Anti-jamming strategies: a stochastic game approach

A. Garnaev, W. Trappe

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearch

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Due to their shared and open-access design, wireless networks are very vulnerable to many malicious attacks, ranging from passive eavesdropping to active interfering. In this paper, using stochastic game modeling we study anti-jamming strategies and their effectiveness against two types of interference attacks: (i) a random jammer, where the malicious user combines jamming modes with sleep modes; and (ii) a sophisticated jammer, where the malicious user uses the network for a two-fold purpose: law-obedient communication with other users and non-obedient jamming against a specific (primary) user. We focus our research on constructing the optimal maxmin anti-jamming transmission strategy and an optimal strategy against a selfish malicious user. Further, employing the suggested models we demonstrate that incorporating silent modes into the anti-jamming transmission protocol, where the primary user does not transmit signals for the purpose of helping an intrusion detection system identify the source of a jamming
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages230-243
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Anti-jamming strategies: a stochastic game approach'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this