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About one multistage non-antagonistic network game. / Bulgakova, M. A.; Petrosyan, L. A.

In: Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya, Vol. 15, No. 4, 01.01.2019, p. 603-615.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Bulgakova, MA & Petrosyan, LA 2019, 'About one multistage non-antagonistic network game', Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 603-615. https://doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.415

APA

Bulgakova, M. A., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2019). About one multistage non-antagonistic network game. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya, 15(4), 603-615. https://doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.415

Vancouver

Bulgakova MA, Petrosyan LA. About one multistage non-antagonistic network game. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya. 2019 Jan 1;15(4):603-615. https://doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.415

Author

Bulgakova, M. A. ; Petrosyan, L. A. / About one multistage non-antagonistic network game. In: Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Prikladnaya Matematika, Informatika, Protsessy Upravleniya. 2019 ; Vol. 15, No. 4. pp. 603-615.

BibTeX

@article{f0fca3beea2442cfb8a8fafd878ce763,
title = "About one multistage non-antagonistic network game",
abstract = "In the paper, a multi-step non-antagonistic game is considered. The game has a finite number of stages, at the first stage a network is formed by simultaneously choosing communication vectors, and at the next, there are simultaneous non-antagonistic games, the payoffs in which depend on the controls chosen in the previous stage, as well as the behavior in the current stage. Players, at all stages except the first, have the opportunity to modify the network by removing any of their connections. A characteristic function is constructed for the model in a new way based on the calculation of optimal controls. For the case of a one-stage subgame, the supermodularity of the characteristic function is proved. As a solution, the Shapley value is considered, a simplification of the formula for calculating the components of the Shapley value for this characteristic function is given. Also, as a solution, a subset of the core (PRD-core) is considered. Strong dynamic stability has been proved for it. Work is illustrated by an example.",
keywords = "Characteristic function, Multistage games, PRD-core, Shapley value, Strongly time consistency, Supermodular function",
author = "Bulgakova, {M. A.} and Petrosyan, {L. A.}",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.415",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "603--615",
journal = " ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ",
issn = "1811-9905",
publisher = "Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - About one multistage non-antagonistic network game

AU - Bulgakova, M. A.

AU - Petrosyan, L. A.

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - In the paper, a multi-step non-antagonistic game is considered. The game has a finite number of stages, at the first stage a network is formed by simultaneously choosing communication vectors, and at the next, there are simultaneous non-antagonistic games, the payoffs in which depend on the controls chosen in the previous stage, as well as the behavior in the current stage. Players, at all stages except the first, have the opportunity to modify the network by removing any of their connections. A characteristic function is constructed for the model in a new way based on the calculation of optimal controls. For the case of a one-stage subgame, the supermodularity of the characteristic function is proved. As a solution, the Shapley value is considered, a simplification of the formula for calculating the components of the Shapley value for this characteristic function is given. Also, as a solution, a subset of the core (PRD-core) is considered. Strong dynamic stability has been proved for it. Work is illustrated by an example.

AB - In the paper, a multi-step non-antagonistic game is considered. The game has a finite number of stages, at the first stage a network is formed by simultaneously choosing communication vectors, and at the next, there are simultaneous non-antagonistic games, the payoffs in which depend on the controls chosen in the previous stage, as well as the behavior in the current stage. Players, at all stages except the first, have the opportunity to modify the network by removing any of their connections. A characteristic function is constructed for the model in a new way based on the calculation of optimal controls. For the case of a one-stage subgame, the supermodularity of the characteristic function is proved. As a solution, the Shapley value is considered, a simplification of the formula for calculating the components of the Shapley value for this characteristic function is given. Also, as a solution, a subset of the core (PRD-core) is considered. Strong dynamic stability has been proved for it. Work is illustrated by an example.

KW - Characteristic function

KW - Multistage games

KW - PRD-core

KW - Shapley value

KW - Strongly time consistency

KW - Supermodular function

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85082080762&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.415

DO - 10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.415

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85082080762

VL - 15

SP - 603

EP - 615

JO - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

JF - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

SN - 1811-9905

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 53305472