Equilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearch

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

The goal of the paper is to demonstrate possibilities of collaborative transportation network to minimize total travel time of the network users. Cooperative and competitive traffic flow assignment systems in case of m ≥ 2 navigation providers (Navigators) are compared. Each Navigator provides travel guidance for its customers (users) on the non-general topology network of parallel links. In both cases the main goals of Navigators are to minimize travel time of their users but the behavioral strategies are different. In competitive case the behavioral strategy of each Navigator is to minimize travel time of traffic flow of its navigation service users while in cooperative case – to minimize travel time of overall traffic flow. Competitive routing is formalized mathematically as a non-zero sum game and cooperative routing is formulated as an optimization problem. It is demonstrated that Nash equilibrium in the navigation game appears to be not Pareto optimal. Eventually it is shown that cooperative routing sys
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEquilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages641-648
StatePublished - 2014

Keywords

  • competitive routing
  • cooperative routing
  • traffic flow assignment
  • Wardrop equilibrium
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Pareto optimality

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