A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration

Grigory Pishchulov, Knut Richter, Sougand Golesorkhi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingArticle in an anthology

Abstract

Most of the supply chain coordination models assume either independent firms engaging in a supply chain relationship or a vertically integrated supply chain structure with a common ownership. At the same time, management and organisation studies literature points to the existence of governance forms which involve shared ownership between the business partners — in particular, such forms where one supply chain member owns an equity share in the other. These governance forms can be described by the term partial vertical integration; to our best knowledge, they received little attention from the supply chain research. Literature suggests that a partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems within a supply chain — in particular, by aligning firms’ incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition in the present work by studying a stylized model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. Assuming informat
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationModelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse
PublisherVerlag Dr. Kovač
Pages117–137
ISBN (Print)978-3-8300-9229-2
StatePublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this