On a Nonrenewable Resource Extraction Game Played by Asymmetric Firms

S. Kostyunin, A. Palestini, E. Shevkoplyas

Research output

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

© 2013, Springer Science+Business Media New York. A differential game of extraction of a nonrenewable resource is taken into account, where two firms compete over time and their two terminal times of extraction are two different random variables. The winning firm will be the only one remaining in the game after the first one retires. We explicitly compute the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations of the model and solve them in an asymmetric game with logarithmic payoff structure and linear state dynamics.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)660-673
JournalJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Fingerprint

Game
Resources
Random variables
Differential Games
Logarithmic
Random variable
Industry
Business
Resource extraction
Non-renewable resources
Asymmetric firms
Model
Differential games

Cite this

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