Purpose
The paper introduces a new typology of agency corruption models, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the ‘ideal’ preferences of Society that contains well-known models, bureaucratic and efficient corruption, and new ones: quasi- and totalitarian corruption.
Design/methodology
The paper is developing the methodology of corruption models’ classification that based on modelling of Society’s preference relation and proving whether the principal’s (agent’s) preferences are different from it (principal’s mala fides) or not (bona fides). In the research, each paper published in JoPP in 2018-2019 was examined, and all considered corruption cases were classified in the framework of the suggested typology included two papers where totalitarian corruption’s assumptions (principal and agent are mala fide and have the same preferences) were true.
Findings
The paper gives the methodology of corruption cases classification, introduces the totalitarian corruption model in the mainstream of the corruption theory, and supplies a practical example of it.
Practical implications
The research suggests the practical algorithm of corruption cases classification that was applied to the JoPP publications and the case where the principal made agents award contracts to the predefined supplier at inflated price.
Originality/value
The study is the first work that introduces a new totalitarian corruption model, establishes its connection with the former research, and gives an example how policy implications can be obtained in this case.