Dynamically stable cost-saving joint venture

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Research output

Abstract

In this chapter, we consider a common economic activity involving cooperative optimization—joint venture. However, it is often observed that after a certain time of cooperation some firms in a joint venture may gain sufficient skills and technology that they would do better by breaking away from the joint operation. Analysis on time (optimal-trajectory subgame) consistent joint ventures are presented in the following sections.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Subtitle of host publicationFoundations and Applications
PublisherBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Pages111-146
Number of pages36
Edition9780817682613
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012

Publication series

NameStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
Number9780817682613
ISSN (Print)2363-8516
ISSN (Electronic)2363-8524

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Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2012). Dynamically stable cost-saving joint venture. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (9780817682613 ed., pp. 111-146). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications; No. 9780817682613). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0_5