Standard

Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games. / Petrosjan, Leon A.

Game theory and applications. Vol. 7 Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2001. p. 121–130.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in an anthology › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Petrosjan, LA 2001, Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games. in Game theory and applications. vol. 7, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., pp. 121–130. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258353069_Nash_equilibria_refinements_for_multistage_and_repeated_games>

APA

Petrosjan, L. A. (2001). Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games. In Game theory and applications (Vol. 7, pp. 121–130). Nova Science Publishers, Inc.. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258353069_Nash_equilibria_refinements_for_multistage_and_repeated_games

Vancouver

Petrosjan LA. Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games. In Game theory and applications. Vol. 7. Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2001. p. 121–130

Author

Petrosjan, Leon A. / Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games. Game theory and applications. Vol. 7 Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2001. pp. 121–130

BibTeX

@inbook{473b33a55c3642648e3f83a1c6602808,
title = "Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games",
abstract = "Multistage game G with simultanous games Γ(·) played on each stage is considered. The definition of outcome, path in tree-graph and history are introduced.The new class of Nash Solutions based on the possibilities of punishment for the deviation on first stages of G are defined. It is shown that the outcomes under these solutions dominate the classical subgame perfect Nash outcomes. For infinite multistage games G the regularization procedure is introduced which enables to construct a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition-proof) in such class of games.",
author = "Petrosjan, {Leon A.}",
year = "2001",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "121–130",
booktitle = "Game theory and applications",
publisher = "Nova Science Publishers, Inc.",
address = "United States",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Nash equilibria refinements for multistage and repeated games

AU - Petrosjan, Leon A.

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - Multistage game G with simultanous games Γ(·) played on each stage is considered. The definition of outcome, path in tree-graph and history are introduced.The new class of Nash Solutions based on the possibilities of punishment for the deviation on first stages of G are defined. It is shown that the outcomes under these solutions dominate the classical subgame perfect Nash outcomes. For infinite multistage games G the regularization procedure is introduced which enables to construct a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition-proof) in such class of games.

AB - Multistage game G with simultanous games Γ(·) played on each stage is considered. The definition of outcome, path in tree-graph and history are introduced.The new class of Nash Solutions based on the possibilities of punishment for the deviation on first stages of G are defined. It is shown that the outcomes under these solutions dominate the classical subgame perfect Nash outcomes. For infinite multistage games G the regularization procedure is introduced which enables to construct a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition-proof) in such class of games.

UR - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258353069_Nash_equilibria_refinements_for_multistage_and_repeated_games

UR - https://dspace.spbu.ru/handle/11701/1792

M3 - Article in an anthology

VL - 7

SP - 121

EP - 130

BT - Game theory and applications

PB - Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

ER -

ID: 4607627