Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment

Research outputpeer-review

Abstract

We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGAMES IN MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGES ZACCOUR
EditorsPO Pineau, S Sigue, S Taboubi
PublisherSpringer
Pages381-396
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-19106-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameInternational Series in Operations Research and Management Science
Volume280
ISSN (Print)0884-8289
ISSN (Electronic)2214-7934

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Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2020). Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. In PO. Pineau, S. Sigue, & S. Taboubi (Eds.), GAMES IN MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGES ZACCOUR (pp. 381-396). (International Series in Operations Research and Management Science; Vol. 280). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21