Standard

Competition in the Logistics Market. / Bure, V.M.; Sergeeva, A.A.

In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. 5, 2012, p. 51-60.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Bure, VM & Sergeeva, AA 2012, 'Competition in the Logistics Market', Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. 5, pp. 51-60.

APA

Bure, V. M., & Sergeeva, A. A. (2012). Competition in the Logistics Market. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 5, 51-60.

Vancouver

Bure VM, Sergeeva AA. Competition in the Logistics Market. Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2012;5:51-60.

Author

Bure, V.M. ; Sergeeva, A.A. / Competition in the Logistics Market. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2012 ; Vol. 5. pp. 51-60.

BibTeX

@article{9f9b531df4424c8c84d61d1d76e18f9f,
title = "Competition in the Logistics Market",
abstract = "We consider the cases of different number of logistics firms in the market which provide service for customers. The game-theoretic model of choosing order service is constructed. The model is a n-person game with perfect information where clients defined as players. We find equilibrium strategies for clients. The existence of these equilibria is proved.",
author = "V.M. Bure and A.A. Sergeeva",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
volume = "5",
pages = "51--60",
journal = "Contributions to Game Theory and Management",
issn = "2310-2608",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition in the Logistics Market

AU - Bure, V.M.

AU - Sergeeva, A.A.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - We consider the cases of different number of logistics firms in the market which provide service for customers. The game-theoretic model of choosing order service is constructed. The model is a n-person game with perfect information where clients defined as players. We find equilibrium strategies for clients. The existence of these equilibria is proved.

AB - We consider the cases of different number of logistics firms in the market which provide service for customers. The game-theoretic model of choosing order service is constructed. The model is a n-person game with perfect information where clients defined as players. We find equilibrium strategies for clients. The existence of these equilibria is proved.

UR - https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=21472217

M3 - Article

VL - 5

SP - 51

EP - 60

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -

ID: 76937273