Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains

Nikolay A. Zenkevich, Irina Berezinets, Natalia Nikolchenko, Alina Rucheva

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Subtitle of host publicationFoundations and Applications
PublisherBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Pages303-336
Number of pages34
DOIs
StatePublished - 2019

Publication series

NameStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (Print)2363-8516
ISSN (Electronic)2363-8524

Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Applied Mathematics

Keywords

  • Buyback contract
  • Conditionally coordinating contracts
  • Coordinating contracts
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Pareto-optimal solution
  • Sales rebate contract
  • Supply chain coordination

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