Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof

Research outputpeer-review

Abstract

Social welfare orderings for different scales of individual utility measurement in distinct population subgroups are studied. In Khmelnitskaya and Weymark
(2000), employing the continuous version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, it was
shown that for combinations of independent subgroups scales every corresponding
social welfare ordering depends on the utilities of only one of the subgroups and is
determined in accordance with the scale type proper to this dictatorial subgroup. In
this article we introduce an alternative completely self-contained proof based on the study of the structure of level surfaces of a social welfare function which provides a real-valued representation of the social welfare ordering.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCollective decision making: views from social choice and game theory, A. van Deemen and A. Rusinowska (eds.). Theory and Decision Library C
Editors A. van Deemen, A. Rusinowska
PublisherSpringer
Pages111-123
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-02864-9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameTheory and Decision Library C
PublisherSpringer
Volume43

Cite this

Khmelnitskaya, A. B. (2010). Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof. In A. van Deemen, & A. Rusinowska (Eds.), Collective decision making: views from social choice and game theory, A. van Deemen and A. Rusinowska (eds.). Theory and Decision Library C (pp. 111-123). (Theory and Decision Library C; Vol. 43). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_8