The main goal of this study is to identify policy implications for investment cooperation between Korea and Russia in the 4th presidential period of Putin and to seek ways to increase mutual investment. In particular, case studies were conducted of various investment cooperation projects by Russia with other countries during the 4th Industrial Revolution, aiming to suggest a more practical way to increase Korean investment in Russia. Chapter 2 focuses on the main characteristics of Russia’s investment environment and overseas investment patterns during Putin’s 3rd (2012‒18) and 4th (2018‒) presidential period. The foreign direct investment to Russia decreased starting from the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (50.5 billion dollars in 2012, 69.2 billion dollars in 2013 to 6.8 billion dollars in 2015). When analyzing the same period by region, European countries are still top-investing countries, although the size of their investments decreased year by year. Other countries except for Europe have similar patterns. Russia’s overseas direct investment also declined after the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and in 2018, when Putin’s 4th presidential period started. Eventually, the total amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) decreased due to economic sanctions against Russia, low international raw material prices, and changes in the ruble value. However, when analyzing the investment trend by country, except for some Europe countries, the investment volume was maintained at a similar level. Chapter 3 examines the recent trends and main characteristics of Korea’s foreign direct investment, and Korea’s direct investment to Russia. Over the past five years, Korea’s foreign direct investment has increased the proportion of M&A and SMEs, market entry via third countries, SMEs’ export promotion and low-wage investment, and the proportion of finance and insurance. Direct investment to major emerging countries also showed similar trends. In the case of Russia, it proved difficult to obtain meaningful results due to the absolute reduction in investment size, but the share of investments for entering the market expanded. However, considering that the proportion of SMEs has slightly decreased, and the proportion of SMEs remains low among the major emerging countries, it will be necessary to advance the industrial ecosystem of existing manufacturing industries and create new markets in the fields of innovation and domestic distribution, consumer goods and services, in order to overcome the stagnation of Korean investment to Russia. SMEs must play a stronger role in this process. In Chapter 4 we conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of Korea’s FDI with Russia, determining why Korea’s FDI with Russia has been relatively poor and offering policy suggestions to improve the situation. According to the main results, in addition to economic variables, cultural and institutional variables acted as important determinants in Korea’s FDI to Russia during the analyzing period (2000-20). In addition, from an aggregate perspective, the negative impact of economic sanctions against Russia on Korea’s total FDI to Russia was less than expected. Also, the factors that determine FDI were very different depending on the investment motive, the type of business, and the size of the investment company. Based on these points, the following implications can be made. First, it is necessary to improve cultural and institutional conditions. Second, as the economic sanctions against Russia are likely to be prolonged, it is important to find ways to cooperate under these conditions. At the same time, it is necessary to identify more fundamental ways to expand FDI to Russia. Chapter 5 proposes policy implications for investment cooperation between Korea and Russia in the 4th presidential period of Putin, and suggests measures to revitalize investment focusing on high value-added industries. Korean investment in Russia is focused on automobiles, home appliances, and food (consumer goods). However, the biggest sector within Russia for investment by European and other foreign companies is natural resources such as energy and metals. To sum up, Korea and Russia have the potential to increase investment cooperation in the future. First, cooperation should be expanded in investment fields (energy, logistics, telecommunications, etc.) that Russian and foreign companies are traditionally interested in. Second, it will be necessary to cooperate in the emerging innovative industries. Third, active cooperation plans must be formulated in the strategic industries where Russia has global competitiveness. Fourth, it is necessary to allow management of the Export-Import Bank of Korea investment support program fund by investment rather than loans. Fifth, joint investment should be considered by Korea and Russia for entry into third-country markets. And sixth, it will be necessary to seek ways to bypass Western economic sanctions against Russia. The solution may be different for each individual investment and economic negotiation issue. Therefore, a permanent advisory body for support will be needed.
|Translated title of the contribution||Планы развития инвестиционного сотрудничества между Кореей и Россией в период четвертого срока президентства Путина с упором на отрасли с высокой добавленной стоимостью|
|Publisher||Korea Institute for International Economic Policy|
|Number of pages||200|
|State||Published - 31 Aug 2021|