In this paper we extend the framework of the evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions to address the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players who can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), i.e., pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many other.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)915-944
Number of pages30
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2017

Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

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