TY - JOUR

T1 - A multistage supergame of downstream pollution

AU - Petrosjan, Leon A.

AU - Zaccour, Georges

PY - 1996/12/1

Y1 - 1996/12/1

N2 - We consider two neighbouring regions whose pollution emissions damage their common environment. Mathematically the problem is formulated as a multi-stage supergame. At each stage, the players decide to cooperate or not during the time interval separating two successive stages. On this time interval, a non zero-sum game is defined. Under a cooperative regime, the players agree to apply the Nash bargaining solution. If a non cooperative regime prevails, the players get the Nash equilibrium outcomes. The structure of the optimal behaviour in the supergame is fully characterised, and time consistency of the solution investigated.

AB - We consider two neighbouring regions whose pollution emissions damage their common environment. Mathematically the problem is formulated as a multi-stage supergame. At each stage, the players decide to cooperate or not during the time interval separating two successive stages. On this time interval, a non zero-sum game is defined. Under a cooperative regime, the players agree to apply the Nash bargaining solution. If a non cooperative regime prevails, the players get the Nash equilibrium outcomes. The structure of the optimal behaviour in the supergame is fully characterised, and time consistency of the solution investigated.

KW - Environment

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Supergame

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0030419280&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

VL - 31

SP - 833

EP - 837

JO - Computers and Industrial Engineering

JF - Computers and Industrial Engineering

SN - 0360-8352

IS - 3-4

ER -