TY - JOUR

T1 - Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers: Bayesian Approach

AU - Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.

AU - Tomilina, Galina A.

N1 - Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Galina A. Tomilina, “Information collecting and dissemination in the network of taxpayers: Bayesian approach”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 14 (2021), 236–256

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - The current research is based on the assumption that the result of tax inspections is not only collection of taxes and fines. The information about audited taxpayers is also collected and helps to renew a priori knowledge of each agent's evasion propensity and obtain new a posteriori estimate of this propensity. In the beginning of the following tax period the fiscal authority can correct auditing strategy using updated information on every taxpayer. Each inspection is considered as a repeated game, in which the choice of agents to audit is associated with their revealed tendency to evade. Taxpayers also renew the information on the number of inspected neighbors using their social connections, represented by networks of various configurations, and estimate the probability of auditing before the next tax period. Thus, the application of the Bayesian approach to the process of collecting and disseminating information in the network of taxpayers allows to optimize the audit scheme, reducing unnecessary expenses of tax authority and eventually increasing net tax revenue. To illustrate the application of the approach described above to the indicated problem, numerical simulation and scenario analysis were carried out.

AB - The current research is based on the assumption that the result of tax inspections is not only collection of taxes and fines. The information about audited taxpayers is also collected and helps to renew a priori knowledge of each agent's evasion propensity and obtain new a posteriori estimate of this propensity. In the beginning of the following tax period the fiscal authority can correct auditing strategy using updated information on every taxpayer. Each inspection is considered as a repeated game, in which the choice of agents to audit is associated with their revealed tendency to evade. Taxpayers also renew the information on the number of inspected neighbors using their social connections, represented by networks of various configurations, and estimate the probability of auditing before the next tax period. Thus, the application of the Bayesian approach to the process of collecting and disseminating information in the network of taxpayers allows to optimize the audit scheme, reducing unnecessary expenses of tax authority and eventually increasing net tax revenue. To illustrate the application of the approach described above to the indicated problem, numerical simulation and scenario analysis were carried out.

KW - tax control

KW - Tax evasions

KW - risk propensity

KW - structured network

KW - a posteriori information

KW - Bayesian approach

UR - http://www.mathnet.ru/php/archive.phtml?wshow=paper&jrnid=cgtm&paperid=400&option_lang=eng

M3 - Article

VL - 14

SP - 236

EP - 256

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -