Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of Cross-Generational Environmental Commons

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Different entry and exit times and overlapping generations of players are common in real-life game situations. In addition, durable strategies which have effects over a period of time are no less common than nondurable strategies which have only one-shot effects. This paper develops a new class of dynamic games which contains durable strategies with asynchronous players' horizons. The optimization techniques for solving asynchronous horizons durable strategies control are derived. Noncooperative game equilibria and cooperative optimal solution are presented. An asynchronous horizons durable strategies dynamic environmental game is provided to analyze the seemingly catastrophe-bound environmental degradation problem. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in cross-generational exploitation of environmental commons is calibrated. A cooperative solution with a dynamically stable compensatory scheme is presented to alleviate the problem.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
DOIs
StateE-pub ahead of print - 10 Sep 2021

Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Business and International Management
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Keywords

  • asynchronous horizons
  • Durable strategies
  • dynamic games
  • environmental commons

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