Cooperative Dynamic Games with Control Lags

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Research output

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Controls with lags are control strategies with prolonged effects lasting for more than one stage of the game after the controls had been executed. Lags in controls yielding adverse effects often make the negative impacts more significant. Cooperation provides an effective means to alleviate the problem and obtains an optimal solution. This paper extends the existing paradigm in cooperative dynamic games by allowing the existence of controls with lag effects on the players’ payoffs in subsequent stages. A novel dynamic optimization theorem with control lags is developed to derive the Pareto optimal cooperative controls. Subgame consistent solutions are derived to ensure sustainable cooperation. In particular, subgame consistency guarantees that the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset will remain effective throughout the game and, hence, there is no incentive for any player to deviate from cooperation scheme. A procedure for imputation distribution is provided to formulate a dynamically stable cooperative scheme under control lags. An application in cooperative environmental management is presented. This is the first time that cooperative dynamic games with control lags are studied.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)550-567
JournalDynamic Games and Applications
Volume9
Issue number2
Early online date31 May 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2019

Fingerprint

Dynamic Games
Cooperative Game
Optimization Theorems
Optimality Principle
Game
Environmental Management
Cooperative Control
Dynamic Optimization
Imputation
Incentives
Environmental management
Control Strategy
Optimal Control
Optimal Solution
Paradigm

Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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Cooperative Dynamic Games with Control Lags. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

In: Dynamic Games and Applications, Vol. 9, No. 2, 06.2019, p. 550-567.

Research output

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