TY - JOUR

T1 - Totalitarian corruption: theory and practice

AU - Иванов, Андрей Евгеньевич

PY - 2024/12/7

Y1 - 2024/12/7

N2 - PurposeThe paper introduces a new typology of agency corruption models, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the ‘ideal’ preferences of Society that contains well-known models, bureaucratic and efficient corruption, and new ones: quasi- and totalitarian corruption. Design/methodologyThe paper is developing the methodology of corruption models’ classification that based on modelling of Society’s preference relation and proving whether the principal’s (agent’s) preferences are different from it (principal’s mala fides) or not (bona fides). In the research, each paper published in JoPP in 2018-2019 was examined, and all considered corruption cases were classified in the framework of the suggested typology included two papers where totalitarian corruption’s assumptions (principal and agent are mala fide and have the same preferences) were true. FindingsThe paper gives the methodology of corruption cases classification, introduces the totalitarian corruption model in the mainstream of the corruption theory, and supplies a practical example of it.Practical implicationsThe research suggests the practical algorithm of corruption cases classification that was applied to the JoPP publications and the case where the principal made agents award contracts to the predefined supplier at inflated price.Originality/valueThe study is the first work that introduces a new totalitarian corruption model, establishes its connection with the former research, and gives an example how policy implications can be obtained in this case.

AB - PurposeThe paper introduces a new typology of agency corruption models, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the ‘ideal’ preferences of Society that contains well-known models, bureaucratic and efficient corruption, and new ones: quasi- and totalitarian corruption. Design/methodologyThe paper is developing the methodology of corruption models’ classification that based on modelling of Society’s preference relation and proving whether the principal’s (agent’s) preferences are different from it (principal’s mala fides) or not (bona fides). In the research, each paper published in JoPP in 2018-2019 was examined, and all considered corruption cases were classified in the framework of the suggested typology included two papers where totalitarian corruption’s assumptions (principal and agent are mala fide and have the same preferences) were true. FindingsThe paper gives the methodology of corruption cases classification, introduces the totalitarian corruption model in the mainstream of the corruption theory, and supplies a practical example of it.Practical implicationsThe research suggests the practical algorithm of corruption cases classification that was applied to the JoPP publications and the case where the principal made agents award contracts to the predefined supplier at inflated price.Originality/valueThe study is the first work that introduces a new totalitarian corruption model, establishes its connection with the former research, and gives an example how policy implications can be obtained in this case.

KW - agency model; corruption; typology; totalitarian corruption; hospital; cleaning; public procurement; English auction; collusion

M3 - статья

JO - Journal of Public Procurement

JF - Journal of Public Procurement

SN - 1535-0118

ER -