Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Research output

Abstract

In this chapter, the optimization by cartels that restricts outputs to enhance their joint profit is examined. In particular, we consider oligopolies in which firms agree to form a cartel to restrain output and enhance their profits. Some firms have cost disadvantages that force them to become dormant partners. In Sect. 7.1 a dynamic oligopoly in which there are cost differentials among firms is presented. Pareto optimal output path, imputation schemes, profit sharing arrangements, and time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent solution are derived for a dormant firm cartel in Sect. 7.2. An illustration is shown in the following section. The case when the planning horizon becomes infinite is analyzed in Sect. 7.4, including an illustration with an explicit solution following in the subsequent section.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Subtitle of host publicationFoundations and Applications
PublisherBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Pages177-202
Number of pages26
Edition9780817682613
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012

Publication series

NameStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
Number9780817682613
ISSN (Print)2363-8516
ISSN (Electronic)2363-8524

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Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2012). Dynamically stable dormant firm cartel. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (9780817682613 ed., pp. 177-202). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; No. 9780817682613). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_7