Abstract

Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.

Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.

We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X
EditorsLA Petrosyan, NA Zenkevich
PublisherИздательство Санкт-Петербургского университета
Pages100-128
Number of pages29
Volume10
ISBN (Print)*****************
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Event10th International Conference on Game Theory and Management (GMT2016) - St Petersburg
Duration: 7 Jul 20169 Jul 2016

Publication series

NameContributions to Game Theory and Management
PublisherST PETERSBURG UNIV GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT
Volume10
ISSN (Print)2310-2608

Conference

Conference10th International Conference on Game Theory and Management (GMT2016)
CitySt Petersburg
Period7/07/169/07/16

Cite this

Kumacheva, S. S., Gubar, E. A., Zhitkova, E. M., Kurnosykh, Z., & Skovorodina, T. (2017). Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach. In LA. Petrosyan, & NA. Zenkevich (Eds.), CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X (Vol. 10, pp. 100-128). (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. 10). Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета.
Kumacheva, Suriya Sh. ; Gubar, Elena A. ; Zhitkova, Ekaterina M. ; Kurnosykh, Zlata ; Skovorodina, Tatiana. / Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers : Evolutionary Approach. CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X. editor / LA Petrosyan ; NA Zenkevich. Vol. 10 Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета, 2017. pp. 100-128 (Contributions to Game Theory and Management).
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title = "Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach",
abstract = "Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.",
keywords = "tax audit, tax evasion, total tax revenue, information spreading, evolutionary game on networks, TAX COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT, SOCIETY, EVASION",
author = "Kumacheva, {Suriya Sh.} and Gubar, {Elena A.} and Zhitkova, {Ekaterina M.} and Zlata Kurnosykh and Tatiana Skovorodina",
year = "2017",
language = "Английский",
isbn = "*****************",
volume = "10",
series = "Contributions to Game Theory and Management",
publisher = "Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета",
pages = "100--128",
editor = "LA Petrosyan and NA Zenkevich",
booktitle = "CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X",
address = "Российская Федерация",

}

Kumacheva, SS, Gubar, EA, Zhitkova, EM, Kurnosykh, Z & Skovorodina, T 2017, Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach. in LA Petrosyan & NA Zenkevich (eds), CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X. vol. 10, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. 10, Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета, pp. 100-128, St Petersburg, 7/07/16.

Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers : Evolutionary Approach. / Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.; Gubar, Elena A.; Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.; Kurnosykh, Zlata; Skovorodina, Tatiana.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X. ed. / LA Petrosyan; NA Zenkevich. Vol. 10 Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета, 2017. p. 100-128 (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. 10).

Research outputpeer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers

T2 - Evolutionary Approach

AU - Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.

AU - Gubar, Elena A.

AU - Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.

AU - Kurnosykh, Zlata

AU - Skovorodina, Tatiana

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.

AB - Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.

KW - tax audit

KW - tax evasion

KW - total tax revenue

KW - information spreading

KW - evolutionary game on networks

KW - TAX COMPLIANCE

KW - ENFORCEMENT

KW - SOCIETY

KW - EVASION

M3 - статья в сборнике материалов конференции

SN - *****************

VL - 10

T3 - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SP - 100

EP - 128

BT - CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X

A2 - Petrosyan, LA

A2 - Zenkevich, NA

PB - Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета

ER -

Kumacheva SS, Gubar EA, Zhitkova EM, Kurnosykh Z, Skovorodina T. Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach. In Petrosyan LA, Zenkevich NA, editors, CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X. Vol. 10. Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета. 2017. p. 100-128. (Contributions to Game Theory and Management).