Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research › peer-review
Personal Identity and False Memories. / Разеев, Данил Николаевич.
Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2020 Collocated Workshops - ASYDE, CIFMA, and CoSim-CPS, 2020, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Loek Cleophas; Mieke Massink. Springer : Springer Nature, 2021. p. 100-107 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 12524 LNCS).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research › peer-review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Personal Identity and False Memories
AU - Разеев, Данил Николаевич
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - In current philosophy of mind, there are two main approaches to the question of personal identity. The first one claims that personal identity is based on our memory and, for several decades, has been known as a psychological approach to the problem. The second one has been called an animalistic approach and considers personal identity as a biological property of human beings or as a specific feature of our bodily continuity. The experiment on creating false memories in mice brains, recently conducted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), seems to shed new light on the question of personal identity, taking into account the fact that the mouse brain is morphologically quite similar to our brain. The purpose of my paper is to consider whether the above-mentioned experiment supports one of the approaches: the psychological or the animalistic. Using the conceptual instrumentarium of contemporary analytic philosophy and cognitive phenomenology, I differentiate between strong and weak false memories and I argue that we cannot consider the conducted experiment to have created false memories in the strong sense. I develop a thought experiment showing what it would be like to experience an implanted (weak) false memory in the human brain. I conclude that there is not and cannot be an experience of the (strong) false memory.
AB - In current philosophy of mind, there are two main approaches to the question of personal identity. The first one claims that personal identity is based on our memory and, for several decades, has been known as a psychological approach to the problem. The second one has been called an animalistic approach and considers personal identity as a biological property of human beings or as a specific feature of our bodily continuity. The experiment on creating false memories in mice brains, recently conducted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), seems to shed new light on the question of personal identity, taking into account the fact that the mouse brain is morphologically quite similar to our brain. The purpose of my paper is to consider whether the above-mentioned experiment supports one of the approaches: the psychological or the animalistic. Using the conceptual instrumentarium of contemporary analytic philosophy and cognitive phenomenology, I differentiate between strong and weak false memories and I argue that we cannot consider the conducted experiment to have created false memories in the strong sense. I develop a thought experiment showing what it would be like to experience an implanted (weak) false memory in the human brain. I conclude that there is not and cannot be an experience of the (strong) false memory.
KW - Personal identity False memory Animalism
KW - Animalism
KW - False memory
KW - Personal identity
KW - CONSTRUCT
KW - SELF
KW - NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
KW - PSYCHOLOGY
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85101535757&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/0542f097-4cde-397b-9f5c-528b6d5b315f/
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-67220-1_8
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-67220-1_8
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85101535757
SN - 978-3-030-67219-5
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 100
EP - 107
BT - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2020 Collocated Workshops - ASYDE, CIFMA, and CoSim-CPS, 2020, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Cleophas, Loek
A2 - Massink, Mieke
PB - Springer Nature
CY - Springer
T2 - 2nd International Workshop on Automated and Verifiable Software System Development, ASYDE 2020, 2nd International Workshop on Cognition: Interdisciplinary Foundations, Models and Applications, CIFMA 2020 and 4th International Workshop on Formal Co-Simulation of Cyber-Physical Systems, CoSim-CPS 2020 collocated with the 18th International Conference on Software Engineering and Formal Methods, SEFM 2020
Y2 - 14 September 2020 through 15 September 2020
ER -
ID: 74787767