Multistage voting model with alternative elimination

Oleg A. Malafeyev, Denis Rylow, Irina Zaitseva, Anna Ermakova, Dmitry Shlaev

Research output

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the alternative is less than a threshold, it gets eliminated from the game. A special subclass of repeated games that always stop after a finite number of stages is considered. Threshold updating rule is proposed. A computer simulation is used to illustrate two properties of these voting games.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Conference of Numerical Analysis and Applied Mathematics, ICNAAM 2017
EditorsCharalambos Tsitouras, Theodore Simos
PublisherAmerican Institute of Physics
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9780735416901
ISBN (Print)9780735416901
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jul 2018
EventInternational Conference of Numerical Analysis and Applied Mathematics (ICNAAM) - Thessaloniki
Duration: 25 Sep 201730 Sep 2017

Publication series

NameAIP Conference Proceedings
PublisherAmerican Institute of Physics
Volume1978
ISSN (Print)0094-243X

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference of Numerical Analysis and Applied Mathematics (ICNAAM)
CountryGreece
CityThessaloniki
Period25/09/1730/09/17

Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

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