nature of things (a 'childish' idea [cited in 13, p. 7]), 'because words ... have their signification by agreement, and constitution of men' [32, p. 253]. There are certainly natural signs (as clouds are signs of rain), but language deals with arbitrary signs; and it is the very understanding that language is arbitrary that distinguishes humans from animals [8]. Besides, 'Hobbes never thought of names as referring to anything, whether mental phenomena, or objects in the world' [8, p. 1]. Even if, for Hobbes, things are represented by *conceptions*, it is still a step from a 'childish' representation of a thing by a *word*. His view that 'the relation between words and things is necessarily mediated ... by our conceptions' [8, p. 4] sounds very up-to-date. Lastly, he even understood that there is 'speaker-meaning', which is not grasped only by 'semantic and syntactic conventions', but also in 'the pragmatic context' [8, p. 13]. Hence, Hobbes draws attention to what a specific speaker in a specific context wants to do with words.

Yet, it does not follow that language can always be changed quickly or by a whim of a single individual. This would be impeded by the tradition of language use [13]. As any intersubjective construction, it can be changed, but not always quickly or by an individual. Humans collectively construct language, but it also constrains them.

### 3 The Different States of Language

For Hobbes, the state of nature and the commonwealth were, largely, different states—conditions—of language. To begin with the former, it is certainly tempting to view it as a 'natural' strife. But for Hobbes, it was 'not the natural beast that erupts within but the unruliness of the word-made mind' that led to the strife [12, p. 99]. *Language* made humans *more* prone to clashes than animals. If meanings are conventional, and there is no sovereign to fix them, different meanings would lead to conflicts. Certainly, it is hardly correct that there is *no* shared language in the state of nature: if no language was shared before the creation or acknowledgment of a sovereign, how could people at all create or acknowledge a sovereign, which is done in language [11]? (Note a parallel paradox with justice: if, for Hobbes, only a sovereign defines justice, how can a sovereign itself be created for the sake of promoting justice, if this presupposes an idea of justice before the sovereign? [41]). Rather, without a state, people *do* share a language that allows them to create it, but not a language with *shared, reliable political meanings* which would allow people to live together with all the benefits of society. The differences between language in the state of nature and language in society are largely theoretical, not descriptive [13, p. 13]. The state of nature which Hobbes focuses on is called by Pettit 'the state of second nature'. The 'first nature' existed before the invention of language, but there is no coming back to it [12, p. 99].

So, the state of nature is, if not totally, anyway largely a *linguistic*, not beastly anarchy. The laws of nature exist as some 'rational moral principles', but the problem is in 'the indeterminacy of the concrete application' of them [29, p. 31]. '[M]en give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions' (recall

that passions themselves are shaped by beliefs): e.g., the same may be called ‘opinion’ or ‘haeresie’ [32, p. 73]. ‘[T]he doctrine of right and wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword’, unlike geometry, which endangers no one’s interests (if it did, it would be likewise disputed) [32, pp. 73–74]. ‘Good, and evill’ are just ‘names that signifie our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different’, and even a single individual at different moments calls the same thing good or evil [32, pp. 110–111]. So, ‘all disputes arise from the fact that men’s opinions differ about mine and yours, just and unjust, useful and useless, good and bad, honourable and dishonourable, and so on’; ‘[t]here is virtually no dogma either in religion or the human sciences, from which disagreements may not arise’ [31, pp. 79–80]. At bottom, ‘the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous’ [32, p. 194].

In its turn, a commonwealth (whether ‘by institution’ or ‘acquisition’ [32, p. 121]) is both created in discourse and fixes it. It ‘rule[s] by words’ [32, p. 246; see also 10, 17, 18, pp. 214–256]. The social contract is like God’s ‘fiat’ in *pronouncing* ‘Let us make man’ [32, pp. 9–10]. Importantly, ‘the actions of men proceed from their opinions’ [32, p. 124]; ‘power ... has no foundation but in the opinion and beleefe’ [34, p. 128]. The sovereigns (whether monarchs or assemblies) ‘are not only declarers, but also makers of the justice, and injustice of actions’ [32, p. 386]; they decide what everyone ‘should call his own and what another’s, what he should call just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and bad’ [31, p. 79]. Here, something is *made* good or bad etc. in *discourse*. While there may be some justice (as keeping contracts) outside of a state, distributive justice only exist within, including both ‘corporeal’ and ‘incorporeal goods’ [33, p. 34, 41; see also 42]. Even ‘the literall sense’ of a law is what the sovereign intends [32, p. 194]. Even if it does not question, e.g., ‘whether theft is a sin’, it defines ‘what is to be said to be theft’ [31, p. 163]. Religious interests, to which Hobbes is so attentive, might lead people to sedition even despite the fear for self-preservation. A sovereign thus cannot achieve full obedience by physical force; yet by reformulating the religious interests, it makes them compatible with obedience [37]. ‘Conscience’ here turns from a quest for deeper truths into ‘simply, etymologically, co-science, shared knowledge’ [16, p. 36] of almost whatever a sovereign inculcates. A sovereign then not just regulates, but *constitutes* key meanings for politics [12, pp. 130–131]. A sovereign can commit iniquity, but no injustice (injury) to any of its subjects, for it is the subjects themselves by whose authority it acts, and no one can be unjust towards oneself [32, p. 124]. A subject’s accusation of their sovereign for injustice here becomes mere absurdity, incoherence. Laws are like rule-following in a game: ‘whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them’ [32, p. 239]. A shared, reliable language in a state is another step that enhances the human capacities to ratiocinate, personate and incorporate [12, pp. 115–140].

As discourses play a key role in politics, it is logical that Hobbes paid special attention to their prime producers. Besides the sovereign, these are various ‘opinion-leaders’. Intellectuals and politics influence each other. A systematic intellectual activity itself is only enabled by a state, which creates stability. But intellectuals often dispute the rights of their sovereign; ‘virtually all social disorder is the result of bad education’ [37, p. 160]. Hobbes criticised all those whom he took to thwart his absolutism, either deliberately or through incorrect language. These were seditious rhetoricians, but also false

prophets, ancient classics (e.g., Aristotle's and Cicero's views of freedom), 'schoole-divines', preachers, universities, and specialists in law who tried to create law without the sovereign's sanction [32, 33, p. 29, 59, 150, 225–226, 236–237, 257–258, 461–462, 465, 472–473]. If only humans, not animals, had 'the priviledge of absurdity', philosophers were especially prone to it [32, p. 34]. No 'doctor whatsoever, if but a man', was to be taken uncritically [32, p. 29]. A necessary and easy way to peace is that universities should 'be better disciplin'd' [34, p. 182].

But Hobbes – though also 'but a man' and philosopher—made generous exceptions *for himself*. He held himself the first to have 'proved all the theoremes of morall doctrine', hoping that a sovereign would 'convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice' [32, p. 254]. Hobbes allowed himself to introduce 'new doctrines', and to 'adorn' his 'truth' with eloquence [32, p. 483–484, 489–490]. Though he mostly criticised rhetoricians, he was himself a brilliant one and used the paradiastole to cast things in a light suitable for his own political views; his veneer of 'science' added to his rhetorical persuasiveness [12, p. 54]. He wanted *his verum* to become *factum*.

#### 4 Language and International Relations

Certainly, it is widely noted that, for Hobbes, sovereigns are 'in a natural state, i.e. a state of war', 'even though an uncertain peace, as fragile as a short truce, exists between them' [31, p. 126]. '[O]utside the commonwealth is the empire of the passions, war, fear, poverty, nastiness, solitude, barbarity, ignorance, savagery; within ... is the empire of reason, peace, security, wealth, splendour, society, good taste, the sciences and goodwill' [31, p. 116]. A 'constant peace' is not to be expected 'between two nations, because there is no common power in this world to punish their injustice' [33, p. 12]. '[S]ecure peace ... (apart from conflicts over space as the population grew)' could be enjoyed 'if the patterns of human action were known with the same certainty as the relations of magnitude in figures' [31, p. 5].

But given the analysis above, the key problem here is that Hobbesian states *do not share a reliable political language*. Again, as with the (imagined) state of nature between individuals, this does not mean the absence of any language, but only of shared, reliable political meanings, as fixed by a single sovereign. How can there be commensurability in an international space structured by different political languages? How can 'geometric certainty' obtain there? The law of nations is the same as the law of nature [31, p. 156], hence its linguistic indeterminacy, which would often serve as a cause or at least pretext for clashing interpretations. Hobbes did write that thoughts and passions of individuals are *similar*. Yet, their 'objects' *differ* a lot due to 'the constitution individuall, and particular education', and 'all circumstances' [32, p. 10]. As shown, passions are mediated by beliefs, and a human individual does not 'naturally' determine Hobbesian politics, which would be constructed differently in different cases. Hobbes turns out a precursor of the Romantic idea that cultures *differ* with respect to languages and, therefore, ways of thinking [12, p. 30; see also 28, p. 351]. His sovereign 'underpins social structures of epistemic concord, ... and creates conditions of predictability'; but as different sovereigns enforce different languages inside, 'political orders are necessarily limited', and exist in mutual anarchy [29, p. 40].

Each state had its own ‘reason’. But, problematically, Hobbes’ view of practical rationality was mostly instrumental (various kinds of instrumentalism are typical for realism in general [43]): he focused on thoughts as means to satisfy desires [32, pp. 53–54], not on the rationality of ultimate ends. If reason was just ratiocination, coherence, it was hardly tied to ethics. Natural law was indeterminate [see also 40, pp. 280–284]. Certainly, the substantive ends of ‘a peaceable, sociable and comfortable life’ [14, p. 342] are attractive; but the concrete contents of these terms were unclear. Government was to be ‘arbitrary’ [32, p. 471]. For Hobbes, people might be rational enough to build long-term, coherent life plans [44]; but they were, again, largely subjective. And individual subjectivism was lifted to the state’s level: the private appetite as the measure of good and evil was superseded by law, which was, however, nothing more than ‘the will and appetite of the state’ [32, p. 469], with few substantive limitations. The sovereign’s decision was intrinsically no better than anyone’s—given Hobbes’ scepticism, no one’s reason *per se* could be ideal or necessarily accord with others [32, p. 32, 187]—it was just an *authoritative* decision for *all* subjects/citizens. Strikingly, even ‘true philosophy’ had to be ‘silenced’ if it happened to contradict any established law [32, p. 474] (Hobbes would perhaps have made an exception for his own philosophy). There was no difference in the liberty of people in, e.g., the republic of Lucca and the Ottoman Empire [32, p. 149]. Though Hobbes himself criticised the Pope, he thought that if someone had done the same in queen Mary’s time, the person would have had to be ‘burnt’, but if in Elizabeth’s time, ‘commended’ [33, p. 42]. Even if power had been acquired unjustly—for Hobbes, ‘there is scarce a common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified’—it should not justify its past [32, p. 486]: the power is as it is, and should be obeyed; what was *factum*, becomes *verum*. Hobbes’ doctrine (regardless of his own sympathies) logically led to supporting whatever *de facto* sovereign—e.g., in 1640, Charles I, in 1651, Cromwell [15, p. 343]. Given all this, Hobbes was profoundly irrationalist [17, p. 233]. The problem, of course, is not in obeying laws—obedience is indeed important—but in that Hobbes hardly allowed for a critical rational discussion of what the laws should be. True, a Hobbesian sovereign cannot determine internal *beliefs*, it only controls outward actions [32, p. 471]. Nevertheless, the sovereign controls the doctrines to be taught (including via the ‘disciplined’ universities). And if people get used to absolute conformity in actions, they will also likely come to have the same routine beliefs. So, the sovereign *does* influence people’s beliefs. Hobbes largely suggests ‘a conceptually closed society’, inimical to a rational internal discussion [18, p. 759]. But, relatedly, it is also conceptually closed, as its political language and reason are hardly commensurable with other societies.

Williams argued that while the Hobbesian sovereign could justly do anything to its subjects in principle, in practice it would be restrained. Its own interests would prevent policies that would force subjects to rebel. Hence, the sovereign would not engage in adventurous or unpopular wars. Hobbes’ scepticism would prevent pretenses to guaranteed success in war. Also, international relations would differ from the state of nature between individuals, because states are not as equal as individuals and do not sleep, which would lessen their insecurity [29, pp. 42–45]. Yet, Williams seems too optimistic. He did not clarify how Hobbesian states can overcome the fundamental predicament of the absence of a shared political language. Moreover, some states can

exacerbate this apparent incommensurability. No guarantee exists in Hobbes against an aggressive propaganda of, e.g., national or religious exclusivity. If his sovereign has powerful tools to condition the subjects' beliefs, even those that can make them risk their lives, what would prevent some sovereigns from abuses, at least for some time? Also, the fact that states are unequal is no guarantee against conflicts, but can provoke them, or the formation of alliances between the weaker states. States do not sleep, but can be unprepared for defense. Whatever Hobbes' more 'peaceable' ideas, his overall logic leaves little room for reliable international understanding.

The discussion above will hopefully enable us now to see why Hobbes relates to the current concerns with language in IR. Indeed, 'Hobbes' concentration on issues of knowledge, consent, and legitimacy ... make his thought of great—if often uncomfortable and certainly unfamiliar—relevance to current research in the social construction of International Relations' [29, p. 49]. It is certainly not my claim that Hobbes is similar in everything with the current research on language in IR. Just instead of reciting quite obvious differences, it seems more fruitful to focus on unexpected, thought-provoking similarities. Also, some differences must not be overstated. Thus, Williams suggests 'that Hobbes can be seen as almost postmodern': just as postmodernism rejects any dogma as naïve and dangerous, Hobbes' scepticism was critical of 'the hubris engendered by religious dogma, political fanaticism, pride, vanity, or (social scientific?) claims to political wisdom' [29, p. 44]. But Williams adds that Hobbes, '[u]nlike some forms of post-positivism, ... believed fully in the possibility of rational certainty' [29, p. 48]. Yet, what is meant here by 'rational certainty'? For Hobbes, as we saw, it was little more than a coherent discourse, one's knowledge of what one has made/defined. Such a 'thin' view of rationality even many postpositivists would accept. *Both* Hobbes and they see rationality as quite a thin, (inter-)subjective notion. Another difference is that Hobbes was state-centric, and many in the current IR are not (though Alexander Wendt's constructivism is). Yet, the Hobbesian challenge of incommensurability between languages concerns not only different states, but also other actors, or international regions, or even different IR theories themselves.

So, what parallels between Hobbes and the current views emerge? First, both reality and thinking are tied to language. There is material reality, but our interaction with it is mediated by language. Social entities are constructed in language, and human relations outside them are also largely influenced by it. Language, knowledge and power are closely knit together; to rule is mostly 'to rule by word'. Language is crucial for thought. There are thus parallels between Hobbes and Gunnell (Gunnell himself does not expand much on Hobbes). Though Gunnell rejected representational philosophies, Hobbes' representation was, as noted, conceptual, not naïve. As Gunnell is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games [4], so the Hobbesian state is not far from such a game (on language games in IR, see, e.g., [45]). *Pace* some of Donald W. Hanson's arguments against bringing together Hobbes and Wittgenstein [28, p. 342], we saw that Hobbesian politics was autonomous from sense experience, and that he rejected a direct reference of words to experience. Hobbes would readily have agreed with the recent approach of Michael Freeden, according to which political stability has largely to do with 'holding linguistic meaning steady' (though they would perhaps have disagreed about how rigid that stability can or should be) [4, pp. 48–49]. As noted, *constitutive* issues were



key for Hobbes, and they are stressed even in the moderate constructivism of Wendt. Also, if Hobbes believed that the humans construct their reason and society in language, but also that language constrains and, in a sense, constructs the humans (notably via the sovereign's language), he grasped a key problem of the interaction of agents and structures [46].

Second, and perhaps even less noted, Hobbes' attention to how intellectuals are tied to the construction of political reality itself makes him close to the similar idea which is trendy now. As we saw, Hobbes analysed how the stability of a state enables intellectual activity, and how intellectuals might influence it, both negatively and positively (positively, in the case of Hobbes' teaching itself). Now, critical constructivists, according to Ted Hopf, 'self-consciously recognize their own participation in the reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social entities they observe'; this distinguishes them from 'conventional' constructivists [cited in 47, p. 679]. Hobbes is then close not only to the conventional constructivists who just theorise the social construction of international reality, but also to the critical group who add the social embeddedness of IR scholars themselves. This critical sensibility also relates Hobbes to the current concerns with reflexivity in IR [47]. Certainly, most constructivists and reflexive theorists would reject both Hobbesian conditioning of intellectuals by the sovereign and his own pretenses to truth. Yet, as we will note, *both* Hobbes and these scholars turn out to lack clear criteria of how knowledge should be produced.

In IR, Hobbes has perhaps been seen as too much conflictual, while the current approaches concerned with linguistic construction, as at least potentially less so. However, let us end by noting that both Hobbes and such approaches turn out to have some similar promises and problems. The promises are in seeing that humans collectively create their own societies and, ideally, also assume responsibility for them. Also, attention is welcome to how theories themselves emerge in their social contexts, and for which purposes. Collective human creations (cultures, states etc.) are, and should be, plural. Williams was right in that a healthy scepticism is a safeguard against pretenses to omniscience or omnipotence. So, freedom, pluralism and responsibility of human collectives (though not always individuals) are here stressed.

But these very promises have their flip sides. Williams was quite incisive in rejecting any complacency about 'relativity and intersubjectivity' [29, p. 50], as they could face, unexpectedly, the old Hobbesian traps. But even Williams was perhaps too sanguine. There is a slippery slope from scepticism to an unbridled relativism. If Hobbes (and many other realists) in various ways considered rationality instrumentally, rationality's role in IR has been shrunken still further by postpositivism. In terms of ontology, neither Hobbes, nor, e.g., Gunnell [4] clarify how different, plural political languages can be commensurable. What is Williams' 'shared understanding between rationally constituted sovereignties' in Hobbes [29, p. 46], if rationality and political language are limited to each sovereign? It is not clearer how Gunnell's linguistic practices relate to each other. This applies not only spatially, but also temporally—to how the 'languages' of different historical epochs could be related [5]. In terms of epistemology, the central issue of Hobbes' scepticism was that of a 'criterion' of knowledge [29, p. 22]. This issue is still unresolved. It is surely too much to claim that knowledge is just constructed on the basis of hardly rational decisions (as a Kuhnian paradigm). Reflexive theorists want to

avoid both dogmatism and nihilism in claiming that ‘reasoned judgements about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral observation language’ (Mark Neufeld cited in [47, p. 680]). But the criteria of knowledge discussed by such scholars—change or emancipation [47]—are hardly intelligible. To change or emancipate, one must somehow know the current situation and which changes are possible and desirable in the first place. Finally, it is unclear how different actors, epochs or theories can be compared in ethical terms. If at least some common ethical criteria were unavailable, then there would be no logical safeguard against irrationally claiming that, e.g., some culture is just superior to others [48]. As with epistemology, it is too much to claim that ethics is just constructed by power. Not everything which happens to be made—*factum*—is either a scientific or ethical truth—*verum*.

## 5 Conclusion

For Hobbes, despite stereotypes, it is in language that the humans construct their reason and society, language also influences their extra-social interactions; and the humans are themselves constrained and, in a sense, constructed by language. Early modernity both made the humans more aware of these immense linguistic possibilities, but also stressed the question of how they could be used—ontologically, epistemologically, ethically. Hobbes’ answer was the almost absolute control of the sovereign. The current approaches have tried to offer broader answers, but the very question is open. One promising way forward, and out of the problems mentioned above, is to discuss more in IR the notions of rationality, in particular those which recognise that it is tied to language, is intersubjective, plural and changing, but also that it can overcome relativism, connect very different points in space and time, and offer an ethical guide [43]. Hobbes and current thinkers are probably right in that ‘the children of pride’ [32, p. 221] would better not pretend to catch the tongue of that leviathan which is beyond our reach, meaning omniscience and omnipotence. But perhaps we may just better know and control those leviathans that are of our own making.

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# Russian-Swedish Economic (Trade) Relationships in the 18th Century

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**Abstract.** The article focuses on the history of the events of the 18th century related to the development of trade and economic relations between Russia and Sweden. The stages of development of political and economic ties throughout the century are traced. The history of the origin of political and economic relations dates back to the period of the formation of statehood in Russia. According to one version, the Scandinavian tribes were related to the unification of the East Slavic tribes and the formation of the state of Ancient Russia. At that time, foreign trade exchanges were also established. One of the first known trade routes passed through the Baltic Sea, and through the territory of the Russian state. The route went to the Black Sea. It is well-known as the Trade Route from the Varangians to the Greeks. In the Tale of Bygone Years (the oldest Russian chronicle), the Baltic Sea was called the Varangian Sea, and the Scandinavian tribes were called the Varangians. Gradually, Sweden gained a dominant position on the Baltic Sea.

The article considers the causes and consequences of military conflicts, their interdependence with economic and trade relations. Based on the scientific literature of various historical periods and the sources, examples of the nature of trade relations between Russia and Sweden are given. The place of these states in international (European) trade is determined. The role of the government policy of both states in the implementation of foreign trade relations is analyzed. The role of the St. Petersburg port in the development of trade with Sweden is indicated. The article provides examples of the participation of private Swedish companies and individual merchants that traded in Russia.

**Keywords:** Economy · Trade · History · Sweden · Russia · Military Conflicts · International · Treaties · Foreign Policy · 18th century

## 1 Introduction

The accumulated historical experience in relations between countries is an intellectual value that can influence modern international ties. As geographically close states, in the history of Russia and Sweden there are common features and individual characteristics. Throughout the history of Russia, extensive experience has been gained in solving numerous foreign policy and economic problems. In the context of globalization, that experience is extremely useful. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to study the history of foreign policy, economic and trade relations between Russia and Sweden in the 18th century. To achieve this goal, the following tasks are set:

- to study and analyze the historiography of the chosen issue;
- based on the material studied, consider the sequence of the most important events of the 18th century in relations between Russia and Sweden;
- taking into account the opinions of researchers, establish the dependence of foreign policy factors with trade and economic relations;
- determine the importance of state policy in the foreign trade policy of Russia and Sweden;
- to highlight the role of private business in the development of trade between the states.

The novelty of the research lies in the allocation of the period of the 18th century for the study of trade relations between Russia and Sweden. The research is based on the analysis of assessments of scientific and statistical materials of the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st centuries.

The key points are as follows.

1. International ties between Russia and Sweden have been formed since the emergence of the Russian state; each historical period of development has left its mark on the history of both states.
2. The military conflicts of the 18th century were caused by the struggle for leadership on the Baltic Sea and its coast.
3. Representatives of autocratic power in the person of Russian emperors and royal power of Sweden were interested in expanding economic ties between states.
4. Treaties concluded as a result of the end of the wars were of great importance for the development of trade relations.
5. Any war brings loss of life, destruction, ruin, often leads to economic and political crisis. At the same time, the Russian-Swedish confrontation did not stop trade and economic cooperation.
6. Competition in the field of trade contributed to the expansion and strengthening of the commercial activities of Russian and Swedish entrepreneurs.

## **2 Methods of Research**

This work used the historical and genetic method, which made it possible to consistently consider events related to the history of trade and economic relations between Russia and Sweden, their changes in the historical process; descriptive-narrative method, on the basis of which the content of events is presented; the historical and typological method contributed to the identification of common and distinctive features in the development of trade relations between Russia and Sweden. The events were considered exclusively in chronological order.

## **3 Historiography of the Issue**

The theme of the history of trade and economic relations between Russia and Sweden is of interest to representatives of various scientific areas. Scientific literature on this issue can be divided into several parts. The first part includes documents. Among

them, for example, Russia. Contracts. The Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation between their Majesties the Emperor of All Russia and the King of Sweden, concluded in St. Petersburg on March 1/13, 1801 [1]. Such agreements exist for different historical periods. The most complete collection of legislative acts of the Russian Empire is the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire, compiled in chronological order from 1649 to 1913. Archival documents stored in the countries under study are of particular interest. The article used a document of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (hereinafter RSAAA), in particular the 1261 fund (The Vorontsovs—an ancient noble family of Russia), which contains the most important information on the organization of Russian-Swedish trade. The Archive contains documents and printed books from the 16th to the 19th centuries [2]. No less valuable is the information from the Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (hereinafter ARFP), where you can find valuable materials on the merchant fleet, international treaties [3]. It is obvious that for any scientific research, the most important material is documents that can be used to better understand and evaluate certain historical events.

The next group of materials used includes studies of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. The most interesting is the multivolume edition of M.D. Chulkov [4], dedicated to a detailed description of Russian commerce in all its borders. The book contains valuable material on Russian-Swedish trade. The completeness of the study gives special significance to the work of M.D. Chulkov which complements an interesting description with statistical data. However, there is a certain disadvantage in this, since the data are not confirmed by the corresponding documents. Note that this is a common drawback in studies of the 18th and 19th centuries. In the context of the issue under study, the book by V.I. Pokrovsky considering the importance of the St. Petersburg port in the foreign trade of Russia is useful. The author examines trade relations between Russia and Sweden [5]. It is characteristic that trade between Russia and Sweden is most often viewed in the context of studies of Russia's foreign policy and foreign trade relations. This feature is inherent in the research of the 20th century.

Among the scientific works dedicated to Russian-Swedish relations, the works of G.A. Nekrasov should be noted. Nekrasov studied Russia's foreign trade through the Baltic Sea, and, as part of the research, Russian-Swedish trade relations of the 18th century were considered [6–8]. Russian maritime trade in the Baltic in the 17th century, including trade with Sweden, is considered in the work of I.P. Shaskolsky [9]. The dissertation of E.A. Sorokin is concerned with the peculiarities of the internal political struggle and foreign trade of Sweden in the 60s of the 18th century [10].

Scientific research into the history of Russian-Swedish relations is actively taking place in the 21st century. In the context of Russia's customs policy, the stages of trade development in the 9th–17th centuries are considered in the monograph by Shumilov [11]. The history of trade, customs and industrial and financial policy of Russia in the period from 1800 to 1945 is studied in the monograph by Obukhov [12]. Minaeva pays great attention to the issues of relations between Russia and Sweden in her scientific work. In particular, the author considers the trade competition between Russia and Sweden in Western Europe in the 18th century [13]. One of the latest studies on Anglo-Russian relations, which are viewed through the prism of Swedish diplomacy, is the article by Kiselev [14].

Considering the historiography of the problem under study, it should be noted that at the present stage, the history of Swedish-Russian relations continues to interest European scholars. In addition to the materials of foreign researchers used in the article. Among them is the work of Azbel, in which the author studies the historical foundations (prerequisites) of Swedish-Russian trade, its types and investments (1840s–1920s), the activities of Branobel Petroleum on the Russian stock market at the beginning of the 20th century, the influence of economic and political factors on Swedish business in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries [15]. Blockmans compiled *The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe 1300–1600*. The author explores the connections of the maritime trading network of Europe from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the North and Baltic Seas. The book studies the connection between economic tasks and intracultural exchanges and contacts [16]. Harreld discusses the significant role of the Hanseatic League in social and economic history. Founded already at the beginning of the twelfth century, the cities that formed the Hanseatic League created an important trade network throughout the coast of the Baltic and North Seas. This network stretched from Russia in the east, to England and France in the west, the cities of the Hanseatic League created an extensive northern maritime trade network [17].

The historiography of Russian-Swedish relations is very extensive, which testifies to the interest of the academic world in the international relations of the two countries. On the scale of the article, only a brief description of some of the existing publications is presented.

## 4 Results

The history of economic relations between the two states is inseparable from politics and diplomacy. In the 17th century, Sweden occupied a dominant position in the Baltic Sea, annexed a significant part of Livonia to its territory, taking it away from Poland. A fairly strong state expanded its possessions at the expense of the Estonian island of Oesel (Saaremaa), which once belonged to Denmark. According to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, significant territories of the southern coast of the Baltic Sea were ceded to Sweden. Thus, by the middle of the 17th century, Sweden dominated almost the entire coast of the Baltic Sea. That situation violated the trade and economic interests of many states, including Russia, Denmark, Germany, Poland.

However, it favorably affected the Swedish economy. The country had made notable advances in industry and trade. Shipbuilding and the metallurgical industry had a priority. The forest was of great importance for the country's economy. It, as well as copper and iron, were objects of export. The list of exported goods was expanded due to charcoal, resin, tar, as well as due to furs and fish. The main trading partners were England, France, Denmark, Holland, Poland. Trade closely connected Sweden and Russia. Sweden controlled Russian trade at sea. In 1617, the Swedes captured the Karelian and Ingrian coasts. The Russian government was forced to intensify trade through the port of Arkhangelsk, bypassing Swedish possessions. The success of Swedish trade is evidenced by the creation of the Southern Company for Trade with overseas countries (1626) and the opening of the State Bank (1668) to finance industry and foreign trade. Thus, Sweden pursued an active mercantile policy.



Sweden's domination of the Baltic Sea has become the subject of serious international conflicts. Charles XII took the throne of Sweden in 1697, his policy was aimed at strengthening the dominant position on the sea and the coast by first of all isolating Denmark. In addition to Denmark, Poland and Russia were not happy with the dominant position of Sweden.

A coalition was formed against Sweden. With the active participation of the Russian Tsar Peter I, an anti-Swedish union was created in 1699, consisting of Denmark, Saxony and Russia. In 1700, the Great Northern War began, in which Sweden and Russia became the main opponents. One of the main goals of Russia in that war was the desire to achieve access to the Baltic Sea, "to cut a window to Europe."

The Northern War, which lasted twenty-one years, ended with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Nystad. According to the document, Russia received access to the Baltic Sea, the primordial Russian lands in the north-west of modern Russia, in the region of the Izhora River, and others were returned to it. In addition, the rich lands of Livonia with Riga, Estonia with Revel and Narva, and some other lands of the Baltic were assigned to Russia. The territory of Finland was returned to Sweden. As compensation for the lands of Livonia, Sweden received 2 million efimks (thalers) [6, p. 45].

The agreement was of great importance for foreign trade relations in the Baltic. Separate sections of the Nystad Peace Treaty were on economic relations. The document provided for the expansion of trade relations between Russia and Sweden, mutually favorable terms of trade, based on the payment of traditional duties (Article 16). In the Nystad Treaty, Article 17 was also dedicated directly to bilateral trade relations, which laid down the provisions on the activities of trading houses [18, p. 70].

The importance of trade and economic interests is evidenced by the fact that among the participants in the negotiations between Russia and Sweden there was Jacob Bruce, the General Master of the Ordnance (military rank of chief of artillery in the Russian Empire), the President of the Manufactory, and Berg Collegiums. The Berg Collegium directed the mining industry in Russia, the Manufactory Collegium was engaged in the development of Russian industry, they acted as a single whole since 1719.

Sweden, in need of grain crops due to the lack of fertile land, received the right of duty-free purchase of bread in Livonia [18, pp. 420–431].

Thus, the peace treaty was of great importance for the development of Russia's foreign trade, for the country were opened paths to world trade centers, which contributed to the development of economic ties, primarily with European countries.

According to research data from the middle of the 19th century, the turnover of Russia's foreign trade had increased significantly. In the period of 1717–1719, goods worth 2,612,775 rubles were exported from Russia on average per year, and in 1726 the amount was 4,238,810 rubles, respectively. It should also be noted that there was an increase in imported goods on the Russian market. In 1717–1719, goods worth 815.643 rubles were imported into the country, in 1726 this indicator corresponded to 2.125.543 rubles [19, pp. 21–25]. The activity of Russia's foreign trade turnover is evidenced by the fact that the export of goods exceeded their import into the country.

Trade with Western European countries had increased significantly. A lively exchange of goods was with England, Holland, as well as with Spain and Portugal.

Founded during the Great Northern War, St. Petersburg (1703) turned not only into the northern capital of Russia but also became a major international port. In 1718, forty-one ships visited the northern capital, then in 1752, there were more than 343 foreign ships [19, p. 226].

Against the background of the growing importance of the St. Petersburg port as a center of international and domestic trade, an industrial center, the importance of the northern Arkhangelsk port gradually decreased.

Under Emperor Peter I, industry developed rapidly in St. Petersburg and its environs, metalworking factories, shipyards (the Admiralty shipyard, still exists today as the largest shipbuilding association), and arms factories were built. Supporting private business, Peter the Great involved private capital in the development of industry, and directed his efforts to the development of rope-sailing, glass, belt, linen production [20, pp. 47–67].

The development of industry contributed to an increase in trade turnover. Iron, flax, hemp (coarse bast fiber obtained from hemp stalks—the most durable, strong vegetable raw materials), yuft (tanned leather) were exported from St. Petersburg, and wool and silk fabrics, sugar, wines, paints and other goods were imported.

After the Northern War, the economic development of the Baltic States (Estonians, partly Latvians) intensified, despite the oppression of tsarism and landowners, the economic situation of these peoples tended to develop. Thus, in the 20-40s of the 18th century, the harvest of grain crops increased significantly, which made it possible to expand the domestic and foreign grain markets. Bread was exported from Riga, Revel, Parnu to Sweden and Holland [4, p. 496].

In 1710, Revel became part of Russia, and a large port where new shipyards and workshops were created. Revel's trade turnover increased significantly, merchant ships came here from England, Holland, Sweden. According to the historical archive of Estonia, in the spring of 1741, there were more than 100 merchant ships in the Revel harbor. Fish, salt, hemp, flax, leather, iron and grain were exported from here.

Regarding Sweden, there are different views of researchers on the consequences of the Great Northern War in the political and economic situation of the country. Some believe that Sweden lost only its colonial possessions, retaining the territory of Sweden proper. The Swedish historian and economist E.F. Heckscher believed that the results of the Northern War did not greatly affect the economic situation of the country, its continental part. However, he did not deny the economic damage that Sweden suffered from the loss of the Baltic territories [21, pp. 147–148]. However, the Russian scientist G.A. Nekrasov referring to the documents of the French government, well aware of the situation in Sweden, notes significant losses in trade due to the loss of the Baltic provinces and indicates a decrease to 1/3 of income [6, p. 54].

It is obvious that the Nystad peace treaty, on the one hand, saved Sweden from complete collapse, and on the other hand, on the world stage, the country lost its dominant position on the Baltic coast and its might as a great power. Evidence of this was the Soissons Congress of 1728. It discussed pan-European problems in connection with the aggravated situation in Europe. Representatives of Sweden were not invited, but having penetrated there, the Swedish envoys N. Gedde and K. Sparre had to leave the meeting of the congress. They were told that the great powers were solving the most important

European problems, and they would be invited when it came to 'northern affairs', which meant that Sweden was no longer a great power.

The current situation could not but affect the political and economic situation of the country. Sweden became economically dependent on England, France, Holland, and Russia. The relationship between Russia and Sweden was greatly influenced by the international situation and the policies of the leading states. It was not beneficial for Russia to strengthen Sweden's position in the Baltic, and the emergence of a new threat of war with Sweden. Therefore, Russia sought to strengthen economic and trade relations with England, considering it an ally. But, at the same time, the Russian government did not seek a political alliance with England. France and Sweden played a mediating role in the reconciliation of the two powers.

Russia did not refuse reconciliation but made certain demands on England. Peter I was concerned about relations with Sweden, and Russian-Swedish negotiations began in 1723. The Russian emperor considered that direction as a priority [3].

The Russian Emperor Peter I actively pursued a mercantile, protectionist policy. On his initiative and with his direct participation, industrial enterprises were created, trade developed, and water canals were built. In order to connect St. Petersburg with the center of Russia by water, the Vyshnevolotsky and later the Ladoga canals were built in 1711. The development of the water network, which contributed to the development of trade, was continued by Peter's successors. The emperor sought to develop the merchant class considering merchants a 'treasure' that brought income not only to themselves but also to the state. In various ways, he tried to strengthen the merchant classes supporting them financially, exempting them from paying taxes, raising tariffs on the import of goods so as not to create competition for national entrepreneurs. At the same time, in an effort to strengthen St. Petersburg merchant class, and turn St. Petersburg into a large international port, Peter I forcibly resettled merchants to St. Petersburg from Arkhangelsk and other regions of Russia. By a decree of 1713, Peter I demanded that all export goods be delivered only to St. Petersburg, that decision dealt a blow to the Russian merchants who traditionally traded through Arkhangelsk but strengthened the position of the St. Petersburg port [22, p. 667]. In order to expand trade and strengthen Russian entrepreneurs, large industrialists were allowed duty-free trade in their products. In 1717, Peter declared a free trade in bread.

Such an inconsistent policy did not satisfy either Russian or foreign merchants. The strengthening of the port of St. Petersburg was not in the interests of the Swedes, and foreign and Russian merchants were afraid of the Baltic Sea, since their merchant ships were attacked by Swedish privateers. Nevertheless, Peter I took measures to strengthen the port of St. Petersburg. For that purpose, the duties on goods imported to Arkhangelsk were 25% higher than on the same goods in the port of St. Petersburg [22, p. 667].

Regarding Russian-Swedish trade relations, the decree of Peter I testified to the freedom of commerce between the two states, without any obstacle [18]. Sweden had the right to buy bread in Riga and Revel duty-free for 50,000 rubles. In the study of I. Kaidanov, it is noted, "Peter I felt the hardships inflicted on Russia by the Stolbovsky Peace Treaty in all its strength. He wanted to open up new and important ways for the trade of his subjects and introduce his state into relations with the enlightened powers of Western Europe" [23, p. 65].

The countries exchanged goods. High-quality iron, copper, alum (double salts) were transported from Sweden to Russia; hemp, grain, canvases were delivered from Russia. However, those goods belonged mainly to German and Russian merchants who traded in the Baltic ports. From the surviving documents it is known that in the 20s of the 18th century, several ships a year arrived at St. Petersburg, the main port of Russia, from Sweden, most of them came under the Swedish flag. For instance, in 1722, three ships arrived from Sweden (Stockholm). One came to Jerome Kisl (a native of Lubeck), the second to the merchant Hans Heinrich Zotov, at the third there was the entrepreneur Johann Prim. The latter delivered significant goods including 11 copper cannons, 155 barrels of steel, five barrels of iron plates, 4 barrels and 10 half barrels of iron nails, 32 barrels of Swedish double beer [24].

It is obvious that the business contacts of Swedish merchants were poorly developed, therefore, J. Prim, like his compatriot merchant Jacob Vogel, independently conducted their trade affairs, brought goods, made deals [7, p. 269].

The followers of Peter I, as a rule, vowed to pursue Peter's policy, including in trade. Nobody really did it. Under Catherine I (1725–1727), the Commission on Commerce was created which developed measures for relative freedom of trade; tobacco and salt were given 'for free trade', many duties were removed. That policy did not correspond to Peter's intentions to strengthen national merchants and to create an opportunity for their competition with foreign traders. A similar policy was pursued by Peter II (1727–1730) and Anna Ioannovna (1730–1740). Elizaveta Petrovna (1741–1761) expanded the monopoly on trade to the privileged nobility class. So, Count P.I. Shuvalov, who enjoyed the empress's special confidence, received the right to a monopoly of fishing in the White and Caspian Seas. As a major industrialist and trader, he achieved the abolition of internal customs duties in 1753. In 1757, Elizaveta adopted a new protectionist customs tariff, which helped boost foreign trade.

Sweden at this time could not come to terms with the results of the Northern War; the internal political situation in the country was difficult. As a result, in 1738 the party of 'hats' came to power in which supporters of the revanchist circles of the nobility and large merchants were united. They sought to reduce the presence of English business in the country, with the help of France to regain the country's power on the Baltic Sea and the lands lost after the Northern War. The result of that policy was another war with Russia in 1741–1743 which ended with the defeat of Sweden and the loss of a part of Finland that was ceded to Russia, and the conclusion of the Abo Peace Treaty (1743). According to the agreement, Russia was able to move its borders away from St. Petersburg, which was of military and strategic importance. From the point of view of trade and economic relations, Russia expanded the coastline in the Gulf of Finland and expanded the territory at the expense of 'Old Finland' which entered the unified trade and economic space of Russia [25, p. 50].

After the end of the war, trade relations between the states improved relatively quickly. This is confirmed by the fact that in 1755, 32 ships arrived in Russia from Sweden, which delivered goods for German and Russian entrepreneurs.

In accordance with the agreements concluded in Nystad and in Abo between Sweden and Russia, Russian citizens located on the territory of Sweden had certain trade privileges. There was a special Russian courtyard in Stockholm where business people

who arrived from Russia stayed. There they could store goods, conduct retail trade in shops.

It should be noted that Stockholm served as a transit port through which goods were delivered to England and back. An interesting assumption was noted in the study of V. N. Zakharov. In the 50s, there were some merchants who received only Swedish ships, only from Sweden. As an example, the names are given: Friedrich Anton Gerken, who met only Swedish ships; the company Heidemann and Westfalen, maintaining contacts with Helsingfors, Stockholm, and carrying out the movement of goods only on Swedish ships [26, p. 188].

In the 50s, commercial firms were created, their activities intensified, and foreign trade relations were developing. In this case, the development of trade relations between Russia and Sweden was facilitated by the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).

Sweden's attempts to regain its positions that existed before the Northern War continued. It participated in the Seven Years' War in alliance with Russia, France and Austria against Prussia, thereby trying to regain the territories that had been ceded to Germany. As an ally of Russia, Sweden helped to strengthen economic relations. The number of ships arriving in Russia under the Swedish flag grew. Among the first in the second half of the 50s was Zacharias Gulten, he received the first Swedish ship in 1758 [27, Part 4]. Further, mutually beneficial relations develop between the states. Russia had ports in Pomerania-Wolgast and Stralsund, in the north of Germany, through which it was possible to carry out trade transactions, as well as to supply Russian troops who participated in the war. A record number of Swedish ships, 238, entered the port of St. Petersburg in 1759, it is more than of other countries. For comparison, the traditional trading partner of Russia, England, sent 200 ships to St. Petersburg at that time [28, pp. 154–155].

Another trend of that time was the chartering of ships under the Swedish flag by Russian merchants. They were the ones who delivered the necessary supplies for the Russian army in East Prussia. These actions especially mention the name of the Russian merchant S. Rogovikov, who sent 67 ships under the Swedish flag for this purpose [27, Part 6, Sheets 3–160].

At the same time, Russia ranked first among the countries that exported its goods to Sweden [8, pp. 171–181]. The activity of private entrepreneurs intensified. Among others, the name of the Swedish merchant Z. Gulten, who conducted his business in St. Petersburg, stands out. In 1762, he received 11 ships. The peculiarity of his activity was to do business only with Sweden. Despite a slight decline in trade operations, Gulten was successfully developing his activities by the end of the 60s. The data indicate that in 1767 he met two ships, in 1769 four ships from Sweden, and in 1771 even nine ships from Stockholm [26, p. 189]. In the mid-60s of the 18th century, another name of the Swedish entrepreneur Kaspar Otto Dolphin was known in St. Petersburg, who, simultaneously with his commercial activities, was the consul of Sweden since 1761 [4, pp. 608–609]. At the end of the century, new Swedish trading companies emerged: Klas Bartholomeus Peirong, French in origin but introduced himself as a Swedish merchant, in company with the French merchant Raimbert [27, Part 13, Sheet 242].

The activity of the firm “The Widow of Lavrenty Girs and I. P. Kok” was successful, it surpassed all other Swedish firms in Russia in terms of turnover. The company developed its activities exclusively in the harbors of Sweden. The following indicators testify to

the firm's activity: in the mid-70s, 16 Swedish ships came to the firm's address in St. Petersburg. The company operated until the end of the century, slightly changing its name for "Fr. Girs and Kok". At the end of the century, new Swedish entrepreneurs appeared in St. Petersburg, such as Christian Bjorkman, who connected his activities with both Sweden and the southern coast of the Baltic Sea [27, Part 13, Sheet 12; Part 14, Sheet 221].

Thus, frequent military conflicts, unstable foreign policy and internal situation did not contribute to the strengthening of economic ties and the development of foreign trade. In the middle of the 18th century, Sweden remained predominantly an agricultural country. It should be noted, however, that the geographic location favored the industry. It remained a major supplier of iron and copper to the world market. The textile industry (linen, woolen, cotton) developed successfully. In the 70s, the share of exports exceeded the amount of imports by 500 thousand dalers.

Gustav III, who came to power in Sweden (1771–1792), like Catherine II, pursued a policy of enlightened absolutism which not all the noble elite was satisfied with. Perhaps the desire to settle domestic political problems forced the king to enter into external adventures. In 1788–1790, Sweden fought a war with Russia and its ally Denmark. The war did not bring good luck to Sweden, this time it came out of the war without territorial losses.

In Russia, before the beginning of the reign of Catherine II (1762–1796), neither domestic nor foreign trade achieved great success. After coming to power, Catherine II focused on the development of the Black Sea and Eastern trade. The Empress took a patronizing position in relation to industry and trade. She established the State Loan Bank (1786), sought funds for the expansion of foreign trade, while she was a supporter of increasing the export of goods. She returned to the treasury the customs, which were given to the tax collectors by the Senate, which increased the revenue of the treasury.

The end of the 18th century was marked by a new military clash between Russia and Sweden. In 1788, the Swedish king Gustav III began a war with Russia which ended with his defeat in 1790. The result of the military clash was the Peace Treaty of Varala. The Treaty made little change to the existing provisions of previous agreements. Free trade of the subjects of both states was preserved, as well as the right of Swedish merchants to buy Russian bread up to 50 thousand rubles, and hemp for 200 thousand rubles [29, p. 279].

Sweden turned from an enemy into an ally of Russia, which was partly facilitated by the French Revolution which affected international relations in Europe. Gustav III and Catherine II in the union sought to restore balance in the European community. But Gustav was killed as a result of a conspiracy of nobles, and in 1796 the empress died. Nevertheless, the contract was considered 'eternal', although it was not; a medal was created as a sign of its conclusion.

The new Swedish king Gustav IV sought to use the alliance with Russia for his own purposes—to annex Norway to Sweden. In 1799, he signed a treaty with Emperor Paul I against France. Sweden itself took a balancing position between Russia and England, with which it had strong economic and trade relations.

Among the acts of Paul I in the field of the development of foreign trade, his ban (1798) on the export of timber abroad is of interest. It is known that timber, as well as

bread, were the main articles of foreign trade and the income of merchants. Such a policy did not contribute to the expansion of foreign trade. The situation was aggravated by the deterioration of relations with England, which bought 1/3 of agricultural products [30, pp. 519–528]. Paul's attempt to create his own merchant fleet failed, Russia depended on foreign merchants and a merchant fleet.

Numerous wars and the foreign policy confrontation between Russia and Sweden in the 18th century did not contribute to the development of trade and economic ties between the two states. In this regard, a particular factor is of interest, it reflects the trade relations between the countries. In the sheets on the cost of imported goods of Russian and foreign merchants in the port of St. Petersburg for 1787, among the St. Petersburg, Moscow, English, and Dutch merchants, the names of Swedish merchants are given with an indication of the cost of goods that they delivered from abroad. The total cost of goods delivered by Swedish merchants to the port of St. Petersburg was 45,806 rubles and 75 kopecks. For comparison: Dutch merchants delivered goods for 257,997 rubles and 80 kopecks; English—983584 rubles and 97 kopecks. The Swiss had lower indicators than the Swedish merchants—1586 rubles and 50 kopecks; the Italian ones—7859 rubles. In addition, Swedish merchants were not listed in the costs sheets of export goods for 1787 [2]. This testifies to the low activity of Swedish merchants in one of the most important ports in Russia.

Considering trade relations between the two countries, trade competition should be pointed out. It was especially evident in the 18th century. Competition developed in the iron trade. Back in the 17th century, Sweden was a regular leader in the global iron trade. Russia at that time was buying metal from Sweden. The reforms carried out by Peter I turned Russia from an iron importing country to a copper and iron exporting country. The preconditions for competition emerged back in the 20s of the 18th century. In addition to iron, resin was also the subject of trade competition. In the European market, Swedish iron was traditionally in demand. However, since about the middle of the century, the Russian economy had made great strides, which boosted exports. Russia exported metal to the states of Southern Europe, gradually conquering the market of Great Britain. The difficult domestic political situation in Sweden forced the country to reduce iron production which resulted in the reduction of exports. Thus, Russia became the leading supplier of metal in the European market, including in England.

Sweden's advantage was in higher quality metal, which made it possible, even with a decrease in exports, to maintain high prices and stability of metal supplies to Great Britain. With its own merchant fleet, Sweden retained its advantages in trade in Southern Europe, strengthening its foreign economic relations with European countries.

The subject of competition between the two countries was the trade in copper. But even here the advantage was on the side of Sweden, since Russia's domestic needs required a reduction in the sale of copper for export.

Regarding resin, Sweden occupied a leading position almost throughout the 18th century. However, in Russia, the policy towards the resin trade was changing. Initially, the state declared a monopoly on this product, then restrictions were introduced related to the foreign trade activities of Arkhangelsk. It is necessary to take into account the low quality of the goods. All these circumstances reduced the competitive ability of Russian

resin in the European market, but gradually overcoming problems, Russian resin by the end of the century was a serious competition for Swedish goods.

Another industry was the subject of competition between Russia and Sweden—the forestry industry. The demand for wood of various types is partly explained by the increased shipbuilding and the development of navigation. Russia traded mainly on English and Dutch ships. Nevertheless, it managed to oust Sweden from the Dutch and partly from the English markets for the sale of wood, wood materials, boards.

Thus, the economic relations between Russia and Sweden in the 18th century were complicated, their relationship developed with varying success. Their political confrontation resulted in their economic ties. In addition, the success in trade competition was directly dependent on government policy, on the availability of natural resources, and on the level of industry development, including process industries. Both countries pursued a protectionist policy aimed at exports of final products. In this case, the competitiveness of a product depended on its quality, cost, and customs policy. Researcher Zakharov, referring to the opinion of A. Kakhan, notes another condition for trade competition—the homogeneity of the trade structure of Sweden and Russia [26, p. 187]. All these circumstances, on the one hand, brought the interests of Russia and Sweden closer together, on the other, they kept both countries in a certain tension, which did not create stability in Russian-Swedish trade and economic relations.

## 5 Conclusion

Based on the goals and tasks set, it can be stated that in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Russia and Sweden were mutually important strategic partners. The government policy of the Russian emperors and kings of Sweden was aimed at economic and trade cooperation, mutually beneficial, despite military conflicts and competition. Both countries, through their merchants, contributed to the development of foreign trade not only of Sweden and Russia, but also of the entire Baltic, European trade. The experience of the two countries over several centuries requires further study. There appear to be still many unexplored issues in the history of trade and economic relations between Russia and Sweden. These include the history of specific firms and entrepreneurs, their role in trade; the history of trading dynasties that preserved the traditions of trade between the countries; documents accumulated over the centuries. It is finally necessary to systematize the historiography of trade and economic relations between Russia and Sweden. These and other issues of economic policy in Russia and Sweden may become the challenges for further study.

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# Geographic and Historical Factors in the Development of Political Relations Between St. Petersburg and Africa

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**Abstract.** In the article, the authors investigate bilateral relations between St. Petersburg and African countries, and also try to explain the reasons for the strengthening of these contacts, primarily at the level of the legislative branch. The authors of the article substantiate the hypothesis of the greatest influence of the historical factor on the process of modern political relations between St. Petersburg and Africa. According to the authors, the geographical factor is important, but not decisive in the establishment and development of bilateral relations. It is argued that personalities play an important role in strengthening international contacts. In particular, former African students of St. Petersburg higher educational institutions, who have achieved success in politics, business and science, use their previous contacts to consolidate their success in interaction with St. Petersburg. Even during the existence of the Soviet Union, a tradition of an individual approach to teaching and educating African students was formed with the hope of promising cooperation with Africa. The authors conclude that the political system of African states is not of fundamental importance for the development of bilateral ties with St. Petersburg. The city on the Neva builds its international relations from the position of its economic interests. The authors believe that the weak point of modern relations between St. Petersburg and Africa is the narrowness of economic and cultural ties, aimed mainly at trade, tourism and education. The development of interaction in the areas of heavy industry and new technologies remains outside the political and economic interests of St. Petersburg.

**Keywords:** Africa · St. Petersburg · International relations

## 1 Introduction

From a physical and geographical point of view, the territory of Africa is usually divided into South, West, East, North and Central. This division is conditional, but it is very convenient to use it in analytical work, including for the analysis of international relations. In the XXI century, a number of new political and economic trends have emerged, among which the authors of the article draw attention to the role of Africa in the international process and to the importance of bilateral relations between individual regions

of different states. As an example, the article examines bilateral relations between St. Petersburg and various African states and their regions. Attention is drawn to the fact that the emphasis in building bilateral relations is placed on the legal component, as the basis of economic and political ties, based on the desire to coordinate the development of the legislative framework of St. Petersburg and African countries.

The XXI century was marked by the rapid development of African states. There are currently over 50 cities on the continent with a population of over 1 million. Over a hundred African national companies annually generate profits comparable to those of the world's leading corporations. Most of the 55 African states are seeking to restructure their economic policies. They are not satisfied with the role of raw material bases for European, American and Asian markets. They are trying to develop their own high-tech enterprises, allowing them to use the profits for their own development. At the same time, practice shows that the previous trend continues. Many African states consider natural resources and agricultural products as the main source of their exports, mainly fruits, vegetables and coffee.

African countries are of economic interest to St. Petersburg. The economy of St. Petersburg ranks second in Russia after the economy of Moscow. The city seeks to invest its economic and scientific potential in promising African countries. Relations between St. Petersburg and South Africa (South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Seychelles) are developing most successfully. Contrary to the seeming geographical expediency, St. Petersburg has the weakest ties with the countries of North and Central Africa.

The topic of relationships between St Petersburg and African countries, in particular (and foreign relationships of St Petersburg, in general), is not elaborated sufficiently. We must note the works by Yagya [1, 2], Vinogradova [3], Zotova and Poltorak [4], as well as George and George [5]. The latter touches on historical aspects of relations between St Petersburg and Africa. At the same time, there is a number of studies on Russia-African relations in Russian [6–11] and English [12–15].

## 2 Methods of Research

To conduct a scientific study, the conclusions of which are presented in this article, research methods such as analysis, synthesis, comparison, deduction were used. The authors used published and unpublished sources, statistical information on the economic cooperation of St. Petersburg with African countries, Internet sources representing reports on the acceptance of delegations from African countries in St. Petersburg.

Using the methods of analysis, the comparative method, generalization and systematization, it was possible to trace the dynamics of cooperation between representatives of the authorities, business, culture and education of St. Petersburg with the regions of Africa, as well as identify the reasons for more effective cooperation with the South, West and East of Africa.

### 3 Results of International Relations Between St. Petersburg and African Regions

#### 3.1 The Relationship of St. Petersburg with the Countries of South Africa

The Parliament of St. Petersburg is most successfully developing relations with such South African countries as the Republic of Angola, Madagascar, South Africa and the Seychelles.

Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Angola were established on November 11, 1975—on the day of the proclamation of this country's independence. A feature of the relationship between modern Russia and Angola is active political cooperation in the field of international relations, as well as regular contacts of parliaments of different levels [16].

In September 2002, a delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Angola, headed by the Chairman of the Assembly, Roberto de Almeida, visited St. Petersburg and the Legislative Assembly of the city on the Neva [17]. Largely thanks to the efforts of the parliamentarians of the two countries, the Intergovernmental Russian-Angolan Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Trade began its work in 2004. Since then, St. Petersburg has been repeatedly visited by diplomats, parliamentary figures and businessmen from Angola. For the first twenty years of the XXI century, education, science and culture are the priority areas of cooperation between Angola and St. Petersburg [18].

The Russia-Angola Business Council was formed in March 2019. This made the dialogue more productive. Among the obvious successes of cooperation is the education of Angolan students in St. Petersburg. In July 2019, the delegation of the Republic of Angola participated in the second International Forum “Development of Parliamentarism” and in the parliamentary conference “Russia–Africa” [16].

The parliamentarians of Madagascar in 2005 visited St. Petersburg, where they met with the governor of the city V.I. Matvienko and held negotiations on business cooperation with the “Almaz” corporation [19]. A year later, the St. Petersburg parliament initiated a meeting of the parliamentary delegation of the Republic of Madagascar with the management of the “Almaz” plant. During the meeting, issues of mutually beneficial interest were discussed [20]. In subsequent years, this cooperation continued, which was reflected in the growth of trade turnover. In particular, in 2018 it reached \$ 4.1 million [21].

Bilateral relations between St. Petersburg and the Republic of South Africa are an example of effective cooperation. Diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Africa were established on February 28, 1992. Since 2015, a group for cooperation with the National Council of Provinces of South Africa has been working in the Federation Council. Diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Africa were established on February 28, 1992. Since 2015, a group for cooperation with the National Council of Provinces of South Africa has been working in the Federation Council [22]. By that time, the St. Petersburg parliamentarians already had strong contacts with their South African counterparts. In the course of many years of cooperation, the St. Petersburg parliamentarians came up with the idea of including the South African cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town in the

expanded dialogue of the city on the Neva with partner cities in the BRICS countries. Petersburgers are ready to implement joint programs with South Africa in the field of education, culture, tourism, as well as to help South Africa in the modernization of the country's thermal power plants and the supply of mining equipment to South Africa. South African parliamentarians are interested in comprehensive business and friendly contacts, especially in the field of medical education [23]. According to the head of the South African delegation, the time has come to strengthen bilateral contacts at the regional level [24].

Petersburg is interested in cooperation with the South African port of Durban, as well as in cooperation in the field of shipbuilding, power engineering, pharmaceuticals and the supply of medical equipment. South Africa expects that St. Petersburg specialists will help them in the development of such an industry as the enrichment of natural minerals. South Africa is very proud of the fact that Russians buy food and wine from their republic. In 2016, three universities in the city established contacts with universities in the Republic of South Africa. The tourism sector seems to be very promising for both sides. This is confirmed by the fact that in 2015 St. Petersburg was visited by 3 thousand tourists from South Africa [25].

Valuable is the fact that bilateral relations are developing very harmoniously, covering a wide range of cooperation: from many areas of culture to interaction in the field of trade and economic development. Trade between St. Petersburg and South Africa in 2019 amounted to \$ 140 million. The structure of imports is dominated by food products, beverages, tobacco and plant products. Oil and oil products, as well as plant products are exported from St. Petersburg to South Africa [26].

Giving a general assessment of the interaction of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg with the parliaments of African states, it should be recognized that they are distinguished by stability and positive dynamics. Against the background of general interaction with the parliamentary forces of other continents, this area of parliamentary activity seems especially promising. The experience of interaction with African legislators, perhaps, should be more actively used in cooperation with legislators of other states.

Unfortunately, there is no close cooperation with most of the states in the region. An example of this is the relationship with the Republic of Botswana. Although diplomatic relations with this country were established in March 1970, only one official visit of a delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Botswana to St. Petersburg took place in the last quarter of a century [19]. St. Petersburg and the Republic of Seychelles have approximately the same level of relations. Although the Seychelles is one of the favorite holiday destinations for Petersburgers, the results of economic cooperation remain modest. Trade between St. Petersburg and Seychelles in 2019 amounted to \$ 1.8 million [27].

### **3.2 Building Relations with West African Countries**

St. Petersburg's relations with the countries of West Africa are developing more successfully than with North Africa. An example of successful cooperation is the relations between St. Petersburg and the Republic of Guinea.

Diplomatic relations between Russia and the Republic of Guinea were established on October 4, 1958. The development of the contractual base of Russian-Guinean relations began actively in 1998, when the intergovernmental Agreement on visa-free travel with diplomatic and service passports and the Inter-MFA Agreement on cooperation in the field of diplomatic archives were signed. The protocol on consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs of the two states was signed in November 2000. Currently, over 10 Russian companies are successfully operating in Guinea, most of which are engaged in the development of the mining industry, civil construction and road construction in the country.

In St. Petersburg, such an important segment of relationships as education is developing. More than 100 Guinean students are constantly studying in St. Petersburg, many of whom are Russian scholarship holders. Several dozen Russian teachers work at the University of Conakry. The national languages of Guinea—Maninka and Mandingo—are studied by students of St. Petersburg State University. In May 2014, President of the Marvel Group of Companies (computer technologies), Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nevsky Bank S.A. Girdin was appointed Honorary Consul of Guinea in St. Petersburg [28].

Relations between St. Petersburg and Guinea have good prospects. This African country possesses large reserves of minerals and has a constant interest in developing collaborative work in the fields of medicine, construction, industry and education. Since 2015, the Republic of Guinea has experienced significant investment growth, and Russian companies are actively involved in the development of various segments of the Guinean economy. According to S.A. Girdin, St. Petersburg could conclude many lucrative contracts with the Republic of Guinea related not only to the development of the country's mineral resources, but also to the development of construction and industry [28].

Economic ties with Ghana and Cameroon are developing successfully. Trade with these countries reached \$ 9.5 million and \$ 8.3 million, respectively [29, 30]. Petersburgers send fertilizers, fuel and energy products, cardboard, paper, as well as products of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy to Ghana. Cocoa and tropical timber come from Ghana to St. Petersburg [31].

In 2017, the trade turnover of St. Petersburg and Nigeria reached its all-time high, amounting to \$ 13.1 million. It has grown by 86% compared to 2016. Thus, Nigeria took 97th place among the countries—trade partners of St. Petersburg. Trade is characterized by a significant predominance of exports. Exports from St. Petersburg to Nigeria doubled in 2017. This increase is due to the supply of grain, which accounted for 70% of total exports. In addition, mineral fuel, paper and cardboard are sent from St. Petersburg to this African country. Imports in 2017 decreased by 87% and amounted to 59 thousand dollars. In terms of imports to St. Petersburg, Nigeria ranks 136th. Basically, this country supplies St. Petersburg with coffee, tea and spices. 76 students from Nigeria study in St. Petersburg universities. The most common languages of Nigeria—Hausa, Yoruba and others are studied at the Faculty of Oriental Studies of St. Petersburg State University [32].

In March 2021, representatives of Nigeria discussed in St. Petersburg a strategically important issue: cooperation with representatives of medium and small businesses,

which have already been paved the way for Nigeria by large Russian business. Among the promising areas of cooperation are pharmaceuticals, energy, water treatment, port facilities, as well as the supply of flour to this African state [33].

Diplomatic relations between Mali and Russia date back over 60 years. Business cooperation and friendly relations are often based on strong individual ties. An example of this is the contribution to the strengthening of relations between St. Petersburg and the Republic of Mali by the citizen of St. Petersburg Issa Togo, who was born in Mali. A former student and graduate student of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, the talented person made a significant career at the university, becoming a major specialist in the field of energy and head of the Department of Water Management and Hydraulic Engineering at the Civil Engineering Institute of the modern St. Petersburg Polytechnic University of Peter the Great. Issa Togo, together with the colleagues in the department, cooperates with enterprises and universities of Mali, gives lectures there and advises participants in important engineering projects of the Republic of Mali [34].

### **3.3 Political and Economic Contacts of St. Petersburg with the Countries of East Africa**

2018 marks 120 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Ethiopia. On July 5, 1895, the Ethiopian embassy, headed by the cousin of the Emperor of Ethiopia, Prince Damtou, arrived in St. Petersburg and was received in Tsarskoe Selo by Nicholas II. The Russian emperor authorized the provision of military assistance to Ethiopia in order to fight against Italy. In September 1897, a Russian emergency diplomatic mission left for Ethiopia, arriving in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on February 4, 1898. The first ambassador of the Russian Empire to Ethiopia was the famous diplomat P.M. Vlasov. In March 1908, the Emperor of Ethiopia Menelik II sent a letter to Nicholas II, in which he wrote: “We are sincerely grateful to you and all your people for your help and support, for your cares and love for us—for all that you have been doing for many days for us, your friends. Be blessed for your benevolence and your good deeds. How can we answer you, besides gratitude? We will always remember your deeds in our prayers and thoughts” [35].

The Intergovernmental Russian-Ethiopian Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Trade has been actively working for many years. Cooperation between St. Petersburg and Ethiopia is also developing. In 2017, the trade between St. Petersburg and Ethiopia amounted to \$ 3.86 million. At the same time, exports are \$ 0.72 million, and imports are \$ 3.14 million. Import supplies are dominated by vegetables, root crops and coffee. Petersburg business is interested in additional supplies of agricultural products from Ethiopia, as well as in the sale of equipment and participation in various projects for the development of minerals. It seems that cooperation between St. Petersburg and Ethiopia has a great future. The languages of the peoples living in Ethiopia are studied at the Faculty of Oriental Studies of St. Petersburg State University. Medieval Ethiopian manuscripts are in the collections of the Russian National Library, the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography.

In March 2011, a delegation from the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, led by Mayor Kuma Demex, visited St. Petersburg. The Ethiopian delegation held a number of important meetings, including with deputies of the St. Petersburg parliament, heads of a number of committees of the City Administration, with the leaderships of the Oriental Faculty of St. Petersburg State University and the State University of Railways. Ethiopia is interested in cooperation with St. Petersburg specialists in the mining and railway industries, in the field of culture and education, in particular, in the approval of the practice of student exchanges. According to the Plenipotentiary Minister of Ethiopia G.G. Cassa, St. Petersburg for his country is one of the most important partners in the field of economy, tourism, education and science [36].

On the whole, relations between St. Petersburg and the Republic of Kenya are developing successfully. This African country has shown interest in relations in the field of commercial farming, construction, well drilling, development of transport infrastructure and hotel business in St. Petersburg. The Kenyan side considers the establishment of twinning relations between St. Petersburg and one of the regions of Kenya as one of the tools for achieving success in international relations [37]. Given the high potential for the development of science in St. Petersburg and the rich practical experience, Kenyans are interested in St. Petersburg specialists engaged in the exploration and production of natural resources in Kenya. The Kenyan side is very interested in purchasing products from St. Petersburg engineering and pharmaceuticals. Trade between St. Petersburg and Kenya in 2019 reached \$ 32.9 million [38]. The Russian language and Russian culture have become extremely popular in Kenya in recent years. The Russian Language Cabinet is successfully operating in Nairobi, which has become the center for various events to popularize the Russian language and literature. Graduates of Soviet and Russian universities who have returned to their homeland fondly remember Russia, St. Petersburg and do their utmost to further strengthen our relationship.

On the contrary, the contacts of the St. Petersburg parliamentarians with their colleagues from the Republic of Djibouti are of an episodic nature. In particular, in October 2017 in St. Petersburg, the Chairman of the National Assembly of Djibouti, Mohamed Ali Hummed, met with the chairman of the St. Petersburg parliament V.S. Makarov [39].

The St. Petersburg parliamentarians promote the establishment of contacts between businessmen of St. Petersburg and the government of the Republic of Djibouti. St. Petersburg specialists are taking part in the construction of a waste recycling plant and the building of the cultural and business center “Djibouti Towers”. This building should become the hallmark of the capital of this state. Joint projects are also being implemented in the field of healthcare and pharmaceuticals, higher education and tourism with the support of parliamentarians [40].

### **3.4 International Relations of St. Petersburg with North and Central Africa**

Relations with Morocco are developing especially successfully in St. Petersburg. The Moroccan and St. Petersburg sides unanimously declare the great potential of their relations. Morocco and St. Petersburg have achieved high results in the field of economy, culture and education [41].

Morocco is one of the main African trade partners of Russia, including St. Petersburg. In 2017, trade between St. Petersburg and Morocco amounted to \$ 496 million. 67% of



the turnover is made up of plant products: citrus fruits, vegetables, etc. Mineral fuels are exported from St. Petersburg to Morocco [42].

Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Algerian People's Democratic Republic were established on March 23, 1962. Almost 30 years later, on December 26, 1991, Algeria recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR [43]. There are strong mutually beneficial relations between our countries in various spheres of international activity, including parliamentary cooperation. Petersburg parliamentarians have direct contacts with their Algerian counterparts.

Petersburg also developed friendly and business relations with the countries of Central Africa. In particular, cooperation with the Gabonese Republic is facilitated by close positions on many international issues, including security issues. The parliamentarians of St. Petersburg and Gabon have developed a number of legal documents that objectively strengthen the interaction of the two parties. An example of this is the agreement signed in 2011 on the abolition of visas for holders of diplomatic and service passports. The parties also agreed on joint actions to promote and protect investments, as well as to avoid double taxation and tax evasion in relation to income tax [44].

On October 1, 2017, Russia and Burundi celebrated the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. The prospects for cooperation between St. Petersburg and the Republic of Burundi are great. The Norilsk Nickel Company and the Gipronickel Research Institute located in St. Petersburg have expressed their desire to start working on the issue of mining rare earth metals in Burundi. Petersburg is ready to supply equipment to Burundi and participate in projects related to the development of minerals. In June 2017, the second vice-president of Burundi, Joseph Butori, visited St. Petersburg and held talks with potential Russian partners. Petersburg businessmen are interested in purchasing in Burundi their coffee, which is famous for its high quality [45].

The building of relations between St. Petersburg and the countries of North and Central Africa was influenced by both objective and subjective reasons. Objective reasons, in particular, include the fact that St. Petersburg is largely establishing relations with those African countries with which Russia has established strong relations. Therefore, the leading position in these relations is played by such countries as Morocco, Algeria, Burundi and others. Unfortunately, the subjective factor also affects. Thus, the crash of a Russian plane flying from Egypt to St. Petersburg in 2015 had a significant impact on the relationship between the Russian metropolis and Egypt.

## 4 Conclusions

The geographical factor, including the degree of development of logistic ties, have a significant impact on the development of relations between St. Petersburg and the countries of the African continent. However, an even more significant factor is the degree of personal contacts between politicians, economists, artists, culture, science, education and sports. The role of personality in history, which is often significantly underestimated, in practice often plays a decisive role. Many Africans who studied and lived in Russia, including in St. Petersburg, not only maintain a good attitude towards the Russian Federation, but also use business and human ties to develop political, economic and cultural relations.

Due to the fact that, since Soviet times, students from West and South Africa have mainly studied in St. Petersburg, decades later this factor turned out to be stronger than the geographical one in the development of modern international relations in all areas.

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# **Administrative Culture, Political Institutions and National Policies**



# Social and Political Influence of the Media on Corruption

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**Abstract.** Mass media occupy an important position in the political life of society. Therefore, in carrying out their functions, they are significantly influenced by various state institutions. In various countries, the position of the media is characterized by the fact that they are to some extent dependent on the authorities or have a greater degree of freedom in carrying out their activities. It can be noted that in numerous countries, the media are state-owned, their subordinate position does not allow them to properly cover problems that directly affect the well-being of the national society, namely the problems of corruption, if this information contradicts the interests of certain sociopolitical structures. The connection of the media with the ruling political elites is a factor that determines a negative or positive impact on the processes in the political life of the society. Using a regional approach, methods of analysis, comparison in the states of different regions, a negative dynamic can be traced, namely that in whole regions of the world, low levels of press freedom correlate with high levels of corruption and as a result with low living standards of the population. A direct correlation between the level of corruption and the status of the media can be observed. In regions without freedom of the press, this instrument is not used for the benefit of public interests. Thus, by modernizing the position of this instrument, it is possible to conduct anti-corruption policy much more effectively. The status of the media in the political system as a special social institution and instrument of influence on societies is determined by the degree of their independence from political elites and, therefore, the state faces the task of ensuring true freedom of speech, implemented, among other things, in the fight against corruption at the national level.

**Keywords:** Corruption · International crimes · Mass media

## 1 Introduction

When analyzing international problems, it is possible to distinguish several most urgent, depending on the period in which the modern society exists. It should be noted that for a developed civil society, those issues that are most frequently discussed in mass media become significant. In countries with state control of the media, information flows are largely shaped by the dominant political parties (the state of the media is tracked by the press freedom index [1]). Along with this circumstance, attention is drawn to the fact

of imposing certain information on the society in a way beneficial to certain political structures that have close ties with specific media outlets. Control over mass media is reflected in the fact that corruption phenomena inherent in the activity of state and political structures are obscured and not duly reflected in certain media outlets affiliated with the leaders of ruling parties or with certain groups holding leading positions in different bodies of state power.

The problem of corruption is of a very specific nature, primarily because when looking at a single state, most often we are talking about a member of the political and/or economic elite, who, in turn, is supported by one of them. That is, if we are talking about a representative of an economic structure (financier, banker, representative of the business elite), then most often we can find their dependence on or connection with a political elite which supports them and vice versa. A similar situation is observed when the issue concerns international economic relations.

Highlighting internal and external problems by the state-owned and controlled by political elites media allows creating trends, as well as public imperatives and the necessary social attitude (opinion) to the problems.

Thus, the media, by taking a certain position, offset the facts of corruption influence on the leading state political structures [2, 3] and create a favorable atmosphere for negative phenomena of corruption.

Studying the correlation between regional authorities and the activities of the media allows actualizing the most acute problems of corruption coverage in the press, which affects the public consciousness, and the relationship between the freedom of exercising the functions of mass media and the level of corruption activity in a particular state [4–7].

Problematics of corruption is quite widely manifested in scientific works. A number of scientific studies deal with corruption activities in different regions. The countries featured in the studies differ in their historical preconditions for the current state of corruption problematics, as well as in their type of the government and sociopolitical situation. The fight against corruption in the Russian Empire, which was actively pursued by the famous Russian monarch-reformer Peter the Great [8], can be rightfully mentioned as one of the most interesting examples. Apart from striving to learn from the European society in the fields of architecture, education, fashion, behavior, etc., Peter the Great made great efforts, notable for their cruelty, to combat corruption. But all his actions, regardless of the degree of cruelty, did not bring the desired result – the great emperor-reformer failed to eradicate corruption. Subsequently, Peter the Great was indignant, admitting that the problem of corruption is a national problem, and it is embedded in the people as a national tradition. The current situation [9] in the Russian Federation has several problems in the legislative field as well. Thus, E. Okhotsky [10] notes the problem of applying international anti-corruption norms in the national law of the Russian Federation (inconsistency of the UN Convention norms with the provisions of the Constitution; the difference in concepts, some of which are not enshrined in the Russian legal framework at all). The actions of law enforcement agencies are also a problem, as well as the relative softness of the judicial system regarding crimes related to corruption issues [11]. The inconsistency between the national norms and the norms of international law, the reluctance to unify them at the national level can lead to complications in the international cooperation [12].

E. Kosevich [13] considers the situation in Latin American countries within the public discourse based on information from social and mass media. Political upheavals on another continent are also of interest – the position of the monarchy in Spain has also suffered serious upheavals after accusations of corruption – and hereby we observe not only domestic corruption schemes but the UAE, European, and Latin American countries were also parties of the conflict [14]. D. Abramov [15] cites a study devoted to the problem of corruption in India. Where he notes that corruption in the country is traditional. Even though India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world – where corruption (bribery) is a social norm of all strata of society.

The scientific community increasingly supports the opinion that the problems of corruption must be resolved by involving the entire civil society. And special attention, of course, should be paid to the education of the population, as well as increasing the level of education in the field of anti-corruption activities [16]. This problem will not be solved instantly - it requires educational and awareness-raising work, and only then, with the change of generations and the establishment of a completely different ethics of behavior, when working with the mass consciousness, it is possible to create a responsible society [17].

## 2 Materials and Methods

Since the problem under consideration is of an international nature and is also in the interests of the United Nations, the fundamental document is the United Nations Convention against Corruption [18]. This convention does not contain a definition of “Corruption” [19] but there is a description of the types of unlawful activities that fall under its scope, both committed by officials and private individuals, or jointly. For the purposes of this paper, we will take the position that corruption is all types of illegal actions by public officials/public figures/private persons of a national and/or international nature with the purpose of illicit enrichment.

The following important documents aimed at regulating international illegal activities are of a regional nature: members of the Council of Europe and member states of the European Union are parties to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption [20]. In this region, the fundamental and related to the previous document is the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption [21]. We emphasize that the parties to the Conventions are not only the member states of the European Union but also the member states of the Council of Europe, as well as third states. Obviously, the European area is an important focus but since corruption activities go beyond one state or one region, the Council of Europe took steps to broaden the scope of the Convention. These Conventions provide an extended list of terms, actions, and conditions for anti-corruption actions, as well as specify the liability of an individual, which distinguishes them from the UN Convention.

The next important international format for anti-corruption activities is the activities of the BRICS countries (a group of five countries, including the fast-developing countries China and India). At the regular BRICS Forum in 2020, the Moscow Declaration was adopted [22], in which the problem of corruption is also given a special place. In addition to cooperation with the UN, as well as the improvement of national anti-corruption legislation, the five BRICS states emphasize the need to recover illegally obtained funds



and to create conditions aimed at eradicating safe havens for both criminals and their illicit assets.

In general, international treaties [23–25] as well as international organizations [26] aimed at the development and regulation of economic relations between countries, have the goal to regulate and create anti-corruption activities. Their differences mainly concern the participating countries. But the main thing they have in common is the reference to the UN activities aimed at combating international corruption.

In order to study the international nature of corruption in more detail, it is necessary to apply a regional approach and, because of the financial flows that in some cases affect individual countries, pay attention to individual cases, namely illicit money transactions through state banks.

When considering this issue, it should be noted that the information available to us is also investigative journalism. Some of the authors (journalists) mentioned in this study suffered because of their professional activities. It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that corruption is of a “shadow” nature, which does not allow us to consider all the possible manifestations of criminal activity, both at the national and international level.

Nevertheless, thanks to the high-profile investigations of journalists, the actions of the security services of individual states, and the work of international organizations, it is possible to trace the dynamics and identify certain patterns in matters of corruption and the fight against it. Not only the provision of information in general is analyzed, but also the willingness/permission of political elites and state bodies to indicate the seriousness of the problem, to form a positive/negative/neutral opinion of civil society, additionally to focus the attention of the population on this problem. Then, analyzing the levels of corruption in regions and individual countries, the results of the analysis and the results about the level of corruption should be compared. This will make it possible to achieve the goal of the research.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Regional Problems of Corruption

The problem of corruption is not evenly distributed in every region of the world. Each region has its own history of development and formation. Surely, it is also a matter of historical traditions of social and political life.

*European region.* The European region, represented in Table 1 by countries such as Malta, Latvia, Finland, and Denmark on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2020 [27] showed that, in general this region is ranked first, some countries do not go beyond the average boundary of the index.

As for certain European countries, namely Eastern European countries and Baltic states (EU member states since 2004), it can be assumed that their later integration into the European society slightly reduces their development in anti-corruption activities. As this process includes both educational and public awareness activities, as well as reforms of law enforcement bodies, it requires a lot of time. The problem is also the involvement of public figures and officials in crimes of illicit enrichment - due to their influential position,

**Table 1.** Comparative analysis of corruption perception and press freedom indices (states of the regions under consideration)

Country	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2020	Worldwide Press Freedom Index (WPI) 2020
Venezuela	176	45.66–147 rank – bad
Russia	129	48.92–149 rank – bad
Brazil	94	34.05–107 rank – problematic
Ecuador	92	32.62–98 rank – problematic
India	86	45.33–142 rank – bad
Malta	52	30.16–81 rank – problematic
Latvia	42	18.56–22 rank - satisfactory
Finland	3	7.93–2 rank – good
Denmark	1	8.13–3 rank – good

this process is delayed. For example, high-profile anti-corruption cases (including the withdrawal of illegally obtained funds through Latvian banks (2016) [28]) in Latvia eventually erase the boundaries between members of civil society regardless of their positions: the corruption scandal that involved Mayor of Riga N. Ushakov (2018) [29] and Mayor of Ventspils A. Lembergs (2019) [30]. The situation concerning the fight against corruption is not homogeneous throughout the EU. The situation that happened to the author of the investigation of corruption schemes (Panama Papers) also brought allegations that journalists are in danger by speaking openly about crimes in which powerful persons are involved regardless of the region and country of residence (murder of D.C. Galizia in 2017) [31].

As can be seen from the data presented in the table, in countries where the CPI is low, the press freedom index (WPI) [32] is rated very positively, and vice versa. This may indicate the level of independence of action from the part of society, aimed at fighting corruption. It also indicates the openness of political elites, who cannot influence possible scandals if they are found to be corrupt. Combining the CPI and WPI indices, we observe a situation in which society becomes intolerant of corrupt practices. Information about crimes must be reported to society, and when influential people are involved in corruption, this is possible thanks to the media, but they must be independent. Certainly, in case of a corruption scandal, for example, with a representative of a political party or with an incident lobbied by them - the society will not accept this provision. In the future, such a situation would entail a decrease in the level of public confidence in the political leader or political party, which would be reflected in the results of the election campaign. But this situation is possible only in countries where the system of government is able to ensure independent and fair elections - democratic countries.

*Latin American region.* Latin American countries show the opposite result - a high level of perception of corruption and a low level of freedom of the press. That is, the media controlled by the ruling political elite cannot report information that would damage

the reputation of the government. Neither is it possible to create a public demand for a change in society's attitude toward corruption. In Latin America, there are periodic civil protests caused by the decrease in the income of the population, leading to a huge part of the population being below the poverty line [33]. There is an accumulation of critical levels of public discontent, which resorts to protest activities at the point of extreme poverty. The countries of the region are also subject to condemnation by the international community during election campaigns. The results of elections are not recognized by some states because of the lack of electoral freedom and their dishonesty.

*BRICS countries.* The situation in the BRICS countries deserves special attention. In three of the five countries, the influence of traditions is quite strong (India, China, and Russia). China is ranked one of the last in the WPMI (177th) and 78th in the CPI, indicating that the perception of corruption among the population is quite high. These indicators correlate with the strong state involvement in all spheres of society, as well as a large social divide between the majority of the population and the ruling party elites (the communist system of modern China is aimed at state control of the society). The control over the civil society consisting in the restriction of media activities (state control of information flows), patriotic education, cultivation of unconditional subordination to representatives of the Communist Party and other similar measures do not stimulate the development of institutions that would facilitate the emergence of a different system of verification (control) by the population in the activities of political elites. Thus, there is an elevation of political party representatives, who can take advantage of their official position to achieve the goal of illicit enrichment. And as CPI shows, the population is very tolerant of such practices. The consequence of WPMI is that only the information that will contribute to the continuation of such a situation appears in the media.

Common features of the sociopolitical situation are observed in all BRICS countries - namely, a fairly strong position of tradition; sociopolitical practices that have evolved over decades; lack of turnover of political elites through open election procedures with civil society participation; division of society into classes and building unequal relations between them (extreme situation in India, formed by traditional culture), etc. These provisions and relations between civil society and authorities do not contribute to the creation of an open society, which could independently respond to sociopolitical challenges. In Brazil, for example, high levels of corruption are combined with the plight of much of the civil society, which has no influence on its own current situation.

### 3.2 Media Factor

Separate consideration should be given to media coverage of corruption schemes. Table 2 summarizes the mentions of the word "corruption" in the national media in selected countries in the regions under consideration over a period of 1 year (July 31, 2020 - July 31, 2021). It is important to note that in Latin America and the BRICS countries, at least five articles (in some cases more) refer to the same corruption offense. Besides, the fact that the word "corruption" is more often mentioned in the headings of articles in India. In Venezuela, the word "corruption" is mentioned only in the body of the article.

Out of the given countries of the European region, Denmark occupies a special place, based on its level of perception of corruption and freedom of the press. The analysis on the coverage of corruption by the media [34] in Denmark reveals a picture where

**Table 2.** Results of the analysis of the media.

Country	Mention of corruption offenses (number of articles in 1 year)
Latin American country	
Venezuela	40
BRICS country	
India	248
Country of the European region	
Denmark	14

materials of corruption offenses are openly published in the country. Among the 14 articles under study, we can mention the situation with Deutsche Bank, where high-ranking Danish officials were caught “laundering” money. Whether this information is used as part of a political struggle remains an open question. Provided that the article was published outside the time of political elections, it is unlikely that the investigation is politically motivated.

The situation of corruption in Latin American media in the case of Venezuela is characterized by its superficial coverage. The few articles that appear in the national media [35] describe some corruption scandals, which are mainly related to the actions of ministers and former officials previously found guilty of corruption offenses in the conduct of business. The rather low number of articles on corruption in Venezuela, unfortunately, does not indicate the absence of corruption offenses, due to the difficult sociopolitical and economic situation in the country.

In India, as one of the most influential BRICS countries, and as one of the fastest developing countries, despite such a high rate of corruption mentions in national media articles [36], the main information background on corruption offenses is created by opposing political parties. That is, the topic of corruption is used to achieve political results. It is also important to take into consideration that India’s healthcare situation with Covid-19 was not without corruption scandals - the problems related to vaccines, oxygen supply, and crematoriums, as can be seen from the information flows, were partly caused by internal corruption in the healthcare system.

## 4 Discussion

The countries of the European region should be taken as a certain “benchmark” of the anti-corruption behavior of society (all participants of the sociopolitical life of the state). Those countries that started to develop independently and democratically earlier than the later members of the European society (European Union) today have an advantage in civic responsibility, which is also manifested in the political system of each individual country. The civic and political responsibility implies responsible individual action. This is due to both the cultivation of the sense of civic responsibility and the possible prosecution of unlawful actions by the law. It is also important that society, where corruption ceases to be a cost of position, society becomes intolerant of the behavior of

political, business, and private individuals associated with such offenses. The presence of independent media, as the main source of news, the “mouthpiece of truth,” which can also freely conduct their own investigations, often prevents corruption schemes from being hidden. Such a situation leads to the fact that the electorate will not tolerate the presence of corrupt and dependent politicians in the political life of the country.

The example of the countries in the European region also reveals the dynamics of the social and political situation in the countries that have relatively recently become full-fledged members of the EU. The requirements that the EU imposes on member states cannot be ignored. But here we can observe both the development of the responsibility of civil society and its electoral responsibility and power, as well as the actions of law enforcement and legislative bodies. In the work of law enforcement and legislative bodies of EU countries, we can observe both borrowing and alignment of their work according to the common EU standards and their independence and integrity.

The situation in Latin America and the BRICS countries is the opposite to the European region, which is primarily caused by the unstable political situation. The lack of a democratic sociopolitical system, as well as the instability of the political system, leads to the fact that the civil society does not have enough tools to influence the political situation of its own state. The current political elites do not allow the development of the civil responsibility, do not create mechanisms of influence of the civil society on the sociopolitical situation in the country. Here, it is also important that the society does not receive critical information on the corruption offenses of the current government, due to the lack of independent media. Information about corruption in the media (the most striking example is India) is used as part of the political struggle between political elites, if any.

## 5 Conclusion

The great freedom of the national media is an essential factor in the effective fight against corruption. In view of the globalization processes in the international arena, the state of corruption counteraction in each country is objectively reflected in the level of anti-corruption campaigns implemented in the interstate policy.

The role of the media in this case cannot be overestimated, since it is a tool for shaping the information background, public imperatives, as well as attitudes towards the problem of corruption. In today’s reality, based on the available information, there is a correlation between the level of corruption and the level of press freedom (freedom of speech). Undoubtedly, this affects the implementation of tasks of the international community aimed at combating corruption and their effectiveness. The positive practice of applying anti-corruption measures can be traced in countries where the public is actively involved in shaping the public policy, where the level of press freedom is high, and where there is a high level of public trust in the government. It seems that this situation is caused, first of all, by the fact that political leaders and political elites who come to power are empowered by the will of the civil society, having previously earned trust, which also includes equality before the law. In turn, the public demand for a particular political party (with a particular electoral program) is formed through the media.

Thus, successful anti-corruption actions force national governments to do the following (and the international community to promote and support these actions), where the role of the media is a key one:

- ensuring freedom of speech and freedom of the press;
- the presence of a large number of independent media outlets;
- conducting fair electoral campaigns, as well as the elections;
- ensuring open access to the financial activities of political elites, both before, during, and after the election campaign;
- ensuring the rule of law and equal rights for all the civil society;
- ensuring a high level of protection for citizens on behalf of security agencies;
- forming a responsible, disciplined, well-educated society.

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# International Practice in the Organization of Management Accounting

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**Abstract.** This article describes the main stages of formation and development of management accounting. The specifics of formation and the factors that influenced the allocation of management accounting as a separate subsystem in the field of accounting are explained. A logical chain of development of management accounting concepts has been carried out. The author notes the features of the use of terms in different countries. The complexity of the translation, similarities and differences in interpretation, character and content were also noted. Analysis of interpretations of management accounting allows us to judge the influence on their content of historical, economic factors, national characteristics.

Particular attention is paid to the history of the emergence and formation of management accounting. Various points of view on the classification of stages of development of management accounting are given.

The article outlines both the main theories of cost management in the enterprise, and modern concepts of management accounting, which include: the theory of constraints, the just-in-time system, total quality management, operations-based management, benchmarking, balanced scorecard. In international practice, integrated systems are often used.

The influence of the processes of globalization and integrated internationalization of markets on the way of doing business by modern corporations is noted.

The main parameters of the development of the management accounting system for the successful functioning of the company have been determined. The importance of management accounting in the development of enterprise and the main advantages of its application are noted. Further prospects for the development of the management accounting system are indicated. The main ones are: adaptation of best practices, modernization of educational programs, further evolution of management and business tools, development of a methodological base.

**Keywords:** Management accounting · Cost system · Strategic management accounting · Balanced Scorecard · Controlling · Calculation · Responsibility centers · Globalization

## 1 Introduction

The last decade has seen a total transformation of the world economy caused by the process of globalization. International integration began its rapid development due to a combination of factors such as digitalization, automation of production, strengthening & increased complexity of economic ties along with the development of internet commerce. This has seen the markets of different countries now becoming more interconnected and interdependent.

The current excessive flow of information today makes it difficult for companies to work. There is the problem of processing an array of unstructured data and many organizations suffer losses due to making wrong decisions or spend resources on inefficient solutions. In this regard, the role of management accounting and analysis is increasingly important and on which the internal information system of the organization is built, effective strategic and operational decisions are developed and control over the risks of economic activity is carried out.

A qualitatively built management accounting system allows for quick expedient decisions to be made to achieve the goals set by the organization. Undoubtedly, the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic will result in changes in the management accounting toolkit. However, before talking about prospects and further evolution, it is necessary to study the specifics of formation and the factors that influenced the allocation of management accounting as a separate sub-system in the field of accounting.

## 2 The Analysis of Studies of Development of Management Accounting Theories

The chronology of the emergence of management accounting is unambiguous. In one way or another, the managerial component was considered by almost all scientists who developed the theory of accounting, with a serious impetus on the formation of the subject of 'Management Accounting' occurring in the middle of the XIX century. With the development of sea communications and railways, it was necessary to draw up forecast calculations, calculate the cost of goods, works and services, as well as various methods for their transportation. At this time, there was a differentiation between financial and production accounting. At the beginning of the XX century, the textile industry began to pay attention to the cost of a unit of production, the cost per worker, the cost of processing of raw materials. Minimizing these costs allowed for greater profit margins over their competitors. This need to improve cost management processes led to the emergence of analytical accounting, making it possible for the effective organization of production process management to solve these several issues at once:

1. track the movement of raw materials and inventories
2. take into account the movement of finished products
3. generate financial results for products
4. track salary analytics [1].

A logical development of the concept of management accounting saw the emergence of the “standard-costing” and “direct-costing” systems. Standard-costing arose in connection with the need for constant management control of operational costs.

F. Taylors concept of scientific management was combined with the idea of normative distribution of costs, which allows for the deviations between standard costs and actual costs to be determined. The principal idea of the concept was to normalize materials and working hours in order to make the best use of them as regulations were not yet seen as a tool to control costs. The current system of normative determination of costs was first introduced by an employee of the audit firm ‘PriceWaterHouse’ a Mr. C. Harrison in 1911 [2]. This system consists of two rules:

1. all expenses must be indicated in comparison with standards (norms);
2. the increase or decrease in actual costs in comparison with the normative should be dismembered for reasons [1].

An alternative approach to building a management accounting system was “direct-costing”. This concept was proposed by J. S. Williams Harrison in 1936. According to his new method, only variable costs were included in the cost of production, fixed costs were not distributed among the finished products. It is worth noting that back in 1923, the American Economist J. S. Williams. B. Clark substantiated the need to divide costs into constant and variable and direct-costing only became commonly used after 1953.

In Europe, in 1927, the French Scientist F. Rimaylo [3] proposed the method of homogeneous sections. In this concept, indirect costs are allocated by defining accounting and costing units. To do this, costs are distributed among homogeneous sections. The unit cost of activity for each of them is firstly determined and then indirect costs are included in the cost of products in accordance with the volume of units consumed. A homogeneous section is a division of an enterprise, separated in accounting, where costs are grouped in advance before they are included in the cost of the products concerned, when they cannot be directly attributed to these products.

The concept of “standard costing” and the concept of homogeneous sections combines accounting by responsibility centers, developed by John Higgins. This method determines the degree of responsibility of specific individuals for the results of their activities [2]. The most common types of responsibility centers are: cost center – reports only on costs; sales center – reports on revenue; profit center – reports on costs and revenue; investment center – reports on costs, revenue, investments [4].

Thus, in the United States and in the most developed countries of Europe in the middle of the twentieth century, a theoretical system of management accounting was developed. The official registration of the concept of “management accounting” occurred in 1972, when the American Association of Accountants developed a program for obtaining a diploma in management accounting [5]. It is worth noting that there are many approaches to the classification of stages of development of management accounting.

Leo Herbert believes that all accounting should be considered as managerial. The history of management accounting begins at the end of the XVIII century, since the industrial revolution. R. Ober identifies three periods of the formation of management accounting: until 1673 there was an information period; from 1673 to 1973 - the legal period; from 1973 to the present time the economic period, managerial [5].

V.T. Baxter divided into four periods the stages of development of management accounting [5] (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Stages of development of management accounting according to V.T. Baxter.

Time interval	Characteristics of the period
The entire history of the ancient world and the early Middle Ages	Classical period. This period is characterized by the predominance of state accounting and the spread of additive numeral systems
From 1200 to 1850	The birth of the positional numeral system, as a result of which double bookkeeping appeared, and the financial result began to be calculated by accounting methods
From 1850 to 1950	A sharp complication of economic life, the spread of cost accounting and costing, the emergence of public reporting and auditing
1950s	A completely new period in the history of accounting arose, associated with the spread of computer technology, the need to reflect inflationary processes and the harmonization of accounting procedures

Pierre Lassec [5] identifies three milestones in the development of accounting related to the development of the economy. In the first stage, which lasted from the inception of accounting until 1914, accounting information was considered mainly as a record “for memory”, and it did not serve for management purposes. The second phase covers the time period from 1914 to 1960. At this time, giant enterprises are created, the transition to paper money, many countries are covered by inflation. Accounting becomes a source of information for economic activity, identification of solvency, profitability, creditworthiness, liquidity. Since 1960, the third stage begins. This stage is associated with radical changes in the organization of accounting, which occurred due to the widespread use of computer technology, the algorithmization of accounting processes, the expansion of accounting processes, the expansion of accounting objects, the emergence of transnational corporations. A new branch appears – management accounting.

The American Association of Management Accountants distinguishes four periods of formation and formation of management accounting in developed countries. Each of the stages has its own key priorities. Within each of the stages, the subject area of management accounting also changed [5] (Table 2).

A number of authors believe that the first two stages of the development of management accounting contributed to the formation of traditional models of management accounting, and modern concepts of management accounting, used to this day, originated at 3–4 turns of development of management accounting.

**Table 2.** Stages of formation of management accounting in developed countries.

Time period	Characteristics of the period
Before 1950	The purpose of management accounting is cost accounting and financial control carried out using the budgeting system and methods of calculating the cost of products and services
Before 1965	Organizations are developing cost accounting by responsibility centers, planning of financial operations and analysis of decision-making based on management accounting information
Before 1985	The main field of application of management accounting is the analysis of the costs of organizations and the development of methods for reducing the resources involved in business processes. The main tool for management accounting at this stage of development is process analysis and comprehensive cost management
After 1995	Management accounting is focused on ensuring the processes of managing target results, through timely planning and forecasting of resources (financial, production, human), decision-making within organizations based on complex balanced economic indicators

### 3 The Study of the Concept of «Management Accounting»

The definition of the term “management accounting” is different in each country. In Germany, the term management is not used at all [3]. Accounting is clearly divided into financial and production, so the Germans borrowed the term “controlling” from English. German economists identify the concept of “controlling” with “management accounting”. In the German model, planning, accounting, control and cost analysis are limited to sales revenue and costs of the current year. The German model has a great influence in other countries: Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, the northern regions of Italy and some other countries in Europe. In France, the concept of “margin accounting” is used [6] and is limited to the search and justification of management decisions for the future using profit margin indicators. In this case, costs are taken into account depending on their impact on the level of activity of the enterprise. Marginal profit is calculated as the difference between revenue and variable product costs. In the USA, England and Canada, management accounting is understood as the analysis of costs and revenues, planning, accounting, control. This concept includes financial and productive investments.

In the Russian Federation, the main goal of management accounting is to make prompt and reasonable commercial decisions in the organization. This information is closed to internal users (for example, employees of the financial service of the organization), for external users of management accounting information.

In American and European accounting practices, management accounting standards were developed first, and only then accounting standards. The practical application of management accounting occurred in the late 1940s and was due to the development of the corporate form of business organization, technical means of data processing [7]. In Russia, “accounting practice has the opposite direction, since external integration has led to the need to orient Russian accounting to the norms of International Financial Reporting

Standards, which predetermined the emergence of Russian accounting regulations” [8]. Until the 1990s, production accounting developed in Russia, which became the basis for management accounting as a branch of new economic knowledge [7].

The development of management accounting in Russia intensified with the advent of translated editions of foreign authors, such as K. Drury “Management and Production Accounting”, C.T. Horngren and J. S. Foster’s “Accounting: Management Aspect” in the mid-90s. The concept of “management accounting” was translated verbatim (Management Accounting) into Russian.

Consider first of all the definition of management accounting, which is given by foreign authors. As defined by C.T. Horngren and J. S. Smith [4] management accounting is “the process of identifying, measuring, collecting, systematizing, analyzing, decomposing, interpreting, and communicating the information necessary to control any objects.”

According to K. Drury, management accounting is “the provision of information to individuals in the organization itself, on the basis of which they can make reasonable decisions and increase the efficiency and productivity of current operations” [9].

Harrison R., Noreen E., Brewer P. describe the concept of management accounting as follows: “This is a system for providing information to managers who direct and control activities within the organization” [10].

A. Upchurch [11] defines “management accounting” as the process of providing managers with financial information in order to help them in key areas: planning, control, decision-making. Management accounting can be defined as “attracting attention.” The management accounting system should show the areas that need to be adjusted.

T. Boynes and D.R. Edwards see the content of the concept of “management accounting” as more voluminous, including the processes of collection, preparation, analytical processing of various accounting and non-accounting information that provides the necessary data to the business management system [12].

The American Association of Accountants defines “management accounting” as the process of summarizing, measuring, and collating information that allows stakeholders to make informed judgments and make informed decisions.

The Oxford Business Dictionary [13] defines management accounting as a database created in a company to which only its managers have access. This allows all leaders in the organization to use the same underlying data to make decisions.

In his work, E. J. Dolan [13] defines “management accounting” as a branch of accounting that is concerned with the presentation of information used within an enterprise.

C. Ward believes [13] that “management accounting” is a function of financial management, expressed in assisting the company’s management personnel in the process of making financial management decisions, the participation of finance specialists in working groups that develop decisions.

It is worth noting that in international practice, the main centers for the formation of the methodological base, ensuring a unified qualified level of specialists and analysis are usually self-regulatory professional associations in the field of management accounting. In the USA, there is the IMA Institute for Management Accounting, in the UK – the CIMA Institute for Management Accounting, established in 1919, these organizations

coordinate the development of the methodological base of management accounting and analysis in the national and international context [14].

According to the US International Management Accounting Standard SMA 1A, management accounting is the process of identifying, measuring, accumulating, analyzing, preparing, interpreting and providing financial information used by management in planning, evaluating and managing an organization to ensure the optimal use of its resources and the completeness of their accounting [3]. Management accounting also includes the preparation of financial statements for groups of external users of information – shareholders, creditors, regulators and tax authorities.

In general, the study of the definitions and views of various economists on the understanding of the category of “management accounting” indicates that the direction of their interpretations is the same, only the nuances differ, explained by historical, economic, national characteristics, and translation difficulties.

The main impetus for the rapid development of the theory of management accounting and its main methods is the widespread increase in competition, the rapid development of production technology and processes within organizations.

## 4 Current State of Management Accounting

Globalization, the integrated internationalization of markets and corporations have changed the way modern corporations do business. To achieve economies of scale needed to achieve a certain level of costs and therefore low prices that must be competitive, companies are now thinking about conquering global markets rather than national ones as they were before. For example, Nike and Reebok produce their athletic shoes in different Asian countries for sale on all continents. Many other companies in North America and Western Europe outsource their production, software, development or customer service to companies in China, Eastern Europe or India [15].

Management accounting is changing with the demand of a market economy, the development of production processes and technologies. To the modern concepts of management accounting Chebotareva Z.V. refers [15].

The theory of constraints – the impact on the limited areas of production/organization management to achieve maximum effect.

Just-in-time system. This system is mainly applicable to manufacturing companies. The main idea of the Just-in-time system is that all stages of production are carefully planned: a new batch arrives at the equipment exactly at the moment when the processing of the previous batch is completed. With this system, downtime of equipment, products and human resources is eliminated or minimized.

Total quality management. The method of production management aimed at comprehensive improvement of the quality of the supplied products.

Operations-based management. Manage the acquisition, use, and sale of your organization’s resources.

Benchmarking is the process of collecting information about the experience of other companies in an area of interest in order to identify best practices. Usually, benchmarking is carried out for companies of an adjacent industry. Conducting benchmarking helps

companies to avoid the time and financial costs incurred by their competitors in the process of establishing and implementing successful practices.

According to Kurchenkova D.A., Torbyna A.E., Konvisarova E.V. [16], special attention should be paid to the study of developing methods within the framework of innovative and lean industries:

- Method of cost accounting by type of activity (ABC);
- Method of cost accounting in the context of flows that create product value (VSC);
- the method of cost accounting by stages of the product life cycle;
- method of accounting for the cost of generating cash;
- ECD cost dynamics research method.

Foreign practice shows the effectiveness of companies that use management accounting. The management accounting system in a large enterprise should be the basis for a business model that contributes to the growth of the company's value. The relationship between the business model and the management accounting system is confirmed by the international principles of management accounting, which in 2014 were prepared and published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in the field of management accounting (CIMA) and the American Institute of Chartered Public Accountants (AICPA) [17]. The International Principles on Management Accounting reflects four principles that should be considered in a comprehensive manner:

- (1) communication that provides an understanding of the needs of stakeholders (involves a discussion based on facts and expert opinions, in order to develop the most effective strategic decisions and their implementation at all levels);
- (2) the relevance of information (the information used to make decisions should be reliable and accessible, as well as diverse depending on the time periods, methods of collecting information, type of information);
- (3) analysis of the identified factors on the value of the company (involves modeling various scenarios demonstrating cause-and-effect relationships between external and internal factors (competition, legislation, macroeconomics, costs, availability of resources, etc.) and the results of the organization's activities);
- (4) trust-based management (includes responsiveness to potential conflicts of interest, personal responsibility of management accounting specialists, social and environmental responsibility, professional integrity and ethics).

Thus, modern management accounting is an effective means of collecting information for its subsequent analysis and management decision-making. In today's economic environment, not only internal analysis of production costs and human capital is important, but also analysis of the external environment. Attention should be paid to the analysis of competitors and customers. Strategic management accounting has been actively developing recently. Strategic management accounting summarizes not only financial and economic information throughout the organization, but also on the structural units of the company (departments, divisions). The complex nature of strategic tasks contributed to the emergence of a dozen different methodological approaches to the formation of a strategic accounting system. The most popular are:



- Balanced Scorecard;
- model of added economic value;
- cost accounting by type of activity.

In practice, integrated systems are often used that combine elements of these approaches. The implementation of a balanced scorecard is also quite common for managing the value of the business (EVA model) [1]. It is also recommended to create a single system that includes elements of the ABC method, the method of calculating costs by stages of the life cycle and V - Analysis. To organize accounting and analytical support for monitoring financial results within the framework of the concept of lean production, standard-cost, Just-in-time and target-costing methods are integrated [16].

Management accounting is used in planning and forecasting, in assessing qualitative and quantitative criteria for assessing the results of economic activity, to ensure the consumer utility of goods, to take into account the influence of internal and external conditions, to comprehensively assess the current situation of the organization to make effective decisions, to monitor the external and internal processes of the organization to identify weak areas, strengthen them and increase the competitiveness of the organization.

When developing a management accounting system in the company, the participation of both interested responsibility centers and the top management of the company is necessary. This will create a relevant and relevant system for assessing the indicators of operational management accounting in relation to the strategies and results of the enterprise, business processes, and management decisions. For the successful development of management accounting, it is necessary to automate the operations of forecasting, planning, accounting and analysis of data comparable to the data of the information bases of the enterprise, as well as reducing the cost of collecting and processing information.

## 5 Conclusion

Summing up the general result of the study, we note that management accounting is the main tool for building strategies and tactics for the development of a modern enterprise. Management accounting allows you to take into account external and internal factors when setting goals and objectives for the development of the enterprise, allows you to minimize costs, ensure interaction between structural units, objectively assess your own position in the market and remain a stable participant in the competition. The main prospects for the development of the management accounting system are: adaptation of best practices, modernization of educational programs, further evolution of management and business tools, development of a methodological base. It is worth noting that the spread of innovative methods of management accounting does not occur instantly. Often innovations are implemented on the basis of one company. In other cases, the initiative is taken over and used by other companies. The speed and scale of the spread of innovations in management accounting depends on internal and external factors. Therefore, an integrated approach to this issue is needed, taking into account changes in the economic environment at the micro and macro levels.

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# In Search of the Ideology of Public Serving: Analysis of Regulatory Legal Acts of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China

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**Abstract.** The author tries to deal with such phenomena as political and non-political ideology. The author's thesis is that even in non-ideological states there are non-political ideologies, which, in the case of bureaucracy, manifest themselves as an ideology of service, service to society and the common good. The paper provides a comparative analysis of the regulatory documents of Russia and China. The author finds strengths and weaknesses in both countries. The main conclusion of the work is that even in a non-ideological state, civil servants need a clear formalization of the ideology of serving the society.

**Keywords:** Public service · Bureaucracy · Ideology · Political ideology · Non-political ideology · Policy · Politics · Common good · Political and legal approach · Moral politics

## 1 Introduction

The word “ideology” has many different definitions [1]. We consider ideology as a non-political system of ideas which is secured in legal acts involving public service.

Prominent sociologist Max Weber noted that an official, a bureaucrat in the modern world, is an impartial, apolitical entity, while a politician is a vivid fighter for the feelings and sympathies of the masses. A politician fulfills the will of people, and an official, like a soldier, fulfills the will of politicians [2].

It would seem that political ideology has been banished from the world and consciousness of European bureaucrats. Formally, it does not exist in the Russian style of civil servant management. However, if there is no political ideology, this does not mean that there is no ideology of a non-political, implicit system of ideas, which can be clearly seen in the ethical codes of civil servants.

A separate case is the People's Republic of China, a state based on communist ideas. In fact, the PRC political ideology is intertwined with non-political when it comes to public administration.

There is a number of studies how an ideology effects on the administration quality. It would be worth mentioning a study how the government identifies ineffective programs and institutions [3]. There are some comparative studies [4]. Some authors compare

the Russian experience with a foreign one [5]. The national specificities change from country to country. Thus, Russia and Belarus use the data disclosure to legitimize the regime within the country, while Central Asian regimes to legitimize themselves for international community [6]. Information disclosure can effect on the increase/decrease in trust to government [7]. Moreover, it can increase/decrease the corruption. Kolstad & Wiig note that the sticks of information disclosure may overweigh the carrots of a corrupt act for a civil servant. It may increase a cost of corrupt act and a willingness of a civil servant to take a bribe [8].

## 2 Methodology

We will compare the experience of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, so our key method is a method of comparison, in the framework of political and legal approach which involves an analysis of legal documents, identifying ideological and non-ideological meanings.

## 3 The Case of Russia

Art. 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states the ideological diversity. No ideology can be established as mandatory [9].

In Russia, a unified ethical code for civil servants has not been adopted, however, analyzing the existing acts, it is possible to identify a number of provisions that act as moral regulators of their behavior.

Moral regulators are an integral element of ethics, and within the framework of political philosophy they are the subject of what is called moral politics in Western political science.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 12.08.2002 No. 885 "On the approval of general principles of official conduct of civil servants" [10] consolidated the general principles of official conduct of civil servants, including prescribing:

- to fulfill their duties in good faith;
- not to give preference to any professional or social groups and organizations, to be independent from the influence of individual citizens, professional or social groups and organizations;
- to observe neutrality;
- to comply with the norms of official, professional ethics and rules of conduct (as a rule, established at the level of the body in which the civil servant works).

The most important idea of serving society is expressed through the formula about the need to proceed from the fact that the recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms determine the main meaning and content of the activities of state authorities and civil servants.

All of the above provisions were included in the Federal Law "On the State Civil Service" adopted two years later [11]. The moral and ethical aspect of behavior did not

find further development in the Law, but the study of the text allows us to highlight several features of the activities of civil servants.

First, the dual position of civil servants is well traced, namely, the presence of moral responsibility both to society and to the state in the person of a state body. For example, the obligation to refrain from behavior that might call into question the objective performance of civil servant's duties. Also, a civil servant is obliged to avoid conflict situations that can damage the reputation or authority of a state body.

Second, attempts to "protect" civil servants of professional misconduct are expressed through the lists of restrictions and prohibitions, for example, through a ban to participate in the management of commercial or non-commercial organizations, engage in entrepreneurial activity, receive remuneration in connection with the performance of their duties and so on. So, we can see a proactive approach: everything that does not fit into the professional ethics of civil servants, is prohibited for an official. Requirements for the moral character of a civil servant are also expressed through the absence of a criminal record, the obligation not to commit acts discrediting his honor and dignity, correctness in dealing with citizens, the need to show respect for the moral customs and traditions of the peoples of Russia.

Third, an interesting feature of the Law is a rule permitting an ethical conflict in the case of giving to civil servant the improper instructions from the management (Article 15 of the Federal Law # 79). The law prohibits to perform a task. In a different case, the disciplinary, civil, administrative or criminal liability threatens both a performer and a person who gave the order.

In the federal law, which establishes the features of civil service in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, employees are ordered to comply with the laws and customs of the host state, generally accepted norms of behavior and morality [12].

The ethics of the civil service is also mentioned in federal state programs for reforming the civil service that have existed since the beginning of 2000s. For example, in the state program for 2003–2005, the task included "the introduction of mechanisms for identifying and resolving conflicts of interest in the civil service, as well as legislative regulation of professional ethics of civil servants", since "the previous norms of morality and ideological influence, which regulated the behavior of employees of state power and administration bodies and put barriers to abuse, corruption and arbitrariness in these bodies, have lost their force" [13]. The state program for 2009–2013 fixed "the development of standards of professional ethics and rules of professional conduct of civil servants, as well as mechanisms to ensure their observance" [14].

At the end of 2018, the Ministry of Labor of Russia published the Methodology for the formation and development of the professional culture of a state body with a recommended unified model of values, the mission of a state body, professional and personal qualities (competencies), which must be guided by a civil servant in the implementation of professional service activities [15], namely:

- the recommended unified model of values includes: professionalism and constant self-development, honesty and conscientiousness, responsibility for the result, ensuring the protection of the legitimate interests of citizens and organizations, creativity and innovation, mutual respect in interaction. These values are and must comply with the

- professional and personal qualities of civil servants (personal effectiveness, systems thinking, flexibility and willingness to change, etc.);
- within the framework of professional interaction with citizens or organizations, it is recommended to show interest in the applicant’s question, take personal responsibility for the result, not interrupt, avoid conflict situations, express your thoughts clearly and in a convincing form without insults or rudeness, follow the rules of public speaking and providing official information;
  - within the framework of professional interaction with colleagues, it is recommended to provide possible support and assistance, show respect, observe subordination, do not shift work to colleagues, show restraint and stress resistance, do not allow discussion of personal and professional qualities of colleagues in team, do not allow public statements, incl. in the media, in relation to the activities of state bodies and their leaders;
  - recommendations to the management staff on the development of professional culture include maintaining emotional calm in relation to subordinates, helping them in the implementation of the assigned tasks, gratitude for good work, constantly maintaining the interest of subordinates in the results of their activities, criticism and admission of their own mistakes, joint analysis of the results activities, including reasons for failure.

In 2019, the Ministry of Labor of Russia developed a Methodology for Intangible Motivation of Civil Servants, which notes that professionalism and competence, honesty and impartiality should be considered among the important values that civil servants should aim at [16]. At the same time, the values of a state body are defined as “the foundations of moral and ethical guidelines for the activities of civil servants, aimed at achieving goals, objectives and implementing the mission of a state body”. It was also emphasized that the highest value (human rights and freedoms, which should be protected by civil servants) predetermines the following basic values that should be inherent in every civil servant: professionalism and competence; honesty and impartiality.

At the level of individual ministries, codes of ethics have been adopted: on December 23, 2010, by the decision of the Presidium of the Council under the President of the Russian Federation for Countering Corruption, a model code of ethics and official conduct of civil servants was approved, which represents a brief set of principles of official ethics and requirements for personal qualities, professional behavior and appearance of employees [17]. It stipulates that every state and municipal employee must take all necessary measures to comply with the provisions of the code, and every citizen of the Russian Federation has the right to expect from the employee appropriate behavior in relations with him. It is noted that the code serves as the basis for the formation of proper morality in the sphere of state and municipal service, respect for service in the public consciousness, and also acts as an institution of public consciousness and morality of employees, as well as their self-control.

For example, employees are instructed to refrain from behavior that could raise doubts about the conscientious performance of official duties by civil servants, as well as from any kind of statements and actions of a discriminatory nature, rudeness, manifestations of a dismissive tone, arrogance, biased remarks, presentation of inappropriate, undeserved accusations, threats, offensive language or remarks, actions that interfere

with normal communication or provoke illegal behavior. Civil servants are encouraged to be polite, friendly, correct, considerate and tolerant in their interactions with citizens and colleagues.

Violation by civil servants of the provisions of the code is subject to “moral condemnation” at a meeting of the commission on compliance with the requirements for official conduct of civil servants and the settlement of conflicts of interest. It is proposed to take into account the observance of the provisions of the Code by civil servants when carrying out certification in the Ministry of Transport of Russia, forming a personnel reserve for promotion to higher positions, as well as when imposing disciplinary sanctions.

The analyzed ethical codes of federal ministries and other government bodies (the State Duma, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Defense, etc.) follow the text of the model code with rare exceptions. For example, in the code of the Ministry of Finance, the requirements for appearance are additionally disclosed in detail [18].

One of the main directions of the civil service development in 2019–2021, established by the decree of the President, was the improvement of the procedure for appointment to positions of the civil service [19]. In its development, the Government at the beginning of 2020 approved the Unified methodology for passing the test for the state civil service in the federal executive authorities (probationary period) [20]. It follows from the text of the methodology that during the test, not only professional, but also personal qualities are assessed. Also in 2020, a Unified Methodology for the Certification of Civil Servants was adopted, according to which the results of certification are used to stimulate the conscientious performance of official duties [21].

The law establishes the principle of equal access of citizens to public service, regardless of gender, race, nationality, origin, property and official status, place of residence, attitude to religion, beliefs, membership of public associations, as well as from other circumstances not related to professional qualities of a civil servant.

At the same time, the age limit for filling civil service positions has been established - from 18 to 65 (for the category of leadership positions - up to 70). The candidate must also be a citizen of the Russian Federation and speak Russian.

Qualification requirements for filling civil service positions include requirements for the level of professional education, length of service in the civil service or work in a specialty, field of study, knowledge and skills.

The recruiting system is decentralized. Each state body determines the list of tasks independently. For example, in the competition procedure for filling vacant posts of public the civil service Russian Ministry of Construction included testing on the Constitution,<sup>1</sup> legislation on public service and anti-corruption, as well as interviewing members of the competition committee [22]. The Ministry of Economic Development further checked Russian language knowledge and skills on the basis of the area and type of professional performance, knowledge and skills in the field of information and communication technologies [23].

A complete list of methods for assessing the professional level of applicants is established by the Ministry of Labor in the Methodological Toolkit for the formation of personnel [24]. In accordance with this document, professional and personal qualities

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<sup>1</sup> The practice of testing for knowledge of the Constitution is available in the Federation Council.

(strategic thinking, team action, personal effectiveness, flexibility and willingness to change) are subject to assessment. Candidates pass:

- testing to assess knowledge of the Russian language, the foundations of the Constitution, legislation on public service and anti-corruption, knowledge in the field of computer technology, knowledge and skills in the required professional field;
- psychological testing (to assess numerical and verbal abilities, as well as personal qualities);
- questionnaires with questions about professional achievements, events, publications, hobbies;
- conducting an individual interview using the following types of interviews: biographical, technical, behavioral, panel (group, with the participation of several interviewers);
- conducting group discussions with distributed and unallocated roles;
- preparation of a draft document, for example, preparation of a draft response to a citizen's appeal, a draft regulatory legal act;
- a personnel assessment center (a specially developed methodology consisting of a set of exercises simulating work situations, performed under the supervision of a specially trained group of experts, evaluating each applicant according to a number of predefined behavioral patterns directly related to work);
- preparation of abstracts, essays and other written works on a topic determined by the head of the structural unit in which the competition is held.

Examination and checks of civil servants are provided in the following cases:

- when entering the civil service: a competition is held (with the exception of the category of managers and assistants (advisers), when concluding a fixed-term contract), which includes two stages - placing an announcement about the competition and the competition itself. Test tasks can be in any form that does not contradict the law, for example, an interview, a questionnaire, writing an abstract, testing, preparing a draft document, conducting group discussions, solving practical problems [25]. It is also noted that assessment methods should allow assessing such professional and personal qualities as strategic thinking, team interaction, personal effectiveness, flexibility and readiness to change [26].
- a qualification examination for the assignment of a class rank to civil servants who fill positions in the civil service for a certain period (except for managers);
- certification of civil servants in order to determine the suitability of the replaced position every three years. For its implementation, a unified certification methodology was approved, as well as sectoral orders were adopted in government bodies [27].

Discussions are currently underway about the effectiveness of the civil service system and the need for its transformation. For example, the Center for Advanced Management Solutions has prepared an expert note "Personnel policy in the civil service: current problems and necessary changes", which proposes to update the requirements for candidates and revise the personnel policy, including to provide government agencies with broader powers to establish requirements for candidates, taking into account the functions and



powers of federal executive bodies, as well as to secure the ability to fire employees for low performance [28]. The declarative nature of the competitive selection and the ineffectiveness in the selection of candidates are noted, since it is carried out on the basis of assessing formal criteria without assessing the real level of candidate competence. A positive example is the government of Moscow, which uses a system of open competition and verification of professional experience, competencies and portfolio of applicants. The authors believe that a number of existing requirements make it difficult to find competent employees (for example, the prohibition to engage in entrepreneurial activity “cuts off” persons with valuable practical industry expertise from the public service) [28, p. 52].

It also notes the problem of maintaining a contradiction between the request to civil servants from the society, which wants to see honest and caring officials, and the requirements of the public administration system, which considers the most important quality of civil servants to be loyal to higher management and to comply with the rule of law. One of the solutions seems to be the development of basic requirements for the personal and professional qualities of civil servants, regardless of their specialization.

Positive changes should be noted in connection with the civil service reform announced at the end of 2020. In particular, work was carried out to optimize and establish a unified structure of federal ministries and departments in accordance with Government decrees [29]. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin at the beginning of 2021 urged the Government Office to work for the result [30]. In April 2021 the updated methodology of key performance indicators assessment for governors was approved [31].

On May 12, 2021, by a government decree, an experiment was approved to use the base of assessment assignments when determining whether candidates meet the qualification requirements for filling civil service positions and when enrolling in the personnel reserve [32]. The experiment will be carried out as part of the civil service reform from May 13 to August 13, 2021 on the basis of four federal executive bodies (Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Energy, Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare - Roszdravnadzor, Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography - Rosreestr) and in relation to a number of positions, the list of which will be published on the websites of state bodies. It is planned to use the general base of assessment tasks formed by experts, which will include both the basic part, which tests the knowledge of the Constitution, the fundamentals of civil service and anti-corruption legislation, and specialized issues in accordance with the official duties of candidates. The experiment should help to determine the appropriateness of assessment tools standardization. It is responsible for the coordination of the Ministry of Labor. The Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) is in charge of expert-analytical support.

The evaluation of the applicants' professional level is planned to be carried out using such assessment methods as individual interviews and testing. It is also allowed to prepare a draft document and questionnaires, conduct group discussions, write an abstract and other written works, and solve practical problems.

The issue of bribery cannot be ignored. Avoiding conflicts of interest and corruption situations is one of the basic principles of official conduct, which are disclosed in the

Federal Law on the State Civil Service, the Federal Law on Combating Corruption and a number of by-laws.

Failure to take action by a civil servant who is a party to a conflict of interest is an offense involving dismissal due to loss of trust, as well as a failure to take action by a civil servant representing an employer.

A person is subject to dismissal also in the following cases:

- the person’s failure to provide information about his income, property and property obligations, as well as the income of his spouse and children;
- participation of a person on a paid basis in the activities of the management body in a commercial organization, except for cases when it is permitted by law;
- carrying out entrepreneurial activity by a person;
- the person joins the management bodies, trustees or supervisory boards, other bodies of foreign non-profit non-governmental organizations and their structural subdivisions operating on the territory of the Russian Federation [33].

Information about persons dismissed due to loss of trust is entered in the relevant register for a period of five years; this information is public and posted on the “Gossluzhba” portal.

Anti-corruption measures also apply to civil servants after their dismissal: failure to comply with the restrictions established in the legislation (notifying the new employer of information about the last place of his service) may result in termination of the labor or civil contract.

The Criminal Code in Art. 290 establishes the liability of an official in the form of a fine in the amount of up to one million rubles, or in the amount of the wages or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to two years, or in the amount of ten to fifty times more than the amount of a bribe with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years, or correctional labor for a period of one to two years with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years, or forced labor for up to five years with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years with or without a fine in the amount of ten to twenty times more than the amount of the bribe:

- for receiving, personally or through an intermediary, a bribe in the form of money, securities, other property or in the form of rendering services of a property nature, granting property rights (including if a bribe is transferred to another person or organization at the direction of an official) in exchange for actions or inaction in favor of the bribe-giver or the persons represented by him, if the specified actions (inaction) are part of the official powers of the civil servant, or if, by virtue of his official position, he/she can contribute to the specified actions (inaction);
- for general patronage in the service, which may manifest itself, in particular, in the unjustified appointment of a subordinate, including in violation of the established procedure, to a higher position, in his inclusion in the lists of persons presented for incentive payments.

- connivance in the service, which includes the consent of the official of the controlling body not to apply the measures of responsibility included in his powers in the event of a violation committed by the bribe giver [34].

Qualifying features include:

- taking a bribe in a significant (more than 25 thousand rubles), large (more than 150 thousand rubles) or especially large (more than 1 million rubles) amount;
- the occupation by an official of a public office of the Russian Federation or a subject, as well as the head of a local government body;
- commission of a crime by a group of persons in a preliminary conspiracy or by an organized group;
- extortion of a bribe.

For official forgery (introduction of deliberately false information in official documents or corrections that distort the original meaning by an official, state or municipal employee), various types of liability are also provided, including fines of up to 80 thousand rubles and imprisonment for up to two years. Fines and the term of imprisonment may be increased if, as a result of such actions, the rights and interests of citizens and organizations were substantially violated (Article 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).

Failure by an official to perform his duties as a result of dishonest or negligent attitude towards service or duties according to his position, if this has caused major damage or a significant violation of the rights and interests of citizens or organizations, society or the state, is punishable by a fine of up to 120 thousand rubles or in the amount of the wages or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to one year, or compulsory labor for a period of up to three hundred and sixty hours, or correctional labor for a period of up to one year, or arrest for a period of up to three months.

It is also criminally punishable for an official to use his official powers against the interests of the service, if this act is committed out of selfish or other personal interest and entailed a significant violation of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens or organizations or the interests of society or the state protected by law, including a fine of up to 180 thousand rubles or imprisonment for up to 4 years [35].

## 4 The Case of China

The system of civil service in China in its modern form began to take shape in the 1990s with the adoption of the “Temporary Regulation on Civil Servants” in 1993. Before its adoption, the relationship between government personnel and the public was expressed by the formula “servants of the people”. The concept of civil service was absent. The regulation determined the basic principles of civil service, the rights and obligations of employees, the procedure for recruiting for service and other organizational issues. The main aspiration was to create a competitive unified civil service system.

Over the next years, the State Council of the PRC and the Ministry of Personnel Affairs subordinate to it, in order to further improve the civil service system and relevant

management standards, adopted more than 20 packages of administrative regulations and departmental rules (including the Regulation on the classification of civil servants' positions and the Temporary Regulation on admission of applicants for civil service positions), which formed the regulatory framework of the civil service, including such elements as the examination of candidates, assessment of the work of civil servants, their rotation, as well as the creation of an institutionalized system of regular professional training of civil servants [36]. The first Law on Civil Service was adopted in 2005 (and amended in 2018) with the aim of improving the efficiency of public administration and eradicating the corruption [37].

Civil servants in China are part of the cadre of the Chinese Communist Party. The term refers to persons who perform public duties in accordance with the law and have been included in the state administrative staff, as well as whose salaries and social guarantees are covered from the state budget. Unlike practice in many Western countries, the public service in China includes the most senior politicians, such as the prime minister, deputy prime minister, state advisers, ministers and provincial governors, deputy ministers and deputy governors, and other leadership positions [38].

The ideological component of public service, in accordance with the new law, based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the teachings of Mao Zedong, the theory of Deng Xiaoping and the concept of Three Represents specified by Jiang Zemin in 2002. According to this concept, the Chinese Communist Party should represent the interests of the wider population, covering the economic, political and cultural spheres. The organization of the civil service is carried out on the principles of openness, equality, competition and selection for service on the basis of a person's merit.

The law provides the examinations for admission to the civil service. Civil servants are the subjects of open examination and rigorous selection. For more than 10 years, there has been a trend towards an increase in the attractiveness of public service. The high level of competition in admission is due, on the one hand, to the size of the population, and on the other hand, to the stability of the civil service and the guarantees provided (the so-called "iron rice bowl"). China's government control over economic resources has allowed formal institutions to offer above-average wages and benefits ranging from housing allowances to subsidized retirement plans. In 2020, according to news reports, 1.6 million people took the pre-admission exam, of which only 1.6% got a job [39]. The need to screen out a large number of candidates affects the complexity of the "entrance" exam, which includes a variety of tasks: from analysis of political issues to math tests, tasks on reading comprehension, etc. In addition, the content of exams is determined in accordance with basic skills and abilities required by civil servants in various job categories. The exam consists of written assignments and an interview.

Usually, candidates with experience of work in local administrations and practical skills in a particular field (the so-called "Grassroots experience") also have an advantage when recruiting.

The organization of exams is under the jurisdiction of a special government agency, the State Administration of Civil Service (SACS), established in 2008 and subordinate to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the PRC. At the end of 2015, it was announced that trying to cheat on the exam would be considered a criminal offense [40]. In accordance with the amendments to the Criminal Code, such a violation may

result in up to three years in prison, detention, and the imposition of fines. In case of serious violations, the term can be extended to 7 years.

In addition to successful passing of the exam, among other requirements for a civil servant, the Law stipulates the obligation “to be a person of good moral qualities”. In general, the Law contains a number of provisions that emphasize the idea of service and conscientiousness. So, in the framework of their activities, civil servants must “fully serve the people”, “protect the security, honor and interests of the state”, “honestly fulfill their duties”, “conscientiously observe professional ethics and approximately follow the norms of public morality”, “be clean and straightforward, impartial and honest in their actions”.

The grounds for promotion in service also include an element of integrity: one of the grounds is “observance of the rules of discipline, honest performance of official duties, fairness and honesty in dealing with issues”. The civil servant must serve as an outstanding exemplary model of behavior, which is also reflected in the list of prohibitions. In particular, civil servants are prohibited from:

- take actions against the country’s reputation, including disseminating views that damage the country’s reputation, organizing or participating in activities aimed at countering the country’s policies, such as meetings, marches and demonstrations;
- violate professional ethics and norms of public morality;
- mislead the management, as well as the public through fraud and deception;
- to commit acts of corruption: offering or receiving bribes, striving for personal gain or benefit for another person through the use of official position;
- violate financial and economic discipline and waste resources and property of the country.

Disciplinary actions include warning, record of misconduct, record of serious misconduct, demotion, removal from office, and dismissal from public service.

The law also describes conflicts of interest in the civil service. It has been established that, in the performance of his official duties, a civil servant must avoid the following circumstances:

- when his personal interests are affected;
- when the interests of the party with which he is connected by close family ties are affected;
- other circumstances that may interfere with the impartial performance of a person’s official duties.

On June 1, 2019, a new version of the Law on Civil Service came into force [41], which, inter alia, strengthened oversight of civil servants, included regulations prohibiting civil servants from serving as heads of industry regulators or administrative departments responsible for overseeing businesses run by their spouses, children or relatives [42].

The idea of service is reflected in the optional second Article, and sounds like “civil servants are a central pillar of the socialist affairs and state servants of the people”.

The requirements for the moral qualities of civil servants have been expanded, which now also include the practice of basic socialist values, a good example in the observance of family virtues.

In 2019, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued the Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres of the Party and Government, which applies to the selection and appointment of leading members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council, the National Committee of the People's Republic of China political consultative conference, and Central Committee [43]. It establishes the need to follow the ideals of socialism. When selecting and appointing to the leading positions in the party and government, it is necessary to evaluate the ability and political honesty, consider virtue as a top priority, appoint according to merit, focus on real results, sincerely serve the people and promote the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, which includes the ability to develop as well as a close-knit and strong leadership team.

Party and government leaders must have strong convictions, serve the people, be diligent and pragmatic, dare to take responsibility, be "honest and clean", work hard, speak the truth, achieve practical results; have a strong sense of revolutionary commitment, political responsibility and historical mission, have the spirit and ability to fight, have practical experience and have the organizational ability, cultural level and professionalism to be competent in leadership work.

The supreme body that monitors the discipline is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, created in order to fight corruption. The influence of this institution remains questionable. The researchers note that there has been a recent shift from "appeals to conscience and morality" to hard policy. If the earlier approach of the Chinese leadership was "calling civil servants for honest performance of duty for the good of the Chinese people", then with the ascendance of Xi Jinping the Chinese top leadership has issued a set of rules that restrict all kinds of officials on costs. The purpose is to instill in officials a modest lifestyle [44].

The corruption characterizes developing systems, as there is still no stable legislative and regulatory system. The institutional organization of the anti-corruption system in China places the anti-corruption powers in the Communist Party (the Central Anti-Corruption Commission and its territorial divisions), rather than an independent body that would have an impact on the Communist Party and could call it to answer. The lack of an independent anti-corruption body makes it difficult to fight corruption. There have been numerous situations in which party officials defend their corrupt subordinates with relative ease [38]. As the researchers note, corruption in China is serious, and in some periods of history (for example, in the 1970–80s) it grew to the scale of an epidemic [45].

Attempts to systematically combat corruption have been made on several occasions. In 2012, the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party decided to launch an anti-corruption campaign with the assignment of the main functions to the Central Commission. Xi Jinping then said that the campaign should affect both high-level officials and the lowest positions in the civil service ("tigers and flies") [46].

One of the features of China's anti-corruption legislation is the "threshold" for bribes. Depending on the amount of the bribe, the punishment can be administrative (fines and confiscation of the amount of the bribe) or criminal (at least 10 years in prison or life imprisonment with confiscation of property, as well as a ban on holding certain positions) [47].

To this day, the death penalty has been prescribed for corruption violations of particular gravity. Often, we can see the use of a clause on a two-year stay of execution, after which it is possible to replace the sentence on softer one, for example, life imprisonment or 25 years in prison. The case in 2021 of the former banker and the head of a state-controlled asset management companies Lai Xiaoming was resonant. He was accused of extorting nearly 1.79 billion yuan (\$ 276.7 million) in bribes over 10 years. He was excluded from the CCP and sentenced to death without delay due to the scale of his crimes.

## 5 Conclusion

Russian experience shows that despite the absence of a state ideology and a unified code of ethics, we can speak about the elements of the ideology of state service, which are spelled out in various policy papers and laws. The elements of the ideology of public service should include professionalism, honesty, conscientiousness, interest in work, politeness and emotional calmness.

As the researchers note, in the Russian Federation there is a significant problem in understanding what an official should be in the interpretation of society and the civil servants themselves? The management system thinks of officials as technocratic machines, correct and polite, but at the same time always fulfilling the will of their superiors. This understanding of bureaucracy is close to that described by Max Weber. Society wants to see officials as honest and caring people, and not as idiots. Such public understanding of the bureaucracy is more like a political (*politics*) interpretation of government.

The most difficult question arises: To what extent do the creators of the administrative apparatus (*policy*) correspond to the ideals of serving the society? The ideology "an official serves the authorities" is good when the authorities are impeccable and themselves serve the society being its reflection. But is this so in practice?

The vagueness and absence of a code of ethics (a clear ideology of public service) only exacerbate the situation.

The other side of this most difficult question is how integral and harmonious is society in itself to politicize the bureaucracy? Wouldn't such an ideology lead to monopolization and the "truth" of one single correct opinion?

In our opinion, the compromise here is again in the development of an ethical standard for the ideology of public service, which would eliminate all classical political and ideological ideas, but only promote the common values of multinational Russia.

To say that the only correct opinion prevails in communist China is to go against the truth. China is an intellectually diverse country. Of course, there are excesses of both practical (for example, the death penalty for economic crimes) and ideological implications. The communist ideology, one way or another, dominates. However, the

Chinese experience shows that the idea of public service can (and should) be enshrined in legal documents. A civil servant is not in itself, not for the state, but a civil servant of the people - is this not what every citizen and patriot of his country dreams of?

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# Verb Representation of Information Sources in Chinese-Language Political Media Discourse

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**Abstract.** The article analyzes the verb representation of information sources in the political media discourse of the Chinese language, dedicated to the implementation of the Chinese foreign policy strategy One Belt, One Road (OBOR). The purpose of the article is to reveal the peculiarities of the verb representation of information sources in the OBOR Chinese political media discourse. Methods of discourse analysis, componential analysis, structural-semantic, descriptive, interpretive methods, as well as continuous sampling method were used to implement the objectives. The main material for the study was articles united by the “OBOR” topic presented on the pages of the online platform of The Zhenmin Zhibao 人民日报 - The Zhenmin Wang 人民网. The first stage of the study is related to the identification of information sources characteristic of the Chinese media discourse, and covering the topic of OBOR. The second stage of the study was the sampling of examples of verb combinations that represent sources of information within the meaning of indirect evidentiality ‘quotative’ and full citation. The third stage of the research was the identification of the verbs with which Chinese publicists formalize sources of information of indirect evidentiality. As a result, the study showed that the main sources of information in Chinese media texts can be divided into several groups: (1) persons (politicians and representatives of various organizations); (2) organizations (financial and trade, mass media); (3) documents (research results and statistics). The study showed that the OBOR Chinese media discourse is dominated by the references to the source of information related to the first group - persons (politicians, representatives of various organizations). Speeches of Chinese government officials and public agents play a significant role in the information support of the OBOR media discourse. Their representation in the text is carried out mainly by means of verbs of speech and mental activity. It is concluded that statements with the evidentiality meaning of ‘quotative’ is the most common way of presenting information in the OBOR Chinese-language discourse.

**Keywords:** Political Media Discourse · Foreign Policy Strategy One Belt · One Road · Category of Evidentiality · Information Sources · Verb Representation · Political Discourse · Source of Information

## 1 Introduction

The Chinese Foreign Policy Initiative One Belt, One Road “一带一路”, launched by the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping 习近平 in the fall of 2013, attracts the attention of the global community with the grandiose plans and the scale of the tasks set. In this regard, the issues of its information support and coverage of primary sources in the media are of particular importance.

The relevance of our research is due, on the one hand, to the significance of the OBOR Chinese initiative for Russian-Chinese political, economic and cultural relations, on the other hand, to the lack of study of the means and methods of processing the sources of information covering this topic in the Chinese media.

The object of this study is the OBOR political media discourse which is understood as a set of Chinese media texts concerning the discussion, consideration and analysis of the OBOR global initiative. Since its first mention, the PRC press has been actively trying to form an exclusively positive image of this idea. Primary sources play an important role in its creation. As noted by Chinese researchers Cheng Zhiwen 程枝文 and Li Yazhen 李雅真, “News media take responsibility for unbiased, fair coverage and increasing the efficiency of distribution; and the main domestic media create thematic sections to cover the One Belt, One Road initiative” [1].

The sources of information of Chinese-language media texts in Russian science have not yet been considered; therefore, they become the subject of our research. Its purpose is to reveal the peculiarities of the verb representation of information sources in the OBOR Chinese political media discourse.

### Literature Review

One of the genre features of media texts is an indication of the source of information, which in science correlates with the concept of evidentiality considered by researchers to be a universal linguistic category recorded in many languages of the world [2–5]. Depending on the source of information, direct and indirect evidentiality are distinguished. In the case of direct evidentiality, the source of information is the speaker himself who receives information through his own sensory experience: with the help of the organs of vision (visual evidentiality), with the help of other senses or their combination (sensor evidentiality). In its turn, indirect evidentiality includes inferentiality (when the speaker receives information through his own mental activity), and reportative (when the speaker receives information from someone else’s words). Depending on the certainty of the source of information, retelling is divided into quotative and hearsay.

Modern researchers point to a surge of interest in the study of this category in Western and Eastern scientific circles [6: 113; 7: 110]. Discursive studies of the evidentiality category have recently become quite widespread. Within the framework of newspaper and political discourse, this category is considered in the works of foreign scientists E. Reber [8], L. N. Berlin [9], L. N. Berlin and M. A. Prieto-Mendoza [10], E. Oishi [11] and M. Sbisa [12], A. Ruskan [13].

In Chinese science, the evidentiality category within the framework of political discourse is studied in the works of Liu Haoran 刘浩然 [14], Liu He 刘贺 [15], Mao Haoran 毛浩然 [16], Zhou Yahong 周亚红, Xia Chen 夏晨 [17]. Scientists Zhou Yahong, Xia Chen, considering the elements of the evidentiality category in the documents of the OBOR national strategy, indicate the importance of using evidentiality markers that

help express the foreign policy views of authority persons, eliminate the rejection and doubts of the international community regarding the rapid economic advancement of the state, recognize and support its development strategy [17: 95].

In Russian science, information sources within the evidentiality theory, based on the material of English, German, Russian, and Tatar media discourses, have been studied in the works of T. N. Astakhova [18], T. N. Astakhova and E. V. Bondaruk [19], A. V. Beloedova [20], S. I. Buglak [21], G.F. Lutfullina and L.B. Kadyrova [22], G.F. Lutfullina [23]. Based on the material of the Chinese language, the category of evidentiality is considered in research focused on the study of the Perfect [24]. Other scientific studies describing the means and methods of representing sources of information in the Chinese political media discourse have not been found, which determines the novelty of this study. At the same time, it should be noted that in the works of Russian sinologists, the means of informing in publicistic texts, specifically the verbs of the informing group, received some coverage, but were not considered by researchers in the framework of evidentiality terminology [25].

## 2 Materials and Methods

The source base for this research work is The Zhenmin Zhibao 人民日报 and its online version, The Zhenmin Wang 人民网 [26]. This choice is not random. The Zhenmin Zhibao is the main guide of all the programs and ideas put forward by the PRC government. Its main task is to objectively and reliably bring to the attention of the reader the official position of the government on a particular issue. As a result, it is The Zhenmin Zhibao that shapes the public opinion of the PRC and helps to popularize the global initiatives of the Chinese government on the world stage.

The Zhenmin Zhibao is also the main agent of the OBOR idea. The popularity of this initiative on the Internet of China can be judged by the number of newspaper articles presented on The Zhenmin Wang online platform. If in March 2015 there were 315 articles on the online version of The Zhenmin Zhibao [27: 164], then in August 2021, on the keywords query ‘OBOR’, the total number of articles was 176506 [26].

The main material for the study was articles united by the subject ‘OBOR’ and presented on the first six pages of the online platform The Zhenmin Wang. As a result, this study is based on the analysis of 60 articles published in 2020–2021. Discourse analysis, componential analysis, structural-semantic, descriptive, interpretative methods, as well as the method of continuous sampling were used in the work.

## 3 Results

The first stage of the study is related to the identification of information sources characteristic of the Chinese media discourse and covering the topic of OBOR. Their main classifications presented in the works of researchers were analyzed. Thus, A.V. Beloedova points out that “the source of information can be an individual, that is, a specific/generalized/undefined person and/or a communication channel” [20: 88]. G.F. Lutfullina and L.B. Kadyrova distinguish: a single specific person; a group specific in

composition; a group that is not specific in composition; a non-specific typical representative, and the absence of a source [22: 22]. T. N. Astakhova, in her classification of information sources, introduces: researchers and experts (particular and without specifying); experts (particular and without specifying); documents; organizations; research results; mass media; scientific Internet portals, representatives of various social groups [18: 167].

The analysis of our empirical material allows us to identify the following groups of information sources characteristic of the OBOR Chinese media discourse: (1) a person (politicians, representatives of organizations); (2) organizations (financial and trade, mass media), (3) documents (research results and statistics). In each of the groups, the source may or may not be defined.

The second stage of the study was the sampling of examples of verb combinations that represent sources of information within the meaning of indirect evidentiality ‘quotative’ and full citation. In the course of the analysis of empirical material, it was revealed that such means are verbs of speech 表示, 说, 强调, 显示, 阐述, 呼吁, 赞叹, 报道, 提出, 指明, 证明, 参考等 and mental activity, 预计, 认为, 以为, 了解等.

The third stage of the research was the identification of the verbs with which Chinese publicists formalize sources of information of indirect evidentiality, as the most characteristic of the texts of media discourse. This made it possible to determine the relative frequency of verb evidentiality markers in our empirical material. The study showed that the most frequent verbs are: 表示 ‘to express’, 说 ‘to say/tell/explain, 强调 ‘accentuate’ and 认为 ‘suppose’. They are most often used to convey the statements of the leaders of the PRC and experts regarding the OBOR initiative.

In the structure of sentences with evidentiality markers, we distinguish: the subject, the verbal predicate that introduces information, then the conveyed information. This is the most frequent variant of the form of utterances. In most examples, a comma is placed after the verb. It should be noted that the results on the structure of the sentence and the types of verbs conveying information correlate with the concepts of the works of Russian researchers on Chinese journalism [25] and Chinese scientists studying the category of evidentiality in the newspaper news discourse [28].

The study showed that the Chinese media discourse OPOP is dominated by references to the source of information belonging to the first group - a person (politicians, representatives of various organizations). It contains references to the statements of specific individuals, indicating their names and positions. We have not identified the statements of anonymous persons in the OBOR media texts. The Chinese media attach particular importance to the opinion of Chinese political leaders. Their views are often the main source of information on the OBOR project. In the analyzed sample, the statements of political figures are presented in the form of full or indirect citations. The full citation of speeches of state leaders, as a rule, is formalized by the verb 说, and the indirect by 表示 or 强调. 2019年4月23日, 习近平主席在致“一带一路”新闻合作联盟首届理事会议的贺信中说: “希望各理事单位发扬丝路精神, 加强沟通合作 [...]”. On April 23, 2019, President Xi Jinping, in his congratulatory message to the first meeting of the news forum on cooperation in the field of the OBOR initiative, said, “I hope that each participant will be inspired by the spirit of the Silk Road, and will strive to strengthen interaction and cooperation [...]” [26]. 中国新兴经济体研究会秘书长徐秀军接受本报采访时

表示,“一带一路”倡议提出8年间,中国与沿线国家合作基础十分牢固。Xu Xiujun, Secretary General of the Chinese Society of Emerging Economies, said in an interview with the newspaper that over the eight years since the One Belt, One Road initiative was launched, a very solid foundation of cooperation has been laid between China and the countries along the route [26]. Such references to the opinion of the top officials of the state do not seem random: they strengthen the reliability of the information provided, as well as focus attention on its undeniable importance and significance.

When considering the OBOR initiative, Chinese publicists pay primary attention to the views and statements of the country's political leader, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping. 习近平总书记强调,“一带一路”是大家携手前进的阳光大道,不是某一方的私家小路。Secretary General Xi Jinping emphasized that One Belt, One Road is the main route that everyone walks hand in hand, it is not a small one-man path [26].

The Zhenmin Zhibao also places a special emphasis on the opinions and assessments of foreign specialists: 巴基斯坦DWP集团董事长兼首席执行官法鲁克·纳西姆认为,共建“一带一路”已从传统基础设施领域扩展到信息技术领域,但许多发展中国家数字基础设施建设尚处于起步阶段。Farooq Naseem, Chairman and CEO of Pakistan's DWP Group, believes that the joint construction of One Belt, One Road has expanded from the traditional area of infrastructure to the field of information technology, but the creation of digital infrastructure in many developing countries is still in its initial stage [26]. It should be noted that most foreign statements about the OBOR initiative, referred to by the Chinese media, belong mainly to personalities from developing countries: South Africa, Latin America and Asia.

When implementing the OBOR Chinese national strategy under conditions of the global pandemic, special attention is also paid to the opinion of medical experts: 康希诺生物创始人兼董事长宇学峰呼吁加强共建“一带一路”框架下的卫生合作,帮助发展中国家提高新冠疫苗可及性。The founder and chairman of the board of the Chinese biopharmaceutical company CanSino Biologics, Yu Xuefeng, called for strengthening joint cooperation in the field of healthcare within the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative to increase the availability of the coronavirus vaccine for developing countries [26].

The second group of information sources of the analyzed sample are organizations (financial, trade, mass media). Our empirical material did not identify organizations without indicating their names, references are given only to particular institutions. For instance, in one of the analyzed articles, publicists enter a reference to the World Trade Organization by means of the verb 预计 'foresee/predict/forecast': 世界贸易组织预计,到2030年数字技术将促进全球贸易量每年增长1.8%-2%。中国与“一带一路”沿线国家深化大数据,互联网,人工智能,云计算,跨境电商等领域合作 [...]. The World Trade Organization predicts that by 2030, digital technologies will contribute to the annual growth of world trade by 1.8–2%. China and the countries located along One Belt, One Road will deepen cooperation in the field of big data, the Internet, artificial intelligence, cloud computing and cross-border e-commerce [...] [26].

Citation from news agencies and newspapers is traditional for media discourse. Their choice and use in text, as a rule, is influenced by the authority of the publication in the media community. Meanwhile, analyzed by us, references to information publications



that are cited as sources of information are rather few. References to the media are given mainly using the verb 称 ‘to report’: 西班牙《起义报》刊文称, “一带一路”倡议是开放且不断发展的实践综合 [...]. The Spanish news site Rebellion reports that the One Belt, One Road initiative is an open and constantly developing integration of practices [...] [26].

The third group of information sources cited in Chinese media texts are documents (research results and statistics). As our sample analysis shows, there are two categories of references in this group: (1) references to various data 数据 accompanied by an indication of a specific research institute; (2) data and facts 事实 without specifying their affiliation.

Data from research institutes and statistics are entered, as a rule, by the verbs 显示 ‘to express’ and 认为 ‘suppose’. 美国企业公共政策研究所发布的数据显示, 今年上半年, 在“一带一路”项目中, 可再生能源投资占比超过化石能源。According to data published by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), in the first half of this year, in the One Belt, One Road project, the share of investments in renewable energy sources exceeded the share of fossil energy sources [26]. In some cases, a prepositional construction and a verb are used 据.....显示: 据中国商务部最新数据显示, 2021年1-5月, 中国对“一带一路”沿线国家 非金融类直接投资74.3亿美元, 同比增长13.8%, 占同期总额的17.2%较上年上升1.7个百分点。Based on the latest data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, from January to May 2021, China’s direct non-financial investments in the countries located along the One Belt, One Road amounted to 7.43 billion US dollars, an increase of 13.8% compared to the same period last year, which is 17.2% of the total volume for the same period, 1.7% more than in the previous year[26]. 世界银行报告认为, “一带一路”倡议全面实施将使全球贸易额和全球收入分别增长6.2%和2.9%, 并有力促进全球经济的增速。The World Bank report says that the comprehensive implementation of the One Belt, One Road initiative will increase the volume of world trade and world income by 6.2% and 2.9%, respectively, and will strongly contribute to the growth of the world economy [26].

Regarding data and facts without indicating the source of information, they are few and convey evidentiality meaning ‘rumors’, they are most often formed by the verbs 表示 ‘to express’ and 证明 ‘to prove’. 事实证明, “一带一路”不仅是经济繁荣之路, 也是绿色发展之路。Facts prove that One Belt, One Road is not only the path to economic prosperity, but also the path to green development [26].

## 4 Conclusion and Recommendations

The conducted research made it possible to identify the main sources of information in Chinese media texts covering the Chinese government foreign policy initiative of OBOR: (1) a person (politicians and representatives of various organizations); (2) organizations (financial and trade, mass media); (3) documents (research results, statistics). The first two groups are characterized by particular, definite persons, companies and enterprises. The third group of analyzed material includes documents of both certain and undefined source of information. Speeches of Chinese government and public officials play a significant role in the information support of the OBOR media discourse. The reference to an authority figure increases the reliability of information and, performing pragmatic functions, influences the reader.

Statements of top officials of the state, representatives of organizations are introduced into the media text, as a rule, with verbs of speech and mental activity. It is these verbs that are the most frequent, and form the sources of the evidentiality meaning of ‘quotative’. The connection between the category of evidentiality and authority determines the reliability of the message in the texts of the media discourse. The peculiarities of the verb representation of sources in the OBOR media discourse include a certain range of verbs, their differentiation according to the type of information source, and the widespread use of the evidentiality meaning of ‘quotative’. The prospect of scientific research is a comparative analysis of information sources of various types of discourse using the database of The National Chinese Language Corpus.

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# What is Donald Trump as a Brand? Public Opinion on the 45th US President and His Second Impeachment in American Social Media Discussions

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**Abstract.** This work is dedicated to analysis of an opinion expression as a basic category when studying online deliberative practices. The author investigates (1) what opinion people do express on D. Trump and his second impeachment in the discussions on Facebook pages of politically polarized American media outlets; (2) how people characterize D. Trump as a brand in these Facebook discussions. The empirical material is online discussions on D. Trump and his second impeachment conducted on the pages of four American media outlets distributed by political affiliation to parties: conservative Washington Times and Fox News; liberal New York Times and MSNBC. To achieve research objectives, systemic content analysis on opinion expression is used. The paper concludes that (1) the more negative attitude to D. Trump and more support for his second impeachment are expressed in the discussions on Facebook pages of liberal media rather than conservative media. In political online conversations, Donald Trump as a brand (2) is predominately described by the following categories: in toilet/trashed; liar/cheater; traitor; destroyed; loser; mentally ill/sociopath; toast; domestic terrorist; dead; narcissistic; toxic.

**Keywords:** Political online discussion · Social media · Opinion expression

## 1 Introduction

Opinion expression is a basic category when analyzing online deliberative practices as it helps understand what people think or might think of current political events, processes, and actors, how polarized their views and what mental and emotional climate is around political life of society. This information is always relevant to policy makers, political decision takers and political leaders, especially in democratic countries, as governmental representatives are strongly responsible for development of open political system, legitimate political course and evolution of democratic state in all aspects.

There is a plethora of digital platforms where people can debate politics and express their preferences and opinions. For example, e-participation platforms, political forums,

news and governmental websites, social networks [1–3]. One of the most powerful channels of political online communication is social media [4–6] as they actively set agenda and have a strong impact on public sphere and opinions, behaviors of individuals. Social networks are an influential and ambivalent tool for politicians. On the one hand, thanks to them, political actors may shape their own image in the way they need and want, reach an audience and set agenda [7]. On the other hand, there can be a destructive effect on a politician’s image as ordinary citizens participate in online discussions where they may express negative opinions, change their positions, interact with others and get new experience and knowledge about politics and actors.

This study aims at analyzing opinion expressions of ordinary citizens on D. Trump as a brand and his second impeachment. Political news on Facebook pages of American media outlets is a source for content analysis. The essence of this work can be reflected in two research questions.

- RQ1: What opinion do people express on D. Trump and his second impeachment on the Facebook pages of politically polarized American media outlets?
- H1: The more negative attitude to D. Trump and more support for his second impeachment are expressed in the discussions on Facebook pages of liberal media rather than conservative media.
- RQ2: How do people characterize D. Trump as a brand in the discussions on Facebook pages of American media outlets?

## 2 Theoretical Background

The research is mainly based on the concept of public sphere and theory of deliberative democracy proposed by J. Habermas.

The fundamental concept in Habermas’ theory is the concept of public sphere which has undergone a whole conceptual evolution since 1974. In this work, I turn to the most recent definition of the public sphere which was given by a German philosopher in 2006. Habermas connects the public sphere with the dualistic model of a deliberative democracy and interprets it as an intermediary system of communication between formally organized and informal, face-to-face discussions in arenas located both at the top and at the very bottom of the political system [8]. Continuing a thought about public sphere, Habermas identifies a “strong” (institutional) public sphere which is organized, formal and endowed with decision-making prerogatives; and a “weak” (informal) public sphere where public opinion is formed, current and new problems are defined and discussed by people who are not endowed with power to make political decisions. The focus is on political discussions of citizens who form a weak public sphere on social media.

The Internet and social networks have generated new «hybrid media systems» that have expanded the number and types of actors who are potentially able to shape the political discourse and agenda [9, 10]. Therefore, the rise of digital platforms makes scholars research who sets the political agenda in networked environments. Despite a great quantity of media studies dedicated to the questions of perception of social media messages [4, 11], effects of exposure to news media on social media discussions [12], interaction between politicians and the public on social media [13], there is still no full and detailed understanding of the social media role in agenda setting.

After having agenda set, there are many discussions among people that appear on social media. Therefore, public opinion can be formed by citizens and measured by researchers. Social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter have emerged as one key battleground of public discourse, where people from different social backgrounds actively take part in commenting on current events and public issues and strive to exert influence [14–16]. This leads to naturally occurring, temporally sensitive, and inherently social opinions [17, 18]. Another key feature of social media public opinion is its embeddedness in various homogeneous networks, where like-minded individuals interact with each other and reinforce opinions [19, 20].

Touching a topic of opinion expression and politics, the deliberative theory of Jurgen Habermas plays a huge role in deliberative studies as his deliberative model of democracy is based on various forms of communication, continuous and maximally broad political discourse in society where the results are determined by the power of arguments [21]. The concept implies that true problems of society, directions of their solution and optimal ways to achieve goals are identified in the course of collective reflection. Deliberative democracy recognizes that opinions are not fixed preferences but are fluid and part of a communicative process that provides justification for the political order [22]. Turning to the concept of (online) deliberation, which is the center of deliberative democracy concepts, researchers note that there is no unified definition [23], but most of them are sure that citizens participating in the discussion process should make political decisions based on arguments in support or refutation of certain proposals. In our study, we define deliberation as a process of public, mutual, purposeful, reasoned, rational, respectful and equal discussion between citizens with the predominance of a dialogical form of communication aimed at solving common problems and reaching consensus [24].

### 3 Data and Approach

The empirical material for analysis consists of Facebook discussions on the second impeachment of Donald Trump in connection with attempted capture of the Capitol on January 6, 2021. The topic is relevant for this study as it causes strong polarization which probably may be observed in opinion expression, disagreement and its uncivil character. Facebook pages of the leading print and television American media were taken as data sources because there are active discussions in terms of users' interaction, their expression of positions, number of comments, argumentation. To do a clear sampling, we differentiated media according to their political affiliation with two leading parties and chose four media outlets. The first group is represented by conservative Washington Times and Fox News, the second one is by liberal New York Times and MSNBC. The news about the second impeachment of D. Trump were posted on 13–14 of January 2021, so we accounted only comments made during this short period of time. A total of 2,343 comments were analyzed (see Table 1).

The discussion materials were collected between 1 and 3 of February 2021 with usage of parsing and uploaded to Excel spreadsheets. When encoding discussions, the following data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet: author ID, link to the author, author's first and last name, author's gender, link to the author's image, link to the comment, date and time of the comment, comment text and the number of likes to the comment (see Table 2).

**Table 1.** Online discussions on the second impeachment of D. Trump on media outlets' Facebook pages

Sources	Liberal		Conservative	
	MSNBC	The New York Times	The Washington Times	Fox News
Article name, material	As House votes to impeach him, Trump's focus shifts to brand rehabilitation	Impeached, Again	Impeachment trial won't begin until after Trump leaves office	House meets to debate article of impeachment against President Donald Trump
Post time	14.01.2021 (3:12)	14.01.2021 (16:50)	13.01.2021 (22:15)	13.01.2021
Number of likes	1100	4800	427	7100
Number of reposts	3	81	33	0
Number of comments	504	645	281	904

To achieve the goals of investigation, systematic content analysis [25] with a coding scheme broadly inspired by prior research [26, 27] was used. The comments were coded according to such category as opinion expression that means an expression of the individual's belief about what/how the world is.

The codebook operates with two directions of analysis. The first one is aimed at studying the positions of participants towards D. Trump and his second impeachment. The second one is devoted to analyzing the characteristics of D. Trump as a brand expressed by participants in forms of single words or phrases.

## 4 Results

The main category to be analyzed first was a position's distribution towards Trump and his second impeachment. The analysis showed that, generally, the majority of online discussions' participants (59,25%) supports D. Trump's second impeachment and negatively react on actions and personality of 45th American president whereas only 40,75% of people are in favor of D. Trump and against his second impeachment (see Table 3). As for media identity, it was expected that more people (87%) taking part in the discussions on Facebook pages of liberal media are against Trump and for his second impeachment while near 2/3 people (68,5%) participating in the discussions on Facebook pages of conservative media express support for D. Trump and disagree with his second impeachment. Overall, the more negative attitude to Trump was demonstrated on liberal media outlets' platforms. Thus, the hypothesis (H1) was confirmed.

A few examples demonstrating expression of attitude towards D. Trump and his second impeachment are revealed below.

**Table 2.** An example of encoding American online discussions on the MSNBC's Facebook page

Link on a comment	Date, time	Author's picture	User's name and surname	Text	Number of likes
<a href="https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4554438534652363&amp;id=273864989376427&amp;tn__=%2As%2As-R">https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4554438534652363&amp;id=273864989376427&amp;tn__=%2As%2As-R</a>	14.01.2021 3:12	<a href="https://m.facebook.com/silbreyer?fbref=nf&amp;rc=p&amp;refid=52&amp;tn__=R">m.facebook.com/silbreyer?fbref=nf&amp;rc=p&amp;refid=52&amp;tn__=R</a>	Sandy Breyer	He was not respectful, he lied and tried to steal the election. Then he invited thugs to DC for weeks ahead of time and then sent them to the Capital to cause chaos. People died	11
<a href="https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4554438534652363&amp;id=273864989376427&amp;tn__=%2As%2As-R">m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4554438534652363&amp;id=273864989376427&amp;tn__=%2As%2As-R</a>	14.01.2021 3:12	<a href="https://m.facebook.com/susan.kolesar.35?fbref=nf&amp;rc=p&amp;tn__=R">m.facebook.com/susan.kolesar.35?fbref=nf&amp;rc=p&amp;tn__=R</a>	Susan Kolesar	Sandy Breyer Almost 400,000	




**Table 3.** Attitude to D. Trump and his second impeachment (in percentage)

	Liberal		Conservative	
	MSNBC	The New York Times	The Washington Times	Fox News
For Trump, against his second impeachment	2	24	71	66
Against Trump, for his second impeachment	98	76	29	34
Data summarizing attitudes expressed on the platforms of liberal and conservative media outlets separately				
For Trump, against his second impeachment	13		68,5	
Against Trump, for his second impeachment	87		31,5	
Overall results				
For D. Trump and against his second impeachment (40,75)				
Against D. Trump and for his second impeachment (59,25)				

- Sandy Breyer: He was not respectful, he lied and tried to steal the election. Then he invited thugs to DC for weeks ahead of time and then sent them to the Capital to cause chaos. People died. **(A negative attitude to D. Trump and his actions expressed in the MSNBC’s discussion)**
- Chris Bowman: Even in impeachment he always did it better and with more class **(Support for the second impeachment of D. Trump in a sarcastic way in The New York Times’ discussion)**
- Connie Stanley: So sad there is so much hate for someone who has tried so hard to help the people of this country. God’s blessings on you and your family **(Support for D. Trump in The New York Times’ discussion)**
- Dawn Ross: Singular Option Obama who lol, he did what for Americans.? Exactly nothing compared to Trump **(Support for D. Trump and his activity in The New York Times’ discussion)**

In general, a more negative attitude towards D. Trump was demonstrated on the liberal media platforms, so it was decided to analyze in detail the public opinion about Trump as a brand in discussions on the platforms of MSNBC and The New York Times.

According to the results obtained (see Fig. 1), the most popular negative characteristics (synonyms and synonymous expressions were combined into one category) were the following: in toilet/trash; liar/cheater; traitor/treason; destroyed/sailed ship/damaged/ruined; loser; toast; domestic terrorist/terror/extremist; dead/endangered; toxic; mentally ill/sociopath; narcissistic/narcissus; grifting/corruption; dangerous/danger/threat; racist/white supremacist; 2 time impeached president; Hitler; insurrectionist; monster; pariah; seditionist; bigotry; Nazi; vindictive; scum; the worst president ever; ridiculous/joke; enemy; tarnished; stinky.



**Fig. 1.** Description of D. Trump as a brand in online discussions on the pages of MSNBC and The New York Times

There are some examples on opinion expression about D. Trump as a brand in contexts.

- Rhonda Tinnel: His “Brand” is Bigotry, Cheating, Division, Grifting, Lying and Sedition, just to name a few. Everything you DON’T want in a business Partner or Associate **(MSNBC’s discussion)**
- Timothy Edwards: trump’s always been about the brand, and now he’s made it toxic. Well done! **(MSNBC’s discussion)**
- Betsy O’Brien Caraco: Better for his brand? He committed treason. THAT is his brand now. **(MSNBC’s discussion)**
- Everett Ogilvie: Insurrectionists don’t have brands **(MSNBC’s discussion)**

Thus, the results illustrate Americans’ attitudes and views expressed on D. Trump and his second impeachment.

## 5 Discussion and Conclusion

The current study presents a good overview on D. Trump, but it has some limitations.

The first limitation is a number of platforms, sources, discussions, and comments for analysis. Such a kind of problematic requires much more empirical material and platforms where people express their opinions. Thus, a full pattern can be observed and investigated. As a result, data will be more valid and objective.

The second constraining point is methodological one as content analysis needs to be more detailed. Consequently, there will be more relevant points for analyzing.

This study partly has a superficial character but demonstrates great potential for future improvements and new research directions in social media opinion expression and Trump studies.

The third limitation refers to the question of subjectiveness and objectiveness of a decoder. There was only one investigator who decoded discussions and analyzed its results. This work has an interpretative nature, therefore there is more likelihood for errors and misunderstandings in interpretations. Sometimes it was completely difficult to analyze some comments as they had ambivalent points and notes. Their interpretation is partially dependent on individual perception, emotional and mental level of scholar.

In the future works, all these limitations can be eliminated in order to make a research stronger and better. Nevertheless, the current research allowed to answer two research questions. The analysis has shown that the more negative attitude to D. Trump and more support for his second impeachment are expressed in the discussions on Facebook pages of liberal media rather than conservative media (RQ1). In political online discussions, Donald Trump as a brand is predominately described by the following categories: in toilet/trashed; liar/cheater; traitor; destroyed; loser; mentally ill/sociopath; toast; domestic terrorist; dead; narcissistic; toxic (RQ2).

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# Electoral Processes in Modern Europe: The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Electoral Institution

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**Abstract.** The characteristics of the electoral process in European countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic are described in this article. Following the pandemic, the world has been adjusting to changes in the social and political realms that have occurred over the previous year. Because political institutions are accountable for decisions made, restrictions put on businesses and citizens, and the efficiency of the coronavirus fight, the electoral institutions, which face challenges in all European nations, receive the most attention. To do this, the author provides an outline of electoral geography as a popular tool for understanding political processes, analyzes elections as a credible institution required for power legitimization, and identifies electoral practices in the COVID-19 pandemic. Electoral geography methods and a comparative analysis of electoral practices are used in the research. Trust, it is decided, creates a climate in society, which contributes to the development and successful settlement of problems. In a trusting society, residents can choose from a variety of voting options, and elections become the most crucial measure of that trust. Electoral practices have been reflected in the pandemic restrictions. However, there is a clear trend toward the active implementation of remote electronic voting, which isn't flawless yet but is a strategic goal in current election campaigns. Simultaneously, greater demands are placed on the election process' security, control, openness, and transparency.

**Keywords:** Elections · Remote electronic voting · Trust · COVID-19 pandemic · Political geography · Electoral geography

## 1 Introduction

Humanity is gradually acclimating to the pandemic's severe conditions, adapting all aspects of public life to new realities. The public's perception of established norms and regulations is shifting. Life priorities shift with time, people's perceptions of social and political institutions shift, and ideological preferences shift as well. Until 2020 the problems of dialectical interrelation between globalization and deglobalization were at the fore, reflecting the emergence of a new polycentric world order based on the principle of unity in diversity [1, p. 65]. But now at the forefront come the questions related to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on global processes, world order, and interrelations between the world's regions.

In the wake of the coronavirus restrictions, the political sphere has also undergone changes. Furthermore, political institutions are accountable for decisions made, restrictions put on businesses and citizens, and the efficiency of the coronavirus fight. Citizens are resentful of politicians and political parties that failed to respond quickly enough to a looming threat or, on the other hand, set unduly harsh restrictions on people's mobility and work, robbing them of faith in the authority to rule their country, area, or municipality.

Elections are used to confirm or acquire the right to participate in governance, that is, to be mainstreamed in government and the decision-making process. Elections are the only method to legalize power and justify its legitimacy in today's world. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens' trust in the authorities becomes the most crucial factor in their ability to implement an effective policy that reflects the majority of voters' interests.

Geographical factors have a strong impact on all of the processes outlined. These factors are characterized by the spatial peculiarities of the territories where political activity is conducted, as well as the formation of a specific political culture and traditions, which can have a significant impact on the outcomes of electoral processes and the government-society relationship.

## 2 Research Objectives

The focus of this article is on the characteristics of the electoral process in European countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The order of the electoral process was altered by elections held in the midst of the pandemic. As a result, new practices arose in a variety of countries. Those that proved to be successful can be applied in post-pandemic scenarios.

The current study's objectives are to provide an overview of electoral geography as a popular tool for researching political processes, examine elections as a credible institution required for power legitimization, and identify electoral practices in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the scholarly community, it is commonly assumed that the world would never be the same again after the pandemic. As a result, new institutions and behaviors that arose in reaction to the pandemic danger are becoming the subject of social scientific inquiry. E. Asplund, L. Heuver, F. Ahmed, B. Stevense, S. Umar, T. James, A. Clark [2], S. Birch [3] have all published papers on this topic in the previous year. They concentrated on the issue of secure elections in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. L. Baccini, A. Brodeur, S. Weymouth [4] analyzed American presidential elections held in the context of a pandemic, G. Gellert [5], Blais, D. Bol, M. Giani, P. Loewen [6] paid special attention to the political support of the citizens as a prerequisite for democracy. M. A. Gatto and D. Thome [7] explored the pandemic's gender elements, while N. Kersting [8] focused on how the pandemic affected political institutions and local policies.

Because a considerable number of articles assessing electoral practices occur after the elections, comparative analysis is one of the methodologies employed in this study. In this regard, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and

the International Foundation for Electoral Systems are conducting a scientific evaluation of electoral processes in various countries, the results of which are incorporated in this study.

### 3 Electoral Geography as a Research Methodology

The influence of geographical elements on voting results and the peculiarities of election conduct are the subject of electoral geography, a branch of political geography. Because “political geography as a discipline at the crossroads of two sciences deals with the spatial aspect of political processes and phenomena” [9, p. 11], we can use its methods to analyze electoral processes, for example, by considering the spatial characteristics of the territories where political processes take place.

A monograph by the French historian, sociologist, and geographer A. Siegfried, “Tableau politique de la France de l’Ouest sous la Troisième République” [10], where geographical conditions, both physical and socioeconomic, were considered as determining the distribution of votes in elections, is one of the first works on electoral geography.

A. Siegfried ascribed the long-term viability of voting results in the same area to population density and property structure, both of which are influenced by geographical factors.

The theories of the French scholar were exploited by American politician V.O. Key Jr., who employed the electoral-geographic method to analyze electoral processes in the southern states of the United States [11]. Due to the democratization of political processes and the widespread use of elections as the only legitimate means of conferring power in the second half of the twentieth century, electoral geography methods became widely used in non-Western countries.

The study of “political and geographical differentiation of the territory through the analysis of differences in the political orientations of the population” [12, p. 161] is the foundation of political geography. A comparative examination of the voting results in the territorial segment is the most common approach of electoral geography. The appearance of districts, regional political cultures and their borders, as well as the geography of electoral systems, can all be examined in this way. Within the context of electoral geography, for example, the following tendency has been identified: small local parties, as well as large parties whose influence extends to broad areas, benefit from electoral systems based on a majority-voting system with a relative majority of votes. But, at the same time, there is no gain for small parties whose activities span large territories and large local parties [13, p. 707].

Political and geographical zoning is a tactic used in electoral geography that involves spatially segregating a territory depending on any feature, its severity, or compatibility with other features. Based on the assessments of the selected zones, we can draw conclusions regarding societal organization, features of party construction, electoral mobilization, and “the geography of electoral competition between parties” [14, p. 350]. This includes dividing the country into zones where different political parties and movements

are given preferential treatment. Within the framework of political geography, British geographer Ron Johnston distinguishes three types of electoral research: the geography of support for parties and/or candidates, the geography of constituencies (electoral districts, ridings, and so on), and the geography of representation that emerges after the votes are counted and the winners and losers are determined [15]. Benjamin Forest, a Canadian political geographer, focuses on three approaches: “(mapping and visualizing votes), geographic influences on voting (the effect of place on political preferences and behavior), and the geography of representation (the analysis of electoral systems)” [16].

Russian scientists following the New Zealand geographer A. Macphail point out three main directions in electoral geography: the geography of voting, consisting of comparing the results of voting by region, building maps and aggregate analysis; the study of geographical factors affecting voting – the effect of friends and neighbors, the neighborhood effect, the effect of the election campaign and problematic voting; and the geography of representation, which examines the representation of territories in government bodies achieved through elections [12, pp. 161–162; 17, pp. 26–27; 19, p. 44].

Some recent studies by political geographers, which have revived interest in the electoral sphere, should be highlighted. These are the works of R. Johnston [18], M. Shin, and J. Agnew [19], B. Warf [20], G. Webster, T. Chapman, and J. Leib [21]. Canadian political scientist Caroline de Miguel, for example, proves that “proportional electoral systems and cross-cutting cleavages can act as a powerful constraint on the translation of territorial ethnic cleavages into territorialized party systems” [22].

The growth of electoral geography was aided by digital technology and the increased availability of electronic data, which made it feasible to gather more consistent information about elections in geographical parts of the state space. Papers on electoral geography in the twenty-first century are augmented by spatial factors related with identity, inequality, ethnic and class affiliation, and gender characteristics. Theoretically, philosophically, and practically, electoral geography is poised to re-establish itself as an important part of the intersections between politics and geography, according to American researchers B. Warf and J. Leib [24, p. 4]. Karen Yusko, an American political scientist, examines the relationship between electoral policy and social policy in the United States [24]. M. Kavianirad and M. Rasouli, Iranian experts, should be mentioned with the researchers from Western countries. They define electoral geography as a subset of political geography, which studies the spatial distribution pattern of power in the context of mutual relations between geography, election and power [26, p. 106].

The postmodern approach to electoral geography, investigated by American scientists, is especially pertinent today, amid the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in changes to election processes in nearly every country on the planet. The efficiency of government responses at all levels – from state to municipal – is quickly becoming the most crucial measure of political support for politicians and political parties forming administrations. Citizens’ reactions to limits imposed by various institutions are particularly telling in liberal democracies, where people aren’t used to widespread prohibitions and, as a result, are wary of lockdowns as a means of battling the pandemic.



## 4 Conceptualization of Elections as an Institution of Trust

Elections are the most important indicator of a democratic political system. The circumstances for democracy vary, but universal equal direct suffrage by secret ballot is linked to a significant amount of democracy's unique characteristics. So, in describing Polyarchy, the most similar system of government to democracy, American political scientist Robert Dahl allocates necessary for democracy institutions and practices such as: elected officials control policy-making; free and fair elections of officials; everyone must have the right to vote; everyone must have the right to run for office; there is freedom of speech; alternative information is available; and people can form free, independent political groups [27, pp. 358–359]. The electoral process is also mentioned in Article 21 paragraph 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures” [27].

As a result, elections constitute a cornerstone of citizens' trust in elected governments and the belief that they will function effectively in accordance with voters' intentions. Trust is a social and, more particularly, a political concept. Thus, when discussing social capital, scholars frequently use the term “trust.” American sociologist James Coleman conceives of trust as a decision under risk, in which one party (trustor) allows a second (trustee) to use some resources without immediately receiving compensation, in the expectation that the eventual gain from doing so will exceed the anticipated loss incurred. He likens the trustor's extension of trust to issuing a credit slip or promissory note, observing that it creates a reciprocal obligation on the part of the trustee. Trust arises, then, in uncertain situations in which any returns to the trustor materialize at some point in time after s/he transfers the resources to the trustee [28]. Trust between members of society generates social capital, which presupposes that collective norms of a moral nature take precedence over individual norms.

From the viewpoint of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, trust requires the formation of special social institutions, and in this case, friendship networks and patron-client relations are such examples of adaptation [30, p. 94]. Trust implies the expected behavior of the partner in the case of interaction and a sense of confidence that these expectations will be met. Such behavior is possible if such moral norms as honesty and reliability prevail in society, without which trust is impossible. A similar perspective is held by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who gives this definition: “Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community” [31, p. 26].

The American political scientist Robert Putnam emphasizes the importance of social contexts of cooperation: “trust is generated primarily where agreements between people are woven into a strong structure of personal ties and social contacts” [32, p. 175]. It is simpler to form major groups based on people's trust in one another here, which helps to strengthen economic links as well as civil society. In this regard, we concur with domestic researchers G. L. Tulchinsky and A. A. Lisenkova, who claim that “trust in business relations leads to the development of economies, trust in interpersonal relations

leads to stability and progress, and trust in institutions leads to the formation of civil society, so it is difficult to overestimate the role and importance of trust in society today” [33, p. 234].

The antipode of trust is distrust associated with the alienation of society from the social sphere, negative experience of participation in civil actions, disbelief in justice, a sense of insecurity and threat from government institutions. As Francis Fukuyama figuratively puts it, “the distrust that is widespread in society imposes something like an additional duty on all its economic activities, which societies with a high level of trust do not have to pay” [31, p. 55].

“These are sort of wagers made depending on the future behaviors of other people, of which we are not convinced,” Piotr Sztompka, a Polish sociologist, defines trust and distrust [34, p. 326]. The expectation of such activities by trusted persons in positions of authority is more widespread in the political realm, where “they obey the law and are exposed to a form of trust test every time during elections” [34, p. 330]. P. Sztompka describes the trust culture as “the cultural imperatives can entirely reject all mental accounting, nullify all rational reasons, as well as individual proclivities opposing to these cultural imperatives” [34, p. 332]. When it comes to organizations or nations, the cultural aspect, according to the Polish sociologist, becomes more important. It may be challenging for an individual to estimate complicated, structured objects. As a result, the traditional viewpoint becomes the most popular, taking on the characteristics of ingrained prejudices. P. Sztompka considers the historical heritage resulting from past experience as structural sources of the trust system, trust or distrust of various institutions or objects; the structural context associated with a system of social rules that society understands and shares; the strength of the social order that creates a sense of security; and the authorities’ subordination to the law is possible only if there is a functioning mechanism for controlling officials [34, pp. 334–336].

Francis Fukuyama in his work “Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity” identifies trust as a key characteristic of a developed human society, manifested both at the individual and social level, including trust in the state and public institutions. The American political scientist believes that it is trust that determines progress, “as the high level of trust allows the most diverse types of social contacts to arise” [31, p. 55].

High importance was attached to trust in past eras as well. Thus, the English literary critic of the Enlightenment, Samuel Johnson, is credited with the phrase: “Sometimes the one who has been deceived is happier than the one who does not trust anyone.” The trust has historically made the basis of guilds and other professional unions and social structures foundation.

Trust is tightly connected with the concept of legitimacy, although these are not identical concepts. American economist and Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Kenneth Arrow, believes that “First, it represents an expansion of legitimacy, in that it adds to a mere procedural attribute both a moral dimension (integrity in the broadest sense) and a substantive dimension (concern for the common good). Trust also plays a temporal role: it implies that the expansion of legitimacy continues into the future” [35, p. 26]. If legitimacy is understood as a support for power by the real political actors, recognition of power’s legitimacy in society, and the level of support may vary, then trust has a longer time lag – support can be conducted even with a significant decrease in the popularity

of the government. Trust in this case is based on faith associated with the hope for the best. As Russian religious philosopher S.L. Frank said, “every system appears from the trust in it and it lasts as long as at least in a minority of its participants, this faith persists, as long as there is at least a relatively small number of ‘righteous people’ (in the subjective sense of the word) who disinterestedly believe in it and selflessly serve it” [36, pp. 218–219].

The French philosopher and political scientist Pierre Rosanvallon [37, p. 1–27] writes about the gap between legitimacy and trust, which has been a central problem in the history of democracy. According to him, the democratic systems were developing in two directions. The first direction assumed the procedure’s legitimacy through the creation of regular, frequent elections, and to limit the independence of the elected persons, different schemes of direct democracy were used. All such initiatives were aimed at improving the quality of “electoral democracy.” The second direction was connected with the use of an arsenal of practical means, checks and balances, formal and informal restrictions designed to compensate for the drying up of trust through organized distrust.

Rosanvallon distinguishes two forms of distrust: liberal and democratic. The basis of the liberal one comes from an American version: the protection of the individual from the encroachments of public power through the creation of a political system with a government, distrust of which would be institutionalized.

The purpose of democratic distrust is to ensure that elected officials fulfill their promises and constantly monitor the actions of the government aimed at serving the public’s interests. In terms of democratic untrust, P. Rosanvallon identifies a political form, which he considers a counterdemocracy, as part of a broader system that includes legal democratic institutions, as well as supervisory functions, preventive tools, and verification of judgments and opinions.

Supervisory functions consist in providing the elected government with legitimacy for a certain time through electoral procedures. The preventive instruments are connected with the application of a new type of sanctions: blocking by civil society the actions conceived by the authorities, which is called “negative sovereignty.” The verification of opinions and judgments makes people behave as a judge through the penetration of legal norms into the political sphere. To subject a political action to judicial verification means to approve certain standards of evidence, rules of testimony based not on legal norms, but on citizens’ ideas about good and evil, about justice and injustice. Legal proceedings have slowly become a form that many people think is preferable to elections since its results are much more specific.

Thus, counterdemocracy is based on distrust of the government, which can be both liberal and democratic.

The decline in trust in democratic institutions is a characteristic feature of the crisis of modern democracy, which distinguishes it from the previous ones. As Ivan Krastev notes in his book “Managing Distrust”, some time ago in Sofia, it was written on the wall in the city center: “Elections don’t make any sense. If the elections made sense, they would be banned” [38, p. 20], which is a paraphrase of the famous expression of Mark Twain: “If something depended on the elections, we would not be allowed to participate in them.” The Bulgarian political scientist wonders: “Does the decline in trust in democratic institutions undermine the ability of democratic regimes to self-correct?”

[38, p. 50]. This is not a rhetorical question, since citizens lose confidence in democratic institutions not because these institutions have become less effective or more corrupt, but because people have lost the ability to influence them. Thus, the question of trust in democracy, as the Bulgarian researcher rightly notes, is a question of influence. And he doubts that a voter holding a ballot in one hand and a smartphone in the other will be able to revive democracy [38, p. 86]. We agree with the Bulgarian political scientist that a society of distrust is a society of helpless citizens who are not capable of constructive actions.

## 5 Elective Practices in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The verification of trust is especially relevant for the electoral institution during the COVID-19 pandemic. The restrictions that have become an integral part of our life also cover the political sphere, reducing the participation of citizens in public events and meetings, making it impossible to exercise individual and collective civil duties and political rights.

In the context of a pandemic, special attention is focused on those who make decisions. If the government is unable to make appropriate and timely decisions, it quickly loses credibility, legitimacy and popularity, as well as votes in elections. The main public health threat associated with elections arises from the requirement for voters to cast their ballots in person at a polling station, most often on a single day. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance proceeds from the fact that by devising timely, appropriate and sustainable solutions, drawn from own or others' experience, electoral democracy frameworks can be gradually strengthened to withstand undue pressure [38].

The challenges that have arisen in the context of the pandemic are to ensure a sufficient and credible level of voter participation that can guarantee the representativeness and legitimacy of elections; to ensure safe voting conditions for both voters and polling station staff and to minimize risks to their health; to ensure a transparent and accountable electoral process with a high degree of integrity.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems summarized the experience of conducting election campaigns during the pandemic and demonstrated various electoral practices that can be used in the further organization of the electoral process: creating separate, tented-off polling locations with paramedics on duty (Israel), voting by proxy, as well as with their own pens to avoid transmitting the virus that way (France), equipping members of election commissions with protective screens (Canada), voting only by mail (Germany, Bavaria), expanding absentee voting (USA, Delaware) [39].

The pandemic has made significant adjustments to the conduct of elections. According to the Article 4 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Right [40] in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. In this context, the experience of Brazil, which only at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century embarked on the path

of democratic development, is interesting. So, on October 4, 2020, municipal elections were supposed to be held in the Brazilian states, but due to the danger of COVID-19 infection, they were postponed to November 29 of the same year. The decision was made by the Congress on the recommendation of the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) in the face of intense competition between supporters of postponing the elections to 2022 and supporters of keeping the original electoral schedule; According to Brazilian political scientist Gabriela Taruco. As for electoral integrity and credibility, the 2020 municipal elections were held fairly and safely, despite the pandemic [42, p. 12].

Note that almost all the elections planned in different countries for 2020 in the context of the pandemic were either held on time or were postponed for a short time, as was the case in Brazil, Northern Macedonia, Serbia, Poland, as well as in France (with the exception of Zimbabwe, where the elections were postponed indefinitely) [39]. The main emphasis during the elections was placed on the safety of citizens, which corresponded to the measures taken by the election management bodies in the conditions of COVID-19.

English political scientist Toby S. James and Swedish researcher Sead Alihodzic analyzed the reasons why the elections were postponed and when it is democratic to postpone them? Simultaneously, the authors focus on the mandatory implementation of five key democratic principles: opportunities for deliberation, equality of participation, equality of contestation, electoral management quality, and the institutionalization of rules [42].

Factors such as pandemic usually significantly reduce the number of citizens who take part in the vote. Thus, in the municipal elections in France on March 15, 2020, 46% of registered voters went to the polls, while in the previous elections in 2014, they were 63.5% [39]. In order to reduce the load on polling stations on the day of voting, some countries have offered early voting. For example, in April 2020, during the elections to the South Korean parliament, administrative measures were taken to encourage early voting, which amounted to a record 26.7% [43].

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the use of Special Voting Arrangements (SVAs), which were used before, but not on such a scale – mail voting, early voting, mobile voting forms, as well as proxy voting. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance identifies these four forms as the most appropriate for the conditions of the pandemic. They are the most widely distributed in European countries. Anika Heinmaa, a researcher from Brussels, summarized the European experience of holding elections during the pandemic [44].

Postal voting is not so common in Europe, unlike in the United States. Important considerations for voting through SVAs include mechanisms for reliable voter identification, ensuring the secrecy and non-coercion of the vote, preventing manipulation of results, guaranteeing functioning postal or other relevant services, and the concurrent costs and capacity of electoral management bodies. While evidence on the impact of postal voting on turnout is mixed, there is a consensus around the fact that postal voting increases accessibility, an important feature amid the considerations of the COVID-19 crisis. However, in granting the voter this flexibility, the risks of voter identification and physical transport of the vote are more acute. To guarantee postal voting, it is essential that voter identification and authentication is carried out in a reliable way, that secrecy of the vote is maintained throughout the process and the ballot transfer and count are safe

and efficient in a timely fashion. In European countries, postal voting is available to all voters in the United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, and Switzerland. In addition, in Austria, Ireland, Spain, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, some voters can use this service.

Early voting is defined as in-person opportunities for submitting one's vote at a polling station before election day. In Europe, it is available to all voters in such countries as Denmark, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Estonia, and partly for Belarus, Iceland, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, Slovenia.

Mobile voting is defined as when members of the election administration visit a voter either at home or at an institution in which they reside with a mobile ballot box to facilitate their vote. This method is different from special polling stations, as it involves a ballot box being brought upon request for a single voter. The vote is placed and kept in the special ballot box, which is returned to the relevant polling station and usually mixed and counted with the regular votes. While mobile voting can help increase accessibility of the vote for groups that would otherwise be unable to vote, maintaining secrecy of the vote and ensuring that votes are cast without coercion are of greater concern with this method. Mobile voting is available in most European countries, except Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, San Marino, France, Switzerland.

Proxy voting is defined as cases in which an authorized individual casts or transmits a ballot on behalf of the voter. The main challenge with proxy voting is that secrecy of the vote in most cases cannot be maintained (except for Sweden, which requires proxies to deliver votes encased in multiple envelopes, similar to the provisions which maintain secrecy in postal voting), and there is often no way to ensure that proxies vote as instructed. In European countries, this form of voting is allowed in Belgium, Great Britain, Monaco, the Netherlands, Poland, France, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Special Voting Mechanisms (SVAs) are considered as a useful tool for ensuring maximum equality and universality of voting. However, according to Anika Heinmaa and Anana Kalandadze, if there are concerns about the integrity of elections of a more fundamental nature, these mechanisms will not be able to mitigate them, but rather aggravate them [46, p. 31].

Electronic voting has become another popular form in recent years, the relevance of which has increased during the pandemic. Electronic voting refers to the procedure of electronic counting of votes (in Russia, for example, the complexes for processing ballots are used – COIB), as well as voting using the Internet or a mobile phone. Remote electronic voting, which is understood as “voting without the use of a ballot made on paper, using special software”, is becoming particularly relevant [46].

The first time remote electronic voting was used in Russia was during deputies' elections in the Moscow City Duma on September 8, 2019, and the experience was deemed a success because both election organizers and voters “saw a number of indisputable advantages in such electronic voting – convenience, simplicity, and time savings” [48, p. 6]. In the case of a pandemic, remote electronic voting was employed in the Kursk and Yaroslavl regions, as well as in Moscow, on July 1, 2020, at the all-Russian vote on the approval of amendments to the Russian Federation's Constitution, and on September 13, 2020, on a single voting day.

The advantages of electronic voting, which are used in many nations, are accompanied by risks and worries about cybersecurity. As a result, a number of countries are implementing technologies to prevent or eliminate outcome tampering. For example, “Electoral blockchain technology” [49, p. 11] “assumes that voting is conducted anonymously with each voter utilizing a virtual avatar.” The advantage is that each user that registers in the system, regardless of their location, has the ability to vote actively. The disadvantage of this technology is the inability to change one’s mind if they make an unintended mistake. Despite the ease with which this system of voting is used, no state has yet reached a level of development that experts and professionals would not question.

It was pointed out that the risks of having a negative impact on election outcomes are less dangerous to democracy than having elections canceled due to a pandemic. Institutional certainty is critical in terms of the procedure. On the other side, if there isn’t an open and transparent mechanism in place, the election results may be questioned.

## 6 Conclusions

In 1988, a collective monograph was published under the editorship of the Italian sociologist Diego Gambetta “Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations” [49], co – authors of which were well-known Western scientists Niklas Luhmann, Ernest Gellner, Jeffrey Hawthorne, John Dunn, Bernard Williams et al. In conclusion, D. Gambetto asks the question: “Can we trust trust?” [50, p. 213]. Any attempt at scientific justification is treated with mistrust because this phenomenon is so ambiguous. However, trust plays a critical role in the government-society relationship, depending on the circumstances, and its importance is especially high in social relationships that are most effectively implemented in the economic sphere and in the formation of a moral environment in society that promotes social progress.

In the twenty-first century, the democratic form of government has once again faced a crisis, as it is unable to adapt to the concerns and challenges of the modern world in a timely and effective manner. We must emphasize that democratic regimes are slow to respond to current challenges, and society is not in a rush to become a full participant in the political process, ignoring the core tenet of deliberative democracy, which is governance “by balanced and informed judgments of citizens” [51, p. 14]. Zh. Beshler, N. Bobbio, F. Schmitter, and Sh. Eisenstadt wrote about the existing problems of democracy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, referring to them as “distortions of democracy,” “unfulfilled promises of democracy,” “threats to democracy,” and “the fragility of modern democratic regimes.” According to Pierre Rozanvallon [36], “whenever democracy was delivered, it remained incomplete: in some places, it was outrageously corrupted, in others, it was expertly limited, and in others, it was methodically trampled on.”

The pandemic has become a yardstick for the durability of a country’s electoral system, as well as democracy in general. Citizens are free to pick from a number of voting options in an atmosphere of trust, while any innovation on the part of the authorities is perceived as a sign of fraud in a climate of distrust. Elections are also becoming more and more of a barometer of trust.

The combination of digital technology that has become firmly embedded in our lives and the need to reduce direct human communication in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has driven the active deployment of remote voting in the electoral practice of many states. This trend appears to be a priority in the next years, placing increased demands on the security, regulatory regulation, openness, and transparency of the democratic process.

After the pandemic, the globe will no longer be the same. The social and political practices that arose as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic will become ingrained in our daily lives, responding to the many obstacles we face.

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# Sustainability and Digitalization as the Basic Principles of the German Environmental Agenda

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**Abstract.** Digital ecology has recently become a conceptually new branch of knowledge and research. The development of digital ecology as a separate direction is explained due to the rapid transformation of the technosphere in the twenty-first century. This article examines the development of the digital ecology concept and introduced two theoretical approaches to the concept's understanding resulting in separation digital ecology associated with mobile technologies, IT technologies and services from digital ecology as a product of the information systems functioning. The article investigates the synthesis of sustainable development and digitalization as the key features of the modern states' environmental agenda. This paper analyzes the measures that are already undertaken in this field on the example of the Federal Republic of Germany and contains the study of such German projects within the digital agenda as ProgRess and Digital Product Passport. The central pillars for the implementation of the planned programs are outlined and the general recommendations for promoting digital ecology are developed.

**Keywords:** Digitalization · Digital ecology · Digital product passport · Environmental agenda · Sustainable development · ProgRess · The federal republic of Germany

## 1 Introduction

In the modern world, digital technologies have become an integral reality of everyday life, both for an individual and for society. At this stage of information technology development, digitalization penetrates directly into all areas of knowledge and research. The sphere of ecology and sustainable development is also no exception to this phenomenon.

The interweaving of the concepts under consideration is due to the following modern regional and world trends.

- Acceleration of the digitalization processes in various spheres of public life.
- Making ecology and environmental issues central themes to national and international agendas.

Thus, the *relevance* of this work is associated with the increased public attention to environmental problems of our time and ways to solve them or to “mitigate”. This process is facilitated by the widespread use of digital technologies.

The *aim* of this study is to determine the features of the development of the digital ecology concept and the combination of digitalization and sustainable development in environmental policy using the example of the Federal Republic of Germany.

To achieve this aim, the following *purposes* were put forward.

- To study the development of the digital ecology concept.
- To highlight the activities carried out by the sectoral ministries and departments of the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of the concept under study.
- To identify the effectiveness of the implementation of the considered measures of sustainable digital development in the field of ecology.

For a better understanding of the concepts considered in the work, it is proposed, first of all, to distinguish the main definitions that are the central pillars in the research text.

So, *digital ecology* in a simplified form should be understood as such an area of environmental science and practice, which is based on the use of digital technologies and devices for the effective implementation of environmental projects. According to some researchers, the presented approach to the consideration of environmental issues is a qualitatively new reflection of the realities of the modern information technology era [1].

*Digitalization* in general sense of the term is a shift of the classical method of recording and transmitting data and information towards a digital method of communication using digital devices. Indisputably, the processes of digitalization were actively developed everywhere due to the pandemic and subsequent lockdowns, when most of the social systems were literally “saved” with the help of digital, remote technologies.

As for the concept of sustainable development, it is necessary to understand that this concept is the most multifaceted of all presented. The term was first used in 1987 as part of the report “Our Common Future” by the Brundtland Commission, which was formerly the World Commission on Environment and Development. In the popularized version, the term can be represented as follows: *sustainable development*, in particular in the field of ecology, is a group of measures aimed at balancing the current needs of the world’s population and the current state of the environment, i.e., the doctrine of sustainable development supposes meeting the needs of a modern human while preserving resources that will ensure a similar decent existence for future generations [2].

## 2 Materials and Methods

The theoretical and methodological foundation of this study is based on the following general scientific methods of cognition.

- Literature analysis is used to detail the subject under study in order to specifically study the concept of sustainable development and digitalization in the framework of the environmental policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.
- Synthesis is applied to summarize the activities for the implementation of the presented concept and to reveal effectiveness of the undertaken measures.

The most valuable sources of information were the official websites of federal ministries and departments of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the reports of ministries publish there. In particular, the Federal Government of Germany [3], the German Advisory Council on Global Change [4] and The Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety [5].

Among the important theoretical works for the disclosure of the topic, the following can be distinguished: Sommer J. and Ibsch P. L. “The ecology of the digital society. On the way to a meaningful use of technology for a socio-ecological transformation” [6] and Patarakin E. and Shustov S. “Digital ecology: eco-social networks and information ecosystems [1].

### 3 Concept of Digital Ecology

#### 3.1 Definition of Digital Ecology and the Concept Development

Digital ecology has recently become a conceptually new branch of knowledge and research. The development of digital ecology as a separate direction is explained due to the rapid transformation of the technosphere in the twenty-first century.

The technosphere of the earth is a special part of the planet’s ecosphere, which is characterized by a qualitative transformation of the environment through artificial technical means based on scientific and technological progress.

There are two approaches to defining the concept of digital ecology, between which there is a fine line of difference.

First, digital ecology is associated with mobile technologies, IT technologies and services designed to facilitate the successful implementation of technical projects in the environmental field.

An example of this is the following: even though the concept of “digital” is associated with intangible objects of human culture, the work of even digital services is implemented at the expense of physical servers that consume electricity, which in turn is largely still produced by burning fossil fuels.

So, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, which is one of the ten leading countries in the production of electricity from renewable sources, their percentage in the total indicator of methods of generating electricity is less than half, namely, the share of electricity produced using wind, solar and water energy accounts for 44.5% of the total, according to data obtained for 2020 [7]. However, the German government, according to its sustainable development strategy, has a goal of increasing energy production from renewable sources to 60% by 2050 [3].

Thus, digital ecology can be associated with even such methods of “digital” reduction of environmental pollution as the correct choice of programming languages.

This is because the use of different programming languages requires different resource costs. Therefore, multi-paradigm programming languages as Python and JavaScript are characterized by higher resource consumption than compiled, statically typed general-purpose programming languages like C++. In turn, higher resource intensity is the reason for an increase in the amount of carbon emissions.

Second, digital ecology is a product of the functioning of information systems, formed by digitized streams of information, through its transmission by various media services.

A striking example of this phenomenon is the operation of Internet pages. A characteristic feature of this process is the similar generation of carbon emissions, which depends on many factors: the size of web pages, their operation in the browser, video playback, etc.

A positive aspect of the informational component of digital ecology is the fact that thanks to applications such as WhatsApp, Instagram or YouTube, networking among environmental activists has been facilitated. A good example is the public movement of schoolchildren and students Fridays For Future, aimed at demanding the development of actions to combat global warming. This movement is also widespread in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Consequently, the digitalization of the environmental sphere cannot be qualitatively assessed in terms of “good” or “bad”. Digital ecology is a toolkit that can both improve and worsen the current situation.

Based on the research, the following three pillars for the future of digital ecology studies were identified [6].

- Research on digitalization for sustainable development.  
This branch of research involves the study of digital systems and infrastructure to create a sustainable final product.
- Research on sustainable digital societies.  
The key motivations for this work are to analyze the ways of human-machine interaction, as well as to explore the possibility of expanding human rights in a digital society.
- Study of the future of Homo sapiens.  
The main topic of this section is the ethical issue of maintaining human dignity in the world of machines.

### 3.2 Sustainable Digital Policy of Germany

In the Federal Republic of Germany, significant emphasis is put on the field of sustainable development and digitalization.

According to the Minister of the Environment of Germany Svenja Schulze, innovations in the digital environment should be used to combat current climate change, as well as to protect the environment within the framework of the European Green Deal. “Digitalisation may not be an end in itself; it must be put at the service of people and nature” [8]. The main focus of the presented course is based on the elimination of net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and the achievement of universal economic growth without a tie to the consumption of natural resources [9]. Thus, this sectoral branch ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany connects the use of digital technologies with possible projects to achieve these points. In particular, the attention is paid to the subsequent transition to green energy and the reduction of traffic in cities through digital smart management. 2019 has become a significant year for the development of the topic under consideration. So, it was in 2019 in the Federal Republic of Germany that the

German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) presented the report “Towards our shared digital future”, which reflects the main vector directions of work in the field of digitalization and sustainable development.

This report is a synthesis of measures to stimulate the development of digital technologies as a means of monitoring environmental changes.

The central pillars for the implementation of the planned programs are the following provisions:

- Development of a digital product passport, which will provide buyers with the ability to track the impact of the consumed product on the environment.
- Taking steps to extend the “life” of smartphones and other electronics and spreading awareness of the importance of proper disposal of this class of waste. In particular, this applies primarily to manufacturers who will need to provide spare parts and software updates in order to extend the life of the device. However, the stumbling block here is the unresolved question of a more complete image of the electronics manufacturing chain. The question remains open. How to achieve sustainable development in this area, given that the deposits of rare earth metals necessary for production are located to a greater extent in the Global South, which has a negative impact on the local environment during their extraction [10].
- Another measure is related to the examples discussed above, namely, the Internet platforms for transmitting information are required to take a more environmentally friendly path, which in turn requires a reduction in energy intensity. Therefore, it is highly recommended to lower the quality of the videos and cancel their automatic playback.
- An equally important measure is the issuance of energy efficiency certificates to data centers (which are a kind of “carbon-producing enterprises”), which stimulate the reduction of energy consumption and the reuse of surplus heat [11].

It should be noted that at this stage all the measures developed and presented in the report are of an exclusively recommendatory, voluntary nature, however, it is possible that over time they will become mandatory.

The use of exclusively digital technologies is not a sufficient measure to reach the goals of sustainable development. In the aforementioned report “Towards our Shared Digital Future”, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) highlighted the following moral and ethical issues, which, according to the council’s experts, were given insufficient attention when developing the Agenda 2030 in 2015 at the UN General Assembly with the aim to “achieve a better and more sustainable future for all”.

- Explosion of knowledge. This term defines the transition of research and cognition methods into a digital environment with wide access to electronic educational programs on a global scale.
- Network. This keyword identifies the experts’ concern about the potential for increasing the vulnerability of the interconnected elements of the combined structures.
- Cognition. This section focuses on the changing role of humans and artificial intelligence in the analysis, study, and assessment of situations. The question arises: how



will the relationships between man and nature change with the further development of artificial intelligence?

- **Autonomy.** This clause defines the concern about the spread of the use of autonomous technical systems, which are currently already used to control production processes in enterprises, etc. Even though such systems have several advantages, for example, they are not subject to making mistakes when working with big information data, autonomous control systems can pose a threat to individual freedom and privacy. In particular, with their further widespread introduction in public places.
- **Virtuality.** This section represents a typical dystopia situation of concern about the transition of a person to the virtual or augmented reality of gaming ecosystems with the degeneration of real-life biodiversity [4].

## 4 Embodiments of the Sustainable Digital Environmental Agenda

### 4.1 ProgRess

Back in 2012, the German government adopted the first German resource efficiency program, ProgRess, making the Federal Republic of Germany a pioneer in innovative approaches to protecting the country's natural resources.

The second update of the ProgRess program, which received serial number two and was released in 2016, was focused on such goals as:

- Implementation of social responsibility in the sphere of resource consumption.
- Harmonization of economic needs with environmental opportunities.
- Reducing the dependence of production on resources.
- Transition to the principle of sustainability in the use of natural resources [12].

The latest program update was approved by the Federal Cabinet on a proposal from the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety in 2020.

The main thesis of this program: “less resource consumption – higher efficiency”. Here, first of all, the emphasis is put on the use of natural resources, the development of which disrupts the balance of ecosystems and harms the environment. The key point of this program is also digitalization.

In addition, this program is related to the concern about the depletion of natural resources. So, according to experts, by 2060 the tonnage of natural resources consumed by humankind will largely exceed the renewable capabilities of the planet.

ProgRess III affects both producers and consumers of goods and services to varying degrees. ProgRess III focuses on digitalization as a way to improve the efficiency of Industry 4.0 systems and data centers. Thus, now, manufacturing companies are supported in the development and production with a more economical use of resources.

For consumers operating in the digital environment, the main objective of the program is to raise awareness among online users of the longevity and quality of the products they consume.

Among the measures for the implementation of the presented project, the following can be distinguished:

- Conducting an environmental review of the supply chain of raw materials for production.
- Consulting on possible ways to repair faulty products or proper disposal.
- Labeling of products that meet environmental requirements, etc. [13].

As for the digitalization of production cycles, among such positive moments as the emergence of new opportunities for doing business and organizing the production cycle and product sales in connection with the ability to control all production chains in real time in the digital field, there are also several negative ones.

Thus, the digitalization of production and methods of selling the final product leads to an increase in the digital infrastructure of companies and an increase in the volume of servers used for storing, processing, and transferring information data.

As demonstrated in the previous part of the work, such technological changes are not completely environmentally friendly ways of functioning in the digital space, which leads to the need for additional analysis of all the advantages and disadvantages to achieve sustainable development goals.

## 4.2 Digital Product Passport

Moreover, to facilitate consumers' access to information on the sustainability and environmental friendliness of the product, it is planned to introduce a unified special digital product passport. However, the proposed innovation according to the plan can be used not only by consumers but by all interested parties at any stage of the product life cycle.

A digital product passport is a set of summarized data on the components of a product, namely what materials or chemicals were used in its production, as well as what capabilities of repair, replacement of parts and disposal to optimize recycling the product has [14].

The digital passport is universal for all types of goods and services – from food to electronics and household appliances. Nevertheless, the developers believe that the most effective use of the digital product passport is in the field of information and communication technologies since their operation is the most energy intensive.

Even though a unified digital product passport has not yet been established, there are some prototypes of a possible application:

- MyEcoCost. This 2015 project allowed consumers to know the environmental costs of a purchase using a scanned product barcode through an app [15].
- AskREACH. The application created for the implementation of this project makes it possible to check the product for the presence of SVHC – substances of very high concern (cobalt dichloride, benzenedicarboxylic acid, chromium trioxide and many other substances listed by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)) by sending a request to the manufacturer or seller through a barcode scan [16].
- Beat the microbead. An application that allows checking the product for the presence of microplastics. The main products presented in the database of this application are cosmetics and skin and hair care products [17].

**Health Protection.** It is also worth noting that environmentally friendly digitalization in the Federal Republic of Germany also takes place under the banner of protecting the health of citizens [18].

First of all, concerns are associated with the expansion of low-frequency electric and magnetic, as well as high-frequency electromagnetic impact on human health due to the ubiquitous development of mobile networks.

For example, the German Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety together with the federal government, has established a Competence Center for Electromagnetic Fields as a part Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) to inform citizens about modern mobile communication technologies and the possible consequences of its functioning for the human body [19].

## 5 Conclusion

Thus, based on the study, it was revealed that there is a close relationship between digital ecology and sustainable development, not only in the ecological sphere of public life, but also in the economic and social ones.

This fact is underpinned primarily by cross-sectoral projects considered on the example of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The key projects are the ProgResS, the introduction of a common digital product passport and its already introduced analogues and prototypes operating on the market, as well as the concern of line ministries for the welfare and health of citizens in the context of the expanding exposure of the population to electromagnetic fields due to an increase in the spread of mobile networks of various frequencies.

The reviewed projects accurately convey the interweaving of three interrelated components – ecology, economy, and social sphere:

- Ecology since the main goals of projects are to reduce energy consumption, carbon emissions and increase energy efficiency to maintain the balance of the ecosystem, preserve natural resources for future generations and reduce the negative impact of human activity on the environment.
- Economy since the measures affect both producers of goods and services and consumers in various ways: from the mode of production to sale and operation.
- Social sphere since the changes affect the life of a person.

As for individuals, it is worth noting that thanks to the measures taken to implement programs in the field of digitalization and sustainable development, we can talk about the conscious environmental responsibility of consumers. For example, the use of a digital passport for a product and its analogues allows consumers to be aware of their impact on the environment.

In addition, the effectiveness of the implementation of the outlined policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of digitalization and sustainable development can be judged by the following measures that have already been started

- Establishment of the Blue Angel label as a benchmark for green IT-technologies, and namely for products such as energy efficient data centers and energy efficient software.

It is worth noting that the German government is establishing federal data processing centers under the Blue Angel criteria.

- Research on the environmental sustainability of 5G technologies. This is primarily about the study of the need for raw materials and mobile infrastructure, but also attention is paid to studies of the impact of new technologies on the human body as part of the citizens' health protection program.
- Environmentally friendly reorientation of municipal data centers. In accordance with this measure, the government is providing investment support and assistance in the provision of services to improve the resource efficiency of local data centers. Moreover, the prospect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by these centers in different time periods is being investigated.

To promote in society the provisions of the concept of digital ecology and digitalization in general, as well as measures taken and implemented in these areas, it seems necessary to create a special body with a specific set of tasks, as for example

- Initiate public discussions in order to explain the conceptual apparatus of digitalization and its essence.
- Conduct independent research in the areas of digital ecology with the subsequent publication of results and recommendations that are in the public domain, etc.

As for the Federal Republic of Germany, a similar body is already active in this country, namely the Digital Environment Council.

The scope of this interdisciplinary council includes cross-cutting issues from areas such as economics, politics, culture, psychology, and medicine, since it is in these areas that digitalization has a great impact.

The German Council for Digital Ecology performs, first of all, educational and informational functions, guided by the opinion that in the modern world with an abundance of information, a person does not notice the most important events in life, that is, a person does not see what has already come, or what is to expect.

In addition, for the subsequent development of a society operating in the spheres of digitalization (digital ecology) and sustainable development, it is important to follow the path of implementing the following rules

- Determination of new humanistic goals of the digital society, consideration of issues about the relationship between human and technology, and most importantly human and artificial intelligence. It is also necessary to pay attention to the protection of the private sphere of the individual's life. This is due to the growing openness of all aspects of human life. This phenomenon is due to both the active use of the Internet and the collection and storage of personal data in commercial and government databases for various purposes.
- Development and strengthening of environmental awareness of the world community, in particular, the appeal applies to ordinary citizens of all countries of the world, and the promotion of international global cooperation in the environmental field using the latest digital technologies.
- Further strengthening of the environmental responsibility of citizens.

Thus, at this stage in the development of digital ecology programs, the following conclusion can be drawn. Extensive digitalization can be both a catalyst for crises in the cluster of social, environmental, and economic spheres, which, as was demonstrated in the main part of the work, are closely interrelated, and a necessary toolkit for building a society within the framework of the concept of sustainable development.

Only the subsequent development of innovative digital projects will make it possible to reveal the significance of current and future transformations for society and the planet and become, according to the UN's wording, that "blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all".

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# Main Trends in the Policy of Regionalism Formation in the Republic of Altai

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**Abstract.** The paper under study is based on the information gathered and reveals the main trends to form the policy of regionalism which has become the official post-soviet ideology in the Altai Republic. The research confirms the postmodernist theory saying that in today's world the public is influenced through the past and future images created to meet powerful structures' demands. The idea of republican sovereignty and statehood as "our" revived achievements, that should be asserted and consolidated for the Altai peoples' benefit, is maintained in public mind. The paper shows reasons to build "memorial places" in the centre of the capital city of Gorno-Altaysk where some memorials were erected to political figures: to G.I. Gurkin, who came up with the idea to form a republic in Gorny Altai in the early 1900s, and to V.I. Chaptinov who became the Head of the Republic. Political mythology in the region refers to social memory as a political resource to form the ideology of regionalism.

The information gathered lets the authors conclude that the key role in organizing national societies is played by ethnical elite – elected tribal zaisans with the southern Altai, the chairmen of public associations with the northern Altai, teachers, journalists and other representatives of symbolic elite. The paper covers the way the regional authorities take revived zaisanate: as a rival and/or as an alternative non-governmental structure inspiring national movement. The dominating mythologeme of regional uniqueness and necessary political and cultural autonomy is the idea of Altai antiquity and its being ancestral home of turkic-speaking nations. One of the reasons to make up symbolic attributes of Altai Republic is the elite's desire to extend history and to add the region to the global association where the pasyryc style is considered presentable. The griffin on the emblem of the Altai Republic is not accidental.

**Keywords:** Republic · Formation · Regionalism

## 1 Introduction

In 2021 two memorable dates were celebrated in the Altai Republic – the 30-th anniversary since the day the Republic was formed and the 265-th anniversary since the time Altai became a part of Russian Empire. The Altai are one of the turkic-speaking nations in Southern Siberia and the titular ethnos of the Altai Republic. This ethnonym refers to

southern groups (altai-kizhi, telengits) in mountainous districts and to southern groups (tubalars, chelkans, kumandins) living at the foothills of the Republic. The Altai make up more than one third (73 000 people) of the total Altai Republic population (220 954 people according to Rosstat data for 2021), where Russians constitute the ethnical majority [1]. The region under study is situated at the junction of Russian, Mongolian and Kazakhstan borders that determines its place in modern geopolitical processes.

The Internet sites inform about the events that were due in 2021 in line with the plan approved by a regional government's order. It was planned to mark "Days of the Altai Republic" in Moscow, organize a trade show of republican deli meats, cheeses, balm producers, exhibition sale of regional decorative and applied art products and gala concert of regional performers [2]. In the series of festive events, it was supposed to have the holiday named "El Oyin" which means "national games". The Ethno-cultural centre "Ombo" (Ust-Khansky district) was chosen the holiday location. A theatrical show telling about the time when the Altai joined Russia, folklore, sports and equestrian competitions were supposed to be held there. A thousand and a half contestants, delegates from neighboring regions, guests from the capital and abroad were expected to arrive for the holiday. The regional government's statutes approve the festival's importance and popularity and outlines its entering the top-200 best eventual projects in Russia [3].

In early summer of the jubilee year, all the celebrations planned were canceled due to unfavorable epidemiological situation caused by the spread of COVID-19. "The Altai Republic Days" in Moscow were marked by extended meeting of the Federal Council, Oleg Choroordin, the Head of the Republic, took part in the session, some representatives of executive and legislative authorities accompanied him. The Upper House of Russian Parliament approved the draft resolution "On state support of social and economic development of the Altai Republic" aimed at building kindergartens, schools, medical, sports and cultural institutions, agricultural and industrial development, environmental protection, admission system at the state borderline within the regional territory [4].

Early July of 2021, a monument to Valery Ivanovich Chaptinov, a political figure and the first Head of the Republic of Altai was erected in the central culture and recreation park in Gorno-Altaysk, the capital city of the Republic. One of the central city streets, the top of the North-Chuisky ridge, the school in the village of Kosh-Agach, where V.I. Chaptinov formed as a soviet political worker, are named after him. The construction of a memorial museum in the village of Verch-Apshuyacta (Shebalinsky district), where he was born, was finished. The audience noted that "When we construct monuments to such people, we create a unique memory book for the present and future generations. It promotes bringing up love of the small native land with the young, forms careful attitude to its history [5].

Today, public and power materialize memory through designing memorial landscapes, erecting monuments, opening museums and museum exhibitions, organizing cultural events and festivals. Methods to construct regionalism ideology as a political process include the actors who produce it, some mechanisms and strategy developed, resources available.

The present study is aimed at detecting new trends in the policy of forming regionalism ideology in the Altai Republic within the idea of regional ethno-political stability in modern global world. The following tasks are set for the research:



- to describe the image of the regional elite who are capable of myth-making and social practice to interpret the Altai current picture of the world, the past and present events
- to reveal the reasons for making up “memorial places” in the context of new meanings connected with the local communities’ social memory which can be a tool while forming ethno-political and ethno-cultural environment
- to characterize the activity of the regional social organizations which are called to cover ethno-social and ethno-political problems of interaction between local powers and public
- to detect a strategy to popularize the idea of Altai’s historical antiquity while forming the image of the Altai Republic
- to collect and introduce into scientific circulation of the research source base the documents of the state municipal and local governments.

The problem stating makes collecting unique field material and its further analysis possible. Local press materials are used as main sources, the website information is engaged together with the draft law “On the clan community of the Altai and other ethnical societies in the Altai Republic”, the documents of the local authorities dealing with public relations: “Regulations on conducting XVII interregional holiday of the Altai people El Oyin 2021”, the Constitutional Law “On the emblem of the Altai Republic”. The research methodical tools make up a combination of comparative-historical analysis and approaches which make revealing the mechanisms and ways to form regional policy in the Altai Republic possible. The structural and functional approach used, gives an opportunity to analyze retrospectively the social mind’s specifics in imaginative perception of the local elite who are being formed under the influence of modern ethno-political and ethno-social processes.

## 2 Historiographical Review

Any new special investigation of the problem has not been done, but certain issues have been touched upon in some research. The modern stage in investigating the problem began in 1990s and is connected with western researchers’ works. In the book “The Invention of Tradition” edited by the British historian E. Hobsbawm the author outlined the concept that a lot of traditions which seem very old turn out to be invented [6]. In his work “Social Framework of Memory” the French scientist M. Halbvaks says that every nation has its own historical memory [7]. Another French scientist P. Nora introduced into scientific circulation the concept of “memory locations” in his article “Problems of Memory Locations”. In his view, memorial places have three semantic designations: material, symbolic, functional and symbolize national heritage – cultural and natural monuments, holidays, emblems, celebrations in honor of people or events, establishing museums etc. [8].

In post-soviet domestic science theoretical and methodological attitude and compositions typical for constructivism, which is one of western research trends, were greatly enhanced. It was the factor that determined centers of the modern Russian research tradition. Many Moscow researchers tried to study ethno-social and ethno-political processes from the newfound positions: S. V. Sokolovskiy in his “The Notion of ‘Indigenous

Nation' in Russian Science" [9], V.A. Shnirelman in "Social Memory and Images of the Past" [10] etc.

The Institute of Anthropology of RAS (Moscow) headed by a constructivism follower V.A. Tishkov opened some projects to study the ethnical minorities' problems. In the series "Research on Applied and Urgent Ethnology" the ethnographer V.Ya. Kidieva (Gorno-Altai) released her report "On Ethno-political and Ethno-cultural Situation in the Altai Republic", where she covered the beginning of new holidays –meetings combined with the head of – the clan elections [11]. Nearly a decade later, in the same series the Moscow ethnologist I.L. Babich published his report "The Main Tendencies of Post-soviet Ethno-Cultural policy in the Altai Republic", where based on the data collected, he analyzed the guidelines the local authorities used concerning the national language, new holiday culture and solving ecological problems in the region [12]. In another project named "Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts" there were released bulletins and annual reports with information from other regional ethnographers, who had the latest information: N.A. Tadina "On the Threshold of the Altai Kurultay" [13]; S.P. Tyuchteneva "Ethno-Political Situation in the Altai Republic and the Possibilities to Settle International Conflicts" [14].

Novosibirsk ethno-sociological school headed by Yu.V. Popkov in the Institute of Philosophy and Law of SB RAS and ethnologists from the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography of SB RAS do theoretical and empirical research analyzing the new tendencies with Siberian nations. Their work confirms the theory of neotraditionalism which states that tradition reviving is aimed at the society's adaptation in modern requirements.

O.A. Persidskaya and S.A. Madyukova in their article "The Pattern of Modern Ethno-National Policy in the Altai Republic" specified that legislative and executive authorities, public and clan organizations are the elements of the structural pattern but the procedural components are based on the regional specific foundation: the population's polyethnicity, republican status etc. [15].

E.V. Samuakhina in her article "Memory Locations in Museum Practice" analyses the processes that form ethnical identity in the Altai socio-political discourse. The author's attention is paid to the national elite's method which they developed to turn to the past images and to extend regional historical and cultural heritage [16].

Another Novosibirsk researcher D.A. Michailov in his article "The Ideologeme of Reviving and Forming Altai Nationalisms" covered the position of revival ideologeme in national processes in the Altai Republic. Using the data collected the author revealed the construction of Altai nationalisms that let him overcome voids in historical narrative and selectivity of social memory while forming a holistic image of the Altai ethnical community in the public consciousness [17].

N.A. Tadina and T.S. Yabishtaev in the article "The Pazyryk Style of Symbolic Attributes of the Altai Republic in the Context of the Altaians' Worldview" reveal the reasons for setting the Pazyryk images as ethno-political symbols of the Altai Republic, and took the regional emblem and tribal tamga as an example. The authors cover the way the powerful elite introduces the region into the world community using symbolic attributes made according to the laws of animal style [18].

In their other article “The Telengit memorials to Ethno-Cultural Renaissance” N.A. Tadina and T.S. Yabishtaev analyzed the gathered data about how the image of zaisan – mythmaker is formed in public consciousness, as an example they took the Altai-Kizhi tradition to install clan “stones” which was supported by the Telengits (the Altai-Kizhi and the Telengits represent the southern groups of the Altai). In 2013 in Ulagansky district they erected a monument to Yarinak, who lived in XVII century and was the head of the clan-syok of “tyoyolyos”. In 2014 there was erected a monument to Ochurdyap, the zaisan of clan-syok of “kyobyok” in XIX century [19].

N.A. Tadina in her article “From the Altai Clan Stones to Memorial Signs of the Altai Republic” shows the connection of the new Telengit practice of erecting steles in honor of the past clan leaders and memorial signs to the founders of the Republic. There has also been studied the social significance of erecting monuments in post-soviet period to some famous Altaians: G.I. Choros-Gurkin who originated the idea of organizing a Republic in Gorny Altai at the beginning of the last century, and V.I. Chaptinov who carried out the creation of the Altai Republic [20].

### 3 “Memorial Locations” in Regional Elite Image Creation

The gathered material being analyzed, it can be stated that the regional elite has become the key factor forming “the self” of the Altai Republic as it has the real power to make a socially important decision. While forming regional ideology its status position gets higher and the expected idea of its position in the past, present and future gets shaped. Political advertizing for charismatic personalities in regional history and culture is certain to be made up through erecting monuments.

In the centre of Gorno-Altaysk there is a memorial landscape – the respective material and informative environment created by regional authorities. In 2006, near the State Assembly “El Kurultay” there was opened a monument to G.I. Choros-Gurkin, the civic leader at the beginning of the past century. In the central park opposite The Regional Government House there are memorial locations devoted to V.I. Chaptinov, the first Head of the Republic, – a memorial stele with a bas-relief (2015) and a monument (2021).

To understand the political figures’ importance some political myths were made up a means to influence the public consciousness. The main objects of regional political space mythologization are the facts from local public figures’ biographies and the past events of regional history. A political myth represents “an ideologically marked narrative claiming for the status of authentic vision of the past, present and expected future which is taken by a social group as generally true” [21, p. 41].

According to the data published the most popular mythologemes about V.I. Chaptinov, the first Head of the Republic, are the following:

- (1) “from the people” – he grew up in the Altai village of Apshyachta (Shebalinsky district), was one from the clan-syok “Kergil”, his mother was from the clan-syok “Chapty”; came from a collective farmers’ family, got the livestock specialist’s diploma of the Altai State Agricultural Institute; made the career of a soviet party worker in outlying Ust-Koksinsky and Kosh-Agachsky districts [22]

- (2) “easy to deal with” – “he was not an ordinary person, loved and valued his family, adored the mother, always found time for friends and relatives [23]; “when coming to any part of the Republic and seeing a group of people near a little shop or a market place he came up to them immediately and was the first to say “hello” [24]
- (3) “omnipresent” – he was the guard and defender of his motherland, well-informed about the people’s problems, born in the year of the great Victory he was meant to win together with his people” [25]; “he was a particular person, bright and active politician able of looking for ahead, sympathizing people” [5]
- (4) “an ideal chief” – “he was a real patriot, his people’s son, deeply felt his own great responsibility for his Republic and Motherland’s destiny [23]; “started a new region from nothing and did a lot to make the Republic self-sustained” [26].

Soviet public administration collapse and the parade of regional sovereignties encouraged the raise of political myth creation. D.I. Tabaev, one of V.I. Chaptinov’s supporters, wrote in his memoirs: “one of V.I. Chaptinov’s merits was his going further than just the Altai autonomous region when leaving the Altai Krai. He took the position of a republican, the one who supports the parliamentary form of government, and a higher status of Gorny Altai autonomous region. He set the task to prepare the documents with legal justification of a new Republic foundation me and S.S. Tyuchtenev, who was a deputy’s assistant at that time” [27]. In the post-soviet period, apart from political figures, regional elites united historians, lawyers, famous sportsmen and public organization leaders. O.L. Chorochrdin, the present Head of the Republic, said: “Today we remember and appreciate the people who initiated the Republic formation... It were they who carried out all the approvals needed and consultations with the central authorities, did a great amount of work at basic documents, made an invaluable contribution to the granting of a new state-legal status of a Federation subject, to setting and further social and economic development of the Republic” [26].

The post-soviet political reforms led to a higher legal status of the region. In 1990, the extraordinary session of Gorno-Altai Regional Council of Public Deputies adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty which came into history as a political and a legal fact. Chapter “[Eurasia in the Post-pandemic Political and Socioeconomic Prospects](#)” of the Declaration determines the transformation of Gorno-Altai autonomous region into Gorno-Altai Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR. The regional council decision was sent to the higher state authorities. Resulting from RSFSR law, 15 December, 1991, some autonomous regions were withdrawn from provinces, and Gorny Altai was withdrawn from Altay Krai. 3 July, 1991 the RSFSR law on the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region transformation into Republic was adopted, and the date became a holiday. Right away were formed the Government of the Altai Republic headed by V.I. Petrov and the Supreme Council of the Altai Republic by the chairmanship of V.I. Chaptinov, who was elected the first Head of the Republic in 1994.

Political mythology being created in the region rests on public memory as a political resource in regionalism ideology formation. It is solving political problems where the role of a developed regional elite’s image is important rather than solving inner problems of the Altai ethnical environment. Not so many Altaians tend to consider ethnical revival V.I. Chaptinov’s credit, but at the same time they consider the result of his social and political activity as the Altai Republic formation where the Altai are the titular nation.

In public consciousness there is an asserted idea that the republican sovereignty and statehood are “our” revived achievements that should be protected and strengthened “in the benefit” of the Altai nations. The history of the Altai Republic formation as an independent subject is closely connected with the names of G.I. Choros-Gurkin and V.I. Chaptinov, one of them came up with the idea of forming a republic in Altai and the other realized it.

G.I. Choros-Gurkin was a representative of the clan-syok “Choros”. He was born in the village of Ulala (currently Gorno-Altaysk) to a family of an Altaian artisan from clan-syok “Choros”. His grandfather Gurke came from the bachat teleut who at the beginning of XIX century moved from Kuznetsk region (currently Kemerovo region). D.A. Michailov wrote regarding his compound surname: “the pseudonym “Choros” tells about the all Altaian leader’s ambitions, and which is called to associate Gurkin with a mighty Dzungarian clan. This adds to Gurkin’s image motives of a founding father, demiurge and a patron” [28, p. 5]. After formation of the Altai Republic the name of Choros-Gurkin became a political symbol. In 1995, one of the main streets in Gorno-Aitaisk was named after him. In 1996, the house where G.I. Choros-Gurkin lived in the village of Anos (Chemalsky district) was included into the list of historic and cultural monuments of the Altai Republic as a museum and became a branch of the National Museum.

In the early years of the soviet power there was a search for ways of self-determination. G.I. Choros-Gurkin was the inspirer of the Oirot Republic formation and which he saw within the Sayano-Altai, Uryanchay Mongolian Altai – the territory of former Dzungaria. With the assistance of supporters from northern and southern Altaians, the Teleut, Shor, Khakass the Altai Mountain Duma was established (1917–1918) which was later replaced by the Karakorum-Altai District Council. The very notion “oirot” is understood by Altaians as an ethno-political term connected with historical past. A.M. Sagalaev noted that the word “oirot” is closely associated with the idea of national independence: “the oirot idea taken from the sphere of worldview and put into the sphere of politics – from the “Oirot chanate” to “the Soviet power” [29, p. 66–67]. The idea of national autonomy in the form of a republic appeared unrealizable, its followers were repressed, and G.I. Choros-Gurkin was shot in 1937; it was only in the post-soviet period that they were rehabilitated.

To satisfy the Altaian ethno-political demands the Oirot autonomous district was formed in 1922. Further on, in 1948, it was renamed Gorno-Altai autonomous region, its only town of Oirot-tura was renamed Gorno-Altaysk. The indigenous people was no longer called Oirot but Altaians. This ethnonym means “a dweller of the Altai” and was chosen in accordance with one of ethnic group’s self-designation of Altai-Kizhi, who are not only central in geographical view but in the ethnical sense as well. There existed a popular explanation for the fact: the Altaians were wrongly named “the Oirot” and the region Oirot as “the Oirot” were the western Mongol who created Dzungaria; the Altai were turks and were in the vassal dependency on the Mongol [30, p. 10–11]. Thereby, the initial regional name “Oirotia” contained the national idea of “Oirot” which in the post-soviet period realized itself through the Altai Republic formation.

## 4 Political Ethnicity the Relationship of the Local Elite and the Public

The data collected let us conclude that the key role in creating ethno-national communities is played by the ethnic elite – elected clan zaisans, chairmen of the northern Altai associations as well as rural and district public figures, teachers, journalists and other symbolic elite representatives. With the northern Altai the ethnic revival took place in administrative manner – in 1991, the Association of the Northern Altai was formed, in 2000, the “ethnos” status was received and the inclusion to the list of indigenous small peoples of Siberia was done. With the southern Altai the public movement “Kurultay of the Altai People” was organized in 1997 as the form of self-government that expresses the Altai national interests at all levels of power.

The regional powers treat the revived zaisanate as a rival and/or a non-governmental structure which inspires national public movement [31, p. 141]. It took more than twenty years to identify the set of problems. The “language” issue is one of most actual and touches upon the following: the degree of native language knowledge the Altai children have, the right to study the native language, the ways to modernize the teaching methods, the ways to extend the sphere of communication etc. Another intraethnic problem is the shortening the list of the bride’s relatives during matchmaking time at the groom’s family discretion, which allows to reduce the matchmaking costs. Some attempts are being made to create and realize programs aimed at preserving material and immaterial heritage of the region. The ecological problem of protecting the Altai sacred places has got acute in conditions of tourist boom which led to accumulation of garbage at river banks, lakes, mountain tops and passes, poaching of wild animals etc.

The revived zaisanate could have been an analog of Public Chamber in the Region. But in late 1990s it became clear that it was not able to realize at full size the function of self-government, as there were no normative documents regulating its status. In addition, the traditional legal forms were not fixed by law. A widely discussed idea of reviving zaisanate as the council of clan heads was realized in 1997 due to the draft law of the Altai Republic “On Clan Community of the Altai”. It consists of preamble and seven chapters: general provisions, organizational and legal bases of activity of a clan community, its management bodies and financial and economic bases, zaisan court, responsibility for breaking the law. The document was developed by lawyers, historians and the zaisan council. In 1997, it was submitted for consideration of the State Assembly – El Kurultay of the Altai Republic, but the local government vetoed it.

Adopting the law on clan community remains still actual in the Altai Republic and is dictated by a number of circumstances. First of all, the Russian Federation legislation encourages the revival of historically existed public government institutions. This is testified by the federal laws “On General Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation”, “On the General Principles of Organizing Communities of Indigenous Small Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of The Russian Federation”. On the one hand, the unification of the positive law is taking place at the moment, and on the other, there is some stability of traditional norms of customary law and their ability to reproduce themselves.

Suggestions “not to touch upon politics and not to deal with politics” are always made at the Altai public organizations meetings. Such a position has been provoked by

tensed relationships between local power structures and the public. In 2011, El Bashchi elections (“Head of the people elections”) resulted in dual power as two applicants had been elected: one from “official” and the other from “people’s” Kurultay (congress). The fact testified to the crisis in the Altai public movement.

The revived zaisanate has been functioning for more than twenty years already, but its necessity and efficiency are still discussed. Critics of the revived social institution outline the fact that it is an anachronism and cannot meet the requirements of modern social and political life. The first elected zaisans were soviet functionaries and had some management experience to adapt themselves to post-soviet conditions. Sometimes, they are said to be fighters for the benefits of indigenous small peoples, or the disguise in national costumes on the tribunes on all republican holidays. The modern zaisanate is mainly criticized for being passive and politicized. Sometimes zaisan’s position is thought as a means of accumulating a political capital in pre-election period. This is one of the forms of “ethnic business policy”, when the leaders mobilize an ethnic group for collective actions to get their political goals.

The zaisanate supporters keep saying that the revival of the Council of clan heads lets the Altai ethnical markers leave family-related and household environment and pass over to a wider public level, it would be one of its self-asserting forms. Due to zaisans’ participation in all republican holidays El Oyin (national games) and Chaga Bairam (the Altai New Year) the national symbolism is observed. Thus, the event is scheduled for an even-numbered day of the new moon and the ritual of the Altai veneration takes place in early morning. Another merit is getting back the “nomadic” status of El Oyin holiday in 2015 because ten years of conducting it in the valley near the village of Elo (Ongudaisky district) led to anthropologic overthrow. In late 1990s, the museum of zaisan was opened by A.K. Bardin, the head of clan-syok “maiman” in the village of Chemal with mosrly Russian population and is very popular now. In 2014, another zaisan Akai Kine, the head of clan-syok “tyoyolyos” made up a monument to Yarinak, the clan leader of the past, in Ulagansky district. In the village of Kokorya the descendants of a Chui zaisan Ochurdyap erected him a monument in connection with the 150th anniversary of the telengit being a part of Russia [19].

Thus, the data gathered and analyzed let us state that the revived zaisanate as a self-government institution acts as a respond to the processes of globalization: the sharpener its challenges are the more demands to preserve ethnical culture arise.

## **5 Ancient Monuments in Creating the Image of the Altai Republic**

The ideology of regionalism has become the official post-soviet ideology in the Altai Republic and now it is developing in the rhetoric of sovereignty and revival of the national culture of the Altai as the titular ethnos. In local elite’s cultivator project, it is considered important to preserve, develop and multiply the ancestors’ heritage.

The borderline location, neighborhood to the countries of Central Asia, historical continuity and preservation of ethnic identity influenced the creation of the local mythologemes “Altai is the Turks’ cradle” and “Altai is the crossroads of global religions and cultures”. V.I. Chaptinov, the first Head of the Altai Republic, initiated and organized scientific and practical conference not by chance. The conference was devoted to the 1450th

anniversary of the First Turkic Khaganate and was held in Moscow, 22–23 February, 1996. Opening the conference, he spoke about historical statehood and cultural relationship between Slavonic and Turkic peoples whose representatives took part in its work [27].

Ancient Turks theme became the key one in creating the Altai Republic Image. At the administrative borderline with the Altai Krai near the motorway Chuisky Tract there is a memorial sign “Altai – the heart of Eurasia”. The sign was set on behalf of the Republic of Tatarstan in connection with the 250th anniversary of the Altai joining Russia. The sign is a composition of six arcs fastened by a rim and making up a hemisphere in the form of half the globe or a dome shaped as a yurt. In the centre there is a hearth outlined. Above the hearth there is a 9 m stele – the mythological symbol of a global tree which connects the Earth and the Sky. The tree is crowned with a golden star “Altin Kasik” (“golden pole”) which is the Altai for a ‘polar star’. “Message to Descendants” is curved on the central stele in Russian, Altaian and ancient Turkic and it runs: “We erected this memorial sign in Gorny Altai – in the centre of Universe, the place where the ancient tribes gathered to solve state affairs, from this place batyrs on argamaks (heroes on heroic horses) went on hikes, and here the people had holidays and competitions to honor famous events. Here the Turkic civilization derived its origin. Descendants! Remember your roots, be proud of your ancestors’ deeds and be worthy of your name. Let the blessing of the Eternal Blue Sky descend upon us.” This text is repeated in six languages: Tatar, English, Japanese, Korean, Turkish, Farsi and is curved on pedestals arranged in a circle. The idea of the “Message to Descendants” is actual in connection with the policy of regionalism construction. The memorial sign, presented by Tatarstan is a means to create imagological image of the Altai Republic as an heir of ancient statehood traditions. Its titular ethnos, the Altai, are descendants of those tribes who “gathered on this territory to solve state affairs”.

Altai used to be in the centre of the first Eurasian Empire called ‘the Khaganate’, and whose political and cultural heritage greatly influenced the Turkic nations’ development. The generality of clan composition, formed basically by ancient Turkic nations (the Kipchak, Tele, Oguz, Merkit, Maiman, etc.), confirms their ethno-genetic continuity. As an example, the Altai and Kirghiz are united by common clans of “tyoyolyos”, “mundus”; The Kazakh, Bashkir and Altai have the clan of “kipchak”; the Altai and Tuvan have a common clan of “irkit”, “koboli”, “soyon”, “tyoyolyos”, and such examples are numerous. In spite of their anthropological and confessional inhomogeneity modern Turkic peoples have preserved language kinship and some features of ancient culture, for example, the cult of Tenery – “the sky left over by common ancestors”. The invention of runic writing was a great achievement. Born in antiquity the Turkic primary language together with ancient Turks, its bearers, passed a difficult path. Up to these days, the so-called “the Altaian hypothesis” of Turkic-speaking peoples’ origin is still dominant; according to the hypothesis, their ancestral home is in Altai, in the centre of Eurasia.

While opening the memorial sign “Altai – the heart of Eurasia” the president of the Tatarstan Republic M.Sh. Shaimiev said in his welcome letter: “I am happy, that due to your having the status of republic you create all the conditions for people living in the centre of Eurasia that used to be the centre of the Turk Khaganate. The territory of Altai is the cradle of many cultures and it is especially important for the Turks as it was



here that our ancient civilizations were originated, as well as writing and statehood in the form of the Turk Khaganate... The Tatar always remember their ancestral home – an Altaian yurt. The Tatar and Altai are very close due to their common destiny, history, culture, spiritual relationship” [32]. The role of the Altai and its ancient inhabitants in the history of Eurasia was admitted by a representative of a big Turkic nation. Apart from the official one, other names for the memorial sign – “Altai – the cradle of Turkic World”, “Altai – ancestral home of the Turks” appeared not accidentally.

Popularization of the Pazyryc archeological culture which existed in Altai one thousand years before the ancient Turkic period helps develop the idea of historical profundity of the region. The dominant mythologeme of the regional uniqueness and the necessity of political and cultural autonomy is presented by the argument of the Altai’s ancient origin and history. Near the memorial sign “Altai – the centre of Eurasia” a ritual complex “Obo Tash” – a ritual stone and wooden hitching posts- is situated. In the centre of the complex there is a sacred stone “Bai Tash”, that was brought here from the high-altitude plateau Ukok (Kosh-Agachsky district) at the border with Mogolia.

On the one hand, the plateau Ukok is the symbol of a sensational finding, in 1993 in a burial mound of the Pazyryc period there was found a female mummy that was later called “the Princess of Altai”. After 20 years of confrontation between Novosibirsk archeologists and the local powers it was put in the National Museum that had been restored with OJSC “Gasprom”’s financial support. The Altai Republic Government’s position was the princess belongs to the land of Altai, the people of Altai, that is why she only must be kept in Altai [33, c. 118].

On the other hand, to build up the ritual complex “Bai Tash” (“sacred stone”) the stones were taken from the plateau Ukok that got the status of the Natural Reserve (1994), the Rest Zone (1997) and was included into the UNESCO heritage list in the nomination of “Golden Mountains of Altai” (1998). The stones brought for the complex “Obo Tash” are put in the form of a barrow (“oboo”) that serves as an altar. Nearby there are two hitching posts with a code stretched between them, the code is used to tie ribbons (“kyira”, “jaloma”).

The ceremonial and ritual complex is called “Bai Tash” as its task is to demonstrate the main idea of the Altai worldview: to honor Altai as the deity who a man, his family and clan depend on for their wellbeing. The sacred places near the mountain passes, river crossings, wellsprings are nearby the roads a traveler connects his plans, changes in the life and wish fulfillment with. This is the reason why the ritual complex “Bai Tash” is founded next to the road – the motorway Chuisky Tract at the administrative borders of the Altai Republic and Altai Krai.

It should be noted that the “Bai Tash” ritual complex has been erected to welcome honorable guests who come to the Altai Republic from the capital or abroad. The ritual of Altai worship is performed by folklore groups dressed in national costumes, the white sacrificial ribbons are tied at hitching posts, the national songs sound while treating the guests. The senior man, the zaisan – the head of the clan – sprinkles the holy drink in the four sides of the world, he begins with the eastern one saying the words of peace and wellbeing and wishes the guests a lucky travel.

The public conscience takes Gorny Altay as a unique place of inimitable Pazyryk culture. Therefore, the Pazyryc images have become not just a decoration but an ethno-political symbol of the region. The Pazyryc griffin on the Altai Republic emblem adopted in 1993 is one of such examples. Many depictions of the griffin Khan-Kerede, a mythical bird – animal, with the head and the wings of a bird and the corps of a lion, were discovered during archeological excavations of the Pazyryc hills. Some Internet sites ponder on the place and role of the Pazyryc cultural subjects in ethno-political life of the Altai Republic. They particularly note, that its official symbol, the griffin on the emblem, “comes from the world of the dead” and the local people connect it with natural disasters [34]. The Regulations on the State Emblem of the Altai Republic outline that in the centre of the emblem there is a depiction of “the griffin Khan-Kerede with the head and wings of a bird, and the corps of a lion. The griffin symbolizes a holy sunny bird who guards peace, happiness and riches of the native land and is the patroness for animals, birds and nature [35].

One of the reasons for creating the Altai Republic symbolic attributes is connected with the governing elite’s desire to introduce their region to the world community where the Pazyryc style is regarded presentable. Depicting signs in the Pazyryc “animal” style is attractive in some decorative meaning but in ethnical meaning it is felt like ‘Altaian’, as the symbol of The Altai, the indigenous ethnos originated in this region [18].

## 6 Conclusion

The paper reveals the main trends in the policy of forming regionalism ideology that has become the official post-soviet ideology of the Altai Republic. In the modern global world, the powers influence the public through constructing the desired views on the past and present. The analysis of the data gathered makes it possible to conclude that in the public opinion there is a maintained idea of the republican sovereignty and statehood as “our revived achievements”; these achievements should be “defended and strengthened” in the benefits of the Altai peoples. The so-called “memorial landscape” in the centre of Gorno-Altaysk, the capital-city of the Altai Republic, is just evidence that approves of this opinion. The complex contains the memorials to G.I. Choros-Gurkin, the founder of republican idea in Gorny-Altai in the last century, and to V.I. Chaptinov, the first Head of the Republic. Some political myths have been composed as a means to influence the public conscience and to make it aware of famous people’s importance. The political mythology made up in the region uses the social memory as a political resource while forming the regionalism ideology.

In the Altai national movement there are tendencies to globalization and regionalism, ethnicity and identity, political mythologemes and social – political reality. The data gathered allows to come to the conclusion that the key role while forming national communities is played by the ethnic elite – elected clan zaisans with the southern Altai, public association chairmen with the northern Altai, teachers, journalists and other symbolic elite’s representatives. The regional powers take the revived zaisanate as a rival and /or as an alternative structure that inspires the national movement. The bill “On a clan community of the Altai” being rejected as not complying with the federal legislation, the level of political claims began to decline which testifies to the crisis of the public movement “Kurultay of the Altai people”.

The local elite's cultivation project considered it important to preserve, develop and multiply the Altai ancestral heritage. The argument of The Altai ancient history and its being the ancestral home of the Turkic peoples is the dominant mythologeme connected with the uniqueness of the region and the need for political and cultural autonomy. When entering the Altai Republic one can see a memorial sign, erected by the Tatarstan government, which represents the region and is called "Altai – the Heart of Eurasia". There are also ritual complexes that contain attributes of ancient Turk and Pazyryc cultures and serve to bless honorable guests. To correspond to the image made up, the faculty of Altaic Studies and Turkology was opened in the Gorno-Altaysk State University, the Research Institute under the regional government was renamed to the Institute of Altaic Studies. One of the reasons for creating the Altai Republic symbolic attributes is connected with the governing elite's desire to introduce their region to the world community where the Pazyryc style is regarded presentable. Not by chance have the Pazyryk images become but an ethno-political symbol of the region and not just a decoration. One of the examples is the Pazyryc image of the griffin on the emblem of the Altai Republic. In public conscience there exists an image of Gorny Altai mainly made up by the place uniqueness and its inimitable ancient history.

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# Transformation of the Electronic Participation System in Russia in the Early 2020s: Centralization Trends

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**Abstract.** The paper is devoted to creating a centralized system that ensures the processing of opinions and claims against regional and municipal officials expressed by citizens in social networks, which began in 2020. Previous authors' studies of Russian systems that ensure the interaction of authorities with citizens made it possible to identify six channels of electronic participation at the regional and municipal levels. However, the development of social networks and the emergence of new technologies for involving citizens in public politics have created the prerequisites for the transformation of electronic participation systems. This was reflected both in scientific research and in practice. For example, in the Russian Federation in 2020 a new channel of electronic participation was launched. A network of Regional Control Centers (RCCs) has been created and is being developed, one of the components of which is the Incident Management system, which allows real-time monitoring of the reaction of users in social networks and ensuring the processing of messages or claims of citizens to the authorities. The article presents the results of a pilot study that made it possible to identify the heterogeneity of new structures in terms of institutional affiliation and data from monitoring e-participation channels in the context of centralization processes.

**Keywords:** Social media · e-participation · Ecosystem approach · Regional control center · Feedback platform

## 1 Introduction

In 2020, the first monograph in Russia was published, dedicated to a comprehensive study of Russian systems that ensure the interaction of authorities with citizens and channels of electronic participation at the regional and municipal levels [1]. The monograph presents in detail the results of large-scale research in 2018–2020, which made it possible to identify the following six channels of electronic participation: electronic petitions; sites for filing complaints and statements about the need to solve various problems; electronic voting; proactive budgeting; open budget; crowdsourcing. However, the development of social networks and the emergence of new technologies for involving citizens in public policy have created prerequisites and incentives for the transformation of electronic

participation systems. This is also reflected in scientific research [2–4], and in practice. Thus, in the Russian Federation in 2020, the process of involving regional authorities in working out opinions and claims against officials expressed by citizens on social networks began, which forms a new channel of electronic participation. We are talking about the development of a network of Regional Control Centers (RCCs), which began to form Autonomous Non-Government Organization (ANO) “Dialog-Regions” after the President of Russia signed a list of instructions following the meeting of the Council for the Development of Local Self-Government, which took place on January 30, 2020 [5]. The instructions envisaged the creation of a Feedback Platform (FP) based on the Unified Portal of State and Municipal Services (UPSMS), on which interaction should be carried out through such electronic participation channels as reporting problems, polls, voting and public discussions. To organize a distributed centralized system in each region, a regional control center was created, and the entire regional network is managed by ANO “Dialog-Regions” together with regional administrations. At the same time, the head of the regional RCC is not a regional official, but a full-time employee of this autonomous non-profit organization.

By the end of 2020, the RCC system was created in all subjects of the Russian Federation (except Moscow). According to the decree of the Government of the Russian Federation [6], RCCs are implemented coordination of work on monitoring and processing of all types of appeals, interaction with citizens through social networks, instant messengers and other means of electronic communication in the areas and topics of the regional control center.

At present, all constituent entities of the Russian Federation are already connected to the centralized FP system (the service “State services. We decide together”) and use its channels to interact with citizens. To promptly respond to citizens’ appeals or discuss acute situations in social networks, each RCC uses the Incident Management system, which provides dispatching of “incidents” by responsible executors with the ability to quickly respond also through profiles in social networks. At the same time, a specific applicant is informed about the results of the consideration or information is sent about plans to resolve the situation or correct any mistake or misunderstanding that caused a negative reaction from a particular citizen or group of citizens. Thus, another channel of electronic interaction with citizens has been implemented, which complements the previously created specialized portals of urban problems (for example, “Our City” in Moscow; “Our St. Petersburg”; “Dobrodel”, Moscow Region; “We Manage Together”, Perm Krai and etc.). As a result of this centralization, many regions that have their own electronic participation channels with built-in logistics for processing citizens’ appeals are faced with the need to ensure either information interaction of regional systems with channels operating through the RCCs (FP, Incident Management), or abandonment of regional systems in favor of federal centralized. At the same time, in many regions these systems simply function in isolation, which, on the one hand, allows citizens to use different channels, and on the other hand, there are difficulties in processing these complaints or messages from citizens. Some regions have taken the path of decommissioning their regional systems. For example, in the Leningrad region, it was decided to abandon the very advanced and popular with citizens portal “People’s

Expertise” with the transfer of all activities for electronic interaction with citizens to the platform of the regional RCC.

Thus, in the regions, along with the channels of e-participation, created at the initiative of the regional and municipal authorities, centralized channels for collecting and aggregating information about citizens’ applications and identified problems began to function. Accordingly, a hidden conflict of interests between initiative projects and federal-centralized systems is inevitable, which actualizes the problem of studying the processes of streamlining the channels of interaction between government and citizens. The emergence of a new component (or a multi-channel service - the Incident Management system), which ensures the response of the authorities to the judgments expressed in social networks, takes this interaction to a new level. In this regard, we can talk about the transformation of the e-participation system in Russia and the important role of centralized channels serviced by the RCC system in it. To capture the institutional picture and identify the diversity of the situation in the regions, we collected information and analyzed it initially.

The paper is structured as follows: first, the theoretical framework of the study is given, then the results of a monitoring study of e-participation channels are presented, indicating an increase in centralization trends, as well as the results of a pilot study of the regional specifics of the RCCs institutional features.

## 2 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypothesis

In this study, electronic participation is understood as a set of methods and tools that provide electronic interaction between citizens and authorities in order to take into account the opinion of citizens in state and municipal government when making political and managerial decisions.

To date, considerable experience has been accumulated in the study of e-participation. However, it is impossible not to notice that the media environment is changing its configuration, becoming more complex, becoming more and more distributed. And although a fairly large number of studies on social networks have appeared, and the effects of interaction through social media are being actively analyzed [7–12], the role of different media in the processes of electronic interaction between government and society remains underexplored. The constant development of the digital media environment leads to a greater variety of opportunities for interaction and participation, thereby changing and complicating the behavioral preferences of citizens and their relationship to governance institutions. There is a global digital transformation of the model for the provision of electronic services, which entails changes in the system of interaction between citizens and authorities and has important effects that require study. Insufficient consideration of such transformations reduces the benefits (public and individual), the efficiency and effectiveness of the created and promising ecosystem of digital participation (digital interaction between government and society). For example, as K. S. Kondratenko notes, feedback services in many ways turn out to be, like other projects of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of digitalization, new conductors of old institutions, which drives the projects themselves into a dead end, while “digital services require different management standards and transformation of the legislative



framework” [13, p. 488]. But at the same time, according to experts, the transformation of the legislative framework is associated with risks, and above all this concerns the system of power in the context of its transition to the mode of functioning not as a “state”, but as a “public” authority. “It may seem that in the end only the term changes, but these changes can affect the delimitation of powers between the levels of the system in favor of strengthening the “vertical”. The main risk is, according to R.M. Vulfovich, that “the autonomy of local self-government bodies is significantly narrowed in the course of introducing legislative amendments of a centralist orientation. The movement is clearly not on the path of strengthening the principle of subsidiarity [14, p. 48].

However, in general, the topic of strengthening the processes of centralization of political power in Russia and the possible tension in relations between the “center and regions” (especially in the light of the draft law on public power) has not yet received sufficient attention in the scientific and expert community and, in our opinion, needs to be the closest attention of researchers. Boffa and colleagues [15] try to explain why decentralization can undermine accountability. Particularly, they study the factors which determine if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous. They conclude that “a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions” [15]. Shiyu Bo [16] analyzes China’s case how government centralization/decentralization effects on regional economic development. Braun [17] focuses on the best practices of four federal Western countries (Australia, Austria, Germany and Switzerland) in order to understand how centralized federations avoid over-centralization. As for digital governance in the context of centralized power, the first group of authors suggests that digital governance helps to decline the negative effects of the political power centralization [18, 19], unify segmented information systems into a single e-government ecosystem [20, 21], and even undermine centralized political power. At the same time, the second group of authors tries to prove that digital governance is a good tool to support a sustainability of centralized political power [18] and is not working in decentralized countries. In turn, some authors talk about the effects (positive [18] or negative [19]) of political power centralization on digital governance and a need of balance between centralized and decentralized types of information sharing [18]. Bicking, Jansen & Wimmer [22] describe the scenarios depending on centralization or decentralization of power.

Accordingly, the processes of transformation of e-participation, which have become noticeable in Russia by 2020 and are closely related to the centralization of power, remain practically unexplored. Therefore, the authors of the article take the liberty of putting forward a hypothesis that starting from 2020, the Russian Federation has entered the so-called centralized-federal phase of development of the e-participation ecosystem. In our opinion, the process of formation of approaches and development of e-participation in the Russian Federation can be divided into three stages (waves or phases), which led to the current phase of development:

1. Initiative-public phase (2010–2012, where public organizations and activists were the main actors of electronic participation).
2. Initiative-regional (2012–2020, when the initiators were regional authorities and local governments).

3. Modern, centralized-federal (starting from 2020, the activity of the federal center is increasing, the processes of centralization are intensifying).

### 3 Study of Centralization Trends

At the beginning of 2022, the e-Governance Center of ITMO University carried out the third stage of e-participation monitoring in Russia, which was a continuation of the monitoring carried out in 2020 and 2021. [23, 24]. The basic methodology and tools of the monitoring study have not undergone significant changes, which makes it possible to compare the results over time (see Fig. 1).

By analogy with the previous two stages (2020 and 2021), the channels of electronic participation of citizens created by the authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments of cities that are the administrative centers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation were identified and evaluated according to 15 indicators, divided into 5 logical blocks. Six types of channels were considered: Open Budgeting, Proactive Budgeting, Problem Reporting, E-Initiatives, E-voting, and Crowdsourcing.


The monitoring results showed a significant reduction during 2021 of electronic participation channels created and maintained at the initiative of the executive bodies of state power of subjects and municipalities, which indicates the strengthening of centralization trends and the role of the federal center in these matters.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the monitoring results is that the total number of e-participation channels considered in the framework of the study in the Russian regions has significantly decreased - from 209 at the beginning of 2021 to 194 at the beginning of 2022.


At the same time, the channels, the tasks and functionality of which involve the greatest interactivity and imply the initiation of the process of electronic participation by citizens, have been reduced to the greatest extent - first of all, these are channels such as "Problem Reports" and "Electronic Voting". The total coverage of regions by this type of e-participation channel has decreased by 11 regions over the past year. The number of channels "Electronic voting" also decreased very significantly - at the regional level, the reduction amounted to exactly half of the number of all channels. At the same time, the overall coverage decreased by 14 regions.

The process of reducing these channels is naturally explained by the fact that it was these forms of activity that were recreated in 2020–2021 on the UPSMS Feedback Platform, as a result of which some of the similar channels created earlier on an initiative basis at the regional and municipal level were abandoned. This indicates the disinterest of a significant part of regional leaders to further support these resources in the context of the position of the federal center on the priority development of the RCC system.

If we turn to the dynamic data for three years (Fig. 1), we can conclude that the hypothesis of a reduction in the number of channels put forward at the previous stage of the study [24] is confirmed. In 2022, two years after the announcement of the creation of the PIC and one year after the inclusion of all regions, the reduction in initiative channels becomes apparent.



**Fig. 1.** Number of e-participation channels created by regional and municipal authorities from 2020 to 2022 (only municipalities - centers of regions are taken into account)



**Fig. 2.** Institutional model of e-participation channels functioning, taking into account the activities of the Regional control centers

The only exception is the least demanded channel - crowdsourcing (single initiative projects) and open budget, where there is federal legislation obliging regions and municipalities to submit budget data on specialized information resources.

Previous research on e-participation [1, 25, 26] conducted by ITMO University's e Governance Center allowed us to develop the author's institutional model of the e-participation ecosystem. In 2022, the model has been refined to include TFP and centralized channels served by the RCC system in Russia. Now it reflects the period after 2020 - the third, modern stage in the development of e-participation (see Fig. 2).

#### **4 Study of the Specific Institutional Features of the RCCs in the Regions**

Let us further consider the data that allow us to identify the existing regional specifics of the formed centralized regionally distributed RCC system.

The RCC is positioned as a tool for direct communication between residents and authorities in order to solve and prevent problems. RCC employees are engaged in monitoring, processing and analysis of appeals and messages from residents, ensure interdepartmental interaction of authorities to minimize the time for receiving a response and solving a problematic issue of a citizen. "We are working to bring the state closer to the people, creating an ecosystem of digital communication between citizens of the country and authorities at all levels," says the ANO Dialog-Regions website [27].

An important source of information about the emerging infrastructure of the RCCs are official documents - resolutions and orders of regional authorities adopted in each subject of the federation. These documents, as a rule, determine the executive body of state power of the region, which is responsible for the creation and operation of the RCC, indicate the need to include representatives of other authorities and subordinate organizations in the RCC, and determine the deputy head of the region (vice-governor), supervising the implementation of the resolution and supervising the work of the RCC. At the same time, the status of the RCCs, enshrined in official documents, is very diverse. In most regions, it is defined as a "project office", less often as a "working group" or "collegiate, advisory body", there are options when the RCC is actually combined with the situational center of the region or created as a division within a subordinate institution. For example, in St. Petersburg, by order of the governor [28], the creation of the RCC was entrusted to the Committee for Territorial Development, with the status of a permanent advisory body under the supervision of the vice-governor responsible for domestic policy.

One of the important, from our point of view, factors is the institutional specifics related to which thematic sector of the regional administration oversees the functioning of the RCCs in a particular region. In our opinion, this largely affects the focus and priorities in the current work of the RCCs. To solve this problem, information was collected on which block of powers falls under the responsibility of the lieutenant governor, who oversees the activities of the RCC in each particular region.

Data collection was carried out by studying the regulations governing the activities of regional RCCs. As a rule, these documents have the status of orders of the heads of the constituent entities of the Federation on the creation of a Regional Control Center,

often this order indicates the responsible department of the regional administration and indicates the deputy head in charge of the work of the RCC. Then, on the site of the administration or the regional government, the area of responsibility of this leader was determined. In parallel, an analysis was made of publications in the media and social media on the specifics of the activity of the regional authorities in the creation of the RCC system, and information about the curators of this activity in specific regions was also taken from this source. The data obtained were placed in a summary table and subjected to verification and clarification by several sources. The following areas of authority were fixed: internal policy, including work with the media, PR, etc.; development of informatization, e-government, etc.

Based on the monitoring results, a clear division in two main areas did not work out, since in some regions one deputy head oversees both domestic policy and digitalization. In our opinion, the allocation of the “digitalization” block is important due to the fact that in many regions a situation has arisen of duplication of electronic channels of interaction with citizens - created on their own initiative by regional or municipal administrations and centralized, which are provided by the RCC system. It is institutional moments that currently significantly affect the success of solving this important problem - ensuring the seamless integration of digital systems.

The overall distribution by region with division into federal districts is presented in Table 1. The table shows that in 45 regions (54%) the RCC belongs to the “domestic policy” block, powers (“domestic policy” and “digitalization”) are combined in 20 regions (24%), in 16 regions (19%) the RCC belongs to the “digitalization” block and in two subjects - to other sectors (security and financial block).

**Table 1** Distribution of subjects of the federation by blocks of powers of deputy heads of regions in charge of RCC activities (grouping by federal districts)

Federal district	Number of entities in the district	Powers			
		Domestic politics	Domestic politics and digitalization	Digitalization and other areas	Other
Central	16	9	3	Four	0
Northwestern	11	7	1	3	0
Ural	6	4	1	1	0
Volga	14	8	4	2	0
Southern	8	2	3	2	1
North-Caucasian	7	2	4	1	0
Siberian	10	10	0	0	0
Far Eastern	11	3	4	3	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>

Data from the e-Governance Center of ITMO University [26]

In our opinion, the most promising from the point of view of information integration and ensuring the connection of administrative processes for processing applications and appeals of citizens in electronic form are those regions where the RCC curator is the vice-governor, who is simultaneously responsible for domestic policy and digitalization or digitalization and development of regional information systems. In total, 36 subjects (43%) meet this criterion.

At present, one can already observe the first steps that the regions are taking towards integrating initiative channels of electronic participation with centralized ones. As an example, we can cite the Belgorod region, where the portal “People’s Expertise” (<https://narod-expert.ru/>) has markers of accesses through FP and social networks. And it should be noted that in the Belgorod Region, the RCC is supervised by the First Deputy Governor of the Belgorod Region, who combines this position with the leadership of the Digital Development Department.

## 5 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

The main findings are as follows

1. Starting from 2020, the e-participation system in Russia is being transformed. New channels of interaction with citizens are being developed (a centralized feedback platform, etc., which are provided as part of the functioning of the RCC system, which in some cases causes duplication of channels at the regional level).
2. Analysis of the development process of e-participation in the Russian Federation allows us to divide it into the following phases
  - First: initiative-public (2010–2012)
  - Second: initiative-regional (2012–2020)
  - Third: centralized-federal (starting from 2020)
 These stages can be thought of as “waves” that coexist with varying degrees of intensity over certain periods of time. Currently, the “wave of centralization” of electronic participation is growing, and this indicates the desire of the federal government to control the situation on the ground, in connection with which a number of problems and implicit conflicts of interest arise between the federal authorities and the regional authorities. One can also note a growing trend towards the dissemination of this experience to local governments.
3. In our opinion, the success of solving the problems of integrating digital resources of electronic participation largely depends on the powers of the vice-governors - curators of the RCCs in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Further testing of the hypothesis about the influence of the powers of vice-governors will be carried out in 2022, in the course of improving the methodology for monitoring e-participation channels in the regions of Russia, which is conducted by the ITMO e-Governance Center in partnership with ANO Dialog-Regions.

Of course, further research will also need to answer the question of the extent to which existing services and media environments reflect the real needs and preferences of citizens in the context of social groups in the context of expanding opportunities for

electronic participation. It seems that it is extremely important to develop a holistic model of the ecosystem of interaction between citizens and authorities, based on real empirical data. An important research task is a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of the role of e-participation as a process of making managerial decisions in Russia under the influence of centralization in the context of interaction between levels of executive power and internal transformations of political and managerial processes within the management apparatus.

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# **Geography of Culture, Sport and Tourism**



# Universities, Cultural Diversity and Global Ethics: Opportunities for Moral Leadership

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**Abstract.** The paper discusses such phenomena as equality, respect and fairness as the basis for creating a global future worth having. The investigation deals with the concept of a new vision for higher education and analyzes the process of change management. Change leadership—the management of significant change and the ability to focus and align their colleagues on needed change—has become the key work of leaders. The context of a new vision for education which calls for mindset shift from reading and writing to skills acquisition with relevance for daily life and society becomes imperative. Ethics education is the opportunity for a new value orientation. Such education ensures the training of both the teacher and the student, develops new technologies and conclusively allows a new vision, a new policy, a new market, new resources and a new system. The multi-cultural university of the 21st century, as a center of thought leadership that creates and imparts conceptual and practical knowledge, is by its very nature ethical. The paper highlights such phenomena as equality, respect and fairness as the basis for creating a global future worth having. The conclusion of this paper is the fundamental idea that education does not happen in isolation but is carried out through societal, environmental and human channels.

**Keywords:** Cultural diversity · Global ethics · Moral leadership · Management of change · Discrimination

## 1 Introduction

The relevance of the paper is connected with the Universities' moral responsibilities, their mission, the challenges of ethics and cultural diversity. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the phenomenon of contemporary, multi-cultural university and reveal the key changes in global educational ethics. The following tasks have been set:

- to discuss the responsibilities of a higher education leader;
- to highlight the necessity for the change leadership at the Universities;
- to analyze the process of change management;
- to view the global ethics movement;
- to emphasize the core moral values of the multi-cultural university.

The novelty of this study lies in the fact that nowadays there is an insufficient number of generalizing studies on the dynamics of Higher Education changes.

Five strategic challenges in particular are in the center of the changing realities for institutional leaders:

- (1) **Costs and Competitiveness**—several universities and colleges are facing financial challenges due to declining revenues from Government, changed market conditions and shifts in student demand. Others are looking at mergers and there are likely between now and 2030, to be significant structural changes in our systems of higher education.
- (2) **Structural Complexity**—With the pursuit of massification of higher education since the mid 1960's, there has been a growing expectation that more and more individuals will attend college and university and that the percentage of individuals in the workforce with a post-secondary qualification will continuously rise. Indeed, some countries have committed to this as a strategic intention. The number of colleges and universities has led to a very complex system which has on its own created some noteworthy barriers to learner articulation and mobility.
- (3) **Changing Student Expectations**—As students pay more of the costs of their own education, they demand more in terms of quality, relevance and engagement. More specifically, students are seeking high quality courses and programs which are work relevant (but not solely focused on employment competencies) and engaging. Students today are much more critical of the quality of their education than many of their predecessors. As governments reduce their per-capita expenditure on higher education (following the trend they have pursued over the last twenty years), these expectations will increase.
- (4) **Technological Development**—Since 2000 there have been many changes in the technological landscape. Hand held devices now surpass desk-top computers in terms of ownership and use. Growing access to broadband (but still not universal) has changed access to knowledge, information, services and support. The emergence of online learning has transformed access to learning for a great many students and has changed the dynamics of higher education.
- (5) **Global Competitiveness**—it will get more difficult over time to recruit, retain students as the market for these students becomes increasingly competitive and value sensitive. Governments will assess institutional performance by their ability to sustain themselves while offering less financial support per capita: expectations will grow while resources available to meet these expectations shift from government to more varied sources of revenue. There are other factors too—demography, a rapidly changing knowledge base, new 'political correctness' sensitivities—but the above mentioned five ones dominate the conversations of leaders. How they respond to the interrelated impacts of these challenges determines the extent of their ability to lead and the sustainable impact their leadership may have on their institution.

## 2 Methods of Research

This work uses scientific research methods such as content analysis, synthesis and generalization. Similarly, a comparison method was applied to identify the changes made in Higher Education.

## 3 Theoretical Background

A project that seeks to develop values-driven leadership presents today's universities with an important new opportunity. It was anticipated nearly a century ago when the eminent Harvard professor of philosophy, Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) wrote prophetically that the “task of a university is the creation of the future, so far as rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation, can affect the issue” [1]. James M. Burnes and K. Lewin are historians and political scientists who are known for the nature of leadership analysis and consideration. Burnes J. and Lewin K. highlight the importance of Leadership and Change where new decisions are made, which surprise stakeholders and the information base, on which the change is being made keeps changing [2]. Professor Martin Prozesky is an ethics trainer and writer operating under the banner of Compass Ethics. According to Prozesky the term “global ethics movement” can be taken to refer to a number of attempts at arriving at a set of ethical values that could be accepted across the globe [3, 4]. Kidder developed an inclusive approach to global ethics, R. Kidder analyzed and appraised the values rated most highly by people in a number of countries around the world [5]. Lloyd Geering discusses the phenomenon of personal freedom. Using Lloyd Geering's helpful and instructive typology we have the many surviving forms of ethnic morality [6]. Murgatroyd and Simpson evaluated the ideas of renaissance leadership for the global knowledge economy in their investigations and emphasize the development tactics that are built for the leaders who aim to have diverse skills [7].

## 4 Results of Research

### 4.1 Changes in Higher Education

Most faculty members, administrators and support staff do not especially like change. They are suspicious both of the outcomes and the process, and will usually question the motives for change, especially if the rationale for change is presented in terms of external factors (financial, competitive factors, etc.) or in response to emerging technology. They are fearful for their future, both in terms of employment and security, but also for the design of their day to day work. Change is generally resisted, always questioned and sometimes seriously challenged. While similar sentiments may be found in business and other organizations, universities and colleges appear unable to engage and accelerate change as there are few incentives for them to do so. Ethical behavior in the management of change is key to the success of any change initiative. This takes five key forms:

- (1) Trust in the Message and the Information on which it is Based: Stakeholders need to know that the information on which the change work is based is “the best it can be”

and that there is integrity about the data, the analysis of these data and the options for change being presented. When there is a sense of bias, mistrust in the evidence base for change, then there will be mistrust in the process of change.

- (2) **Genuine Engagement Rather than Tokenism:** stakeholders feel that their voices are heard and that their suggestions are carefully considered and, where appropriate, included in the plan for change. They know that their voice carries weight.
- (3) **Development of a Values Driven Change Process**—the change process is planned and designed so as to leverage and support the values of the organization. These values are articulated and the plan for change is tested against them.
- (4) **A Sense of Shared Outcome—The Change Will Benefit More Than a Few:** The change plan has consequences but these consequences seek to improve outcomes and performance for all not just a few. While some may be more impacted by change than others, the intended outcomes are aligned with the mission and values of the organization.
- (5) **Clarity About the Change Plan:** Once the change plan is made and communication lines established, organizational members do not receive constant surprises or sudden requests for action. The organizational members know what they have to do and why.

These ethical principles are the bedrock of an approach to change which others have called “planned change. In this approach there are focused outcomes agreed by stakeholders and the journey to these outcomes is negotiated with stakeholders, who feel a true sense of engagement [2]. Some changes in higher education institutions can be seen as planned and others as emergent. One key difference between these two kinds of change—planned and emergent—is the ethical bases of the change. In planned change ethics are front and center and are guiding the process of change. In emergent change expediency and urgency drive the process, with ethical behavior sometimes sacrificed for a “quick win” [8]. This leads to very different sense of stakeholder engagement and a very different focus for leadership. In emergent change, leadership is often focused on mediating between conflicting groups whereas in planned change the focus is more on engagement with all stakeholders on an agreed journey and destination. One is built on trust and the other is built on mistrust. Given the commitment to collegiality and peer decision making within the higher education sector, planned and ethical change seem to fit culturally, especially if coupled with a strong use of empathy and evidence based decision making. Emergent change is often seen in a higher education context as expediency and is generally done with poor or no consultation and a lack of genuine engagement [9].

## 4.2 Change Leadership

Change leadership is a fraught process, especially in higher educational institutions where professional autonomy is strong and tenure, supported by collective agreements written and agreed to at a different time, a reality for leaders to deal with. In many situations, managing by consensus is not possible, and so tensions and anxiety are very real. Also very real when faced with significant challenge, threat or uncertainty, is genuine

and deep anxiety. According to Moujaes, C.N effective change leaders have three main roles:

- **Thinking Ahead**—thinking back from the future, having undertaken cross-boundary learning and explored global and local developments. Using this work to develop a shared sense and shape of the future.
- **Leading Across their School and System**—demonstrate focused, ethical and effective leadership within their institution and system through their openness, personal mastery and passion.
- **Delivering Within**—ensuring that the institution continuously improves its performance, not just for some but for all. Driving performance with passion and being systematic, focused and mindful in leading change and measuring results [10]. These three managerial behaviors need to come from a stronger catalogue of leadership dispositions, such as these:
- **Practice personal mastery:** They have high integrity and view self-awareness as a prerequisite for leadership. They work hard to develop their capacity to innovate, and to inspire others to join them in making the world a better place and their school a great place for all.
- **Apply a glocal mindset:** They have a keen sense of history and seek a holistic understanding of changes taking place on a global scale. They use this global perspective as they address local challenges and seize opportunities (global and local—hence “glocal”) to connect their work and that of others in the school to developments taking place elsewhere.
- **Accelerate cross-boundary learning:** They constantly seek to satisfy an intense curiosity about every facet of human life, past and present, scientific and artistic, technical and social. They guide others in distilling meaning from a morass of information, and efficiently apply their learning in creative ways to nurture innovation and drive improved performance.
- **Think back from the future:** They are readily able to imagine and articulate alternate futures and work back from there—connecting with lessons from the past to better understand the present and choose among possible paths to the future they see.
- **Lead systemic change:** They are systems thinkers who seek out patterns, interconnections and interdependencies. They are skilled in seeking common ground and nurturing productive collaboration across diverse parts of a system—be it an organization, a sector, a community, a network—to solve complex problems and drive large-scale change in their own school.
- **Drive performance with a passion:** They care that their leadership makes a substantive and sustainable difference, and are relentless in their commitment to performance. They articulate clear (and high) expectations of themselves and others, create focused strategies for innovating to achieve these ends, and are disciplined about assessing progress. These six characteristics, developed by Murgatroyd and Simpson, are not listed in order of importance nor are they intended to be complete [7]. It is becoming more difficult to recruit and retain such leaders. Underlying all of this work is the challenge of being an effective, focused communicator—engaged in communication that conveys determination, optimism, conviction, integrity and realism. Such

communication cannot be “command and control”, but has to lead to engagement, involvement and action [11].

### 4.3 The Values of Multi-cultural Universities

By nature, people in all cultures want to thrive; they want to experience sustainable happiness and avoid as much suffering as possible. Experience shows that these desires cannot be achieved alone but depend on the support of others. Conversely, they can be harmed by the enmity of others, as we also all know from personal experience. Sustainable thriving therefore is a matter of understanding and managing our relationships with others in ways that increase the level of support we give and receive from one another, and reduce or even eliminate enmity [3]. From this bio-cultural approach to global ethics a set of core values can be deduced which is very similar to the findings of Kidder R. [5]. The resultant set of core values can be grouped in two related sets: those that express the various main facets of beneficence (which means doing what is beneficial to others) and those that express the various facets of integrity, understood as a commitment to consistent truthfulness [6].

According to the scholar M. Prozesky the beneficence values are connected with generosity, truthfulness, respect, freedom without harm, and inclusiveness. The integrity values are connected with reliability, justice and fairness, trustworthiness, self-knowledge, open-mindedness and judicious criticality [3]. There is thus ample justification from human nature, from reflective experience across cultures, from philosophy, culture and religion for the following conclusion about global ethics: “Our separate histories, homelands and cultures have given the world a divided soul but not, at heart, a divided conscience” [4]. The core emergent principle of active concern for the common good provides an invaluable basis for negotiating a fresh, respectful and fully inclusive way to forge a truly inclusive global ethic and to handle the things about which our cultures differ. It is here that an important opportunity exists for the contemporary, multi-cultural university. There are three reasons for this contention. The first one derives its moral status from the integrity cluster of values. It asserts that the business of creating and sharing knowledge is itself a core form of ethical practice (as distinct from teaching about ethics, which may have no real impact on actual practice) [12]. Knowledge must be true to count as knowledge, and in every value-system accessed in the global ethics movement, truth is judged to be a central moral value. So to be in the knowledge business is to be in the ethics business whether our universities acknowledge this explicitly or not. Thought that is characterized by factual error, mere opinion, illogicality and partisanship and that is untested by the critical assessment of qualified peers is not thought leadership but an unpardonable waste of resources. The second reason derives its moral status from both the beneficence and integrity clusters of moral values. It is that academics are key ethics players in their roles as researchers, teachers and in their community service. The examples they set both personally and in how they do their work are noted by their students and colleagues, and send out clear ethical (and sometimes unethical) messages [13]. So it is important to ask how well the academics and administrators are equipped for their role in providing moral influence in the academy and beyond. It should be noted that university staff members all have the right to be religious or not, but the notion that

they have the right to be professionally amoral if they choose, or that the right to freedom means the possibility of dishonest behavior off campus must be firmly rejected as a violation of the ethical principles of integrity and responsibility. The third reason for asserting that universities worthy of the name are by their nature ethical relates to the beneficence cluster of values. Beneficence is defined as an act of kindness and mercy with a strong connotation of moral obligation. Universities are inherently social. They are places which cannot function without cooperation and inter-personal reliability [8]. The duty to increase knowledge is of course non-negotiable, but nobody ever does this entirely alone, without recourse to laboratories, libraries, learned journals, administrative departments and those who staff them. It will be clear that in drawing on these resources and those who work there, staff members who do so respectfully and considerately will help maintain the spirit of helpfulness that is essential for success, just as rude or inconsiderate behavior damages that spirit. Having set out these three reasons for defining the university as by its nature ethical, it is now possible to identify the most important challenges facing universities in connection with the further development of a global ethic. They are the inter-disciplinary and multicultural development of a maximally inclusive, multicultural value system as a contribution to the global ethics movement; the development of a values-driven pedagogy which will incorporate the values of the developing global ethic; and thirdly to develop leaders in any field imbued with those values, so fitting them for a moral impact in a globalizing, richly multi-cultural world [1, 14]. The operations and structures of an ethically excellent, multi-cultural university will embody and practice agreed, basic ethical values such as those listed in the table above and avoid the opposites of those ethical qualities, above all dishonesty, injustice, mediocrity, selfishness, disrespect and laziness.

## 5 Conclusion

As we look at the beginning of a transformative period in higher education, we need to ensure that institutional leadership focuses on change skills, competencies and ethical, planned change. If change is to occur without disruption and lead to improved learning outcomes for learners, greater equity and the most effective use of available resources, planned change is essential. While business leaders can simply exercise authority and demand change—something we can see in some private educational institutions and publishing organizations—universities and colleges do need to bring their people with them to ensure the sustainability of change. What makes this work more difficult is the increasing austerity and financial challenges which higher educational leaders now have to cope with. Reduced per capita funding coupled with demand for greater student numbers, better quality, more work-ready skills, more commercially focused innovation and research—leaders are challenged simply to maintain what they have, especially in terms of people, buildings and infrastructure. As more change happens, leadership will be under considerable pressure. It would be easy to respond in an emergent rather than planned way. Yet time and time again in the study of effective, sustainable organizational change it is important to highlight the importance of engagement, building ownership of a plan and making decisions with an evidence and empathy base. In higher education we need a high quality of leadership with the necessary skills and capabilities for this work.



## 5.1 Practical Considerations for Universities

Ethics must never be just an impressive set of concepts and principles; it is pre-eminently something done, so there are the guidelines and measures for implementing the kind of multi-cultural, global ethics project described above. The guidelines are given according to the underlying principles of an effective ethics program in any multi-cultural organization but especially in universities.

- The essential foundation for institutional ethical strength is excellent thought leadership about ethics itself.
- Ethics must be understood in the light of all available knowledge about it. It is not the exclusive province of one or two historically dominant disciplines, nor is the gift of the west or of religion to the whole world.
- Ethical strength depends much more on commitment than compliance.
- Commitment requires that all those affected must be able to participate freely in enhancing the ethical quality of the university in question.
- There is no organizational quick fix for ethics: achieving and sustaining deep ethical quality is an ongoing, monitored process.
- Organizational ethical strength has three key aspects: workplace ethical strength, individual moral character, and exemplary ethical leader.
- To achieve success in a multi-cultural society, the processes and values of ethical enhancement must be multi-culturally based.
- Top-down moralizing is fatal to an ethics project; instead it is essential to appeal to and involve the ethical strengths and experiences of the members of the university on a voluntary, respectful basis.
- All parts of the organization must be involved, including the leadership.

## 5.2 The Challenges of Contemporary Ethical Education

With these principles to guide the implementation of the ethics project envisaged in this chapter, here are practical steps that can be taken.

- (1) Constitute and authorize a task group with ethical and related expertise. It is vitally important to implement rules that need to be followed by all staff members. The staff members are supposed to treat each other with respect and tolerance, any kind of discrimination should be rejected.
- (2) Drive and manage the process under a respected leader. It is the job of the leader to provide solutions to the problems and implement conflict resolution methods in an appropriate manner.
- (3) Invite and enable all members to participate in discussing and defining the core ethical values and ethical nature of their institution, e.g. by means of sending inputs to the task group in response to drafts created by the task group. The drafts are then revised and a second version is sent to members.
- (4) Develop a careful, academically and ethically sound method of fostering moral motivation—i.e. the will to do the proper thing at all times and communicate this to all members of the institution. Clear objectives, standards and expectations are regarded as key requirements for ethical performance.

From human brain science we learn that there are powerful structures in the brain-stem, the limbic system and hippocampus which drive (but do not coerce) us to actions that keep us alive and help us thrive, such as our pleasure, memory and feeling centers [15]. Uncontrolled by conscience, they easily lead to selfishness and even violence by those equipped to use it. A realistic institution must recognize this reality and curb its harmful potential by understanding the following. Policing, metaphorically understood as that which protects the staff and students from wrong-doing and from wrong-doers, must always be there in any institution. It requires two arms: external, in the form of effective, fair disciplinary structures, personnel and where necessary punishments, and internal, in the form of the moral sense or conscience of members. The ideal situation is where individual conscience is strong, backed by a strong ethical workplace culture and by ethical leaders, and where these are supported by the minimum of effective external policing. The worst situation is where both internal and external policing are weak, for that opens the door to the evils of academic corruption. To achieve the ideal situation, it is not enough for the multi-cultural university to open its doors to people from any culture. It must enlist their commitment to participating in the project of creating a richly ethical, multi-cultural future for the academy and the world by understanding their backgrounds and needs, seeking to meet those needs and ensuring that the university they attend is not just inclusive in name but in reality. For this to happen a special responsibility rests on the shoulders of the senior university leadership. Only they can set the right tone for a truly inclusive campus that embraces ethical values all can share. Achieving that requires of them the visible, consistent practice of three cardinal values: equality, respect and fairness. Equality means that everyone in the university is treated and valued equally as unique human beings with hopes, fears, frustrations, needs and feelings. Respect means accepting and valuing the reality that they come from diverse backgrounds, follow different faiths or none, and have different political loyalties. Fairness means relating even-handedly towards all, and that makes it essential that the leadership shows no trace of bias on grounds of belief, culture and political party. On this kind of basis our universities can do invaluable work to create a global future worth having. The only constant is change.

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# The Role of Russian Soft Power Institutions in Ukraine (2007–2014)

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**Abstract.** Soft power has already become an interior tool of any international actor. Hardly can one disagree with the fact that any state should definitely incorporate it in foreign policy institutions so as to utilise corresponding political potential within the framework contemporary system of international relations. NGOs become an evident central player in this effort. It is of prior importance to mention that the issue of formal multiple diversity of miscellaneous NGOs provides states with an opportunity to pursue long-run goals without a distinct affiliation to aforementioned organizations. This article is devoted to Russian path and its attempts to create semi-government soft power “NGOs” and their influence in Ukraine within a period between 2007 and 2014.

**Keywords:** Soft power · NGOs · Ukraine

## 1 Introduction

The fact that Russia was not among «soft power» pioneering states (the USA, France and Great Britain mainly) did not prevent its official establishment from altering the negative opinion on the issue in the 21st century. Despite evident relative lag in terms of developed academic literature and practical experience of implementation corresponding mechanisms, Russia made an attempt to incorporate the very notion of soft power in its foreign agenda and, thus include it in the main doctrines that determine foreign policy and its decision-making procedures.

The very first appearance of the aforementioned notion was tightly connected with the beginning of research period. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister (since 2004) Sergey Lavrov was the first official who include corresponding issue in his official speech that was related to the topic of protection of rights and maintenance of warm and deep connection between Russia and its compatriots living abroad (autumn 2008). He focused on the prior and exorbitant role of vital Russian values, especially, language, rich history and culture. S. Lavrov pointed that Russia should not avoid contemporary and well-known methods of influence via available sources of indirect branding that are of high quality in Russia (language, history and culture). All these attributes of Russia could play «civilizational» role so as to guarantee the general increase of state’s attraction and

its international status [1]. Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin then multiply used the notion and declare one of the main goals for the whole model of Russian soft power—to unite compatriots abroad in order to stay in touch so as to always have an opportunity to protect and support in all the cases.

The issue of soft power and its importance was one of the main topics within the framework of National Security Council discussions several times within the period. V. Putin raised the necessity of enhancing corresponding mechanisms of indirect influence via social and political cooperation trade and dispersion of cultural values in order to provide Russian foreign policy with an effective and relevant tool to compete efficiently on the international arena for the promotion of national interests abroad [2]. Moreover, one of the most exponential points there was in the fact that abovementioned opportunity to promote was strongly connected with not only diverse image-based initiatives but with principal statements about national security and its provision. The very sharp relation was explained by the idea that international community of overfilled with the same or comparable strategies of influence and Russia cannot be an exception. Evident and visible presence in the international informational agenda is of vital importance for any state that want to be politically sovereign and economically independent in, at least, preferable degree [3]. Despite the fact that such a grave notion of the necessity of soft mechanisms within the framework of Russian public diplomacy, foreign policy and even national security will be clearly understandable if the context of the Crimean crisis and its consequences are taken into account. Thus, last and the sharpest in terms of informational security and media coverage Council within the framework of chosen period was after the secession of Crimea. However, some premises, of course, were obviously visible before the crisis and it could not be eliminated when analyzing the organization and structure of Russian soft power model between its very official beginning and occurrence of the Crisis. Thus, a research question of the whole work to determine the role of soft power tools in the Ukrainian direction of Russia's foreign policy.

Working on the topic, numerous research methods were used, both general logical (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction) and general scientific. A systematic approach allows us to consider the foreign policy of a particular country as part of a broad system of international relations and interests. Elements of structural and functional analysis are also used, when the role of each institution is considered not on the basis of legal definitions, but on the basis of the functions that this institution actually performs.

## 2 Main Part

Despite the fact that the notion of «soft power» appeared in Russian official discourse only in 2008 the number of official documents in the field of foreign policy had anticipated its appearance and further practical implementation. The Doctrine of Informational Security of Russian Federation from September 9, 2000 was the first document with some prerequisites for the future usage of media resources and informational databases in the light of foreign policy goals in order to sustain national security via the Internet [4]. The Internet and corresponding media opportunities were claimed to be one of the most preferential ways to promote the opinion on certain events and shape informational background of contemporary events in order to support government positions and promote

its view on the situation. Moreover, further amendments and alterations in the doctrine had focused on the fact that Russia was evidently underrepresented in the Internet scope and related sources of informational dispersion. It makes Russian image-based agenda weaker and more vulnerable in comparison with properly represented states, for example, the US. Such a situation can be used against not only Russian interests abroad but decrease its efficiency in terms of maintaining own economic, social and political values [5].

The Conception of Russian participation in International Development from June 14, 2007 should be another document that needs to be analyzed in order understand Russian soft power model. The prior goals of Russia in the international relations and global agenda were declared in this document. There was an idea of influence on global process with a clear aim to build substantial, stable and fair democratic order. Furthermore, strengthening and promoting of Russian authority in the world community was pointed as another priority. Increasing of intensity of integrational procedures in terms of economic cooperation among countries with significant role Russian production in the domestic market and development of cultural, scientific, economic, educational connection with foreign state and non-government organizations were depicted as preferable in the nearest future. Moreover, it was the first document with the clear appearance of the issue of «belt of good neighborliness» (belt of *dobrosesdstvo*) [6]. The goal of the last aforementioned initiative was to organize pro-Russian discourse in terms of informational, economic and political agenda in neighboring states. It was mainly related to previous Soviet Republics. The appearance (at least, nominal) of this buffer zone between Russia and other states was the fundamental stone in the organization of «Russian World» system and its implementation. The idea of Russian World lies in the fact that all the states that are incorporated in it have to be widely influenced by Russian language (maybe even official or the second official), to be in agreement with Kremlin official political line, at least it general trends and to be ready to cooperate in terms of trade and economic development.

Strategy of Development of Informational Society from February 7, 2008 was aimed at the evident raising of Russian competitiveness on the international arena in terms of informational production and enlightenment of the influential events with the correspondence to the interest of Russian citizens. It incorporated the basic pillars of aforementioned Conception of Russian participation in International Development from June 14, 2007 and Doctrine of Informational Security of Russian Federation from September 9, 2000 but made a step of further in terms of media coverage and the role of positive image of Russia as an independent international actor [7]. The lack of strong positions in the field was tightly connected with problems in trade and business relations abroad. Evident and significant increase of Russian state image was promoted as one of the prior ways in order to multiply improve foreign investment environment in Russia and boost the rate of funds coming from Western partners. Moreover, stable and prosperous international status as efficient brand can boost chance of domestic producers to reach success in the foreign markets because of growing credibility and multidimensional trust. Thus, already in 2007, Russian official political establishment clearly tied the matters of national branding and economic opportunities not only in terms of export potentials

but in import preferences as well. Furthermore, the scope of influence of Russian international reputation and attractiveness was promoted as miscellaneously beneficial for government sector (economic and political institutions comprising the whole sectors of foreign trade and policy, internal market of goods) and private actors of all the business levels from small entrepreneurs to large corporations [7].

Conception of Foreign Policy from July 12, 2008 was one of the most significant documents even among the major ones analyzed within the framework of this work. The Conception was the first document where Russian foreign policy decision-makers made a shift in responds to a changing nature of international relations and Russian place in the world arena. The prior difference from corresponding Conception of 2000 and brand-new approach was in fact that Russia officially was not satisfied with the role of an equal participant in the international agenda and related informational streams. Russian power potential was estimated as equal to the leaders and agenda setters in the arena that is why the increase in the decisive opportunities of Russia was one of the main goals [8]. It was a point of no return in terms of Russian political ambitions in the global arena and its authorities wanted to be among the most decisive ones. The legitimization of such attempts was tightly connected with fail of Western monopoly on the world order and its blatant tries to deter and restrict Russian geopolitical inclinations [8]. The prior thing that needs to be mentioned arguing about this radical alteration in the view of Russian foreign policy makers on its role and positions is that it was proposed as a reactive measure but not an initiative. For this reason, the content of the Conception incorporated multiples references to historical legacies and experience within EU (as a representative of Western side) and Russian relations. The EU and the US were blamed for sharp and inappropriate relation towards Russian interests abroad in all the spheres that were considered as main by foreign policy makers. Moreover, the UN Security Council was accused of its incapability to utilize sanctions against evident and strong violations of world order and legitimate peace (the reference to Kosovo case and NATO intrusion without direct agreement in the Council) [8]. The experience of neglecting practices towards the main principles of international law that were evidently assessed to be detrimental to the whole system of legal interstate cooperation and communication could not be left without corresponding changes in Russian approach towards Western colleagues and the system in general. Russian establishment officially pointed its historical-based, economic-based and law-based rights to have greater possibilities to influence and act as one of the main and equal players [8]. Cultural values, language, historical background were considered to be of tremendous influence as contemporary instruments of achieving goals in the foreign policy. The start of gradual process of transition of power or, at least, its dispersion from Western states that were a power center for the last two decades (after Cold War) was depicted. The next Conception (from November 30, 2016) elaborated this approach and the role of soft influence in its maintenance because of the fact that there was already an experience of usage corresponding mechanisms [9].

Strategy of National Security from May 12, 2009 continued the mood of the above-mentioned Conception and focused on the altered reality of Russian power. Russia was declared as the state that successfully all the threats from nationalists, separatists and international terrorists' forces. Furthermore, economic situation was evaluated as multiple times better than in the very beginning of the century. For this reason, current

Russian status on the international arena as well its Strategy of National Security from 1997 were treated as obsolete and irrelevant [10]. It was the second document where Russia strengthened its approach towards its willingness towards leading positions and the status of world power (“mirovaya derzhava”) [10].

Main streams (decree) of Russian policy in the sphere of International cultural and humanitarian cooperation from December 18, 2010 was the last but not the least in terms of importance document that played tremendous role within the organization of implementation Russian foreign policy and, thus, soft power practicing. The document not only made another step towards affiliation of Russian power potential and growing role in the sustainability of world order but it finally bolstered the transition from traditional power-assessment practices that were based on the weight of military and economic properties of the states to pure soft ones. Approach that was promoted in the document was based on cultural values, historical roots and international attractiveness [11]. Of course, traditional way of influence and promotion of national security, sovereignty and independence such as military opportunities and economic development was not eliminated but their role was changed from the initially and traditionally prior to supporting and basing one. This document together with aforementioned ones was an attempt to reject the sole and all-inclusive nature of military spheres in the issue of national security. Societal, economic, environmental and other non-military soft dimensions should be properly established and further elaborated in order to sustain the stability [12].

Thus, Russian foreign policy within a period of 2–3 (2008–2010) years evidently officially switched from the traditional approaches towards influence and its reaching with a strong reliance upon intrusive force, economic pressure (in energetic and resource spheres mainly) and military deterrence to the ones of soft and indirect impetus (culture, language, historical background and unity), at least, nominally. Moreover, it restructured own self-identification in terms of international decision-making processes and the role of power in it. Russian soft power potential hardly could be overestimated, especially within the framework of the Post-Soviet Republics because of the aforementioned common historic, economic and social experience and background.

Russia promoted three basic and quite verifiable points in order to support the benevolence of own approaches and reject the status of evil colonial empire. According to Konstantin Kosachev (Head of Rossotrudnichestvo 2012–2014), there first one was an evident lack of necessity to gain brand new territories (sound ironic after the Crimea but it was well before the crisis) that could be easily proven with map and demographical statistics. The second was related to inherent capacities to integrate and cooperate with tremendous amounts of various cultures, traditions and ethnicities (multinational state). The third was in fact that for the vast majority of Post-Soviet Republics Russia was the first and only power that «let them go» without military secessions [13]. However, such a high degree of confidence in the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and neighboring states could lead to apparent fail in the balancing budget expenditures—for the agenda within the territories of post-Soviet states and within the national borders of others. The idea of common grounds for the multidimensional communications was detrimental for Russian soft power in these states in terms financial aid and official attention. Nobody wanted to spend huge amounts of money on the activities that were connected to populations that had been already in deep touch with Russian culture,



language, economy and political stream because of the fact the money could be spent on more socially, economically, politically distant regions so as to gain representative results. Moscow was basically incapable to implement the viable model establishing positive status of Russia among these nations without providing direct investments, special energy prices and, thus, bolstering their economic dependence that could not be absolutely incorporated within the boundaries of soft power concept [14].

That is why the idea of brother nations was really dangerous for Russian public diplomacy and Ukraine became the most notorious proof. Ukraine was defined as the one of the most common and close nations to Russia. Nevertheless, the practice of foreign policy of the period shown that the more state was elaborated as close and friendly, the less soft attention was devoted to it. Nonetheless, Ukraine was of exorbitant importance for Russia both culturally and socially because of the fact that significant portion of Russian society identify Ukraine as non-official part of Russia and non-official only accidentally [15]. Despite the fact that the same thoughts were popular among the Ukrainians within the Eastern part and the abovementioned principles of Russian safety mentioned by K. Kosachev, concerns of Russian imperial streams in politics were strong as well and could not be rejected and Maidan respondents just proved the situation of duality of relations [16]. On the one hand, Russian population was close and common to Ukrainian one. On the other, Russian political establishment was at huge risks to fall in imperial dreams. Moreover, economic cooperation with Russia was of non-equal structure and could provoke even poorer state of economy in Ukraine because of increasing dependence in the Russian domestic market of goods and energy supplies [16]. Russia at the same time promoted the idea of parallel and even more dangerous dependency of Ukraine but with EU in case of Association Agreement signed.

Further chapters will analyze the implementation of aforementioned officially agreed and granted principles in Ukraine within a period of their first practical utilization between 2007 and 2014.

### **3 Russian World Foundation (NGO)**

From its very creation in 2007 and almost two further years until 2009, the establishment of Russian World Foundation blatantly ignored Ukraine and nearly eliminated it from the agenda of the foundation. The only relatively visible projects that were realized by the organization were related to books and were evidently of poor scale. The most significant was «Literature Express» that gifted examples of books written by contemporary Russian authors to Kharkiv Humanitarian University and Kyiv National University [17]. Another impact that was launched towards Ukrainian audience can be connected with the presentation of the Second Russian World Assembly that was shown via only one Ukrainian TV channel - via Odessa TV [17].

In 2009 were opened two first centers in Ukraine, the first was in Kharkiv June 17, 2009—National Ukrainian Academy and the second in Lugansk September 18, 2009 [18]. However, within the same there were 3 centers in Kyrgyzstan, 3 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Tajikistan, 3 in Moldova, 4 in China, 3 in South Korea, 2 in Germany, 2 in Poland, 2 in Serbia [18]. It is evident, that Ukraine was of low priority in the sense of the activity of foundation. The number of events was critically limited and low in comparison to

not only European States and the other Post Soviet States as well. However, Ukrainian Kharkiv center organized 13 events from June to December 2009 and became one of the most effective of the year in terms of organizing public activities together Hungarian and Bulgarian ones. The vast majority of events were related to library, classes of patriotism and historical archives of the Second World War. There only exceptions were: Public classes on historical and cultural background of European region «Slobojanchina» October 2, Presentation of economic and law schools November 26, Russian culture day November 27, Business management council December 3 [18].

In 2010, Kharkiv center organized the conference “Russian language outside Russia as native: problems of using, teaching and learning” and it was chosen to land the seven International conference on “Rusistika and modernity” and got financial grant. Moreover, Russian Crimean diaspora was financially supported to organize the third International conference “Russian language political and cultural world” [19]. Social organization “Donbasskaya Rus” was financially supported in order organize debate club for the lovers of historical books “Tochka persechenia”. Russian World Foundation organized International media club “Ukraine-Russia” under the management of Lugansk social organization “The league of young deputies” [19]. One of the most influential ideas was to organize the net of scientific and historical programs that are related to the greatest Russian world representatives from Kharkiv or connected with the city in order to be broadcasted via local TV agencies. Russian World foundation sponsored the publication of pop science journal for adolescents “Strana Znaniy” in Ukraine. Furthermore, the third, the fourth, the fifth and even the sixth Russian centers were launched in Kyiv, March 4 and Donetsk, April 8, Rovno in November and Dnepropetrovsk November 26, 2010. Ukraine became the most presented country in terms of Russian World centers and the number of events was evidently huge (29) in comparison with the other aimed states [19]. Moreover, the most popular and applicable actions “Georgievskaya lentochka”, “History of my family”, “Sightseeing tour to the places of Russian Military Glory” were first implemented and tested in Ukraine 2010. The number of memory alleys were built this as well [19]. Russian World Foundation financed the research conducted by Kyiv center of political investigations “Russian language in contemporary Ukraine”, results were present in Moscow, March 30 [19].

2011–2014 was relatively poor in terms of events and their size among the Ukraine-based centers of the foundation. The started with round table in Donetsk center January 13 that was related to Konstantin Leontiev anniversary (180). Lugansk one organized International conference for Russian language teachers «Forms and methods of implementation school research activities». In March and October, Kharkiv launched seminar weeks for boosting qualifications of Russian language teachers as well. In Donetsk center in February 24, there were the same seminar courses but for history teachers. June 15–18, Kharkiv center organized international student theatre festival «On the wings of love». In Sevastopol December 15, 2011 the seventh center was created [20]. RWF initiated complex project that was related to financially support Russian language schools in Ukraine [20]. Like in 2010, it organized international conference «Russian language political and cultural world» in Crimea and created united Internet source for the association of Ukrainian teachers of Russian language [20]. Moreover, it continued research of war archives and made publications within «Konnoarmeyskiy way in Galichina. Documents»

The biggest history-based complex project was connected with Donbas, it included several round tables on the topic of the role of the territory during the Second World War, number of essay competitions on the same topic for students, publication that were related to the topic of patriotism and Great Victory, excursions to memorial places [20]. Kharkiv center filmed number of programs related to its reflection in Russian literature. There were two Russian language newspapers started «Russian World» in Crimea and «Russian Choice» in Sevastopol [20]. Another critical novelty was the appearance of 7 Russian Foundation cabinets: Chersonesos, Volchansk, Balakleya, Valki, Krasnograd, Zolochev, Izum.

2012 was a memory year in terms of patriotic war of 1812 and it reflected the vast majority of events. Lugansk center launched reading competitions on the of 1812 archive materials and corresponding literature while Sevastopol one organized memory evening that was tied to Borodin fight September 9 [21]. The eighth and ninth centers were opened in Chersonesos May 12 and Nikolaev (joined with the cabinet) July 12 2012. The second in Sevastopol and tenth in general center was organized in August 16 while the eleventh one was in Odessa December 6. All the aforementioned cabinets and centers took part in the memorial action «Vivat Pushkin» July 6 [21]. Despite the fact that these year Ukraine was not prioritized by the agenda of the foundation, according to its official statistics its Internet resources and general events were most visited in Ukraine: 8 points in comparison to 2 that is related to the second state in a row—Kazakhstan [21]. It means that Ukrainian population was evidently warm and open towards Russian language and culture even without significant efforts to the contrary situations in the other states.

November 20 and 21 2013 were opened new centers in Gorlovka and Zaporozhye. It is meaningful that these centers were nearly the only opened this year and during 2014 with exception the ones in Italy and Great Britain. Events were rather of cultural and pure literature-based. February 21 there was a public lecture on the topic of spirituality in Russian literature [22] and linguistic public seminars in Rovno center. February 23, there was a literature evening devoted to Prishvin. In March 13, Odessa center organized book exposition devoted to V. Vernadskiy. In the end of April, Sevastopol center organized big International Conference «Russian language in library space». June 8 was a date of Donetsk round tables that were related to 400-year anniversary of Romanov dynasty. Kharkiv center created festival devoted to 1025 anniversary of Baptism of Rus [22]. Moreover, there was a summer for Russian language teachers for improving skills in Odessa. Between December 2 and 8, there was a Russian culture week organized by Kharkiv center [22].

Speaking about 2014 due to the Crisis the vast majority of Cabinets and Centers were closed immediately, frozen and or just ineffective because of instability. Conferences and Assemblies were transferred in Russia and the prior topic was Ukraine and situation there [23]. Hardly can they somehow influence the situation and feeling of the population in Ukraine.

Taking everything mentioned above into consideration, it becomes evidently clear that RWF first do not take Ukraine as a serious destination of influence but then fairly added it to the agenda and even succeeded in it. However, all the agenda was related to the history of Patriotic War of 1812, Great Victory of 1945, classic Russian language

literature and Russian language in general. The problem here is that all the aforementioned achievements and properties are of dubious uniqueness in connection with solely Russia as state because of the fact that the greatest victories were made by previously existed Russian Empire and Soviet Union that included the territory of Ukraine as well as Russian one. Moreover, Russian language and, thus, its literature is accepted as native by a relatively big portion of Ukrainian citizens, they can understand Russian as native but identify themselves as Ukrainians.

Rossotrudnichestvo and Russian Centers of Science and Culture (government NGO).

From the very beginning and until 2012, the main instrument of influence of Rossotrudnichestvo was related to its foreign representative centers—Russian Centers of Science and Culture. Speaking about its aims in Ukraine, corresponding centers point: maintaining of positions of Russian language, protection and promotion of rights of compatriots and education, implementation of cultural and international projects. As to language projects, they were concentrated mainly around children, Ukrainian center (Kyiv one) organized Summer language school «Gramotey» and language club «AB-VGDeyka» for children. Educational agenda was mainly composed by events and actions that were connected with opportunities to get school education (5–11 grades) in Russia, these projects were annual and pretty available. The vast majority of events and intellectual competitions were tied with classic literature and memorial archives on the Second World War as well as in the activity of Russian World Foundation. The most vivid actions were: «Pushkin Days» organized in Kyiv; «Fairy tales of Boldin autumn», «Dal' readings»; «Visiting Korney» (due to Korney Chukosvkiy anniversary); the series of events «Writer about writer» on Pushkin, Brodskiy, Bulgakov; «Gymnasium number 1» [24]. Another part of educational promotion was aimed at Russian language teachers and improvements of their qualifications: Conferences «Methodology and practices of teaching of foreign students» in Kharkiv, World Forum «Enlightenment without boundaries», «Cyber pedagogika» on the base of RUDN university, Summer School for Russian language teachers in Odessa. There was an evident lack of the projects that were related to higher education—only several Russian language-based Olympiads with the opportunity to budget education in Russia: for example, organized by Moscow Institute of Electronic Technique, organized «Technological University» MGOTU.

The further progress was achieved with the opening the second center in Sevastopol 2012, June 12. Kyiv center got an opportunity to organize collective access to online source of Russian language learning so as to enlarge the number of listeners of Russian language course from 3–3,500 in 2009–2011 to nearly 4000 in 2012. Moreover, in 2012 Rossotrudnichestvo first financially support the number of Russian Nongovernment organizations (human rights) on, at least, 500 000 roubles [25]. Significant increase was achieved in the number of participants in visiting programs among young scientific, business and social specialists: 46 in 2011, 93 in 2012, 114 in 2013—nearly the one sixth of a total number of participants in related programs. The number of historical actions was organized: «"The creators of the Slavic alphabet Saints Cyril and Methodius", "Russian educational book of the 17th-18th centuries", "Saints Peter and Fevronia of Murom", "Baptism of Russia", "Volga stronghold", "Kursk Bulge", "Modern Russia", to 150 anniversary of K.S. Stanislavsky, 140th anniversary of F.I. Chaliapin, 150th anniversary of the House of Romanov, 20th anniversary of the Constitution of the Russian Federation,

185th anniversary of L.N. Tolstoy, 70- anniversary of the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad» [26]. In 2013, another row of reading classes was as continuation of the program 2010 and aforementioned collective online access facilities on the basis of Russian Centers of Science and Culture. 2 specialized schools of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Security Agency (as addition to 3 opened between 2010–2012) were opened [26]. 2013 was fruitful in terms of events related to Russian language in Ukraine, more than 30 ones within the period of one year that were connected with classic Russian movies, poetry and book expositions mainly. In 2014, Sevastopol center was closed because of Crimea secession and Kyiv officially did not conduct major and significant internal events (except round tables on the topic of history falsification «Public diplomacy for the truth about Russia») until 2015 but educational and language programs continue to be utilized. Nevertheless, these programs in Ukraine were organized even in a larger extent because it was the first year when Rossotrudnichestvo got official support from federal budget—57,4268 mln [27]. The number of visiting program participants increased from 114 in 2013 to 223, the number of students accepted at budget places in Russian universities from 1400 to 1560 [27].

The prior thing that needs to be concluded on the activity of Rossotrudnichestvo and its corresponding Centers of Science and Culture is that despite the fact that as well as Russian World Foundation the target activity was aimed at children and promotion of Russian language via Russian literature, history and poetry, it incorporated some effective economic/business-grounded proposals. There were higher education programs, business and management trips for students and young professionals that can be treated as an attempt to enlarge the scope of audience. Rossotrudnichestvo tried to promote Russian not only with a strong reliance upon its normative beauty and broad cultural background but upon its career and thus socioeconomic perspectives. Russian was put as language that can give the one an opportunity to get applicable and preferable higher education in a country with developed mechanisms of economic prosperity and career lists. However, the number of aforementioned initiatives was still low in comparison with the on that of «traditional» programs on the beauty of Russian literature, heritage of Pushkin, glory of the Great Victory and unity.

## 4 Conclusion

Despite the fact that Russian ones had chosen to concentrate on pretty applicable ways of raising national the attractiveness of Russia (language, culture, common history) in Ukraine, the attempts were not only unsystematic and poorly provided in terms of financial matters but too direct with clear and blatant goals. The language was one of the most problematic instruments in the case of Ukraine. On the one hand, according to the reports Russian World Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo, the vast majority of events and programs that were related to Russian language and its knowledge were of self-centered nature. In other words, the goal of events was hypothetically (Russian language was already very popular in Ukraine) to attract attention to Russian language and its literature so the only reason that was promoted to the audience studying Russian was to have an opportunity to read Russian literature in Russian and obtain all the senses.

Furthermore, it is of tremendous importance to mention that Russian language in Ukraine was not represented as solely the language of a Russian Federation. Significant

part of Eastern population of Ukraine identified themselves as pure Ukrainians with a strong civil and national positions and spoke Russian as the main at the same time. Russian soft power institutions were vastly related in this part of Ukraine where the population can be divided into three categories. The first who support Russia and its integrative policy because of number historical and cultural common grounds between this part of Ukraine and Russia. The second who strongly self-identified with Ukraine but speak Russian as the main and, thus do not connect it with Russia, they identify it as the second government language. The third is the minority who do not speak Russian and do not feel any cultural or historical unity with Russia. That is why the initiative to promote Russian language as a part of the strategy to increase Russian attractiveness was too risky and not relevant in reality. Moreover, this initiative should be realized in different manners for Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine in order to be effective because of the aforementioned linguistic and identification specifics.

Culture and historic background were represented mainly by retrospective programs and events in order to support the memory of the Great Victory and literature. However, the problem with this instrument was pretty the same as with the language—the context of the Great Victory and classic literature was not tightly and accurately tied with Russia and its identity. The events were of nostalgic and memorial nature but due to the Soviet Union that was/is not really popular among young generations. All the positive relations towards the time when Ukraine and Russia had been a part of the same state were popular mainly among older generations. This leads to the situation that even hypothetical positive effect from cultural and historical-based attempts to attract Ukrainian population were rather effective not with the youngest ones but with the elder. Both language, culture and common historic background were initiatives of weak connection with Russia and, thus were not really perspective in terms of its attractiveness. It could be possible but with a great work in order to tie these events and their theme with solely Russia and its status directly. However, of course, it would have demanded greater time and financial costs. Former head of Rosstrudnichestvo—K. Kosachev than mentioned that one of the most crucial factors of the appearance of the Crimean crisis could directly connected with the prominent work of the EU' and the U.S.' NGOs there and the relative inactive and passive work of their Russian colleagues [28].

Another point that needs to be mentioned is that the work of Russian institutions was rather of inertial nature rather than predictive and even reactive. The scope of attention of Russian foreign policy agenda and corresponding soft power institutions was evidently limited in Ukraine in comparison with the other post-Soviet states. Only in the middle and the end of the period the number of centers relatively enough (comparison with Russian attempts in post-Soviet states), however small in comparison with corresponding centers of the other states: 15 centers of Goethe (Germany), 11 centers of French Institute, 5 centers of British Council. The reason for such a poor attention can lie mainly in 'brother» nations' paradigm—the idea of inherently tight cultural and historical connection of two states and populations that could use as an argument to be inactive in Ukraine in terms of soft influence because the attractiveness of Russia is guaranteed. Nonetheless, the reality showed that the idea was destructive for Russian soft power and, thus, foreign interests in Ukraine. Furthermore, such an approach of normatively tight relations between two nations without clear strategy of cooperation with the direct involvement of common

population and young people made the distance between political elites and its electorate in Ukraine even more sharp. People did not feel the relation and benefits from tendencies in comparison with the U.S.' and European partners, for instance, however, political elites were still of deep friendship and admiration to Russian side.

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
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# Sports Relations Between Russia and Europe Through the Lens of Sport Diplomacy

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**Abstract.** Modern relations between Russia and European countries are going through a rather difficult time, which is marked by the severity of political confrontation, the pressure of sanctions and mutual claims. In such contexts, the importance of cultural interaction has grown, which, due to a certain specificity and inertia, continues in conditions of political confrontation. Sport is a part of human culture and has exceptional opportunities in the development of relationships between countries, peoples and entire continents. Sports interaction is able to bring international dialogue to a new level, unite a wide audience of participants and contribute to solving various pressing problems of our time, which go beyond traditional competition. Sports relations today are the most important political resource that is used both by individual states and by political associations to solve various urgent problems. The possibilities of modern sports and international sports cooperation have become the basis of an independent direction - sports diplomacy, the potential of which in international relations is steadily growing, and the spheres of influence are consistently expanding. This study examines sports relations between Russia and Europe through the lens of sports diplomacy. The authors pay attention to both theoretical issues and directly to practical aspects of sports diplomacy in Russia and European countries. Today, relations between the Russian Federation and European countries are going through real tough time. Significant changes and transformation of traditional forms of cooperation in the field of sport are taking place, the political influence on the sphere of culture, sports and sports games is increasingly felt. The COVID epidemic also had a negative impact on the cooperation in the field of sport. This article examines the documentary basis, practical examples and acute problems of sports relations between Russia and European countries. The conclusions of this study can be used in the development of the regulatory framework for sports cooperation and the preparation of projects and programs in the field of modern sports interaction not only in Europe and Russia, but also in other countries of the world.

**Keywords:** Europe · European Union · Russia · Cooperation in the field of sport · Sports diplomacy

## 1 Introduction

The problem of development of modern cooperation in the field of sport is relevant at national, regional and global levels. Sport in the modern world is the bright phenomenon bringing together sportsmen and almost all the inhabitants of the planet, who are following various international sporting. The modern sport has exceptional opportunities and influences the political, economic and sociocultural life of the individual countries, political associations and continents. It is not accidental that researchers and practitioners has recently noted the growing importance of sports diplomacy in the toolbox of states and political associations.

The countries of Europe and Russia are the acknowledged leaders in particular sports. It is on the European continent that the most significant sporting events and sports have taken shape. The countries of Europe are most successfully cooperating in various sports, European sportsmen participate in humanitarian and social projects and help ensure that sport and cooperation in the field of sport could be used for the solution of the topical issues of the present day.

Cooperation in the field of sports between the Russian federation and European countries is today quite varied. It is supported by a solid legal and normative framework, which is updated and seek to respond to new problems and challenges of contemporary sports cooperation. Institutionalization of the links in sport between the Russian federation and European countries is consistently implemented.

The great variety of approaches, forms and directions of cooperation in the field of sport between the Russian federation and European countries can be considered as example of modern sports diplomacy.

The purpose of the research is the identification of features, opportunities and inconsistencies in cooperation in the field of sport between the Russian federation and European countries within the context of sport diplomacy.

## 2 Methodology and Research Methods

The theoretical basis for research on the phenomenon of sport relations within the context of sports diplomacy built upon the writings of Russian and foreign scholars that deal with the diplomatic potential of sport. Researchers Ellison [1], Beacom [3], Bogolyubova and Nikolayeva [4, 5], Boniface [6] note that sport plays a prominent role in contemporary international relations. This is because the high-performance sport has been involved in big politics and has become an integral part of it. At the same time, there are a number of researchers that treat precisely political (and not diplomatic) opportunities of sport, viewing it as an instrument of pressure rather than a tool of negotiation, such as Houlihan [17], Kanin [20], Munt [21]. A great contribution to the development of the theoretical foundations of sports diplomacy was made by Murray, who offered a rationale for phenomenon of “diplomatization of sport” [22]. The important contribution being made by researchers who have raised the specific issues of sport and diplomacy, sport and politics, sport and international relations, history of sports diplomacy should also be underscored. Thanks to their works the concept of sport diplomacy has reached a theoretical saturation and was introduced into scientific circulation (Redeker [28], Rofe [31], Stolyarov [34, 35], Barinov and Oreshkin [35]).

Despite the variety of research approaches, it may be observed that scientists are unanimous in their evaluations of the opportunities of sports diplomacy which is being used successfully today both by individual States and political associations. In scientific works sports diplomacy is considered on the example of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, it is pointed out the emergence and evolution of this phenomenon.

The role of sport and sports cooperation was also commended by Joseph S. Nye Jr. Representative of the international relations theory of neoliberalism. According to his theory, sport is without a doubt the soft power tool that has been repeatedly proved to be true, as evidenced for example by the history of victories and achievements of USA and USSR [24].

When working with the documentary sources, we used the systems approach and content analysis which allowed us to identify the phenomenon of sports cooperation and sport diplomacy in national, European and international normative and regulatory sources. To study practical activities in the field of sports cooperation between Russia and European countries within the framework of sports diplomacy, the methods of institutional and functional analysis were used, which led to the identification of the main forms and tools of this activity, indication of results, detection of problems. The comparative method in this study was used to identify the general and specific in matters of sports cooperation in Russia and in European countries. Also, this approach allows to note the evolution of sports cooperation, which manifests itself in the regulatory, institutional and practical aspects.

### **3 Debating Concept of “Sports Diplomacy”**

Sports is an important part of modern life, social and international relations. It has a significant impact on people, especially on young people, as it appeals to noble feelings and humanistic ideals. This quality of sports allows it to be used as a supranational tool for spreading human values.

With the growth of the international significance of sports, the term “sports diplomacy” – the use of sports as a political tool to strengthen diplomatic relations between two states – has solidified in the political lexicon.

The sports diplomacy is traditionally viewed in the context of the broader “soft power” paradigm used by countries to promote their attractiveness. Many researchers consider the sports diplomacy to be a kind of public diplomacy, which, however, does not contradict the above statement. On the basis of the classical understanding of public diplomacy, sports diplomacy helps to establish closer international contacts and prevent armed conflicts. Followers of the theory of new public diplomacy believe that the purpose of sports diplomacy is improving the international image, promoting national branding and developing communications.

The complexity of understanding the essence of sports diplomacy is caused by the contradictory assessments of the humanistic potential of sports. This is the reason why there are two opposing trends in approaches and assessments. On the one hand, there is the reconciliation sports diplomacy (for example, ping-pong diplomacy, which in the early 1970s promoted the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China), on the other hand, there is the confrontation of sports diplomacy (a classic

example is the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics by many Western countries as a response to bringing of Soviet troops into Afghanistan). There are also the official sports diplomacy, i.e. the one involving governments, and the unofficial sports diplomacy when public organizations and people are the main actors. The subtypes of sports diplomacy are sometimes distinguished, such as Olympic, football, ping-pong, cricket diplomacy, etc.

Sports events, especially major ones (Olympics, world championships), sporting achievements, the authority of sportsmen, especially sports stars, going in for a particular sport (for example, football) are most commonly used as tools of sports diplomacy.

### **3.1 “European Dimension” of Russian Sports Relations**

The European direction is one of the main priorities of Russian sports cooperation. This is due to the rich historical traditions, strong cultural ties between Russia and the Western Europe, even despite the political crisis, encountered in 2014 and continuing to this day, the level of development of sports and sports institutions in European countries, a variety of humanitarian programs implemented in the framework of sports competitions and sports initiatives and many other factors. The European experience in arranging sports competitions and the policy-making activities of European sports organizations are of great importance.

The peculiarity of modern sports relations between Russia and Europe is that they are a complex phenomenon that takes place at different levels, in different forms and with varying degrees of intensity. The “European vector” of Russian sports ties firstly includes bilateral contacts with European countries at the public and government levels. These contacts are not limited only to the EU member states, as to a greater or lesser degree Russia is in contact with almost all European countries on sports issues. Secondly, it includes Russia’s participation in European sports projects (competitions, festivals, sports events, etc.), where “European countries” means all European countries, including EU countries. Thirdly, Russia participates in multilateral contacts as a member of most European sports associations and federations established on a regional basis. Fourthly, the Russia-Council of Europe and Russia-EU cooperation takes place at the institutional level, i.e. through the main European institutions. These contacts are extremely uneven; Russia is most actively involved in European sports projects, European sports organizations, as well as in bilateral exchanges with EU countries. Multilateral cooperation is also well developed through the Russia-Council of Europe line.

### **3.2 Russia – European Sports Federations Cooperation**

The Russian Federation is a full member of most European sports organizations. It is not a member of only five European sports federations, namely softball, shooting sport, tennis, weightlifting, and trampoline tumbling. In different years, the European sports federations were headed by the representatives of Russia: A. B. Usmanov (fencing), S.I. Soloveichik (judo), D.V. Svatkovsky (modern pentathlon), V. Lisin (shooting sport), V. Shestakov (amateur sambo). Fourteen Russians were vice-presidents of the world and European federations (basketball, baseball, judo, wrestling, table tennis, swimming, taekwondo, sailing, archery, weightlifting, biathlon, luge, skiing).

### 3.3 Sports Links of Russia and the Council of Europe in the Context of Sports Diplomacy

The Russia – Council of Europe cooperation is developing quite actively. Being a member of this organization since 1996, the Russian Federation participates in many sports projects. It joined a number of European sports conventions, such as the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events [13], Anti-Doping Convention [2], the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions [36]) and the Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events [8]. In May 2016, a bilateral Russia-CE Anti-Doping Action Plan was signed, which outlined the latest methods of combating banned drugs in sports [23] and the draft Council of Europe Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour [9].

Russia's participation in the work of the Council of Europe related to sports is not limited to joining the major relevant conventions. Sports issues are included in one of the five projects of the organization being implemented in Russia. In 2017, the development of a pilot training course "Rights and Obligations in Sports" was started at the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO) under the HELP program (The European Human Rights Training Program for Lawyers, Judges and Prosecutors). The course has been developed for sports professionals (sports agents, coaches, etc.) and facilitates the training of specialists who effectively protect the rights of Russian athletes in the world. The project has been organized by the Council of Europe, the Ministry of Sports of Russia and MGIMO in the framework of the implementation of the Anti-Doping Action Plan. However, in view of the EU sanctions, financing of the Russia-CE cooperation programs is still undecided. Due to this, Russia has to adjust the priority of programs and search for co-financing from interested Russian organizations.

Russia's participation in the sports policy of the Council of Europe is gradually institutionalizing. In 2009, the Russian Federation joined the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport [11] applicable within the Council of Europe. This step confirms the status of the Russian Federation as a great sports nation and a participant in intergovernmental cooperation in this field. Joining the agreement allows Russia to be a partner having the status of a major sponsor. Russia can use the opportunities of this Agreement to take part in the development of new standards and implement joint projects with partner sports organizations. Considering the fact that during the period of 2013–2021 Russia hosted several major sporting events, namely the Summer Universiade in Kazan (2013), the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (2014). The FIFA World Cup (2018), the Winter Universiade in Krasnoyarsk (2019), the series of matches of the European football championship (2021) such opportunities are very beneficial and provide additional information and organizational prospects. The diplomatic potential of such major events that will create conditions for the development of political contacts between Russia and the Council of Europe cannot be denied.

Sports becomes more and more important in the humanitarian track of the Council of Europe. It has a wide conventional and practical experience in this area, in which Russia is taking the most active part. Russia's priority in the Council of Europe these days is the work related to the problem of doping in sports. The measures against the

possibility of disqualifying athletes from competitions under vain pretexts are discussed. It is easy to understand why the doping issue is top-priority as the scale of the doping scandal around Russia at the Olympic Games during the last decade was quite large.

### 3.4 Sports Contacts of Russia with the European Union Versus Sports Contacts of Russia with the European Union Countries

**Russia - European Union.** Unlike the council of Europe, sports ties are not that important for the cooperation of the European Union and Russia. None of the fundamental documents regulating the relations between Russia and the EU (Russia and EU partnership and cooperation agreement [31]), road map on the common space of research, education and culture [30] indicates them as a special line. The deteriorated relations between Russia and the west because of the Crimea and Ukraine situation also did not contribute to their development. At the same time, the sports component is gradually becoming more and more significant in both the Russian and the all-European foreign policy, which allows to express hope for their further activation.

At present, both Russia and the EU have a serious approach to sports diplomacy issues: concepts are being discussed, institutional frameworks are being developed, and effective forms are being thought out. This may give an impetus to the activation of sports contacts and help Russia and the European Union agree on some key cultural and humanitarian or even political and economic issues.

**Russia - European Union countries.** Unlike the sports contacts between Russia and the European Union as an interstate union, cooperation of Russia with the European Union countries is developing more actively. It is quite non-uniform, as it includes cooperation at the level of bilateral state relations, and through various European sports organizations, and in the form of sports competitions or all-European sporting events.

Russia has agreements and memorandums on physical training and sports cooperation with 15 EU states: France (1995), Hungary (1996), Malta (1996), Cyprus (1997), Romania (1999), Estonia (2001), Lithuania (2001), Italy (2002), Spain (2006), Portugal (2009), Finland (2009), Germany (2010), Bulgaria (2012), Slovenia (2013). (Ministry of Sports of the Russian Federation. Legal framework, 2018).

Sports is often included in the program of official bilateral events. During the Petersburg Dialogue Forum (2010) in Yekaterinburg, the Russian-German intergovernmental consultations were held, during which an agreement was reached on the exchange of experience in the construction and maintenance of sports facilities and equipment, joint events, research in sports medicine and joint combating doping in sports. More than 4,100 Russian athletes and coaches went to Germany to participate in sports events in 2009. In 2010 this number increased [33].

Sports events were included in the official program of the Russian-Spanish Cultural Bilateral Year (2011). Considering the excellent achievements of Spanish football, the leaders of the countries agreed to exchange the experience in sports. King of Spain Juan Carlos I offered the Russian partners assistance in preparing the 2018 World Cup in Russia. In 2015, the Embassy of the French Republic in Moscow held a conference “Arranging major international football events: the cross-views of France and Russia” confined to the 2018 World Cup.

These days, the sports relations between Russia and the EU countries are developed through large-scale major events that engage a lot of European participants and arouse significant public interest.

The modern European sports palette is very rich. It includes various tournaments, competitions, championships, cups – regional and sub-regional, complex and individual, professional and amateur, new and those established at the end of the 19th century, age and gender related. Russia has been actively and successfully participating in most of them for a long time.

The European Games and the European Summer Sports Championship, in which Russia participates successfully, have become the largest complex sports competitions in Europe. Both in the first European Games (Baku, 2015) and in the first European Summer Sports Championship (Glasgow and Berlin, 2018), Russia topped the medal table with 79 and 31 golds respectively.

Europe took the lead in arranging regional games rather late, while other regions began to successfully hold their sports competitions in the mid-twentieth century. For example, the Asian Games have been held since 1951, the Pan-American Games since 1951, the Pan-Arab Games and Pan-African Games since 1965. These Games have been recognized by the international sports community and the International Olympic Committee. In 1985, some countries united to hold the so-called Games of Small European States – countries with a population of fewer than 1 million people (Andorra, Iceland, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino). On June 1, 2009, Montenegro joined the Group. However, these Games were local.

The idea of European Games was first announced in April 2011 by the President of the European Olympic Committee Patrick Hickey, who put forward an initiative to hold the Games, which would include all major Olympic sports and new athletic disciplines. The capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, became the first city to host the European Olympics. The next European Olympics took place in Minsk in 2019.

The European Olympics marked the new format of sports cooperation between the Russian Federation and the EU countries at the beginning of the 21st century. By participating in the Games, Russia shares European sports values and is a participant in various programs, including humanitarian ones, which are traditionally implemented in sports fields. At the same time, being an equal participant of the European Games, Russia is included in the initiatives of European sports diplomacy.

A significant number of European competitions are held in individual sports. Both Russia and most EU countries are participating in them. These are large, prestigious tournaments with many participants and the highly appreciated victory. The European Football Championship (since 1960), the main competition of national teams, has a special place among such competitions in terms of entertainment and number of fans. Russia, the USSR those days, became the first European champion after winning the Henri Delaunay Cup (1960). Russia is a participant of the most prestigious European club football tournament, the UEFA Champions League, established in 1955. The Russian clubs never won it, however, the European winning clubs included players from Russia: I. Dobrovolsky was in the Marseille Olympique (1993), V. But was in the Dortmund Borussia (1997), D. Alenichev was in the Portuguese Porto (2004), D. Cheryshev was in the Madrid Real (2016).

Since 1971, the second most important European club football tournament, the UEFA Europa League, has been held annually. Two Russian football clubs won this tournament, namely the Moscow CSKA (2005) and St. Petersburg Zenit (2008). Moreover, in 2008, Zenit became the only Russian club that won the UEFA Super Cup, for which the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League winners compete. Zenit was headed by the coach from the Netherlands Dick Advocaat back then.

Russia takes part in other major European championships, such as the European Basketball Championship (EuroBasket), European Water Sports, Athletics, Wrestling, Swimming, Artistic and Modern Rhythmic Gymnastics, Figure Skating, Speed Skating, Equestrian Sport, Short Track and many other Championships.

The Russian Championships in different sports were held many times in Russia, namely Fencing (2002), Sambo (2005, 2012), Volleyball (2007), Luge (2015), Wrestling (2006), Curling (2011), Weightlifting (2011), Modern Rhythmic Gymnastics (2012), Pneumatic Weapon Shooting (2014), Biathlon (2016), and Taekwondo (2018) Championships. A more active use of the Russian sports infrastructure for European image-building major sports events may become a new vector in the development of sports cooperation between Russia and the EU.

Cooperation at the club and team levels is developing quite well. Many Russian team sports clubs have European athletes – football players, hockey players, volleyball players, basketball players. Over the years, European coaches headed Russian clubs and even national teams in various sports. For example, the Russian national football team was headed by the Dutch Gus Hidding (2006–2010) and Dick Advocaat (2010–2012), and the Italian Fabio Capello (2012–2015). The sports clubs situation is similar. For example, over the years, Zenit football club from St. Petersburg was headed by Vlastimil Petržela from the Czech Republic (2002–2006), Dick Advocaat from the Netherlands (2006–2009), Luciano Spalletti from Italy (2009–2014), Andre Villas-Boas from Portugal (2014–2016), Mircea Lucescu from Romania (2016–2017), Roberto Mancini from Italy (2017–2018).

Russian athletes and coaches also work successfully in Europe. For example, A. Kerzhakov (Sevilla, Spain), A. Arshavin (Arsenal, England), D. Cheryshev (Valencia, Spain), A. Golovin (Monaco), and others were in European football clubs in different years. An outstanding Russian specialist A. Mishin was a coach of a famous Italian figure skater K. Costner in 2016–2018.

There are examples of joint sports programs of Russia and European countries. In 2010, an interesting Russian-English project “Football Unites” was implemented, in which Chelsea (London) and Spartak (Moscow) fans took part. Meetings with players from both teams and a football match between the fans were held. That same year, a friendly match between the fans of Irish and Russian teams was held at the Irishtown stadium. It was confined to the qualifying match of the 2012 European Championship between these teams. A master class for students of Dublin St Lorcan’s School and children from the Ireland Russian-Speaking Sports Association was given by Russian and Irish coaches.

Young people actively participate in informal sports events. For example, in 2017, in Rostov-on-Don, a Cooperation Agreement was signed between the Russian Student Sports Union and the German Sports Youth Association aimed at expanding bilateral



youth exchange in the mass sports, establishing and developing partnerships between youth sports organizations of Russia and Germany. As a result, the Russian-German conference of organizers of sports youth exchange, a new actor of sports diplomacy, was established.

Contacts of Russia and the European Union countries in terms of sports and youth exchanges today are developing in new sports that appeared in the information age. Computer games competitions claim the status of sports competitions. Today, the term “eSports”, which, of course, is very likely to develop, is widely used. E-sports is successfully developing in Russia. Moreover, the Russian Federation was the first country that officially recognized this sport. The interest in eSports competitions is great. Today there are several projects related to this sport. In 2014, the Russian State University of Physical Education, Sport, Youth and Tourism began implementing the educational program “Theory and Methods of Intellectual Sports (eSports)”, and in 2018 ITMO University decided to award talented eSportsmen a monthly scholarship in the amount of 10 thousand rubles. There are many well-known eSportsmen in Russia. The main rivals of Russia are players from the USA and India. Italian and Spanish clubs are the most successful European eSports teams. Russian sportsmen compete with them at various competitions. In this sport, it is Russia that can become an intellectual leader and a strong rival for European sportsmen. The system of competitions and institutionalization of eSports is only taking shape today, but it can be assumed that interest in it will grow.

Participation in humanitarian actions in the framework of European sports events with a large audience can be called a trend of sports cooperation between Russia and the European Union. Russia participates in the large-scale European movement Sports for All aimed at developing an active lifestyle and promoting taking sports, as well as in the European Public Sports Movement, the main goal of which is to support mass sports and culture of European countries to promote various cultures and ideologies in the field of sports and leisure.

The promotion of a healthy lifestyle, mass sports events are the basis of the European approach to the sports development. Another European mass sports initiative, the European Mobility Week, is of such nature (European mobility week, 2018). This traditional annual event has been held since 2002. The events are held in different European cities, the administration and citizens of which share the main ideas of this project. Hungary (239 cities participate in the action) and Austria (156 cities) are the leaders. Thirty three Russian cities take part in the European Mobility Week. They are: Arzamas, Barnaul, Gagarin, Kazan, Moscow, Omsk, St. Petersburg, Ulan-Ude, stanitsa Kushchevskaya, etc., i.e. interest in this project is obvious [12].

Each year the European Mobility Week has a certain main theme, on which the program is based. In 2018, the Week was held from September 16 to September 22 under the slogan “Mix and move!” and was devoted to multimodality. The concept of a coordinated multimodal transport system involves creating comfortable and environmentally friendly conditions for using all types of transport, including bicycles, in order to reduce the number of road traffic accidents, road congestions, to reduce urban noise and air pollution.

European cycling parades are included in the program of another all-European event – the European festival European Days, which takes place in September annually. In

Russia, such cycling parades are very popular and traditionally have a large number of participants in different cities.

#### **4 Sports Relations Between Russia and Europe Through the Lens of Sports Diplomacy: Key Problems and Predictions**

Today, the relations between Russia and the European Union (both in general, at the institutional level, and with a number of EU member states) are experiencing hard times. Numerous contradictions, mainly political, led to a serious cooling in relations, which is complicated by the sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union against the Russian Federation. When preparing sanctions, among other measures of influence, some EU officials offered to consider the possibility of suspending Russia's membership in a number of international sports organizations, for example, in UEFA, in order to deprive Russia of the opportunity to participate in the world or European competitions. In 2014, the European Commission considered limiting the participation of Russian athletes in various competitions. Such suggestions were especially frequent before the FIFA World Cup (2018). There were suggestions to deprive the Russian Federation of the right to host the Championship, and then there were ones to boycott it. However, despite everything, largely due to the consistent position of FIFA and the support of an army of fans from different countries, the FIFA World Cup was held and was organized at a high level, thus making the idea of sports sanctions against Russia irrelevant.

The crisis in Russian sports arose after the Olympics in Sochi. Russia was accused of violating anti-doping rules and state support for doping in sports. In 2015, the Russian Athletics Federation was expelled from the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and the European Athletics Association for this reason. RUSADA was disqualified. Based on the McLaren's report, IOC strongly recommended the winter sports federations not to hold major competitions in Russia.

The doping scandal escalated before the Olympic Games in Pyongyang (2018), when the Russian National Olympic Committee was disqualified, many Russian athletes (biathlete O. Zaitseva, bobsleighter A. Zubkov, figure skater K. Stolbova and others) and the full Paralympic team were suspended from the Games and other international competitions. The World Bobsleigh and Skeleton Championship was moved from Sochi to the German city of Königssee (2018), the biathlon teams of Norway, the Czech Republic, and Great Britain declared a boycott to the eighth stage of the World Cup in Tyumen (2018). Tyumen also lost the right to host the Biathlon World Championship in 2021. The first step towards a possible "warming" in relations was the restoration of RUSAD to its rights in September 2018.

The sports diplomacy can become the most effective tool for decreasing the number of contradictions between the Russian Federation and the EU in this matter. The FIFA World Cup held in Russia showed that sports can defuse interstate conflicts. Further use of its positive potential could pave the way for ending the crisis in relations between Russia and the European Union. For example, an organization of the institution of European sports ambassadors, the EU is working on now, is hard to imagine without the

outstanding Russian athletes E. Isinbayeva, A. Ovechkin, A. Zagitova, E. Medvedeva, E. Plushchenko, and many others.

However, the experience of holding major sporting events these days shows that the positive effect should be enforced by using various forms of sports diplomacy, promoting and popularizing the venues of sports competitions. The authority of athletes participating in sporting events should also be used. They can share their impressions with a wider and interested audience of their fans and become opinion leaders. For example, the institutionalization of EU sports diplomacy is associated with Sports Forums, which serve as a platform for dialogue and discussion of the most important issues of the development of physical training and sports. The EU Sports Forum got its current format in 2007 based on the White Paper on Sports, which contains a comprehensive vision of EU sports. Representatives of international, European and national sports federations, organizations (leagues, clubs), sports industry, athletes, including Russian, gather annually at the forum to discuss topical issues of the world and European sports. However, Russia's participation in this sports forum is not as active as it could be. If there were more representatives of the Russian sports community at the forum, it would allow to discuss the most difficult, topical issues of the sports development and cooperation. An expanded participation of Russian representatives could also become one of the areas of cooperation between Russia and the EU in the short term.

Since sports diplomacy solves image and political problems, it is advisable to establish the interaction between athletes and politicians, public organizations, and the wide public. The world has a successful experience in the use of athletes' authority in international relations, especially in humanitarian actions. We believe that this experience will be valuable today, in the period of sanctions and political confrontation.

## 5 Conclusion

Russia and Europe are successful partners in sports. On the other hand, Russia is an important part of sporting Europe. It is difficult to imagine the success and achievements of European sports without the Russian Federation. By participating in humanitarian actions, sporting events, activities of European institutions, Russia confirms its commitment to the European values and contributes to their promotion in the world, confirming its European identity to a certain degree.

Comparing the goals of sports diplomacy in Russia and the European Union countries, you can note they have much in common – interest in arranging major sports events as the basis of modern sports diplomacy, attention to large-scale actions for the benefit of social development and public health, and interest in cooperation in the field of sports innovations. The sports diplomacy of both the European Union and Russia is aimed at forming a positive image, at developing a dialogue with partners, at strengthening social ties and intercultural communications. It serves to promote the ideals of peace, integration, non-violence, tolerance, and justice, i.e. to solve the most important problems that are of particular importance for both modern Russia, and for European countries, for the European Union and for the humanity.

The Russia-Europe dialogue on sports is under a significant influence of a political factor today. It is related to the problems of the medialization of sports competitions, complicated by doping scandals, but, nevertheless, has every reason for further development.

It can be assumed that in addition to the traditional areas and forms of sports relations, contacts between Russia and European countries in the 21st century will acquire new outlines: in the format of participation of representatives of the sports community in humanitarian projects or actions that go beyond the modern sports. The institutionalization of sports and sports relations between Russia and Europe will continue. It can be assumed that large, high-status platforms and forums related to European and Russian sports will be established, and special large-scale events, for example, the Years of European Sports, in which Russia will be given an important place, will be held. It is also possible that new sports will emerge that will be able to reflect the features of the physical and intellectual development of a person and his view on sports and sports ties. One thing is obvious: despite all the negative tendencies in the sports relations between Russia and Europe, these relations will continue in the 21st century, bringing together athletes and fans.

Unfortunately, sports relations between Russia and Europe doesn't affect the overall improvement of the Russian-European relations that are going through real tough time. However, the communicative potential of sport needs to be exploited as an additional means of creating closer, more cooperative, crisis-free relations between the European world and Russia, because the capacity of sports diplomacy based on universal values of sports, like culture, can provide the basis for their further normalization.

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# Sport as a Focus of Bilateral Contacts Between Russia and Post-Soviet Central Asia

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**Abstract.** This paper is aimed at the analysis of how Russia and its close neighbours – the five post-Soviet Central Asian states – cooperate in the area of sport. Sport becomes a topic of interest due to forming a meaningful aspect of humanitarian cooperation, one of the sources for the development of extensive people-to-people exchanges and informal communication between the respective societies, as well as an instrument for enabling the self-empowerment of states at the international level. Russia's partnerships with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are discussed to identify what sporting formats are involved in each relationship and whether these arrangements are implemented by the countries in the form of bilateral agreements. In addition, the development dynamics of the cooperation over the recent decade are traced in terms of what benefits accrue to each of the partner states.

**Keywords:** Russia · Central Asia · Kazakhstan · Kyrgyzstan · Tajikistan · Uzbekistan · Turkmenistan · Sport · Cooperation

## 1 Introduction

In contemporary international relations, sport has become a meaningful focal point, as well as a tool for countries to fulfil their respective foreign policy objectives. In international studies, sport is regarded as one of the social aspects or factors contributing to interstate dialogue and direct people-to-people exchanges [1–6]. States can use sporting events to exhibit the superior level of their economy, address issues of development aid, or even for political messaging purposes.

In this paper, the authors discuss sport not as an area of rivalry but rather as a focal point of international cooperation on the example of relations between the Russian Federation and its close neighbours, the five post-Soviet Central Asian states: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Turkmenistan. The aims of the present research are to discover the extent to which each of the respective partnerships involves basic formats of cooperation and implements bilateral agreements, as well as to trace the dynamics of how the cooperation has developed over the recent decade, and identify what benefits the partner states have acquired as a result of these contacts.

## 2 Methodology

For this research, we applied comparative analysis methodology to the cases of bilateral cooperation in the following respective partnerships: Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, Russia and Turkmenistan, Russia and Uzbekistan. For the purposes of comparison, the characteristic features are as follows:

- a. The presence of bilateral documents referring specially to the area of sport.
- b. The type of these documents (e.g., treaty, agreement, memorandum, declaration, etc.). This characteristic is essential for understanding whether the bilateral document is binding or advisory.
- c. The realisation of bilateral agreements: are there contacts between the countries' respective sporting organisations?
- d. Do they organise any sporting events jointly?
- e. Is there any cooperation in the training process?
- f. Do the states cooperate in sport education?
- g. Do the states have common projects in sport medicine and research?
- h. Do the states coordinate their policies under the auspices of international sporting organisations?
- i. Do they have any other cooperation formats?

After discussing these points with respect to each separate partnership, we then compare the level of cooperation and draw the relevant conclusions.

## 3 Results of the Study

### 3.1 Russia and Kazakhstan

Regarding Russian-Kazakh bilateral ties, sport is addressed in the intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Science and Education, which was signed in 1994. This document contains the following provisions: the development of direct ties between Russian and Kazakh state and non-state sport institutions; the organisation of joint sporting events; athlete and coach exchanges; the dissemination of sport-related teaching materials; and sharing experience of participation in world sporting events [7]. Furthermore, in 2005, a Protocol of Intent on Cooperation in Physical Education and Sport was signed by the Russian Federal Agency for Physical Education and Sport and the Kazakh Ministry of Culture, Information and Sport. In addition to repeating the points from the 1994 Agreement, this document proposes that cooperation be developed in the following areas: organisation of training sessions; sharing experiences in sports medicine; training of instructors, referees and other personnel; organisation of sport-related research conferences; exchanging information about the work of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations; anti-doping measures; sharing the experience of sport equipment manufacturing and the construction of sport facilities in cities; media coverage of sporting events; organisation of sporting events in accordance with memorial activities and joint celebration of anniversaries; elaboration of an interstate agreement on cooperation in physical education and sport [8].



Despite the protocol of intent, a full agreement has yet to be signed. Meanwhile, in 2021, the two countries adopted a new type of document: the bilateral Programme of Cooperation in Sport. In addition to reaffirming the earlier documents, this Programme recommends the development of interregional cooperation in sport, as well as confirming the participation of Kazakh teams in Russian Continental Hockey League and VTB Basketball League fixtures [9]. Nevertheless, the Programme ends with the noteworthy paragraph: “This Programme is not an international treaty and does not generate rights and responsibilities, regulated by the international law”. This provision demonstrates that either one of the parties, or both, can refuse to undertake its responsibilities or implement any of the contents of the Programme. Due to the presence of this paragraph, the legal value of this document is rather dubious. Thus, cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan in the field of sport is regulated by one general document of an obligatory character and two advisory documents having a special character.

Despite being largely voluntary, the arrangements between the two countries can be observed to have been fully implemented. The leading sport institutions of Russia and Kazakhstan have developed direct contacts. For example, since 2011, the Russian Pentathlon Federation has provided methodological support to Kazakh Pentathlon Federation [10]; in 2012, a delegation of Kazakh athletes visited the Russian Ministry of Sport in order to learn more about the training system in Russia, coordination between the Ministry and the various sporting federations, as well as the work of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) [11]; in 2015, Russian and Kazakh cycling federations agreed on cooperation in education and anti-doping measures [12]; in 2017, members of the organising committee of the 2019 Universiade in Krasnoyarsk visited the Universiade in Almaty to learn about local experience [13]; in 2018, the delegation of Aktyubinsk region from Kazakhstan visited the Orenburg region of Russia to get acquainted with its sporting infrastructure [14].

Russia and Kazakhstan have also jointly participated in the organisation of sporting events. In 2014 [15] and 2018 [16], Orenburg and Aktyubinsk football teams played test matches; in 2016, Kazakh Embassy in Russia and Moscow Bauman University organised a kurash wrestling tournament [17]; in 2019, Kazakh Embassy and Russian MISIS University organised a futsal tournament [18]; in 2020, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan established the Eurasian Equestrian League, which held its first tournament in 2021 [19].

Cooperation in the area of sports training has also been rather fruitful. In 2012, more than 700 athletes from Russia participated in training sessions in Kazakhstan. According to the Russian Ministry of Sport, this has been a regular practice [11]. In 2013, Russian sporting federations held training seminars for instructors of Almaty Republican Sport Boarding School. In addition, the school is regularly provided with teaching literature from Russia [20]. In 2014, well-known Russian coach Yuri Krasnozhan was assigned as the head coach of the Kazakh national football team [20]. After working in this position for two years, he returned to Russia. Another Russian coach, Yuri Yakovich, worked with the Kazakh national chess team in 2014 and 2017 [21].

Kazakh athletes have had regular training sessions in Russia over the last decade. For example, artistic gymnastics and kick-boxing national teams organised their training in the cities of Penza [22] and Kislovodsk [23], respectively, while the national biathlon

team prepared at the Belokurikha resort [24]. Russian and Kazakh boxers had a joint training session in Almaty during the 2017/2018 season [25]. In 2018, the St Petersburg taekwondo team had a joint training session in Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan, together with the Kazakh Karaganda and Uzbek Tashkent teams, alongside several teams from Kyrgyzstan [26]. In 2021, Kazakh national boxing team carried out a joint session with the Russian and Uzbek teams in Kislovodsk [27], and Kazakh national equestrian team had a training session in the Moscow region [28].

Regarding sport education, Kazakh citizens regularly enter Russian universities, such as Russian State University of Physical Education, Sport, Youth and Tourism (SCOLIPE), Russian State Lesgaft University of Physical Education, Sport and Health, and others, including the postgraduate programmes of Russian International Olympic University (RIOU) [29]. These represent examples of university-to-university contacts, e.g., between SCOLIPE and Kazakh Academy of Sport and Tourism [30], Lesgaft University and Turan University [31], as well as between Moscow State Academy of Physical Education (MSAPE) and Kazakh National al-Farabi University [32].

Contacts in sport medicine and research have also been developed. In 2018, members of Kazakh Weightlifting Federation attended a seminar on sport medicine and anti-doping policies organised by the Russian Ministry of Sport, ROC, the Russian Weightlifting Federation and the International Weightlifting Federation in Moscow [33].

There have been instances of Russia-Kazakhstan coordination in international organisations. In 2016, Russian-, Kazakh- and Belorussian weightlifting federations jointly initiated an appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport against their doping disqualification [34], and in 2017, Kazakhstan signed a collective protest to the International Paralympic Committee against the total disqualification of the Russian Paralympic Committee following the doping scandal [35].

Several other formats of cooperation specific to Russia-Kazakhstan relations can be identified. Kazakh athletes from the Astana water polo team, the Barys ice hockey team and the Astana basketball team frequently participate in top-level Russian national leagues, while several additional teams have been admitted to the lower ice hockey championship divisions. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Kazakhstan has become eligible for unlimited official admission to Russian football-, ice hockey-, basketball-, volleyball-, handball-, water polo- and field hockey championships since 2020 [36]. Moreover, in 2021, Kazakh swimmers took part in the Russian national championship, whose results were classified as qualifying for the Olympic Games in Tokyo [37]. As well as numerous international tournaments held in Russia, to which Kazakh teams are generally invited, such participation at the level of national championships provides more practice for participation at the international level.

In addition, the two countries have shared contacts in sport journalism. Kazakh citizens have regularly taken part in the all-Russian Energy of Victories sport journalism contest organised annually by ROC [38], and in 2018, Almaty hosted a joint seminar for exchanging experiences [39].

Finally, there is a practice in the area of charity foundations: Mikhail Sutyaginsky, the head of the Titan corporation in Russia, who was born in the Kazakh village of Zhaltyr, provides financial support to the local school from which he graduated. Since 2008, Titan has provided this school with sports uniform and equipment, as well as

financed the renovation of the local sports centre and organised the annual Spartakiade in the village [40].

### 3.2 Russia and Kyrgyzstan

Since the 1990s, Russia-Kyrgyzstan contacts in sport have been regulated by the 1995 intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Science and Education. This document contains several provisions regarding sport: develop direct cooperation between state and non-state institutions and regions; organise joint sporting events, athlete and coach exchanges; disseminate sport-related teaching materials; share the experience of national participation in world sporting events; use contacts in sport for the development of youth exchanges; coordinate activities in international sport organisations [41].

Current relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan are regulated by the 2012 bilateral Agreement on Humanitarian Cooperation, which reaffirmed the first five provisions of the previous Agreement but ignored the remainder. At the same time, the document recognises the possibility of elaborating additional joint programmes to be carried out by the responsible state institutions of the partner countries [42]. Although such a programme outlining various joint activities for 2020–2021 was signed in 2019 [43], this cooperation was suspended by the pandemic. Earlier in 2019, a bilateral Memorandum on sport cooperation was also signed. Repeating the key points from the Agreement, this document proposes the development of cooperation in all aspects of sport: professional sport, mass sport, sport for physically challenged persons, sharing experience in sport-related research and sport education [44]. Nevertheless, as with the Russian-Kazakh Programme, since this document does not comprise a treaty or agreement, it does not entail specific legal rights or obligations. Therefore, the Russian-Kyrgyz cooperation is regulated by one general document of an obligatory character and one advisory document having a special character.

The experience of direct contacts between sport institutions of Russia and Kyrgyzstan can be seen at the examples of the meetings of national ice hockey [45] and equestrian sport [46] federations. Some tournaments have been jointly organised by Russian and Kyrgyz institutions. In 2017 and 2018, Russian Gazprom corporation and Football Federation of Osh region organised futsal tournaments for children in Kara-Suu [47]. In 2018 and 2019, Gazprom together with the Kyrgyz Chess Federation organised chess tournaments for physically challenged children in Bishkek [48]. In 2019, Kyrgyzstan put forward the idea of a youth football tournament between the teams from the Hero Cities of the EEU countries. This tournament was later organised by Russia in 2019 and 2020 with participation from Central Asian teams together with their Russian counterparts. Since the tournament was not limited to Eurasian Economic Union countries [49], non-EEU countries also participated. In 2020, Gazprom organised a charitable volleyball tournament in Osh [50].

Russian and Kyrgyz athletes have the opportunity to use the sport cites of the respective partner countries for training sessions. Russian athletes frequently choose the Issyk-Kul lake for their sessions due to comfortable climatic conditions and altitude. For example, in 2010, a training session of Russian national athletics team took place there [51]; in 2012 – a training session of the Novosibirsk youth judo school [52]; in 2013 – a training

session of Russian national swimming team [53], as well as a joint training session of Russian and Kyrgyz national boxing teams [54]; in 2017 – a session of the Sakhalin boxing team [55]; in 2018 – the above-mentioned international taekwondo training session [26], and others. Kyrgyz athletes use Russia's sport cites, too, e.g., in 2018 and 2019, Kyrgyz national freestyle wrestling team had training sessions in Makhachkala [56] and Moscow region [57], respectively; and Kyrgyz national boxing team had a training session in Yekaterinburg in 2019 [58] and in Sochi in 2020 [59]. In 2021, Kyrgyz swimmers participated in the same Russian Olympic qualifying championship as the Kazakh team [37].

Considering sport education, in addition to Kyrgyz citizens studying in Russian universities, there is a special cooperation practice: in 2020, Moscow's Spartacus Futsal Academy opened a branch in Bishkek [60].

In terms of international coordination, in 2017, Kyrgyzstan joined the protest against the disqualification of the Russian Paralympic Committee.

Some other collaborative practices are worthy of note. As part of its charity programme "From Gazprom to Children", Gazprom has constructed 9 sport and recreation centres in Bishkek, Osh, Talas, Naryn, Kara-Suu, Kyzyl-Kiya, Baktuu-Dolonotuu, Arashan and Jalal-Abad [61]. In addition, the Russian corporation was one of the sponsors of the World Nomad Games in Kyrgyzstan in 2019 [62]. Finally, Kyrgyz sport journalists have taken part in the above-mentioned Energy of Victories contest.

### 3.3 Russia and Tajikistan

In terms of Russian-Tajik relations, interaction in sport is included in the provisions of the 1995 intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Science, Technology, Education, Healthcare, Information, Sport and Tourism. However, unlike Russia's agreements with other Central Asian countries, while this document is the only obligatory instrument regulating bilateral sport ties, it does not provide a detailed list of desirable areas of cooperation, but only mentions that the two states have agreed to promote cooperation between their sport institutions and coordinate their activities in international sport organisations [63].

In 2017, Russia and Tajikistan also signed a Memorandum on cooperation in sport in which they stated the intention to cooperate in professional sport, mass sport, sport for physically challenged persons, youth sport, sport education, sport-related research, sport infrastructure, anti-doping measures, mega-events organisation, coordination in international sport organisations, sport history studies, exchange of information and documents, as well as the organisation of thematic conferences, seminars, visits and exhibitions. At the end of the document, the signatories emphasise that it is not an international treaty and thus does not establish any rights and responsibilities regulated by the international law [64].

There has been experience of direct contacts between Russian and Tajik sport associations. In 2019, ROC and the Tajik Olympic Committee signed a Memorandum on future partnership [65]. In 2019, Russian and Tajik futsal federations also agreed on regular contacts and cooperation, since the Tajik side was particularly interested in studying the experience of their Russian colleagues [66].

In terms of education and research contacts, Tajik citizens study in Russian universities, and there are also university partnerships, for example, MSAPE signed a partnership agreement with Tajik Institute of Physical Education named after S. Rakhimov [32]. In 2012, Tajikistan welcomed the research expedition from SCOLIPE, whose members studied the competitive culture of Tajik nation and Tajik traditional gushtingiri wrestling [67]. In 2019, representatives from Tajikistan took part in a conference of sport universities organised by RIOU. The participants discussed the development of sport education and the experience of recent world sporting events [68].

There has also been a case of international coordination: Tajikistan was among the signatories of the 2017 protest against the disqualification of the Russian Paralympic Committee.

Several additional instances of cooperative practices can also be noted. In 2021, alongside the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz teams, Tajik swimmers were admitted to Russian national Olympic qualifying championship [37]. The Russian Megafon corporation has organised a football championship for orphanages and boarding schools from all over Tajikistan every year since 2010 [69]. Tajik sport journalists have taken part in the above-mentioned Energy of Victories contest.

### 3.4 Russia and Uzbekistan

The Russian-Uzbek contacts in sport are regulated by the 1993 intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Science, Technology, Education, Healthcare, Information, Sport and Tourism. The agreement states the decision of the two sides to promote cooperation between sport institutions, organise mutual visits of delegations, athlete and coach exchanges, joint sporting events and training sessions of national teams, preparing to Olympic Games and other international tournaments, as well as to establish joint enterprises for sport equipment manufacturing and the construction of sport facilities, and to coordinate the activities at the level of international sport organisations [70].

In 2016, Russian Ministry of Sport and Uzbek Ministry of Culture and Sport signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in physical education and sport. In addition to repeating the points outlined in the 1993 Agreement, this document additionally proposes cooperation in professional sport, mass sport, sport for physically challenged persons, youth sport, sport education, sport-related research, sport infrastructure, anti-doping measures, mega-events organisation, sport history studies, exchanging information and documents, as well as the organisation of thematic conferences, seminars and exhibitions [71]. While the 1993 Agreement is obligatory, the Memorandum ends with the characteristic paragraph concerning the absence of rights and responsibilities regulated by the international law.

Considering exchanges between sporting institutions, in 2017, Russian and Uzbek equestrian federations arranged direct contacts [72]; in 2018, the heads of the ROC and the Uzbek Olympic Committee (UOC) met in Moscow and signed a memorandum on further cooperation [73]; in 2019, the UOC delegation made another visit to Moscow at which the partners discussed the organisation of joint training sessions and other questions. The Uzbek delegation emphasized the fact that their country valued the cooperation with Russia as a “sports power” and would “use every opportunity to adopt its training experience” [74]. In 2019, Russian and Uzbek ice hockey [75] and pentathlon

[10] federations established direct contacts. In 2021, members of the UOC visited the ROC to express their interest in studying Russia's experience in winter sports in order to develop related disciplines in Uzbekistan. The ROC agreed to facilitate such cooperation in the near future [76].

The two countries also cooperate in the organisation of training processes. Uzbek national artistic gymnastics team have regularly held training sessions in Penza [22], while Uzbek national fencing team has trained in Moscow and Novosibirsk alongside the Russian national fencing team [77]. In 2021, Uzbek national boxing team had a joint session with Russia and Kazakhstan in Kislovodsk [27], and Uzbek national swimming [78] and weightlifting [79] teams had training sessions and adaptation to the Tokyo time zone in Vladivostok.

Ties in education have also been developed. As well as university-to-university contacts, e.g., those taking place between Lesgaft University and Uzbek State University of Physical Education (USUPE) [80], MSAPE and USUPE [32], Lesgaft University and Ferghana State University [81], Uzbek citizens study in Russian sporting universities. In 2018, the UOC invited the legendary Soviet and Russian boxer Kostya Tszyu to give a master class for Uzbek boxers [82], while in 2019, Uzbek triathlon coaches attended an advanced training course in Moscow at the CyclON Triathlon Academy [83]. In 2019, a branch of SCOLIPE was established in Samarkand [84].

In 2018, members of Uzbek Weightlifting Federation attended a seminar on sport medicine and anti-doping policies in Moscow [33]. In 2018 and 2019, Lesgaft University conducted an advanced education course for the employees of Uzbek sporting institutions [85]. In 2019, representatives of Uzbek Anti-Doping Agency took part in the conference on anti-doping policies in Moscow, organised by Russian Ministry of Sport and Russian Anti-Doping Agency [86]. Also in 2019, heads of UOC and of the Republican Sport Medicine Research Centre visited the Innovation Centre of ROC to learn about the latest developments in Russia's sport-related research and mass sport programmes [87]. Furthermore, Uzbekistan took part in the 2019 RIOU conference.

Additional experience of coordination in international sport organisations took the form of Russia's 2019 support for Uzbekistan's bid to join the World Ice Hockey Federation [88].

Several more instances of cooperation between the two states are as follows. In 2018, the Russian corporation Beeline provided funds for the completion of the construction of a top-level swimming pool, which had been abandoned in 1987, in Tashkent. The new sports centre responds to all international standards and has been provided with innovative equipment [89]. In addition, the Russian tycoon Alisher Usmanov, who heads the Metalloinvest corporation, provides regular financial aid to the Uzbek Pakhtakor football team [90]. Uzbek sports journalists have taken part in the Energy of Victories contest. Finally, Uzbek ice hockey team Humo was admitted to the "D" division of the Russian championship [91].

### 3.5 Russia and Turkmenistan

In 1995, Russia and Turkmenistan signed an intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Education and Science, whose provisions also covered sport. In this agreement, the respective states proclaimed that they would promote contacts between

their sport institutions, jointly organise tournaments, athlete and coach exchanges, share teaching materials and the experience of participation in world sporting events [92]. In 2017, the two states signed a special Agreement on Cooperation in Sport, which added the following arrangements to the agenda of the 1995 Agreement: to share experience in the organisation of international sporting events, as well as sport facility management, anti-doping measures and sport for physically challenged persons; to develop cooperation in sport medicine, sport psychology, sport-related research, training process; and, finally, to elaborate mutual support policies in international sport organisations [93]. Thus, Russian-Turkmen sporting ties are the only among the considered partnerships to be regulated by two documents having an obligatory character.

Despite this, however, there are not many examples of the successful implementation of cooperation in the area of sport. The majority of the contacts relate to the exchange of experience. Although Turkmen citizens study in Russian sport universities, there are no active university-to-university ties. In 2014, the Turkmen State Sport Committee invited the legendary Soviet and Russian figure skater Irina Rodnina to give a master class to young Turkmen figure skaters [94]. In 2018, members of Turkmen Weightlifting Federation attended a seminar on sport medicine and anti-doping policies in Moscow [33]. Also in 2018, the ROC and the Turkmen Olympic Committee (TOC) held a meeting to discuss current issues and the prospects for cooperation [95], while the leaders of Russian Cycling Federation (RCF) took part in the Ashgabat bicycle parade. As well as regular contacts developed between the RCF and their Turkmen colleagues, the Russian Katyusha cycling team has participated in a series of training sessions held in Turkmenistan [96]. In addition, the Russian coach Albert Kolybin worked with the Turkmen cycling team [97].

In 2019, Turkmen Football Federation organised master classes in Ashgabat by Kurban Berdyev, the coach of the Russian Rubin team, for several Turkmen football teams [98], while the Turkmen Minister of Sport visited the Russian Ministry of Sport together with the Secretary General of the TOC to exchange experience [99]. In addition, Turkmenistan took part in the 2019 RIOU conference. In 2020, Turkmen Ministry of Sport and Turkmen Tennis Federation organised a master class for young players by the Russian tennis star Mikhail Yuzhny held in Ashgabat [100].

There is also an example of a charity support in the form of financial aid regularly provided to develop the cycling sport in Turkmenistan by Russian businessman Igor Makarov, who heads the Areti corporation [101].

## 4 Conclusions

We have studied five cases of bilateral cooperation in sport between Russia and each of the post-Soviet Central Asian countries. Although these have certain common features, there are also some differences. All partnerships possess bilateral documents, which refer specifically to the area of sport. Four out of five basic documents are of the memorandum type and therefore of an advisory character. However, one partnership – Russian-Turkmen – is based on a bilateral agreement on sport, which carries stronger obligations. At the same time, Russia has signed a general agreement regarding humanitarian cooperation with each of the Central Asian countries, all of which

mention sport as a prospective area of cooperation. While most provide an extended list of cooperation objectives, the Russian-Tajik agreement is the least detailed. Meanwhile, Russia-Kazakhstan and Russia-Kyrgyzstan ties are characterised by additional documents on cooperation – the bilateral programmes.

In terms of the realisation of the agreements, all partnerships demonstrate actual contacts between the countries' sport organisations to a remarkable extent. The most intensive of these are the Russian-Kazakh and the Russian-Uzbek institutional partnerships. The experience of organising joint tournaments has been particularly prominent in Russian-Kazakh cooperation, somewhat less so in Russian-Kyrgyz and Russian-Uzbek ties. The cooperation in the training process is characteristic to all partnerships, although Russian-Turkmen contacts are evidently of a limited character. Sport education is a subject of diversified cooperation in four out of five partnerships, with the exception of the Russian-Turkmen relationship. Ties in sport medicine and research have been established in all five partnerships, the most intensive of these being in Russian-Kazakh and Russian-Uzbek relations. The coordination of policies in the international sport organisations is an attribute of four out of five partnerships, with the exception of the Russian-Turkmen one. Finally, ties between Russia and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan continue to become diversified as new formats of cooperation arise, such as the contacts between sport journalists, charitable programmes of industrial corporations and admission to national championships.

The fact that the partnerships differ in intensity can be explained not only in terms of the geographic factor (in case of the partnership with Kazakhstan), but also by the overall welfare of the states, which can define the level of budgetary financing for sport. Thus, Kyrgyzstan acts not as an organiser, but as a recipient of aid. Due to the Tajik economy also experiencing financial difficulties, it is not in a position to propose large investments, too. At the same time, since the country is obviously interested in foreign aid, Tajik authorities typically take the initiative in establishing contacts with their Russian counterparts. The new presidential administration of Uzbekistan, which has been working on its self-empowerment since 2016, has intensified relations with Russia, leading to the evident intensification of contacts. In addition, Uzbekistan is currently implementing a new national strategy of sport popularisation and development, which was adopted in 2018 [102]; for this reason, the country is paying special attention to the exchange of experience and capacity building in sport.

Known for its locked borders and neutral foreign policy, Turkmenistan is paradoxically the only Central Asian country that has a special agreement with Russia detailing cooperation in sport. Probably, this can be explained by the implication that the Turkmen state, often classified in international studies either as authoritarian [103, 104] or even as totalitarian [105], pays particular attention to sport as an instrument of foreign policy positioning, and thus tries to use the benefits from its partnership with Russia in this area. Such an agreement functions to demonstrate the presence of Turkmen international ties on the world stage and its desire to communicate with its neighbours without really affecting its neutrality. Since the development of sport in this country is highly controlled by the Turkmen state, contacts with Russia as one of its foreign partners are few and organised only by state institutions. Thus, Russian-Turkmen cooperation responds to formal parameters without significantly involving the citizens of the two countries.



However, since the essence of sport cooperation consists in the provision of people-to-people exchanges, bilateral partnerships have an inherently social basis. If the relationships are limited, they become more formal and are generally used by the respective states in order to achieve specific foreign relations goals. The question facing partners in such relationships then consists in whether their respective goals correspond.

In all partnerships, Russia acts mainly as a donor country, i.e., in experience, training skills, teaching literature, etc. Since professional sport in Central Asia is not currently at the top level, there should not be too many hopes placed in the future level of joint competitions and training in terms of the role they can play in the training of Russian athletes. For example, considering the equestrian sport, the level of the Eurasian championship with Central Asian and other post-Soviet teams is much lower than the European tournaments [106], while the same can be noted regarding the majority of sporting disciplines. Russia's aims in these partnerships consist primarily in the development aid and the above-mentioned people-to-people exchanges. However, not all Central Asian countries develop such exchanges, tending to pursue their own objectives in these partnerships. Here, a discrepancy can be observed in terms of priorities. The interest of the sport authorities of these countries to cooperate with Russia in professional sport appears to have a glimpse of commercial character, since they are interested in the acceptance of more and more types of aid from the donor for the resulting advancement of their teams at the international level. Therefore, taking into account the limits for people-to-people exchanges, these relations in professional sport are of a somewhat one-sided nature. The question arises as to whether, in addition to the increasing levels of foreign aid, Russia will be able to provide sufficient and comprehensive support to its own sport infrastructure, medicine, education, science, coaches, athletes, and youth sport.

At the same time, the cooperation in mass sport and sport education seems to be much more promising in terms of providing the development aid and the social basis to bilateral relations by offering the potential for large-scale people-to-people exchanges and ensuring the development of mass sporting participation. Possibilities stated in bilateral documents for increasing sport education ties and cooperation in mass sport, youth sport and sport for physically challenged people, should therefore be developed, and the existing practices of cooperation in these aspects should be multiplied, as they will have much more effect on people-to-people exchanges, on the development aid, on the image of Russia, as well as on the extensive, mutually beneficial and non-commercial social support for the relationship. Such practices will also benefit professional sport in Central Asian countries, as they will lead to more people engaging in sport, which will develop new generations of talented coaches and athletes.

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# The Global Tourism Industry After the COVID-19 Pandemic: Prospects and Ways of Recovery

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**Abstract.** This work is devoted to the prospects for the recovery of the tourism industry after the Covid-19 pandemic in the context of the transformations of this industry, which are the consequences of the pandemic. The theoretical significance of the work is determined by tracing in it the patterns of recession and recovery of the globalized sphere of the world economy in the context of the global crisis, which has several dimensions, within the framework of a specific case. The practical significance of the work is due to the fact that, on the basis of identifying short and medium-term trends that contribute to the recovery of the tourism industry, recommendations are proposed to accelerate the latter and deepen the positive trends associated with it. The relevance of this work is due, on the one hand, to the need for the most effective means of restoring global tourism, on the other hand, the need to understand the impact of multidimensional crises on a global scale (such as the Covid-19 pandemic) on the globalized economy of the modern world and its individual industries. The world tourism industry as a part of the global economy was selected as the object of analysis. The subject of the study is the recovery process of the global tourism industry after the recession caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

**Keywords:** International tourism · COVID-19 · UNWTO code · G20 recommendations

## 1 Introduction

International tourism is one of the main types of international economic activity and complex area that has a significant impact on both the structure and the general situation in the world economy, and on the economies of most countries and individual regions of the world. The development of tourism has a stimulating effect on such sectors of the economy as transport, communications, trade, construction, agriculture, production of consumer goods, and is one of the most promising areas of economic restructuring. International tourism has become a mirror of the modern era. Until recently, the tourism

sector accounted for a significant share of the world's gross domestic product and provided about 10% of world employment. In addition, revenues from tourism around the world as a whole in 2018 were estimated at 1.45 trillion \$, which was about 8% of the total export volume of the WTO member countries. International tourist arrivals close to 1.5 billion people before coronavirus pandemic [1].

The largest tourist destination in the world is overseas Europe, which accounts for over 50% of all international tourist arrivals. International tourism is developed in most European countries. The Mediterranean region stands out among the rest for the development of tourism in Europe (France, Spain, Italy, Greece, etc.).

Asia and the Asia-Pacific region occupy the second place after Europe in terms of the number of international tourist arrivals. They account for about a quarter of all arrivals. Thus, about 63 million tourists visited mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau) a year before the coronavirus pandemic, while Hong Kong - 29.3 million, and Macau - 18.5 million tourists. Thailand (38.3 million), Malaysia (25.8 million), Japan (31.2 million) are leaders in the number of international tourist arrivals in the region. Vietnam (15.5 million), the Republic of Korea (15.3 million) are expanding their share in the international tourism market. A significant number of tourists go to Singapore - 14.7 million. While the huge territories - India, Indonesia and Australia - received only 17.4 million, 13.4 million and 9.2 million tourists, respectively. This suggests that international tourism in the countries of Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is predominantly focal in nature, business tourism is a success. Hong Kong and Singapore are major financial centers in the world. Thailand and Turkey (45.8 million) are the traditional leaders in sea travel in Asia [2].

America has the third largest international tourist arrivals. More than 15% of all tourist arrivals accounted for its share in the year before the coronavirus pandemic. The undisputed leader on the American continent is the United States (79.6 million), followed by Mexico (41.4 million) and Canada (21.1 million). International tourism is underdeveloped in the countries of South America. The number of tourists in 2018 was: Brazil - 6.6 million, Argentina - 6.9 million and Chile - 6.4 million. This is due to the lack of a developed tourist infrastructure, a modern base of accommodation facilities and insignificance of air traffic with leading countries-suppliers of tourists [3].

Africa and the Middle East complete the list of regions in terms of the number of international tourist arrivals. In Africa, international tourism is developed in the north and south of the continent: Morocco (12.3 million), Egypt (11.4 million), South Africa (10.4 million), Tunisia (8.3 million). In the Middle East, international tourism is widely represented in Saudi Arabia (15.3 million) due to religious pilgrimages, as well as in the UAE (15.9 million) due to shopping tours and business tourism. The weakness of the international tourism market in the region is due in most cases to the underdevelopment of countries, the presence of a large number of infectious diseases, and other negative factors.

Data on Russia - 24.6 million international tourist arrivals in 2018 seem to be over-estimated [4]. UNWTO statistics does not consider that a significant number of arrivals from the former republics of the USSR, and now independent states of the world, to Russia, are not tourists, but labor migrants.



The authors note that the field of international tourism until 2019, in general, had a positive trend, despite the fact that not all countries have realized their tourism potential. However, in 2020, the global tourism industry faced a serious challenge - a crisis caused by the spread of a new type of coronavirus (COVID-19 pandemic). International tourism has become one of the most affected industries by the pandemic. The demand for travel and hospitality services, which were one of the world's largest sources of foreign exchange earnings and employment during the pre-COVID-19 era, has significantly decreased.

In theoretical terms, the analysis of the tourism recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic makes it possible to trace the dynamics of the recession and recovery of the most globalized spheres of the world economy after the global crises. Such crises have several dimensions: economic, political, epidemiological, etc. Based on this, general patterns are traced that are important for a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena of globalization, the global economy and transnational interdependence [5].

From a practical point of view, identifying the prospects for the recovery of the global tourism industry allows us to highlight its qualitative transformations caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. This approach allows us to propose the most effective ways to maximize the positive and minimize the negative aspects of these transformations, which, in turn, allows us to model the most optimal ways to restore the tourism industry on a global scale.

The aim of the study is to predict short-term prospects in the recovery of the international tourism industry. To achieve this goal, the authors set themselves the following tasks:

- analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism industry;
- analysis of current trends and qualitative changes contributing to the recovery of the tourism industry on a global scale;
- identification of the most stable trends in the short term and changes that contribute to this recovery.

## 2 Materials and Methods

The expert judgment method, the system analysis method and the forecast method were chosen as the methodological basis for this study. The system analysis method was used to analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism industry. The method of expert judgment was applied in the analysis of current trends and qualitative changes contributing to recovery of the tourism industry on a global scale. The forecast method was used to determine the current trends and changes that are most stable in the short term. The method of expert assessments was applied within the framework of this task to correct the forecasts.

Despite the sudden character of the pandemic, a broad range of academic literature is dedicated to its economic features and social circumstances in the context of tourism, especially in developing markets. In particular, such specialists as Brouder [6], Lim [7], Skare [8] and Gossling [9] present a classical economic-centered prospect on the pandemic impact that allows us to extrapolate the tendencies discovered to the sub-spheres of tourism, while non-Western experts – in particular, Rogerson [10], Gu [11]

and Resca [12] – concentrate on the tourism decline in the states of the global South and its impact on the recovery dynamics. In this context the conclusions about the sustainable approach (and local orientations as its part) positive impact on the tourism are emphasized, deepen and broadened by Figueroa [13] and Lapointe [14] who regard a paradigm reorientation as an opportunity for the tourism both globally and locally. Finally, a range of literature (Horowitz [15], Ganes [16]) is dedicated to the phenomenon of medical tourism as a result and driver of globalization in 2010s as well as a factor of growth in developing states.

Tourism is a complex poly structural system that is part of the socio-economic system. This industry is inextricably linked with such industries and markets as hotel services, insurance, transportation, legal, healthcare, catering, etc. Therefore, as a complex structure, the tourism industry exists and develops under the influence of external factors. However, the situation changed dramatically in 2020, when the coronavirus infection COVID-19 began to spread at a high rate. In addition, the rapid spread of the disease has caused a pandemic due to globalization, increased mobility of citizens and other integration processes, in particular due to travel, which has become more and more accessible. In turn, this led to a number of restrictive measures (closing borders, banning large gatherings of people, etc.) and the subsequent crisis in the tourism industry.

The crisis related to COVID-19 has caused the closure of air services between countries and cities, the closure of hotels, tourist and cultural places, a decrease in the number of public events, etc. All this has led to huge losses in the tourism sector. First of all, employees of this sphere suffer from a lack of profit, since air travel companies, hotel services conduct mass layoffs of their employees. According to the German company “Statista” for 2020, about 100 million people in the tourism industry lost their jobs. The largest number of job losses were recorded in the Asia-Pacific region - 63.4 million and in Europe - 13 million [17].

The analysis of individual countries demonstrates the fact that the impact of a pandemic on their economic level can be as destructive as possible. In particular, for those states whose economy directly depends on tourism. These are states such as small island developing states: Marshall Islands, Seychelles, Maldives, Bahamas, etc.

The private data processing company “Knoema” is based on research of various factors and reports that the share of tourism in different countries varies from 1.6% to 72% of GDP. Countries such as Macau - 72%, Maldives - 66.1%, Seychelles - 65.8%, other island states from 27.4% to 65.8%, Georgia - 33.5%, Albania - 27%, Italy - 13.3%, Spain - 14.6%, USA - 7.8%, etc. occupy the first lines [18]. Data were collected for 2019, that is, before the pandemic. Research by the World Travel and Tourism Council showed slightly different figures (apparently, the method of calculating income for this area in the total share of GDP differs). However, the trend continues, and the difference itself does not exceed 15–18% on average. Thus, the contribution of tourism to the Macau economy is 91.3%, to the Maldives - 56.6%, the Bahamas - 43.4%, Seychelles - 40.5%, Italy - 13% [19].

Thus, the authors note that the crisis and the subsequent restrictions of a different nature have become a serious test for countries with a high share of tourism in the total contribution to GDP. The number of international tourists to island states decreased by about 47% between January and April 2020. The UN Department of Economic and

Social Affairs warns of increased economic risks during a pandemic in small island developing states and their economies shrinking by 4.7% [20].

However, in practice, the most affected countries due to the impact of COVID-19 are Mexico, Spain, Italy, China, Australia, Germany, UK, USA, France, etc. First, despite the smaller share of tourism in the GDP of these countries, the monetary turnover from the tourism industry is significantly higher than in small island developing countries, where the share of tourism in GDP is more than 50%. For example, Spain's tourism revenues for 2019 are \$ 208 billion, while Macau's revenues are \$ 42 billion. Secondly, this is due to the high mortality rate from coronavirus and the subsequent measures taken by states. So, in Europe, restrictive measures were one of the most stringent (not counting the PRC), when adults were allowed to leave their home only to buy food, medicine, and walk dogs. All of this was reflected in the state of tourism in these countries [21].

UNWTO reports that the number of tourist trips has significantly decreased in international tourism, namely, it decreased by 72% from January to September 2020. Thus, we note that the Asia-Pacific region ranks first in a decrease in tourist flows (by about 84% or a shortage of 303 million tourists) compared to 2019, followed by the Middle East and Africa (75% for both parts of the world or a shortage 49 million tourists in the first region and a shortage of 52 million tourists in the second), Europe (70% or a shortage of 525 million tourists), America (69% or a shortage of 150 million tourists). In total, in 2020, the tourism sector missed 1.08 trillion international tourists or losses of 74% from 2019 [22].

At the moment, a number of restrictive measures are still in effect in European countries, since the third wave of the pandemic has already moved to the continent. An important fact is that, according to UNWTO, countries such as Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain are among the 10 most visited countries in the world. However, a number of restrictive measures and vaccination of citizens allowed a number of countries to open borders for tourists, thereby starting a long process of restoring the entire sphere. Citizens of the Russian Federation can visit countries such as Armenia, Maldives, Germany, India, etc., but the situation may change.

Analysts' calculations about total losses are not final and far from the truth. So, some researchers, based on the data of the hotel rooms platform "Hoo", say about losses of 753.6 billion dollars for 2020. The World Tourism Organization reports losses in tourism at 1.3 trillion dollars for 2020. However, at the moment this figure continues to grow, as despite the vaccination, the number of infected people is increasing. Moreover, researchers from the World Tourism Organization say that international tourism has returned to the level of 1990, due to the reduction of profits in this area [23]. As of March 2021, about a third of the world's countries are completely closed to foreign tourists, which means that losses in the tourism sector continue.

It is worth noting that experts from the World Economic Forum warned about threats from possible pandemics in 2006. Today, experts from the Economic Forum warn the public and politicians that the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic will threaten the development of the world economy for another 3–5 years [24]. The International Air Transport Association also notes a crisis in the tourism industry. The Association notes a 90% decrease in international air travel compared to 2019 levels. The Association predicts that global passenger traffic will stabilize no earlier than 2024 [25].

### 3 Results

In the modern world, international tourism is a significant factor in globalization, which is associated with its role in the world economy and its place in international cooperation. It, as a sector of the world economy, plays a significant role for the development of the states of the global South, stimulates related industries (transport, hotel, recreational), and is a significant share of world GDP. Tourism, as an element of political cooperation, is the object of international agreements affecting issues of economic development, intercultural communication and human rights [26].

The data of the International Tourism Organization show the contribution of tourism to the global economy. The contribution was \$ 7.6 trillion, which exceeded 10% of global GDP and corresponded to 10% of jobs in the world in 2016 [27]. At the same time, tourist flows have undergone and continue to undergo transformation under the influence of the development of the economies of the global South. The authors note the building of national brands that attract tourists, modernization, accompanied by a revision of visa policies and digitalization, reducing the “intermediation” in the construction of tourist routes and paperwork. The WEF forecasts indicate that, in the period up to 2026. Inbound tourism is expected to increase to India, Angola, Uganda, Brunei, Thailand, China, Myanmar, Oman, Mozambique and Vietnam [28].

Cooperation in the field of tourism, from the point of view of international political cooperation, is the result of cooperation of tourist operators united in international professional associations: International Congress of Official Tourism Promotion Associations (1925), International Congress of Official Tourism Organizations (1927), International Union Official Tourism Promotion Organizations (1930). In historical retrospect, this indicates the possibilities of tourism to be a unifying factor in international interactions.

In modern conditions, digitalization is becoming a factor that stimulates cooperation, expanding the possibilities of tourism, simplifying the interaction of tourists with workers in related fields, creating new formats of excursions, expanding opportunities for branding and urban tourism. [29] This trend was considered as a key industry driver in the 2010s. The Covid-19 pandemic has become one of the emergencies on a global scale.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the consequences for the global tourism industry can be divided into general economic and private economic. The general economic consequences are an extrapolation of the typical consequences of Covid-19 for the global economy as a whole and the associated restrictions. Private economic consequences represent the consequences for world tourism as an industry characterized by seasonality, cross-border, linkage to specific regions, interdependence with the service sector, the correlation between tourist flows and industry profitability.

Large-scale recession refers to the general economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic caused by simultaneous supply and demand shocks. A supply shock is the reduction in the economy's ability to produce goods and services at specified prices. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the supply shock consisted of restrictive measures that prevented workers in various sectors - primarily the service industry - from doing their work [30].

A demand shock is a set of conditions that reduce the ability or desire of consumers to purchase goods and services at specified prices. In the context of the pandemic, the

global demand shock consisted of an increase in the unemployment rate (33 million new unemployed - that is, an increase in the share of unemployed in the world from 1.1% to 6.5%) [21], the gap in global value chains (a striking example is the PRC, where in the period from January to February 2020, quarantine measures led to a drop in industrial production by 13.5%, a decrease in imports by 4% in dollar terms, and exports - by 17% compared to the previous year), [32] restrictions imposed on the entertainment, catering, tourism industries (by May 2020, they became mandatory in 65 countries of the world) [33] and consumer pessimism caused by the above factors [34].

The global economy fell by 4.3% in 2020. The international tourism industry was no exception - its decline amounted to \$ 1.3 billion in financial terms, which corresponds to a 74% decline in the scale of tourist flows. Such a large-scale drop even during the Covid-19 crisis (compared, for example, with trade and industry) is caused by the close relationship of tourism with the service sector, some elements of which (domestic and international transport, hotel industry) form the tourism “sub-industry”. The decline in these areas (−63 for indices of external and domestic air transportation, −47 for indices of booking and hotel accommodation) resulted in a multiplier effect [35].

The problem of general economic consequences is that they are determined by the state of the world economic system as a whole. The solution to the problem cannot be achieved through the restoration of one specific industry, the restoration of its production chains or links between consumers and producers of services [36].

The private economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic for the global tourism industry, however, cannot always be described as negative. Many of them are qualitative in nature, strengthening some characteristics of tourism and weakening others. Among these consequences, there are: a reorientation to domestic tourism and agritourism, an increase in the number of spontaneous trips and an increase in the proportion of tourists under 35 years old.

The reorientation to domestic tourism weakens the cross-border nature of tourism, but strengthens its attachment to specific regions and attractions, which in the long term has a positive role for the branding of these regions, and well as stimulates the inflow of funds for infrastructure development. An increase in spontaneous travel could theoretically weaken the seasonal nature of tourism. Spontaneity of travel is associated with the dynamism of changes in quarantine measures and is of a short-term nature, while a temporary weakening of seasonality may, on the contrary, lead to an inflow of funds into a weakened industry when this inflow is usually not expected.

As for the increase in the share of tourists up to 35, this trend is long-term. The total value of the international youth travel market in 2009 was almost USD 190 billion, and in 2018 this figure increased to USD 333 billion. The limited financial base is a problem for youth tourism in general. According to the WYSE Travel Confederation statistics, the average travel cost of a young traveler was 1,035 euros in 2018. This becomes a problem in the context of the impact of the pandemic on the labor market and youth employment, as youth tourism, which had a limited financial base before the pandemic and is faced with it narrowing, does not contribute to the rapid recovery of the industry. Nevertheless, youth tourism is characterized by a high proportion of targeted travel (work and study abroad, volunteer trips, trips to study languages) - more active travel formats that have a positive impact on destinations and contribute to the recovery of its economy [37].

Medical tourism is another segment of the global tourism industry that deserves special attention. It attracts attention in two contexts - in its pre-crisis dynamics and in the context of the regions of medical tourism recovery. The medical tourism market grew rapidly before the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Oxford Business Group data, medical tourism generated USD 58.6 billion in 2018, with an 11.7% growth forecast in 2019. This market should have generated USD 142.2 billion in profit per year by 2026. The growth was predicted on the basis of increased awareness of residents of developed economies about quality medical services offered in developing economies, increased demand for medical services in developed economies, as well as government incentives, a key instrument of which has become a visa policy. So, in 2017, India introduced a special type of tourist visas - medical visas. The UAE has also adapted its visa policy. The business has also initiated the promotion of medical tourism. For example, in 2015, Turkish Airlines offered 50% discounts to medical tourists [38]. The general dynamics of the segment, combined with government support and business incentives, led to the fact that by 2020 the medical tourism industry has accumulated reserves for an accelerated (compared to other segments) recovery. So, according to the forecasts of Future Market Insights, the compound annual growth rate in the medical tourism sector between 2020 and 2030 will be 12.3% [39], which implies reaching the 2019 level of 1–2 quarters of 2022 (for comparison - the UNWTO’s optimistic forecast for the industry as a whole assumes a recovery in 2023) and further exponential growth. In the context of the relationship of medical tourism with related industries (hotel, restaurant, transport and recreational sectors), this will help accelerate their recovery [40].

#### 4 Discussion

The international rating of the Medical Tourism Index states that 6 out of 10 top positions are occupied by the states of the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region [41]. In 2018, 18% of the medical tourism market was in India, [42] in the same period, countries such as Thailand were gaining popularity as medical tourism destinations. Costa Rica, Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, Colombia, Turkey, Taiwan and South Korea are emerging economies in which tourism as a whole is a significant profitable part of the economy (see Table 1).

**Table 1.** Tourism sector in emerging medical tourism markets

	Thailand	Costa Rica	Mexico	Singapore	Turkey	Taiwan	South Korea	Brazil
Share tour. Sectors to GDP [43]	21.9%	13.5%	17.3%	10%	12.7%	4.4%	2.8%	8.1%
MTI rating [30]	17	7	42	2	30	16	14	28

In 2020, the World Tourism Organization prepared a forecast based on two scenarios (optimistic and realistic). The first scenario points to a sharp rise in tourist traffic, which was expected in July. This should result in a 66% increase in international arrivals in 2021, compared to historic lows in 2020. The second scenario assumes a potential increase in tourist traffic in September, which should lead to an increase in the number of arrivals by 22% compared to last year. Nevertheless, in both the first and second cases, it is assumed that the tourist flow will not reach the level of 2019, remaining 55% and 67% lower, respectively [44]. The estimated date for the industry to return to 2019 refers to 2023–2024. Key barriers to recovery in this case are:

- persisting travel restrictions,
- slow fight against the virus,
- unfavorable economic environment,
- lack of coordination in the actions of governments,
- consumer pessimism.

Currently, three of the above-mentioned determinants are being smoothed out in the slower tourism recovery. Thus, according to the World Tourism Organization Recovery Barometer, consumer pessimism of travelers fell from 44% in November 2020 to 17% in January 2021, and by March 2021 it stabilized at 30% after accelerated growth. Growth and stabilization can be associated with the beginning of the season and have a short-term character - however, in the context of the continuing growth in the number of vaccinated people in the world (by April 2021, their number reached 841 million and continues to grow at an arithmetic progression) [45]. Experts point to the likelihood of this trend developing into a constant and intensifying as the summer season approaches.

A similar trend applies to travel restrictions on a global scale. Since the beginning of November 2020, the authors have observed a shift from complete restrictions to partial ones (restrictions on family reunification, travel to work and study are removed) [46]. These trends appear to be robust and are the opposite of the factors hindering the recovery of the tourism industry. In addition, all these factors exert a mutual intensifying influence on each other. This means that they will help accelerate the positive dynamics of each other and, as a result, the implementation of the optimistic scenario of the World Tourism Organization.

Indirectly, this positive forecast is confirmed by the current dynamics in the services sectors related to tourism - the growth of actual bookings of air tickets and hotel rooms. Thus, in March 2021, actual flight bookings increased by 32% compared to January 2021, and hotel room bookings increased by 90% simultaneously with the number of hotel searches [47].

Efforts to rebuild the tourism industry are also being undertaken at the level of international organizations. New legal and financial guarantees of states, tourist operators and related industries are becoming key instruments for recovery in these conditions. This should reduce risks for tourists, consumer pessimism in the short term and dangers of a sharp drop for the industry in the long term. This was manifested in the initiative for the adoption of the International Code of Legal Protection of Tourists at the UNWTO level, which was announced in 2020 [48]. In 2021, this initiative was embodied in the adoption of a preliminary version of this document. The draft International Code of

Legal Protection of Tourists is based on the principles of harmonization, coordination and cooperation, which in the long term should contribute to the formation of common standards of financial protection, common rules for informing, as well as the emergence of common interpretations of emergency situations. The recommendations focus on informing tourists about emergencies and “mitigating the administrative burden in emergencies”. Recommendations for the creation of insurance mechanisms and support tools for tour operators, however, are of a general nature [49].

The G20 recommendations for the future of the tourism sector provide more specific recommendations for improving the work of related industries - transport (general policy in the field of testing, vaccination and certification, expanding the use of biometrics), travel agency and hotel spheres (market diversification, priority support for small and medium-sized businesses, stimulating local value chains, inclusiveness monitoring, social protection of tourism workers), as well as to improve the political agenda and policy in the field of tourism [50].

The International Code of Legal Protection of Tourists and the G20 Recommendations differ from each other in terms of purpose and target audience. However, their general principles and approaches (see Table 2) can contribute to a long-term international tourism recovery strategy.

**Table 2.** Comparative characteristics of the UNWTO Code and the G20 recommendations

Comparison criteria	UNWTO code	G20 recommendations
Addressees of recommendations	States (“host country”, “country of departure”)	Political decision-makers, business
Issues of recommendations	Mitigation of consequences of emergencies	Long-term perspective of tourism development
Place of information support	Main component of recommendations	One of a number of components of recommendations
Objectives	Protecting tourists	Achieving sustainable tourism development
Place of small business and local communities	Obey the recommendations of the center	Addressees of support

In the context of current trends in tourism as a field of political cooperation and the economic sector at the level of individual states, it is recommended, focusing on private economic trends, to activate domestic tourism through support of local small and medium-sized businesses, branding and rebranding of local attractions, as well as through support to stimulate forms of tourism in demand. Among young people - in particular, forms of volunteer and educational tourism. In the long term, the documents recommend developing technologies and infrastructure related to medical tourism, focusing on its branding and rebranding, as well as raising the standards of tourism medicine.

At the level of international tourism regulation, the documents recommend continuing cooperation in the field of international rule-making aimed at protecting the rights



of tourists in emergency situations. In particular, UNWTO recommends supplementing the International Code of Legal Protection of Tourists with specific recommendations on insurance protection, on mechanisms for social protection of tourism workers and on mechanisms for developing a common policy, which should be developed based on the experience of the G20, which proposed a comprehensive and extensive plan. In turn, G20 participants are encouraged to promote the principles and guidelines proposed in this plan in the economic blocs and unions of which they are members. Also, at the level of both international regulation and interstate cooperation, it is recommended to develop universal and sustainable mechanisms for the evacuation of tourists in case of health crises, mechanisms to protect the rights of volunteer tourists (cooperation with the International Labor Organization is recommended), as well as global standards for medical tourism.

## 5 Conclusion

The problem of tourism as an important sphere of the world economy, an instrument of interstate political dialogue on the scale of world politics, branding and increasing the soft power potential on the scale of individual states has acquired particular relevance in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, which, on the one hand, has become a determinant of the global decline in tourist flows, with on the other hand, a stimulus for the transformation of tourism as a sphere of economy and political and social practice.

Based on the results of the forecast, the authors of this article give recommendations on the restoration of the international tourism industry for certain groups of states: developed economies with a high share of the tourism sector, developing economies with a high share of the tourism sector, developed economies with a low share of the tourism sector, developing economies with a low share of the tourism sector.

Thus, if at the general economic level, the global tourism industry is undergoing a large-scale decline, exacerbated by a decline in related industries, then at the level of industry trends, it is undergoing a reorientation to domestic tourism, an increase in the number of spontaneous trips, an increase in the share of young tourists, as well as an exponential growth of the medical tourism sector with its high share of revitalization in the developing economies of the Middle East, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. Recent trends do not lead to an accelerated recovery of the industry directly, but indirectly contribute to the strengthening of local economies and the flow of funds into a weakened industry outside the context of seasonality.

Currently, the revitalization of tourism-related industries is taking place. This is due to both seasonality and positive factors in expanding vaccination campaigns, easing border crossing restrictions, reducing consumer pessimism and intensifying international cooperation in the field of protecting both tourists and the industry as a whole, reinforcing each other and thereby strengthening their positive dynamics. In this regard, the authors assume a likely optimistic forecast of experts from the World Tourism Organization, suggesting an increase in tourist flow in July 2021 at the level of 45% of its number in 2019.

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In the context of current trends at the state level, the authors recommend activating domestic tourism, stimulating forms of tourism that are in demand among young people (volunteer and educational tourism), and using the slowdown in international tourism for rebranding and branding local attractions. In the context of international tourism, it is recommended to link vaccination campaigns to the parallel continuation of lifting restrictions, financially stimulate related industries, expand opportunities for volunteering (local and foreign) that would contribute to economic recovery, and develop infrastructure for medical tourism. It is also recommended to continue cooperation at the level of the International Tourism Organization (UNWTO). At the UNWTO level, it is recommended to support the initiative to create a Code of Tourism Protection, focus on mechanisms for evacuating tourists in case of health crises, on mechanisms to protect the rights of volunteer tourists, and on the development of global standards for medical tourism.

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# **Migration and Socio-demographic Processes**



# How Do Geographical Imaginaries Shape Academic Migration to Global Centres and Peripheries?

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**Abstract.** The paper discusses the geographical imaginaries framing and shaping the migration decision-making process in the case of academics. Based on two qualitative studies focused on international academics employed in Poland (100 individual in-depth interviews) and Polish-born academics in the UK and the US (40 interviews), it demonstrates how the objective working conditions and common-sense knowledge translate into the imaginaries of higher education systems. The article suggests that vivid and positive imaginaries of Western higher education (“West is Best” narrative) contrast with blurred and ambiguous imaginaries of Poland, a semi-peripheral country (“in-between” narrative). The analysis of life and career stories problematises two common assumptions on academic migration. The first one is that “science has no nationality”. It is very difficult to defend it as some academics had a strong sense of place. The second one is the idealised and romanticised image of the West. The analysis suggests that the narrative of Western superiority is, at least partially, inadequate because international academics, over the years, start to re-work their imaginaries. The paper concludes with broader implications of geographical imaginaries for the power inequalities in global academia.

**Keywords:** Geographical imaginaries · Geographical imaginations · Academic migration · Geography of knowledge · International academics

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 The Purpose of the Study

This paper contributes to the existing literature on the geography of knowledge by discussing the abandoned aspect of migration decision-making in the case of international academics. Usually, even these migration scholars who discuss not only economic, psychological and social rationales for moving from one country to another, and point out to certain pre-conceptions, do it without explicit reference to the concept of a geographical imaginary [1, 2]. In this paper, I analyse how the imaginaries of particular countries (or, more precisely, particular academic systems) frame and shape academic migration. In doing so, I build on the work of few scholars who already strongly emphasised that

the way one “imagines qualities of certain places in the world and the people who live there, and the social, economic or political possibilities that these places may offer, is very significant for the decision to emigrate or not, and if so, where” [3, p. 45]. In other words, what I would like to analyse in this paper is a kind of “superstructure” built over the material conditions and other measurable pull and push factors.

To answer the question of how geographical imaginaries shape academic migration, I use two data sources. The first one is a 2017–2019 research project on foreign-born faculty in Poland (100 individual in-depth interviews, henceforth: IDIs). The second is a 2020–2021 study on the Polish-born academics in the UK and the US (40 IDIs).

## 2 Literature Review

### 2.1 Geographical Imaginaries – The Concept

Historically, geographical imagination(s) [4, 5] and imaginaries are two distinct concepts, although they are often used interchangeably. The first one had initially been used to “focus attention on geography’s own understandings of physical and social worlds” [6, p. 132]. Being a disciplinary self-reflection, this concept resembles, to some extent, C.W. Mills’s idea of “sociological imagination”. In his paper on geographical imaginations, Harvey [7, p. 429] advocates marriage between geographical work and aesthetic theory by claiming that it is crucial to focus on the question “how spatial constructs are created and used as fixed markers of human memory and of social values in a world of rapid flux and change”. This claim is rooted in Immanuel Kant’s notion of judgments of beauty, based on both feeling and cognition [8]. Without engaging in philosophical problems, it should be highlighted that the theory of geographical imagination is interested in the interaction of cognitive judgement (widely discussed in migration studies) and subjective assessment. The geographical imaginations are thus representations of the world or ways that “people perceive places” [9, p. 2], “ideas about the world” [10, p. 449] or “mental images we hold of different places and of the people living there” [11, p. 79]. In the present day, the imaginaries can be produced either in personal encounters (e.g., during stays abroad), via media [6, 12, 13], as a result of marketing activities [14], or education and national policies [10]. It should be taken into account, however, that “states, despite their strong role in curriculum development, do not necessarily control education’s geographical imaginaries” [15, p.163].

The concept of “geographical imaginaries”, also referred to as “spatial imaginaries” [16], is what Bill Howie and Nick Lewis define as an idea that allows us to understand “not only that there are multiple geographical imaginations at large in the world, but that they do work in framing understandings of the world and in turn making our different worlds, and that particular imaginaries are wilfully put to work with political affect and effect” [6, p. 132].<sup>1</sup> This understanding is similar to Gregory’s [4, pp. 203–204] definition of “imaginative geographies” shaping “the ways in which, from our particular perspective, we conceive of the connections and separations” between different places. As Howie and Lewis [6, p. 134] aptly summarise it “imaginaries are socially constructed and in turn construct the social”.

<sup>1</sup> Howie and Lewis, however, use their new notion in reference to the papers on geographical imaginations (2014).

## 2.2 Geographical Imaginaries – Exemplary Research

Although the authors use various theoretical concepts in reference to similar phenomena, there is a vast literature focused on what I referred to as geographical imaginaries. Said [17] discussed the “imagined geographies” of the Orient. Sassen [18] emphasised “ideological linkages” between the sending country and the receiving countries in the context of Westernisation. Appadurai [12, p. 33] explained how electronic media co-construct “imagined worlds”, or “the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe”. Also, Florida [19, p. 186] emphasised that highly-skilled individuals move not only in pursuit of jobs and financial rewards, but “what creatives look for are abundant high-quality amenities and experiences, an openness to diversity of all kinds, and above all else the opportunity to validate their identities as creative people”.

More recently, Fujita [13, p. 23], using the concept of the “imagined West”, argued that in the eyes of Japanese migrants, “New York City is believed to be a place where they can continue to lead a normal life with better prospects; London is regarded as a place where they can acquire distinction”. Yoon and Kim [20, p. 640], based on their qualitative study, argued that “to Korean female scholars, the US is imagined as a country offering more freedom from patriarchy and opportunities to overcome barriers in their home country.” Suzanne Beech [21, p. 174], in turn, demonstrated that “international students are motivated by imaginative geographies and place attachments when choosing where to study”. The impact of media images on the migration of Albanians [22] and Moroccans [23] to the West was also examined. Riaño and Baghdadi [3, p. 47], investigating multinational couples, demonstrated how the geographical imaginaries (*imaginaires géographiques*) of the country of origin impacted the attitude of a family towards planned relocation. Similarly, in her recent book on escape as a reason for mobility in Europe, Katarzyna Waniek [37], with no reference to this notion, provided numerous examples of how geographical imaginaries shaped migration decisions. The way how people perceive various European countries affected their decision to seek adventure in the East, move from one Western country perceived as “culturally lower” (Netherlands) to the one perceived as “higher” (Switzerland), or pretended to be German instead of Estonian.

The geographical imaginaries may impact the way the “whiteness” is perceived. For instance, Garapich [24, p. 320] argued that many Polish nationals residing in the UK “reposition themselves on a local geography of perceived hierarchy and emphasise new ways of belonging, which express essentialist attitudes towards culture understood as whiteness, Europeanness, and proximity to the British middle class”. At the same time there is evidence that the “whiteness” of Eastern Europeans in some contexts can be contested. Jochen Lingelbach analysed Polish migrants in Africa (1942–1950) positioned “on the margins of the white community”: “While Polish elites underlined their Europeanness and portrayed themselves as allied nationals on a par with the British colonisers, the lower-class Poles in the camps were less convinced about their superior position. For the colonial administrators and settlers, the Poles constituted a problematic peasant group that shared traits with other white subalterns. In the religious arena, the Poles occupied a position that showed some similarities with European missionaries” [25, p. 240].



### 3 Methodology

#### 3.1 Sample

This paper builds on two studies conducted, respectively, in 2017–2019 and 2020–2021. The first study was focused on rare cases of foreign-born academics who migrated to Poland (100 individual in-depth interviews).<sup>2</sup> The second embraced the group of 40 Polish-born scholars who followed the beaten path from Poland to the UK and the US<sup>3</sup> (Table 1). In both studies, the interview protocol contained various questions regarding academic work, including a global reputation of a particular higher education (HE) system.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 1.** Sample characteristics

		Study 1	Study 2
Gender	Female	60	24
	Male	40	16
Academic discipline	Humanities and social sciences	55	24
	STEM	45	16
Country of origin	Western Europe, USA, Canada	59	0
	Eastern Europe	29	0
	Other countries	12	0
	Poland	0	40
Average age (at the time of interview)		45	43

#### 3.2 Method

In both studies, a typical interview took between 60 and 90 min. The interview protocol was semi-structured to allow flexibility in asking questions relevant to a life situation of an interviewee. Each interview was transcribed verbatim and subsequently coded in Atlas.ti. As a result, 172 codes were created in the first study and 109 different codes in the second one. In the first study, the crucial code for this paper was a “Prestige” as it embraced various statements about the Polish HE system, often in comparison to other systems, which the interviewees knew. In this study, however, the perceived prestige of

<sup>2</sup> This study was generously supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Dialog no. 0142/DLG/2017/10).

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<sup>4</sup> The data analysis was conducted thanks to the support of the National Science Centre Poland, grant number UMO-2019/35/D/HS6/00169.

a HE system was not a central issue of the project but one of many lines topics of this explorative study.

The second study was designed with a direct intent to delve into details of the geographical imaginaries. In particular, two sets of interview questions and replies will be analysed here. The first one was based on a projection technique with the use of a political world map. The interviewees were asked to recommend an ideal country to move to for career reasons. The second question was based on a table with 10 fictional job offers from the US (2 universities: a top one and a lesser-known one), the UK (2 universities: a top one and a lesser-known one) as well as Australia, the Netherlands, Dubai, Kazakhstan, Poland and Slovakia. The interviewees were shown basic information about these offers (e.g., place in the university ranking, annual base salary, additional benefits). The main aim of this material was not so much to delineate desirable and undesirable locations but rather to analyse the argumentation supporting a decision of willingness or lack of willingness to move to these countries.

Based on coded transcripts, the paper analysed various lines of reasoning present in the interviewees' narratives regarding different academic systems. Due to the nature of the empirical material, the analysis avoided any generalisations and quantifications because the main contribution of this paper was to show that geographical imaginaries are taken into account in the migration decision-making process and how they influence academic careers in the two studied contexts (migration to academic centres and untypical migration to academic semi-peripheries).

## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Academic World Has a Symbolic Centre

In the first part of the analysis, I will focus on the notion of “positionality”, as introduced by Deema Kaneff, based on Eric Sheppard's original idea. Positionality is defined as “a relational construct, where places are reliant on their interdependencies with other places and are embedded in power relations, as some positions and relationships are inevitably more influential than others” [26, p. 38]. Thus, positionality “can be mapped by depicting the relationships between different agents, in different places, and at different scales” [27, p. 323]. I looked at the empirical material from this perspective to find out what sort of interdependencies between different academic systems can be identified.

Data from both studies are highly complementary. The general image of the academic world was a map with the US and the UK at the centre and surrounded by concentric circles of the peripheries (see: Fig. 1). The interviewees during Study 2 were convinced that, regardless of academic discipline, the core academic countries were either the US or the UK, despite some criticism of these systems expressed in the course of interviews.

*The UK is still a powerhouse, that is, a strong stronghold of the academic world. There are very many... There are good laboratories. There are good institutions (UK8).*

*You know, it's very hard to leave Oxbridge [laughter] (UK12).*

*I do not believe that anywhere else in the world, I can have better working conditions than here (US15).*


*[recommending a place for starting PhD studies] I would look at the top institutions in international rankings, so classically, British, American, German universities.*

*Then probably Swedish, Australian. In my discipline, French institutions are mediocre. Canadian, yes (UK2).*

If a non-European, or American country ever occurred, it was either a clear second choice, or a choice suggested only in very specific circumstances.

*I would definitely draw attention to... – apart from the US – Australia, Singapore, Japan, so in general, I would suggest not to exclude Asian countries (US5).*

*If you come directly from Poland and you're not prepared for an American university, it's very difficult for you to get to the most intellectually interesting level (...) And I would say that a lot of interesting people who, for various reasons, haven't got a job in the States are now in East Asia, South Asia, South America, also Mexico (US13).*



**Fig. 1.** General geographical imaginaries of the academic world (source: own research).

Similarly, the academics who moved to Poland (Study 1) clearly indicated countries perceived as centres of global knowledge production [28].

*I will say it openly. Probably just like any university in Central and Eastern Europe, everyone wants to have contacts with universities in the United Kingdom, the United States, etc. (PL41).*

*Universities in the UK are very good. Then we have leaders [in Europe]: France, Germany, Italy. This means, of course, that there is much competition. Simply put, it is a bit difficult for Central European countries to compete with Western European countries (PL50).*

In saying that, the interviews contested the old and still vivid assumption that science has no nationality [29–31]. In this vein, some authors have suggested that the students choose a particular university rather than a country [32, p. 168]. This cosmopolitan approach was indeed present in my interviews, mainly among academics representing STEM. Nevertheless, in the entire sample, it was neither the only nor the dominant narrative. Moreover, the vast majority of interviewees, including the ‘hard’ scientists, definitely ruled out the very possibility to work in Dubai and Kazakhstan for various “cultural reasons”.

*There is no cultural barrier between Poland and the United States, but it exists in the case of Asia (US11).*

*Kazakhstan, no, sorry... Neither the university is good, culturally... Culturally it is also a cosmos. Money? I do not see any difference between what is in Poland and what is there, so it is not an option (UK4).*

*I would also cross out Kazakhstan right away. I would also cross out Dubai because of my gayness, right away [laughs]. No, because I can't imagine living there openly as I do here as a gay man (UK7).*

*I can tell you straight away that Dubai is the last place I would go.*

**Why?**

*Mainly for cultural reasons. It seems that it would be simply too distant culturally for me, and I do not see a place for myself there, apart from earning money. I know people who had been to Dubai, even not so long ago. Sure it's great in terms of earnings, but apart from that, I think it would be quite difficult for me (UK13).*

Some interviewees were well aware that such opinions may sound prejudiced or simply racist, but this self-reflection did not discourage them from revealing their imaginaries, which can be interpreted as an indicator of how deeply they are rooted.

*I'm going to come off as a bit prejudiced now [laughter]. Well, yes, I don't know the culture, I don't know the language... (...) It's related to the fact that I just don't know the place. Is it a good place to live, to live in similar, right, conditions that I know now? But there may be a total distortion of this image. Maybe Almaty, is very international and cool, I don't know (UK14).*

*As racist as it may sounds, but no. No. 8 [on the list] is out.*

**Kazakhstan is out. Why?**

*I don't know the situation there at all. It is in a part of the world where I would be afraid to go (UK5).*

*I would reject Kazakhstan, I think. It's very discriminatory. I think... because I have no idea what science is like there... in my life, I haven't read any scientific paper from there (UK6).*

To a much smaller extent, the geographical imaginaries made certain regions of the US unattractive. Also these imaginaries were thoroughly stereotypical. It proves that the “intuitive” imaginations [5, p. 6], or “use of one’s personal impressions of selected facts instead of impersonally considering and weighing all pertinent evidence” discussed here are based on simplifications not only in peripheral places but also in reference to some parts of the academic world leader – the United States. This brings us back to the subjective assessment as a key component of every imaginary, besides the cognitive judgement.

*Texas is out of the question because it's the Bible Belt, so I wouldn't find myself there at all (UK3).*

*The US, Texas, is not an option. Georgia (...) it's a Deep South. There's a lot of racism. There's a lot of xenophobia and a lot of that kind of... a lot of guns and all sorts of weird stuff (UK8).*

*I mean, Texas is generally conservative, very traditional. I don't ride horses, and I don't have to eat meat and barbecued ribs every day. I'm joking, of course, but you know what I mean (UK16).*

## 4.2 Poland is “In-Between”

The image of Poland was decidedly different from an image of the core countries discussed above. The first part of this imaginary was based on the invisibility of Polish universities and research centres on a global scale.

***When you talk with your colleagues in [Eastern European country], has anyone heard of your university, or is it a completely anonymous institution?***

*Well, it is rather unknown. Sometimes people even don't know where [the city] is located (PL61).*

*I just was looking on the internet, you know, jobs for a scientist. I just googled it. I applied for many positions. It's not the only one. Ok. I just tried to find something that should be interesting (PL23).*

***When you studied in [Eastern European country], did you hear about any Polish university or was it not interesting at all and...***

*No, I hadn't heard (PL25).*

Judged by the material from the Study 1, the geographical imaginaries of Poland should be placed in the middle of the scale between the global centres (clearly positive image) and peripheries (clearly negative image). On various occasions, the interviewees expressed a strong feeling of being in-between: halfway between Western academic supercentres and peripheral academic systems.

*I think that [prestige] of Poland is more or less like in [the home country in Southern Europe] because, for example, England is always at the top, some of the universities in England (...)*

***So when we are talking about the whole of Europe, we can say that [home country] and Poland are in the middle, or in the bottom?***

*I think in the middle. Not in the bottom but in the middle (PL35).*

*Generally speaking, Poland's prestige is at the middle level. Unfortunately, our countries Poland and [another Eastern European country] in the next two or three decades absolutely cannot compete with American and English universities (PL54).*

If Poland was indicated as a good career choice, the opinion usually came from an academic born in another post-communist country or in the Global South. Even these interviewees, however, rarely argued that working conditions could be barely compared to the Western countries.

*Well, generally because of the image of the West... Because there was this division, this Iron Curtain. Western countries developed in different circumstances. So people simply believe that a diploma from those countries will be, I don't know, a guarantee of success, I think so. However, generally in academic circles, I think that Polish academia have, at least in [Eastern European country], a positive image (PL67).*

*When I'm in [home country in Eastern Europe], and I say that I work at a university in Poland, then, of course, I'm immediately respected. [They feel] that this is something, right? But if I say the same thing in, for example, in Germany or the United States, it's not so... is it? (PL57).*

*At that time, the general perception in [home country] at that time was that Poland had good schooling, but, on the other hand, that it was a poor country and that it was better to study in France than in Poland (PL27).*

*I would say that Poland is in this process of transition that [South American country] didn't know how to do. And Poland knew how to do it. And I expect that in five years from now, Poland will be really high respected (PL77).*

Moreover, the meticulous analysis of the transcripts allowed me to identify cases where the symbolic advantage of the West was tacitly assumed but not always explicitly expressed.

*Even foreign countries are opening their own research centres, and, well, the level is not as high as at the MIT, etc., but the level is very high in my discipline (PL96).*

*I have a lot of acquaintances from Warsaw who graduated from a university in Warsaw or Cracow and got accepted in Singapore, the USA, and Western European countries, where they did their postdocs are still working there (PL95).*

In the first quoted example, the interviewee argues that the research level in his discipline was high, and he justifies his opinion by discussing international companies, which invested in research centres in Poland. This is as if the foreign investment was the ultimate seal of quality. Similarly, in the second case, the proof of the good quality of teaching is that a graduate can successfully move to a global centre of knowledge production.

Taken together, these two themes – lack of international recognition and the feeling of being in the middle, or having to catch up with the West, do not build positive associations and favourable geographical imaginaries. As shown above, even these interviewees who emphasised the strengths of Polish HEIs did it with less confidence than academics claiming that Poland is far behind the supercentres. These opinions were formulated often with some further qualifications, e.g. that reputation can be attributed to a particular institution or even person or that Polish HEIs are recognisable in the post-communist countries. Nevertheless, Poland does not have a clearly negative image of a periphery, which positions it as a semi-periphery.

### 4.3 Disillusionment

As the previous section suggested, the geographical imaginaries of Poland were highly contradictory, pointing out to the in-the-middle position. Furthermore, an academic who was not born in a culturally similar country (e.g., Ukraine, Czech Republic) at the time of migration might not have any image of Poland at all, or the image which was highly likely to be incomplete or blurred. On the contrary, the perceptions of Western academia were not only widespread but, as the empirical material suggests, exaggerated or overrated [21, p. 182]. The testimonies of my interlocutors confirm that there is a gap between the imagined West and migrants' experiences at their destinations [13, 22, 23].

In some cases, the initial geographical imaginaries turned out to be largely inadequate. At the most general level, the distorted image embraced entire countries, especially the United States.

*Our idea of the United States then was something like Manhattan [laughter]. And Manhattan is the exception rather than the rule. So it was the first serious culture shock that we suddenly landed in [name of the city], which of course, has a few skyscrapers, but mainly single-family houses (US14).*

More interestingly, the working conditions turned out to be disappointing in some cases. This theme permeated especially the narratives of academics on teaching positions without regular contracts, both in the US and the UK.

*I also had this image of America. That people are so, you know, they're great researchers and so on (...) I think in terms of prestige and the chances of finding a job, later on, I would perhaps point to the States [asked about a recommendation for a future PhD student]. Why? Because there is still this perception that this is a good place. But no... But I would also warn this person that it is not so easy and that there is an awful lot of bureaucracy and other issues (US10).*

*The contract was for one semester only. I was paid extra for grading exams. I was paid as a person still without a PhD, but after all, with 10 years of study. The most basic rate (...) was £10 an hour. And that was for grading essays and preparing for the classes. Then there was a rate for lectures and creating new material. So lectures were about £18 per hour and then creating new material, for example, exams, £25 per hour (...) I think on a monthly basis I probably netted at most £1,500 gross (UK5).*

*And this, of course, involves exploitation, to put it bluntly. Exploitation because adjuncts are cheap, they are cheap labour (...) So an adjunct has six courses, so his salary is 42,000 a year, which is half of what an assistant professor gets for 50% less courses. And an assistant professor has benefits, insurance. So from this point of view, it is good to be a professor in America, but it is not very good to be an adjunct (US15).*

Even the geographical imaginaries of scholars employed by top world universities or research institutes were subject to change. Attracted by the romantic narrative of a world-class university, they started to observe obvious inadequacies of such a narrative. They pointed out the problems that might have been expected in the case of lesser prestigious universities, but not the top of the world rankings: lack of funds or a lack of work-life balance.

*[In my field] professors retire, and their positions are often not renewed because there is no money for it. For the last five years, there was just one professor position, but the required specialisation was very narrow, so I wasn't even able to apply for it (UK18).*

*Group leaders around the highest productivity age – 35, 45, maybe even early 30s to 40s... Basically, they were all divorced (US2).*

*The drawback: uncertainty. People who are postdocs have their contracts renewed every 2, 4 years, depending on when the grant arrives. If, for example, a visiting scholar finishes his stay in Oxford in 2 years (...), he is still under the influence of this mild euphoria: "wow, Oxbridge". And it was the same with me. I did not see it at the beginning. You only start to notice it, at least in my case, after 4 years (UK22).*

Moreover, some interviewees with stable positions at the top universities openly contested the geographical imaginaries produced by international rankings.

*I can't explain to myself why [my university] is number one or two, because we should be the 10th, 20th.*

***Why do you think so?***

*Well, because in terms of academic output, we are good, but not outstanding. It seems to me that these rankings are very susceptible to students' opinions, to such, well, subjective opinions, and here we win because [leading UK institution] has its name. But*

*if we had changed our name because some sponsor had come, then suddenly we would have dropped in the rankings (UK10).*

The disappointment behind these narratives reveals how unfair is the simplistic narrative “West is Best”. This does not, however, mean that disillusionment translates to low job satisfaction. On the contrary, Poles employed in the UK and the US were satisfied with their working conditions, although their migration decision was based on false premises. This has implications for the global power inequalities in the academic world as discussed below.

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that despite the widespread narrative that global science is international in its nature, the sense of place plays a role in the migration decision-making process. International academics living and working in the most highly esteemed HE systems had high expectations before they migrated as opposed to the untraditional migrants to the semi-peripheries. In this sense, even if science has no nationality, it seems that (at least some) scientists do [33].

Although the members of the first group were satisfied with their work and life, after a few years abroad, they realise that the image of Western academia is idealised and romanticised. This finding should be analysed in light of the assumption that geographical imaginaries “often reflect perceived power relations between two nations or regions” [21, p. 173]. This approach allows us to trace yet another proof of global inequalities in the knowledge exchange system [28, 34].

The analysed narratives can be, however, far more than the discursive representations of global inequalities in the knowledge exchange system if we interpret them as a factor co-constituting these inequalities. As the pioneers of the geographical imaginaries approach pointed out, they are never neutral but have a political effect. In this case, the romanticised image of the West works as a full-fledged pull factor along with objective economic disparities or social reasons (e.g., family bonds). These imaginaries, build on an image of the most successful scientists and best institutions, widen the gap between academic centres and peripheries.

The idealised image may have an impact on career decisions, which brings about serious consequences for those who were not able to land a stable job in a reputable institution. Teaching only contracts and unsuccessful postdocs are examples of such dead ends. Most importantly, however, these intuitive imaginaries may harm people who for various reasons cannot move to the centres. They may suffer from the impostor syndrome [35], imputations of inferiority [36] or take the “promotional imaginaries” [5] at face value. In this sense, academic superpowers like the US and the UK not only can drain the most talented researchers from around the world or set up the global research agenda, but their symbolic power also produces imaginaries, which strengthen their power. This is why one of my interviewees compared the American higher education system to the “virus” or “bacteria”.

*This is an important feature [of the American HE system], an amazing ability, I would say, to have an intellectual impact on other academic centres, even when this intellectual impact may not be entirely justified, I would say, nor is it entirely justified*



*in terms of the value of the idea. In other words, I want to say that even bad ideas from academic centres here often have a greater intellectual impact than good ideas from other academic centres. So when I think about it this way, obviously that's a pretty terrible answer, but I think to myself, gee, they're like bacteria (US5).*

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# Migrant Women as a Risk Group in Contemporary Human Trafficking

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**Abstract.** This article examines the problem of human trafficking in modern times through the example of the female population. The influence of standard factors under the influence of which one or another population group becomes particularly vulnerable to abduction and subsequent exploitation is currently becoming particularly acute due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The article examines and analyzes the significant aggravation of the problem of trafficking in women at the present stage. Despite the fact that the UN recognizes this problem as very significant, there is still a lack of targeted solutions to the problem. It is also worth noting that the current situation can be improved not only by the results of specific programs, but also by the efforts of the international community aimed at achieving the SDGs, which will help to eliminate the impact of factors that increase the likelihood of being trafficked.

**Keywords:** Human trafficking · Migrants · Gender discrimination · Globalization

## 1 Introduction

Within the framework of transnational cooperation, combating human trafficking (THB) is of particular importance today. Trafficking in human beings, which not only continues but also acquires new forms in the 21st century, is defined by the United Nations (UN) in the Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed by 147 states as [37] “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, ... exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” [36, 42].

Despite the global community’s efforts to eradicate the problem through prevention (through legal and educational activities), coordinated transnational prosecution of traffickers, and comprehensive assistance to victims [38], representatives of various social groups remain vulnerable to human trafficking, among which individuals who combine several characteristics that increase the likelihood of becoming a victim of this crime are most vulnerable to human trafficking. These include young age, female gender, low or no education, migration intentions, violence, lack of family, need to raise children alone,

alcohol/drug addiction, lack of residence, poverty, belonging to an ethnic minority, etc. [34, 35].

Researchers also distinguish different types of human trafficking by purpose: “for the purpose of sexual exploitation; labor exploitation (slave labor); begging - especially of children and the disabled; adoption (child trafficking)” [35, 36]; for the purpose of removing human organs [10]; and “for coercive criminal activity” [34].

The combination of several vulnerabilities, combined with widespread trafficking targets, has a significant impact on the persistent gendered nature of exposure, a fact also recognized internationally: As UN Secretary General António Guterres stresses in his report, “about 70 percent of detected trafficking victims are female” [2, 33]. Experts note that “the demand for sex services (in which mainly women are at risk of being involved [35, 36]) and cheap slave labor is one of the root causes of human trafficking” [35, 36]. At the same time, “the demand for cheap labor generates an influx of illegal migrants, including those trafficked through human trafficking schemes” [35, 36]. In this connection, we conclude that migrant women constitute one of the most vulnerable social groups to human trafficking, since they are at the intersection of factors that increase their exposure to this problem.

One cannot ignore the fact that men and children also fall victim to traffickers, being at risk mainly for other forms of exploitation [35, 36]. However, in the current circumstances, characterized by the closure of state borders and the mass transition to digital interactions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which will be discussed later in the article, the study of the spread of sexual exploitation of women through the Internet, which is an accessible form of activity for traffickers even in the context of the pandemic and its related international restrictions, is of particular relevance for research.

## 2 Objectives

Thus, the main purpose of this article is to identify the causes and consequences of the “gender-migration-trafficking” relationship in the modern world, using as an example its characteristic manifestation - the sexual exploitation of migrant women as one of the most vulnerable social groups to human trafficking.

## 3 Materials and Methods

The strong migration aspirations of women, especially those born in regions of the world with significant gender disparities in rights (legal and de facto), have much to do with discrimination that begins in childhood and continues throughout a woman’s life.

According to UNESCO statistics, more than 31.5 million girls in the world do not have access to primary education, especially in sub-Saharan Africa - more than 17.4 million girls in the region do not attend elementary school [22]. Despite the fact that boys also face the problem of inaccessibility to primary education (more than 26.8 million boys in the world are outside the primary school system) [23], this is not because of discriminatory gender restrictions, as it is in the case of girls. Some cultures continue to show prejudice-based, direct discriminatory taboos that limit girls’ access to education [2, 3].

Without education, women in developing countries find it difficult to find high-paying jobs. Moreover, in traditional, patriarchal cultures, it is the woman who is responsible for the daily unpaid domestic work that includes raising children, caring for sick/older relatives, and household maintenance, which has an additional negative impact on a woman's career opportunities.

Lack of education and/or work experience makes women dependent on their husbands and increases their financial vulnerability in the event of divorce or death, especially if they have minor children and may have to be supported by their mothers alone. According to the UN Secretary-General's report, within the 25–34 age group, women are 25% more likely than men to live in extreme poverty [3, 33].

It is worth noting that even when women are educated and employed, they cannot always count on high salaries (equal to those of men in similar positions) or on leadership positions, due to the “glass ceiling” [2, 4] that hinders women's career advancement and the significant gender wage gap [31].

These and other discriminatory factors reinforce women's migration aspirations - as of 2017, 41.1% [7, 14] of all officially registered labor migrants in the world were women, while, as experts note, “labor forms of exploitation bordering on slavery and human trafficking can expose anyone who is forced to work informally without any social protection” [31, 35].

In addition, some migrants are forced to flee outside their homeland from armed conflicts, revolutions, and similar incidents that have engulfed their country of origin, which is also a factor that increases the vulnerability of the refugee to traffickers [5, 32].

Sometimes, however, a woman's own family is a danger to her. Domestic violence against women takes the form of forced marriage (including underage marriage), a common problem in some countries of the global South [24, 53]; female genital mutilation [9] (at least 200 million girls and women alive today have been subjected to so-called “female circumcision” [4, 16]); and other forms of psychological or physical violence.

Violence against women is defined by the UN as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” [1, 3].

The following manifestations of violence against women are distinguished:

1. “physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family...;
2. physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community...;
3. physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs” [2, 3].

Thus, women who face ongoing discrimination, violence, poverty, hostilities, and other problems at home and seek to change their country of residence by agreeing to unsafe conditions of relocation are likely to become victims of human trafficking in the absence of such experience and legal support.

In studying this problem, the scientific method of structural and functional analysis was used to achieve the goal of the study.

The problem raised in this article is topical and has been studied by researchers around the world for decades.

Donna M. Hughes, a renowned anti-trafficking specialist, has comprehensively studied the issues related to human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, in particular, the use of migrant slave labor [11]. The researcher pays special attention to the situation with human trafficking in post-Soviet countries, especially in Russia and Ukraine, as large “suppliers” of female sex workers to foreign countries [12]. It is noteworthy that in 2002, Hughes was even one of the signers of an open letter addressed to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, concerning human trafficking [13].

Rachel Masika, in cooperation with other researchers, working in the direction of anti-trafficking, at the beginning of this century, collected materials on such aspects as gender issues of human trafficking, NGO activities in this area, etc. [21].

In their work “The Traffic in Women. Human Realities of the International Sex Trade”, Siriporn Skrobaneek, Nattaya Boonpakdi and Chutima Jantakeero have thoroughly investigated the problem of trafficking in women with the aim of becoming involved in the sex industry amid cross-border migration [28].

The works of the aforementioned authors represent an important basis for the development of investigations in this direction, however, they consider crimes that, unfortunately, have already become classical. Today, there are new methods and purposes of trafficking in women, to which this article is largely devoted.

## 4 Research and Discussion

Migration processes acquire a special weight in today’s context of globalization, becoming a characteristic feature of it [1, 5]. In the modern world significant migration flows are recorded - according to data for 2020, 281 million people live in a state different from their country of origin [5, 19].

At the same time, as discussed earlier in this article, people at risk, seeking to improve their quality of life by moving to another state, are at risk of becoming victims of human traffickers. Of course, as Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, notes, “not all migrants become victims of trafficking. But people fleeing conflicts, emergencies and poverty are forced to migrate in insecure and vulnerable conditions” [25]. The OSCE Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbusynova, calls on the global community to first recognize the inextricable link between migration processes and human trafficking in the context of addressing this problem [20].

At the same time, both migration and human trafficking are affected by global phenomena such as the COVID-19 pandemic. As experts note, the negative economic consequences of the pandemic will lead to an increase in “the number of vulnerable people desperately searching for work and economic opportunities” [7, 33]. Meanwhile, despite existing restrictions in many countries, including state border closures aimed at the non-proliferation of COVID-19, irregular migration continues to take place under more dangerous conditions than was previously the case. Interpol has reported deaths of migrants transported in inappropriate conditions by land due to the inaccessibility of

cross-border air travel during the pandemic [6]. According to the UN, measures taken by states to combat the pandemic may have a negative impact on the victims of human trafficking—as long as the efforts of authorities and nongovernmental organizations are focused on addressing the problems caused by the spread of coronavirus infection, “it is easier for traffickers to hide their operations, making victims increasingly invisible” [2, 15].

In addition, the conditions created during the pandemic, namely the prolonged forced self-isolation and the large-scale transition of interpersonal interactions to an online format, expand the range of human traffickers’ recruitment of victims for sexual exploitation online, including through webcams, erotic video chat rooms whose content varies in degree of explicitness, and online pornography [8, 33].

Experts’ fears about an increase in the number of cybercrimes related to sexual exploitation are not unfounded: such cases occurred even before the pandemic and the mass transition to digital interaction associated with forced self-isolation.

In its report “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex and Forced Marriage of North Korean Women and Girls in China” [27], the human rights organization Korea Future Initiative described cases of girls and women kidnapped for sexual exploitation online in China, where the victims were refugees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who sought shelter and employment in China, but were deceived by human traffickers [27, 37]. In addition to the materials of the report, the authoritative publications *The New York Times* [26] and *The Telegraph* [29] published materials of interviews with women who managed to escape from “cybersexual slavery” [26].

The spread of such crimes throughout Southeast Asia has also been reported, with the situation of sexual exploitation via the Internet in the Republic of the Philippines, as well as in the Kingdom of Cambodia, being of greatest concern [7].

Given the numerous cases of cyber-sexual exploitation of human trafficking victims in various countries that occurred even before the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the conditions in which humanity (including human traffickers) found itself in connection with it described earlier, one can conclude that the world will indeed see an increase in such crimes unless the problem is brought to the attention of the global community, supported by joint, coordinated actions to address it.

Today the fight against human trafficking, especially of women and children, is a significant cause of international cooperation. Numerous documents, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime [36]; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance [17]; the United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons [38]; the International Framework for Action to Implement the Protocol to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons [18], and others, define the theoretical and practical steps necessary to address the problem at hand. However, despite the international community’s desire to implement the recommendations of these documents, the eradication of human trafficking, which is a complex problem rather than one that exists in a vacuum [8], is still at an unfinished stage, as it requires addressing an extremely wide range of issues concerning the elimination of “economic and political instability, weak rule of law, fragile institutional frameworks, fractured family and social cohesion, and all forms of gender-based violence, inequality and discrimination” [30].

According to the UN, today “migrants make up more than half of all identified victims of human trafficking,” of whom the majority, as mentioned earlier in the article, are women. Experts note that “victims and survivors’ voices are often unheard” [30]; therefore, publicizing the problem can be a meaningful step for the academic community, public figures, and other people who care because public awareness lays the foundation for a higher-level solution to the problem.

## 5 Results

Thus, summarizing the above, we conclude that in today’s world the concepts of globalization, migration, human trafficking, and gender identity are closely intertwined, forming a set of problems whose solution requires coordinated, targeted international intervention. At this stage, the latter is insufficiently emphasized and structured, in part because of the factors that cause the specific nature of the problem.

The victims of human trafficking, most of whom are women, need to be made aware of the problems they have suffered, and the world community as a whole has a duty to continue to implement measures developed at the highest level to eradicate the practices of human trafficking occurring in many countries of the world and adapted to the changing environment, which is particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic that is currently underway. Therefore, it must be noted that the severity of the problem in question has increased considerably, necessitating more research in this area, as well as substantive action by the international community.

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# Sociological and Legal Peculiarities of Migration to Turkey: The Case of Russian-Turkish Marriages

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**Abstract.** Examining the statistics of tourism, of real estate sales to foreigners and statistics of mixed marriages, the authors argue that Russians' interest to Turkey has steadily increased not only as a tourist destination but also as an emigration country for Russians. Many Russian citizens who visit Turkey for tourism purposes think about settling down in the country, and some of them buy real estate there. The second main period of the Russian immigration to Turkey is 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Due to the number of mixed marriages increased as a result of irregular migration, a new generation grew up with two common cultures. In general, the gender factor appears more prominently in the marriage and migration, and the mixed marriages point out the unimportance of social-cultural differences such as language and religion. After 1980, an increase in foreign population was observed in Turkey especially in coastal areas such as Aegean and Mediterranean regions with tourism activities, and from 2000, these locations, mainly Antalya, have become popular in international migration. Main changes in Turkish legislation on citizenship are closely linked to the economic migration process, including quantitative limits set forth for investments in capital and real estate were dramatically decreased. Turkey has really become an immigration country while before it was an emigration one. The statistical data collected from different sources prove some surveys' conclusions that economic factors are less important than social and geographical ones in the decisions of Russian citizens to migrate to and settle down in Turkey.

**Keywords:** CIS · Citizenship · Legislation · Real estate · Mixed marriage · Refugees · Antalya

## 1 Introduction

Human mobility has increased due to globalization and tourism and migration activities therefore have intensified around the world. The study conducted by the World Tourism Organization (UN WTO) in 2009 revealed that international migration and tourism were two interdependent concepts and every year the numbers of tourists and immigrants

were increasing simultaneously. Migrants contributed to the tourism and service sectors in social, economic and cultural terms in their destination countries. In this context, two concepts appear: tourism as a result of migration (Tourism-led migration) and Migration due to tourism.

Russia and Turkey have close relations in many areas such as commercial, economic and cultural fields. Tourism and irregular migration have been increased due to various reasons such as Turkey's geographical location, proximity to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, suitable vacation and travel opportunities, living conditions, and climate. Geographical proximity has enabled the people of the both countries to become mutually close. The reasons of immigration of citizens of the CIS states to Turkey vary historically.

In the historical process, two periods are especially noticeable in the migrations from Russia to Turkey. The first of them is migration to Turkey of Russians from the anti-Bolshevik White movement (during the Russian Civil War) and civilians who just took refuge from the Soviet regime. During this period, it is estimated that 140–150 thousand or 200 thousand according to some sources, Russian immigrants have come to Turkey [1]. General Wrangel stated that 134 thousand Russian refugees arrived in Istanbul and that the total number of Russians in Istanbul was 167 thousand [2].

Another main immigration period is 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From that time, the number of citizens of Russia and of the other former Soviet republics residing in Turkey has increased. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union after 1990, agreements between the CIS countries and Turkey in the field of economic, trade, political, education and culture were signed, bilateral relations accelerated, and waves of migration from these countries have started to Turkey. Azerbaijan and Central Asian states are among the top 20 countries in the ranking of foreigners residing in Turkey. It was stated that 9,031 people are from Azerbaijan, 3,650 people from Uzbekistan and 2,738 people from Kazakhstan [3]. In 2018, foreigners from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) accounted for 23.8% and foreigners from the Central Asian Republics accounted for 16.8% of the total foreign population in Turkey [3, p. 153].

## 2 Problem Statement

The issue to be discussed is whether migrants' experiences in Turkey are bound to their legal status. For example, socio-cultural, political and economic aspects of the legislation form the strategies used by marriage migrants. In the modern migration processes Turkey is famous as a transit country but it has also become a popular host state for legal economic migrants, including citizens of the Russian Federation and of other CIS countries. Different statistical data collected from different sources are used in the article to highlight role of the social and geographical factors in the Russian citizens' migration to the Mediterranean provinces especially Antalya.

## 3 Findings

### 3.1 Labour and Tourist Migration

In general, the labour deficit in the tourism sector is decreasing in the migration caused by tourism [4]. For example, women's labour migration from the Russian Federation

and other CIS countries to coastal areas in Turkey contributes to travel, accommodation, catering and other tourism sectors [3, p. 148]. Another example is the migration of Turkish male workers in the construction industry. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkish construction companies fulfilled different investment and construction projects in the CIS states providing the Turkish male labour migration to these countries.

According to data of the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR), the numbers of workers employed to Russia by İŞKUR were 23.349 in 2007, 16.085 in 2008, 7.718 in 2010 and 9.265 in 2011. The total number of workers who employed abroad from Turkey by the Agency was 52,013 people. 13,463 people of them moved to Russia that is the second country in terms of finding employment in foreign countries [5]. According to Foreign Ministry data, 40 thousand Turkish citizens live in Russia as of 2019 [6] (see Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4).

**Table 1.** Turkey Employment Agency Workers Submissions from Turkey to Russia (1989- 2013) [5, p. 123; 7]

Year	Number of workers	Year	Number of workers
1989	932	1997	13.195
1990	1.243	1998	7.426
1991	4.693	1999	2.215
1992	6.708	2000	2.199
1993	21.436	2001	4.190
1994	41.837	2002	10.160
1995	35.792	2003	10.816
1996	20.460	2004	13.281

**Table 2.** Number of Turkish workers sent to Russia and CIS countries through the Turkish Employment Agency (İşkur) between 2004–2010 [8]

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Russia	13.271	19.540	24.142	23.349	16.095	9.482	7.718
Kazakhstan	4.403	5.775	8.627	7.994	4.723	1.595	1.011
Ukraine	761	1.017	1.926	2.753	2.575	832	217
Turkmenistan	2.031	964	1.086	741	1.249	4.291	4.625
Azerbaijan	745	629	632	1.299	975	858	555

In tourism caused by migration, it covers the foreigners' visits from countries of emigration to their own countries. According to the World Tourism Organization's (UNWTO) research, immigrants' visits to their own countries account for at least 15% and even in some countries 70% of total tourism [4].

**Table 3.** Number of Turkish workers sent to Russia and CIS countries through the Turkish Employment Agency (İşkur) between 2011–2017 [9]

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Russia	9.277	13.762	13.463	9.163	4.379	1.938	2.537
Turkmenistan	4.876	4.810	3.816	3.723	2.913	1.219	623
Georgia	598	626	750	519	395	802	350
Kazakhstan	877	985	678	1.928	1.374	803	292

**Table 4.** Number of Turkish citizens living in Russia and CIS countries (2019) [6]

Country	Total
Azerbaijan	55.000
Russian Fed	40.000
Georgia	22.000
Ukraine	20.000
Kazakhstan	20.000
Kyrgyzstan	10.000
Turkmenistan	3.500
Uzbekistan	2.000
Belarus	600
Tajikistan	400
Mongolia	200

In 1988, while the number of people who came from the USSR to Turkey was 21,567, it showed an increase of more than ten times in 1990 and reached 222,537 people. In 2010, the number of foreigners who came to Turkey from Russia was 3,107,043 and from all CIS countries – 6,075,484 people [10]. The increase in the number of tourists has brought with it a demand for a Russian-speaking labour force in tourism sector. There has also been an increase in the number of people coming to Turkey to work for short and long terms (The suitcase trade between the two countries has increased after the 1990s).

Thus, examining the statistics of tourism, of real estate sales to foreigners and statistics of marriage to foreigners, it is seen that Russians' interest to Turkey, their close neighbour, has increased (Table 5).

According to the Table 5, the number of tourists visiting Turkey has increased every year. Although this number fall due to the aircraft crisis in 2015 and the coronavirus outbreaks, which took effect all over the world in 2020, Turkey has continued to maintain the priority of citizens of the Russian Federation and CIS countries.

**Table 5.** Number of tourist arrivals from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian Federation to Turkey (2017–2019) [11].

Countries	2017	2018	2019
Azerbaijan	765.514	858.506	901.723
Belarus	229.229	245.254	258.419
Armenia	48.320	51.880	66.882
Georgia	2.438.730	2.069.392	1.995.254
Kazakhstan	402.830	426.916	455.724
Kyrgyzstan	104.911	114.926	121.364
Moldova	171.538	194.268	198.867
Uzbekistan	195.745	24.235	252.138
Russian Fed	4.715.438	5.964.613	7.017.657
Tajikistan	30.532	40.879	44.155
Turkmenistan	230.881	252.911	297.706
Ukraine	1.284.735	1.386.934	1.547.996
TOTAL CIS	10.618.403	11.847.714	13.157.885

After 1980, an increase in foreign population was observed in Turkey especially in coastal areas such as Aegean and Mediterranean regions with tourism activities, and after 2000, these locations, mainly Antalya, became popular in international migration. In particular, Russian citizens' participation in social life has become apparent [10, p. 13]. Another migration movement caused by tourism is retired migration and tourism-based movements of real estate owners. The transition period to settled life has begun with the acquisition of property by tourists in Turkey for holiday purposes [3, p. 148].

The number has undoubtedly increased considering data on the total Russian immigration to Turkey in 2016–2019: from 6,425 (2016) and 7,311 (2017) to 13,782 (2018) and 17,311 (2019) [12]. This tendency was not changed despite the record fall in 2017 with only 866,256 arrived Russians (mainly tourists), while one year before there were and 3,649,003 in 2016 (cf. 4,479,049 in 2015) and a year later 4,715,428 (2018). The strange drop and then rise (up to 5 times in 2018) are directly linked to the foreign policy factors: at first, worsening relations between Turkey and Russia in the end of 2015–2016; second, their stabilization later. Moreover, 2020 became a record year for the Russians' visits: 7,017,657 arrived in Turkey (7,000,407 of them departed). Probably, 2021 could give similar figures but for the COVID-19 pandemic: 2,128,758 arrived in the first 6 months of 2021 [12].

In the context, a survey fulfilled by O. Deniz among Russian expats in Antalya province is of great interest. According to the survey, the main reasons in choosing Antalya as a migration destination are warm climate, good environmental conditions and touristic attractions, the positive image of Turkey and its society's tolerant attitude towards foreigners, the ease of establishing social and human relations with the local

people, former positive Turkey experiences and the vast number of foreigners in Antalya. Among the migration motives of Russian respondents, economic factors (expectations of good job and earning, demand for Russian-speaking labour force in Antalya) were less important than social and geographical ones in their decisions to migrate to Antalya [13, p. 8].

### 3.2 Correlation Between Mixed Marriages and Real Estate Sales

Turkey has gained great momentum in the construction sector after 1980 and 2002 [14]. As investing in the construction sector and increasing economic activity, Turkey aimed to provide foreign currency income through tourism and real estate sales to foreign investors to Turkey. While in 2017 22,428 properties were purchased by foreign investors in Turkey, in 2019 they purchased 45,967 properties [15] which is the highest figure in real estate sales for the last 10 years [16]. House sales increased by 105% in two years [17].

The reason of the increase of sales could be related to the granting of citizenship to foreigners in exchange for housing. While the number of real estates sold to foreigners in 2015 was 22,991, this figure decreased to 18,391 in 2016 [15]. The law adopted in January 2017 granted Turkish citizenship to foreign citizens who purchased property worth at least US\$ 1 million in Turkey. However, it was rearranged on 12 January 2017 – in order to be eligible for Turkish citizenship, the law required to keep the purchased property for at least 3 years. As amended on 18 September 2018, the value of the property purchased to obtain Turkish citizenship has arranged to USD 250,000. While housing sales have increased by the help of decreasing the worth of real estate and the devaluation of the Turkish lira, foreigners have purchased a total of 180,000 houses from Turkey in the last 7 years [17].


The increase in real estate sales in citizens of the Russian Federation is noteworthy. Citizens of the Russian federation purchased 12,076 houses and they accounted for 6.7% of foreigners who buy housing from Turkey [15]. Russian citizens who came for tourism purposes started to buy housing from Turkey, to stay longer and settle down in the country (Fig. 1, Table 6).

### 3.3 International Migration to Turkey from CIS

Though refugees have a long history, the first international refugee protection initiative as well as the League of Nations international community's attempts to provide protection and find solutions for refugees dates back to the 1921, when Dr. Nansen was elected as the first High Commissioner for Russian refugees [18, p. 130].

Later, in 1929, the High Commissioner's mandate was broadened to take in Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, and Turkish refugees [19]. Inter alia, the issue of refugees is closely tied to the problem of citizenship. For example, "The Soviet Government promulgated a series of decrees which deprived Russian refugees of their citizenship. This loss was automatic and complete without resort to intervention or to special decision by tribunals or other authorities". Many Armenians also became stateless by decree as "fugitives" from Turkey [20].





**Fig. 1.** Number of residential properties sold in Turkey to the Russian Federation citizens from 2015 to 2020 [15]

**Table 6.** Number of residential properties sold in Turkey to Russian Federation and CIS countries citizens from 2015 to 2020 [15]

Country	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Russia	2.036	1.224	1.331	2.297	2.893	2.295	12.076
Azerbaijan	815	610	942	1.250	1.191	1.020	5.828
Ukraine	608	484	505	624	719	598	3.538
Kazakhstan	540	380	334	542	776	877	3.449
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	434	

Modern Turkey, having the geographical limitation clause, grants refugee status only to people originating from Europe, as a result of events occurring in European countries [21]. For persons not originating from European Countries, Turkey grants the so-called conditional refugee status [22].

According to the TURKSTAT, the first five places in the foreign immigrant population in 2019 belong to citizens of Iraq (with 14.5%), Turkmenistan (13.8%), Afghanistan (8.2%), Syria (7.5%) and Iran (7.3%).

Regarding destination regions, İstanbul had the largest immigrant population with the proportion of 45.3%. İstanbul was followed by Ankara with 9.2%, Antalya with 6.5%, Bursa with 3.5% and İzmir with 2.2%, respectively [12].

Of the 8361 people from the former Soviet Union and Romania who became citizens between 1995 and 2001, nearly all were women who gained citizenship through marriage. A total of 56,449 people gained Turkish citizenship in this period [23].

Turkey has recently become an immigration country while before it was emigration country [24, p. 37]. According to the 2020 report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Turkey has been the largest host country in the world for five

consecutive years in 2018 [25]. Until 31 December 2019, the number of foreign citizens living in Turkey, determined by the TurkStat's Address Based Population Registration System Results was announced 1,531,180 people [26]. The population of foreigners living in Turkey exceeds 5.9 million, and that make up 7% of the total population [27].

Approximately 52 thousand citizens of the Russian Federation living in Turkey form 3.4% of the total foreign population. It is also observed that the total foreign population of people who came from the former Soviet republics and reside in Turkey also includes 4.7% from Azerbaijan, 4.6% from Turkmenistan, 2.8% from Georgia and 2.0% from Ukraine [26].

Some of the Turkish citizens who were born abroad are foreigners who subsequently acquired Turkish citizenship. For this reason, the birthplace data also provide information about foreigners residing in Turkey. According to TurkStat's Address Based Population Registration System Results, 2019, 83 million 154 thousand 997 people are living in Turkey and of those, 3.2% were born abroad. The residents in Turkey who was born in Russia make up 2.1% to the number of born abroad and this is approximately 55 thousand 880 people. People residing in Turkey who were native born from Turkmenistan are 5.1%, who was born in Azerbaijan is 3.7% and who was born in Uzbekistan is 2.9% to the number of people born abroad [28] (Table 7).

**Table 7.** Russian population living in Turkey by year [29]

Year	Number of people
1927	6.206
1935	1.620
1945	752
1955	370
1960	483
1970	477
1975	1.029
1985	600
1990	3.514
2000	13.806

The Table 8 indicates that in the female population is more than the male population (excluding Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Armenia). This is described as the feminization of migration. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially women from Russia and the CIS countries migrated to different countries for economic and social reasons. Ryazantsev and Tkachenko stated in their article that the Russian immigrant women were actively joining international migration and constituted 53% of all immigrants out of Russia [31].

**Table 8.** Foreign citizens from CIS with residence in Turkey, by sex and country of citizenship (As of 31 December 2019)<sup>1</sup> [30]

Country	Female	Male	Total
Russia	26.882	13.319	40.201
Azerbaijan	35.982	32.533	68.515
Ukraine	16.438	3.790	20.228
Uzbekistan	31.880	13.026	44.906
Georgia	17.982	4.114	22.096
Kazakhstan	12.979	8.172	21.151
Turkmenistan	59.426	74.243	133.669
Kyrgyzstan	17.358	6.183	23.541
Moldova	6.587	1.483	8.070
Tajikistan	2.297	2.355	4.652
Belarus	2.225	276	2.501
Armenia	371	1.389	1.760

### 3.4 Waves of Russian Immigration to Turkey

Some of the Ottoman sultans' wives and mothers were of Slavic including Russian origin. For example, Ibrahim's wife and mother of Mehmet IV HaticeTurhan Sultan, wife of Mustafa II and mother of Osman III Şehsuvar Sultan, and also Suleiman the Magnificent's wife and mother of Selim II Hürrem Sultan etc. [32]. The kinship ties that began with the marriage of the Sultans with the Slavic women in the Ottoman Empire continue today with the Russian-Turkish marriages.

Even the top officials of the both countries have been talking about this phenomenon. On 13 February 2009, at a dinner hosted by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Turkish President Abdullah Gul said: "The Turkish people are getting to know the Russian people more and more. The growing number of mixed marriages and the children of these families will form the most solid foundations of Turkish-Russian friendship in the future." At a meeting with Sergei Lavrov on 27 January 2012, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said: "It is significant that the number of Turkish-Russian marriages increases. I want the number of Russian brides to increase. Because Russian brides are very suitable for the Turkish family structure. Russian family culture is very close to the Turkish family culture, very harmonious." [33].

<sup>1</sup> Foreign population covers individuals who are holding a valid residence/work permit at the reference day and individuals who have a valid address declaration at the reference day while holding an identity document equivalent to residence permit such as international protection identity document and the individuals who have already renounced his/her Turkish Republic citizenship and who have a valid address declaration at the reference day. In addition to Syrians under temporary protection, foreigners holding visas or residence permits shorter than 3 months with the purpose of training, tourism, scientific research, etc. are not covered.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, citizens of the Russian Federation constituted a large group among circular migrants in Turkey. At first they arrived in the Black Sea coastal cities of Turkey and in Istanbul. There they worked in services such as tourism, entertainment, domestic labour and in shuttle trade.

Later, other large cities of Turkey also began to attract Russian migrants, especially Ankara and İzmir, as well as Mediterranean touristic regions, like Antalya, Alanya and Fethiye. Antalya gradually became the seaside province number one in, and it concerns both external tourist and migrant flows [34].

In general, Antalya became one of the main destinations for internal and international migrations in Turkey (along with Istanbul and Ankara) and transformed into a real multi-ethnic and multicultural areas.

According to the statistics of the TUIK (2014), 20.650 Russian Federation citizens were registered in Turkey as of end-2013, and Antalya was the city with the largest Russian population, with 6.876 people (1/3 of the Russians registered in the country) [35].

It's logical that Foreigners Communication Centre under the body of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) provides information services not only in English but also in Russian, Arabic, Persian and German for non-speaking Turkish foreigners (157 Emergency Hotline). Public institutions and organisations together with civil society discuss steps and approach on the services provided for the foreigners. The Directorate inform and discusses the issues regarding the foreigners in different provinces of Turkey, such as raising the awareness of rights, obligations, access to services and identifying their problems. Besides, various shares on supporting the positive perception towards the foreigners are made together with local actors, civil society, public organisations and host communities [36].

Country	Toplam
Azerbaijan	20.630
Russian Fed.	14.676
Ukraine	11.118
Uzbekistan	7.967
Georgia	6.372
Turkmenistan	6.280
Kyrgyzstan	5.469
Kazakhstan	4.658
Moldova	3.993
Belarus	2155
Tajikistan	307
Armenia	402

Table: 2009-2019 Turkish men and Russian and CIS Citizens official marriage data.

Country	Total
Azerbaijan	984
Russian Fed.	176
Turkmenistan	143
Georgia	99
Uzbekistan	48
Kyrgyzstan	33
Kazakhstan	29
Ukraine	23
Moldova	11

Table : 2009-2019 Turkish women and Russian and CIS Citizens official marriage data.

Fig. 2. Mixed marriages data (Turkey – CIS citizens) [12]

If examine carefully the statistical data (Fig. 2), we see that Turkish men prefer to marry to foreigners much more than Turkish women do [37]. One can say that social-cultural differences such as religion, language, ethnic origin, family life are not a negative factor for Turkish men in marriages with foreigners via the data. The gender factor appears more prominently in the marriage of Turks with foreigners.

According to the Russian registry office (ZAGS), the number of marriages between Russian women with foreigners has increased. The ease of travel opportunities has also a significant impact to the increase. As considering the statistics of Russian citizens who married foreigners in the last five years, Turks are in the first place. The increase of the number of Russian–Turkish marriages depends on choosing Turkey for the vacation, and working Turkish employees of Turkish construction companies operating in Russia. Due to the fact that some of the marriages between Russian–Turkish couples are not officially performed in Turkey and some in Russia, the exact number of Russian–Turkish marriages is not known. However, it is estimated that there are over 200,000 Turkish–Russian families, including 150,000 in Russia and 50,000 in Turkey [38, 39].

### 3.5 Turkish Legislation on Citizenship

First of all, Article 66 of the Turkish constitution of 1982 stipulates:

- Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.
- The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk (Sentence repealed on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709).
- Citizenship can be acquired under the conditions stipulated by law, and shall be forfeited only in cases determined by law.
- No Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he/she commits an act incompatible with loyalty to the homeland.
- Recourse to the courts in appeal against the decisions and proceedings related to the deprivation of citizenship, shall not be denied.

According to the 2009 Turkish Citizenship Law (No. 5901), a person can acquire citizenship by birth or by descent (Turkey 2009, Art. 6–7) as well as after birth (Art. 9) that is by naturalisation.

Regarding the citizenship acquired by birth, the law stipulates the following:

- A child born in Turkey, but acquiring no citizenship of any state by birth through his/her alien mother or alien father is a Turkish citizen from the moment of birth.
- A child found in Turkey is deemed born in Turkey unless otherwise proven (Art. 8)

Regarding citizenship acquired by descent, the law states the following:

- A child born to a Turkish mother or through a Turkish father within the unity of marriage either in Turkey or abroad is a Turkish citizen.
- A child born to a Turkish mother and through an alien father out of wedlock is a Turkish citizen.

- A child born through a Turkish father and to an alien mother out of wedlock acquires Turkish citizenship if the principles and procedures ensuring the establishment of descent are met (Art. 7) [40].

In addition, in accordance with Article 11 of the Law, a foreigner who wishes to acquire Turkish citizenship to have been residing in Turkey for five years without interruption and those who fulfill conditions can acquire the Turkish citizenship [40]. Purchasing real estate property in Turkey, working, investing or establishing a business in Turkey ensure the acquisition of Turkish citizenship by foreigners in exceptional situations such as a concrete behavior that reveals one's intention to settle in Turkey.

Foreign citizens who are married to a Turkish citizen shall not obtain Turkish citizenship directly. In accordance with Article 16 of the Turkish Citizenship Law, the one who has married to a Turkish citizen for at least three years and continues to marriage and fulfills the requirements can apply for Turkish citizenship [40]. As analyzing the statistics of those who were born abroad and are residing in Turkey now, one can say that a great number of people have obtained Turkish citizenship through marriage. Turkish citizens who are married to Russian citizens also often acquire Russian citizenship through their spouses.

Those who meet the requirements of Article 16 of the Law may apply to acquire Turkish citizenship by marriage. Authorities will examine the application and it cannot be approved in the following cases:

- (a) the applicant has not been married for three years with a Turkish citizen,
- (b) the marriage ends due to reasons such as death before the date of divorce or application,
- (c) the proceedings for any offense have been continued or convicted or detained,
- (d) he/she cannot submit the requested documents in accordance with Article 26.

If the spouse of the foreigner who wants to obtain Turkish citizenship has already gained Turkish citizenship, then the date of acquisition of Turkish citizenship shall be taken as basis in the calculation of the time elapsed in marriage.

Another act – Law on Foreigners and International Protection no. 6458 dd. 10.04. 2013 – was declared to be prepared in international standards with a transparent and participatory process by ensuring the norms of law on human rights. Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior (DGMM) was established to have an effective and human rights-oriented migration governance.

According to the law, migration means “regular migration whereby foreigners’ legally enter into, stay in or exit from Turkey as well as irregular migration whereby foreigners enter into, stay in or exit from Turkey through illegal channels and work in Turkey without a permit; as well as international protection” (Art. 1, par. 1). It’s noteworthy that the conditions stipulated in Articles 5, 6 and 7 “shall not be construed and implemented to prevent the international protection claim” (Art. 8).

New Legislative Regulation. According to the amendment (by the Presidential Decree No. 106) made to the Regulation on the Implementation of Turkish Citizenship Law which entered into force on 11 February 2010 with the Council of Ministers Decision No. 2010/139, after 18.09.2018 foreigners can get citizenship of Turkey if

they buy real estate in Turkey worth at least \$250,000, but under the condition that the property is not sold for at least 3 years (Article 20, sub-article 2(b)).

The quantitative limits set forth for investments in capital and real estate as well as employment were dramatically decreased, so foreign investors can obtain Turkish citizenship much easier than before.

A property of valued minimum \$250,000 USD can be purchased in any part of Turkey, though previously the worth was 1 million USD. Other options are making \$500,000 fixed capital investment; depositing at least 500,000 USD (or equivalent foreign currency or Turkish lira) in any bank(s) operating in Turkey; buying at least 500,000 USD worth of real estate investment fund share or venture capital investment fund share; buying at least 500,000 USD worth of government bonds with the condition that they cannot be sold for at least three years; or creating jobs for at least 50 Turkish employees (Art. 20).

## 4 Conclusion

1. Two historical events in Russia, such as the collapse of the Russian Empire and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, affected not only Russia but also the surrounding countries. These regime changes have resulted in international migration movements. While the number of immigrants in Russia has recently decreased, on the contrary, the number of foreign migrants moving to Turkey is increasing every year [41]. Especially after the 1990s, Turkish construction workers who employed in Russia and Russian female labor force in Turkey formed gender-based labor employment and international migration between two countries.
2. Tourism and irregular migrations have been increased due to various reasons such as geographical location, suitable vacation and travel opportunities, living conditions, and climate. Due to these migrations, the number of mixed marriages is also increasing and then children born in the cross-cultural marriages grow up within Russian and Turkish cultures. In addition, the mixed marriages, which cannot be underestimated in number, point out the unimportance of social-cultural differences such as language and religion.
3. Commercial, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian relations are interconnected, affect each other, and are progressing day by day between the two countries. Marriage migration proves that the migrants' experiences are bound to their legal status. The legislation of Turkey and its sociocultural, political and economic aspects form the strategies used by marriage migrants.

In general, diaspora activism takes two forms in the eyes of the home state: conflictual and complementary [42]. The Russian diaspora (i.e., citizens of the Russian Federation) in Turkey, especially in Antalya, presents the complementary mode of action. Though the Russian government does not pay attention to the diaspora, in the future it can be used within the soft power and public diplomacy policy. As Shain and Barth noted: "The basic nature of the hostland regime determines the ability of a diaspora to organise influence; indeed, it determines the ability to organise at all" [43, p. 463]. However, in some cases it can become a challenge for Turkey (the host state) and involve changes in its public policy and legislation.

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# Finnish Labor Migration Policy and Integration Instruments: Talent Boost Program Objectives and Methods

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**Abstract.** Nowadays labor migration level is growing exceptionally fast and influences states' migration policies significantly. Finland has prioritized labor migration encouragement as facilitating high-qualified labor migrant's inflow will bias the country's economy, industry, and demography favorably.

Finnish migration policy places a particular emphasis on integration aspects as it aims to attract and retain labor migrants in the country. In order to achieve needed labor migration increase, the Talent Boost program was developed. The aim of the program is to establish conditions under which international specialists, graduated international students and qualified labor migrants would like to work and stay in Finland.

While performing the program, integration phase has a particular significance to retain specialists in Finland and to make Finnish labor market more competitive on the global market. In this regard, Finnish municipalities create various integration projects aimed to tailor municipal's specific circumstances and facilitate international specialists' integration and to elaborate the most efficient national-wide integration policy.

The article explores Finnish integration policy aims and methods and particular emphasis puts on the examination of the Talent Boost program and instruments it uses.

**Keywords:** Finland · Integration · Labor migration

## 1 Introduction

The impact of constantly growing migration flows cannot be underestimated as it influences state's demography, economy, borders safety, as well as relations with other political actors like states (e.g. neighboring countries), intergovernmental and super-national organizations (e.g., the United Nations, the European Union, the International Organization for Migration, etc.).

From the very beginning migration (from Latin *migratio* “move”, “change”) was an essential part of human history and later became one of the most important factors of states' economic growth. Since capitalism started to domain internal (or domestic) migration gathered its pace as urbanization process and population shift from rural to

urban areas increased. Alongside this external (or cross-border) migration caused by the development of states' cross-border economic, political interaction became an inevitable part of international relations.

According to the Migration Policy Institute data, the number of migrants is constantly growing. For instance, for the last 20 years the total amount of migrants has grown from 173.5 million people up to 271.6 million people [1]. It naturally leads states to the necessity of forming up-to-date and flexible migration and integration policies which could perform state's aims on migrants' inflow.

Basing on the information provided by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, the majority of states (86%) has official migration policy which aims to maintain (61%)/lower (13%)/raise (12%) immigrants number while 14% of states do not have official migration policy or do not control migration processes at all [2]. Another essential aspect is that 68% of all states with established migration policy seek to attract labor migrants when  $\frac{3}{4}$  of all international migrants are considered as labor migrants [2].

In compliance with the statistics, the majority of states require labor migration-oriented policy which would successfully attract qualified and low-qualified labor migrants and retain them. This thesis could be exemplified by the Finnish migration policy which includes various instruments to attract more high-qualified labor migrants and integrate them into Finnish society.

One of the most recent is the Talent Boost program which focuses on creation of decent terms of working and social life for labor immigrants in Finland aiming to keep educated specialists in the country. The uniqueness of the program is that it combines both human labor resources attraction and their further integration in Finland.

The paper aims to reveal whether this particular migration policy instrument fits Finnish integration policy.

In order to achieve the goal, the following tasks were set:

1. To determine current aims, tasks, instruments of the Finnish integration policy and what legislation acts form it.
2. To examine Talent Boost program focus, methods, instruments.

The research was accomplished using methods of analysis of Finnish integration related documents like and laws state strategy, program documents of the Talent Boost program, and other related to it projects. The documents provided the background of the Talent Boost program and other variations of integration programs (like "Spouse Program", "My integration", "Kotona Suomessa") aimed at labor migrants and their further assimilation.

Moreover, scientific papers of recognized specialists on Finnish migration issues like S. Koikkalainen, Heikkilä E. covered the main stages of Finnish migration policy development as well as analyzed laws which formed it and what course does it have today.

## 2 Labor Migrants Integration in Finland

From the historic point of view, Finland has been a part of migration and integration processes since three Crusades were organized by Swedes aiming to spread the Christian faith into Finland. As the result, Finns were conquered by Sweden and the integration of Western and Southern Finland into Sweden began. This process was accompanied by the resettlement of ethnic Swedes seeking to settle in sparsely populated areas of Finland [3].

Later, in 1809 Finland was annexed by the Russian Empire as the result of the Finnish War (1808–1809). Finns migrated to Saint-Petersburg seeking a job and education in Empire's capital [3]. However, the process of emigration and return in Finland started in 1917 when Finnish government declared state's independence. Here political, ethnic, labor migration has occurred and gathered its pace.

Thus, Finland faced internal and external migration throughout its history.

Nevertheless, in the 20th century in Finland prevailed emigration processes (Finns aimed to migrate to more economically developed and stable Sweden) and there was no need for the development of immigration and integration policies and instruments. However, in the 1990s the situation has completely changed due to the return of Ingrian Finns [4] and the arrival of Somali refugees and asylum seekers. According to Heikkilä E. since that moment the apparent need for coherent and consistent migration and integration policies has occurred [5].

Despite the fact that Ingrian Finns immigration program was closed in 2016, the inflow of international immigrants of other nationalities has not run low requiring new laws to set boundaries for the migration sphere [6].

Basing on the information provided by the European Commission there are five groups of laws that regulate Finnish migration policy. Conditionally they could be distinguished as Aliens, Asylum, Integration, Nationality, and anti-discrimination laws [7]. Moreover, the Finnish constitution forms the basis of the migration policy on the grounds of Chap. 2 (Basic rights and liberties) [8].

It is significant to note that according to the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration, it is a matter of particular importance for the Finnish government to prevent discrimination and to provide equality of opportunities for immigrants with Finnish citizens. According to this Act, all migrants regardless of their citizenship and status (migrant, refugee, etc.) should receive needed for working and social life skills preserving their own culture and language [6].


According to the Annual Report on Migration and Asylum (Finland, 2020), the most significant role in immigration administration have the Ministry of the Interior (which coordinates the migration process through the Migration Department), and the Finnish Government [7]. These two official bodies are in charge of immigration issues, form Finnish migration policy, budget proposal, integration programs, set Government Program on Migration, etc. [9]. Furthermore, they design strategies on migration policy and set goals and ways to achieve them using migration.

The Government Action plan could be considered as a key document as it is planned by the Prime minister Cabinet and reflects Government's objectives and focus on Finnish society development. The current Marin Cabinet has planned a program named "Inclusive and competent Finland – a socially, economically and ecologically sustainable

society” which was published in 2019. This particular document sets a list of issues modern Finnish society faced and has to overcome in order to achieve economic growth.

It specifically draws attention to the shortage of qualified employees in Finland, population aging, low employment rating [9]. Specialists especially are needed in maritime, manufacturing, tech, and software development spheres. It is also highlighted in the document that listed previously issues that could negatively influence the Finnish economy in the nearest future by weakening the dependency ratio and lowering labor supply [9].

At the moment, according to the statistics provided by the European Migration Network, first-time labor migrants’ residence permit applications could be divided into several groups (see Fig. 1).



**Fig. 1.** First applications for a residence permit on the grounds of employment in 2020, largest categories [10].


According to the statistics, the total number of such first-time applications is 10 461, when the majority of employees arriving in Finland are manual laborers (5971). But by contrast, the number of high-qualified migrants is approximately 3,6 times lower (880 specialists and 784 scientific research versus 5971 manual laborers) [10]. Nevertheless, the number of labor migrants applying for a residence permit has grown compared to the previous year (8255 applications in 2019).

Hence it appears that current statistics on labor migration do not match with the aims Finnish Governments sets in the Action Plan. Even the total amount of labor migration has grown (work is the most common reason for coming to Finland for the second year in a row), the number of high-qualified specialists remains to be low and even decreased compared to the previous year (853 versus 1791 in 2019) [11].

The estimated solution of the problem the Finnish government sees in promoting and facilitating labor immigration in Finland using various instruments and programs to make

Finland an attractive place to work and to stay in compared to other states. In this regard, government and municipalities invest in integration programs for educated migrants that aim to retain high-qualified specialists [12]. Basing on the OECD information, Finland is the only country in Nordic countries that provides all seeking for work migrants with integration services (not only refugees and asylum seekers as, for instance, Norway and Sweden do) but labor migrants as well [13].

At the national level, the particular emphasis on labor migrant’s integration is put by the Public Employment Service (PES) (work under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment) through organizing integration-promoting employment services [13]. The whole process of integration for actively seeking work migrants is depicted in the following scheme (see Fig. 2).



**Fig. 2.** Finnish integration plan scheme for labor migrants [13].

Before performing integration programs into life, each migrant should provide information to Local PES or municipality about previous education, work experience, language skills, etc., and prove it. The next step is the classification of those migrants into four groups depending on the level of their education and estimated ability to integrate: a fast track, an intermediate track, a slow track, a basic literacy training track [13].

On the grounds of the chosen track future integration plan is prepared by the Local PES or municipalities. Another important feature of the Finnish integration system is that it is not implemented on a fully voluntary basis. Non-participation in the integration programs leads to 20–40% of social benefits reduction [13]. It should be also mentioned that the maximum time such integration plans last is 3 years since migrant received first residence permit [6]. Nevertheless, if it is needed each migrant is able to have an extension for two years.

However, the waiting time for a migrant to begin an integration program varies across the country which seems to be a problem according to the OECD. From the moment of registering in Local PES it could take around 70 days to begin plan fulfillment [13]. For instance, in Uusimaa municipality it takes approximately 140 days of waiting when in Kainuu, where lines are smaller, it takes up to 34 days.

The problem of long waiting time is also highlighted by the Finnish Migration Service. For instance, the Ministry of the Interior developed an action plan for 2021–2024 aimed to encourage immigration to Finland of high-qualified labor migrants [11].

The fulfilling of the aim is planned due to the reduction of the time migrants' applications examination. Another significant point is to diminish lines for residence and work permits through the digitalization of the Finnish Migration Service work. The aim is to process work permits applications for labor immigrants no longer than a month by 2023 (today it takes approximately 122 days) [11]. This step is essential as receiving a residence permit or registering the right of residence (relevant for EU citizens) is the best way for the labor migrant to get access to the labor market and the welfare state's benefits (like healthcare, family, and unemployment allowance, etc.) [9].

### 3 Talent Boost Program Integration Aspect

Considering previously mentioned information about the Finnish Government's steps to promote and facilitate the integration of labor migrants into Finnish society, it is important to note specific programs aimed at labor migrants retaining in Finland.

In the Government's Action plan the particular emphasis was put on the Talent Boost program. The program was put into practice in 2017 by Prime Minister Sipilä's Government. The Ministry of Employment and Economy made a 5 mil. Euro annual appropriation for the Program.

However, in 2020 it was reconsidered, and the emphasis of the program was expanded from international startups and specialists to students, researchers, employees [15]. The main idea of the program is to attract labor migrants to Finnish economy growing sectors with a shortage of employees.

The program is coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Education and Culture. It is also mentioned in the official description of the Talent Boost program that implication of it into working life is only possible if the government, ministries, municipalities, education centers, and companies will work together [14]. That means that successful performance of the program is possible due to cooperation between authorities and local actors which reflects a decentralized process of integration and migration programs application and performance.

As it was mentioned previously, the Talent Boost program was developed in 2017. According to the L. Lindeman, at the beginning of 2017 in Finland, there was no direct national strategy on attracting and retaining international high-qualified specialists [16]. The expert highlighted that migration and integration policies should be primarily directed on business, employment, and innovation spheres [16]. Thus, the high-priority task is to concentrate efforts on attracting international top experts.

There are several concrete reasons for developing programs aimed to engage high-educated labor immigrants who come to Finland. They are:

1. Promoting and diversifying Finnish companies and make them competitive on an international global market.
2. Increasing knowledge base in innovation sectors and boost Finnish technological consultancies and scientific centers.




3. Already living in Finland international experts do not have enough opportunities to participate in Finnish labor market and promote the internationalization of Finnish companies.
4. The internationalization of Finnish companies will attract foreign investments.

Taking into consideration previously mentioned factors Talent Boost program aims to achieve these goals:

1. To enhance the image of Finland as an attractive and perspective country to stay and to work in.
2. To channel international experts' potential into the development of Finnish companies and innovation sectors.
3. To make an inclusive and open labor market to high-educated labor migrants.

In order to perform Talent Boost Program "Talent Attraction Management" model was used. It was developed in 2013 by the "Future Place Leadership" company (Nordic management consultancy). It consists of five steps which are depicted in the Fig. 3.



**Fig. 3.** Talent attraction management model used in the Talent Boost program [17].

Briefly described it is a set of activities aimed to retain high-qualified labor migrants in Finland. For instance, these activities include Alumni networks, Regional trainee programs, culture and leisure events, open-house activities, etc. [17].

Basing on the information provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, today's most crucial aspect of the Program is integration. Due to the unstable economic situation caused by Covid-19, municipalities should provide needed

social support for labor migrants. That especially promotes already existed integration programs developed for the “Talent Integration” stage.

In the framework of the integration part of the “Talent Boost” program lay several integration activities aimed to acquaint labor migrants with Finnish social and working life. They are the Spouse Program, the Hidden Gems program, the Entry Point program, the “Kulttuurikaveri” concept, “Myintegration.fi” web portal, “Kotona Suomessa” project. In addition, the majority of Finnish municipalities have their own integration programs (like Town Hall meetings and residence events, as well as mentioned previously programs are also organized by different municipalities and cities like Helsinki, Vantaa, Hämeenlinna, etc.). Part of them is often organized on the grounds of local universities (Universities of Turku, Helsinki, Tampere). The project is called “HEI LIFE – Higher Education Institutions’ Support for International Academics & Staff - Living, Integration, Family, and Employment in Finland” [17].

Based on the “Hidden Gems Program” and “Spouse Program” Finnish Government facilitates labor migrant’s spouses with integration and employment, empowers them to adapt to a new environment [18]. Funded by the European Social Fund they organize job-related workshops, professional mentoring, Finnish culture acquaintance, etc. [19]. Making a particular emphasis on high-qualified specialists’ spouses it is expected to raise the country’s attractiveness as a live and work destination. The program is relevant for those migrants’ spouses, who live in Helsinki, Vantaa, Espoo.

Another way to boost the integration process is called the “Entry Point” program developed in the Helsinki region. The idea of the program could be described through the mentoring concept. Mentors are people who already have 3 and more years working experience in Finland and willing to guide newcomers while mentees are labor migrant with higher education graduated in Finland or abroad [20]. The structure of the program consists of 5 pair and 4 collective meetings, the “Entry Point” itself lasts for 5–6 months [20].

The concept “Kulttuurikaveri” (the “Culture Friend”) has the same mentoring essence. Both projects are organized on a voluntary basis and aim to encourage the local community to take part in the integration process of labor migrants and assist it.

The integration facilitating process is also organized in the online format. The most complete option, web site Myintegration.fi, is provided by the city of Hämeenlinna. The service is available in English, Russian, Somali and Arabian and provides information about all integration programs relevant for labor migrants in the Kanta-Häme region. They include Health care, education, daycare, housing, employment, and Finnish language study services [21].

Another significant step in labor migrants’ integration is the development of the program “Kotona Suomessa” (Home in Finland) which is, in its turn, divided into two other projects called “Hyvä Alku” (Good Start) and “Hyvä Polku” (Good Path) [22].

The main focus of the “Hyvä Alku” project is concentrated on performing pilot integration programs into official functioning national integration services [17]. The particular emphasis was put on initial integration programs that should support labor migrant during his/her first months in the country. For instance, such support includes orientation period activities like day and evening schools (lasts for 2–6 weeks) providing

information about Finnish public services, authorities, legislation acts, social benefits, etc. [23].

In addition, the “Hyvä Polku” program was developed for the purpose of unification and enhancement of efficiency of the state’s integration programs. Moreover, the purpose was to implement local, municipal projects and initiatives into national integration projects and programs [24]. Tasks of the program included promotion and advertisement of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment activity in the integration field as well as create online courses of integration management for local authorities.

The specific feature of the “Talent Boost” program is also concluded in the “Talent Hub” service model. The idea of the concept is to unite different integration initiatives oriented on high-educated labor migrants and to convert them into a seamless integration system [15]. Each municipality develops its own operation model the most efficient for its needs and tailored for their unique circumstances.

These “Talent Hubs”, which basically could be described as an umbrella term, are funded by the Finnish Government. The right to get the grant has municipalities with 15000 + foreign residents living there [25]. At the moment, in Finland already function Talent Hub Tampere, Talent Hub Turku, Talent Hub Joensuu and will function Talent Hubs in Vaasa, South Karelia, Northern Savo, Oulu [15].

## 4 Conclusion

Taking into consideration information provided by the Finnish authorities concerning migration policy it can be conducted that it is primarily concentrated on attracting high-qualified specialists and retaining them in Finland through various integration programs. Moreover, labor migration, according to the Government Action Plan, occurs to be the most efficient method for strengthening dependency ratio, employment rating, boosting the economy and solving population aging issue.

Nevertheless, labor migration, in this case, has potential only if a prudent integration policy is implemented to encourage international specialists to choose Finland as a place to work and to live in. Thus, integration programs should be provided not only for refugees and asylum seekers as it traditionally does the majority of states but for labor migrants as well.

In this regard, emphasis was placed on integration programs in Finland for high-qualified migrants. The specific peculiarity of it is that it is formed on different levels by several authorities and has a decentralized character. The general course is formed by the Government and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment through the Government’s Action Plan and coordination of the Talent Boost program. The general goal of the program is to attract educated labor migrants and diversify the Finnish labor market. Moreover, it also includes a set of integration instruments that are considered to be the most crucial aspects of the Talent Boost program in general.

Due to the decentralized character of the Finnish integration policy, integration programs, which would tailor for specific needs of municipalities, are developed by local authorities. Hence, each municipality has its own integration initiatives for labor migrants depending on their needs. They are primarily focused on migrants’ general awareness of

already existing integration programs (web site “Myintegration.fi”), on mentoring programs (“Entry Point” program), labor migrants’ spouses’ integration (“Hidden Gems” program), etc.

In addition, the Talent Boost program proves itself as an effective instrument that is modernized by the Talent Hub models aimed to collect the best regional integration initiatives and perform them on a national level which meets Government’s goals on retaining high-qualified labor migrants in Finland.

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# Migration Processes of the Vepsian Population of the Vologda Region: Historical Aspects and Modern Trends

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**Abstract.** The paper analyzes the main aspects associated with the migration of the Vepsian population of the Vologda region in the XX–XXI centuries. The Vepsians are one of the indigenous Finno-Ugric peoples that originally inhabit the northwestern regions of Russia - the Leningrad and Vologda regions, as well as the Republic of Karelia. Over the past century, the Vepsian population has significantly decreased in all regions of their residence. The key factors that influenced the decline in the number and movement of the Vepsian population within the Vologda region and to adjacent territories are considered. The influence of the state national policy on the processes of forced migration of Vepsians is assessed. The dependence of the dynamics of the number of Vepsians in the Vologda region on the intensity of their migration is revealed. An analysis of the negative factors that caused the decline in the number of Vepsians in recent decades is carried out. The prospects for the preservation of the ethnic self-identification of the Vepsians, the implementation of programs in the field of culture in places of compact residence of the Vepsian population of the Vologda region, which could expand the tourism potential of the region and serve to preserve the original culture of the indigenous people, are assessed. In the conclusion of the study, measures are proposed to stimulate the development of infrastructure in places of compact residence of Vepsians in the Vologda region, which will help to improve the quality of life and stabilize the dynamics of the population of this people in the region.

**Keywords:** Vepsians · Ethnic groups · Migration · Assimilation · Finno-Ugric peoples · Vologda region

## 1 Introduction

Vepsians are historically one of the indigenous peoples of the Russian North-West, inhabiting the adjacent territories of the Leningrad and Vologda regions, as well as the Republic of Karelia. Modern scholars distinguish three main ethnic groups of Vepsians according to their dialectal peculiarities of speech: northern (Prionezhskaya), middle (Oyat, Belozerskaya) and southern [1]. The compactness of the ethnos' residence within the same territory, unfortunately, did not allow completely preserving the previously existing system of social and cultural ties between these three groups, which ultimately

led to migration and accelerated the assimilation of the Vepsians. This paper proposes to consider the negative factors that influenced the disunity of the ethnic groups of Vepsians and caused a sharp decline in their number in the XX century - both in general and living in the territory of the modern Vologda region (see Table 1).

## 2 Research Results

In the past, the territory of settlement of the Vepsians was much more extensive. Its decline occurred gradually, but it accelerated sharply in the middle of the 20th century. Such processes are especially noticeable on the territory of the modern Vologda region. Thus, back in the 19th century, a number of villages were Vepsian, the majority of whose inhabitants have now become Russified [2]. Until 1922, the Vepsians lived on the territory of the former Olonets (Vytegorsky and Lodeynopolsky districts) and the former Novgorod provinces (Belozersky, Tikhvinsky, Ustyuzhensky districts). The radical change in the administrative-territorial structure in these territories that followed after the 1917 revolution led to the formation of the Leningrad region in 1927 and the Vologda region in 1937.

**Table 1.** Dynamics of changes in the number of Vepsians from 1926 to 2010 (total and living on the territory of the Vologda region), thousand people

Year	Total number	The number of Vepsians in the Vologda Oblast
1926	32,8	6,9 <sup>a</sup>
1937	29,8	5,4
1939	31,7	5
1959	16,4	0,1
1970	8,3	0,3
1979	8,1	0,07
1989	12,5	0,7
2002	8,2	0,4
2010	5,9	0,4

<sup>a</sup> For 1926 on the territory of the Cherepovets province

It can be argued that up to the mid-1950s, the Vepsians lived in a single ethnic group. However, the prerequisites for their separation into disparate groups began to emerge back in the 1930s. Such prerequisites were the failure to solve many problems of national and cultural development in the 1920s–30s, a complete rejection of the indigenouization policy that was carried out until 1937, the difficulty in providing the Vepsian places for living with the appropriate infrastructure, especially in the Leningrad and Vologda regions.

The migration of the Vepsians, as such, began during the period of the existence of their historical ancestors - the entire tribe, which was a large ethnic group that played

a significant role in the era of the formation of a single ancient Russian state [3]. The historical fate of the Vepsians was influenced by the advance of the Slavs to the north, which began at the turn of the 1st and 2nd millennia, along the waterways previously inhabited by the ancient tribe. It marked the beginning of the assimilation of the Vepsians who lived near navigable rivers, and their displacement into the interior of the territory between the Ladoga, Onega and White lakes and beyond, which can be considered the beginning of the migration processes of the Vepsian population. Vepsi's ethnic history was very complex. All Vepsians encountered many ethnic groups, experienced various influences and influenced them themselves, and despite significant losses due to migration and participation in the ethnogenesis of other peoples, they survived as an independent nationality on their territory [4].

The division of the Vepsian lands between the Olonets and Novgorod provinces affected the differences in the socio-economic and cultural development of the Vepsians in different regions. During the period of serfdom, the Vepsians of the Olonets province (Prionezhskiy, Shimozerskiy, part of the Oyat) were state peasants, and the rest were landowners. At the beginning of the 18th century. The Vepsians of the Petrozavodsk district were assigned to the Olonets (Petrovsky) metallurgical and arms factories, and the Vepsians of the Lodeynopolsky district - to the Olonets shipyard. Work in factories and construction drew the Vepsians of the Olonets province into the economic and political life of the region [5].

Despite the fact that the process of Russification of the Vepsians went on for several centuries, it was gradual and it is quite difficult to fully assess its scale, which is due to the fragmentary nature of information about the size of the Vepsian population up to 1897. The main factors of gradual assimilation were the need to study the Russian language due to the close proximity of the Vepsians to the Russian population, the presence of seasonal work (leaving the male population for seasonal crafts), etc. However, the processes of enslavement were more noticeable in the ethnic border zone, due to the mixed marriages that took place between Vepsians and Russians. At the same time, the circle of Vepsian marriages in the center of the settlement area until the beginning of the 20th century was extremely narrow - marriages were concluded in their own communities, going beyond which were extremely rare [6].

In the late 1920s - early 1930s, the process of the administrative-territorial division of the northwestern part of the USSR began. The Vologda region was formed in 1937, and it includes the Cherepovets Okrug, previously referred to the Leningrad Oblast, where the Middle and Southern Vepsians lived. The rupture of ties between individual groups of Vepsian settlements occurred due to numerous changes in the regional boundaries, which were carried out without taking into account the habitation of the Vepsian people here. The existing structure of regional division was formed after another reorganization in the 1960s.

The peculiarities of the construction of the local road infrastructure in the USSR were limited to providing transport links only with the centers of the newly formed regions, which led to the loss of routes that are extremely important from the point of view of socio-cultural contacts between the ethnic groups of Vepsians. Thus, the administrative border between the Leningrad and Vologda regions, created in the pre-war period, completely divided the Oyat and Shimozero Vepsians, who were part of the



middle ethnic group, since the transport routes crossing it were no longer supported, and new ones were not created. The specific nature of the relief, the strong swampiness of the territory of the Vepsian Upland led to the rapid loss of the former horse-drawn roads connecting the villages of the middle Vepsians. A similar situation was observed in the neighboring Leningrad region, where there was virtually no road network between the regions of the Middle and Southern Vepsians - Vinnitsa and Kapshinskiy (later Podporozhskiy, Tikhvinskiy and Boksitogorskiy), respectively [7].

Another reason for the termination of interethnic ties of the middle Vepsians living in the Vologda and Leningrad regions was the disappearance of the tradition of joint fairs and religious holidays, which was not combined with the official Soviet ideology. The economic and cultural ties that existed earlier between the Vepsian villages of neighboring regions were interrupted.

The period of active reform of the administrative-territorial boundaries, which violated the relative ethno-territorial integrity of the Vepsians, coincided with a sharp change in the state national policy towards ethnic minorities [8].

It should be noted that in the first two decades of the existence of Soviet power, measures were taken for the national and cultural development of the Vepsians, which directly influenced the demographic situation. So, in 1926, the highest number of Vepsians was recorded - 32.8 thousand people (of whom lived in the Vologda region - at that time Cherepovets province - 6.9 thousand people) [9], which indicated the actual suspension of the assimilation process. During this period, national-territorial formations were also created in places of compact settlement of Vepsians. So, in 1931, the Vinnitsa district of the Leningrad region was given the status of the Vepsian national, which remained for it for 7 years. Similarly, the Sheltozersk region of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which existed in this status until 1956, was recognized as the Vepsian national one. Unfortunately, this trend did not continue in relation to the territory of the modern Vologda region - the plans to create a third national region in this region were not implemented.

The status of ethno-territorial formations was strengthened as a result of the indigenization policy pursued before 1937, the purpose of which was proclaimed the alignment of the political, cultural and economic development of national minorities with the "advanced nations". Overcoming national inequality was implemented within the framework of a system of interrelated measures, benefits and privileges that ensure the accelerated formation of the national elite and the working class. Office work and school education were translated into the language of local peoples, educational and cultural activities were carried out in them. All this contributed to the institutionalization of ethnicity and the growth of national self-awareness of peoples [10].

It should be mentioned that the Declaration of the Russia's Peoples Rights, which was essentially one of the first documents of Soviet power, adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR in November 1917, proclaimed the free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia. The indigenous policy was a logical continuation of such a declaration and was supposed to have a great influence on the formation of the cultural space of the USSR as a multinational state. In addition, the spread of the national language and culture, the

participation of national cadres in local self-government, according to the plan of the Soviet authorities, were to stop the spread of autonomist and separatist sentiments.

Unfortunately, the positive trend aimed at supporting the national identification of the Vepsians was curtailed by the mid-1930s. This change in priorities on the part of the USSR authorities was explained by the beginning of the so-called campaign of “struggle against bourgeois nationalism”, which de facto led to a struggle against national identity. Research on the history of peoples was banned as “nationalist” and began to reflect only the history of the respective territories. A serious blow was dealt to the development and strengthening of the spiritual unity of kindred peoples.

In the late 1930s, Vepsian national districts and village councils in the Leningrad and Vologda regions were abolished. Thus, one could speak of the end of the first period of the Vepsians’ national revival. The process of ethnocultural development of the Vepsians as an ethnos with the help of the state was curtailed. The administrative-territorial disunity of the Vepsian population and the lack of transport communications between territorial units led to a further weakening of the intra-ethnic cultural and linguistic ties of the Vepsians. The changed political situation has created the preconditions for the acceleration of linguistic and political assimilation [11].

Major reconstruction of the road network in places of compact residence of Vepsians was carried out in the Republic of Karelia and partly in the Leningrad region, but did not affect the northern part of the Babaevsky district of the Vologda region, where the Vepsians also lived. This did not allow the creation of the proper infrastructure related to social services to the population, hindered the establishment of transport links. In 1955, the Oshta district, on the territory of which most of the Vepsians of the Vologda region lived and previously there were 7 national village councils, was abolished with a division into Vytegorsky and Borisovo-Sudsky, and then in 1959 into Vytegorsky and Babayevsky districts. This administrative-territorial reform had an extremely negative impact on social security and transport accessibility, which led to the abolition of part of the original Vepsian settlements.

It should be noted that one of the most negative phenomena that emerged in the post-war period was the campaign to enlarge the settlements and abolish a number of them as unpromising, and it was the national settlements that were often abolished. The reason for this was the general trend that took place in the USSR, as well as the continued unfavorable situation with the road network and infrastructure.

It can be argued that the most destructive effect on the ethno-territorial integrity of the Vepsian people in the Vologda region was the forced resettlement from the settlements of the Oshta region that had ceased to exist in the late 1950s - early 1960s.

Despite the fact that, in general, the sharpest decline in the number of Vepsians in the USSR, according to the official censuses, occurred in the period from 1939 to 1959, for the Vologda Oblast it was the most catastrophic (see Table 1) - from 4976 to 117 people, i.e. that is, more than 40 times [12]. Such a change in indicators can be associated with the events of the Second World War and the repressions that preceded it in relation to the Vepsian population, the fact of the application of which, in particular, is confirmed by the author’s field studies [13].


The military events of 1942 had a negative impact, when the 25-km frontal zone expanded and it became necessary to evacuate the population from a number of villages

in the Oshta region. The Oshta region, being a front-line one, in the period 1941–42 due to hostilities at the request of the military command was forced to evacuate the civilian population from this zone. In accordance with the instructions of the command of the USSR army, until October 31, 1942, 3 northern and eastern village councils of the district - Megorsky, Verkhne-Vodlitsky and Torozersky, on whose territory the Vepsians lived, were freed from the civilian population. In accordance with this decree, 30 collective farms were evacuated, accounting for 65% of the entire economy of the region, which entailed a sharp decline in the material and economic level of the entire population of the region [14].

After the cessation of hostilities, it was necessary to re-evacuate the population and restore the destroyed economy. On June 28, 1944, the Bureau of the Oshta RC ACPb (Revolutionary Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)) made a decision “On the restoration of the regional center of the Oshty village and the liberated collective farms of Nizhne-Vodlitsky, Verkhne-Vodlitsky, Oshtinsky, Kurvoshsy and Torozersky village councils.” In general, the Oshta region suffered significant damage - more than 20 villages, 460 residential buildings were burned, property was destroyed. On September 29, 1944, a decision was made “On measures to provide assistance to the Oshta region” [15], associated with the need for the supply of building materials, food, etc. However, the damage caused by the military operations was not fully compensated for, which was aggravated by the complexity of agriculture in this territory due to the peculiarities of the relief and soil structure. This led to the decision of local authorities to abolish most of the Vepsian settlements in the Oshta region at the end of the 1950s and forced labor migration of the population from places of compact residence of the ethnic group, which sharply accelerated the assimilation process.

The most negative consequences had the complete liquidation of the Vepsian villages of the former Shimozero volost, whose population back in 1926 was almost completely Vepsian (95.8%) [16]. In 1953, the local authorities again returned to the consideration of the issue “On measures of assistance to the Oshta region” [17]. The collective farms in the south of the Oshta region, which were in a difficult economic situation, were supposed to be transferred by unification to the Leningrad region and other settlements of the Vologda region. By 1955, they had completely stopped financial assistance [18]. Due to the lack of support from the local authorities, the Shimozero farms completely ceased to exist by the end of 1959, and their Vepsian population migrated to the adjacent Leningrad region and the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1955, the Oshta district was abolished, due to which the farms of the settlement of Shimozero appeared on the periphery, first of the Borisovo-Sudsky and then Vytegorsky districts, and there was almost no connection with the regional centers and other infrastructure support in them (Fig. 1).

The elimination of Shimozero and the surrounding villages not only led to mass migration of ethnic Vepsians, which accelerated their assimilation with the Russian population, but also aggravated the territorial disunity of the ethnic group, especially the middle (Oyat) Vepsians. At the same time, a somewhat different situation was observed in the Pyazhoversky village council of the Borisovo-Sudsky (then Babayevsky) district, where, as a result of the protests of the local population, villages with a dominant Vepsian population were preserved.



**Fig. 1.** Scheme of migration of the Vepsian population of the former Shimozero volost in the 1950–60s. The areas of settlement are schematically indicated: 1 - northern (pronezhsky) Vepsians; 2 - medium (Oyat) Vepsians; 3 - southern Vepsians.

Thus, the village councils of the former Opginsky region, which officially ceased to be Vepsian national in the late 1930s, were almost destroyed by the early 1960s. The Kuysky and Pondalsky Vepsian village councils of the former Sholsky district, having become part of the Babayevsky district of the Vologda region, existed from the late 1930s until the end of the 1990s without a special ethnic status.

In the post-war period, the authorities also pursued a policy of artificial assimilation of the Vepsians, refusing to reflect the true data on nationality in official documents, which led to the registration of the Vepsians as the Russian population. Thus, according to a study conducted in 1981–1983 by the Institute of Language, Literature and History of the Karelian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the total number of the Vepsian population during the 1979 census was underestimated by more than 4000 people [20]. The dramatically changed indicators of the 1989 census, when the official number of Vepsians in the Vologda region increased to 728 people, indicate the relevance of allegations of falsification.

An attempt to revive national villages, to raise the national self-awareness of the Vepsians was undertaken in the late 1980s along with a change in the national policy of the USSR and the general political situation. Later, in the 1990s, the Vepsian national volost was formed in the Republic of Karelia, and in the Vologda region, the status of the Vepsian national was returned to the Kuysky village council [21]. Infrastructure

restoration projects in the areas previously inhabited by Vepsians became the subject of active public discussion. In 1989–1990, experimental projects of district planning were to be developed in the places of Vepsian residence, including in the Babaevsky and Vytegorsky districts of the Vologda region [22].

Nevertheless, the question of the administrative unification of the Vepsians into a single national region could not be resolved. Disunity and aging of the ethnic group, negative economic situation, migration to cities and assimilation led to a continuing decrease in the total number of Vepsians (from 12501 people in 1989 to 5936 people in 2010, in the Vologda region from 728 people in 1989 to 412 people in 2010) In this context, the fact of an extremely insignificant decrease in the Vepsian population of the Vologda region according to the official data of the 2002 and 2010 censuses seems to be interesting. (see Table 2). At the same time, according to census data, the decline in the total population during this period continued and was significant. Perhaps this situation can be explained by the growth of ethnic self-awareness against the background of the national Vepsian village council existence in the Vologda region, but it needs further monitoring and scientific study.

### 3 Discussion

Thus, the following main reasons for the migration of the Vepsian population of the Vologda region in the XX century can be identified. First, the administrative-territorial disunity of the Vepsians, which persisted throughout the entire century, was aggravated by the administrative reforms of 1927–1959. Secondly, the political situation that changed after the revolution led to the termination of intra-ethnic contact due to the traditions' loss of Vepsians holding joint events of a religious and secular nature.

Thirdly, a sharp change in national policy in 1937–1938 and a campaign to abolish the so-called “unpromising” villages in the 1950s–1960s led to the disappearance of a large number of settlements in which the Vepsian population lived, which was forced to migrate. A negative role was played by the events of World War II and the lack of attention of local authorities to the need for economic support of the Vepsian population in the post-war period, which led to the complete disappearance of the former Shimozero volost, which served as a link for contacts within the Vepsian ethnos in the Vologda region. All these factors were extremely negative for the national identity, the preservation of the culture and the traditional way of life of the Vepsians, and were the reason for a sharp decline in their number.

The lack of attention of the state in the second half of the twentieth century to the creation of the infrastructure necessary for living continues to lead to the outflow of the population from the countryside, as well as to its significant aging. This also applies to the Babaevsky district of the Vologda region, which remains the main place of compact residence of Vepsians in the 2010–2020s.

Analyzing the dynamics of the decline in the number of Vepsians given by the official statistics of population censuses, one can distinguish a significant difference between the situation in the Vologda region and the trends in the Leningrad region and Karelia (see Table 2).

Despite the fact that the Vepsian population of the Vologda region in 1989 was only 5.6% of the total number of Vepsians, the dynamics of its decline in subsequent years

**Table 2.** Reduction in the number of Vepsians in the regions of residence of the North-West of Russia in the 1990–2010s.

Region	1989	2002	2010
Republic of Karelia	5954	4870	3423
Leningrad region	4273	2019	1380
Vologodskaya region	728	426	412

is not similar to the situation in adjacent regions. So, from 2002 to 2010, the number of Vepsians in the Republic of Karelia decreased by 29.8%, in the Leningrad region - by 31.7% (which is approximately comparable), while in the Vologda region the decrease was only 3.3%.

#### 4 Conclusion: Future Steps and Recommendations

The trend showing a significant slowdown in the decline in the number of Vepsians in the Vologda region in 2002–2010 needs to be confirmed in the course of forthcoming studies and results' analysis of the future population census. However, as necessary measures that can be implemented at the level of federal and local authorities, the following should be highlighted already today. First, it is necessary to preserve the existing social infrastructure - first of all, transport, medicine and education. The remoteness of the Vepsian area in the Babaevsky district from the main transport arteries and the regional center makes it necessary to have regular transport links, develop and expand communication networks to level the peripheral status. Secondly, it is extremely important to develop the ethnic direction of domestic tourism associated with tourists visiting places of residence of indigenous peoples. Today, the region already hosts annual festivals of Vepsian culture with reference to national practices, and this trend needs support and development. The creation of new jobs will allow to slow down the outflow of the able-bodied population to other regions, and an increase in the tourist attractiveness of the region against the background of trends in the development of domestic tourism will ensure attention to the original culture of the Vepsians.

The proposed measures will not be able to sufficiently compensate for the decline in the Vepsian population, which was the result of a complex of negative factors in the 20th century analyzed in this paper, however, they will significantly slow down the decline in the number of Vepsians in the Vologda region.

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# The Cham of Cambodia as a Divided People: From Refuge to Genocide

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*A divided people is a conquered people. (Richard Paul Evans).*

**Abstract.** The paper considers the most tragic period in the history of the Cham minority in Cambodia. Like the Indian culture in Champa, Islam there had to adapt to local conditions that is also demonstrated by the modern Cham communities in the border provinces of Cambodia and Vietnam. A specific feature of the Cham community is that they still retain elements of matrilocal relations. The author proves that the resistance of the Cham (both in Cambodia and Vietnam) has been at least threefold: aspiration to regain state or religious autonomy, escape from the state, discerning mobility within its territory. The Cambodian Cham as a minority of immigrant descent have reinvented their identity on the basis of Islam, while their ethnic identity is at a secondary position. The Cham and Malays (“Khmer Islam” community) are the ethnic and religious minority most affected by the genocide under the Khmer Rouge regime. Today, a majority of Cambodia’s Cham population has felt the urge to belong to the wider Islamic world ever since.

**Keywords:** Champa · Islam · Bani · Malay · Khmer Rouge · FULRO · Frontier · Crime · Tribunal

## 1 Introduction

The Cham is an Austronesian people who created the state of Champa with a rich original culture. Champa, located in the eastern part of Indochina peninsula (territory of modern southern and central Vietnam) in the 2nd–18th centuries, represented one of the crossroads of civilizations that have left deep traces in the subregion’s culture.

The history of Champa is also linked with the history of South-East Asia, especially Cambodia and Nusantara (the Malay-Indonesian region), of China and India. Despite a significant number of the population in the past, today the majority of Chams live in Cambodia, but not in Vietnam: up to 600,000 in Cambodia<sup>1</sup> and 180,000 in Vietnam

<sup>1</sup> According to the Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs in Cambodia, the total Cham population in the country was 510,000 in 2006.



(S.R.V.). Also, over 50,000 Cham live in Malaysia; over 4,000 in Thailand, and there are small Cham communities in the Western countries, mainly the USA (3,000) and France (1,000) [8].

The Chams have been living in Cambodia since at least the end of the 15th century: fleeing the Vietnamese, who captured almost the entire Champa's territory, a significant number of the Cham refugees settled along the rivers and on the banks of Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia. Later, Chams also began to live in the northern part of Phnom Penh and in the province of Kampong Cham (in Khmer "Cham village"). Unlike the Chinese and Vietnamese population of Cambodia, who are perceived there as foreigners, the Cambodian Cham are considered a local and the largest ethnic minority, in accordance with the distinction adopted in Cambodia - between "ethnic minorities" and "foreigners". Since all Chams had Cambodian citizenship and professed Islam, the government of independent Cambodia officially assigned Chams to the "Khmer Islam" group in the 1950s–1960s. At the time the action was criticized by some Cham who claimed that Prince Sihanouk intended to erase the Cham identity. Currently, the country's authorities do not distinguish between local Malays and Chams either.

## 2 Methods and Problem Statement

The study is based on the comparative historical, political and legal analysis that should result in a better understanding of the situation of the Cham in Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam. The issues that the community experienced there were crying human rights violations based on race discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia. They are also to be considered as initial stages of genocide, according to Gregory Stanton's concept of the ten stages of genocide [7, 10–13].

In case of conflict situations, the technologies of resolving them include willingness to use the state's authority to protect and support cultural, economic, political rights of the minorities which have found themselves in unfavorable conditions.

## 3 Results of Research

### 3.1 Religions of the Cham

**Champa/Vietnam:** The traditional religious ideas of the Cham are characterized by the syncretic nature of Hinduism and Islam based on local cults. First of all, in ancient Champa there were exclusively cults of local deities. The ancient Cham knew the cult of standing stones (menhirs). Later, after the emergence of Hinduism in Champa, the cult of menhirs merged with the cult of Shivalinga. Even now the Cham Hindus preserve the custom of placing a standing stone in the linga form (Kut) at their ancestral cemeteries. Obviously, along with the menhirs, the cult of female deity Uroya/Po Nagar ascends to the cult of fertility. Besides Po Nagar, the Cham also worshiped several super gods, different genies, some kings and heroes included in the pantheon.

The most famous Cham kings are Po Klong Garay (1151–1205) and Po Rome (1627–1651), who have own temples (towers) devoted to them in the region of Phan Rang (NinhThuan province). The both gods were identified with Shiva.

According to many scholars, Islam penetrated into Champa very early – in 8th–9th centuries. Arab, Indian and Persian seafarers, and traders visited, in increasing numbers, the coastlines of Malay peninsula and of eastern part of the Mainland South-East Asia (Indochina) on the way to China. They also entered the Cham ports. The archaeological data have also proved that in IX–X centuries Champa had constant contacts with the Middle East countries.

There is a version according to which the majority of Cham-Hindus chose to stay in the territory occupied by the Vietnamese because of their attachment to temples and ancestral burials (Kut). It can be assumed that mainly Muslims left Champa, although some Hindus, the ancestors of modern Jahed community (see below), could also follow them to Cambodia.

Until the 13th–14th centuries a significant part of the Cham had been converted to Islam, and the closest ties between Nusantara and Champa were established in that period. It is not surprising that after the capture of Vijaya (the capital of Champa) by the Vietnamese in 1471, many Chams fled to Malacca. Before the military defeat, the trade, religious, cultural contacts between Champa and Nusantara were regular, since the peoples are related in anthropological, linguistic, and cultural terms. However, because of isolation from the Islamic world as well as the influence of local cults and Hinduism, this religion was greatly transformed among the coastal Cham. As a result, such a syncretic cult as Bani appeared.

19th century is marked by dramatic events in the Cham history. In 1822, Po Tion, the last Cham king of Panduranga, realizing that he could not save his country, left the throne and emigrated to Cambodia with a significant number of his subjects. Ten years later, in 1832, the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mang annexed the remnants of Champa by sending troops into the dependent Cham principality of Panduranga. The Chams responded with a series of popular uprisings. Thus, in 1833, a major uprising was led by Katip Sumat, a Muslim of noble origin. He returned to Cambodia in 1833 after studying in Makkah and then conducted a preaching mission in Panduranga, where he led the anti-Vietnamese revolt. This resistance assumed the form of a holy war. In 1834–35, another insurrection was incited by Katip Yathak-va. Obviously, it was mainly their Muslim followers who fled to Cambodia after the uprisings' suppression.

Nowadays, the religious worldview of the Cham Bani (about 25 thousand in Vietnam) is a synthesis of Islam and ancient local cults, which were influenced by Hinduism. The reason for the likely departure from the orthodox form of Islam in the medieval period may be the “conservation” of the Cham from the Islamic world, primarily Malaysia and Indonesia, that themselves became the object of colonial conquest. In the past few decades, there has been a tendency for Bani to convert to the orthodox form of Islam. In the 1960s, because of activities of some Cham preachers who had studied in Malaysia, several mosques were built in NinhThuan – BinhThuan provinces with the support of Malay Muslims (the first in 1960). In 1965, there were already 2,000 people - former Bani. At present, their number has drastically increased [5].

**Cambodia:** Almost all Cham refugees to Cambodia had been Muslims or were converted to Islam later. This is confirmed by the presence of Bani's medieval manuscripts among the Cambodian Cham. Naturally, the Chams who fled from the Vietnamese conquerors to Cambodia, became close with Malays there thanks to their common culture,

language and religion. The authorities of Cambodia gradually perceived the two peoples as one whole and, in the censuses, often included the Chams in the ethnonym “Malays” [10, 11].

According to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), there are 800,000 of Muslims in Cambodia, that is 5% of the country’s population. Obviously, the number includes the Malays, Indian Muslims and other communities.

In Cambodia, the Cham closely communicated with Malays, their kindred and co-religionists, entered into mixed marriages, therefore the Malay language and Malay culture were widely spread among the Cham. Currently, the country’s authorities do not distinguish between local Malays and Chams. Chams live in separate villages adjacent to Khmer ones. In cities, they live compactly, in separate quarters and suburbs. Even in Phnom Penh, Chams live mainly in the northern part of the city on the so-called “kilometres”: 1st km, 2nd km, 5th km, etc. Chams retain their traditional appearance: women grow long hair, cover it with a Muslim scarf, and often wear national dress; men wear sarongs, a Malay cap and often leave behind a mustache or beard. The traditional activities of the Cham are jewelry, blacksmithing, sculpture, boat making, silk weaving, and clothing trade. Although the Muslim Cham have lived side by side with Buddhists for centuries, due to the Sharia prohibition of marriages with non-Muslims, they have retained their inherent physical characteristics.

All Chams speak Cham and Khmer languages, many also speak Malay. In madrasahs (Muslim schools), children learn the Western Cham based on the Arabic alphabet. It should be noted that Champa’s script, akhar thrah, originated from Sanskrit (Pallavi graphics). It was on the traditional script that a large number of epigraphic inscriptions of Champa were made and literary works, religious Hindu texts, historical chronicles, etc. were written. Currently, this traditional script is used only by the Cham of Central Vietnam (Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan provinces), while in the southern provinces of Vietnam, the Cham (Western Cham) use Arabic script, learn Arabic language and practice Islam.

In the second half of the 19th century, some groups of the Cham, Malays and the Jawakun (descendants from mixed marriages between Malays and Khmer women), moved from Cambodia to South Vietnam after the defeat of the Tuon Seit uprising. All of them professed the Islam of the Shafi’i mazhab, like their descendants, currently living in the Mekong Delta (Southern Vietnam). They use an adapted form of the Arabic-derived Jawi script as the Malays did formerly.

For higher-level Islamic education, the community looked toward Patani (now in southern Thailand) and Kota Bharu (in Kelantan, Malaysia). The latter was already a center of religious education for students from all over Southeast Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century. Kelantan called “little Makkah” is still the most important destination of Cham religious students.

Although the Cham of Cambodia profess Shafi’i Islam, there is a separate group of “Jahed”, whose representatives are not orthodox Muslims and in some ways are similar to the Cham-Bani in Vietnam. Among them, the Cham manuscripts of the Bani are still preserved. However, the existence of thirty-five Cham Jahed villages in the modern Cambodia proves that not all Chams in Cambodia experienced the same degree of Malay influence. The Jahed, who are not Sunnis, pray only on Friday and are considered the

preservers of the Cham traditional culture, as only they can still read and write in the classical Cham script. Most of these Cham live in the province of Udong, where the capital of Cambodia was once located.

Some researchers believe that the modern Jahed in Udong are descendants of this group of noble Cham. It was here that the Cham royal family and part of the aristocracy fled after the submission of Panduranga by Vietnamese troops in 1692. Indeed, the Cham in Udong still preserve knowledge of the Champa script and manuscripts that their ancestors apparently brought with them from Panduranga. On the other hand, there were many later waves of Cham emigration to Cambodia (and other countries), and Udong could become a center for the preservation of the traditional culture of the destroyed Cham state, including its religious syncretism.

Nevertheless, under the influence of Islam, a religious transformation of the Jahed (also so-called “Udong”) also took place. However, it did not lead to the full acceptance of Islamic norms, given the significant deviations from the basic dogmas of the faith among modern Jahed. Interestingly, nowadays they are called “Chams 3/three”: this means that the Jahed consider it sufficient to pray three times a day, and only on Fridays instead of the five prayers daily required for all Muslims. Therefore, “Chams 5/five” means the orthodox Muslims.

A specific feature of the Cham society in general is that the Cham still retain elements of matrilineal relations, and the woman still occupies a central place in the Cham family. For example, even among the Cham Muslims of the Mekong delta, a husband goes to live at his wife’s house after the marriage (post-marital residence pattern). It’s also commented by some Chams as “In this we differ from the Vietnamese”.

### 3.2 The Cambodian Cham in Early 1970s

There is no consensus regarding the number of Chams in Cambodia before 1975. According to estimates on the families number based on the data from mosques, Cambodian Chams (Khmer Islam) numbered 700,000 in the country and in emigration. According to the Muslims of Thailand, their co-religionists in Cambodia were about 500 thousand. The Khmers themselves considered the Cham population to be much smaller: 150 thousand people. The Rev. Ponchaud named 250,000 (in 1975). According to Elizabeth Becker, a former Washington Post correspondent in Phnom Penh, “Sihanouk had tried to integrate the Chams into Khmer society, but both the Cham and the Khmer disapproved. The Chams did not want to lose their identity or disobey their faith as integration might require. The Khmer were sufficiently racist to prefer the Chams to keep a lowly distance” [1].

In early 1970s, during the civil war, a part of the Cham population sympathized with the Khmer Rouge. They hoped that the communists would change the Cambodia’s latent discrimination policy. Many Chams who were believed to be the best warriors in the country supported and were in the ranks of the Khmer Rouge until 1973, when the communists declared that the Cham’s particular way of life was counter-revolutionary. Then the authorities tried to attract the Cham sending army officers to them and even strengthening the Cham’s relations with the Muslim countries of the Southeast Asia and Middle East.

It should be recalled about the FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Nations), which was created in the late 1960s on the territory of South Vietnam and Cambodia by leaders of several national minorities. This organization was headed by the most educated and active Chams, Jaray, Raglai, Koho, Bana, who dreamed of autonomy (and even independence) of the mountain regions (Tay Nguyen), which had been once part of Champa. Their support of the Khmer Rouge in the fight against the Sihanouk authorities can be partly explained by these aspirations. Gradually, a split occurred in the movement, not without the participation of the French and American special services. The latter began to control FULRO and continued to provide financial and other assistance to the Front's detachments. They were operating in the border territory of Vietnam until the early 1980s, when many FULRO members laid down their arms and returned to civilian life. A certain role in the process was played by the spread of Protestantism in the Tay Nguyen plateau (the south-west region of Vietnam), which has an extensive border with Cambodia.

### **3.3 The Genocide of the Cham Under the Khmer Rouge Regime (1975–1979)**

There is no disagreement about the deadly situation of the Cham during this period: they were subjected to the most severe repressions and genocide.

The Khmer Rouge decreed: “There is one Kampuchean revolution. In Kampuchea there is one nation, and one language, the Khmer language. From now on the various nationalities do not exist any longer in Kampuchea. Therefore, Cham individuals must change their names to Khmer names. The Cham mentality [Cham nationality, language, costume, habits and religion] are abolished. Those who do not abide by this order will reap all consequences” [3].

According to research fulfilled by human rights investigators, in many areas Cham communities were abolished and dispersed among the Khmer population, sometimes only 2–3 families remained in a commune. The leaders of Cham communities and Muslim clergy were executed. Even all the hajji and the madrasah teachers were killed. Cham women were forced to cut their hair short, men were forbidden to wear their traditional caps and sarongs. Almost all of the mosques were destroyed. According to the hakim at Chaing Chamres, a suburb of Phnom Penh, of 113 mosques that existed in the beginning 1975, only 20 remained. Muslim cemeteries were desecrated and it was forbidden to bury the dead facing Mecca. All Qurans were collected and burned. Many Cham were forced to eat pork and raise pigs, and those who refused were killed [2].

In many areas, it was forbidden to speak Cham language. Naturally, many Cham communities resisted such repressions and the violent Khmerization. After Muslim Chams revolted in 1975, 150,000 Cham were deported from the eastern zone (Mekong delta) and dispersed across the northern and northwest zones. In November 1975, an official complained of his inability to implement “the dispersal strategy”...Northern officials rejected the 50,000 Cham deportees, denouncing “enemies” such as “Islamic people” [4].

Since the Cham were declared enemies of the regime - the Khmers Rouge destroyed entire Cham villages. Those who fled to Thailand reported that the Cham villages Trea and Kroch Chhmar in Kompong Cham province had been completely slaughtered. Mat Le reported massacres at Koh Thas and Svey Klieng villages in the same province.

Also in Kompong Cham, tens of thousands of Cham were killed in the Kong Meas and Kompong Siem districts. In 1980, a survivor told a Japanese journalist that 2,000 people of 500 families were killed in one evening in April 1978 (Khach So community, Peam Chikang village, Kompong Cham province). Thousands of corpses were dumped in the Stung Trang ravine. Other massacres in the provinces of Kratie, Pursat and Kompong Chhnang were reported at the Phnom Penh tribunal in 1979. In August 1979, only 60 of 1,200 Cham families who had lived in the Chruai Changvar area near Phnom Penh before 1975 returned home [3].

An example of the Khmer Rouge's savagery is the following episode, which can be put on a par with the Hitlerites' crimes.

In early 1977, in the Stung Trang area of the Mekong (Eastern Zone), where a large number of Chams had been deported, the false rumours that Malaysia offered oil in exchange for Chams were spreading. For several days, the Khmers sent trucks, ostensibly to deport Chams to Battambang or Malaysia. Everyone who got into the trucks was taken to the Chamkar Andong rubber plantation<sup>2</sup> and exterminated there. In Speu village, only 43 of 150 Cham families who arrived there in 1975, survived till 1979 [9].

"In the Kong Meas district, Kompong Cham province, situated on the banks of the Mekong, there were about 12,000 Moslem families living in the hamlets of Svai Ta Hen, Bach So, Anh Long Sor and Ang korban. Some of the inhabitants of these hamlets were scattered to other areas and disappeared. Others, on 1 August 1978, were beaten to death and thrown into the river. The only survivor was a man named Chuk. Many Moslems lived in the KompongSiem district. In all, there were nearly a thousand families. All of them perished. Children from Moslem families in the Kong Meas district were seized and thrown into disused wells. The Pol Potists threw straw over these unfortunate children, poured petrol on it and set it alight. In March 1977, the Pol Potists seized babies in the Kompong Siem district, put them in plastic or jute bags and hung them from the branches of trees, giving them neither food nor drink. The babies struggled in the bags until they died. There were other mass executions of Moslems, executions of a blatantly genocidal nature, at various places in the provinces of Kompong Cham, Kompong Chhnang, Pothisat, Kampot and Kompong Thorn...." [9].

## 4 Conclusions

In general, according to the lowest estimates, from 1975 to 1979 in Democratic Kampuchea, 100,000 Cham and Malays (Khmer Islam) died, that is, about 40% (from 250,000 people at the beginning of 1975). In 1975, the Khmer Rouge expelled more than 100,000 Vietnamese citizens from the country, and of those who remained there, 10 thousand were killed. More than half of the Chinese minority, a quarter of a million people, died in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979. Thais, Lao and other minorities were also subjected to repression.

"One survey taken among the victims shows that they estimate the number of surviving Moslems at 200,000 as compared to the previous total of 700,000. This means that at least 450,000 Moslems have perished. We cannot verify the accuracy of the figures

<sup>2</sup> Ta Sat, a Khmer Rouge, was in charge of the rubber plantation in Chamkar Andong (Genocide Studies Program. <https://gsp.yale.edu/cgp/cbio/y05260>).

for the Moslem population before 1975, but the estimate that two thirds of the Moslem population was massacred by the Pol Potists can be taken as reliable” [6].

The attempts of some Western experts to refute the genocide under the Pol Pot regime seem to be indefensible and immoral. Pol Pot’s regime is guilty of the genocide of the Cham and Malays (“Khmer Islam”) on religious and ethnic grounds, as well as other peoples (on the basis of ethnicity), not to mention the mass extermination of Khmers themselves. However, the topic of the long-term support of China, the United States and their allies for the Khmer Rouge deserves a separate consideration. The Khmer Rouge policy towards the country’s national minorities was condemned by the tribunal in 1979, the UN-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the Cham, along with the Malays, are the ethnic and religious minority most affected by the genocide. Nowadays, various conflicts could be prevented promoting the participation of civil society and inclusive policy concerning ethnic and other minorities, while the political will and adequate resources are pre-conditions for timely and relevant reactions to crises.

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