On Stability of Coalition Structures with Constraints on Players' Deviations in a Simple Game

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In this paper we give a new definition of stability of a coalition structure in cooperative game and it is called stable with constraints on players' deviations. We prove that if coalition structure is stable, then it is stable with constraints on players' deviations. An example of a simple game with n players is represented in this paper to illustrate the difference with the previous definition.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)499-503
Number of pages5
JournalПроцессы управления и устойчивость
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2019
EventThe L Annual International Scientific Conference on Control Processes and Stability (CPS'2019) - Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation
Duration: 8 Apr 201912 Apr 2019


  • coalition structure
  • Shapley value

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